title: Explanatory Report on the Convention on the fight against corruption involving officials of the European Communities or officials of Member States of the European Union (Text approved by the Council on 3 December 1998)

text: 15. 12. 98 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 391/1 (Acts adopted under Title VI of the Treaty on European Union) on the Convention on the fight against corruption involving officials of the European Communities or officials of Member States of the European Union EXPLANATORY REPORT (Text approved by the Council on 3 December 1998) (98/C 391/01) I. INTRODUCTION The criminal law in the Member States of the European Union, as virtually everywhere in the world, contains provisions to combat the active and passive corruption of national officials. While the definitions of offences of corruption may vary from Member State to Member State, they have elements in common which make it possible to arrive at a common definition. From an international rather than the national perspective, it has long been recognised that the principal weakness in the fight against corruption with transnational features has been the fact that criminal law in the Member States has often failed to address the issue of the corruption of foreign officials and officials employed by international organisations. Indeed, the definition of ‘public officer’ or official, for the purposes of applying internal criminal law, is in many Member States only applicable to national officials; even if the term is not more narrowly defined, it is often interpreted restrictively. Thus, the criminal law in most Member States does not extend to the criminalisation of conduct aimed at corrupting officials of other Member States, even where it took place in their own territory or at the instigation of one of their own nationals (1). Even if the criminal conduct can in certain circumstances be prosecuted using charges other than corruption such as fraud or breach of trust, the chances are that the corruption itself would go unpunished. This situation, which had long been the focus of attention in international forums (in particular the OECD (2) and the Council of Europe) and the subject of numerous recommendations and resolutions, has become increasingly intolerable in the European Union owing to the tightening links between its Member States and their common membership of the European Community, a supranational organisation founded on the rule of law, with its own institutions and a large staff of officials. Quite apart from the question of principle, this state of affairs frequently hampers the process of judicial cooperation between Member States, where the double criminality condition has not been fulfilled. An initial response to this state of affairs was the drawing up by the Council on 27 September 1996 of the Protocol (3) to the Convention of 26 July 1995 on the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests (4); the said Protocol was also a response to point 7(h) of the (1) See Commission communication to the European Parliament and the Council on a Union policy against corruption (COM(97) 192 final), p. 3. (2) After the conclusion of this Convention, an OECD Convention on combating bribery of foreign public officials in international transactions was concluded and opened for signature on 17 December 1997. (3) OJ C 313, 23. 10. 1996, p. 1. (4) OJ C 316, 27. 11. 1995, p. 49. C 391/2 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 15. 12. 98 Council resolution of 6 December 1994 on the legal protection of the financial interests of the Communities (1), which stated: ‘Member States should take effective measures to punish bribery involving officials of the European Communities in relation to the financial interests of the Communities’. However, owing to the subject matter of the parent Convention, the Protocol could only require Member States to punish conduct relating to fraud against the financial interests of the European Communities, i. e. according to the definition in Articles 2 and 3 of the Protocol, an act or omission ‘which damages or is likely to damage the European Communities’ financial interests’. In 1996 the Italian Government tabled a draft Convention in order to ensure that all corrupt conduct involving Community officials or Member States’ officials, and not just that which is linked to fraud against the Communities’ financial interests, was criminalised. While based largely on the provisions and definitions on which delegations had agreed in the earlier discussions on the Protocol, it was nonetheless a proposal for a free-standing act of general application and contained the requisite additional provisions on judicial cooperation and jurisdiction of the Court of Justice. Following this initiative, on 26 May 1997 the Council adopted the Act drawing up the Convention on the fight against corruption involving officials of the European Communities or officials of Member States of the European Union (2). The operation of that Convention will also contribute to the proper functioning of the internal market and to the implementation of political guideline No 13 of the action plan of 28 April 1997 to combat organised crime (3), approved by the 1997 Amsterdam European Council. It should be noted that parts of this Explanatory Report have been elaborated on the basis of the comments in the Explanatory Reports on the 1995 Convention on the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests (4) and on the 1996 Protocol thereto (5). II. COMMENTARY ON THE ARTICLES Article 1 Definitions These categories are defined by reference to their respective statuses. This introductory provision defines the terms ‘official’, ‘national official’ for the ‘Community official’ and purposes of the Convention wherever the terms are used in it. 1. 1. The general definition of ‘official’ in point (a) covers various categories of persons, Community officials and national officials, including national officials of another Member State, in order to the broadest and most homogenous ensure application possible of the substantive provisions of the Convention in the fight against corruption. (1) OJ C 355, 14. 12. 1994, p. 2. (2) OJ C 195, 25. 6. 1997, p. 1. (3) OJ C 251, 15. 8. 1997, p. 1. (4) OJ C 191, 23. 6. 1997, p. 1. (5) OJ C 11, 15. 1. 1998, p. 5. 1. 2. Point (b) applies to ‘Community officials’, which means not only permanent officials stricto sensu, covered by the Staff Regulations of officials of the European Communities, but also the various categories of staff engaged on contract under the Conditions of Employment of other servants. It includes national experts seconded to the European Communities to carry out functions equivalent to those performed by Community officials and other servants. Members of the Community institutions, the Commission, the European Parliament, the Court 15. 12. 98 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 391/3 of Justice of the European Communities and the European Court of Auditors, are not covered by this definition but are dealt with in Article 4 of the Convention. — the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work (11), — the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (12), 1. 3. The last sentence of point (b) brings the staff of bodies established under Community law within ‘Community official’. This the definition of concerns at present: — the European Central Bank (13), — the Community Plant Variety Office (14), — the European Agency for Cooperation (1), — the European Investment Bank (2), — the European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (3), — the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (4), — the European University Institute in Florence (5), — the European Investment Fund (6), — the European Environment Agency (7), — the European Training Foundation (8), — the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (9), — the European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products (10), (1) Council Regulation 16. 11. 1981, p. 1). (EEC) No 3245/81 (OJ L 328, (2) Articles 198d and 198e of the EC Treaty. (3) Council Regulation (EEC) No 337/75 (OJ L 39, 13. 2. 1975, p. 1). Regulation as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 354/95 (OJ L 41, 23. 2. 1995, p. 1). (4) Council Regulation (OJ L 139, 30. 5. 1975, p. 1). Regulation as amended by Regulation (EEC) No 1947/93 (OJ L 181, 23. 7. 1993, p. 13). (EEC) No 1365/75 (5) Convention setting up a European University Institute (OJ C 29, 9. 2. 1976, p. 1). (6) Statute of the European Investment Fund (OJ L 173, 7. 7. 1994, p. 1; see also Article 30 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European Investment Bank and Article 239 of the EC Treaty. (EEC) No 1210/90 (OJ L 120, (7) Council Regulation 11. 5. 1990, p. 1). (8) Council Regulation (OJ L 131, 23. 5. 1990, p. 1). Regulation as amended by Regulation (EC) No 2063/94 (OJ L 216, 20. 8. 1994, p. 9). (EEC) No 1360/90 (9) Council Regulation (EEC) No 302/93 (OJ L 36, 12. 2. 1993, p. 1). Regulation as amended by Regulation (EC) No 3294/94 (OJ L 341, 30. 12. 1994, p. 7). (10) Council Regulation (OJ L 214, 24. 8. 1993, p. 1). Regulation as amended by Regulation (EC) No 649/98 (OJ L 88, 24. 3. 1998, p. 7). (EEC) No 2309/93 — the Translation Centre for the Bodies of the Union (15), — the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (16). This provision concerns personnel of existing or future bodies responsible in a very broad sense for applying Community legislation, already enacted or yet to be enacted under the Community Treaties. 1. 4. Point (c) defines the concept of ‘national official’ in terms of an official or public officer as defined in the national law of each Member State for the purposes of its own criminal law. The definition in the criminal law of the official’s home State is thus given priority. Where a national official of the prosecuting Member State is involved, this clearly means that its national definition is applicable. Where, however, an official of another Member State is involved, this means that the definition in the law of that Member State should normally be applied by the prosecuting Member State. If the person concerned would not have had the status of official under the law of that State, that definition may not be decisive. This is clear from the second subparagraph of point (c), according to which a Member State is not bound to apply another Member States’ definition of ‘national official’ (11) Council Regulation (OJ L 216, 20. 8. 1994, p. 1). Regulation as amended by Regulation (EC) No 1643/95 (OJ L 156, 7. 7. 1995, p. 1). (EEC) No 2062/94 (12) Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 (OJ L 11, 14. 1. 1994, p. 1). Regulation as amended by Regulation (EC) No 2868/95 (OJ L 303, 15. 12. 1995, p. 1). (13) Article 4a of the EC Treaty; Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, annexed to the Treaty on European Union. (14) Council Regulation (EC) No 2100/94 (OJ L 227, 1. 9. 1994, p. 1). Regulation as amended by Regulation (EC) No 2506/95 (OJ L 258, 28. 10. 1995, p. 3). (15) Council Regulation (EC) No 2965/94 (OJ L 314, 7. 12. 1994, p. 1). Regulation as amended by Regulation (EC) No 2610/95 (OJ L 268, 10. 11. 1995, p. 1). (16) Council Regulation (EC) No 1035/97 (OJ L 151, 10. 6. 1997, p. 1). C 391/4 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 15. 12. 98 except in so far as that definition is compatible with its national law and may therefore opt to determine involving that corruption offences national officials of another Member State refer only to such officials whose status is compatible with its own definition of national officials. While there is no specific obligation to do so, a Member State may make a declaration to the effect that it has decided to make general use of this option. It should be noted that in general the reference to the law of the official’s Member State means that due account can be taken of specific national situations regarding the status of persons exercising public functions. does Article 4(2) and (3), however, shows that the ‘national concept not of official’ automatically include members of Parliament, ministers, members of the highest courts or members of a court of auditors in the Member States. However, this does not preclude any Member State from extending its own definition of ‘national official’ these categories of persons. to one or more of Article 2 Passive corruption Article 2 defines the elements of the offence of passive the Convention’s other corruption. Like many of provisions, the wording is substantially modelled, with the necessary adjustments, on that of the corresponding articles of the Protocol to the Convention on the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests (hereinafter ‘the first Protocol’). 2. 1. Paragraph 1 enumerates a series of elements constituting corruption of an official, of which intent is a necessary component. 2. 2. The material components of corruption include requesting, accepting and receiving certain things, ‘directly or through an intermediary’. This includes: — a unilateral act by an official who requests a benefit for himself by letting it be known to another person, explicitly or implicitly, that he will have to ‘pay’ to have some official act done or abstained from; immaterial whether the request is acted on, the request itself being the core of the offence, is it — acceptance or receipt by the offender of certain things pursuant to a meeting of minds between himself and the giver; the offence is complete when consents have been exchanged, even if the official subsequently waives performance of the agreement or returns the thing received. The Convention makes no distinction between direct and indirect means of corruption. The fact that an intermediary may be involved, which would extend the scope of passive corruption to include indirect action by the official, necessarily entails identifying the criminal nature of the official’s conduct irrespective of the good or bad faith of the intermediary involved. 2. 3. The offence also covers the cases where an official, for example, requests a gift or another advantage not for himself but for a third party, such as a spouse or a partner, a close friend, a political party or other organisation. 2. 4. The elements that constitute the material substance of the corruption include offers, promises or advantages of any kind whatsoever for the benefit of the official or of any other person. ‘Advantages of any kind whatsoever’ is a deliberately broad concept, embracing not only material objects (money, precious objects, goods of all kinds, services rendered) but also anything that might represent an interest, such as settlement of the corrupted person’s debts, work on property belonging to him. This list is not exhaustive. The concept of advantage, requested, received or promised, covers all kinds of material or intangible advantages. indirect For the purposes of the Convention, the point in time at which things constituting the substance of the corruption are given or provided is immaterial. By expressly covering the acceptance of promises, paragraph 1 catches deferred payments, provided their origin lies in a criminal agreement between the corrupted and the corruptor. 15. 12. 98 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 391/5 2. 5. The provision is worded so that the request or acceptance must predate the official’s act or omission since the text states clearly that: ‘the. action of an official who. requests, or receives advantages. or accepts a promise. to act or refrain from acting. ’. Article 3 Active corruption Within the meaning of this provision, therefore, where an advantage is received after an act has been performed without there having been a prior request or acceptance, there will be no obligation on Member States to introduce criminal liability. This Article does not apply either to gifts that are not related to any subsequent act by the official in the performance of his duties. Under Article 11 of the Convention, there is of course nothing to prevent Member States who so wish that from also criminalising corruption consists in receiving an advantage requested or accepted after the official has performed the act in breach of his official duties. This Article describes the components of the offence of active corruption of an official. The provision is the corollary of the offence defined in Article 2, seen from the corruptor’s side; it is in particular intended to ensure that public administration functions properly and from possible to protect officials manoeuvres targeting them, on the understanding that in most Member States active and passive corruption are distinct, autonomous offences, for which distinct, autonomous prosecutions may be brought. Paragraph 1 identifies forms of punishable conduct on the part of the corruptor that constitute active corruption of an official. 