title: 1999/794/EC: Commission Decision of 8 July 1999 concerning the German application for a transitional regime under Article 24 of Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity (notified under document number C(1999) 1551/4) (Only the German text is authentic)

eurovoc_concepts:
Germany
approximation of laws
electrical energy
single market
transitional period (EU)

text: L 319/18 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 11. 12. 1999 COMMISSION DECISION of 8 July 1999 concerning the German application for a transitional regime under Article 24 of Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity (notified under document number C(1999) 1551/4) (Only the German text is authentic) (1999/794/EC) Having application, informed Whereas: 1. Procedure THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, the European Having regard to Directive 96/92/EC of Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 1996 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity (hereinafter (cid:145)the Directive(cid:146)) (1), and in particular Article 24 thereof, the Member States of the German zur Neuregelung des Energiewirtschaftsrechts(cid:146), which was published in the Bundesgesetzblatt on 28 April 1998 (2) and entered into force on the following day. in Bonn. The Ministry confirmed that (4) On 14 July 1998, Commission representatives undertook a fact-finding mission to the Bundesministerium f(cid:252)r Wirtschaft it regarded the application of 12 February 1998 as final and that, apart from the protection clause for lignite contained in the application, there were no other transitional regimes for which the Government would envisage support or aid schemes. The Commission the requested development of the lignite sector in the new L(cid:228)nder as well as on the contractual situation between the parties concerned, which is the basis of the commitments in accordance with Article 24(1) of the Directive. information concerning additional I. FACTS (5) By letter of 11 September 1998, the Ministry submitted this additional information. (1) By letter of 30 July 1997, the German Bundesministerium f(cid:252)r Wirtschaft (Ministry of Economic Affairs) asked the Commission to comment on, among other issues, the introduction into the German (cid:145)Gesetz zur Neuregelung a des protection clause for lignite-based electricity production. Energiewirtschaftsrechts(cid:146) (Energy Act), of (6) Additionally, in and agreement with the the Bundesministerium f(cid:252)r Wirtschaft, there was direct contact between the Commission and the company primarily concerned, Vereinigte Energiewerke AG (VEAG). VEAG set out its position in a letter to the Commission dated 28 January 1999. On 12 February 1999, a meeting between VEAG and the Commission took place in Brussels. By fax of 23 March 1999, VEAG submitted a report accountants evaluating the need for the lignite protection clause. from chartered commissioned (2) By letter of 22 September 1997, the Commission replied that a protection clause including a possible refusal of system access would be a derogation from the access right under the terms of Article 17 of the Directive and the could not Directive, but would need to be in accordance with the procedure set out in Article 24 of the Directive (transitional regime). therefore be based on Article 8(4) of applied for (3) By letter of 12 February 1998, the German Ministry of Economic Affairs applied for a transitional regime in accordance with Article 24 of the Directive in relation to the provisions of Article 4(3) (new L(cid:228)nder) of the (cid:145)Gesetz 2. Structure and development of the electricity sector in the new L(cid:228)nder (7) Electricity transmission in the new L(cid:228)nder is carried out by VEAG. VEAG is also the largest electricity producer in the new L(cid:228)nder, accounting for approximately 60 % of total electricity production. VEAG produces 92 % of its electricity generation on the basis of lignite. Electricity distribution is organised by 15 regional distribution companies (in which VEAG or its shareholders often (1) OJ L 27, 30. 1. 1997, p. 20. (2) BGBl. I, p. 730. 11. 12. 1999 EN Official Journal of the European Communities L 319/19 own shares). In addition, several municipalities own local electricity distribution companies, which also own generating facilities. Thus the structure of the electricity network in the new L(cid:228)nder consists of up to three levels, as in other parts of Germany: (1) VEAG’s high-voltage companies’ grid; medium-voltage grids; the municipal distribution companies’ low-voltage or medium-voltage grids. regional (3) distribution the (2) (8) on the and and one trust (power (Government the (cid:145)Stromvertrag(cid:146) then German Democratic Republic In the period between the German economic and monetary union (1 July 1990) and political reunification (3 October 1990), supply contract) was concluded on 22 August 1990 between the the Treuhandanstalt for privatising East German property established by an Act of 17 June 1990) Bayernwerk AG, side PreussenElektra AG and RWE Energie AG on the other). the electricity The contract sets out following reunification. sector It provides for the sale of former East German power plants and transmission lines to VEAG, a joint venture company founded on 12 December 1990 by the Treuhandanstalt. VEAG was 75 % owned by the three largest West German electricity companies, RWE Energie AG (26,25 %), and Bayernwerk AG (22,5 %). The remaining 25 % was held by four other German transmission system operators via the holding company EBH GmbH. PreussenElektra AG (26,25 %) in the new L(cid:228)nder the structure of the (9) As an integral part of the purchase agreement with the Treuhandanstalt, VEAG (or more precisely in 1990 its three main subsequent shareholders) committed itself to maintaining lignite-based electricity generation and to investing large amounts in modernising existing plants and bringing them into line with higher environmental standards. These commitments by VEAG were confirmed in a parallel contract concluded on 27 August 1990 between AG, PreussenElektra AG and RWE Energie AG (shareholders in VEAG) and the regional electricity companies. This contract was subsequently confirmed in a series of 20-year bilateral contracts between VEAG and the regional electricity companies. These contracts require their the regional distributors electricity consumption (i. e. the electricity sold by them) over 20 years from VEAG at a price based on full costs, with the distributors passing on any resulting higher costs to final customers. to purchase 70 % of consortium of Bayernwerk 3. Development of the lignite mining sector (10) In 1997, VEAG produced 46,6 TWh of electricity from lignite, which accounts for approximately 60 % of the total of 77,5 TWh of electricity produced in the new L(cid:228)nder. The remaining 40 % is generated via municipal by generators, independent power producers (IPP). Lignite output in 1997 was 73,8 million tonnes, of which VEAG autoproduction generation and purchased 54,3 million for electricity production. Before reunification in 1989, East German lignite mines produced 300 million tonnes. Since then, output capacity has been gradually reduced to the current level. (11) (12) Lignite mining in the new L(cid:228)nder is carried out by two major companies. Mibrag (Mitteldeutsche Braunkohle) was privatised in 1993 and sold to an Anglo-American and Morrison consortium (PowerGen, NRJ Energy Knudsen). Laubag (Lausitzer Braunkohle) was sold to a German consortium, 55 % of which is owned by Rheinbraun AG/RWE, 30 % by PreussenElektra AG and 15 % by Bayernwerke AG. Thus, Laubag and VEAG are linked via common shareholders. In 1989, 138 800 employees were working in the lignite mining sector and 30 499 in the electricity production sector. Since then, employment has declined dramatically to a current level of 16 400 in the lignite mining sector and 8 163 in electricity production with VEAG. Thus, together with an additional 5 000 employees depending indirectly on lignite mining and electricity production, a total of 30 000 employees currently depend on the lignite sector. (13) Since 1990, VEAG has invested DM 13 000 million in modernising lignite power plants. DM 2 000 million have been invested in lignite mining. VEAG’s total to DM 20 000 million, investment plan amounts running until 2001. (14) At the the fact-finding meeting on 14 July 1998, German Ministry of Economic Affairs drew the following conclusions from the above figures: (cid:151) a further decrease in the use of lignite in electricity into question the future of production would call lignite mining as a whole, (cid:151) a key consideration as to why German energy policy lignite is long-term security of needs to protect supply. German energy policy has to weigh increasing dependency on imported natural gas against the disadvantages of existing indigenous fuels such as lignite. 4. The opening of the German electricity market to competition: implementation of Directive 96/92/EC (15) The German des Energiewirtschaftsrechts(cid:146) entered into force on 29 April 1998. It implements Directive 96/92/EC by opting for a Neuregelung (cid:145)Gesetz zur L 319/20 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 11. 12. 1999 contract-based third party access system with a parallel single buyer option for distributors until 2005. The Act the provides for an immediate 100 % opening-up of final market: consumers eligible customers. is no eligibility threshold, distributors there jure, and are, all de (16) Thus, under the liberalised system introduced by the new German Act, all eligible customers in the new L(cid:228)nder (all for final consumers and all distributors) can contract in supplies from outside the VEAG system. However, order to deal with the situation that would result if many consumers transferred their demand to competing if not suppliers, impossible for VEAG to sell its lignite-based electricity, Article 4(3) of the Act provides for a transitional regime. increasingly difficult thus making it 5. The transitional regime notified by the German Government (17) The notification of 12 February 1998 and the complementary information of 11 September 1998 define the following transitional regime. (18) The basis of for programme construction the transitional regime is the the VEAG and investment modernisation of lignite-based power plants with a financial volume of DM 20 000 million, which will be terminated around 2000. The programme is part of VEAG’s commitment under the contract of 22 August 1990 between the then German Democratic Republic and the Treuhandanstalt on the one hand and Bayernwerk AG, PreussenElektra AG and RWE Energie AG (later VEAG) on the other. The programme must also be seen in the light of the 20-year commitment under the terms of the contract of 27 August 1990 between AG, PreussenElektra AG and RWE Energie AG (later VEAG) and the regional electricity companies, as well as the related series of bilateral contracts between VEAG and the regional electricity companies. consortium of Bayernwerk the (19) The proposed transitional regime provides the for possibility of to eligible customers, in so far as the requirements as defined in Article 4(3) of zur Neuregelung des (cid:145)Gesetz Energiewirtschaftsrechts(cid:146) are fulfilled: refusing network access the the customers system to (cid:145)(1) When assessing whether refusal to permit access to in Berlin, supply Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt and Thuringia with electricity pursuant to Article 1 (6) and (7) is impermissible or represents abuse, discrimination or unfair impediment as defined in Section 22, paragraph 2 and Section 26, paragraph 2 of restraints of competition, particular the Act against attention shall be given to the need for a sufficiently high level of power generation from lignite from these L(cid:228)nder. (2) The Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs shall report to the German Bundestag in 2002 on the impact of this provision on power generation from lignite and on the electricity price trend in the L(cid:228)nder listed in is not paragraph 1. extended until 31 December 2005 on the basis of that report, this transitional provision shall expire on 31 December 2003. (cid:146) In so far as this arrangement less electricity from VEAG. (20) Thus, in principle, all clients in the new L(cid:228)nder as well as in the remainder of Germany are eligible. However, if a significant number of such clients choose to purchase from new suppliers, the distributors tied to the 70 % purchase obligation from VEAG may lose sales, thereby purchasing such circumstances, VEAG itself would lose market share, making it difficult in turn to maintain lignite purchases and resultant electricity generation. If this occurs, VEAG and, the distributors may decide to refuse network access to requiring customers de facto to eligible customers, electricity lignite-based purchase more supplied by VEAG. Any such refusal is potentially subject to the control of the Bundeskartellamt, which will decide whether the refusal was reasonable and necessary in order to meet the need to maintain lignite production. according to the wording of expensive, law, the In II. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1. Legal basis: Article 24 of Directive 96/92/EC by Article (21) The German notification of 12 February explicitly applies for a transitional regime pursuant to Article 24 of the Directive. It also, however, contains a declaration that the German Government considers the regime laid is already down in Article 4(3) of covered 96/92/EC. Originally, in the memorandum to the draft Act of March 1997, the Government justified this provision on the grounds of Article 8(4) of the Directive (dispatching priority for indigenous fuel sources to cover up to 15 % of consumption). This approach was also taken in the official the transitional regime in accordance with Article 24 of the Directive. application of 12 February 1998 for the German Act of Directive 8(4) (22) However, Article 8(4) of the Directive does not apply to the scheme as notified. 11. 12. 1999 EN Official Journal of the European Communities L 319/21 (23) Article 8(4) of the Directive states: (cid:145)A Member State may, for reasons of security of supply, direct that priority be given to the dispatch of generating installations using indigenous primary fuel sources, to an extent not exceeding in any calendar year 15 % of the overall primary energy necessary to produce the electricity consumed in the Member State concerned. (cid:146) energy a whole, represents (24) Although electricity from lignite in the new L(cid:228)nder represents less than 15 % of electricity production in Germany as approximately it 60-70 % of electricity production in the new L(cid:228)nder. This high percentage is not the whole of a pure dispatching obligation in Germany under is accordance with Article 8(4) of the Directive, but locally protected by potentially refusing access to the possibility of customers wishing to make use of purchasing elsewhere, via network access, an essential requirement of the Directive defined in its Chapter VII. spread over transmission. Article 8(4) (25) The provision for priority treatment under Article 8(4) under no circumstances justifies refusal of an application for network access or is explicitly limited to making provision for a maximum of 15 % to be purchased from plants using indigenous fuels. Article 8(4), as well as Article 8(3), have to be seen as special provisions in the context of the general merit order principle as laid down in Article 8(2). The present mechanism (cid:151) potentially refusing access to the network for bilateral purchasing contacts between eligible clients and producers (cid:151) clearly falls outside the scope of this provision. 2. The requirements of Article 24 (26) Article 24 (1) and (2) of Directive 96/92/EC require the following elements to be examined by the Commission in the light of the EC Treaty when considering any application for a transitional regime. (3) A causal inability Directive commitment must be established. link between the entry into force of the the honour and the to 2. 2. Requirements concerning the measures proposed in order to achieve the objectives in question (28) (1) The measures of the transitional regime must fall within the scope of derogations from Chapters IV, VI and VII of the Directive. (2) The transitional regime must be of limited duration the commitments or and linked to the expiry of guarantees of operation in question. (3) The the apply transitional least regime must restrictive measures reasonably necessary to achieve the objectives, which themselves must be legitimate. In deciding on these issues the Commission must take into account, amongst other things, the size of the system concerned, the level of interconnection of the system and the structure of the electricity industry in the Member State in question. 3. Assessment of the German transitional regime 3. 1. Requirements concerning the nature of the commitments or guarantees of operation in question (29) The information contained in this Decision concerning the legal and contractual situation at the time of German reunification in 1990 is based upon the description of the relevant contracts provided by the German Ministry of Economic Affairs by letter of 11 September 1998. Two sets of contracts are mentioned therein: (i) of contract 22 August between the the German Democratic the Treuhandanstalt on the one hand and Bayernwerk AG, PreussenElektra AG and RWE Energie AG on the other; Republic 1990 and 2. 1. Requirements concerning the nature of the commitments or guarantees of operation in question (27) (1) The existence of a commitment or guarantee of operation must be proven. (ii) the contract of 27 August 1990 between the consortium of Bayernwerk AG, PreussenElektra AG and RWE Energie AG (later VEAG) and the regional electricity companies, as well as the series of subsequent bilateral contracts between VEAG and the regional electricity companies. (2) The commitment or guarantee of operation must have been given before 20 February 1997. (30) The central commitment within the meaning of Article 24(1) is the investment commitment by Bayernwerk AG, PreussenElektra AG and RWE Energie AG, represented in L 319/22 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 11. 