CIA activities in Vietnam the next 14 years, the focus of their paramilitary operations changed over time. Until 1964, the Hmong fighters in Laos focused on trying to fight back North Vietnamese fighters and on preventing further encroachment. They were highly important, because the US hadn't begun putting troops on the ground in any great numbers, yet. After that, in 1965, the report describes the Hmong activities in Laos as "flitt[ing] over mountain trails or mov[ing] by air to occupy key high ground and to harass Hanoi's tanks and artillery," meaning that US troops took on a frontline role and asked the paramilitary forces
Joint warfare in South Vietnam, 1963–1969 Vietnam, and the 173rd Airborne Brigade for the Bien Hoa/Vũng Tàu area near Saigon. Early, CINCPAC had objected to the use of the 173rd, since it was the primary strategic reserve for Pacific Command. Westmoreland, in early June, saw the situation as close to collapse without a major commitment of ground troops, in addition to the ARVN. This triggered several weeks of intense debate among the President's close civilian advisers, with McNamara controlling all direct military input to the process. There were two drivers among the inner circle. First, some, but not all, were fervent believers in the containment doctrine,