The "Anstoss" thus provides the essential impetus that first posits in motion the entire complex train of activities that finally result in our conscious experience both of ourselves and others as empirical individuals and of the world around us. Although "Anstoss" plays a similar role as the thing in itself does in Kantian philosophy, unlike Kant, Fichte's "Anstoss" is not something foreign to the I. Instead, it denotes the original encounter of the I with its own finitude. Rather than claim that the not-I ("das Nicht-Ich") is the cause or ground of the "Anstoss", Fichte argues that not-I is posited by the I in order to explain to itself the "Anstoss" in order to become conscious of "Anstoss". The "Wissenschaftslehre" demonstrates that "Anstoss" must occur if self-consciousness is to come about but is unable to explain the actual occurrence of "Anstoss". There are limits to what can be expected from an a priori deduction of experience, and this, for Fichte, equally applies to Kant's transcendental philosophy. According to Fichte, transcendental philosophy can explain that the world must have space, time, and causality, but it can never explain why objects have the particular sensible properties they happen to have or why I am this determinate individual rather than another. This is something that the I simply has to discover at the same time that it discovers its own freedom, and indeed, is a condition for the latter.