12. 1999 VEAG, based on the Stromvertrag of 22 August 1990. VEAG not only took over production and transmission facilities but, as part of the contract package, committed itself to a DM 20 000 million investment programme to modernise the lignite sector. (31) This investment commitment was based on a long-term guaranteed minimum delivery of electricity and a corresponding amortisation of the investment. To this end, the central Stromvertrag is complemented by 20-year power downstream agreements distributors. purchase with (32) This the in 1990, VEAG undertook investment commitment on the basis of the guaranteed 20-year electricity purchase agreements, which themselves were ultimately based on, or guaranteed by, the monopoly supply of captive consumers, which was the situation prior to liberalisation of the German electricity market in April 1998. than electricity from other (33) The German Government considers that this investment commitment may not be honoured under the liberalised system if not protected until 2003 with the clause relating to potential refusal of access. This is because of the concern that lignite-sourced electricity will be more sources, expensive particularly due to the very heavy investment obligations on VEAG arising from modernisation requirements. If this is correct, and VEAG is unable to make the necessary improvements in efficiency to compete at market prices, purchases from distributors linked to VEAG by the 70 % purchasing obligation will decrease as eligible customers source elsewhere, leading to falling sales by VEAG. Under these circumstances it does appear correct that, with regard to VEAG, a commitment or guarantee of operation had been entered into prior to the entry into force of the Directive, and that fulfilment of is endangered by the entry into force thereof. this commitment if the that have assumed undertaken the investment in lignite production capacity. It can in 1990 Bayernwerk AG, be PreussenElektra AG and RWE Energie AG would not investment lignite commitment there had been no guaranteed delivery, ultimately based at that time on a captive market. It can further be assumed that 100 % liberalisation, defining all categories of customer as eligible the Directive, might well lead to a situation where VEAG may not be in a position to complete its DM 20 000 million investment programme, which will not be completed until 2000, if no transitional regime is established. customers within the meaning of 3. 2. Requirements concerning the measures proposed to achieve the objectives in question (35) 1. in question fall within the The measures scope of derogations from Chapters IV, VI and VII of Directive 96/92/EC. of sufficient (36) The German transitional regime refers exclusively to the protection clause of Article 4(3) of the Energy Act. It gives transmission system operators the right to deny network access on a case-by-case basis in order to guarantee from delivery lignite-fired power plants. Refusal of access on the grounds of guaranteeing sufficient delivery of electricity from lignite-fired power plants is not covered by Article 17(5) of Directive 96/92/EC, which only refers to the lack of necessary transmission or distribution capacity and duly substantiated reasons with regard to notified public service obligations as defined in Article 3 of the Directive. Germany has not notified any public service obligations under Article 3 of the Directive. electricity (34) The Commission therefore considers that: (1) a commitment or guarantee within the meaning of Article 24(1) of the Directive exists; (2) such commitments or guarantees of operation were given prior to the entry into force of the Directive; (3) causal the necessary connection between the inability to fulfil the commitment and the entry into force of been sufficiently established for the VEAG commitment arising from the Directive has (37) Consequently, the German transitional regime represents a derogation from Article 17(5) in Chapter VII of the Directive. Such a derogation falls under the measures mentioned in Article 24(2). Article 24 is therefore applicable. (38) 2. The transitional regime is of limited duration and is linked to the expiry of the commitments or guarantees of operation in question. (39) The German transitional regime is of limited duration, namely until 31 December 2003. The Act provides for the possibility of an extension until 31 December 2005, depending on the outcome of a report which the to the Bundestag in 2002 Ministry must present 11. 12. 1999 EN Official Journal of the European Communities L 319/23 regarding the impact of the transitional regime on power generation from lignite and electricity price trends in the new L(cid:228)nder. 3. 2. The least restrictive measures taking into account, amongst other things, the size of the system concerned, the level of interconnection of the system and the structure of the electricity industry in the Member State concerned (40) The Commission therefore considers this Decision regarding a transitional regime to be valid until 31 December 2003. Should Germany decide in 2002 to extend the transitional regime until 31 December 2005, this additional period would at that stage have to be the subject the Commission requesting an extension of the transitional regime. complementary application to of a (41) Whilst the Commission is not at present considering extending the derogation from the Directive granted by this Decision, such an eventuality is not completely to envisage such an excluded. extension as being compatible with the Directive were it to be long term in nature, for example extended beyond 2005. However, it is not necessary to address this issue at present. It would be difficult (42) 3. The transitional regime has to apply the least restrictive measures necessary to achieve the legitimate objectives, taking into account, amongst other things, the size of of interconnection of the system and the structure of the State concerned. system concerned, in the Member electricity industry level the the 3. 1. Legitimate objectives the the and lignite justifies related to these commitments. As (43) The objective pursued by the scheme in question is to permit VEAG to honour investment commitments entered into and to meet the legitimate a expectations background element, Germany further the objective of the transitional regime with two additional arguments. Firstly, the specific economic situation of the new L(cid:228)nder and need environmentally acceptable restructuring of the energy sector in this region. A further decrease in the use of lignite for electricity production would call into question lignite mining activities as a whole. Secondly, Germany argues that the measures are necessary in terms of long term security of supply. The continued use of electricity produced from lignite is part of overall German energy policy which attempts to weigh increasing dependency on imported natural gas against the environmental and cost disadvantages of existing indigenous fuels such as lignite. socially for a (44) On the basis of these Commission considers Germany to be legitimate. the three considerations objectives pursued the by (45) Under all the new German Energy Act, eligible customers (all final consumers and all distributors) may contract supplies from outside the VEAG system. Article the German Act 4(3) of is designed to provide a limit to purchases of electricity from outside potential the VEAG system where this would result in severe difficulties in continuing to operate lignite-fired power plants. (46) (47) In practice, such an occurrence cannot be excluded. According to the German Government, the electricity produced by VEAG on the basis of lignite is not only more expensive than electricity provided from other sources such as natural gas, but even more expensive than lignite-based electricity from the western L(cid:228)nder. The uncompetitive situation of east German lignite has been explained by the the high investments in modernisation. As most of these costs are fixed, a significant fall in VEAG electricity sales would increase the cost burden on remaining customers. amortisation of to fulfil If VEAG lost significant sales due to eligible customers purchasing elsewhere, this would, as mentioned above, endanger its lignite-based electricity production and its and modernisation investment ability commitments. The transitional regime would enable it to refuse these eligible customers access to its transmission network. These eligible customers would therefore be obliged to continue expensive, lignite-based electricity from VEAG. to purchase more its (48) The Commission considers that Germany has sufficiently demonstrated that the transitional regime is a possible measure to achieve the objectives in question. However, the practice in other Member States shows that there are problems. alternative stranded solutions Therefore, specific attention must be given to the question of whether the German transitional regime applies the least restrictive measures possible in order to achieve the objectives in question. cost for (49) The German Government considers that, in the light of the current the particular circumstances in question, solution is less restrictive to trade and competition than lignite, the alternative, namely statutory quotas possibly electricity all a by consumption in Germany. This is due to the temporary is the support scheme, and in fact nature of financed levy that for on it L 319/24 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 11. 12. 1999 that states only not possible to determine whether protection will in fact the be necessary. The proposal Bundeskartellamt, when judging disputes over refusal of access, must consider the lignite issue among other arguments, notably capacity restraints. According to the government, this is only likely in rare cases to lead to a refusal of access and would only exist in principle until 2003. Furthermore, this approach has the advantage that it would not affect the contracts between VEAG and the regional distributors. Under these circumstances, is the present approach taken by the German argued, Government ensures that market distortion will occur only if, and in so far as, necessary. it (50) (i) the area limited concerned the strictly limited timescale, In the light of the specific circumstances of the case, and in particular in comparison to the size of the entire German system, (ii) the lack of certainty that any protection will in fact be necessary, and (iii) the Commission considers that such a scheme is indeed a reasonable method of in It is not possible to demonstrate that other question. schemes, such as those based on levies, would be less restrictive of trade and competition that the transitional regime as notified, given the very special circumstances under consideration here. achieving the objectives (51) However, two caveats are necessary in this respect the transitional regime as regarding certain details of regional notified: for possibility the firstly, transmission/distribution system operators to refuse network access pursuant to this scheme, and secondly ensure the defined, need non-discriminatory, transparent and verifiable criteria exist regarding the right to refuse access. clearly that to 3. 2. 1. The possibility for regional transmission/distribution system operators to refuse network access (52) The wording of Article 4(3) of the German Act does not specifically restrict to VEAG the right to refuse network access. It would also, subject to ex-post approval by the Bundeskartellamt, allow regional transmission/distribution system operators to implement the clause and to deny in fact only VEAG access to their networks. However, is investment in electricity production. The regional commitment electricity companies are neither producing electricity their only obligation is to from lignite nor ([(cid:133)] (*); substantially through affected its (*) Business secret. procure 70 % of their sales from VEAG). Under these circumstances, it does not appear necessary to allow the regional transmission/distribution companies to refuse network access on the grounds of the need to ensure adequate production from lignite. (53) this. Secondly, as interest can determine Firstly, the regional distribution/transmission companies are not falling in a position to determine whether demand from their customers for electricity, resulting in reduced purchases from VEAG, will actually endanger continuing production by VEAG of electricity from lignite. Only VEAG, which can take into account purchases by all distributors and individual eligible the customers, distributors have no direct or commercial in lignite production, any need that they might experience to restrict access to their networks might be based more on commercial considerations than on the need to maintain lignite production. This, combined with the impossibility distribution/transmission companies to determine in practice whether falling sales overall on lignite-based production, makes to permit regional distribution/transmission companies to refuse access on these grounds. Consequently, only VEAG, entitled on the basis of a commitment within the meaning of Article 24(1) of the Directive, should be in a position to invoke the protection clause. prejudice VEAG’s it inappropriate part would regional their for (54) Moreover, it would significantly compromise the market position of eligible customers if they had to face not one potential access dispute settlement with the transmission system operator, but possibly two, one on the level of the distribution network and the other on the level of the transmission network. (55) A further of by demand. distributors issue raised by Germany in this purchases respect concerns electricity originating from outside the new L(cid:228)nder, which would involve only the low and medium-voltage grid. VEAG would not be aware of these (cid:145)imports(cid:146), and would not therefore be able to take them into account in planning future lignite-based production levels based on likely the If (cid:145)domestic(cid:146) low/medium-voltage grid reached a certain level, the distributors’ sales would be reduced. Consequently, the amounts bought by them from VEAG would also fall, thus reducing VEAG’s sales. The Commission has tested se, as this argument, but does not justification for allowing the distribution/transmission companies to refuse network access in the medium term on the grounds of the need to protect lignite. Firstly, given the fact that these (cid:145)imports(cid:146) can only be via the low/medium-voltage grid, it cannot be taken for granted regard it, per (cid:145)imports(cid:146) such via 11. 12. 1999 EN Official Journal of the European Communities L 319/25 that such flows will acquire any quantitative significance. Secondly, this issue can be resolved in a manner less restrictive of trade and competition than the possibility of refusing network access at regional level. (56) Germany can, for example, establish a procedure whereby regional companies are obliged to inform VEAG of transmission contracts concluded at the level of the regional network operators which could indirectly affect VEAG’s lignite-based electricity production. This would enable VEAG to include these cases in its overall planning and thus submit it as evidence when claiming refusal of access. However, in order to give Germany the such additional opportunity to determine whether measures are required, in order to enable VEAG to fulfil its lignite-based production obligations and to ensure that regional distributors have an appropriate period of time to adapt prior to the introduction of this additional market it appropriate to bring this condition into force with suspensory effect (cf. 3. 2. 3 below). Commission considers pressure, the (60) There is a risk that, in the absence of such a caveat, little competition would develop in the new L(cid:228)nder during the period in question and that, in particular, VEAG might face insufficient pressure to increase efficiency and lower prices. At present, approximately 60 % of electricity generation is by VEAG and 40 % by municipal producers and autoproduction. It is to be expected that, if even limited numbers of eligible clients decide to purchase elsewhere, this will inevitably, and probably immediately, put pressure (cid:151) albeit limited (cid:151) on VEAG’s lignite-based production. To meet this challenge it would need to increase efficiency and competitiveness, or risk losing market share. However, rather than cutting costs and reducing prices, in the absence of a minimum number of unequivocal eligible customers VEAG may adopt a policy of systematically refusing any request for network access share and, indirectly, lignite production. The possibility of such a policy by VEAG is supported by the conclusions of the report evaluating the need for the lignite protection clause by VEAG from chartered accountants PWC Deutsche Revision (see below). to maintain its market commissioned in order (61) (62) 3. 2. 