<unk>  notice; Monmouthshire, Wales, 1872 United States 1870–1929 The US has had nine<unk>  outbreaks since it was first recognized on the northeastern coast in 1870; the most devastating happened in 1914. It originated from Michigan, but its entry into the stockyards in Chicago turned it into an epizootic. About 3,500 livestock herds were infected across the US, totaling over 170,000 cattle, sheep, and swine. The eradication came at a cost of US$4.5 million (equivalent to $ million in ). A 1924 outbreak in California resulted not only in the slaughter of 109,000 farm animals, but also 22,000 deer. The US had its latest<unk>  outbreak in Montebello, California, in 1929. This outbreak originated in hogs that had eaten infected meat scraps from a tourist steamship that had stocked meat in Argentina. Over 3,600 animals were slaughtered and the<unk>  was contained in less than a<unk> . Mexico–U.S. border 1947 On December 26, 1946, the United States and Mexico jointly declared that<unk>  had been found in Mexico. Initially, proposals from Texans were for an animal-proof wall, to prevent animals from crossing the border and spreading the<unk> , but the two countries eventually managed to cooperate in a bilateral effort and eradicated the<unk>  without building a wall. To prevent tension between ranchers and the veterinarians, public broadcasts over the radio and with speakers on trucks were used to inform Mexican ranchers of why the U.S. veterinarians were working on their livestock. Any rancher who lost cattle due to it being put down by the vets would receive financial compensation. However, the tension remained and unfortunately resulted in clashes between locals and the military protected U.S. veterinarians. These teams of veterinarians worked from outside the infection zone of the<unk>  and worked their way to the heart of the epidemic. Over 60,000,000 injections were administered to livestock by the end of 1950. It was a sign that U.S.–Mexico relations were improving in the post-World War II era. United Kingdom 1967 In October 1967, a farmer in Shropshire reported a lame sow, which was later diagnosed with<unk> . The source was believed to be remains of legally imported infected lamb from Argentina and Chile. The virus spread, and in total, 442,000 animals were slaughtered and the outbreak had an estimated cost of £370 million (equivalent to £ billion in ). Taiwan 1997 Pork export from Taiwan during 1995 to 1998 shows the devastating drop. Taiwan had previous epidemics of<unk>  in 1913–14 and 1924–29, but had since been spared, and considered itself free of<unk>  as late as in the 1990s. On the 19th of March 1997, a sow at a farm in Hsinchu, Taiwan, was diagnosed with a strain of<unk>  that only infects swine. Mortality was high, nearing 100% in the infected herd. The cause of the epidemic was not determined, but the farm was near a port city known for its pig-smuggling industry and illegal slaughterhouses. Smuggled swine or contaminated meat are thus likely sources of the<unk> . The<unk>  spread rapidly among swine herds in Taiwan, with 200–300 new farms being infected daily. Causes for this include the high swine density in the area, with up to 6,500 hogs per square mile, feeding of pigs with untreated garbage, and the farms' proximity to slaughterhouses. Other systemic issues, such as lack of laboratory facilities, slow response, and initial lack of a vaccination program, contributed. A complicating factor is the endemic spread of swine vesicular<unk>  (SVD) in Taiwan. The symptoms are indistinguishable from<unk> , which may have led to previous misdiagnosing of<unk>  as SVD. Laboratory analysis was seldom used for diagnosis, and<unk>  may thus have gone unnoticed for some time. The swine depopulation was a massive undertaking, with the military contributing substantial manpower. At peak capacity, 200,000 hogs per day were disposed of, mainly by electrocution. Carcasses were disposed of by burning and burial, but burning was avoided in water resource-protection areas. In April, industrial incinerators were running around the clock to dispose of the carcasses. Initially, 40,000 combined vaccine doses for the strains O-1, A-24, and Asia-1 were available and administered to zoo animals and valuable breeding hogs. At the end of March, half a million new doses for O-1 and Asia-1 were made available. On the May 3rd, 13 million doses of O-1 vaccine arrived, and both the March and May shipments were distributed free of charge. With a danger of vaccination crews spreading the<unk> , only trained farmers were allowed to administer the vaccine