title: Schengen-Besitzstand - Beschluss des Exekutivausschusses vom 16. September 1998 bezüglich der Errichtung eines Ad-hoc-Ausschusses Griechenland (SCH/Com-ex (98) 43 rev.)

eurovoc_concepts:
Greece
accession to an agreement
ad hoc committee
exchange of information
free movement of persons

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title: 1999/338/EC: Commission Decision of 16 September 1998 authorising subject to conditions, aid granted by Italy to Società Italiana per Condotte d'Acqua SpA (notified under document number C(1998) 2858) (Text with EEA relevance)

eurovoc_concepts:
Italy
State aid
aid for restructuring
aid to undertakings
capital increase
public works

formats: html pdf print

text: L 129/30 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 22. 5. 1999 II (Acts whose publication is not obligatory) COMMISSION COMMISSION DECISION of 16 September 1998 authorising subject to conditions, aid granted by Italy to Societ(cid:133) Italiana per Condotte d’Acqua SpA (notified under document number C(1998) 2858) (Only the Italian text is authentic) (Text with EEA relevance) (1999/338/EC) THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, (cid:190) to set up a subholding company, Fintecna (Fintecna), which was to privatise Iritecna’s profitable businesses. Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular the first subparagraph of Article 93(2) thereof, Having regard to the Agreement on the European Economic Area, and in particular Article 62(1)(a) thereof, Having given notice to the parties concerned to submit in accordance with the aforemen- their comments (1), tioned provisions, Whereas: I Societ(cid:133) Italiana per Condotte d’Acqua SpA (Condotte) is a company operating in engineering and civil infrastructure construction (roads, railways, etc. ); it was previously the property of Iritecna SpA (Iritecna), a wholly owned subsidiary of IRI SpA (IRI), which was in its turn wholly owned by the Italian Treasury. In 1993 IRI, which wished to restructure its engineering and construction activities, decided: (cid:190) to put Iritecna into liquidation, at a total cost of ITL 4 490 billion (ECU 2,3 billion), and (1) OJ C 327, 29. 10. 1997, p. 4. Condotte recorded losses totalling ITL 152 billion over the period from 1991 to 1994. Its gross profit margin fell from 11 % of turnover in 1991 to 4,5 % in 1994, with a low point of 2 % in 1993. The shareholders repeatedly had to make up the company’s losses, at a total cost of more than ITL 118 billion (ECU 61 billion). Despite its losses, Condotte was considered to be poten- tially attractive to private investors, largely because of the size of its order-book; the main items in the order-book derived from Condotte’s membership of the Iricav 1 and Iricav 2 consortia, the contractors for the Rome-Naples and Verona-Venice stretches of the projected Italian high- speed rail network. in Iritecna’s Condone, which amounted at that time to 91,7 %, was accordingly transferred to Fintecna, with a view to privati- sation. controlling stake The restructuring measures which Condotte now under- took, reducing its workforce from 1 500 to less than 1 000, writing down the value of work in hand, etc. , together with the prospects generated by the resumption of work on the high-speed rail network, led Fintecna to 22. 5. 1999 EN Official Journal of the European Communities L 129/31 believe that Condotte could be privatised as early as 1995; and this was expressly provided for in the plan for the restructuring of Iritecna which was submitted to the Commission. At the end of 1994 an adviser was appointed to select potential buyers for Condotte. By Decision 95/524/EC (2) (the Decision) the Commis- sion declared that the aid granted to Iritecna and Fintecna in connection with the Iritecna liquidation was compat- ible with the common market. The Decision also author- ised Iritecna to cover Condotte’s losses up to 31 December 1994, which amounted to ITL 110 billion, or ECU 56,4 million. Article 1 of the Decision required compliance with the restructuring plan approved by the Commission, which among other things called for the privatisation of Fintec- na’s subsidiaries, including Condotte, within a reasonable time limit and without further State aid. After the Decision was adopted, however, the Italian Government informed the Commission that the sale of Condotte had been suspended in order to allow time for an assessment of implications of guarantees given by IRI in connection with the high-speed rail network project. the legal When that assessment was completed in November 1995, the procedure for the sale of Condotte was set in motion once again, the objective now being to sell off a minority holding: the whole of the capital was to be sold only when IRI had discharged the guarantees for the work on the high-speed rail network. In the mean time Condotte continued to record substan- tial losses: these reached ITL 71 billion (ECU 36 million) in 1995, falling to ITL 21 billion (ECU 11 million) in 1996. In order to replenish Condotte’s share capital, which had been eroded by its losses, Fintecna was obliged to provide fresh funding of ITL 65 billion in March 1996 (ECU 33 million) and a further ITL 7 billion (ECU 4 million) in December 1996. As a result of these transactions Fintec- na’s holding in Condotte increased to 95,8 % of the capital. (atto dovuto) within the meaning of the Civil Code, as Condotte would otherwise have had to be put into liquidation. in March 1997, Fintecna sold 45,7 % of Finally, the capital in Condotte to a private investor, Ferrocemento SpA (Ferrocemento); the contract of sale includes the following clauses: (a) Fintecna gives Ferrocemento an option to buy the remaining shares at a predetermined price, and Ferro- cemento gives Fintecna an option to sell them at the same price; these options are valid until six months after the expiry of IRI’s guarantees on the work on the high-speed rail network or, in the event of early discharge by IRI itself, until 30 June 1999; (b) the sale price is based on a valuation of ITL 100 billion (ECU 51 million) for Condotte; (c) Fintecna must replenish Condotte’s share capital to bring it up to ITL 40 billion at the time of the transfer; (d) Fintecna is to have no further interest in Condotte’s trading results from the time of the transfer of 45,7 % of this being achieved by means of a compensation mechanism which adjusts the selling price for the remaining 50,1 % of the capital. the shares, in order to comply with the clause In June 1997, requiring it capital, to replenish Condotte’s Fintecna provided further funding of ITL 33 billion (ECU 17 million). share The Commission now decided to initiate proceedings under Article 93(2) of the Treaty in respect of the fresh capital contributed in the years from 1995 to 1997, the unsatisfactory restructuring measures taken, and the terms of the privatisation of the company, which appeared to conflict with the conditions laid down in the Decision. The Commission informed the Italian Government of its decision to initiate proceedings by letter of l August 1997 (3). The Italian Government submitted formal observations by letter of 20 October 1997. On 24 June 1997, in response to a request from the Commission, the Italian authorities informed it of the measures taken to replenish Condotte’s share capital and reported that negotiations for the sale of the company had took the view that resumed. The Italian authorities Fintecna’s funding of Condotte must be considered a duty No other Member State or interested party submitted observations within the time allowed. By letter of 1 December 1997 the Commission requested more in- formation from the Italian authorities. That information was supplied in a letter of 22 January 1998, and at a meeting which took place in Rome on 20 January 1998. (2) OJ L 300, 13. 12. 1995, p. 23. (3) See footnote 1. L 129/32 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 22. 5. 1999 The Italian authorities provided further particulars by letters of 10 and 12 February. Lastly, on 5 May the Commission received a copy of the company’s balance sheet as at 31 December 1997 and its industrial plan for the period 1998 to 2000. The information furnished by the Italian authorities showed that on 17 December 1997 Fintecna had provided Condotte with a further capital injection amounting to ITL 58 billion (ECU 30 million) as an adjustment for the purchaser, value of Condotte’s assets. With this injection, the total funding provided by Fintecna to Condotte after 1994 was brought up to ITL 163 billion (ECU 84 million). following further in the falls II In its observations the Italian Government argues: (i) that the Decision makes provision for injections of fresh capital into Condotte; (ii) that Fintecna provided the fresh capital out of its own resources and acted as a private investor would have done, so that the money does not constitute State aid, (iii) that there has been no infringement of the condi- tions imposed by the Decision. The Italian Government further argues that, if the meas- ures referred to are to be considered State aid, they should in any event be declared compatible with the common market under Article 92(3) of the Treaty. As regards point (i), the Italian Government contends that at the time of the Decision the Commission was already aware of the need for further funding of the company in order to allow privatisation to take place and that the Commission was informed in good time of each of the recapitalisation operations the progress of the sale of the company. at Condotte and of The restructuring plan approved in the Decision provided that sound businesses, and those that could be returned to a sound footing, were to be transferred to Fintecna with a view to privatisation. The Italian Government argues, therefore, the Decision allowed for the need to finance a measure of restructuring, particularly in the construction industry, which is the industry in which Condotte operates. that After the Decision, the Italian Government contends, both Fintecna and its parent IRI kept the Commission regularly informed of the progress of the privatisation process. At a meeting in Rome in June 1997, for example, IRI and Fintecna supplied all the information needed for an assessment of the facts which now form the basis of the Article 93(2) proceedings. As regards point (ii), the Italian Government argues that Fintecna helped Condotte using resources generated by Fintecna’s own activities, without any contribution on the part of the State, and that Fintecna acted in accordance its action with the private investor principle, so that cannot be considered State aid. The Italian Government states that Fintecna compared the cost of putting Condotte into liquidation with the cost of recapitalising and privatising it. Where the foreseeable cost of a liquidation exceeds that of recapitalisation and sale of the company, the Italian Government argues, there is no State aid caught by Article 92(1). The Italian Government states in particular that Fintecna estimated the cost of putting Condotte into liquidation