Nonetheless, a subsequent study by UMass Amherst indicated that the Navy's charts did not contain the latest data relevant to the crash site because the geographical area was not a priority for the Defense Mapping Agency. Moreover, a subsequent report "found that the (submarine's parent) squadron and the group could have done more to prepare the ship for sea." Specifically, it determined that the submarine's squadron "did not take adequate action to correct previously identified deficiencies in open ocean navigation onboard SFO," and did not provide adequate oversight of "San Francisco"s navigation performance. Additionally, "The report also notes the document known as a 'Subnote' from the Group, which laid out a path and average speed, was delivered to the ship two-and-a-half days before "San Francisco" sailed, and the Group's own requirements are that it be to the ship three to five days before sailing." Ultimate responsibility for navigational safety rests with the ship's captain and crew, not the Subnote; however, "The report found that the Subnote did route the "San Francisco" through the area where it hit the seamount."