2. Clearly defined, non-discriminatory, transparent and verifiable criteria by (57) The Commission regards refusal of network access as a severe measure which is directly opposed to one of the the Directive, namely to permit main objectives of supply competition for introducing electricity network access. In this light, it is important that any application of the lignite protection clause be exercised defined, according and restrictively non-discriminatory, transparent and verifiable criteria. The Commission considers that the wording of Article 4(3) of the German Act does not satisfactorily fulfil these it criteria. necessary to ensure that several conditions are met the regulatory procedures and within the scope of dispute Such conditions are: settlement mechanisms the Commission in question. Therefore, considers clearly to (58) (59) (1) that a refusal of access will only take place on a case-by-case basis, that there will therefore be no a priori or systematic refusal, and that in every case of refusal detailed reasons will be given by VEAG as to the need to refuse transmission to ensure an adequate level of lignite generation; (2) a minimum opening-up of the market must also be guaranteed in the new L(cid:228)nder so that a network access system can develop in practice, albeit on the basis of the transitional regime at a pace below the minimum market opening requirements of the Directive. Thus, it must be guaranteed eligible customers must have the unrestricted right to change supplier in spite of the legitimate interests of VEAG. a minimum segment of that of the lignite clause, (3) Although the German Government argued that a minimum opening-up of the market and market practice would be ensured by the case-by-case approach of the German Article 4(3) the Commission considers that Article 4(3) firstly provides insufficient guarantees in this respect, and secondly does not comply with the requirement for clear and verifiable criteria, which are necessary to differentiate clearly between those network access applications which are admissible and those which are to be refused. These concerns have already been stressed by the Commission in the letter to the Ministry of Economic Affairs of 22 September 1997. Such clear and verifiable criteria must be specified in order to enable customers to predict whether they will be able to exercise their right to network access. This will avoid potential discriminatory application of from excessive discretion in the case-by-case assessment of refusals of access. arising clause the seems appropriate that, when weighing lignite-based electricity, or whether It the justification of a refusal of access against the right of eligible customers to choose their supplier, account must be taken of whether the eligible customer is itself a party to long-term purchasing commitments, e. g. in the case of distributors committed to taking 70 % of their electricity from VEAG, in which case particular attention may be given to the interest in ensuring sufficient sales of eligible customer is a final consumer without specific long-term purchase commitment, in which case particular attention may be given to access to competitive electricity prices. In this context, it is important to note that VEAG and the regional distribution companies are in many cases affiliated companies belonging to the same shareholders. With regard to the need for major industrial final consumers to have access the to competitive electricity prices, Article 19(3) of companies, associated the or or L 319/26 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 11. 12. 1999 (on a segments the market, Directive lays down that, despite a certain discretion for for in defining customer Member States achieving a minimum opening-up of (cid:145)all final consumers consuming more than 100 GWh per and including year consumption site basis in the category of autoproduction) must be included(cid:146) eligible customers. Thus the Commission considers that at least this customer segment (3) should have a clear guarantee that their potential requests for market access will not be refused on the basis of Article 4(3) of the German Act. (63) This would be transparent and would avoid any potential discrimination. In this way, an appropriate balance can be struck between the need to provide adequate and effective protection for lignite production in Germany and the need to ensure that competitive forces (cid:151) the basic aim of the Directive (cid:151) nonetheless play an important role in ensuring that all companies increase efficiency and lower prices. 3. 2. 3. Entry into force of this Decision (64) In order to permit: (cid:151) preparation of suitable and appropriate measures as necessary in order to ensure that electricity sales to eligible customers, via the regional distributors’ low/medium-voltage grid only, do not bypass production VEAG’s obligation, and to enable the regional distributors to prepare for the introduction of such competition, lignite-based electricity (cid:151) VEAG to adapt to the new situation with regard to than 100 GWh consuming more customers annually, it appears reasonable to ensure a suitable period of time prior to the entry into force of the conditions set out in 3. 2. 1 and 3. 2. 2(3). (3) Although no official data have been presented, the Commission received oral information from VEAG as well as from electricity consumers (VIK) indicating that the category of final consumers consuming more than 100 GWh/year in the new L(cid:228)nder represents 15-20 companies with a consumption share of approximately 15-16 %. Inaccuracies stem in particular from the difficulties of assessing autoproduction and defining the consumption site. (65) In particular, It should be noted that the circumstances leading to the choice by the German Government of this transitional regime, as well as the objectives pursued by it, are specific and not characteristic of the other schemes notified to the Commission pursuant to Article 24 of the this regime results from the Directive. significant reconstruction of the electricity sector in the new L(cid:228)nder following reunification, and the resulting very major and localised regional and employment problems. Under these circumstances it is particularly important in this case that an appropriate balance is struck between the need for VEAG to be placed under a reasonable degree of competitive pressure and the need to ensure that VEAG can meet its investment and lignite-based electricity production obligations. This its nature and Decision is therefore, extremely objectives, in comparison with transitional regimes accepted or examined in other Member States. The other schemes relate to the need or aim to maintain the viability or competitiveness of individual undertakings, not the reconstruction and major modernisation of an entire regional electricity sector. in terms of specific (66) In this light, the Commission considers it appropriate to provide for an interim period of two years between publication of this Decision and the entry into force of the conditions set out in Article 2(2) and (3) below. This period will provide VEAG and the regional distributors with the necessary time to take corresponding measures to meet any additional competitive pressure resulting from this Decision. 3. 2. 4. Additional considerations (67) 1. a to limit In order the possible impact of this Decision, and in particular the conditions set out in 3. 2. 1 and 3. 2. 2(3), to the competitiveness and viability of VEAG, a review of the Decision is scheduled for two years after its adoption. The basis for such a review must be report by the German Government on its experience with the application of Article 4(3) of the the additional German Act and the application of Condition (3) of this Decision. If the proportion of final customers which have transferred to an electricity supplier not producing on the basis of lignite from the new L(cid:228)nder is substantial and endangers the the Commission will review this viability of VEAG, Decision, and in particular, if appropriate, Condition (3). actually (68) 2. In order to ensure sufficient the Commission also considers it necessary to ensure close monitoring of the application and interpretation of Article 4(3) of German Act. Thus the Commission must be notified of any decision by a German arbitration or transparency, 11. 12. 1999 EN Official Journal of the European Communities L 319/27 regulatory body which conditionally or unconditionally approves a refusal of network access on the basis of Article 4(3) of the German Act. 3. 2. 5. Appreciation of the arguments of VEAG (69) In order to support its arguments expressed by letter of 28 January 1999 and during a meeting between VEAG and the Commission on 12 February in Brussels, VEAG submitted a report commissioned from the chartered accountants PWC Deutsche Revision evaluating the need for the lignite protection clause. (70) In its letter of 28 January 1999, VEAG argues that any loss of sales whatsoever would be unsustainable. The lignite protection clause in Article 4(3) of the German Act should therefore be applied in full without any restrictions. (71) The accountants’ report calculates target quantities for electricity sales in order to cover VEAG’s full costs (p. 24). This calculation is based on data from VEAG’s medium-term cost planning of VEAG and cannot therefore be directly compared with data from the published annual accounts. The cost base for calculating the target quantities includes capital costs of [(cid:133)] % (*) and a margin for a return on equity of [(cid:133)] % (*) p. a. ([(cid:133)] % (*) state obligation plus [(cid:133)] % (*) risk premium), assuming [(cid:133)] % (*) equity capital. (72) A comparison between the calculated target quantities for electricity sales and actual electricity sales for 1998, and estimated electricity sales planned by VEAG for 2003 gives the following results: in 1998, actual sales exceeded calculated target quantities by [(cid:133)] % (*). In 2003, however, target quantities are [(cid:133)] % (*) higher than planned sales. This leads to the conclusion that future operations will not fully cover costs (p. 27). (73) The report subsequently examines two scenarios up to 2003. Scenario 1 assumes full application of the lignite protection clause in Article 4(3) of the German Act in VEAG’s favour. It concludes that, except for 2000, all years will show a surplus, peaking in 2002, showing a sales margin of [(cid:133)] % (*) which translates into a return the on equity of is abovementioned quantitative gap of (2003) results in a decreased return on equity from the expected [(cid:133)] % (*) to [(cid:133)] % (*) (2002, comparable figure for 2003 not available). shown that [(cid:133)] % (*) [(cid:133)] % (*). Thus it (74) The report also examines a Scenario 2, assuming that representing [(cid:133)] % (*) of VEAG turnover consumers change to a different supplier. The assumption of [(cid:133)] % (*) is derived from a [(cid:133)] % (*) market segment of total electricity production in the new L(cid:228)nder ([(cid:133)] (*) TWh) which is assumed to be lost exclusively from VEAG turnover. This scenario concludes that VEAG’s viability will be threatened, although there is no detailed analysis of realistic plant operation, nor are revenues from sales to alternative customers or on spot markets taken into account. (75) The Commission concludes as follows: (76) a) (77) b) (78) c) costs to make the report does not provide for a detailed analysis of VEAG’s cost structure according to fixed and to assess variable short-term marginal costs; nor does it provide any cash-flow analysis to assess VEAG’s in order liquidity. This according to the data provided, the short and medium-term viability of VEAG cannot be considered to be directly threatened; it possible the report’s conclusions are based on the objective of maintaining full cost coverage including a profit margin ([(cid:133)] % (*) ROE). As is not achieved, even if the lignite protection clause is fully applied in VEAG’s favour (resulting in [(cid:133)] % (*) ROE), the rather pragmatic conclusion is that no restriction on the lignite application of protection clause would be sustainable; target this the data provided show that The full-cost accounting approach chosen includes a number of safety nets before VEAG’s viability would be seriously called into question: the (cid:151) [(cid:133)] % (*) profit margin included in the calculations, (cid:151) undisclosed potential margin included in the to procure lignite from the related contract company Laubag (4), (cid:151) [(cid:133)] % (*) equity capital, (cid:151) revenues from surplus to alternative customers or on spot markets would have to be included when calculating the effect of customer losses; electricity sales (4) According to the report (p. 17), until [(cid:133)] (*) VEAG purchased lignite mainly from Laubag, a company which is related through common shareholders, at [(cid:133)] (*), and after [(cid:133)] (*) according to a price-quantity schedule [(cid:133)] (*). Neither Laubag’s cost structure nor the current profit margin have been disclosed and analysed. L 319/28 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 11. 12. 1999 (79) d) Scenario 2, assuming af [(cid:133)] % (*) is based on assumptions which cannot be compared with the potential effects of the conditions referred to in 3. 2. 2 of this Decision. loss of sales, (80) e) In contrast to the position expressed by the German Government, namely that the lignite protection clause would apply on a case-by-case basis, thereby allowing a degree of market opening, the position expressed the accountants’ report makes it clear that VEAG would strive for a systematic refusal of access to all direct and indirect VEAG customers over the full period of application of the clause. by VEAG and supported by (81) In summary, the Commission recognises VEAG’s legitimate concern to maintain sufficient sales in order to ensure the specific economies of scale for lignite-based electricity production. Thus the Commission developed the conditions in 3. 2. 2 with regard to these concerns, albeit weighed against the equally legitimate needs of review consumers. The possibilities electricity described above the competitiveness and viability of VEAG. safeguard for further are for a (85) The Commission therefore concludes that a number of to ensure the conditions must be fulfilled in order adequate predictability and transparency of the German transitional regime. The conditions can be implemented either through an amendment of the law or through adequate application of provisions or practices on the part of implementing Article 4(3) of the German Act, the authority responsible for HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS: Article 1 the German (cid:145)Gesetz Energiewirtschaftsrechts(cid:146) (new L(cid:228)nder) of des Article 4(3) zur (Energy Act), Neuregelung published in the Bundesgesetzblatt on 28 April 1998, p. 730, which is the single subject of the application for a transitional regime in accordance with Article 24 of Directive 96/92/EC, notified to the Commission on 12 February 1998, shall be considered to be based on a commitment or guarantee of operation within the meaning of Article 24(1) of the Directive. 4. Conclusions the commitment within the In the abovementioned case, meaning of Article 24(1) of Directive 96/92/EC is the contract concluded on 22 August 1990 between the German Democratic Republic and the Treuhandanstalt on the one hand and Bayernwerk AG, PreussenElektra AG and RWE Energie AG on the other. (82) The transitional regime was applied for by letter of 12 February 1998. Thus the application is in accordance with the deadline laid down in Article 24(2). Article 2 (83) The based regime series of transitional is from a on investment commitments arising contracts former German concluded in 1990 between the Democratic Republic, the Treuhandanstalt, Bayernwerk AG, PreussenElektra AG, RWE Energie AG and the regional electricity companies. The nature of VEAG’s investment commitment meets all the criteria of Article 24(1) of the Directive. (84) As regards the measures proposed, the transitional regime is a derogation from Chapter VII of Directive 96/92/EC, namely refusal of network access, which in principle falls within the scope of Article 24(2) of the Directive. The proposed transitional regime is of limited duration and linked to the expiry of the commitments or guarantees of operation in question. The requirement that the transitional regime applies the least restrictive measures necessary to achieve the legitimate objectives is in principle fulfilled, albeit with two limitations, namely the need to clarify its scope, which is to be limited to the lignite-based electricity-producing the network of company, and clarification of the German transitional regime, which is not sufficiently clearly defined in order to ensure non-discriminatory, transparent and verifiable application. the wording of In accordance with Article 24(2) of Directive 96/92/EC, Germany shall be entitled to derogate from Article 17 and thus from Chapter VII by applying Article 4(3) (new L(cid:228)nder) of the Energy Act as a transitional regime limited until 31 December 2003, under the following conditions. (1) Germany shall ensure that the right to network access also remains the general norm in the new L(cid:228)nder, and that every refusal of network access is considered an exception which must be duly substantiated on a case-by-case basis. (2) Requests for network access may only be refused where they involve the Vereinigte Energiewerke AG (VEAG) and transmission distribution system operators may not apply the provisions of the transitional regime. This condition shall be applied not this later than two years following publication of Decision. transmission network. Regional (3) A minimum proportion of final electricity consumption must also remain open to competition in the new L(cid:228)nder. Therefore, at least those final consumers consuming more than 100 GWh per year (on a consumption site basis and 11. 12. 1999 EN Official Journal of the European Communities L 319/29 including autoproduction) within the meaning of Article 19(3) of Directive 96/92/EC shall not be refused network access on the basis of Article 4(3) of the Energy Act. This condition shall be applied not than two years following publication of this Decision. later approval of such refusal at first instance (Landeskartellbeh(cid:246)rde or Bundeskartellamt). 3. Germany shall notify to the Commission any change in relation to the Energy Act which may directly or indirectly affect the application of this transitional regime. Article 3 Germany shall submit to the Commission, within three 1. years of the adoption of this Decision, a report on the actual use of network access by final customers in the new L(cid:228)nder. Should this report conclude that final consumers who have actually changed to an electricity supplier not producing on the basis of lignite from the new L(cid:228)nder is substantial the the Commission shall review this Decision. viability of VEAG, the proportion of and endangers 2. Germany shall notify to the Commission every refusal of network access in accordance with Article 4(3) of the Energy conditional Act following unconditional or immediately Article 4 This decision is addressed to the Federal Republic of Germany. Done at Brussels, 8 July 1999. For the Commission Christos PAPOUTSIS Member of the Commission


