Many private users (pension funds, banks) of ratings data now demand that ratings be from an NRSRO. Consequently, there is some debate that, by "recognizing" certain CRAs, the SEC has bestowed a competitive advantage on them. This view is supported by the vigor by which many non-NRSRO CRAs seek NRSRO recognition. On the other hand, historically, many private users of ratings data have "defaulted" to Standard & Poor's and Moody's when specifying which ratings must be used for their own purposes. (S&P and Moody's are the oldest, most widely respected, and by far the largest of the CRAs.) Accordingly, it is conceivable that the NRSRO designation has actually increased competition in the industry by providing an unintended government "seal of approval" on certain smaller CRAs (such as Fitch Ratings, DBRS, Kroll Bond Rating Agency, A.M. Best and Egan-Jones). If true, this, of course, raises the question of whether this is something the government should do, and whether the NRSRO recognition process is the best mechanism to achieve this goal.