While the Fannie Mae pilot program described above sought to expand housing opportunities for under-served consumers, these loans did not result in major losses and performed significantly better than private label subprime loans. Phil Angelides, the Chair of the FCIC commented that ". . .the FCIC analyzed the performance of roughly 25 million mortgages outstanding at the end of each year from 2006 to 2009, and found that delinquency rates for the loans that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac purchased or guaranteed were substantially lower than for mortgages securitized by other financial firms. This holds true even for loans to borrowers with similar credit scores or down payments. For example, data compiled by the FCIC for a subset of borrowers with scores below 660 shows that by the end of 2008, far fewer GSE mortgages were seriously delinquent than non-GSE securitized mortgages: 6.2 percent versus 28.3 percent." Although under Raines, Fannie Mae invested in some securities backed by subprime loans, it didn't start buying subprime and Alt-A loans directly (and bundling them into securities) until 2006 after Raines had left Fannie Mae. Purchasing of subprime and alt-A mortgages expanded under the guidance of Raines's successor Daniel H. Mudd. (See also Subprime lending.)