title: Megállapodás az Európai Közösség és Ausztrália között a tudományos és technológiai együttműködésről szóló megállapodás módosításáról

eurovoc_concepts:
Australia
cooperation agreement (EU)
revision of an agreement
scientific cooperation
scientific research
technical cooperation

formats: html pdf print

text: 80 HU Az Európai Unió Hivatalos Lapja 11/32. kötet 21999A0728(01) 1999. 7. 28. AZ EURÓPAI KÖZÖSSÉGEK HIVATALOS LAPJA L 195/32 az Európai Közösség és Ausztrália között a tudományos és technológiai együttműködésről szóló megállapodás módosításáról MEGÁLLAPODÁS AZ EURÓPAI UNIÓ TANÁCSA, az Európai Közösség nevében, egyrészről, és AUSZTRÁLIA KORMÁNYA, másrészről, tekintettel az Európai Közösség és Ausztrália közötti tudományos és technológiai együttműködésről szóló megállapodásra, amely 1994. július 25-én lépett hatályba, mivel mindkét Fél kifejezte óhaját a megállapodás hatályának kiterjesztésére és ilyen értelmű módosítására a megállapodás 12. cikkének b) pontjával összhangban; mivel a módosításra irányuló tárgyalások sikeresen lezárultak, A KÖVETKEZŐKBEN ÁLLAPODOTT MEG: 1. cikk (1) Az Európai Közösség és Ausztrália közötti tudományos és technológiai együttműködésről szóló megállapodás 4. cikkének (2) bekezdése helyébe a következő szöveg lép: „(2) E megállapodás alkalmazásában az együttműködési területek a következők: A Közösség tekintetében az együttműködés magában foglalja az Európai Közösséget létrehozó szerződés 130 g. cikke a) pontjának (1), valamint 130G. cikke d) pontjának (2) hatálya alá tartozó valamennyi kutatási, technológiafejlesztési és demonstrációs tevékenységet, az utóbbit csak az érintett infrastruktúra működtetői és a megfelelő kutatási programok közötti hálózati kapcsolatok erejéig. Ausztrália tekintetében az együttműködés magában foglalja az ausztrál kormány, az illetékes tartományi vagy területi kormány, nem-kormányzati szervek – ideértve a magánszektort és az üzleti szférát, vagy bármely kutatási intézményt is – által finanszírozott, illetve megvalósított valamennyi tudományos és technológiai tevékenységet Ausztrália diplomáciai csatornák útján értesíti a Közösséget e megállapodásnak az érintett tartományokra vagy területekre történő alkalmazásáról. (1) »Kutatási, technológiafejlesztési és demonstrációs programok megvalósítása, a vállalkozások, kutatóközpontok és egyetemek közötti együttműködés előmozdításával«. (2) »A kutatók Közösségen belüli továbbképzésének és mobilitásának ösztönzése«. ” Ez a megállapodás azon a napon lép hatályba, amikor a Felek írásban értesítették egymást az e megállapodás hatálybalépéséhez szükséges jogi követelmények teljesüléséről. 2. cikk 3. cikk Ez a megállapodás két-két eredeti példányban készült, angol, dán, finn, francia, görög, holland, német, olasz, portugál, spanyol és svéd nyelven, amely szövegek mindegyike egyaránt hiteles. In witness whereof the undersigned have signed this Agreement. Hecho en Bruselas, el ocho de julio de mil novecientos noventa y nueve. Udfærdiget i Bruxelles den ottende juli nitten hundrede og nioghalvfems. Geschehen zu Brüssel am achten Juli neunzehnhundertneunundneunzig. Έγινε στις Βρυξέλλες, στις οκτώ Ιουλίου χίλια εννιακόσια ενενήντα εννέα. Done at Brussels on the eighth day of July in the year one thousand nine hundred and ninety-nine. Fait à Bruxelles, le huit juillet mil neuf cent quatre-vingt dix-neuf. Fatto a Bruxelles, addì otto luglio millenovecentonovantanove. Gedaan te Brussel, de achtste juli negentienhonderd negenennegentig. Feito em Bruxelas, em oito de Julho de mil novecentos e noventa e nove. Tehty Brysselissä kahdeksantena päivänä heinäkuuta vuonna tuhatyhdeksänsataayhdeksänkymmentäyhdeksän. Som skedde i Bryssel den åttonde juli nittonhundranittionio. 11/32. kötet HU Az Európai Unió Hivatalos Lapja 81 Por la Comunidad Europea For Det Europæiske Fællesskab Für die Europäische Gemeinschaft Για την Ευρωπαϊκή Κοινότητα For the government of Australia Pour la Communauté européenne Per la Comunità europea Voor de Europese Gemeenschap Pela Comunidade Europeia Euroopan yhteisön puolesta På Europeiska gemenskapens vägnar Por el Gobierno de Australia På den australske regerings vegne Für die Regierung Australiens Για την Κυβέρνηση της Αυστραλίας For the Government of Australia Pour le gouvernement d’Australie Per il governo dell’Australia Voor de regering van Australië Pelo Governo da Austrália Australian hallituksen puolesta På Australiens regerings vägnar