at ITL 600 billion, if the company were wound up in an orderly fashion, and at ITL 2 700 billion, if it were wound up in free fall. Fintecna concluded that it would be prefer- able to recapitalise Condotte and to keep it in operation pending privatisation. With that end in view, Fintecna behaved as a private investor would have done, and the funds it injected into Condotte do not constitute State aid. As regards point (iii), the Italian Government maintains that it has complied with all the conditions imposed by the Decision, with particular reference to the total cost of restructuring, the commitment to restructure the group, and the privatisation of Condotte. On the total cost of the plan approved by the Commis- sion, the Italian Government points out that the Decision authorised a total of ITL 4 490 billion in aid, ITL 1 090 billion being money already given to subsidiaries, including Condotte, in the period 1991 to 1993, and ITL 3 400 billion being the estimated cost of putting Iritecna into liquidation, after deduction of ITL 1 653 billion in proceeds from sales by Fintecna. As things stand at present, the Italian authorities expect that the final cost will be less than the maximum just mentioned, despite the lower returns on the sale of Condotte: the Decision has thus been complied with. Turning to the restructuring operations provided for in the Decision, the Italian Government argues that the action taken does in reality comply with the plan approved by the Commission. As regards the reduction in the workforce (and thus indirectly in production capacity), the forecast figures which the Commission cites in the letter initiating proceedings refer to the active workforce 22. 5. 1999 EN Official Journal of the European Communities L 129/33 engaged on open-ended contracts, while the figures taken from the annual reports include other staff, such as those on fixed-term contracts and those laid off under the ‘Cassa integrazione guadagni' wage compensation scheme. According to the Italian Government, that clause could be cancelled by agreement between the Iricav consortium for the sale of and TAV. In that event Condotte would already entitle Fintecna to sell the remainder of its holding. the contract that The Italian Government argues the decline in Condotte’s performance as compared with the forecasts in the plan, which called for net profits of ITL 19 billion in 1995 and ITL 40 billion in 1996, was due to worsening market conditions, and not to a failure to restructure the company. that The Italian Government contends the results obtained by Condotte in 1995 and 1996 cannot be compared directly with the restructuring plan which the Commission approved in the Decision. The failure to achieve the turnover called for in the plan caused a reduc- tion of ITL 130 billion in Condotte’s gross margin over the two years. A number of non-operational items amounting to ITL 46 billion have to be added to that negative effect (cid:190) items which were not foreseeable at the time the plan was drawn up; once this has been done, it can be seen that the restructuring effort provided for has actually been exceeded. On the obligation to privatise laid down in the Decision, the Italian Government points out: (cid:190) that the same question is currently before the Court of First Instance of the European Communities, (cid:190) that in any event Fintecna complied with the condi- tion, having sold Condotte within a ‘reasonable time limit' as required by the Decision. initiated the proceedings, When it the Commission argued that on the basis of the information at its disposal the sale of Condotte could not be considered a genuine privatisation: out of the shares in its possession Fintecna had sold only 45,7 % and had kept 50,1 % (the remaining 4,2 % is quoted on the Milan Stock Exchange). In support of its claim that the sale of Condotte has to be considered definitive, the Italian Government cites two other points: (cid:190) the fact that the Italian competition authority, the ‘Autorit(cid:133) garante della concorrenza e del mercato', found in the course of its own inquiry that, although the sale related to only 45,7 % of the capital, it never- theless directly transferred managerial responsibility to the purchaser, (cid:190) the fact that the auditors certifying Condotte’s accounts intended to exclude the company’s 1997 results from Fintecna’s consolidated accounts on the grounds that there was no effective control. The Decision also required that the privatisation of Condotte be carried out without further aid. The Italian Government maintains that the financing that Fintecna gave to Condotte after 1994, amounting to some ITL 163 billion (about ECU 84 million), should not be considered State aid within the scope of Article 92, on the grounds explained with reference to point (ii). Alternatively, any aid should be considered compatible with the common market because: (cid:190) the financing was provided in connection with a restructuring plan aimed at restoring the company to profitability, something which is confirmed by its privatisation, (cid:190) the funds were limited to what was strictly necessary to ensure that Condotte returned to market viability. III The Italian Government argues that the privatisation of Condotte must be considered genuine and definitive. The sale of 45,7 % is linked to specific contractual clauses which make the sale of the remaining 50,1 % inevitable. The decision to sell the company in two instalments is due to the presence of a contractual clause in the agree- ment between the high-speed rail company TAV and the Iricav consortium, of which Condone is a member. The consortium has won the contracts awarded by TAV for the building of the Rome-Naples stretch of the high- speed network. The clause requires IRI to preserve its ‘majority participation' in the consortium until the work is completed. In the light of what has been said, it will first have to be the measures described determined whether or not infringe the conditions laid down in the Decision. If they do, the question of the compatibility of the aid given to Condotte up to 1994, which was approved in that Decision, will have to be reconsidered. In order to deter- mine whether the conditions laid down in Article 1(4) and (5) of the Decision have been complied with, it will also have to be established whether the funds given to Condotte after 1994 constitute State aid caught by Article 92 of the Treaty, and, if more State aid has in fact been granted, it will then have to be considered whether the aid measures for Condotte, taken as a whole, are compat- ible with the common market. L 129/34 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 22. 5. 1999 As has been explained, the Decision found that the aid granted to Condotte up to 1994 (ITL 110 billion or ECU 56 million) was compatible with the common market subject to a series of conditions, including the following: (i) Condotte was to carry out the measures called for in the restructuring plan approved by the Commission; (ii) Fintecna and its subsidiaries, including Condotte, were to be privatised in accordance with the time- scale submitted to the Commission, and in any case within a reasonable time limit; (iii) the income from the sale of companies was not to be used to assist companies in difficulty which had not yet been sold; According to the Italian Government, these figures show that the efficiency objective in the plan has been achieved. To make a proper comparison, however, the figure that must be looked at is the average number of employees over the year (estimated on the basis of the arithmetic average of the end-of-year figures for two successive years): 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 (iv) no further State aid was to be granted in connection with the privatisations. Annual staff (Commission estimate) average n. a. 750 663 661 592 (i) The obligation to carry out the restructuring measures called for in the plan In the decision initiating the Article 93(2) proceedings, the Commission argued that the reorganisation of Condotte called for by the restructuring plan had not been completed. In particular, it observed that: (cid:190) the number of employees on open-ended contracts had increased in the period 1994 to 1996 from 383 to 431 (or 513 including Metroroma, which was taken over in 1996), (cid:190) this increase in staff coincided with a very unfavour- able economic situation, with losses of ITL 71 billion in 1995 and ITL 21 billion in 1996. In its observations the Italian Government contends that the figures used by the Commission include workers who are entered on the company’s personnel register (libro matricola) but are not actually working, such as those laid off under scheme. According to the Italian Government, comparing compar- able figures gives the following picture: the Cassa integrazione guadagni 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1 003 759 550. 609 854 645 680 642 543 Staff provided for restructuring (average) in plan Staff at end of year (as shown in personnel register) Note: Figures for entire construction sector (Condotte and Italstrade). It will be seen that only in 1994 was the real average figure in line with the restructuring plan; subsequently, in both 1995 and 1996, it easily exceeded what was laid down in the plan. At the same time, and partly as a consequence, Condotte’s financial results were heavily negative, in contrast to what had been provided for in the plan. The plan anticipated a net profit of ITL 19 billion in 1995, when there was in fact a net loss of ITL 71 billion, and a net profit of ITL 40 billion in 1996, when there was in fact a net loss of ITL 21 billion. In 1997, whereas the plan anticipated a net profit of ITL 37 billion, the company in fact made a loss of ITL 78 billion. It is not sufficient to say here, as the Italian Government does, that the worsening situation was due to an unfore- seeable decline in the market. The plan provided that beginning in 1995, the internal restructuring measures would enable Condotte to achieve a gross industrial margin, before structural costs, equal to 7 % of turnover. In theory, that margin would have allowed the company’s losses to be contained at roughly ITL 20 billion in 1995, despite the fall in revenue that actually took place. With an industrial margin of 7 % the Commission took the view that, even with a pessimistic forecast of the market (which proved to be justified) the company would be able to maintain a substantial economic balance without In fact Condotte’s 1995 industrial margin was negative and indeed it made a net loss in excess of its corporate assets. to further capital injections. resort However, in 1996 and above all in 1997 Condotte under- took a more stringent effort than that in the plan that had been approved, in order to deal with the manifest deteri- oration in market conditions. The period 1995 to 1997 proved to be one of the most difficult periods experienced by the construction sector in Italy (where Condotte gener- ates over 70 % of its income). 22. 5. 