Kallis wrote the Sudetenland dispute was a pretext for a war to destroy Czechoslovakia as the Czechoslovak government treated the German minority in the Sudetenland far better than the Italian government treated the German minority in South Tyrol. When Hitler finally did turn his attention to South Tyrol in 1939, he signed the South Tyrol Option Agreement with Mussolini calling for the German-speakers of South Tyrol to either move to Germany or be Italanized. For Hitler, an alliance with Fascist Italy outweighed any concern with the persecuted German community of South Tyrol. As the countdown for a war scheduled to begin on 1 October continued, Henlein's grew more anxious and desperate as it dawned on him that his beloved Sudetenland was going to be turned into a war zone, a prospect that caused him to sink into depression. The decisive moment in the crisis occurred on 27 September 1938 when Hitler decided not to go to war after all, citing the unenthusiastic response of the people of Berlin to a huge military parade he had ordered, saying he could not go to war with the German people not behind him. On 28 September 1938, Hitler told the French ambassador, André François-Poncet that he was willing to attend a conference in Munich to discuss a peaceful solution to the crisis with Mussolini to serve as a mediator. The Munich Agreement of 30 September 1938 ended the crisis and stated the Sudetenland was to "go home to the "Reich"" peacefully over a ten-day period in October 1938. Hitler saw the Munich Agreement as a diplomatic defeat as it "cheated" him out the war he was planning to start the next day, but Henlein was greatly relieved that his beloved Sudetenland escaped the horrors of war.