2. 6. The Convention applies to conduct that is related to an official’s functions or duties. The Convention applies to performance of, or abstention from performing, any act within the powers of the holder of the office or function by virtue of any law or regulation (official duty) in so far as the acts are carried out in breach of the official’s duties. 3. 1. Any ‘deliberate action of whosoever promises or gives. an advantage. ’ refers to the corruptor, whatever the capacity (business, public service, etc. ) in which he acts; the corruptor may be a private individual acting as such or for a company, or a person exercising a public function. The laws of certain Member States also cover cases where an official, contrary to his official duty to act impartially, receives an advantage in return for acting in accordance which this function (e. g. by giving preferential treatment by accelerating or suspending the processing of a case). These cases are covered by the present Article. The act constituting corruption must be done intentionally, that is to say from a deliberate desire to have the official perform acts that are contrary to the duties attached to public service. Whether or not the offence exists in cases where the corruptor acts deliberately but is mistaken as to the authority which he believes is vested in the official will be a matter for determination in accordance with Member States’ national law. 2. 7. Paragraph 2 requires Member States to enact the law measures needed to ensure that criminal conduct of the type described in paragraph 1 is made a criminal offence. It is therefore up to the Member States to see whether their current criminal law does indeed cover all the relevant categories of persons and forms of conduct and, if not, to enact measures establishing one or more offences corresponding to them. They may do so either by establishing one offence of a general nature or by establishing several specific offences. 3. 2. The corruptor’s action may consist in promising or giving, directly or through an intermediary, a material or intangible advantage of any kind whatsoever, irrespective of whether the offer is acted on and the advantage materialises. The corrupt manoeuvre could be unilateral or bilateral; it could relate to a material or an intangible thing: the concept of advantage must be taken in its broadest possible sense, bearing in mind points 2. 4 and 2. 5. C 391/6 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 15. 12. 98 The Article makes no distinction between the means, direct or indirect, whereby the corrupt manoeuvre is undertaken. It includes any kind of corrupt manoeuvre directed at the official, whether directly or through a third party. 3. 3. Active corruption is targeted at a person who must, by definition, be an official, irrespective of whether the advantage is for the official himself or for some other person. 3. 4. Active corruption pursues the same objective as passive corruption; see at 2. 6. 3. 5. Article 3(2) is drafted in the same terms as Article 2(2); see at 2. 7. members of the highest national courts and members of the European Court of Auditors to their national counterparts. By this assimilation, national provisions, in so far as they cover such offences committed by members of national parliaments, government ministers, etc. , have to be extended to include the aforementioned members of the institutions of the European Communities. Clearly, the rule does not require special offences necessarily to apply in respect of these individuals in a Member State. Where a Member State already applies the same provisions to the corruption of ministers, members of parliament or members of the judiciary as it applies to the corruption of officials, then it will merely be required in addition to criminalise corruption of members of the Community those general provisions. institutions using Article 4 Assimilation This Article is designed to broaden and strengthen the scope of the anti-corruption measures introduced by the Convention, by requiring that each Member State’s criminal law be adjusted to accommodate certain offences committed by individuals occupying specific posts in the Community institutions. As with the first Protocol, a principle of assimilation is introduced whereby Member States will be bound to apply to members of the Community same descriptions of the corruption offences as apply to individuals occupying similar posts within their own institutions. institutions 4. 2. As certain Member States do not have a court of auditors as such, the counterpart bodies will be: — the National Audit Office in the United Kingdom, — the Office of the Comptroller and Auditor-General in Ireland, — the Rigsrevisionen in Denmark, — the Riksrevisionsverket in Sweden, — the Valtiontalouden tarkastusvirasto/Statens revisionsverk in Finland. 4. 1. Paragraph 1 states that the principle the offences applicable the descriptions of to government ministers, members of parliament, members of the highest courts and members of the courts of auditors shall be extended to include their counterparts acting in the exercise of their duties within the Community institutions (member of the Commission, members of the European Parliament, members of the Court of Justice of the European communities and members of the European Court of Auditors). of corruption, members It follows that for the purposes of punishable the offences Commission will be assimilated to government ministers, members of the European Parliament to members of national parliaments, members of the Court of Justice of the European communities to of 4. 3. Paragraph 2 allows for liability of government ministers legislation applicable the possibility of derogating from the assimilation principle of paragraph 1 in those Member States where the criminal is in governed by special specific national situations. Use of the option of derogation does not, however, preclude the need to introduce a form of criminal liability for offences the committed against or by members of Commission under the common rules of national criminal law. This possibility may prove useful in Member States like Denmark, where the rules of criminal law governing ministers’ in specific situations (e. g. those where the minister can be liability apply 15. 12. 98 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 391/7 held criminally for acts done by his subordinates) in which other persons with leading positions would not normally be criminally liable. liable defined in Articles 2 and 3 are always punishable by criminal penalties, in other words triable by courts. 4. 4. Under paragraph 3, the preceding paragraphs on assimilation as regards punishability are ‘without prejudice to the provisions applicable in each Member State concerning criminal proceedings and the determination of the competent court’. likewise to participation This applies in and instigation of those offences, to be interpreted in accordance with the definitions given in the criminal laws of each Member State. For the purposes of the various paragraphs of Article 4 taken together, the Convention cannot affect or jeopardise national rules of criminal procedure or the rules conferring jurisdiction on courts to try cases relating to the relevant offences. But this does not prevent the Article from having full effect within the national legal systems. law, With particular reference to persons covered by paragraph 1, with regard to whom the assimilation principle generally and without exclusions implies the treatment under criminal an equal following should be noted. Where a special law of a Member State confers on a special court (or a specific composition of an ordinary court) the jurisdiction to try government ministers, members of parliament, members of the highest courts or members of the court of auditors accused of an offence, that court may then also have jurisdiction in similar cases concerning members of the Commission, members of the European Parliament, members of the Court of Justice of the European Communities and members of the European Court of Auditors, but without prejudice to national provisions governing jurisdiction. 4. 5. Paragraph 4 provides that the convention is without prejudice to provisions governing the withdrawal of the Community institutions. immunity staff of for the Withdrawal of immunity continues thus to be a prior condition for exercising jurisdiction. In this the convention connection obligation of each of the institutions concerned to give effect to the provisions governing privileges and immunities, subject to existing procedures and ordinary means of redress under Community law (1). recognises Since the offences of active and passive corruption include conduct that consists in making promises irrespective of whether such promises are actually kept or fulfilled, it was not considered necessary to impose an obligation to criminalise the attempt to commit active or passive corruption. It is clear, however, that Member States which so wish, may also make attempts to commit the offences in question punishable. Penalties must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive, in accordance with the well-known judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, which in Case 68/88 (2) stated: (the Member States) ‘must ensure in particular that infringements of Community law are penalised under conditions, both procedural and substantive, which are analogous to infringements of national law of a similar nature and importance and which, in any event, make the penalty effective, proportionate and dissuasive’. those applicable to In complying with this ruling, the Member States have some discretion in determining the nature and severity of the penalties which may be provided for. These need not always necessarily involve deprivation of liberty: it will also be possible to impose fines in addition or as an alternative to imprisonment. 5. 2. In serious cases, the Convention does, however, require the Member States to provide for penalties involving deprivation of liberty which can give rise to extradition. In any event, it will be for the Member States to decide what criteria or factual elements are to determine the seriousness of an offence legal traditions. light of their respective in the Article 5 Penalties 5. 1. Article 5(1) requires the Member States to ensure that the offences of active and passive corruption 5. 3. Paragraph 2 deals with the link between criminal law and disciplinary rules where the circumstances are such that one and the same act of corruption may be subject to both; priority is given to the (1) See in particular Article 18 of the Protocol on the privileges and immunities of the European Communities. (2) Judgment of 21 September 1989, ECR p. 2965. C 391/8 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 15. 12. 98 principle of the independence of national or European disciplinary systems in that the conduct of criminal proceedings is ‘without prejudice to the exercise of disciplinary powers by the competent authorities against national official or community officials’. To take account of certain national legal traditions, the paragraph further allows national authorities to give effect to the principles of their own legislation whereby, in determining the criminal penalty to be imposed, account may be taken of disciplinary penalties already imposed on the same person for the same offence. This is a specific provision that will not be mandatory in Member States not to disciplinary sanctions. recognising or giving effect Article 6 Criminal liability of heads of businesses 6. 1. This Article is almost completely drawn from Article 3 of the Convention on the protection of interests. the European Communities’ financial Like that provision, its purpose is to ensure that heads of businesses or other persons exercising legal or effective power within a business are not automatically exempt from all criminal liability where active corruption has been committed by a person under their authority acting on behalf of the business. The Convention leaves Member States considerable freedom to establish the basis for criminal liability of heads of businesses and decision-makers. As well as covering the criminal liability of heads of businesses or decision-makers on the basis of their personal actions (as authors of, associates in, instigators of, or participants in the fraud), Article 6 allows Member States to consider making heads of businesses and decision-makers criminally liable on other grounds. Within the meaning of Article 6, a Member State may make heads of businesses and decision-makers criminally liable if they have failed to fulfil a duty of supervision or control (culpa in vigilando). In this connection the criminal liability of heads of businesses could be based on an offence, distinct from the corruption, of failure to fulfil an obligation under national exercise supervision or control. law to The criminal liability of the head of a business or decision-maker could also attach to negligence or incompetence. Lastly, nothing in Article 6 prevents Member States from providing for objective criminal liability to attach to heads of businesses and decision-makers by virtue of others’ actions, without it being necessary to prove fault, negligence or failure to exercise supervision on their part. The Convention does not however deal directly with the problem of the liability of legal persons. It should be borne in mind however that Article 3 of the Second Protocol to the Convention on the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests requires Member States to provide for various forms of liability on the part of legal persons, including liability for active corruption involving the financial interests of the Community. A similar provision is incorporated in the recent OECD Convention. Thus it is safe to say that Member States will in any event be required to consider the matter in the light of the obligations arising from those legal instruments. Article 7 Jurisdiction 7. 1. This Article establishes a series of criteria conferring jurisdiction to prosecute and try cases involving the offences covered by the Convention, i. e. active and passive corruption and any offences introduced under the principle of assimilation specified in Article 4, on national enforcement and judicial authorities. By analogy with the solution already adopted in the context of instruments relating to the protection of the Community’s financial interests, four criteria for jurisdiction are proposed, only one of which (territoriality principle) is however compulsory for all Member States, since a derogation may be made from each of the other three criteria by virtue of the possibility of a declaration provided in paragraph 2. for 7. 2. Pursuant to paragraph 1, each Member State is, in principle, required to establish its jurisdiction at least in four kinds of situation, i. e. : 15. 12. 98 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 391/9 (a) where the offence is committed in whole or in part on its territory, i. e. the act of corruption takes place there, the advantage is given there, or the offending agreement is reached there, irrespective of the status or the nationality of the involved (territoriality principle); corruptor or the official (active personality principle): (b) where the offender is a national or one of its officials the criterion of the offender’s status means that jurisdiction can be established regardless of the lex loci delicti. It is then up the Member States to prosecute for offences committed abroad, including in non-member countries. This is particularly for Member States which do not extradite their own nationals; important (c) where the offence is committed against a national of the Member State, being an official, or Member, of a Community institution (passive personality principle). This principle is in cases of active of particular corruption abroad by persons who are not nationals of the relevant Member State; interest (d) where the offender is a Community official working for a Community institution with its headquarters in the relevant Member State. The headquarters criterion may prove to be useful for exceptional cases not covered by other competence rules, for example, where an offence is committed outside the Community by a Community official who is not a national of a Member State (1). 