1999 EN Official Journal of the European Communities L 129/35 Despite adverse trading conditions, Condotte maintained an adequate operating profit margin and reduced its struc- tural costs more drastically than assumed in the restruc- turing plan approved by the Commission. As can be seen from Table 1 its 1996 gross margin reached 12 % of net turnover, compared with the figure of 7 % anticipated in the plan. In 1997, its structural costs were around 20 % below those anticipated in the plan, as a result of further restructuring measures adopted by the enterprise. Table 1 Condotte’s financial results (in billion ITL) 1996 planned 1996 actual 1997 planned 1997 actual Net turnover 1,425 496 1 366 603 Gross margin 126 61 120 41 Structural costs (35) (37) (31) Operating loss 38 (21) 37 (78) Source: Condotte’s annual accounts for 1996 and 1997 (excluding for Metroroma). Much of the company’s net losses in the period resulted from writing down assets in line with the smaller margins which were capable of being generated on work in progress and work already completed. Moreover, Condotte’s rationalisation measures continued into the first months of 1998; headquarters staff was further cut from 110 as at 31 December 1997 to 105 as at 27 March 1998 (they had numbered 185 on 31 December 1996). Managerial staff, with an appreciably higher unit cost, was cut from 25 as at 31 December 1997 to 19 as at 27 March 1998. It can be concluded that the condition imposed by Article 1(2) of the Decision has been complied with, more espe- cially in view of the action taken by the company to contend with a market less favourable than that anti- cipated in the restructuring plan. (ii) The obligation to privatise Condotte in accord- ance with the timescale submitted or, in any case, within a reasonable time limit One of the factors which was felt to justify the Decision was the Italian Government’s undertaking to privatise Condotte rapidly in accordance with the restructuring plan; on the basis of the information submitted it was considered in the Decision that privatisation would be possible in a very short time (4). The intention to sell off Condotte rapidly was considered a major factor in the assessment of the aid granted to Iritecna, among other things, in view of the enormous aid given to Iritecna’s construction sector up to that time. The Commission accepted that some restructuring of the construction sector was still going on at the time of the Decision but, in the light of the Iritecna plan, it expected that this ‘should be completed by the end of 1995' (5), allowing the companies to be sold off. For this reason, Article 1(3) and (5) of the Decision expressly required that Fintecna’s subsidiaries be privatised in accordance with the timescale submitted to the Commission or, in any event, within a reasonable time and that no further State aid be given. But the procedure for the sale of the companies was suspended shortly after the Decision was adopted, and set in motion again only in November 1995. According to the Italian Government, this was because of the need to study the legal implications of the contractual guarantees given by IRI for the work on the high-speed rail network. Only in March 1997 was a contract concluded for the sale to Ferrocemento of 45,7 % of Condotte’s capital belonging to Fintecna. When it initiated proceedings, the Commission did not have sufficient information to be able to establish whether the sale could be considered genuine and irreversible so as to satisfy the requirements of the Decision. The Commission raised doubts regarding the following aspects in particular: (cid:190) the transfer from Fintecna to the buyer power to appoint the management, (cid:190) the financial implications for Fintecna of any further losses by Condotte, (cid:190) the terms of the transfer of the remaining 50,1 % of the capital, (cid:190) the possibility that the IRI guarantees in respect of the high-speed rail network contracts might have to be met. In its reply, the Italian Government has supplied suffi- cient the doubts raised by the Commission. information to dispel As regards the transfer of managerial power, the buyer is given the responsibility for appointing the managing director (amministratore delegato), who has the power to manage the company subject to the authorisation of the board of directors (consiglio di amministrazione). The only restrictions relate to acts which might be damaging (4) See Section III, point 6. (5) See Section IV, point 3. L 129/36 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 22. 5. 1999 to Fintecna or IRI in connection with the work on the high-speed rail network. The board of directors itself is made up of seven members, three of them, including the managing director, being appointed by Ferrocemento, three by Fintecna, and the chairman by Ferrocemento subject to Fintecna’s agreement. On the basis of this information, it can be concluded that the buyer takes over from Fintecna full power to manage Condotte. future losses by Turning now to the possibility that the Condotte might have to be borne by Fintecna, contract establishes a complex mechanism for the adjust- ment of the selling price for the 50,1 % of the share capital remaining with Fintecna; this has the result of excluding Fintecna itself from any financial burdens whatsoever deriving from operating losses by Condotte. The selling price for the 50,1 % is set at ITL 50,1 billion, but this is to be adjusted to include: (cid:190) the portion borne by Fintecna in any further capital increase, whether or not intended to cover losses made after the transfer of the shares (to be added to the price), (cid:190) the portion accruing to Fintecna in any profits made by Condotte and distributed to the shareholders after the transfer of the shares (to be subtracted from the price), (cid:190) any payments by Fintecna to cover losses made by Condotte after the reference date laid down in the contract (to be added to the price). All of the items described, including the selling price, are indexed from the date of the particular transaction to the date of transfer of the remaining 50,1 % of the capital, at a rate of interest laid down in the contract. On the basis of this information, it can be confirmed that Fintecna will not bear the financial effects of any further losses by Condotte. It is clear, then, that Fintecna will no longer be liable for the company’s operating losses. From the point of view of liability, the privatisation of Condotte can be regarded as complete even though Fintecna continues to hold the majority of the share capital. The contract lays down the following mechanism for the transfer of the remaining 50,1 % of the share capital to Ferrocemento: (cid:190) Fintecna is entitled to transfer its 50,1 % to Ferroce- mento at the predetermined price between 1 January and 30 June 1999 or until six months after the discharge by IRI of the guarantees for the high-speed rail network, (cid:190) Ferrocemento is entitled to acquire the 50,1 % in Fintecna at the predetermined price at any time from the date of discharge of the guarantees referred to until 30 June 1999 or until six months from the date of discharge of the guarantees by IRI. It transpires from this that there is no legal obligation on the parties to complete the transfer of Condotte. Each party is entitled to call for completion of the sale, and only if one exercises its right is the other obliged to complete the transaction. It might conceivably happen in that case the that neither party exercises its right: transfer of Condotte would not be completed, and the condition laid down in the Decision would not have been complied with. However, the Italian Government has given an under- taking that Fintecna will transfer the remaining holding in Condotte on the contractual conditions, with particular reference to the deadlines for the exercise of the option itself. In view of that commitment Fintecna’s remaining holding in Condotte can be considered a temporary one only, serving merely to protect IRI with respect to the guarantees it gave in connection with the contracts for the high-speed rail network regarding the acquirer’s possible failure to complete. Despite the fact, then, that Fintecna continues to hold 50,1 % of Condotte, the condition laid down in Article 1(3) of the Decision has been complied with. The delays in the sale were due to circumstances beyond Fintecna’s control (the contractual clause in respect of the work on the high-speed rail network); as far as was in its power, Fintecna acted with the objective of privatising Condotte as rapidly as possible. That objective has been achieved, as was explained, by virtue of the clauses in the contract of sale and the commitment given by the Italian authorities that the remaining holding will be completed as soon as possible. the transfer of The Commission notes that negotiations are taking place between IRI and TAV, the company which awarded the contract, with a view to removing the clause that requires the IRI to continue holding an absolute majority of capital that a in Condotte. The Commission notes positive outcome to those negotiations could speed up the formal transfer of the entire capital of Condotte to Ferro- cemento. (iii) The prohibition on using the proceeds of the asset sales by Fintecna to assist companies in difficulty, and (iv) The prohibition on granting further State aid in connection with privatisa- tions In order to determine whether Fintecna has complied with the conditions set out in Article 1(4) and (5) of the Decision, and in particular the prohibition on the granting of further aid, it has to be established whether the funding that Condotte received after 1994 can be considered an investment on market lines or whether it constitutes State aid for the purposes of Article 92(1) of the Treaty. 22. 5. 