Cartesian Other Cartesian Other In philosophy, the Cartesian Other, part of a thought experiment, is any other than the mind of the individual thinking about the experiment. The Other includes the individual's own body. According to the philosopher Descartes, there is a divide intrinsic to consciousness, such that you cannot ever bridge the space between your own consciousness and that of another. This "other" is in essence theoretical, since one cannot ever be empirically shown such an "other." Put differently, Descartes concluded "cogito ergo sum", "I think, therefore I am," that is, that the presence of a self of which to speak
Cogito, ergo sum for thought". In other words, "the only claim that is indubitable here is the agent-independent claim that there is cognitive activity present". The objection, as presented by Georg Lichtenberg, is that rather than supposing an entity that is thinking, Descartes should have said: "thinking is occurring." That is, whatever the force of the "cogito", Descartes draws too much from it; the existence of a thinking thing, the reference of the "I," is more than the "cogito" can justify. Friedrich Nietzsche criticized the phrase in that it presupposes that there is an "I", that there is such an activity as "thinking",