In the majority of cases, it is impossible for agents to seek specific authority for every deal or detail within a deal. Agents must, of necessity, be allowed some degree of discretion in the conduct of routine transactions. But, for the purposes of ascribing legal responsibility to the Principal, when the Agent acts with actual or apparent authority, all the Agent's knowledge will be imputed to the Principal. If Principals were allowed to hide behind their agents' own ignorance, mistakes or failures to communicate, a Principal could, by using an Agent, achieve a better result than if they acted personally. For example, if the particular deal turned out well, the Principal could adopt the transaction. But, if it turned out badly, the Principal could disavow it. Indeed, if not for imputation, there would be a perverse incentive to conduct business through Agents rather than personally. Consequently, the Principal cannot exploit ignorance to their advantage by instructing the Agent to withhold key information or by appointing an Agent known to be secretive.