title: Regulamento (CE) n° 1501/1999 da Comissão, de 8 de Julho de 1999, que fixa as restituições aplicáveis à exportação dos cereais, das farinhas, dos grumos e das sêmolas de trigo ou de centeio

eurovoc_concepts:
cereal flour
cereals
export refund
groat
meal

formats: pdf print

text: 9. 7. 1999 PT Jornal Oficial das Comunidades Europeias L 174/19 REGULAMENTO (CE) N. o 1501/1999 DA COMISSÃO de 8 de Julho de 1999 que fixa as restituições aplicáveis à exportação dos cereais, das farinhas, dos grumos e das sêmolas de trigo ou de centeio A COMISSÃO DAS COMUNIDADES EUROPEIAS, Tendo em conta o Tratado que institui a Comunidade Europeia, Tendo em conta o Regulamento (CEE) n. o 1766/92 do Conselho, de 30 de Junho de 1992, que estabelece a organi- zação comum dos mercados no sector dos cereais (1), com a última redacção que lhe foi dada pelo Regulamento (CE) n. o 1253/1999 da Comissão (2), e, nomeadamente, o n. o 2 do seu artigo 13. o, (1) (2) (3) Considerando que, nos termos do artigo 13. o do Regula- mento (CEE) n. o 1766/92, a diferença entre as cotações ou os preços referidos no artigo 1. o deste regulamento e os preços desses produtos na Comunidade pode ser coberta por uma restituição à exportação; Considerando que as restituições devem ser fixadas aten- dendo aos elementos referidos no artigo 1. o do Regula- mento (CE) n. o 1501/95 da Comissão, de 29 de Junho de 1995, que estabelece normas de execução do Regula- mento (CEE) n. o 1766/92 do Conselho, no que diz respeito à concessão de restituições à exportação, bem como as medidas a tomar em caso de perturbação, no sector dos cereais (3), com a última redacção que lhe foi dada pelo Regulamento (CE) n. o 2513/98 (4); farinhas, às Considerando que, no que respeita às sêmolas de trigo ou de centeio, a restituição aplicável a esses produtos deve ser calculada tendo em conta a quantidade de cereais necessária ao fabrico dos produtos considerados; que essas quantidades foram fixadas no Regulamento (CE) n. o 1501/95; (4) (5) (6) (7) Considerando que a situação do mercado mundial ou as exigências específicas de certos mercados podem tornar necessária a diferenciação da restituição para certos produtos, conforme o seu destino; Considerando que a restituição deve ser fixada uma vez por mês; que ela pode ser alterada; Considerando que a aplicação dessas modalidades à situação actual do mercado no sector dos cereais e, nomeadamente, as cotações ou preços desses produtos na Comunidade e mercado mundial, implica a fixação da restituição ao nível dos montantes constantes do anexo; Considerando que as medidas previstas no presente regulamento estão em conformidade com o parecer do Comité de Gestão dos Cereais, ADOPTOU O PRESENTE REGULAMENTO: Artigo 1. o As restituições à exportação dos produtos referidos nas alíneas a), b) e c) do artigo 1. o do Regulamento (CEE) n. o 1766/92, com excepção do malte, são fixadas no nível dos montantes constantes do anexo. Artigo 2. o O presente regulamento entra em vigor em 9 de Julho de 1999. O presente regulamento é obrigatório em todos os seus elementos e directamente aplicável em todos os Estados-Membros. Feito em Bruxelas, em 8 de Julho de 1999. Pela Comissão Franz FISCHLER Membro da Comissão (1) JO L 181 de 1. 7. 1992, p. 21. (2) JO L 160 de 26. 6. 1999, p. 18. (3) JO L 147 de 30. 6. 1995, p. 7. (4) JO L 313 de 21. 11. 1998, p. 16. L 174/20 PT Jornal Oficial das Comunidades Europeias 9. 7. 1999 ANEXO do regulamento da Comissão, de 8 de Julho de 1999, que fixa as restituições aplicáveis à exportação dos cereais, das farinhas, dos grumos e das sêmolas de trigo ou de centeio Código do produto Destino (1) (Em EUR/t) Montante das restituições Código do produto Destino (1) (Em EUR/t) Montante das restituições 1001 10 00 9200 1001 10 00 9400 1001 90 91 9000 1001 90 99 9000 1002 00 00 9000 1003 00 10 9000 1003 00 90 9000 1004 00 00 9200 1004 00 00 9400 1005 10 90 9000 1005 90 00 9000 1007 00 90 9000 1008 20 00 9000 — 01 — 01 01 — 01 — — — 01 — — — 0 — — — — — — — — — — — 1101 00 11 9000 1101 00 15 9100 1101 00 15 9130 1101 00 15 9150 1101 00 15 9170 1101 00 15 9180 1101 00 15 9190 1101 00 90 9000 1102 10 00 9500 1102 10 00 9700 1102 10 00 9900 1103 11 10 9200 1103 11 10 9400 1103 11 10 9900 1103 11 90 9200 1103 11 90 9800 — 01 01 01 01 01 — — 01 — — 01 01 — 01 — — 34,00 32,00 29,50 27,25 25,50 — — 67,00 — — 0 (2) 0 (2) — 0 (2) — (1) Os destinos são identificados do seguinte modo: 01 todos os países terceiros. (2) Se este produto contiver sêmolas aglomeradas, não será concedida nenhuma restituição. NB: As zonas são delimitadas pelo Regulamento (CEE) n. o 2145/92 da Comissão (JO L 214 de 30. 7. 1992, p. 20), alterado


title: 1999/795/CE: Decisão da Comissão, de 8 de Julho de 1999, relativa ao pedido de regime transitório apresentado pela Áustria em conformidade com o artigo 24.o da Directiva 96/92/CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho que estabelece regras comuns para o mercado interno da electricidade [notificada com o número C(1999) 1551/5] (Apenas faz fé o texto em língua alemã)

eurovoc_concepts:
Austria
approximation of laws
electrical energy
single market
transitional period (EU)