7. 3. As has already been mentioned, paragraph 2 allows any Member States which so wishes not to accept or to accept subject to conditions any of the rules in points (b), (c) and (d) by making a the declaration notification provided for in Article 13(2) of the Convention. that effect when giving to It should be borne in mind that, in accordance with Article 15 of the Convention, this provision is one of only two in respect of which, as will be seen, reservations may be entered. Article 8 Extradition and prosecution financial interests, and European Communities’ in particular on Article 5 thereof, modifying it only as required; both provisions were in fact expressly made applicable also to the first Protocol in accordance with the referral clause provided for in Article 7 of the latter instrument. As in Article 5 of the Convention referred to above, the rules contained in this Article are intended to supplement, in regard to corruption offences involving Community officials and officials of the Member States, the provisions on extradition of own nationals which are already in force between the Member States and which arise extradition agreements. from bilateral or multilateral It should first be specified that a number of Member States do not extradite their own nationals. Article 8 lays down rules to prevent persons alleged to have committed acts of corruption going scot-free because extradition is refused on principle. For the purposes of Article 8 is to be interpreted in the light of the declarations made in Article 6(1)(b) of the European Convention on Extradition of 13 December 1957 by the parties to that Convention. ‘national’ Article 8 firstly requires a Member State which does not extradite its nationals to take the necessary measures to establish its jurisdiction over the offences defined and punished within the meaning of Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the Convention when committed by its own nationals in another Member State. In addition, if an act of corruption has been committed in the territory of one Member State by a national of another Member State who cannot be extradited for the sole reason that the latter Member State does not extradite its own nationals, Article 8 requires the requested Member State to submit the case to its legal authorities for the purpose of prosecution. Thus, Article 8(2) plainly sets out the principle aut dedere aut judicare. This provision intended to affect national rules regarding criminal proceedings. is not, however, In order to apply this principle, the requesting Member State undertakes to transmit the files, information and exhibits relating to the offence to the Member State its national. The requesting which Member State will be kept informed of the prosecution and its outcome. is to prosecute Article 8 too, as indeed also Articles 9, 10 and 11, is based largely on the Convention on the protection of the (1) In this respect it should be noted that although Community officials as a general rule will have the nationality of one of the Member States, exceptions to this principle are possible. Article 8 sets no prior conditions on the proceedings brought by the requested Member State. No application from the requesting Member State is needed for the requested Member State to initiate the prosecution. C 391/10 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 15. 12. 98 It should also be stressed that, as at the time of conclusion of the first Protocol, it was not considered necessary in this case to incorporate the provision, contained in Article 5(3) of the Convention on the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests, which prohibits refusal of extradition solely on account of the fiscal nature of the offence. Unlike offences against the protection of the Community’s financial interests, such an exception cannot be relevant in the case of corruption offences. Article 9 Cooperation As has already been observed, the Convention is concerned with providing for charges against both cases of domestic corruption and those involving Community officials or officials from other Member States. This second category of cases is, however, by far the more innovative section of Convention and necessarily involves aspects of transnationality. In the face of the particular complexity of cross-border investigations into this matter, cooperation is of fundamental importance. The forms of cooperation in paragraph 1 are cited as examples. The expression ‘for example’ was inserted in this provision to take account of the situation of Member States which are not parties to all the relevant European Conventions on cooperation in criminal matters. The forms of cooperation listed as examples are: mutual legal assistance in criminal matters, extradition, transfer of proceedings and the enforcement of sentences passed in another Member State, allowing the most appropriate means of cooperation to be chosen in each specific case. The relevant Conventions currently applying between the the present Member States are not affected by Convention. Paragraph 2 allows for the situation in which more than one Member State has jurisdiction to prosecute an offence connected with the same facts. In such cases, this paragraph requires Member States to cooperate is to have in deciding which of them jurisdiction to prosecute. This provision should improve efficiency by enabling prosecution to be centralised in a single Member State wherever possible. Member States will be able to settle such conflicts of jurisdiction by reference, for example, to the scale of the corruption committed in their respective territories, the place where the advantages in question were provided, the place where the suspects were arrested, their nationalities, previous prosecutions, and so on. Article 10 Ne bis in idem Paragraph 1 establishes the ne bis in idem rule. This rule assumes particular importance in cases of international corruption which are liable for prosecution in courts of more than one Member State, when it has not been possible to centralise the prosecution in a single Member State by applying the principle laid down in Article 9(2). This Article is based largely on the Convention on the application of the ne bis in idem rule, signed in Brussels on 25 May 1987 in the context of European Political Cooperation. Similar provisions are contained in Article 54 and onwards of the 1990 Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement. Paragraph 2 limits to only a few specified cases the possibility for the Member States to draw up a declaration. Such cases coincide with the three hypotheses provided for in Article 2 of the Convention on the application of the ne bis in idem rule. In accordance with paragraph 4, however, the exceptions considered in such declarations will not apply if the Member State which made them has nevertheless taken action against the person in question, requesting the other Member State to bring the prosecution or granting him extradition. Special attention must be paid to the possibility of an exception provided in paragraph 2(c), relating to facts which were the subject of the judgement rendered abroad and which were committed by an official contrary to the duties of his office. Although taken from the Convention on the application of the ne bis in idem rule, this does in fact seem particularly relevant in the case of this Convention, which is concerned exclusively with corruption offences, since, in all the cases in which the subject of the judgement rendered abroad was acts of passive corruption by the foreign official, these facts would certainly have been committed by this official contrary to the duties of his office. Paragraph 2(c) may therefore be of particular importance in the context of this Convention depending on the declarations which Member States may make at the time of ratification. Paragraph 3 provides that periods of deprivation of liberty served in another Member State are in all cases taken into consideration by the State which has brought a further prosecution. Finally, paragraph 5 states that the principles applying between Member States and the declarations contained in bilateral or multilateral agreements remain unaffected by this Article. 15. 12. 98 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 391/11 Article 11 Internal provisions Article 11 allows the Member States to adopt internal legal provisions which go further than those of the Convention. Like the Conventions adopted on the protection of financial interests, this Convention also constitutes a set of minimum standards. Article 12 Court of Justice This Article specifies the jurisdiction conferred on the Court of Justice of the European Communities to settle disputes between Member States and, in certain cases, between Member States and the Commission relating to the interpretation or application of the Convention; it also provides for the Court of Justice to have jurisdiction to interpret some of the Articles of the Convention by way of preliminary rulings at the request of national courts. The Article refers in part to similar provisions already introduced in the other instruments adopted to date in the context of Title VI of the Treaty on European Union; it must however be stressed that this is the first time the question of the competence of the Court of Justice to give preliminary rulings has been dealt with and resolved directly in a Convention, instead of being referred to a separate Protocol as was the case with the Convention on the establishment of a European Police Office (Europol) (1), the Convention on the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests and the Convention on the use of information technology for customs purposes (2). Paragraph 1 specifies the conditions under which the Court of Justice has jurisdiction to rule on disputes interpretation or between Member States on application of the Convention. the It is stipulated in that paragraph that any dispute will in an initial stage be examined by the Council in accordance with the procedure set out in Title VI of the Treaty on European Union with a view to reaching a solution. If no solution is found within six months, a Member State party or the Member States parties to the dispute may refer the dispute to the Court of Justice for a ruling. As with the Convention on the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests, the provision concerning disputes between one or more Member States and the Commission is limited to those provisions of the Convention where such a dispute may possibly occur. Those provisions are Article 1, ‘Definitions’, with the express exclusion of point (c) which defines ‘national official’ with reference only to the national law of each Member State, and the Articles on the charge of passive and active corruption and the assimilation of corruption of Members of the Community institutions in so far as questions of Community law, the Community’s financial interests or Community members or officials are involved. As regards procedure, paragraph 2 provides that, in disputes between Member States and the Commission, an attempt must first be made to reach a settlement through negotiation. If negotiation fails, the dispute may be submitted to the Court of Justice. The Court’s jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings on a matter concerning the interpretation of the Convention, provided for in paragraph 3, is not extended to all the provisions of the Convention but is limited to the Articles which involve questions of relevance to Community law and excludes those Articles concerning penalties, liability of heads of businesses, rules governing jurisdiction, provisions on legal cooperation and provisions on the application of the ne bis in idem principle. This approach may be said to constitute a further innovation compared with the solution adopted previously in the case of the to Conventions, which abovementioned Protocols provided for the possibility of interpretation extending to all provisions, without exception, of such Convention and Protocols. Paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 are based on the provisions on preliminary rulings in the Protocol of 29 November 1996 on the interpretation, by way of preliminary rulings, by the Court of Justice of the European Communities of the Convention on the European the protection of Communities’ financial interests (3). Paragraph 4 provides that the competence of the Court of Justice in respect of preliminary rulings is subject to acceptance by the Member State concerned by a declaration. On the basis of paragraph 5, the possibility of asking for preliminary rulings to the courts against whose decision there is no judicial remedy under national law. Paragraph 6 provides that the Statute of the Court of Justice and its Rules of Procedure shall apply concerning proceedings pursuant to Article 12. the declaration may restrict Article 13 Entry into force 13. 1. This Article concerns the entry into force of the Convention in accordance with the relevant rules (1) OJ C 316, 27. 11. 1995, p. 2. (2) OJ C 316, 27. 11. 1995, p. 34. (3) OJ C 151, 20. 5. 1997, p. 2. C 391/12 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 15. 12. 98 established by the Council. The Convention will enter into force 90 days after the notification referred to in paragraph 2 by the last Member State to fulfil that formality. 13. 2. As with the conclusion of some other Conventions between the Member States, it must further be pointed out that paragraph 4 provides for the application of the provisions of the Convention, before its entry into force, in mutual relations between those Member States which have deposited the relevant declaration. There seems to be justification for the provision of such a clause in the Convention which does not appear in the Convention on the protection of the European Communities’ that Convention it is essential that all Member States are equally committed to protecting a common interest. However, under the present Convention, which does not have as its sole objective the protection of an interest common to all Member States but also the protection of the interests of individual Member States, there is no objection to allowing two or more Member States to rely on it, in anticipation of its adoption by all Member States. interests. financial For As regards cases which may involve Community officials, it should be borne in mind that, in the event of early application of the Convention under paragraph 4, the Member States which make such a declaration will also be obliged to implement the Convention in cases of active and passive corruption of such officials. This analysis seems to be confirmed by paragraph 5 which stipulates that, even in the absence of the declaration of early application, the provisions of the Convention may in relations between two Member States, simply on likewise be applied the basis of bilateral agreements. The provision appears essentially to open up the possibility for a Member State to apply the Convention on a bilateral basis with another Member State without necessarily having to allow application thereof to its own relations with other Member States or in respect of Community officials. In any case, the provisions of Article 12 on the Court of Justice only apply once the Convention has entered into force after its ratification by all Member States. Article 14 Accession of new Member States This Article concerns the accession to the Convention of future Member States in accordance with the rules already laid down in other Union instruments. The only special feature to be noted concerns paragraph 5, which provides for the possibility for acceding States also to have recourse to the clause allowing early application in the event that the Convention has not yet entered into force at the time of their accession. Article 15 Reservations This Article stipulates that no reservation is authorised, with the exception of those expressly referred to in the text of the Convention with regard to determination of jurisdiction other than the various rules governing principle of strict territoriality (Article 7) and application of the ne bis in idem principle (Article 10). A reservation may be withdrawn at any time by notice given by the General Secretariat of the Council


