Sancy Hope diamond. The Sancy was in the collection of Vasiliy Rudanovsky until 1828 when purchased by Prince Demidoff for £80,000. It remained in the Demidov family collection until 1865 when sold to Sir Jamsetjee Jeejeebhoy, an Indian prince, for £100,000. He sold it only a year later, creating another gap in its history. It reappeared in 1867, displayed at the Paris Exposition, carrying a price tag of one million francs; the gem then vanished again for forty years. The Sancy next surfaced in 1906 when bought by William Waldorf Astor, 1st Viscount Astor, from famous Russian collector A.K.Rudanovsky. The prominent
Multiunit auction provides an incentive for bidders to bid insincerely unless each bidder has demand for only a single unit. For multiple-unit demand, bidders have an incentive to shade their bids for units other than their first because those bids may influence the price the bidder pays. This demand reduction results in an inefficient equilibrium. A variation that preserves the incentive to bid truthfully is the Vickrey-Clark-Groves auction. In a pay-as-bid auction (or discriminatory price auction), multiple homogeneous items are sold at different prices. An example is the auction system at the Dutch Flower Auctions, where a lot is allocated to (potentially)