text: L 319/30 PT Jornal Oficial das Comunidades Europeias 11. 12. 1999 DECISˆO DA COMISSˆO de 8 de Julho de 1999 relativa ao pedido de regime transit(cid:243)rio apresentado pela `ustria em conformidade com o artigo 24. o da Directiva 96/92/CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho que estabelece regras comuns para o mercado interno da electricidade [notificada com o nœmero C(1999) 1551/5] (Apenas faz fØ o texto em l(cid:237)ngua alemª) (1999/795/CE) A COMISSˆO DAS COMUNIDADES EUROPEIAS, Tendo em conta o Tratado que institui a Comunidade Europeia, Tendo em conta a Directiva 96/92/CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho, de 19 de Dezembro de 1996, que estabelece regras comuns para o mercado interno da electricidade (1), e, nomeadamente, o seu artigo 24. o, Tendo informado os Estados-Membros do pedido apresentado pela `ustria, Considerando o seguinte: I. FACTOS 1. Procedimento (1) (2) (3) Por carta de 11 de Fevereiro de 1998, o Bundesministe- rium f(cid:252)r wirtschaftliche Angelegenheiten da `ustria noti- ficou a Comissªo de um pedido de regime transit(cid:243)rio em conformidade com o artigo 24. o da Directiva 96/92/CE. Em 23 de Mar(cid:231)o de 1998, os representantes da Comissªo empreenderam uma missªo explorat(cid:243)ria em Viena e reuniram-se com o Bundesministerium f(cid:252)r wirts- chaftliche Angelegenheiten da `ustria bem como com os representantes dos consumidores (parceiros sociais) e da indœstria de produ(cid:231)ªo de electricidade. Por carta de 15 de Outubro de 1998, o Bundesministe- rium f(cid:252)r wirtschaftliche Angelegenheiten da `ustria apresentou informa(cid:231)ıes complementares (cid:224) Comissªo, nomeadamente o relat(cid:243)rio final dos contabilistas e advo- gados independentes encarregados pelo Governo aus- tr(cid:237)aco de determinar o n(cid:237)vel previsto de pagamentos compensat(cid:243)rios decorrentes do regime transit(cid:243)rio em questªo. Com base neste relat(cid:243)rio, o Governo austr(cid:237)aco o pedido diminuiu de de 35 600 milhıes de xelins austr(cid:237)acos de custos irrecuperÆ- veis da notifica(cid:231)ªo inicial para um montante de 8 700 milhıes de xelins austr(cid:237)acos. transit(cid:243)rio regime 2. O sector da electricidade austr(cid:237)aco e a aplica(cid:231)ªo da Directiva 96/92/CE (4) A `ustria estÆ a aplicar a Directiva 96/92/CE atravØs da Elektrizit(cid:228)tswirtschafts- und -organisationsgesetz (a seguir designada «ElWOG»), publicada em 18 de Agosto de 1998 e que entrou em vigor em 19 de Fevereiro de 1999 bem como atravØs de leis complementares para os nove L(cid:228)nder. A ElWOG prevŒ uma abertura do mercado come(cid:231)ando com cerca de 2 % em Fevereiro de 1999 e aumentado atØ cerca de 50 % em 2003. De acordo com isto, na primeira fase sªo admiss(cid:237)veis os clientes finais com consumo anual superior a 40 GWh bem como os distribuidores, que sªo igualmente operadores de redes de transporte. A partir de Fevereiro de 2000, serªo admiss(cid:237)veis os clientes finais com consumo anual supe- rior a 20 GWh bem como todos os distribuidores com consumo anual superior a 40 GWh. Finalmente, em Fevereiro de 2003, serªo admiss(cid:237)veis todos os clientes finais e todos os distribuidores com consumo superior a 9 GWh por ano. A `ustria optou por um sistema de acesso (cid:224) rede regulamentado. (5) A (cid:214)sterreichische Elektrizit(cid:228)tswirtschafts AG («Verbund- gesellschaft») Ø o principal operador de rede de transpor- te. AtravØs das suas filiais separadas juridicamente, Ø igualmente o maior produtor de electricidade da `ustria. A maioria das nove empresas de electricidade regionais sªo nªo apenas distribuidoras mas tambØm produtoras; algumas delas sªo igualmente operadores de redes de transporte. 3. O regime transit(cid:243)rio notificado pelo Governo autr(cid:237)aco 3. 1. Introdu(cid:231)ªo (1) JO L 27 de 30. 1. 1997, p. 20. (6) A `ustria notificou dois regimes em conformidade com o artigo 24. o da Directiva 96/92/CE: 11. 12. 1999 PT Jornal Oficial das Comunidades Europeias L 319/31 (7) Garantias de funcionamento concedidas a centrais elØctricas com base no procedimento legal de autoriza(cid:231)ªo para centrais elØctricas anterior (cid:224) liberaliza(cid:231)ªo. As autoriza- (cid:231)ıes para determinados tipos de centrais elØctricas foram concedidas apenas ap(cid:243)s se ter avaliado a correspondente procura de electricidade (Bedarfspr(cid:252)fung). As centrais elØctricas que receberam a autoriza(cid:231)ªo beneficiaram de uma garantia de funcionamento e de uma garantia de amortiza(cid:231)ªo dos custos. Em rela(cid:231)ªo a estes casos, o regime de custos irrecuperÆveis procura compensar algu- mas centrais elØctricas da perda de receitas que se pode esperar com a redu(cid:231)ªo dos pre(cid:231)os resultante da intro- du(cid:231)ªo da concorrŒncia. (8) A notifica(cid:231)ªo final de 15 de Outubro de 1998 limita as centrais admiss(cid:237)veis para o regime transit(cid:243)rio a trŒs cen- trais hidroelØctricas: a Freudenau, a Mittlere Salzach e a Kraftwerkskette Obere Drau, todas elas exploradas por filiais da Verbundgesellschaft. (9) Contrato a longo prazo de compra de lignite aut(cid:243)ctone para a central elØctrica «Voitsberg». O contrato foi conclu(cid:237)do em 1977 entre a mina de lignite GKB e o operador da cen- tral elØctrica (cid:214)DK, uma filial da Verbundgesellschaft. Adicionalmente, a central elØctrica beneficia de uma garantia legal de funcionamento que pode ir atØ 3 % do consumo nacional anual de electricidade. O regime de custos irrecuperÆveis procura pois compensar esta cen- tral elØctrica: i) pela sua obriga(cid:231)ªo a longo prazo de comprar lignite a pre(cid:231)os superiores aos pre(cid:231)os mundiais de carvªo/lignite, e ii) pela perda de receitas esperada com a redu(cid:231)ªo dos pre(cid:231)os resultante da introdu(cid:231)ªo da concorrŒncia no que diz respeito (cid:224) garantia legal de fun- cionamento. 3. 2. Pormenores das garantias de funcionamento concedidas (cid:224)s centrais elØctricas e do contrato de compra de lignite de total custos irrecuperÆveis (10) O mØtodo proposto encontra-se definido no parÆgrafo 69 da ElWOG. PrevŒ o aux(cid:237)lio ao funcionamento para compensar custos irrecuperÆveis em rela(cid:231)ªo aos referidos compromissos e garantias de funcionamento. Em 11 de Fevereiro de 1998, a `ustria notificou preliminarmente um montante de 35 580 milhıes de xelins austr(cid:237)acos (aproximadamente 2 500 milhıes de euros). Em 15 de Outubro de 1998, foi apresentada uma notifica(cid:231)ªo final, baseada numa ava- lia(cid:231)ªo subsequente dos custos irrecuperÆveis por contabi- listas e advogados independentes, tendo o montante total de custos irrecuperÆveis diminu(cid:237)do para 8 700 milhıes de xelins autr(cid:237)acos (600 milhıes de euros) que consiste num mÆximo de 6 270 milhıes de xelins austr(cid:237)acos para as trŒs centrais hidroelØctricas e 2 430 milhıes de xelins austr(cid:237)acos para a central elØctrica a lignite. O regime transit(cid:243)rio tem uma dura(cid:231)ªo limitada atØ 2009. (11) M Ø t o d o d e c Æ l c u l o Numa primeira etapa, calcularam-se os custos irrecuperÆ- veis para cada central elØctrica como a diferen(cid:231)a actuali- zada entre a cobertura de custos garantida e o pre(cid:231)o de mercado esperado da electricidade tendo em conta a abertura real do mercado para cada empresa. Numa segunda etapa, avaliou-se em que medida seria afectada a viabilidade das empresas intervenientes consolidadas. (12) M Ø t o d o d e c o m p e n s a (cid:231) ª o No que diz respeito (cid:224)s trŒs centrais hidroelØctricas, o regime transit(cid:243)rio prevŒ a concessªo de um aux(cid:237)lio ao funcionamento, numa base anual, tendo em conta a evo- lu(cid:231)ªo dos pre(cid:231)os de mercado da electricidade e o conse- quente efeito na viabilidade das centrais em questªo. No que diz respeito (cid:224) central a lignite, prevŒ-se um paga- mento compensat(cid:243)rio fixo. (13) M Ø t o d o d e r e c u p e r a (cid:231) ª o O regime transit(cid:243)rio prevŒ que os pagamentos sejam financiados pelo recurso a uma imposi(cid:231)ªo por kWh de electricidade comprada por clientes admiss(cid:237)veis. Os clien- tes cativos pagam a sua quota proporcional inclu(cid:237)da na tarifa de electricidade regulamentada. Os fundos sªo recolhidos pelos operadores de redes (atravØs de uma taxa sobre o transporte) e sªo administrados pelo Minis- tØrio da Economia. II. AN`LISE JUR˝DICA 1. Base jur(cid:237)dica: n. os 1 e 2 do artigo 24. o da Directiva 96/92/CE (14) O Governo austr(cid:237)aco notificou um pedido de regime transit(cid:243)rio em rela(cid:231)ªo a alegados compromissos e garan- tias de funcionamento em conformidade com o artigo 24. o da directiva. 2. Requisitos do artigo 24. o (15) O artigo 24. o da Directiva 96/92/CE determina o seguinte «1. Os Estados-Membros em que os compromissos ou garantias de funcionamentos concedidos antes da entrada em vigor da presente directiva nªo possam ser cumpri- dos em virtude das disposi(cid:231)ıes desta poderªo solicitar a aplica(cid:231)ªo de um regime transit(cid:243)rio que lhes poderÆ ser concedido pela Comissªo, tendo nomeadamente em conta a dimensªo e o n(cid:237)vel de interliga(cid:231)ªo da rede em causa, assim como a estrutura da sua indœstria da electri- cidade. Esta institui(cid:231)ªo informarÆ os Estados-Membros desses pedidos antes de tomar uma decisªo, no respeito pelo princ(cid:237)pio da confidencialidade. Essa decisªo serÆ publicada no Jornal Oficial das Comunidades Europeias. L 319/32 PT Jornal Oficial das Comunidades Europeias 11. 12. 1999 2. Este regime transit(cid:243)rio terÆ uma dura(cid:231)ªo limitada e estarÆ ligado ao termo dos compromissos ou garantias a que se refere o n. o 1. O regime transit(cid:243)rio pode abranger derroga(cid:231)ıes aos cap(cid:237)tulos IV, VI e VII da presente directi- va. Os pedidos de aplica(cid:231)ªo do regime transit(cid:243)rio deverªo ser notificados (cid:224) Comissªo, o mais tardar um ano ap(cid:243)s a data de entrada em vigor da presente direc- tiva nos Estados-Membros. » (16) (cid:192) luz do Tratado CE, os n. os 1 e 2 do artigo 24. o da directiva exigem que a Comissªo, ao avaliar um pedido de regime transit(cid:243)rio, examine os seguintes elementos: A. Requisitos relativos (cid:224) natureza dos garantias de funcionamento em questªo compromissos ou (20) Como referido, para constituir um regime transit(cid:243)rio na acep(cid:231)ªo do artigo 24. o, o sistema escolhido pelo Estado- -Membro deve prever uma derroga(cid:231)ªo aos cap(cid:237)tulos IV, VI ou VII da Directiva 96/92/CE. (21) As medidas em questªo baseiam-se num simples regime de compensa(cid:231)ıes, ou seja, um sistema de taxas ou impo- si(cid:231)ıes aplicadas por um Estado-Membro a fim de com- pensar custos irrecuperÆveis causados pela aplica(cid:231)ªo da Directiva 96/92/CE. No caso em apre(cid:231)o, a aplica(cid:231)ªo de tais imposi(cid:231)ıes nªo exige uma derroga(cid:231)ªo aos cap(cid:237)tulos da directiva anteriormente citados e, por conseguinte, nªo pode considerar-se um regime transit(cid:243)rio na acep(cid:231)ªo do artigo 24. o da directiva. (17) 1. Deve provar-se a existŒncia de um compromisso ou (22) garantia de funcionamento. 2. O compromisso ou as garantias de funcionamento devem ter sido concedidos antes de 20 de Fevereiro de 1997. 3. Deve estabelecer-se um nexo de causalidade entre a entrada em vigor da directiva e a incapacidade para respeitar o compromisso. B. Requisitos relativos (cid:224)s medidas propostas para atingir os objectivos em questªo (18) 1. As medidas do regime transit(cid:243)rio tŒm que constituir derroga(cid:231)ıes aos cap(cid:237)tulos IV, VI e VII da directiva. 2. O regime transit(cid:243)rio tem de ter uma dura(cid:231)ªo limi- tada e estar ligado ao termo dos compromissos ou garantias de funcionamento em questªo. 3. O regime transit(cid:243)rio deve aplicar as medidas menos restritivas que sejam razoavelmente necessÆrias para atingir os objectivos em questªo, os quais tŒm igual- mente que ser objectivos leg(cid:237)timos. Ao decidir sobre estas questıes, a Comissªo deve ter em conta, nomeadamente, a dimensªo da rede em causa, o seu n(cid:237)vel de interliga(cid:231)ªo assim como a estrutura da sua indœstria de electricidade. 3. Avalia(cid:231)ªo do regime tansit(cid:243)rio austr(cid:237)aco (19) Neste caso, relativo ao regime transit(cid:243)rio tal como notifi- cado, nªo Ø necessÆrio determinar se os requisitos A. 1, A. 2, A. 3 ou B. 2, B. 3 sªo cumpridos pois as medidas do regime transit(cid:243)rio em questªo nªo exigem uma derro- ga(cid:231)ªo aos cap(cid:237)tulos IV, VI ou VII da directiva e, por con- seguinte, nªo cumprem o requisito B. 1 supra. Esta conclusªo nªo Ø afectada pelo facto de medidas como estas poderem resultar em grandes distor(cid:231)ıes do mercado œnico da electricidade. De facto, a Comissªo reconhece que o pagamento de tais imposi(cid:231)ıes pode ter consequŒncias econ(cid:243)micas essencialmente semelhantes (cid:224)s que resultam de uma derroga(cid:231)ªo total ou parcial de algu- mas obriga(cid:231)ıes contidas nos cap(cid:237)tulos IV, VI ou VII da directiva. Contudo, tais distor(cid:231)ıes, dada a sua natureza, nªo resultam de uma derroga(cid:231)ªo espec(cid:237)fica prevista na directiva. A transferŒncia de um pagamento compensat(cid:243)- rio a certos produtores de electricidade, financiado atra- vØs de uma imposi(cid:231)ªo ou uma taxa cobradas aos consu- midores Ø, por conseguinte, uma medida que nªo Ø directamente abordada pela directiva mas que necessita antes de ser examinada segundo as regras da concorrŒn- cia e, nomeadamente, o n. o 3, al(cid:237)nea c), do artigo 87. o do Tratado CE. Nesta hip(cid:243)tese, Ø (cid:243)bvio que as medidas de efeito econ(cid:243)mico semelhante serªo tratadas de forma coerente, independentemente do procedimento relevante em cada caso particular. (23) Tendo em conta a nªo aplicabilidade do artigo 24. o da directiva, nªo Ø pois necessÆrio avaliar os requisitos suplementares A. 1, A. 2, A. 3 e B. 2 e B. 3 supracitados. 4. Conclusªo (24) O regime transit(cid:243)rio notificado pelo Governo austr(cid:237)aco em conformidade com o artigo 24. o da Directiva 96/92/CE foi avaliado em conformidade com os n. os 1 e 2 do seu artigo 24. o A Comissªo conclui que nªo pode nem necessita ser aprovado a este respeito um regime transit(cid:243)rio nos termos do artigo 24. o, uma vez que as medidas escolhidas nªo constituem derroga(cid:231)ıes aos cap(cid:237)- tulos IV, VI e VII da directiva. O regime prevŒ transferŒn- cias de pagamentos compensat(cid:243)rios a certos produtores de electricidade, financiados por imposi(cid:231)ıes ou taxas cobradas aos consumidores. Tais medidas nªo sªo direc- tamente abordadas pela directiva mas necessitam de ser examinadas em conformidade com as regras relativas aos 11. 12. 1999 PT Jornal Oficial das Comunidades Europeias L 319/33 aux(cid:237)lios estatais e, nomeadamente, o n. o 3, al(cid:237)nea c), do artigo 87. o do Tratado CE, Artigo 2. o ADOPTOU A PRESENTE DECISˆO: Artigo 1. o A presente decisªo diz respeito ao pedido de regime transit(cid:243)rio apresentado pela `ustria em conformidade com o artigo 24. o da Directiva 96/92/CE, notificado (cid:224) Comissªo em 11 de Feve- reiro de 1998 e apresentado na sua versªo final em 15 de Outubro de 1998. Esta notifica(cid:231)ªo refere-se ao seguinte: a) garantias de funcionamento concedidas a trŒs centrais hidroelØctricas, b) um contrato de compra a longo prazo e uma garantia de funcionamento concedidos a uma central elØctrica a lignite. O regime transit(cid:243)rio notificado pela `ustria nªo contØm quais- quer medidas que constituam derroga(cid:231)ıes aos cap(cid:237)tulos IV, VI ou VII da Directiva 96/92/CE, tal como definidas no n. o 2 do seu artigo 24. o Por conseguinte, o artigo 24. o da directiva nªo Ø aplicÆvel ao regime transit(cid:243)rio notificado pelo Governo austr(cid:237)aco. Artigo 3. o A Repœblica da `ustria Ø a destinatÆria da presente decisªo. Feito em Bruxelas, em 8 de Julho de 1999. Pela Comissªo Christos PAPOUTSIS Membro da Comissªo