title: Kommissionens förordning (EG) nr 2611/98 av den 3 december 1998 om fastställande av det högsta exportbidraget för korn inom ramen för den anbudsinfordran som avses i förordning (EG) nr 1078/98

eurovoc_concepts:
award of contract
barley
export refund

formats: pdf print

text: 4. 12. 98 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning L 328/21 KOMMISSIONENS F(cid:153)RORDNING (EG) nr 2611/98 av den 3 december 1998 om fastst(cid:132)llande av det h(cid:148)gsta exportbidraget f(cid:148)r korn inom ramen f(cid:148)r den anbudsinfordran som avses i f(cid:148)rordning (EG) nr 1078/98 EUROPEISKA GEMENSKAPERNAS KOMMISSION HAR ANTAGIT DENNA F(cid:153)RORDNING med beaktande av F(cid:148)rdraget om uppr(cid:132)ttandet av Euro- peiska gemenskapen, med beaktande av r(cid:134)dets f(cid:148)rordning (EEG) nr 1766/92 av den 30 juni 1992 om den gemensamma organisationen av (cid:132)ndrad genom spannm(cid:134)l (1), marknaden f(cid:148)r kommissionens f(cid:148)rordning (EG) nr 923/96 (2), senast med beaktande av kommissionens f(cid:148)rordning (EG) nr 1501/95 av den 29 juni 1995 om vissa till(cid:132)mpningsf(cid:148)re- skrifter f(cid:148)r r(cid:134)dets f(cid:148)rordning (EEG) nr 1766/92 vad avser beviljande av exportbidrag och de (cid:134)tg(cid:132)rder som skall vidtas vid st(cid:148)rningar inom spannm(cid:134)lssektorn (3), senast (cid:132)ndrad genom f(cid:148)rordning (EG) nr 2513/98 (4), s(cid:132)rskilt artikel 4 i denna, och med beaktande av f(cid:148)ljande: En anbudsinfordran f(cid:148)r bidrag och/eller avgift f(cid:148)r export av korn till alla tredje l(cid:132)nder har inletts genom kommis- sionens f(cid:148)rordning (EG) nr 1078/98 (5). I artikel 7 i f(cid:148)rordning (EG) nr 1501/95 f(cid:148)reskrivs att kommissionen p(cid:134) grundval av de meddelade anbuden och i enlighet med det f(cid:148)rfarande som f(cid:148)reskrivs i artikel 23 i f(cid:148)rordning (EEG) nr 1766/92, kan besluta att fastst(cid:132)lla ett h(cid:148)gsta exportbidrag, varvid h(cid:132)nsyn tas till de kriterier som avses i artikel 1 i f(cid:148)rordning (EG) nr 1501/95. I detta fall tilldelas kontraktet den eller de anbudsgivare vars anbud (cid:132)r p(cid:134) samma niv(cid:134) eller l(cid:132)gre (cid:132)n det h(cid:148)gsta bidraget, samt den eller de anbudsgivare vars anbud avser en exportav- gift. Till(cid:132)mpningen av ovann(cid:132)mnda kriterier p(cid:134) det nuvarande marknadsl(cid:132)get f(cid:148)r ifr(cid:134)gavarande spannm(cid:134)l medf(cid:148)r att det h(cid:148)gsta exportbidraget fastst(cid:132)lls till det belopp som anges i artikel 1. De (cid:134)tg(cid:132)rder som f(cid:148)reskrivs i denna f(cid:148)rordning (cid:132)r f(cid:148)renliga med yttrandet fr(cid:134)n F(cid:148)rvaltningskommitt(cid:130)n f(cid:148)r spannm(cid:134)l. H(cid:142)RIGENOM F(cid:153)RESKRIVS F(cid:153)LJANDE. Artikel 1 F(cid:148)r de anbud som meddelats fr(cid:134)n och med den 27 november till och med den 3 december 1998 inom ramen f(cid:148)r den anbudsinfordran som avses i f(cid:148)rordning (EG) nr 1078/98 (cid:132)r det h(cid:148)gsta exportbidraget f(cid:148)r korn fastst(cid:132)llt till 57,98 ecu per ton. Artikel 2 Denna f(cid:148)rordning tr(cid:132)der i kraft den 4 december 1998. Denna f(cid:148)rordning (cid:132)r till alla delar bindande och direkt till(cid:132)mplig i alla medlemsstater. Utf(cid:132)rdad i Bryssel den 3 december 1998. P(cid:134) kommissionens v(cid:132)gnar Franz FISCHLER Ledamot av kommissionen (1) EGT L 181, 1. 7. 1992, s. 21. (2) EGT L 126, 24. 5. 1996, s. 37. (3) EGT L 147, 30. 6. 1995, s. 7. (4) EGT L 313, 21. 11. 1998, s. 16. (5) EGT L 154, 28. 5. 1998, s. 20


title: SCHRIFTELIJKE VRAAG nr. 3639/98 van John McCARTIN aan de Commissie. Voedselhulp aan Rusland

eurovoc_concepts:
EU aid
Russia
export policy
fish
food aid
frozen product

formats: html pdf print

text: 15. 10. 1999 NL Publicatieblad van de Europese Gemeenschappen C 297/91 Deze aanbestedingen werden op die data gepubliceerd in verband met de deadline van de financiële verplichtingen in 1998. Aangezien de Commissie zich ervan bewust is dat de publicatiedata niet ideaal waren, is alles gedaan om de aanbestedingen via andere middelen bekend te maken, bijvoorbeeld door de informatie aan de EG-adviescentra voor ondernemingen voor plaatselijke verspreiding verder te leiden. (1) PB L 209 van 24. 7. 1992. (1999/C 297/119) SCHRIFTELIJKE VRAAG E-3632/98 van Anita Pollack (PSE) aan de Commissie (3 december 1998) Betreft: Opbouw van de expertise van NGO’s in de ontwikkelingslanden Hoe draagt de Commissie bij aan de opbouw van de expertise van NGO’s en plaatselijke gemeenschappen in de ontwikkelingslanden opdat zij een rol kunnen spelen in het toezicht op en de bescherming van bossen en fauna? Antwoord van de heer Marín namens de Commissie (22 december 1998) De Commissie zendt het geachte parlementslid en het Secretariaat-generaal van het Parlement rechtstreeks een computeruitdraai met de gevraagde gegevens toe. (1999/C 297/120) SCHRIFTELIJKE VRAAG E-3639/98 van John McCartin (PPE) aan de Commissie (3 december 1998) Betreft: Voedselhulp aan Rusland Heeft de Commissie bij de voorbereiding van de voedselhulpleveranties aan Rusland eraan gedacht om er ingevroren pelagische soorten (vis) aan toe te voegen, waarvoor de exportmarkt van de Europese Unie momenteel zeer zwak is? Antwoord van de heer van den Broek namens de Commissie (12 januari 1999) De Commissie is niet voornemens in het programma van voedselleveranties aan Rusland ook vis op te nemen, aangezien de Russische regering hier niet om heeft verzocht. (1999/C 297/121) SCHRIFTELIJKE VRAAG E-3647/98 van Amedeo Amadeo (NI) aan de Commissie (3 december 1998) Betreft: Communautaire fraudes en slechte politieke praktijken In het Italiaanse weekblad „Panorama” wordt in de op 5 november jl. verschenen editie gewezen op zwendel in verband met de vluchtelingenhulp, die gepleegd zou zijn bij ECHO, het communautaire agentschap voor humanitaire hulp. ECHO heeft tot taak toe te zien op de doeltreffendheid van het communautaire optreden en heeft zich in enkele maanden bezig gehouden met Bosnië, de Grote Meren en Koerdistan. Dit zijn veelomvattende werkzaamheden en het budget van het agentschap is daarom verdrievoudigd. Thans moet ECHO meer dan