1999 EN Official Journal of the European Communities L 129/37 When it has to determine whether the financial relations between a State and a public enterprise include a State-aid component caught by Article 92 of the Commission applies the private-investor test to the finan- cial flows between them. In the case under consideration, the funds given to this means considering whether Condotte after 1995 were public resources and, if so, whether they would have been invested in accordance with the private-investor test. the Treaty, Under the Iritecna plan, Condotte was transferred to Fintecna, a wholly owned subsidiary of IRI, an industrial holding company itself wholly owned by the Italian Treasury. The Italian Government appoints the board of directors of IRI, which in turn appoints the board of Fintecna. According to the settled case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, in particular its judgment of 21 March 1991 in Case C-305/89 Italy v. Commis- sion (6), in order to establish whether an aid measure can be considered State aid within the scope of Article 92 of the Treaty, ‘no distinction should be drawn between cases where aid is granted directly by the State and cases where it is granted by public or private bodies established or appointed by the State'. Thus, even if the funds given to Condotte did not come directly from the State, it may nevertheless be that they are public funds. It is not enough to affirm here, as the Italian Government does in its observations, that the financial measures taken by Fintecna used resources generated by the operation of its own business and not obtained from the State. If Fintecna’s operating cash flow is used for an unprofitable purpose, as it was in the case of Condotte, that reduces the profit accruing to Fintecna’s shareholder IRI and thus ultimately to the State. Fintecna might have used its own funds to engage in activities with a better return; this would have enabled IRI, and consequently the State, to obtain a better economic return on its investment. A lower return on IRI’s investment in Fintecna will ulti- mately be reflected in a loss of profit to the State so that, even though the funds given to Condotte were not provided directly by the State, they can nevertheless be said to constitute State resources. In order to establish whether or not they are caught by the prohibition in Article 92(1) of the Treaty, they have to be studied in the light of the private-investor principle (7). transaction According to that principle, a financial between the State and a public undertaking contains a State-aid component if it would not have been acceptable [1991] ECR I-1603, paragraph 13. (6) (7) Commission communication to the Member States on the application of Articles 92 and 93 of the EC Treaty and of Article 5 of Commission Directive 80/723/EEC to public undertakings in the manufacturing sector (see Part III), (OJ C 307, 13. 11. 1993, p. 3). to a private investor operating under normal market economy conditions. In particular, the presence of State aid can be presumed ‘where the financial position of the company, and particularly the structure and volume of its debt, is such that a normal return (in dividends or capital gains) cannot be expected within a reasonable time from the capital invested' (8). Accordingly, an analysis has to be made of Condotte’s financial position in the years before the increases in capital; this is shown in Table 2. Table 2 Condotte’s financial results (in billion ITL) 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Net turnover 672,1 660,3 445,3 352,9 495,7 Gross margin 33,8 14,8 19,5 (19,0) 60,9 Operating income (9,1) (34,9) (9,0) (74,8) 0,1 Net profit (loss) (40,7) (87,7) (23,9) (70,9) (20,4) Net worth 39,9 63,9 46,9 (23,9) 28,1 Source: Condotte’s annual accounts. The figures set out above show that Condotte was not a profitable concern when Fintecna provided the funds. Fintecna provided further funding in 1996 despite the fact that, given Condotte’s results, Fintecna could not reasonably expect any significant return on its investment. It is not sufficient to plead that the costs of putting the company into liquidation would have been higher than those of the recapitalisations carried out. A private share- holder faced with declining market prospects and the impossibility of a return to viability would have put the company into liquidation well before 1996, and indeed before 1994, thus avoiding costly recapitalisations and substantially reducing the costs of the liquidation itself. Furthermore, a shareholder not subject to the unlimited guarantee rule in Article 2362 of the Civil Code would have been liable for Condotte’s debts only up to the amount of the equity of the company, possibly via insol- vency proceedings, and would consequently have been than those liable for amounts actually injected into Condotte. significantly smaller (8) Ibid. , paragraph 16. L 129/38 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 22. 5. 1999 The financial resources given by Fintecna to Condotte in 1996 and 1997 therefore constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 92(1) of the Treaty. Thus the condition laid down in Article 1(5) of the Decision has not been complied with; consideration will accordingly have to be given not only to the compatibility of the fresh aid granted, but also to the compatibility of the aid received by Condotte and approved in the Decision, which amounted to ITL 110 billion. reason to conclude that the sale took place at the market price and thus that no aid was given to Ferrocemento in its acquisition of Condotte. Moreover, the contract of sale does not contain any clauses specifically obliging the acquirer to continue any loss-making activities. In any case, no element of aid for Condotte can be discerned in the terms of sale. it In assessing compliance with the Decision, is not enough to say that the total volume of aid approved has not been exceeded. The Decision expressly provided that the individual privatisation operations were not to be financed by further State aid. The purpose of this obliga- tion was to reduce the distorting effect of the aid granted and, consequently, to ensure that any resources acquired as a result of the sell-offs were devoted to reducing the costs of putting the Iritecna/Fintecna group into liqui- dation. In addition, given that the businesses likely to be most attractive to potential private investors had been trans- ferred to Fintecna primarily with a view to sale, and only within limits with a view to restructuring, the Decision expressly prohibited further aid to those businesses. In principle, when State-owned businesses are privatised it may be permissible to grant State aid for purchasers where the sale does not take place on market conditions or for the business where the contract of sale requires the acquirer of the business to carry on unprofitable segments which would have been discontinued by an investor oper- ating on market conditions. Regarding the sale of Condotte to a private investor, that sale was carried through in compliance with the relevant Community rules. Both the 1994 procedure, which was subsequently abandoned, and the 1995 procedure, which terminated in the sale of the company to Ferrocemento, entailed making public offers to buy the business. Thus about 20 investors were initially interested in the sale of Fintecna’s civil engineering businesses. Of the 20, 13 submitted offers, of which two were placed on a shortlist. Only Ferrocemento submitted a binding offer and there- fore it alone was admitted to the due diligence stage. In the procedure followed by Fintecna all potential investors were placed on an equal footing in the sale and the best offer was chosen. That gave the Commission As has been explained, the aid granted to Condotte after 1994 constitutes State aid within the scope of Article 92(1) of the Treaty and, as a result, the aid received by the company before 1994, which the Commission approved in the Decision, is in principle likewise unlawful; the possibility has now to be considered whether the grants of aid, taken as a whole, are compatible with the common market. IV Under Article 92(2) and (3) of the Treaty certain aid is, or may be declared, compatible with the common market. Paragraphs 2, 3(a) and 3(b) of Article 92 of the Treaty cannot be applied to measures of the kind under consid- eration here. In view of the variety of Condotte’s activities and locations, and the fact that the aid does not have a regional objective, the only possible exemption is that provided for in paragraph 3(c), which deals with aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities. By its very nature, the aid in this case must be considered aid for the restructuring of firms in difficulty. As regards such aid, the Commission has published Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty (9). In practice, if it is to approve one-off measures to restructure a firm in difficulty, the following tests must be satisfied: (i) the measures must restore the long-term viability of the firm; (ii) the measures must avoid undue distortion of competition; (iii) the measures must be in proportion to the costs and benefits of restructuring and thus limited to the strict minimum needed; (iv) the restructuring plan must be fully implemented; (v) the implementation of the restructuring plan must be monitored and verified by the Commission. (9) OJ C 368, 23. 12. 1994, p. 12. 22. 5. 1999 EN Official Journal of the European Communities L 129/39 Only if all of these tests are satisfied can the Commission take the view that the effects of the aid are not contrary to the Community interest and approve it under Article 92(3)(c) of the Treaty. As regards test (i), the restoration of viability, the Italian authorities had submitted a restructuring plan at the time of the Decision which was intended to restore Condotte to profitability from 1996 onward. The aid given to Condotte up to 1994 (ITL 110 billion) was held to be compatible with specific regard to that plan and to the Community Guidelines. However, Condotte did not achieve the financial results expected and so had to fall back on public assistance once again (receiving ITL 163 billion, as has been explained). It should be pointed out, however, that Condotte’s failure to return to profitability was the result of a market situa- the tion which was not Decision. foreseeable at the time of Condotte’s restructuring plan, which the Commission approved in the Decision, was based on prudent estimates of the future development of the company’s order book. On 31 December 1992 that portfolio of work amounted to ITL 2 255 billion, of which more than ITL 795 billion related to contracts connected with the high-speed rail network. On the basis of the work schedule laid down by the company awarding the contract, it was reasonable to expect Condotte’s to develop as shown in Table 3. turnover and financial results Table 3 Forecast financial results of Condotte (in billion ITL) 1995 1996 1997 Net turnover 896 1 425 1 366 Gross margin Operating result Net profit (loss) 66 31 19 126 120 91 38 83 37 Source: Iritecna’s restructuring plan. company would be focusing on work related to the high- speed rail network. None the less, the crisis in the sector continued until 1996 with a severity that was not foresee- able, giving some signs of recovery only in the second half of 1997. Moreover, the contracts already secured for the high- speed rail network were delayed for reasons outside the company’s control. With the interaction of those two factors, Condotte’s turn- over was in fact substantially lower than forecast in the plan, as is shown in Table 1: (cid:190) in 1995 it amounted to ITL 353 billion, or 39 % of the figure forecast, (cid:190) in 1996 it amounted to ITL 496 billion, or 35 % of the figure forecast. In both those years, as in 1994, Condotte’s turnover was about 40 % less than in 1992 and 1993, years in which the crisis in the industry in which Condotte operates was already very serious. Faced with this crisis on the market around it, Condotte reacted by taking further restruc- turing measures, going beyond what had been provided for in the plan; although these were not enough to secure net profits, they did allow the company to record a posi- tive operating result in 1996, its first in a long time. In particular, the restructuring measures concentrated on reducing structural costs, which in 1996 reached levels some 10 % below what had been provided for in the restructuring plan. In 1997, as has been indicated, these costs were about 20 % below what had been provided for in the restructuring plan. In that period, the company stepped up its internal restructuring effort with the aim of returning to a stable level of profitability. For example, headquarters staff, an item reflected in structural adminis- trative costs, was reduced from 201 on 31 December 1995 to 105 in March 1998, with management staff, which has a higher unit cost, falling from 51 at the end of 1995 to 19 in March 1998 (down 61 %). As a result of these operations and of further restructuring the group, efforts affecting the entire structure of Condotte succeeded in 1996 in reversing the negative economic trend that had been apparent up to 1995, in spite of the crisis in the construction sector. Its gross margin went from –5,4 % of turnover to positive figures in both 1996 and 1997 (ITL 61 billion and ITL 41 billion respectively). The above valuations have already given due regard to the difficulties of the civil engineering sector, which experi- enced a severe crisis in the 1990s, in staging a recovery. They allowed for a rate of acquisition of orders much below Condotte’s potential and indeed assumed the In 1996 and 1997 Condotte recorded a net loss, particu- larly heavy in 1997, but this was due mainly to the extraordinary items representing the costs of restruc- turing. L 129/40 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 22. 