At the Battle of Kasserine Pass in February 1943, the first major battle between the Americans and Germans during World War II, elements of the 1st Armored Division were sent reeling back by a series of sudden enemy offensive thrusts. The dispersal of the 1st Armored Division into separate combat commands across the front by British Lieutenant General Kenneth Anderson, commanding the British First Army, with the connivance of Ward's immediate superior, Major General Lloyd Fredendall, the U.S. II Corps commander, had angered Ward from the start, as it greatly weakened the division's ability to repulse concentrations of German armor and to shift his forces in response to enemy thrusts (Fredendall was later relieved of command and replaced by Major General George S. Patton). However, Ward also bore responsibility for his failure to consult British tank commanders on German panzer tactics and to disseminate that information to his subordinate commanders . As a consequence, elements of the 1st Armored Division at Faïd fell victim to one of "Generalfeldmarschall" Erwin Rommel's familiar tactics when they pursued German tanks feigning retirement into a screen of 88 mm high-velocity German anti-tank guns, resulting in large American armor losses.