title: 98/700/JAI: Acción común de 3 de diciembre de 1998 adoptada por el Consejo sobre la base del artículo K.3 del Tratado de la Unión Europea, por la que se crea un Sistema europeo de archivo de imágenes (FADO)

eurovoc_concepts:
archives
cooperation in home affairs
data processing
joint action
transmission network

text: L 333/4 ES Diario Oficial de las Comunidades Europeas 9. 12. 98 ACCI(cid:222)N COM(cid:230)N de 3 de diciembre de 1998 adoptada por el Consejo sobre la base del art(cid:146)culo K. 3 del Tratado de la Uni(cid:155)n Europea, por la que se crea un Sistema europeo de archivo de im(cid:145)genes (FADO) (98/700/JAI) EL CONSEJO DE LA UNI(cid:222)N EUROPEA, Visto el Tratado de la Uni(cid:155)n Europea y, en particular, la letra b) del apartado 2 de su art(cid:146)culo K. 3, Considerando que el punto 3) del art(cid:146)culo K. 1 del Tratado dispone que la pol(cid:146)tica de inmigraci(cid:155)n y la pol(cid:146)tica rela- tiva a los nacionales de Estados terceros constituyen una cuesti(cid:155)n de inter(cid:130)s com(cid:156)n; Considerando que la lucha contra la falsificaci(cid:155)n de docu- mentos es un (cid:145)mbito que depende de la pol(cid:146)tica de inmi- graci(cid:155)n y de la cooperaci(cid:155)n policial; que la proliferaci(cid:155)n de documentos aut(cid:130)nticos y falsos requiere una actualiza- ci(cid:155)n frecuente; que el hecho de que las t(cid:130)cnicas empleadas para producir documentos aut(cid:130)nticos y sus falsificaciones sofisticadas hace tambi(cid:130)n necesario disponer de medios de grand calidad; sean cada vez m(cid:145)s Considerando que el Bolet(cid:146)n de falsificaciones europeo y el Manual de documentos aut(cid:130)nticos no responden plenamente a las exigencias de rapidez y de precisi(cid:155)n de reproducci(cid:155)n, por lo que la utilizaci(cid:155)n de un sistema informatizado de archivo de im(cid:145)genes constituye, con una formaci(cid:155)n adecuada de los interesados, un elemento esencial de una estrategia global destinada a satisfacer las necesidades de los Estados miembros; agentes Considerando que varios Estados miembros disponen de sistemas de archivo de im(cid:145)genes informatizados, que est(cid:145)n poniendo en funcionamiento; Considerando que, para garantizar un alto nivel de control en todas las fronteras de los Estados miembros de la Uni(cid:155)n, ser(cid:146)a (cid:156)til crear un sistema informatizado de archivo de im(cid:145)genes al que tengan acceso los responsables del control de los documentos en los Estados miembros; que este sistema debe permitir a los usuarios disponer de informaci(cid:155)n sobre cualquier nuevo m(cid:130)todo de falsifica- ci(cid:155)n detectado, as(cid:146) como sobre los nuevos documentos aut(cid:130)nticos en circulaci(cid:155)n; Considerando que la presente Acci(cid:155)n com(cid:156)n no afecta a la competencia de los Estados miembros relativa al reco- nocimiento de pasaportes, documentos de viaje, visados u otros documentos de identidad, HA ADOPTADO LA PRESENTE ACCI(cid:222)N COM(cid:230)N: Art(cid:146)culo 1 1. Se crea un Sistema europeo de archivo de im(cid:145)genes destinado a intercambiar, por v(cid:146)a inform(cid:145)tica y en plazos muy cortos, la informaci(cid:155)n de que disponen los Estados miembros sobre los documentos aut(cid:130)nticos y falsos regis- trada seg(cid:156)n las modalidades establecidas en el anexo de la presente Acci(cid:155)n com(cid:156)n. 2. Este sistema no sustituir(cid:145) ni suprimir(cid:145) los intercam- bios normales en papel hasta el momento en que todos los Estados miembros est(cid:130)n en condiciones de utilizar el sistema informatizado. Art(cid:146)culo 2 La base de datos del sistema deber(cid:145) contener, entre otras cosas, la siguiente informaci(cid:155)n: a) im(cid:145)genes de documentos falsos y falsificados, b) im(cid:145)genes de documentos aut(cid:130)nticos, c) informaci(cid:155)n sucinta sobre t(cid:130)cnicas de falsificaci(cid:155)n, d) informaci(cid:155)n sucinta sobre t(cid:130)cnicas de seguridad. Art(cid:146)culo 3 La creaci(cid:155)n del sistema europeo no impedir(cid:145) a cada Estado miembro poner a punto y utilizar su propio sistema nacional que responda a las necesidades de los servicios nacionales de fronteras y de los servicios internos encargados de la comprobaci(cid:155)n de los documentos. Considerando que, con el objetivo de garantizar la compa- tibilidad y la homogeneidad de la informaci(cid:155)n contenida en el sistema, es necesario establecer procedimientos de elaboraci(cid:155)n de las contribuciones de los Estados miem- bros al sistema, al igual que procedimientos de control y comprobaci(cid:155)n de estas contribuciones; El Consejo aprobar(cid:145) sin demora las especificaciones t(cid:130)cnicas relativas a la compatibilidad con los sistemas existentes, as(cid:146) como a la inserci(cid:155)n de la informaci(cid:155)n en el sistema y a los procedimientos de control y de comproba- ci(cid:155)n de dicha informaci(cid:155)n. Art(cid:146)culo 4 9. 12. 98 ES Diario Oficial de las Comunidades Europeas L 333/5 Art(cid:146)culo 5 La presente Acci(cid:155)n com(cid:156)n se publicar(cid:145) en el Diario Oficial y entrar(cid:145) en vigor el d(cid:146)a siguiente al de su publicaci(cid:155)n. Los Estados miembros aplicar(cid:145)n el art(cid:146)culo 1 a m(cid:145)s tardar doce meses despu(cid:130)s de la adopci(cid:155)n de las medidas contempladas en el art(cid:146)culo 4. Hecho en Bruselas, el 3 de diciembre de 1998. Por el Consejo El Presidente K. SCHL(cid:153)GL L 333/6 ES Diario Oficial de las Comunidades Europeas 9. 12. 98 ANEXO SISTEMA EUROPEO DE ARCHIVO DE IM(cid:214)GENES Se crea, en el seno de la Secretar(cid:146)a General del Consejo, un sistema informatizado que contendr(cid:145) los documentos aut(cid:130)nticos as(cid:146) como los documentos falsos y falsificados. Dicho sistema se denominar(cid:145) FADO, seg(cid:156)n sus siglas en ingl(cid:130)s (False and Authentic Documents: Docu- mentos Falsos y Aut(cid:130)nticos). 1. Descripci(cid:155)n del sistema — El sistema s(cid:155)lo podr(cid:145) consultarse a trav(cid:130)s de un (cid:156)nico servicio central en cada Estado miembro. — El sistema se basar(cid:145) en la tecnolog(cid:146)a Internet. El sistema deber(cid:145) garantizar que la informaci(cid:155)n pueda transmitirse con rapidez a las unidades centrales nacionales. En cuanto se reciba la informaci(cid:155)n en la Secretar(cid:146)a General del Consejo, se introducir(cid:145) lo antes posible en el sistema FADO. Corresponder(cid:145) a cada Estado miembro integrar esos datos en su propio sistema nacional o en su copia del sistema FADO. — El sistema ser(cid:145) multiling(cid:129)e. — El sistema deber(cid:145) ser de f(cid:145)cil utilizaci(cid:155)n. — El sistema se basar(cid:145) en una codificaci(cid:155)n sumamente estricta. Deber(cid:145) quedar garantizada la seguridad de la informaci(cid:155)n contenida en el sistema informatizado. El sistema emplear(cid:145) l(cid:146)neas especiales para la transmisi(cid:155)n de los datos entre la Secretar(cid:146)a General del Consejo y los servicios centrales de los Estados miembros. — Dentro de cada Estado miembro, el sistema podr(cid:145) consultarse desde una unidad central a trav(cid:130)s de un internet protegido. Los Estados miembros podr(cid:145)n utilizar el mismo sistema para un uso interno en sus territorios respectivos (lo que implica conectar distintos terminales instalados en los puestos de control fronterizo correspondientes, o en la sede de otras autoridades competentes). No deber(cid:145) existir ninguna conexi(cid:155)n directa entre los terminales distintos de los del servicio central nacional de los Estados miembros y la central instalada en la Secretar(cid:146)a General. Se implantar(cid:145) un mecanismo de reproducci(cid:155)n y actualizaci(cid:155)n del sistema instalado en los Estados miembros a partir del sistema FADO (cintas magn(cid:130)ticas, discos extra(cid:146)bles, CD-ROM, etc. ). — Cada Estado miembro podr(cid:145) elaborar su propio sistema nacional protegido para la transmisi(cid:155)n interna de los datos. — El sistema FADO funcionar(cid:145) en red entre la central de la Secretar(cid:146)a General y el servicio central de cada Estado miembro, lo que permitir(cid:145) un intercambio r(cid:145)pido de informaci(cid:155)n. — Como los documentos se enviar(cid:145)n electr(cid:155)nicamente para poder incluirlos en los sistemas nacionales existentes, deber(cid:145) emplearse un formato normalizado para las im(cid:145)genes (JPEG, TIFF, BMP, etc. ). Las im(cid:145)genes deber(cid:145)n ser de la mejor calidad posible, pero habr(cid:145) que llegar igualmente a un buen equilibrio entre definici(cid:155)n de la imagen, tama(cid:157)o y compresi(cid:155)n. — Si fuera necesario, podr(cid:145) disponerse de ampliaciones de las partes importantes de la imagen. — El sistema deber(cid:145) permitir realizar comparaciones en pantalla entre un documento original y un documento falso o falsificado. — El sistema ofrecer(cid:145) explicaciones sobre las distintas t(cid:130)cnicas de falsificaci(cid:155)n y las t(cid:130)cnicas de seguridad. — Ser(cid:145)n necesarias referencias cruzadas para que los usuarios puedan encontrar r(cid:145)pidamente toda la informaci(cid:155)n referida a un documento. — Se dar(cid:145) prioridad en primer lugar a los documentos de los Estados miembros y a los documentos de pa(cid:146)ses terceros de los que proceda un flujo constante de inmigraci(cid:155)n hacia los Estados miembros. La informaci(cid:155)n del sistema se ampliar(cid:145) y actualizar(cid:145) para incluir todos los dem(cid:145)s documentos para que sea lo m(cid:145)s completa posible. — El sistema deber(cid:145) tener un sistema «flash» que permita enviar una advertencia por correo electr(cid:155)nico a todos los Estados miembros acerca de un documento falso concreto. — El sistema tendr(cid:145) varios niveles. Deber(cid:145) preverse desde el inicio la posibilidad de desarrollar un nivel de interrogaci(cid:155)n adicional a fin de obtener informaci(cid:155)n m(cid:145)s detallada sobre las falsificaciones, con destino a los expertos. — El sistema deber(cid:145) tener una zona especial que contenga los documentos que no son reconocidos por uno o m(cid:145)s Estados miembros. 9. 12. 98 ES Diario Oficial de las Comunidades Europeas L 333/7 2. Costes del sistema Los costes correspondientes a la creaci(cid:155)n y al funcionamiento del sistema FADO consistir(cid:146)an en la adquisici(cid:155)n de equipo t(cid:130)cnico y en costes de personal. Puesto que el sistema FADO (cid:156)nicamente est(cid:145) concebido para archivar y transmitir a trav(cid:130)s de medios electr(cid:155)nicos, documentos que en la actualidad son archivados y transmitidos a trav(cid:130)s de un soporte f(cid:146)sico, dichos costes constituyen para el Consejo gastos administrativos con arreglo a lo dispuesto en el p(cid:145)rrafo primero del apartado 2 del art(cid:146)culo K. 8 del Tratado de la Uni(cid:155)n Europea