5. 1999 The restructuring efforts undertaken will bring the company to a better level of profitability in future years, bearing in mind the anticipated slow-down in work on the high-speed rail network, as forecast in the industrial plan presented to the Commission. Table 4 Condotte’s industrial plan 1998 to 2000 (in billion ITL) 1998 1999 2000 Net turnover 660 570 459 Gross margin Operating result Operating loss 95 13 8 84 9 8 70 10 5 Source: Condotte’s 1998 to 2000 restructuring plan. As a result of the company’s restructuring effort, particu- larly in the period 1996 to 1997, in addition to the plan approved by the Commission Decision, Condotte will be able to reach a satisfactory level of profitability despite the forecast deterioration in market conditions. Nevertheless, it must be kept in mind that long-term profitability is being attained through the crucial contribution of internal rationalisations (reductions in capacity etc. ) rather than on the basis of favourable market prospects. It may be considered that the first test of the admissibility of aid for restructuring is thus satisfied. The Commission notes that the company has been trans- ferred to a private shareholder, so that the State will not, under the contractual terms, be made financially liable for any losses that Condotte may incur. The presence of a private controlling shareholder (see section III) also provides a better assurance of Condotte’s prospects of profitability. The second test requires that the aid avoid undue distor- tion of competition. In principle, any aid granted by a State to a firm causes undue distortion of free competition since it leaves that firm in a more favourable economic situation than its competitors. This effect consequently has to be offset by reductions in production capacity, especially in an industry such as construction, where there is substantial overcapacity. In this case the restructuring plan approved by the Commission in the Decision has already provided for significant cuts in production capacity. The production capacity of a construction firm, both in terms of its ability to plan and design and in terms of its ability to imple- ment its plans, is based mainly on its human resources; the significant reduction in the size of Condotte’s human resources base at the time of the Decision, along with the relevant decline in production, pointed clearly to a substantial in its market share. The Commission accordingly held that the aid given to Condone up to 31 December 1994 satisfied the tests for restructuring aid. fall But Condotte received further aid after the Decision, and it must therefore be asked whether these new resources have not affected trade between Member States in a manner contrary to the common interest; this would be so if Condotte had been put in a position to use the resources to finance trading practices enabling it to increase its own market share at the expense of competi- tors who had received no State aid. As has been explained, however, Condotte reduced its staff and thus its production capacity in 1995 and espe- cially in 1996 and 1997, and the reductions went beyond what was provided for in the plan. The Commission took the view that the development of turnover provided for in the plan (see Table 3) would not affect trade to an extent contrary to the common interest. As it turned out, Condotte’s turnover during the period 1995 to 1997 was about 40 % of what was called for in the plan, and the rate of incoming orders was a great deal slower, as is shown in Table 5. Table 5 Condotte’s turnover and orderbook 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Net turnover 660 445 352 495 603 Order book 2 012 2 411 2 214 2 376 2 058 Including rail network high-speed 795 1 566 1 516 1 792 n. a. Source: Condotte’s annual accounts. the It is clear from these figures that, as a result of the restructuring of company, Condotte has been competing less and less on world markets. Its order book for work connected with the high-speed rail network (orders won as a result of the formation of the Iricav consortia at the beginning of the 1990s) has increased as a proportion of its overall activities, from 39 % in 1993 to 22. 5. 1999 EN Official Journal of the European Communities L 129/41 75 % in 1996. The increase in the order book in 1994 was almost entirely due to the acquisition by Iritecna of a further share in the Iricav consortium for the high-speed rail network. In the same way, the increase in turnover in 1996 is the direct consequence of the progress of the work of the consortium itself. Moreover, the industrial plan for the period 1998 to 2000 that was drawn up by the company’s new management entails, through its concentration on orders already placed for the high-speed rail network, a further reduction in the company’s presence on the market. In future, turnover will therefore be reduced, resulting in a further reduction in the distortion caused by the grants of aid. At the same time, the company has substantially reduced its operations abroad, where the number and value of new contracts has fallen significantly. It has consequently reduced its production capacity by much more than what was called for in the restructuring plan for the company. Accordingly, its ultimate competitive position will not affect trade to an extent contrary to the common interest. Test (iii) requires that aid be in proportion to costs and benefits: if State aid is to be declared compatible, it must be limited to the strict minimum needed to finance the return to viability and must not be used to finance aggres- sive competitive practices, except to the extent necessary to restore the firm itself to profitability. From the information supplied by the Italian Govern- ment it can be concluded that the funding provided by Fintecna to Condotte was needed to cover losses due mainly to the writing-down of activities and to the costs of reducing production capacity (staff cuts). During the delays in the sale of Condotte, Fintecna financed further restructuring efforts, going beyond what was laid down in the Iritecna plan, in order to cope with the unexpected worsening of market prospects. The Commission takes the view, therefore, that the aid granted did not bring the company additional liquidity which was unrelated to the process of restructuring and might have helped to finance aggressive commercial or investment practices not necessary to the restructuring operation. The Commission also observes that Condone will not qualify for any tax credit in respect of the losses covered by the funds contributed by Fintecna. the company, through the mechanism for adjusting the price of the transfer of the 50,1 % of the share capital still in Fintecna’s possession. The Italian Government should be required to submit periodic reports on the progress of privatisation and on the implementation of the restructuring plan drawn up for Condotte, HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION: Article 1 The aid to Societ(cid:133) Italiana per Condotte d’Acqua SpA (Condotte) to which this Decision relates, namely the capital injections granted in the years 1995 to 1997 total- ling ITL 163 billion, and the aid granted up to 1994 already approved by the Commission, amounting to a total of ITL 110 billion, constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 92(1) of the Treaty and Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. It satisfies the tests laid down in the Community Guide- lines of 27 July 1994 on State aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty. The aid is consequently declared exempt, under Article 92(3)(c) of the Treaty and Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement, from the prohibi- tion imposed by Article 92(1) of the Treaty and Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, being aid that is compatible with the common market, provided that Article 2 is complied with. Article 2 Italy shall transfer its remaining shares in Condotte to the private shareholder on the terms and conditions stipu- lated in the contract of sale, in particular the terms within which the option is to be exercised. Article 3 In order to secure full cooperation in the arrangements for monitoring this Decision, Italy shall provide the Commission with half-yearly reports on Condotte’s economic and financial situation and communicate to it in good time the main steps in the transfer of Fintecna SpA’s remaining holding in Condotte. Lastly, the recipient will make a significant contribution to the financing of the restructuring operation, as any further burdens are to be borne entirely by the buyer of The first report shall set out Condotte’s economic and financial results at 30 June 1998 and shall reach the Commission by 31 December 1998. L 129/42 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 22. 5. 1999 This Decision is addressed to the Italian Republic. Article 4 Done at Brussels, 16 September 1998. For the Commission Karel VAN MIERT Member of the Commission


title: Afgørelse om Rådets fælles holdning fastlagt med henblik på vedtagelse af Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets direktiv om kaffeekstrakter og cikorieekstrakter (C4-0306/98 96/ 0117(COD))(Fælles beslutningsprocedure - andenbehandling)

eurovoc_concepts: coffee foodstuff


title: Κεκτημένο του Σένγκεν - Απόφαση της εκτελεστικής επιτροπής της 16ης Σεπτεμβρίου 1998 σχετικά με τη σύσταση της μόνιμης επιτροπής εφαρμογής της σύμβασης Σένγκεν [SCH/Com-ex (98) 26 def.]

