Oil and its byproducts, especially high-octane aviation gasoline, would prove to be a driving concern for how Germany conducted the war. As a result of the lessons of World War I, Germany had stockpiled oil and gasoline for its blitzkrieg offensive and had annexed Austria, adding 18,000 barrels per day of oil production, but this was not sufficient to sustain the planned conquest of Europe. Because captured supplies and oil fields would be necessary to fuel the campaign, the German high command created a special squad of oil-field experts drawn from the ranks of domestic oil industries. They were sent in to put out oil-field fires and get production going again as soon as possible. But capturing oil fields remained an obstacle throughout the war. During the Invasion of Poland, German estimates of gasoline consumption turned out to be vastly underestimated. Heinz Guderian and his Panzer divisions consumed nearly of gasoline on the drive to Vienna. When they were engaged in combat across open country, gasoline consumption almost doubled. On the second day of battle, a unit of the XIX Corps was forced to halt when it ran out of gasoline. One of the major objectives of the Polish invasion was their oil fields but the Soviets invaded and captured 70 percent of the Polish production before the Germans could reach it. Through the German-Soviet Commercial Agreement (1940), Stalin agreed in vague terms to supply Germany with additional oil equal to that produced by now Soviet-occupied Polish oil fields at Drohobych and Boryslav in exchange for hard coal and steel tubing.