title: Besluit van de Raad van 3 december 1998 houdende verlenging van het mandaat van de voorzitter van het Bureau voor harmonisatie binnen de interne markt (merken, tekeningen en modellen)

eurovoc_concepts: European Union Intellectual Property Office

text: 30. 12. 98 NL Publicatieblad van de Europese Gemeenschappen C 409/1 I (Mededelingen) RAAD BESLUIT VAN DE RAAD van 3 december 1998 houdende verlenging van het mandaat van de voorzitter van het Bureau voor harmonisatie binnen de interne markt (merken, tekeningen en modellen) (98/C 409/01) DE RAAD VAN DE EUROPESE UNIE, Gelet op het Verdrag tot oprichting van de Europese Gemeenschap, Gelet op Verordening (EG) nr. 40/94 van de Raad van 20 december 1993 inzake het Gemeen(cid:220) schapsmerk(cid:216)(˛), inzonderheid op artikel 120, leden 1 en 2, Gezien het besluit van de Raad van 16 juni 1994 houdende benoeming van de voorzitter van het Bureau voor harmonisatie binnen de interne markt (merken, tekeningen en modellen)(cid:216)(ˇ), Gezien het voorstel van de Raad van Bestuur van het Bureau voor harmonisatie binnen de interne markt (merken, tekeningen en modellen) van 21 september 1998 betreffende de ver(cid:220) lenging van het mandaat van de voorzitter van het Bureau, BESLUIT: Enig artikel Het mandaat van de heer Jean(cid:220)Claude COMBALDIEU, geboren op 21 september 1935 te Tou(cid:220) louse (Frankrijk), als voorzitter van het Bureau voor harmonisatie binnen de interne markt (merken, tekeningen en modellen) wordt verlengd voor de periode van 1 september 1999 tot en met 30 september 2000. Gedaan te Brussel, 3 december 1998. Voor de Raad De Voorzitter K. SCHLˆGL (˛)(cid:217)PB L 11 van 14. 1. 1994, blz. 1. Verordening gewijzigd bij Verordening (EG) nr. 3288/94 (PB L 349 van 31. 12. 1994, blz. 83). (ˇ)(cid:217)PB C 314 van 25. 11. 1995, blz. 1


title: SCHRIFTELIJKE VRAAG nr. 3636/98 van Peter TRUSCOTT Rechten van gehandicapten in de lidstaten

eurovoc_concepts:
EU Member State
State aid
aid system
competence of the Member States
disabled person
information network
social policy

text: 6. 11. 1999 NL Publicatieblad van de Europese Gemeenschappen C 320/61 Van de Portugese autoriteiten is geen verzoek ontvangen om stieren voor stierengevechten van de verbodsbepaling uit te zonderen, en van de Spaanse of Franse autoriteiten evenmin. Dit probleem dient zorgvuldig te worden onderzocht en daarbij moet de nodige aandacht worden besteed aan de risico’s voor de gezondheid van mens en dier, aan de geboden garanties en aan de uitvoerbaarheid van de vereiste controles. Om in Beschikking 98/653/EG van de Commissie enigerlei wijziging te kunnen aanbrengen is echter een gekwalificeerde meerderheid in het Permanent Veterinair Comité nodig. Mocht een dergelijke meerderheid niet haalbaar blijken, dan moet het wijzigingsvoorstel voor nader onderzoek worden toegezonden aan de Raad. (1) PB L 311 van 20. 11. 1998. (1999/C 320/081) SCHRIFTELIJKE VRAAG P-3622/98 van Ulf Holm (V) aan de Commissie (24 november 1998) Betreft: Discriminerende controles in het Schengengebied Onlangs zond de Zweedse TV een programma uit over twee TV-verslaggevers met een buitenlands uiterlijk die door de EU reisden om het vrije verkeer van mensen te testen. Zij bleken stelselmatig te worden gecontroleerd, zowel aan de grens als in het land dat zij wilden bezoeken. De reden hiervoor bleek hun niet-Europese afkomst te zijn. Zij werden visueel gediscrimineerd ondanks het feit dat zij geboren en getogen Zweedse burgers zijn. Mensenrechtenorganisaties in het hele Schengengebied bevestigen dat dit soort discriminatie bestaat. Is dit soort discriminatie van burgers de prijs die volgens de Commissie moet worden betaald voor 1. Schengen? 2. Welke maatregelen overweegt de Commissie om de visuele discriminatie te verhinderen die voortkomt uit de grenzenloze controle in het Schengengebied? Acht de Commissie een „niet-Europees uiterlijk” voldoende reden voor persoonscontroles in het 3. Schengengebied? Antwoord van de heer Monti namens de Commissie (14 januari 1999) 1. Nee. Het geachte parlementslid wordt verwezen naar het antwoord van de Commissie op schriftelijke vraag 2. P-2892/98 van mevrouw Waddington (1). 3. Nee. (1) PB C 118 van 29. 4. 1999, blz. 161. (1999/C 320/082) SCHRIFTELIJKE VRAAG E-3636/98 van Peter Truscott (PSE) aan de Commissie (3 december 1998) Betreft: Rechten van gehandicapten in de lidstaten Worden gehandicapten in alle lidstaten gelijk behandeld wat hun invaliditeitsuitkering betreft? Hebben met name slechthorenden volledig aanspraak op invaliditeitsuitkeringen in alle lidstaten?


title: Rozhodnutie Rady z 3. decembra 1998 o doplnení definície trestného činu obchodovania s ľuďmi v prílohe k Dohovoru o Europole (1999/C 26/05)

eurovoc_concepts:
Europol
crime against individuals
offence
trafficking in human beings

text: 19/zv. 1 SK Úradný vestník Európskej únie 115 31999D0130(01) C 26/21 ÚRADNÝ VESTNÍK EURÓPSKYCH SPOLOČENSTIEV 30. 1. 1999 ROZHODNUTIE RADY z 3. decembra 1998 o doplnení definície trestného činu „obchodovania s ľuďmi“ v prílohe k Dohovoru o Europole (1999/C 26/05) RADA EURÓPSKEJ ÚNIE, so zreteľom na článok 43 ods. 3 dohovoru vypracovaného na základe článku K. 3 Zmluvy o Európskej únii o zriadení Európskeho policajného úradu (Dohovor o Europole) (1), odvolávajúc sa na dohodu v rámci Rady zo 4. decembra 1997 o doplnení definície trestného činu „obchodovania s ľuďmi“ v prílohe k Dohovoru o Europole, po diskusiách so správnou radou Europolu, ROZHODLA TAKTO: Definícia trestného činu „obchodovania s ľuďmi“ v prílohe k Dohovoru o Europole sa týmto dopĺňa takto: Článok 1 „— ‚obchodovanie s ľuďmi‘ je podrobovanie osoby reálnej a nezákonnej nadvláde inej osoby použitím násilia, vyhrážok, zneužívaním právomoci alebo intríg s úmyslom jej využívania na prostitúciu, na formy sexuálneho zneužívania a na týranie maloletých alebo obchodovanie s opustenými deťmi. Medzi spôsoby zneužívania patrí aj výroba, predaj alebo rozširovanie detského pornografického materiálu;“ Toto rozhodnutie nadobúda účinnosť 1. januára 1999. Článok 2 V Bruseli 3. decembra 1998 Za Radu predseda K. SCHLÖGL (1) Ú. v. ES C 316, 27. 11. 1995, s. 1


title: Resolução sobre a comunicação da Comissão ao Conselho e ao Parlamento Europeu sobre o aprofundamento das relações com a Turquia (COM(97)0394 C4-0490/97) e sobre a comunicação da Comissão ao Conselho intitulada "Estratégia europeia para a Turquia - Primeiras propostas operacionais da Comissão" (COM(98)0124 C4-0634/98)

eurovoc_concepts:
EU relations
Indonesia
Kurdistan question
agricultural product
executive
free movement of capital
freedom to provide services
fuel
international cooperation
political situation

formats: html print


title: QUESTION ECRITE no 3646/98 de Amedeo AMADEO Additifs dans l'alimentation des animaux

eurovoc_concepts:
animal nutrition
food additive
food industry
health control
product quality
proposal (EU)
quasi-fiscal charge
restriction on competition

