Suez Crisis much-watched debates about the Suez war on "Free Speech" mirrored the divided public response to the war. The British government pressured the BBC to support the war, and seriously considered taking over the network. Eden's major mistake had been not to strike in July 1956 when there was widespread anger at Nasser's nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company, as by the fall of 1956 public anger had subsided, with many people in Britain having come to accept the "fait accompli", and saw no reason for war. This was especially the case as Eden's claims that the Egyptians would hopelessly mismanage
Suez Crisis to gather intelligence from British bases in Cyprus. The British relationship with the United States did not suffer lasting consequences from the crisis. "The Anglo-American 'special relationship' was revitalised immediately after the Suez Crisis", writes Risse Kappen. The United States wanted to restore the prestige of its closest ally and thus "The two governments...engaged in almost ritualistic reassurances that their 'special relationship' would be restored quickly". One example came with Britain's first Hydrogen bomb test Operation Grapple which led to the 1958 U.S.–UK Mutual Defence Agreement. Six years after the crisis, the Americans amazed the British by selling them state-of-the-art