On June 1, 1947, the political commissar of the communist 2nd Column, Wang Enmao wrote in his diary that the 22nd Regiment of the 8th Cavalry Brigade of the nationalist Reorganized 82nd Division was ill-equipped in comparison to other nationalist units and lacked heavy weaponry. However, these nationalist troops were extremely tough and very combat capable. Once their unit was defeated, they could still fight on individually and launch counterattacks, and refused to lay down their arms. Unlike other nationalist units which often ignored the plea of their comrades-in-arms for reinforcement, the forces of the Ma clique in Qinghai not only would reinforce their comrades-in-arms for sure, but they would reinforce their comrades-in-arms multiple times. The communists had gravely underestimated their nationalist opponents in this campaign. The political commissar in his diary concluded that under no circumstance should the enemy be underestimated. The second realization was that the main enemy's position must be taken for the battle to conclude, otherwise, the defenders could launch counterattacks and driven the attackers from the city. The third point was there must be reserves. The fourth was the effectiveness of the artillery bombardment, but one could not solely depend on artillery bombardment, and the fifth point was the need to be always prepared for the enemy's counterattacks. Peng Dehuai instructed the communist 2nd Column to rest of ten days and to use the time to find the mistakes that caused the defeat. Wang Zhen admitted that since he had joined the communist revolution, he fought several hundred battles and there were both victories and defeats, but none of them as bad as in this campaign. Peng Dehuai concluded in late October, 1947 on a conference included commanders of battalion level and above that the main reason of the communist defeat was underestimating the enemy, claiming that branching out in three fronts to attack Ma clique in both Qinghai and Ningxia was a blunder. In his work titled "Combat Evaluations in Shaanxi for the Past Nine Months", Peng Dehuai further admitted that launching another new campaign just thirteen days after the end of Panlong Campaign was also a blunder in that the communists troops were exhausted and had not had the time needed to rest and regroup.