text: 6. 11. 1999 FR Journal officiel des Communautés européennes C 320/63 chapitre 2, deuxième édition (1988)) (1), qui ont pour but de réduire les nuisances sonores imposées aux riverains d’aéroports au moyen de mesures visant les types d’avions les plus bruyants. La Commission a en outre présenté une proposition concernant les appareils munis de dispositifs d’insonorisation (2), qui s’appuiera sur la législation en vigueur. De manière plus générale, la Commission examinera, dans sa prochaine communication sur le transport aérien et l’environnement, les incidences sur l’environnement et la concurrence des restrictions locales imposées en matière de transport aérien. Cette communication comprendra une évaluation de la portée et du contenu d’un éventuel cadre communautaire en matière de restrictions d’exploitation dans les aéroports soumis à des contraintes sonores (incluant la question des restrictions du trafic nocturne), qui tiendrait compte des compétences spécifiques des autorités locales et régionales en la matière. En ce qui concerne la taxation du kérosène, le Conseil a demandé une étude, actuellement en cours d’achèvement, examinant l’impact qu’aurait une telle mesure sur l’environnement et l’économie en fonction de différents niveaux de taxation et selon son champ d’application. La Commission projette d’apporter ses commentaires sur les résultats de cette étude dans la communication mentionnée ci-dessus. (1) (2) JO L 76 du 23. 3. 1992. JO C 118 du 17. 4. 1998. (1999/C 320/084) QUESTION ÉCRITE E-3646/98 posée par Amedeo Amadeo (NI) à la Commission (3 décembre 1998) Objet: Additifs dans l’alimentation des animaux Dans le cadre de la proposition de directive du Conseil modifiant la directive 70/524/CEE concernant les additifs dans l’alimentation des animaux et la directive 95/69/CEE établissant les conditions et modalités applicables à l’agrément et l’enregistrement de certains établissements et intermédiaires dans le secteur de l’alimentation animale et modifiant les directives 70/524/CEE, 74/63/CEE, 79/373/CEE et 82/471/CEE (COM(98) 0216-98/0131(CNS)) (1), il convient de définir des méthodes et des instruments réduisant au minimum les risques de distorsions éventuelles de la concurrence liés à la fixation de redevances différentes d’un pays à l’autre. À cette fin, il conviendrait de prévoir une phase transitoire durant laquelle les États membres resteraient libres de fixer les montants des redevances; par la suite, des montants uniques valables pour tous seraient fixés. La Commission entend-elle adapter ses propositions en ce sens et modifier en conséquence les données indiquées? (1) JO C 155 du 20. 5. 1998, p. 29. Réponse donnée par M. Fischler au nom de la Commission (15 janvier 1999) La Commission est d’avis, que la fixation d’un mode de calcul des redevances comme le prévoit la proposition de directive du Conseil modifiant les deux directives concernées, est mieux adaptée à la situation. Ces modifications prennent en compte les expériences faites dans d’autres secteurs d’activités et le système envisagé permet également de réduire le risque de distorsion de concurrence. Par ailleurs la proposition d’une décision du Conseil concernant un système communautaire de redevances pour le secteur de l’alimentation animale (1) prévoit que le mode de calcul sera revu, sur la base des rapports élaborés par les États membres et le cas échéant, qu’il pourra faire l’objet d’une adaptation. (1) COM(98) 225 final


title: WRITTEN QUESTION No. 3612/98 by Luciano VECCHI Recognition of Protected Designation of Origin and (DOP) Geographical Indication of Origin (IGP) for balsamic vinegar

eurovoc_concepts:
European Commission
Italy
application of EU law
condiment
designation of origin
exchange of information
location of production
originating product
product quality


eurovoc_concepts:
ESC opinion
environmental monitoring
motor vehicle
motor vehicle industry
motor vehicle pollution
pollution control measures

text: C 40/8 DA De Europæiske Fællesskabers Tidende 15. 2. 1999 Det Økonomiske og Sociale Udvalgs udtalelse om »Forslag til Rådets beslutning om en overvågningsmekanisme for de gennemsnitlige specifikke kuldioxidemissioner fra nye personbiler« (1) (1999/C 40/03) Rådet for Den Europæiske Union besluttede den 9. juli 1998 under henvisning til EF-traktatens artikel 198 C at anmode om Det Økonomiske og Sociale Udvalgs udtalelse om det ovennævnte emne. Det forberedende arbejde henvistes til ØSU’s Sektion for Landbrug, Udvikling af Landdistrikter- ne og Miljø, som udpegede José Ignacio Gafo Ferna´ndez til ordfører og Seppo Kallio og Marı´a Sa´nchez Miguel til medordførere. Sektionen vedtog sin udtalelse den 29. oktober 1998. Det Økonomiske og Sociale Udvalg vedtog på sin 359. plenarforsamling af 2. og 3. december 1998, mødet den 3. december 1998, følgende udtalelse med 42 stemmer for, ingen imod og ingen hverken for eller imod. 1. Indledning Bilag IV Det foreliggende forslag vedrører indførelse af 1. 1. en fælles overvågningsmekanisme for CO2-emissioner fra personbiler, som registreres for første gang i Fæl- lesskabet, og som ikke tidligere er blevet registreret andetsteds. 1. 2. Forslaget er et led i Fællesskabets strategi for bekæmpelse af klimaændringer og for reduktion af emissionerne fra personbiler, der blev fastlagt af Rådet (miljø) den 25. juni 1996 — senest udmøntet i konklusio- nerne fra Rådets møde (miljø og transport) den 16. og 17. juni 1998. I sidstnævnte opstilles et mål om nedbringelse af den gennemsnitlige emission fra nye biler til 120 g/km frem til år 2005 og allersenest i år 2010, og der anmodes om indførelse af et effektivt kontrolsystem for CO2-emissionerne i lyset af konklusio- nerne af Rådets møde (miljø) den 23. marts 1998. 1. 3. Et andet vigtigt element er den nylige aftale mellem Kommissionen og Foreningen af Europæiske Bilfabrikanter (ACEA). I denne aftale, som Rådet (miljø) har godkendt på sit møde den 6. oktober 1998, forpligter ACEA sig til at opfylde målet om en nedbringelse af den gennemsnitlige CO2-emission til 140 g/km for nye personbiler, der sælges i EU indtil år 2008. I år 2003 vil ACEA undersøge, om der er mulighed for yderligere begrænsninger for at nå det generelle mål om en nedbringelse af den gennemsnitlige CO2-emission til 120 g/km inden år 2013. 1. 4. Som led i dette overvågningssystem for CO2 foreslår Kommissionen, at medlemsstaterne én gang om året — og senest den 1. april det følgende år (bortset fra det første år, hvor det foreslås, at fristen bliver den 1. juli) indsender dataene for de gennemsnitlige CO2-emissioner fra de biler, der blev registreret på deres område det pågældende år. Dataene skal specificeres efter følgende kategorier af oplysninger: Bilag I — emissionen fra alle førstegangsregistrerede person- biler. — samlede gennemsnitlige emission pr. fabrikant og CO2-emissionskategori; — samlede gennemsnitlige emission pr. fabrikant, brændstoftype og CO2-emissionskategori; — samlede gennemsnitlige emission pr. fabrikant, brændstoftype, vægtklasse og CO2-emissionskate- gori; — samlede gennemsnitlige emission pr. fabrikant, brændstoftype, motoreffekt og CO2-emissionskate- gori. 1. 5. Kommissionen foreslår, at medlemsstaterne fremskaffer disse data fra typegodkendelsesdokumenta- tionen for nye biler, der er harmoniseret i henhold til direktiv 70/156/EØF senest ændret ved direktiv 98/14/EØF (2), og de nuværende nationale bilregistre- ringssystemer. 1. 6. Kommissionen mener, at det kun i nogle enkelte medlemsstater vil være nødvendigt at indhente flere oplysninger, end de hidtil har gjort i forbindelse med indregistreringen af nye biler. Det er således ikke hensigten med denne beslutning at harmonisere de nationale bilregistreringssystemer, men af hensyn til den praktiske gennemførelse vil det muligvis blive nødvendigt med en tilpasning, selvom der ikke er planer om en egentlig EU-harmonisering. 2. Generelle bemærkninger 2. 1. ØSU bifalder i høj grad dette forslag til Rådets beslutning, der skal bidrage til at nedbringe CO2- emissionen. Dette mål søges nået gennem kontrol med overholdelsen af de frivillige aftaler med bilfabrikanterne og indirekte ved at gøre forbrugerne mere bevidste og give dem bedre mulighed for at træffe et valg. Dermed lægges der yderligere pres på bilfabrikanterne med (1) EFT C 231 af 23. 7. 1998, s. 6. (2) EFT L 91 af 25. 3. 1998. 15. 2. 1999 DA De Europæiske Fællesskabers Tidende C 40/9 hensyn til forbedring af de nye bilers effektivitet, og medlemsstaterne tilskyndes til at indføre afgifter og andre ordninger, som kan føre til en hurtigere udskiftning af bilparken til fordel for mere brændstofeffektive biler. 2. 2. ØSU har ved flere lejligheder (1) peget på, at der er behov for en samlet konsekvensanalyse, hvor der tages højde for alle variabler vedrørende personbiler og lastbiler (f. eks. strengere sikkerhedsnormer, mindskelse af støjemissionen, ny brændstofkvalitet, skrotnings- ordninger), som har betydning for energiforbruget og dermed for CO2-emissionerne. ØSU påpeger endnu en for CO2- gang, emissioner, der nu foreslås, vil kræve, at en sådan analyse foretages så hurtigt som muligt, så det kan fastslås, hvor langt emissionsniveauet nu er bragt ned under hensyntagen til ovennævnte variabler. at den overvågningsmekanisme 2. 3. ØSU mener desuden, at det bør overvejes at træffe yderligere tre foranstaltninger, for at den foreslåede overvågningsmekanisme kan fungere så effektivt som muligt. 2. 3. 1. ØSU foreslår for det første, at der indføres en individuel mærkningsordning for biler, som giver forbrugerne bedre mulighed for at vælge den mest brændstofeffektive bil blandt de modeller, der opfylder deres særlige behov, hvilket er i tråd med Kommissionens nylige forslag fra september 1998 (2). (1) Se f. eks. EFT C 89 af 19. 3. 1997; EFT C 206 af 7. 7. 1997; EFT C 287 af 22. 9. 1997. (2) KOM(98) 489 endelig udg. Bruxelles, den 3. december 1998. 2. 3. 2. For det andet foreslår ØSU at fremme indfø- relsen af nationale afgiftsordninger, som tilskynder forbrugerne til at vælge mere brændstofeffektive biler. En sådan foranstaltning bør ledsages af præciserende retningslinjer fra Kommissionen for at undgå eventuel konkurrenceforvridning mellem medlemsstaterne og/el- ler fabrikanterne. 2. 3. 3. For det tredje er det meget vigtigt for forbruger- ne, at de ikke blot kan få oplysninger om emissionstallene for de enkelte modeller (jf. punkt 2. 3. 1), men også kan få kendskab til de i artikel 4 nævnte data for de forskellige biltyper, fabrikanter, brændstofkategorier og andre faktorer. Disse data må også opgives, således at forbrugerne kan foretage et miljørigtigt valg. 2. 3. 4. ØSU opfordrer Kommissionen til at indgå aftale med ACEA, bilfabrikanterne og importørerne af biler fra tredjelande om offentliggørelse af alle de i punkt 2. 3. 3 nævnte data. 2. 3. 5. ØSU opfordrer Kommissionen til at sammen- kæde denne udtalelse med den anmodning til Kommis- sionen, som Rådet (miljø) fremsatte på sit møde den 25. juni 1996 — og gentog i sine konklusioner af 23. marts 1998 — om at undersøge, om »de største bilproducerende lande gennemfører tilsvarende politik- ker« for at reducere CO2-emissionerne. Baggrunden herfor er, at importørerne efter ØSU’s mening bør søge at tilslutte sig alle de initiativer til forbedring af brændstofeffektiviteten, som de europæiske fabrikanter tager, herunder kontrolmekanismerne for disse emis- sioner. Beatrice RANGONI MACHIAVELLI Formand for Det Økonomiske og Sociale Udvalg


