"At the same time, those workers who managed to obtain insurance might experience more unemployment otherwise would have been the case." The private insurance company would have to determine whether the employee is unemployed through no fault of their own, which is difficult to determine. Incorrect determinations could result in the payout of significant amounts for fraudulent claims or alternately failure to pay legitimate claims. This leads to the rationale that if government could solve either problem that government intervention would increase efficiency. The moral hazard argument against unemployment insurance is based on the idea that such insurance would increase the risk, or 'hazard,' that the insured worker would engage in activity that is undesirable, or 'immoral,' from the insurer's point of view. That is, unemployment insurance could create longer or more frequent episodes of unemployment than would otherwise occur. This could occur if workers partially cushioned against periods of unemployment are more likely to accept jobs that have a higher risk of unemployment, or spend more time searching for a new job after becoming unemployed.