A<unk> , or a<unk>  property, is a<unk>  of mind of a person.<unk> s comprise a diverse class including perception, pain experience, belief, desire, intention, emotion, and memory. There is controversy concerning the exact definition of the term. According to epistemic approaches, the essential mark of<unk> s is that their subject has privileged epistemic access while others can only infer their existence from outward signs. Consciousness-based approaches hold that all<unk> s are either conscious themselves or stand in the right relation to conscious<unk> s. Intentionality-based approaches, on the other hand, see the power of minds to refer to objects and represent the world as the mark of the<unk> . According to functionalist approaches,<unk> s are defined in terms of their role in the causal network independent of their intrinsic properties. Some philosophers deny all the aforementioned approaches by holding that the term<unk> " refers to a cluster of loosely related ideas without an underlying unifying feature shared by all. Various overlapping classifications of<unk> s have been proposed. Important distinctions group<unk>  phenomena together according to whether they are sensory, propositional, intentional, conscious or occurrent. Sensory<unk> s involve sense-impressions like visual perceptions or bodily pains. Propositional attitudes, like beliefs and desires, are relations a subject has to a proposition. The characteristic of intentional<unk> s is that they refer to or are about objects or<unk> s of affairs. Conscious<unk> s are part of phenomenal experience while occurrent<unk> s are causally efficacious within the owner's mind, with or without consciousness. An influential classification of<unk> s is due to Franz Brentano, who argues that there are only three basic kinds: presentations, judgments, and phenomena of love and hate.<unk> s are usually contrasted with physical or material aspects. For (non-eliminative) physicalists, they are a kind of high-level property that can be understood in terms of fine-grained neural activity. Property dualists, on the other hand, claim that no such reductive explanation is possible. Eliminativists may reject the existence of<unk>  properties, or at least of those corresponding to folk psychological categories such as thought and memory.<unk> s play an important role in various fields, including philosophy of mind, epistemology and cognitive science. In psychology, the term is used not just to refer to the individual<unk> s listed above but also to a more global assessment of a person's<unk>  health.
Mental state
Physical strength
Sense of smell
Arousal
Vision
Sense of balance
Face time
Consciousness