The operational aspects were devised by Peltz. He remarked to Göring that he would need any aircraft capable of carrying a bomb. By December 1943, Peltz assembled 695 operational aircraft before the offensive. 467 were bomber aircraft, 337 of them operational. On 20 January 1944 this increased further to 524, with 462 combat ready. Peltz was subordinated to Göring directly, bypassing Sperrle, who Hitler and Göring regarded as sybarite by this stage. The feeble offensive was mocked by the British, and Peltz' forces incurred a 10 percent loss rate per sortie, for little military gain. 329 bombers were lost. The offensive wasted the last German bomber reserves. The losses were a blow to Sperrle. He had wanted to use his bomber forces to attack the invasion forces during the night; both at the landing grounds and the embarkation points in England. Hitler and Göring rejected this strategy as "too passive".