title: 1999/658/EHTY: Komission päätös, tehty 8 päivänä heinäkuuta 1999, Saksan Neue Maxhütte Stahlwerke GmbH i. K -yrityksen hyväksi suunnittelemasta toimenpiteestä (tiedoksiannettu numerolla K(1999) 2269) (ETA:n kannalta merkityksellinen teksti) (Ainoastaan saksankielinen teksti on todistusvoimainen)

eurovoc_concepts:
ECSC Treaty
Germany
State aid
control of State aid
iron and steel industry

text: 6. 10. 1999 FI Euroopan yhteisöjen virallinen lehti L 259/23 KOMISSION PÄÄTÖS, tehty 8 päivänä heinäkuuta 1999, Saksan Neue Maxhütte Stahlwerke GmbH i. K -yrityksen hyväksi suunnittelemasta toimenpiteestä (tiedoksiannettu numerolla K(1999) 2269) (Ainoastaan saksankielinen teksti on todistusvoimainen) (ETA:n kannalta merkityksellinen teksti) (1999/658/EHTY) EUROOPAN YHTEISÖJEN KOMISSIO, joka ottaa huomioon Euroopan hiili- ja teräsyhteisön perustamisso- pimuksen ja erityisesti sen 4 artiklan c alakohdan, ottaa huomioon Euroopan talousalueesta tehdyn sopimuksen ja erityisesti sen 62 artiklan 1 kohdan a alakohdan yhdessä pöytä- kirjan 14 kanssa, ottaa huomioon yhteisön säännöistä valtion tuesta terästeolli- suudelle 18 päivänä joulukuuta 1996 tehdyn komission päätöksen N:o 2496/96/EHTY (1), on kehottanut näiden määräysten mukaisesti (2) huomautukset, asianomaisia esittämään huomautuksensa ja ottaa huomioon nämä sekä katsoo seuraavaa: I Menettely 1) Saksa ilmoitti komissiolle 5 päivänä toukokuuta 1998 päivätyllä kirjeellä kahdesta Baijerin osavaltion suunnit- telemasta toimenpiteestä Neue Maxhütte Stahlwerke GmbH:n (jäljempänä ’NMH’) hyväksi: 3) 4) ilmoitti Saksalle 1 päivänä helmikuuta 1999 päivätyllä kirjeellä päätöksestään aloittaa mainituista toimenpiteistä päätöksen N:o 2496/96/EHTY 6 artiklan 5 kohdan mukainen menettely. tehty yhteisöjen aloittamisesta julkaistiin Menettelyn Euroopan lehdessä (3). Komissio virallisessa kehotti samalla asianomaisia esittämään huomautuk- sensa. Saadut huomautukset toimitettiin Saksalle, jotta se voisi ottaa niihin kantaa. päätös II Toimenpiteiden yksityiskohtainen kuvaus Baijerin osavaltion ja Thyssen Edelstahlwerke AG:n, Thyssen Stahl AG:n, Lech-Stahlwerke GmbH:n, Saarstahl Völklingen GmbH:n, Krupp Stahl AG:n, Klöckner Stahl GmbH:n ja Mannesmann Röhrenwerke AG:n 4 päivänä marraskuuta 1987 tekemän sopimuksen (jäljempänä ’sopimus’) mukaisesti konkurssin tehneen Eisenwerkge- sellschaft Maximilianshütte mbH Sulzbach-Rosenbergin toimintoja jatkettiin vastaperustetussa NMH:ssa. 5) Sopimuksessa määrätään muun muassa seuraavaa: a) 697 700 Saksan markan suuruisen summan maksa- minen NMH:lle niiden kustannusten korvaamiseksi, joita NMH:lle aiheutui vuonna 1994 alueellaan sijait- sevan kuonavuoren osittaisen sortumisen estämisestä; b) NMH:n vapauttaminen 2 213 274 Saksan markan kustannuksista, joita aiheutui kuonavuoreen liittyvistä toisista turvatoimenpiteistä. Kuten 7—12 kohdassa esitetään, Saksa ei katso näiden toimenpiteiden muodostavan tukea. tehtiin EHTY:n perustamissopimuksen 86 artiklan ja päätöksen N:o 2496/96/EHTY:n 6 artiklan 2 kohdan mukaisesti, jossa jäsenvaltioita edellytetään ilmoittamaan kaikista valtion varoilla toteutetuista rahoitustoimenpiteistä riip- pumatta siitä, ovatko ne tukea. Ilmoitus 6) 7) 2) Saksa toimitti komissiolle 30 päivänä kesäkuuta, 13 päivänä elokuuta, 15 päivänä lokakuuta ja 1 päivänä joulukuuta 1998 päivätyillä kirjeillä lisätietoja. Komissio ”5. 5 Tehtaan haltuunotto tapahtuu ilman vanhoja rasitteita. Jos haltuunotto ilman vanhoja rasitteita ei ole mahdollista, Baijerin osavaltio varmistaa, siitä syntyvät taloudelliset velvoitteet eivät koske MHN- yritystä (toisin sanoen NMH:ta). ” että Tämä määräys poikkeaa Saksan lainsäädännön tavan- joiden mukaan omistaja on omaisista määräyksistä, vastuussa teollisuusalueestaan. NMH:n teollisuusalueella sijaitsevan kuonavuoren etelä- rinteelle syntyi vuonna 1994 suuria halkeamia. Geotek- nisen toimiston (Prof. Dr. Schuler und Dr. -Ing. Gödecke) antaman lausunnon mukaan vaarana oli, että nämä muutokset johtaisivat välittömästi osittaisiin sortumiin. Sen vuoksi väliaikaisena turvatoimenpiteenä kuona- vuoren etelärinteelle rakennettiin tukipengerrys terästeh- taalla syntyvästä kuonajätteestä. NMH toteutti nämä työt vuonna 1994, ja niistä aiheutui 697 700 Saksan markan kustannukset. (1) EYVL L 338, 28. 12. 1996, s. 42. (2) EYVL C 108, 17. 4. 1999, s. 9. (3) Ks. alaviite 2. L 259/24 FI Euroopan yhteisöjen virallinen lehti 6. 10. 1999 8) 9) jotka Vuonna 1996 kuonavuoren etelärinteellä ilmeni uusia halkeamia, saman geoteknisen toimiston 23 päivänä syyskuuta 1997 antaman lausunnon mukaan voisivat johtaa uusiin sortumiin etelärinteellä. Kuona- vuoren sortumisen estämiseksi katsottiin sen vuoksi vält- suurentaa ja vahvistaa vuonna 1994 tämättömäksi rakennettua tukipengerrystä. a) korvata NMH:lle ensimmäisistä turvatoimenpiteistä 697 700 Saksan markkaa; b) vapauttaa NMH:n toisesta turvatoimenpide-erästä aiheutuneista 2 213 274 Saksan markan kustannuk- sista. Niinpä Baijerin osavaltio vaati syyskuussa 1997 NMH:ta ryhtymään valttämättömiin rakennustöihin. NMH kiel- täyi väittäen sen kuuluvan Baijerin osavaltion vastuulle sopimuksen 5. 5 kohdan nojalla. Sen jälkeen Baijerin osavaltio päätti aloittaa työt itse soveltaen lainsäädäntöä, jonka mukaan valtio voi vaaratilanteissa toteuttaa toimenpiteet itse omistajan laskuun (”Ersatzvornahme”) 13) Ilmoituksen jälkeen käydyssä kirjeenvaihdossa Saksa on kuitenkin myöntänyt, että suurta osaa kuonavuoresta on käytetty kunnan ja jätteiden varastointiin sekä uudelleen- käyttöön (kunnan valmistelu tienrakenriukseen). Saksan tietojen mukaan nämä toiminnot kuitenkin toteutettiin vuoren toisella puolella ja etelärinne pysyi koskematto- mana. Sen vuoksi etelärinteen sortumavaara on yksin- omaan seurausta vanhoista rasitteista. 10) Tässä yhteydessä Baijerin osavaltio antoi geotekniselle toimistolle Prof. Dr. Schuler und Dr. -Ing. Gödeckelle tehtäväksi töiden valvonnan ja MH Dienstleistungen GmbH & KG:lle rakennustyöt. Marraskuussa 1998 kokonaiskustannukset töiden päätökseen nousivat 2 213 274 Saksan markkaan. saatujen Saksa on osoittanut, että rakennusurakoitsijan lasku oli alun perin oletettua pienempi. Geotekninen toimisto hyväksyi laskun. 11) 12) konkurssia kaatopaikkana. Ilmoituksen mukaan kuonavuorta käytettiin jo ennen Maximilianshütten Sen vuoksi sortumavaara oli seurausta pelkästään kaatopaik- ja vahingon on sen vuoksi katsottava kana käytöstä, olevan seurausta vanhoista rasitteista. Vaikka NMH onkin käyttänyt 500 tonnia kuonaa tien rakentamiseen etelärinteelle voidakseen tarkkailla vaarallista aluetta, ei tämä ole vaikuttanut mitenkään kuonavuoren tilanteen turvatoimenpiteet olivat pahenemiseen, välttämättömiä (1). Lisäksi Saksa vahvisti, että NMH ei saanut taloudellista hyötyä kuonavuoren käytöstä, koska NMH olisi muussa tapauksessa myynyt tien rakentami- sessa käytetyt 500 tonnia kuonaa. jonka vuoksi Tästä syystä Saksa pitää NMH:n sopimuksen 5. 5 kohdan nojalla esittämää vaatimusta ja tämän vaatimuksen suuruutta oikeutettuina. Se muistuttaa komissiota siitä, että komissio hyväksyi sopimuksen 27 päivänä kesä- kuuta 1989 tekemässään päätöksessä (ei ja vahvisti NMH:n hyväksi toteutetusta tukitoimenpiteestä 4 päivänä huhtikuuta 1995 tehdyssä päätöksessä 95/ 422/EHTY (2), että määräys ei muodosta valtiontukea. Saksan mukaan tämä vahvistetaan myös ympäristönsuo- jeluun myönnettävää valtiontukea koskevien suuntavii- vojen 3. 2. 2 kohdassa (3). Sen vuoksi Saksa katsoo, että nämä toimenpiteet eivät sisällä tukea. Niinpä se aikoo julkaistu) (1) Tämä vahvistettiin Prof. Dr. Schuler und Dr. -Ing. Gödecke -nimisessä geoteknisessä toimistossa toimivan insinööri Gödecken 23 päivänä ilmoituksen liitteenä. syyskuuta 1997 laatimassa raportissa, joka oli (2) EYVL L 253, 21. 10. 1995, s. 22. (3) EYVL C 72, 10. 3. 1994, s. 3. 14) Komissio aloitti 9 päivänä joulukuuta 1998 päätöksen N:o 2496/96/EHTY 6 artiklan 5 kohdan mukaisen menettelyn seuraavista syistä: 1. Se epäili sen väitteen todenmukaisuutta, että etelärin- teelle ei varastoida kuonaa. 