under veterinary supervision. Taiwan had previously been the major exporter of pork to Japan, and among the top 15 pork producers in the world in 1996. During the outbreak, over 3.8 million swine were destroyed at a cost of US$6.9 billion (equivalent to $ billion in ). The Taiwanese pig industry was devastated as a result, and the export market was in ruins. In 2007, Taiwan was considered free of<unk> , but was still conducting a vaccination program, which restricts the export of meat from Taiwan. United Kingdom 2001 The epidemic of<unk>  in the United Kingdom in the spring and summer of 2001 was caused by the "Type O pan Asia" strain of the<unk> . This episode resulted in more than 2,000 cases of the<unk>  in farms throughout the British countryside. More than six million sheep and cattle were killed in an eventually successful attempt to halt the<unk> . The county of Cumbria was the most seriously affected area of the country, with 843 cases. By the time the<unk>  was halted in October 2001, the crisis was estimated to have cost Britain £8 billion (equivalent to £ billion in ) to the agricultural and support industries, and to the outdoor industry. What made this outbreak so serious was the amount of time between infection being present at the first outbreak locus, and when countermeasures were put into operation against the<unk> , such as transport bans and detergent washing of both vehicles and personnel entering livestock areas. The epidemic was probably caused by pigs that had been fed infected rubbish that had not been properly heat-sterilized. Further, the rubbish is believed to have contained remains of infected meat that had been illegally imported to Britain. China 2005 In April 2005, an Asia-1 strain of<unk>  appeared in the eastern provinces of Shandong and Jiangsu. During April and May, it spread to suburban Beijing, the northern province of Hebei, and the Xinjiang autonomous region in northwest China. On 13 May, China reported the<unk>  outbreak to the World Health Organization and the OIE. This was the first time China has publicly admitted to having<unk> . China is still reporting<unk>  outbreaks. In 2007, reports filed with the OIE documented new or ongoing outbreaks in the provinces of Gansu, Qinghai and Xinjiang. This included reports of domestic yak showing signs of infection.<unk>  is endemic in pastoral regions of China from Heilongjiang Province in the northeast to Sichuan Province and the Tibetan Autonomous region in the<unk> west. Chinese domestic media reports often use a euphemism<unk>  Number Five" (五号病 wǔhàobìng) rather than<unk>  in reports because of the sensitivity of the<unk>  issue. In March 2010,<unk> ern Rural News (Nanfang Nongcunbao), in an article "Breaking the Hoof and<unk><unk>  Taboo", noted that<unk>  has long been covered up in China by referring to it that way.<unk>  is also called canker (口疮, literally<unk>  ulcers" kǒuchuāng) or hoof jaundice (蹄癀 tíhuáng) in China, so information on<unk>  in China can be found online using those words as search terms. One can find online many provincial orders and regulations on<unk>  control antedating China's acknowledgment that the<unk>  existed in China, for example Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region 1991 regulation on preventing the spread of<unk>  No.5. United Kingdom 2007 An infection of<unk>  in the United Kingdom was confirmed by the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, on 3 August 2007, on farmland located in Normandy, Surrey. All livestock in the vicinity were culled on 4 August. A nationwide ban on the movement of cattle and pigs was imposed, with a 3-km (1.9-mi) protection zone placed around the outbreak sites and the nearby virus research and vaccine production establishments, together with a 10-km (6.2-mi) increased surveillance zone. On 4 August, the strain of the virus was identified as a "01 BFS67-like" virus, one linked to vaccines and not normally found in animals, and isolated in the 1967 outbreak. The same strain was used at the nearby Institute for Animal Health and Merial Animal Health Ltd at Pirbright, away, which is an American/French-owned research facility, and was identified as the likely source of infection. On 12 September, a new outbreak of the<unk>  was confirmed in Egham, Surrey, from the original outbreak, with a second case being confirmed on a nearby farm on 14 September. These outbreaks caused a cull of all at-risk animals in the area surrounding Egham, including two farms near the famous four-star hotel Great Fosters.
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