eurovoc_concepts:
application of EU law
committee (EU)
standing committee


title: Id-Deċiżjoni tal-Kummissjoni tas-16 ta' Settembru 1998 dwar ir-regolament tekniku komuni għall-ħtiġijiet ġenerali ta' twaħħil għal stazzjonijiet mobbli maħsuba biex ikunu wżati ma’ networks pubbliċi tat-telekomunikazzjonijiet ċellulari diġitali Fażi II li jaħdmu fil-firxa GSM 1800 (it-2 edizzjoni) (notifikati taħt dokument numru K(1998) 2721)Test b'relevanza għaż-ŻEE.

eurovoc_concepts:
harmonisation of standards
public service
radio telecommunications
technical regulations
transmission network
waveband

text: 13/Vol. 21 MT Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali ta’ l-Unjoni Ewropea 61 31998D0575 L 278/35 IL-ĠURNAL UFFIĊJALI TAL-KOMUNITAJIET EWROPEJ 15. 10. 1998 ID-DEĊIŻJONI TAL-KUMMISSJONI tas-16 ta’ Settembru 1998 dwar ir-regolament tekniku komuni għall-ħtiġijiet ġenerali ta’ twaħħil għal stazzjonijiet mobbli maħsuba biex ikunu wżati ma’ networks pubbliċi tat-telekomunikazzjonijiet ċellulari diġitali Fażi II li jaħdmu fil-firxa GSM 1 800 (it-2 edizzjoni) (notifikati taħt dokument numru K(1998) 2721) (Test b’relevanza għaż-ŻEE) (98/575/KE) IL-KUMMISSJONI TAL-KOMUNITAJIET EWROPEJ, telekomunikazzjonijiet u li jaqa’ fil-kamp ta’ applikazzjoni ta’ l-istandard armonizzat imsemmi fl-Artikolu 2(1). Wara li kkunsidrat it-Trattat li jistabbilixxi l-Komunità Ewropea, Wara li kkunsidrat id-Direttiva 98/13/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tat-12 ta’ Frar 1998 li għandha x’taqsam mat-tagħmir terminali ta’ telekomunikazzjonijiet u tagħmir ta’ stazzjon terres- tri tas-satellita, inkluż ir-rikonoxximent reċiproku tal-konformità tagħhom (1), u partikolarment inċiż, tagħha, l-Artikolu 7(2), it-tieni Billi l-Kummissjoni adottat il-miżura li tidentifika identifikat it-tip ta’ tagħmir terminali tat-telekommunikazzjoni li għalih huwa meħtieġ regolament tekniku komuni, kif ukoll id-dikjarazzjoni dwar il-qasam ta’ applikazzjoni assoċjat miegħu skond l-Arti- kolu 7(2) l-ewwel inċiż; Billi għandhom ikunu adottati l-istandards armonizzati korrispon- denti, jew partijiet ta’ dawn, li jimplimentaw il-ħtiġiet essenzjali li għandhom jitbiddlu f’regolamenti tekniċi komuni; Billi biex tkun assigurata kontinwità ta’ l-aċċess għas-swieq għall- manifatturi, huwa meħtieġ li jkunu stabbiliti disposizzjonijiet transitorji fir-rigward ta’ tagħmir approvat taħt id-Deċiżjoni tal- Kummissjoni 97/528/KE (2); Billi d-Deċiżjoni 97/528/KE għandha tkun revokata b’effett minn tmiem il-perjodu transitorju; Billi l-proposta ġiet sottomessa lill-Kumitat (ACTE), skond l-Arti- kolu 29(2); Billi r-regolament tekniku komuni adottat f’din id-Deċiżjoni huwa fi qbil ma’ l-opinjoni ta’ l-ACTE, tat-telekomunikazzjonijiet ċellulari diġitali Fażi 2. Din id-Deċiżjoni tistabbilixxi regolament tekniku komuni li jkopri l-ħtiġiet ta’ aċċess għal tagħmir terminali għan-networks II pubbliċi networks pubbliċi tat-telekomunikazzjonijiet ċellulari diġitali b’Fażi II li jaħdmu fuq il-firxa DCS 1 800 b’separazzjoni bejn il-kanali ta’ 200kHz u li ġġorr kanali ta’ traffiku skond il-prinċipju tat-TDMA. Id-Deċiżjoni għandha tapplika wkoll għal tagħmir terminali li jkun kapaċi jopera kemm fil-firxa ta’ frekwenza GSM 900 kif ukoll GSM 1 800. Artikolu 2 1. Ir-regolament tekniku komuni għandu jinkludi l-istandard armonizzat imħejji mill-korp relevanti ta’ standardizzazzjoni li jimplimenta sal-limitu applikabbli l-ħtiġiet essenzjali msemmija fl-Artikolu 5(ċ) sa (f) tad-Direttiva 98/13/KE. Ir-riferenza għall- istandard hija mniżżla fl-Anness I. Il-partijiet applikabbli jinsabu fl-Anness II. 2. It-tagħmir terminali kopert b’din id-Deċiżjoni għandu jkun konformi mar-regolament fil- paragrafu 1, għandu jilħaq il-ħtiġiet essenzjali msemmija fl-Arti- kolu 5(a) u (b) tad-Direttiva 98/13/KE, u għandu jilħaq il-ħtiġiet ta’ kull Direttiva oħra applikabbli, partikolarment id-Direttivi tal- Kunsill 73/23/KEE (3) u 89/336/KEE (4). tekniku komuni msemmi Artikolu 3 ADOTTAT DIN ID-DEĊIŻJONI: Artikolu 1 1. Din id-Deċiżjoni għandha tapplika għal tagħmir terminali network pubbliku tat- maħsub li jkun imqabbad ma’ Korpi notifikati nominati biex iwettqu l-proċeduri msemmija fl-Artikolu 10 tad-Direttiva 98/13/KE għandhom, fir-rigward ta’ tagħmir terminali kopert bl-Artikolu 1(1) ta’ din id-Deċiżjoni, jużaw jew jassiguraw l-użu tal-partijiet applikabbli ta’ l-istandard armonizzat imsemmi fl-Artikolu 2(1) wara d-dħul fis-seħħ ta’ din id-Deċiżjoni. (1) ĠU L 74, tat-12. 3. 1998, p. 1. (2) ĠU L 215, tas-7. 8. 1997, p. 60. (3) ĠU L 77, tas-26. 3. 1973, p. 29. (4) ĠU L 139, tat-23. 5. 1989, p. 19. 62 MT Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali ta’ l-Unjoni Ewropea 13/Vol. 21 Artikolu 4 Artikolu 5 1. Id-Deċiżjoni 97/528/KE għandha tkun revokata b’effett mid- data ta’ tliet xhur wara d-dħul fis-seħħ ta’ din id-Deċiżjoni. 2. Tagħmir terminali, approvat taħt id-Deċiżjoni 97/528/KE jista’ jitkompla jitqiegħed fis-suq u mqiegħed fis-servizz basta li approvazzjoni bħal din tkun ingħatat sa mhux aktar tard minn tliet xhur wara d-dħul fis-seħħ ta’ din id-Deċiżjoni. Din id-Deċiżjoni hija indirizzata lill-Istati Membri. Magħmula fi Brussel, is-16 ta’ Settembru, 1998. Għall-Kummissjoni Martin BANGEMANN Membru tal-Kummissjoni 13/Vol. 21 MT Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali ta’ l-Unjoni Ewropea 63 ANNESS I Riferenza għall-istandard armonizzat applikabbli L-istandard armonizzat imsemmi fl-Artikolu 2 tad-Deċiżjoni huwa: Sistema ta’ telekomunikazzjonijiet ċellulari diġitali (Fażi II) Ħtiġijiet ta’ twaħħil għal stazzjonijiet mobbli fil-firxa ta’ frekwenza DCS 1 800 u GSM 900 ukoll Aċċess ETSI Istitut Ewropew ta’ l-Istandards ta’ Telekomunikazzjoni Segretarjat ETSI TBR31 Edizzjoni 2: Marzu 1998 (eskluża d-daħla) Tagħrif addizzjonali L-Istitut Ewropew ta’ 83/189/KEE (1) l-Istandards ta’ Telekomunikazzjoni huwa rikonoxxut skond id-Direttiva tal-Kunsill L-istandard armonizzat imsemmi hawn fuq ġie prodott skond mandat maħruġ fi qbil ma’ proċeduri relevanti tad- Direttiva 83/189/KEE. It-test sħiħ ta’ l-istandard armonizzat imsemmi hawn fuq jista’ jinkiseb mill-: Istitut Ewropew ta’ l-Istandards ta’ Telekomunikazzjoni 650 Route des Lucioles F-06921 Sophia Antipolis Cedex Kummissjoni Ewropea, DG XIII/A/2 - (BU 31, 1/7). Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat 200, B-1049 Brussels jew minn kull organizzazzjoni oħra responsabbli milli tagħmel l-istandards ETSI disponibbli, li lista tagħhom tista’ tinstab fuq l-Internet fl-indirizz www. ispo. cec. be. (1) ĠU L 109, tas-26. 4. 1983, p. 8. 64 MT Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali ta’ l-Unjoni Ewropea 13/Vol. 21 ANNESS II Partijiet applikabbli ta’ TBR 31 (edizzjoni 2) Ħtieġa ta’ TBR 31 11. 1. 1 12. 1. 1 13. 3-1 14. 2. 3 14. 4. 5 14. 8. 1 18 20. 3 20. 9 20. 16 21. 2 25. 2. 1. 1. 2. 1 25. 2. 1. 2. 2 25. 2. 3 25. 2. 7 26. 2. 4 pr1 26. 2. 4 pr7 26. 5. 2. 3 26. 5. 5. 1. 1. 1 26. 5. 5. 3. 2 26. 5. 7. 1. 1 26. 6. 1. 2 26. 6. 2. 2 26. 6. 3. 2 26. 6. 5. 1-1 26. 6. 5. 1-7 26. 6. 5. 2-5 26. 6. 5. 3-1 26. 6. 5. 5. 1 26. 6. 6. 1 26. 10. 2. 3 26. 6. 12. 4 26. 6. 13. 10 26. 7. 4. 1 26. 7. 4. 3. 1 26. 7. 4. 6 26. 8. 1. 2. 3. 2 26. 8. 1. 2. 4. 5 26. 8. 1. 2. 5. 3 11. 1. 2 12. 1. 2 13. 4 14. 2. 4 14. 5. 1 14. 8. 2 19. 1 20. 4 20. 10 20. 17 21. 3. 1 25. 2. 1. 1. 2. 2 25. 2. 1. 2. 3 25. 2. 4. 3 26. 2. 1. 1 26. 2. 4 pr2 26. 2. 4 pr8 26. 5. 3. 1 26. 5. 5. 1. 1. 2 26. 5. 6. 1. 1 26. 5. 7. 1. 3 26. 6. 1. 3 26. 6. 2. 3. 1 26. 6. 3. 3 26. 6. 5. 1-2 26. 6. 5. 1-8 26. 6. 5. 2-6 26. 6. 5. 3-2 26. 6. 5. 5. 2 26. 6. 7. 1 26. 10. 2. 5 26. 6. 13. 3 26. 7. 1 26. 7. 4. 2. 1 26. 7. 4. 3. 2 26. 7. 5. 3 26. 8. 1. 2. 3. 5 26. 8. 1. 2. 4. 6 26. 8. 1. 2. 6. 2 11. 2 12. 2. 1 14. 1. 1. 2 14. 3 14. 5. 2 15 19. 2 20. 5 20. 11 20. 19 21. 3. 2 25. 2. 1. 1. 2. 3 25. 2. 1. 2. 4 25. 2. 5. 1 26. 2. 1. 2 26. 2. 4 pr3 26. 5. 1 26. 5. 3. 2 26. 5. 5. 1. 2 26. 5. 6. 1. 2 26. 5. 7. 1. 4 26. 6. 1. 4 26. 6. 2. 3. 2 26. 6. 3. 4 26. 6. 5. 1-3 26. 6. 5. 2-1 26. 6. 5. 2-7 26. 6. 5. 4-1 26. 6. 5. 6 26. 6. 8. 4 26. 10. 3. 1 26. 6. 13. 5 26. 7. 2. 1 11. 3 12. 2. 2 14. 1. 2. 2 14. 4. 1 14. 6. 1 16 19. 3 20. 6 20. 12 20. 20. 1 21. 4 11. 4 13. 1 14. 2. 1 14. 4. 2 14. 6. 2 17. 1 20. 1 20. 7 20. 13 20. 20. 2 22 25. 2. 1. 1. 3 25. 2. 1. 1. 4 25. 2. 2. 1 25. 2. 5. 2 26. 2. 1. 3 26. 2. 4 pr4 26. 5. 2. 1. 1 26. 5. 3. 3 26. 5. 5. 2. 1 26. 5. 6. 2. 1 26. 5. 7. 2 26. 6. 2. 1. 1 26. 6. 2. 4 26. 6. 3. 6 26. 6. 5. 1-4 26. 6. 5. 2-2 26. 6. 5. 2-8 26. 6. 5. 4-2 26. 6. 5. 7 26. 6. 8. 5 26. 6. 12. 1 26. 6. 13. 6 26. 7. 2. 2 25. 2. 2. 2 25. 2. 6. 1 26. 2. 2 26. 2. 4 pr5 26. 5. 2. 1. 2 26. 5. 3. 4 26. 5. 5. 2. 3 26. 5. 6. 2. 4 26. 5. 7. 3 26. 6. 2. 1. 2 26. 6. 2. 5 26. 6. 4. 1 26. 6. 5. 1-5 26. 6. 5. 2-3 26. 6. 5. 2-9 26. 6. 5. 4-3 26. 6. 5. 8 26. 10. 2. 1 26. 6. 12. 2 26. 6. 13. 8 26. 7. 3. 1 26. 7. 4. 2. 3 26. 7. 4. 5. 1 26. 8. 1. 2. 2. 1 26. 8. 1. 2. 4. 3 26. 8. 1. 2. 4. 13 26. 8. 1. 2. 6. 6 11. 5 13. 2 14. 2. 2 14. 4. 4 14. 7. 1 17. 2 20. 2 20. 8 20. 15 21. 1 25. 2. 1. 1. 1 25. 2. 1. 2. 1 25. 2. 2. 3 25. 2. 6. 2 26. 2. 3 26. 2. 4 pr6 26. 5. 2. 2 26. 5. 4. 1 26. 5. 5. 3. 1. 1 26. 5. 6. 3 26. 6. 1. 1 26. 6. 2. 1. 3 26. 6. 3. 1 26. 6. 4. 2. 2 26. 6. 5. 1-6 26. 6. 5. 2-4 26. 6. 5. 2-10 26. 6. 5. 4-4 26. 6. 5. 9 26. 10. 2. 2 26. 6. 12. 3 26. 6. 13. 9 26. 7. 3. 2 26. 7. 4. 2. 4 pr1 26. 7. 4. 5. 2 26. 8. 1. 2. 2. 2 26. 8. 1. 2. 4. 4 26. 8. 1. 2. 5. 2 26. 8. 1. 2. 7. 1 26. 7. 4. 2. 2-1 26. 7. 4. 2. 2-2 26. 7. 4. 3. 3 26. 7. 5. 5 26. 8. 1. 2. 3. 6 26. 8. 1. 2. 4. 7 26. 8. 1. 2. 6. 3 26. 7. 4. 3. 4 26. 7. 5. 7. 1 26. 8. 1. 2. 4. 2 26. 8. 1. 2. 4. 8 26. 8. 1. 2. 6. 5 13/Vol. 21 MT Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali ta’ l-Unjoni Ewropea 65 26. 8. 1. 2. 7. 3 26. 8. 1. 3. 3. 1 26. 8. 1. 3. 5. 2 26. 8. 1. 4. 3. 2 26. 9. 2 26. 9. 6. 2. 1 26. 11. 3. 1 26. 12. 3 27. 6 27. 11. 1. 4 27. 11. 3 27. 17. 1. 2 26. 8. 1. 2. 8. 1 26. 8. 1. 3. 3. 3 26. 8. 1. 3. 5. 3 26. 8. 1. 4. 5. 1 26. 9. 3 26. 9. 6. 2. 2 26. 11. 3. 2 26. 12. 4 27. 7 27. 11. 1. 5 27. 12. 1 27. 17. 1. 3 26. 8. 1. 2. 9. 1 26. 8. 1. 3. 3. 4 26. 8. 1. 3. 5. 4 26. 8. 2. 1 26. 9. 4 26. 11. 2. 1 26. 11. 5. 1 26. 12. 5 27. 10 27. 11. 2. 1 27. 12. 2 27. 17. 1. 4 27. 17. 1. 5. 4 27. 17. 2. 1. 1 27. 17. 2. 1. 2 27. 18. 1 27. 21. 4 31. 6. 1. 1 31. 6. 2. 1 31. 8. 3. 1 34. 2. 2 27. 18. 2 29. 3. 2. 6. 7 31. 6. 1. 2 31. 6. 2. 2 31. 10 34. 2. 3 27. 19 29. 3. 2. 6. 9 31. 6. 1. 5 31. 6. 2. 3 32. 11 34. 2. 5. 3 26. 8. 1. 2. 9. 2 26. 8. 1. 3. 4. 2 26. 8. 1. 3. 5. 5 26. 8. 2. 2 26. 9. 5 26. 11. 2. 2. 1 26. 12. 1 27. 3 27. 11. 1. 1 27. 11. 2. 2 27. 14. 3 27. 17. 1. 5. 1 27. 17. 2. 2 27. 20. 29. 3. 3. 2 31. 6. 1. 6 31. 6. 2. 4 32. 12 34. 3 26. 8. 1. 2. 9. 4 26. 8. 1. 3. 4. 3 26. 8. 1. 4. 2. 1 26. 8. 2. 3 26. 9. 6. 1. 1 26. 11. 2. 2. 2 26. 12. 2. 1 27. 4 27. 11. 1. 2 27. 11. 2. 3 27. 14. 4 27. 17. 1. 5. 2 27. 17. 2. 3 27. 21. 1 29. 3. 3. 3 31. 6. 1. 7 31. 6. 2. 5 33. 6 26. 8. 1. 3. 1. 1 26. 8. 1. 3. 4. 8 26. 8. 1. 4. 3. 1 26. 8. 3 26. 9. 6. 1. 2 26. 11. 2. 3 26. 12. 2. 2 27. 5 27. 11. 1. 3 27. 11. 2. 4 27. 17. 1. 1 27. 17. 1. 5. 3 27. 17. 2. 5 27. 21. 3 29. 3. 3. 5 31. 6. 1. 8 31. 8. 1. 1 34. 2. 1


title: Odločba Komisije z dne 16. septembra 1998 o skupnem tehničnem predpisu za splošne priključitvene zahteve za mobilne postaje, namenjene uporabi v II. fazi javnih digitalnih celičnih telekomunikacijskih omrežij, ki delujejo v frekvenčnem pasu GSM 1800 (2. izdaja) (notificirana pod dokumentno številko K(1998) 2721)Besedilo velja za EGP.