2. Se pelkäsi, että kuonavuoren muilla puolilla harjoitet- tavat toiminnot voisivat vaikuttaa etelärinteeseen. 3. Se katsoi, että NMH käytti tätä vuorta, jota on pidet- tävä yhtenä ainoana alueena, ja sai siitä taloudellista on hyötyä. Toimenpiteiden tarkoitus pitää NMH:n käyttämä kaatopaikka toimin- nassa. Tämä on vastoin ”saastuttaja maksaa” -periaa- tetta. rahoituksen avulla 15) Sen vuoksi komissio katsoi, että toimenpiteet muodos- tavat päätöksen N:o 2496/96/EHTY 1 artiklassa tarkoi- tetun valtiontuen. III Asianomaisten huomautukset 16) Komissio sai kolmansilta seuraavat huomautukset: 1. Ympäristönsuojeluryhmä B. I. Rosenbergin edustaja Zager katsoo, että NMH käyttää kuonavuorta sekä varastointi- että uudelleenkäyttötarkoituksiin, mutta ei pysty vahvistamaan, että NMH käyttää tai on käyt- tänyt etelärinnettä. 2. Yhdistyneen kuningaskunnan terästuottajien yhdistys tulisi joista NMH on vastuussa ja (UK Steel Association) katsoo, että tukea ei myöntää toiminnoille, kantaa riskin. 3. Federazione Imprese Siderurgiche Italiane (Federac- ciai) katsoo, että koska NMH:lta ei ole mahdollista periä takaisin yhteismarkkinoille soveltumattomia 74 miljoonan Saksan markan tukia, yritykselle ei tulisi antaa uutta pääomaa. 6. 10. 1999 FI Euroopan yhteisöjen virallinen lehti L 259/25 IV Saksan huomautukset 17) 18) Saksa on toistanut, että NMH ei ole varastoinut kuonaa vuoren etelärinteelle. Käyttäen todistusaineenaan karttoja ja valokuvia, joiden mukaan kuonavuori muodostaa todellisuudessa 21 hehtaarin suuruisen alueen, Saksa väittää, että NMH:n varastointi- ja uudelleenkäyttötoiminnoissa käyttämät osat sijaitsevat kaukana etelärinteestä. Sen vuoksi nämä toiminnot eivät voi vaikuttaa etelärinteeseen. Lisäksi Saksa toteaa, että asiantuntijat, tutkineet kuonan käytöstä tienrakennukseen aiheutuvia vaiku- tuksia, tutkimustuloksiaan, vaikka eivät muuttaneet saivatkin tiedon näistä toiminnoista. jotka ovat 19) Tästä syystä Saksa kiistää komission toteamuksen, että kuonavuori muodostaa yhden ainoan yhtenäisen alueen. Vaikka vuoren yhtä osaa käytetäänkin, koskee sopi- muksen 5. 5 kohta Saksan mielestä edelleen vuoren muita osia. V Toimenpiteen arviointi 20) 21) NMH kuuluu EHTY:n perustamissopimuksen 80 artiklan soveltamisalaan, koska se tuottaa EHTY:n perustamisso- pimuksen liitteessä I lueteltuja tuotteita ja maksaa EHTY:n perustamissopimuksen 49 artiklassa tarkoitet- tuja maksuja. Sen vuoksi EHTY:n perustamissopimusta ja päätöstä N:o 2496/96/EHTY on sovellettava. Päätöksen N:o 2496/96/EHTY 3 artiklan nojalla ympä- ristönsuojelutukea yhteismarkkinoille voidaan pitää soveltuvana, jos se on ympäristönsuojeluun myönnet- tävää valtiontukea koskevissa yhteisön suuntaviivoissa annettujen sääntöjen mukaista sekä päätöksen N:o 2496/96/EHTY liitteessä niiden soveltamisesta EHTY:n terästeollisuuteen annettujen perusteiden mukaista. 22) Suuntaviivojen 3. 2. 2 kohdassa todetaan seuraavaa: ”Investointitukia koskevat säännöt koskevat yleensä myös investointeja ympäristövahinkojen poistamiseen, esimerkiksi saastuneiden teollisuustonttien puhdistami- seen. Kun saastumisen aiheuttajaa ei voida nimetä tai asettaa vastuuseen, tontin puhdistamiseen myönnetyt tuet voidaan jättää EY:n perustamissopimuksen 92 artiklan 1 kohdan soveltamisalan ulkopuolelle, jos tuet eivät tuo ansiotonta taloudellista hyötyä tietyille yrityk- sille tai teollisuudenaloille. Tällaiset tuet tutkitaan tapaus- kohtaisesti. ” Kuten menettelyn aloittamisesta tehdyssä päätöksessä todetaan, komissio hyväksyi sopimuksen 27 päivänä kesäkuuta 1989 tehdyssä päätöksessään (ei julkaistu). Tässä päätöksessä ei arvioitu erikseen sopimuksen 5. 5 kohtaa, mutta päätöksessä 95/422/EHTY (1) selvästi tehtiin niin. Tässä päätöksessä komissio vahvisti, että 5. 5 kohdan nojalla toteutetut toimenpiteet eivät ole tukea. Komissio otti huomioon suuren ja arvaamattoman riskin joutua vastuuseen ympäristövahingoista, jotka on aiheu- tettu aikaisemmin toisen yritysjohdon alaisuudessa. llman tällaista sopimusta ei olisi mitään mahdollisuutta myydä tällaisia maa-alueita, minkä seurauksena monet teollisuustontit jäisivät käyttämättömiksi. Ottaessaan vastuulleen aikaisemmin tapahtuneesta saastuttamisesta aiheutuvan taloudellisen riskin valtio toimii ainoastaan julkisen edun mukaisesti eikä tontinomistaja saa siitä taloudellista hyötyä. Koska sopimuksen 5. 5 kohta koskee aikaisemmin saastuneita maa-alueita ja laitoksia, ei kyseessä ole tuki. Yhteisön suuntaviivojen mukaan tämän määräyksen soveltamista on kuitenkin arvioitava tapauskohtaisesti. On todettava, täyttyvätkö 3. 2. 2 kohdassa mainitut edel- lytykset, nimittäin a) onko NMH itse aiheuttanut saastu- misen tai vahingon ja b) eikö toimenpiteistä koidu NMH:lle ilmaista taloudellista hyötyä. Saksan toimittamien tietojen ja kolmansien huomau- tusten perusteella voidaan päätellä, että NMH ei ole varastoinut kuonaa vuoren etelärinteelle. Ei ole todisteita väittämälle, että kuonan käyttäminen tienrakennukseen on vaikuttanut alueen eteläosaan. Saksan toimittamien tietojen perusteella ei voida myöskään päätellä, että toiminta kuonavuoren muilla osina olisi vaikuttanut haitallisesti etelärinteeseen. Varastointi- ja uudelleenkäyt- tötarkoituksissa käytetyt alueet sijaitsevat useiden satojen metrien päässä vaaranalaisesta alueesta, eikä näiden toimintojen ja alueen tilan muutoksen välillä ole yhteyttä. Saksa on osoittanut, että 500 tonnin käyttäminen tienra- kennukseen on ainut NMH:n etelärinteellä toteuttama toimenpide taloudellista hyötyä. NMH olisi muussa tapauksessa myynyt tämän kuonan kuonan käytöstä sen vuoksi ollut yritykselle taloudellista hyötyä. siitä ollut yritykselle tienrakennusalan yrityksille, eikä eikä 24) 25) 26) 27) Saksan toimittamat tiedot osoittavat, että 21 hehtaarin suuruinen alue on laaja ja että yksittäisiä toimintoja harjoitetaan toisistaan erillään. 23) Tämän määräyksen avulla on tarkoitus välttää teollisuus- tonttien hylkääminen, kun ostajaehdokkaalla ei ole suojaa kyseisen tontin (osan) aikaisemmasta käytöstä aiheutuvia vaatimuksia vastaan. Tämän vuoksi komissio päättelee, että kuonavuori voidaan jakaa alueisiin. (1) Edellä 12 kohta; ks: päätöksen 9 kohta. L 259/26 FI Euroopan yhteisöjen virallinen lehti 6. 10. 1999 saatavat NMH:n vuoren käytöstä saamista taloudellisista eduista huolimatta (varastointipaikka, jätteiden uudelleenkäy- töstä tulot) yhteisön suuntaviivojen 3. 2. 2 kohtaa voidaan soveltaa. Se, että teollisuustontista osaa käytetään taloudellisiin tarkoituksiin eikä se siten kuulu sopimuksen 5. 5 kohdan soveltamisalaan, ei tarkoita sitä, teollisuustontin että muihin osiin. Päinvastainen päätelmä olisi liioiteltu ja vastoin tällaisen määräyksen ja yhteisön politiikan tavoitteita. tätä määräystä sovellettaisi ei VI Päätelmä 28) Komissio päättelee, että Saksan Neue Maxhütte Stahl- werke GmbH i. K:n hyväksi suunnittelemat toimenpiteet, nimittäin a) 697 700 Saksan markan suuruisen summan maksa- minen NMH:lle niiden kustannusten korvaamiseksi, joita NMH:lle aiheutui vuonna 1994 alueellaan sijait- sevan kuonavuoren osittaisen sortumisen estämisestä; b) NMH:n vapauttaminen 2 213 274 Saksan markan kustannuksista, joita aiheutui kuonavuoreen liittyvistä toisista turvatoimenpiteistä, koskevat vanhoja rasitteita. Päätöksen N:o 2496/96/ EHTY 3 artiklan ja yhteisön suuntaviivojen 3. 2. 2 kohdan ja käsittelemiensä ennakkotapausten perus- mukaisesti teella komissio katsoo sen vuoksi, että kyseiset toimenpi- teet eivät ole tukea, ON TEHNYT SEURAAVAN PÄÄTÖKSEN: 1 artikla Saksan Neue Maxhütte Stahlwerke GmbH i. K:n hyväksi suun- nittelema 2 911 274 Saksan markan (1 488 190 euron) suuruinen toimenpide ei ole EHTY:n perustamissopimuksen 4 artiklan c alakohdassa tarkoitettua tukea. Sen vuoksi toimenpide saadaan toteuttaa. 2 artikla Tämä päätös on osoitettu Saksan liittotasavallalle. Tehty Brysselissä 8 päivänä heinäkuuta 1999. Komission puolesta Karel VAN MIERT Komission jäsen