Lloyd Clark wrote, "On the battlefield, Epsom ended, rather ignominiously, in a sort of draw" and that judging the effects of Operation Epsom is hampered by disagreement about Montgomery's intent. In written orders Montgomery required an advance across the Orne River and the capture of high ground south of Caen, which was prevented by the defenders. Clark wrote that there were implicit objectives with strategic implications, more important than the capture of ground. In 1971, Stephen Ambrose wrote of Epsom veering off-course from the plan and D'Este that Epsom was "an operation of immense intentions which were not attained", calling it a "dismal failure". In 2004, Simon Trew and Stephen Badsey wrote of the British "failure" that it "... took most of six Panzer Divisions to stop Epsom short of its final objectives..." and Michael Reynolds in 2002 wrote that without the commitment of the six divisions, it was highly likely that the British offensive would have achieved its goals. Ian Daglish in 2007 wrote that while the original concept of Epsom had failed, the offensive was a strategic success. By withdrawing the 11th Armoured Division across the Odon and then into reserve, the Second Army had re-created the threat of an offensive near Caen. By the end of June, all German armoured forces in Normandy were concentrated on the Second Army front.