title: Talous- ja sosiaalikomitean lausunto aiheesta "Ehdotus neuvoston päätökseksi järjestelmän perustamisesta uusien henkilöautojen keskimääräisten erityisten hiilidioksidipäästöjen valvomiseksi"

text: C 40/8 FI Euroopan yhteiso¨jen virallinen lehti 15. 2. 1999 Talous- ja sosiaalikomitean lausunto aiheesta ”Ehdotus neuvoston päätökseksi järjestelmän perustamisesta uusien henkilöautojen keskimääräisten erityisten hiilidioksidipäästöjen valvo- miseksi” (1) (1999/C 40/03) Neuvosto päätti 9. heinäkuuta 1998 Euroopan yhteisön perustamissopimuksen 198 c artiklan nojalla pyytää talous- ja sosiaalikomitean lausunnon edellä mainitusta ehdotuksesta. Asian valmistelusta vastannut ”Maatalous, maaseudun kehittäminen, ympäristö” -jaosto antoi lausuntonsa 29. lokakuuta 1998. Esittelijä oli José Ignacio Gafo Ferna´ndez sekä apulaisesittelijät Seppo Kallio ja Marı´a Candelas Sa´nchez Miguel. Talous- ja sosiaalikomitea hyväksyi 2. –3. joulukuuta 1998 pitämässään 359. täysistunnossa (joulukuun 3. päivän kokouksessa) seuraavan lausunnon. A¨ änestyksessä annettiin 42 ääntä puolesta. Vastaääniä ei annettu eikä kukaan pidättynyt äänestämästä. 1. Johdanto liite 4: 1. 1. Ehdotuksen tarkoituksena on luoda yhteinen järjestelmä, jonka avulla arvioidaan ja valvotaan sellais- ten ajoneuvojen CO2-päästöjä, jotka rekisteröidään ensimmäisen kerran yhteisössä ja jotka eivät aiemmin ole olleet minkään maan rekisterissä. Ehdotus kuuluu osana neuvoston (ympäristö) 1. 2. 25. kesäkuuta 1996 määrittelemään ilmastonmuutosta ja henkilöautojen päästöjen supistamista käsittelevään yhteisön strategiaan, johon on viimeksi otettu kantaa ympäristö- ja liikenneneuvoston 16. ja 17. kesäkuuta 1998 pitämän kokouksen päätelmissä. Uusien ajoneuvo- jen keskimääräisten päästöjen tulisi olla 120 g/km vuoden 2005 paikkeilla tai viimeistään vuonna 2010. Ministerit kehottivat lisäksi luomaan ympäristöministe- rien 23. maaliskuuta 1998 pitämän kokouksen päätel- mien mukaisesti tehokkaan päästöjen valvontajärjes- telmän. 1. 3. Lisäksi on otettava huomioon Euroopan komis- sion ja Euroopan autoteollisuuden liiton (ACEAn) hiljat- tain solmima sopimus. Neuvoston (ympäristö) 6. lok- akuuta 1998 hyväksymässä sopimuksessa ACEA sitou- tuu tavoitteeseen, jonka mukaan EU:ssa myytävien uusien henkilöautojen keskimääräiset CO2-päästöt ra- joitetaan vuoteen 2008 mennessä tasolle 140 g/km. Vuonna 2003 ACEAn on määrä tarkastella mahdolli- suutta supistaa päästöjä edelleen siten, että vuoteen 2013 mennessä keskimääräiset CO2-päästöt olisivat enää 120 g/km. että 1. 4. Hiilidioksidipäästöjen valvontajärjestelmän ke- hittämiseksi komissio ehdottaa, jäsenvaltiot lähettävät komissiolle vuosittain tiedot kussakin maassa rekisteröityjen ajoneuvojen päästöistä seuraavan vuoden huhtikuun 1. päivään mennessä (järjestelmän käyttöö- nottovuonna määräajaksi heinäkuun 1. päivää) ja esittävät yksityiskohtaisesti seuraavat tilastotiedot: ehdotetaan liite 1: – kaikkien uusien ajoneuvojen päästöt. – valmistajakohtaiset keskimääräiset kokonaispäästöt ja CO2-päästöluokka; – valmistajakohtaiset keskimääräiset kokonaispäästöt, polttoainetyyppi ja CO2-päästöluokka; – valmistajakohtaiset keskimääräiset kokonaispäästöt, ja CO2- polttoainetyyppi, ajoneuvon massa (kg) päästöluokka; – valmistajakohtaiset keskimääräiset kokonaispäästöt, polttoainetyyppi, moottorin iskutilavuusluokka ja CO2-päästöluokka. 1. 5. Komission tavoitteena on, että jäsenvaltiot käyttävät tiedonkeruussa direktiivillä 70/156/ETY ja viimeksi direktiivillä 98/14/EY (2) muutettua, yhdenmu- kaistettua ja jäsenvaltioiden nykyisten rekisteröintijär- jestelmien mukaista uusien ajoneuvojen tyyppihyväk- syntäasiakirjaa. 1. 6. Euroopan komission käsityksen mukaan ainoas- taan muutamien jäsenvaltioiden on kerättävä lisätietoja uusien ajoneuvojen rekisteröimiseksi, eikä nyt tehtävällä päätöksellä ole tarkoitus yhdenmukaistaa rekisteröinti- menettelyä. Komissio katsoo tosin, että päätöksen täytäntöönpano saattaa hyvinkin edellyttää jäsenvaltion menettelytapojen mukauttamista siitäkin huolimatta, että menettelyjä ei yhdenmukaisteta yhteisön tasolla. 2. Yleistä 2. 1. Talous- ja sosiaalikomitea suhtautuu myöntei- sesti ehdotukseen neuvoston päätökseksi, jonka tarkoi- tuksena on auttaa saavuttamaan CO2-päästöjen supista- mistavoitteet varmistamalla, että autoteollisuuden kanssa tehtyjä vapaaehtoisia sopimuksia noudatetaan. Ehdotuksen avulla pyritään välillisesti valveuttamaan kuluttajia ja antamaan heille lisätietoa hankintapäätök- sien tekemiseksi. Käytännössä autoteollisuuden on si- touduttava aiempaa ponnekkaammin parantamaan uu- (1) EYVL C 231, 23. 7. 1998, s. 6. (2) EYVL L 91, 25. 3. 1998. 15. 2. 1999 FI Euroopan yhteiso¨jen virallinen lehti C 40/9 sien ajoneuvojen päästöjenhallintakykyä, ja jäsenvaltioi- den on puolestaan sitouduttava ottamaan käyttöön verotus- ym. järjestelmiä, joilla nopeutetaan autokannan uudistamista ja suositaan päästöjen kannalta entistä suorituskykyisempiä ajoneuvoja. Komitea on aiemmin todennut (1), että on tarpeen 2. 2. tutkia toimenpiteiden kokonaisvaikutuksia mittaamalla henkilöautoihin ja raskaisiin ajoneuvoihin tehtyjen muu- energiankulutukseen ja CO2- tosten vaikutukset päästöihin (esimerkiksi turvallisuusmääräysten tiuken- taminen, melupäästöjen supistaminen, uudenlaiset polt- toaineet, käytettyjen ajoneuvojen kierrätys). Komitea katsoo edelleen, että hiilidioksidipäästöjen seurantajär- jestelmän käyttöönotto edellyttää kyseisen tutkimuksen pikaista toteuttamista, jotta voidaan mitata asianmukai- sesti, millaiset todelliset päästörajat saavutetaan, ja verrata niitä nykyisiin päästöihin ottamalla huomioon kaikki aiemmat muuttujat. 2. 3. Jotta ehdotettu järjestelmä olisi riittävän teho- kas, komitean mielestä olisi harkittava lisäksi kolmea oheistoimea. 2. 3. 1. Ensinnäkin olisi otettava käyttöön järjestelmä ajoneuvojen yksilölliseksi merkitsemiseksi, mikä auttaisi kuluttajaa valitsemaan ympäristöä vähiten rasittavan ajoneuvon tilanteensa ja erityistarpeidensa mukaan, samaan tapaan kuin komissio on esittänyt syyskuussa 1998 tekemässään ehdotuksessa (2). (1) Ks. esim. EYVL C 89, 19. 3. 1997; EYVL C 206, 7. 7. 1997; EYVL C 287, 22. 9. 1997. (2) KOM(98) 489 lopull. Bryssel 3. joulukuuta 1998. 2. 3. 2. Toiseksi olisi suosittava järjestelmää, jonka puitteissa jäsenvaltiot myöntävät päästöjen kannalta suorituskykyisimmille ajoneuvoille verokannustimia. Komission olisi annettava asiasta selventävät suuntavii- vat, jotta valtioiden ja/tai valmistajien välinen kilpailu ei vääristyisi. Kolmanneksi kuluttajat eivät tarvitse tietoa 2. 3. 3. pelkästään yksittäisten henkilöautojen päästöistä (ks. kohta 2. 3. 1), vaan on tärkeää, että he saavat lisäksi tietoa kustakin valmistaja- ja polttoaineluokasta ja muista tekijöistä komission ehdotuksen 4 artiklan mu- kaisesti. Myös nämä tiedot tulisi julkaista, jotta voidaan auttaa kuluttajia tekemään ympäristön kannalta oikeita valintoja. Komitea kehottaa komissiota tekemään sopi- 2. 3. 4. muksia ACEAn, autoteollisuuden sekä yhteisön ulko- puolisista maista autoja tuovien tahojen kanssa kaikkien kohdassa 2. 3. 3 mainittujen tietojen julkaisemisesta. Komitea kehottaa komissiota lisäksi yh- 2. 3. 5. distämään tämän lausunnon ympäristöministerien neu- voston 25. kesäkuuta 1996 tekemään esitykseen, jonka neuvosto toisti päätelmissään 23. maaliskuuta 1998 ja jossa komissiota on kehotettu varmistamaan, että ”tärkeimmät autonvalmistajamaat panevat täytäntöön samanlaisia politiikkoja” CO2-päästöjen supistamiseksi. Komitean mielestä maahantuojat on saatava kiinnostu- maan kaikista Euroopan autoteollisuuden tekemistä aloitteista, joiden tarkoituksena on parantaa ajoneuvo- jen suorituskykyä päästöjen kannalta, päästöjen valvon- tajärjestelmät mukaan lukien. Talous- ja sosiaalikomitean puheenjohtaja Beatrice RANGONI MACHIAVELLI


title: INTERROGAZIONE SCRITTA n. 3642/98 dell'on. Paul LANNOYE Inquinamento acustico causato dal traffico aereo

eurovoc_concepts:
European standard
air traffic
aircraft
aviation fuel
competition law
noise
noise level
noise pollution
standard


title: WRITTEN QUESTION No. 3631/98 by Panayotis LAMBRIAS to the Commission. Measures to encourage the use of olive oil as part of the campaign to prevent cardiovascular disease

eurovoc_concepts:
EU financing
cardiovascular disease
disease prevention
dissemination of information
olive oil
public awareness campaign
sales promotion