Hezbollah's rocket force is a strategic, not tactical weapon, intended not to achieve battlefield effects but to harm Israel's sense of security and quality-of-life. The main impact is not the physical destruction but the way that rocket fire affect the lives of Israel's population and cause people to flee northern Israel. As one observer dryly noted in the 1990s, "When a Katyusha falls on somebody's house, it is hard to tell them this is going well." In this sense, it functions as a deterrent, and is Hezbollah's main means of leveraging a favorable outcome to a war against Israel. In 2009, Hezbollah could probably sustain heavy rocket fire onto Israel for at least two months. Hezbollah's rocket strategy of using rockets against Israel is broadly similar to Hamas's strategy. Hezbollah's rocket arsenal is of higher quality and quantity than Hamas, and Hezbollah's daily rate of fire is about four times higher. Hezbollah's rocket stock grew tenfold between 2006 and 2015. In a future war with Israel, estimates for the number of rockets fired per day range from 500 to over 1000, with a higher opening blow in the initial stages of the conflict. Estimates of Hezbollah's overall number of rockets vary, but high end estimates are around 150,000 thousand rockets. In 2002, the party had about 8,000 to 9,000 rockets, and in 2006, Western intelligence sources believed Hezbollah had about 12,000 rockets, a number also claimed by Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. Hezbollah had about 12-13,000 rockets on the eve of the 2006 war, of which 11,000 were supplied via Iran and about 100 were from the medium-range Fajr series. In 2008, Israeli Defense Intelligence said that about 20,000 rockets were stationed south of the Litani River. In 2018, the deputy defense minister, Eliyahu Ben Dahan, estimated the organization had more than 120,000 missiles.