The "Report to the Minister for Defence on the Collins class submarine and related matters" (commonly referred to as the "McIntosh-Prescott Report") was compiled in ten weeks, and released on 1 June 1999. This report concluded that the "Collins" class was incapable of performing at the required level for military operations. Although the report highlighted several elements of the submarine design that performed to or beyond expectations, and acknowledged that many of the publicised problems had been or were in the process of being fixed, it presented the propulsion system, combat system, and excessive noise as ongoing problems across the class. After identifying the combat system as the central problem, McIntosh and Prescott recommended that it be scrapped entirely and replaced with a system based on commercially available equipment and software. They also claimed that these problems were caused by poor design and manufacture; inappropriate design requirements; deficiencies in the structure of the contract, particularly with regards to modifying the contract to meet changing requirements; and problems between the various parties involved in the construction of the submarines, with a lack of overall direction and conflicts of interest causing avoidable hostility and uncooperativeness. Despite the report being promoted by the government as 'ground-breaking', many people involved with the "Collins"-class project later claimed that large sections of the report could have been copied from reports previously submitted by the RAN or ASC.