Soviet reaction to the Polish crisis of 1980–1981 Kremlin was discontented with how leniently this suppression proceeded, and on 18 October 1981, it forced the Polish United Workers' Party to replace Kania with Jaruzelski. The latter promised to impose martial law but demanded backing his action by a promise of Warsaw Pact military intervention if he failed to control the situation. On 29 October, Jaruzelski's demands were discussed at a session of the Soviet Politburo, where Andropov confirmed the consensus that no Soviet troops would be sent to Poland. At the 14th annual meeting of the Committee of Ministers of Defense of the Warsaw Pact, which took place
Soviet reaction to the Polish crisis of 1980–1981 once again, on 13 December 1981, Jaruzelski finally proclaimed martial law. To justify the emergency measures, Jaruzelski was still playing on the public fear of Soviet invasion. However, there was no significant resistance to the martial law and any foreign military backing proved unnecessary. Ever since, Jaruzelski himself has denied that he invited Soviet troops, insisting that, on the contrary, the martial law was aimed at prevention of a Soviet military intervention. In November 1997, a conference was held in Jachranka on the Soviet role in the Polish crisis of 1980–1981, where Solidarity, Polish communist, Soviet and American participants of