Hitler's plans for "Fall Grun" (Case Green), scheduled for 1 October 1938 was sabotaged by Britain, who took Hitler's stated claim that all he wanted was the Sudetenland at face value, and did not realize the Sudetenland issue was a pretext for a war against Czechoslovakia. The Greek historian Aristotle Kallis wrote: "The problem Hitler was that the British government took the irredentist alibi of Nazi expansionism quite seriously, eager to make concessions on these lines, without realising no territorial offer on "ethnic" grounds would ever satisfy the "geographical" prerequisites of the fascist 'new order'. The final, if ephemeral, solution, namely the cession of the Sudetenland to the "Reich", was authorised on the grounds of the overwhelmingly German character of the population and region". In this regard, Kallis noted that Hitler's plans always called for the conquest of all of Czechoslovakia, not just the Sudetenland. The fact that Britain kept pressuring Czechoslovakia in September 1938 to make concessions sabotaged Hitler's plan for a war, which were based on the assumption that the Castle would not make concessions on the Sudetenland issue, thus allowing Hitler to present himself as being "forced" to invade Czechoslovakia. Kallis wrote that the bogus nature of Hitler's claim that he was only concerned about the treatment of ethnic Germans in the Sudetenland can be seen in that until 1939 he completely ignored the subject of the South Tyrol region of Italy, whose ethnic German population were treated far worse than the Sudetenlanders were. Kallis wrote that if Hitler was really concerned about the treatment of ethnic German minorities in other nations, he would never had allied himself with Benito Mussolini as Fascist Italy had the worse record in regards to treating its German minority in Europe, as the Italian government tried very hard to stamp out the use of the German language in South Tyrol.