Grounding the right to life in essential "natural" capacities rather than accidental "developed" capacities is said to have several advantages. As developed capacities are on a continuum, admitting of greater and lesser degrees—some, for example, are more rational and self-conscious than others—therefore: (1) the "developed capacities" view must "arbitrarily" select some particular degree of development as the cut-off point for the right to life—whereas the "natural capacities" view is non-arbitrary; (2) those whose capacities are "more" developed would have "more" of a right to life on the 'developed capacities' view—whereas the "natural capacities" view entails we all have an "equal" right to life; and (3) the continuum of developed capacities makes the exact point at which personhood ensues vague, and human beings around that point, say between one and two years of age, will have a shadowy or indeterminate moral status—whereas there is no such indeterminacy on the "natural capacities" view.