One type of explanation at the level of assertion exploits the view that assertion implies or expresses belief in some way so that if someone asserts that "p" they imply or express the belief that "p". Several versions of this view exploit elements of speech act theory, which can be distinguished according to the particular explanation given of the link between assertion and belief. Whatever version of this view is preferred, whether cast in terms of the Gricean intentions (see Paul Grice) or in terms of the structure of Searlean illocutionary acts (see speech act), it does not obviously apply to explaining the absurdity of the commissive version of Moore's paradox. To take one version of this type of explanation, if someone asserts "p" and conjoins it with the assertion (or denial) that he does not believe that "p", then he has in that very act contradicted himself, for in effect what the speaker says is: I believe that "p" and I do not believe that "p". The absurdity of asserting p" & I do not believe that "p is thus revealed as being of a more familiar kind. Depending on one's view of the nature of contradiction, one might thus interpret a speaker of the omissive Moorean sentence as asserting everything (that is, asserting "too" much) or asserting nothing (that is, not asserting "enough").