At the deliberations of the Congress of Vienna in 1814 and 1815, Frederick Augustus' position was doomed by his country's difficult geographic position, the changing fortunes of war, a lack of assistance from Austria, and his own vacillatiions. The Prussian-Russian alliance had never had honorable intentions in bringing Saxony into the anti-Napoleon alliance in the first place. Even before Prussia declared war on France on 17 March 1813, it had agreed to an alliance with Russia to the detriment of Saxony and Poland at Kalisz on 22 February: the Duchy of Poland would predominantly come under Russian rule, whereas Prussia would be compensated for relinquished Polish territories with the annexation of Saxon territory. Prussia's appetite for the economically and culturally more developed territories of Saxony originated in the old dream of annexation that Frederick II had developed in his political testament of 1752 and had already tried to realize in the Seven Years' War. It did not originate from any necessity to overcome Napoleonic rule in central Europe.