Philosophers who favour the B-view of time tend to find McTaggart's argument against the A-series to demonstrate conclusively that tense involves a contradiction. On the other hand, philosophers who favour the A-view of time struggle to see why the argument should be considered to have any force. Two of the most commonly invoked objections are, first, that McTaggart is mistaken about the phenomenology of time; that he is claiming to see a contradiction in the appearance of time, where none is apparent. Second, that McTaggart is mistaken about the semantics of tensed discourse. The idea here is that claims like ""M" is present, has been future, and will be past" can only imply a contradiction if it is interpreted as saying that "M" is all at once future in the past, present in the present, and also past in the future. This reading, it is argued, is absurd because "has been" and "will be" indicate that we are not talking about how "M" currently "is", but instead of how "M" once was, but is no longer, and how it will be, but is not yet. Hence it is wrong to think of the expression as an attribution to "M" of futurity, presentness, and pastness, all at once (Marhenke 1935; Broad 1938; Mink 1960; Prior 1967; Christensen 1974; Lloyd 1977; Lowe 1987).