Writing in the journal "Ratio", philosopher István Aranyosi, while noting that "tension between the idea of states being both actual and probable is taken as the chief weakness of the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics," summarizes that most of the critical commentary of David Lewis' immortality argument has revolved around its premises. But even if, for the sake of argument, one were willing to entirely accept Lewis' assumptions, Aranyosi strongly denies that the "terrifying corollary" would be the correct implication of said premises. Instead, the two scenarios that would most likely follow would be what Aranyosi describes as the "Comforting Corollary," in which an observer should never expect to get very sick in the first place, or the "Momentary Life" picture, in which an observer should expect "eternal life, spent almost entirely in an unconscious state," punctuated by extremely brief, amnesiac moments of consciousness. Thus, Aranyosi concludes that while "[we can’t assess whether one or the other the two alternative scenarios gets the lion’s share of the total intensity associated with branches compatible with self-awareness, [...] we can be sure that they together (i.e. their disjunction) do indeed get the lion’s share, which is much reassuring."