The leader wants to choose formula_8 to maximise its payoff formula_52. However, in equilibrium, it knows the follower will choose formula_6 as above. So in fact the leader wants to maximise its payoff formula_54 (by substituting formula_6 for the follower's best response function). By differentiation, the maximum payoff is given by formula_56. Feeding this into the follower's best response function yields formula_57. Suppose marginal costs were equal for the firms (so the leader has no market advantage other than first move) and in particular formula_58. The leader would produce 2000 and the follower would produce 1000. This would give the leader a profit (payoff) of two million and the follower a profit of one million. Simply by moving first, the leader has accrued twice the profit of the follower. However, Cournot profits here are 1.78 million apiece (strictly, formula_59 apiece), so the leader has not gained much, but the follower has lost. However, this is example-specific. There may be cases where a Stackelberg leader has huge gains beyond Cournot profit that approach monopoly profits (for example, if the leader also had a large cost structure advantage, perhaps due to a better production function). There may also be cases where the follower actually enjoys higher profits than the leader, but only because it, say, has much lower costs. This behaviour consistently work on duopoly markets even if the firms are asymmetrical.