When front-line garrisons and their supports were unable to hold or recapture the front-line, they were to defend positions even if surrounded, to give time for a counter-attack by reserve divisions. When an immediate counter-attack () from behind the defensive position was not possible, a deliberate counter-attack () was to be planned over several days. Two schools of thought emerged over the winter; the principal authors of the new training manual, Colonel Max Bauer and Captain Hermann Geyer of the General Staff, wanting front garrisons to have discretion to move forwards, sideways and to retire. General von Hoen and Colonel Fritz von Lossberg the 1st Army Chief of Staff issued a memorandum, (Experience of the German 1st Army in the Somme Battles) on 30 January 1917. The document advocated the rigid holding of the front line by its garrison, to keep the defence organised under the control of battalion commanders. Lossberg and Hoen doubted that relief divisions could arrive quickly enough to counter-attack before Allied infantry had consolidated. They predicted that (relief divisions) would not be ready in time for hasty counter-attacks to succeed and that they should make planned counter-attacks after with full artillery support. Both theories were incorporated by Ludendorff into the new (Training Manual for Foot troops in War) of March 1917. Training schools were established to prepare German commanders and courses began in February 1917.