text: 13/Zv. 21 SL Uradni list Evropske unije 61 31998D0575 15. 10. 1998 URADNI LIST EVROPSKIH SKUPNOSTI L 278/35 ODLOČBA KOMISIJE z dne 16. septembra 1998 o skupnem tehničnem predpisu za splošne priključitvene zahteve za mobilne postaje, namenjene uporabi v II. fazi javnih digitalnih celičnih telekomunikacijskih omrežij, ki delujejo v frekvenčnem pasu GSM 1 800 (2. izdaja) (notificirana pod dokumentarno številko K(1998) 2721) (Besedilo velja za EGP) (98/575/ES) KOMISIJA EVROPSKIH SKUPNOSTI JE SPREJELA NASLEDNJO ODLOČBO: ob upoštevanju Pogodbe o ustanovitvi Evropske skupnosti, Člen 1 ob upoštevanju Direktive 98/13/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 12. februarja 1998 v zvezi s telekomunikacijsko ter- minalsko zemeljskih opremo postaj,vključno z medsebojnim priznavanjem njune skladnosti (1), in zlasti druge alinee člena 7(2) Direktive, satelitskih opremo in ker je Komisija sprejela ukrep, ki opredeljuje tip telekomunikacij- ske terminalske opreme, za katero se zahteva skupni tehnični predpis, in s tem povezano izjavo o področju uporabe, v skladu s prvo alineo člena 7(2); ker naj se sprejmejo ustrezni usklajeni standardi ali deli standardov za izvajanje bistvenih zahtev, ki jih je treba preobli- kovati v skupne tehnične predpise; ker je za zagotovitev neprekinjenega dostopa do trgov za proiz- vajalce treba določiti prehodne določbe v zvezi z opremo, odo- breno skladno z Odločbo Komisije 97/528/ES (2); ker naj se Odločba 97/528/ES razveljavi ob koncu prehodnega obdobja; ker je bil predlog v skladu s členom 29(2) predložen Odboru za odobritev terminalske opreme (ACTE); ker je skupni tehnični predpis, sprejet s to odločbo, v skladu z mnenjem Odbora za odobritev terminalske opreme, 1. Ta odločba se uporablja za terminalsko opremo, ki je name- njena priključevanju na javno telekomunikacijsko omrežje in spada na področje uporabe usklajenega standarda iz člena 2(1). 2. Ta odločba uvaja skupni tehnični predpis, ki zajema dostopovne zahteve terminalske opreme za II. fazo javnega digi- talnega celičnega telekomunikacijska omrežja, ki deluje v fre- kvenčnem pasu DCS 1 800 z medkanalskim razmikom 200 kHz in podpira prometne kanale v skladu z načinom TDMA (časovno porazdeljeni sodostop). Odločba se uporablja tudi za terminalsko opremo, ki lahko deluje v frekvenčnih pasovih GSM 900 in GSM 1 800. Člen 2 1. Skupni tehnični predpis vključuje usklajeni standard, ki ga je pripravil ustrezni standardizacijski organ in pri tem, kolikor je mogoče, upošteval bistvene zahteve iz člena 5(c) do (f) Direktive 98/13/ES. Sklicevanje na standard je določeno v Prilogi I. Veljavni deli so navedeni v Prilogi II. 2. Terminalska oprema iz te odločbe ustreza skupnemu tehnič- nemu predpisu iz odstavka 1, izpolnjuje bistvene zahteve iz člena 5(a) in (b) Direktive 98/13/ES ter zahteve vseh drugih veljav- nih in 89/336/EGS (4). zlasti Direktiv 73/23/EGS (3) direktiv, Sveta Člen 3 Priglašeni organi, pristojni za izvajanje postopkov iz člena 10 Direktive 98/13/ES, v zvezi s terminalsko opremo iz člena 1(1) te odločbe, uporabijo ali zagotovijo uporabo veljavnih delov usklajenega standarda iz člena 2(1) po začetku veljavnosti te odločbe. (1) UL L 74, 12. 3. 1998, str. 1. (2) UL L 215, 7. 8. 1997, str. 60. (3) UL L 77, 26. 3. 1973, str. 29. (4) UL L 139, 23. 5. 1989, str. 19. 62 SL Uradni list Evropske unije 13/Zv. 21 Člen 4 Člen 5 1. Odločba 97/528/ES se razveljavi tri mesece po začetku veljav- nosti te odločbe. 2. Terminalska oprema, odobrena skladno z Odločbo 97/528/ES, se lahko še naprej daje na trg in uporablja pod pogojem, da je bila takšna odobritev podeljena najpozneje tri mesece po začetku veljavnosti te odločbe. Ta odločba je naslovljena na države članice. V Bruslju, 16. septembra 1998 Za Komisijo Martin BANGEMANN Član Komisije 13/Zv. 21 SL Uradni list Evropske unije 63 PRILOGA I Sklicevanje na veljavni usklajeni standard Usklajeni standard iz člena 2 te odločbe je: Digitalni celični telekomunikacijski sistem (faza 2); Priključitvene zahteve za mobilne postaje v frekvenčnem pasu DCS 1 800 in dodatnem pasu GSM 900; Dostop ETSI Evropski inštitut za telekomunikacijske standarde ETSI Sekretariat TBR31 2. izdaja: marec 1998 (brez predgovora) Dodatne informacije Evropski inštitut za telekomunikacijske standarde je priznan v skladu z Direktivo Sveta 83/189/EGS (1). Navedeni usklajeni standard je izdelan v skladu s pooblastilom, podeljenim skladno z ustreznimi postopki Direktive 83/189/EGS. Celotno besedilo zgoraj navedenega usklajenega standarda je mogoče dobiti na naslovih: Evropski inštitut za telekomunikacijske standarde 650 route des Lucioles F-06921 Sophia Antipolis Cedex Evropska komisija DG XIII/A/2 — (BU 31, 1/7), Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat 200 B-1049 Brussels ali pri katerikoli drugi organizaciji, odgovorni za objavo standardov ETSI, katerih seznam je na voljo na spletni strani www. ispo. cec. be. (1) UL L 109, 26. 4. 1983, str. 8. 64 SL Uradni list Evropske unije 13/Zv. 21 PRILOGA II Veljavni deli TBR 31 (2. izdaja) Zahteve TBR 31 11. 2 12. 2. 1 14. 1. 1. 2 14. 3 14. 5. 2 15 19. 2 20. 5 20. 11 20. 19 21. 3. 2 25. 2. 1. 1. 2. 3 25. 2. 1. 2. 4 25. 2. 5. 1 26. 2. 1. 2 11. 3 12. 2. 2 14. 1. 2. 2 14. 4. 1 14. 6. 1 16 19. 3 20. 6 20. 12 20. 20. 1 21. 4 11. 4 13. 1 14. 2. 1 14. 4. 2 14. 6. 2 17. 1 20. 1 20. 7 20. 13 20. 20. 2 22 25. 2. 1. 1. 3 25. 2. 1. 1. 4 25. 2. 2. 1 25. 2. 5. 2 26. 2. 1. 3 25. 2. 2. 2 25. 2. 6. 1 26. 2. 2 11. 5 13. 2 14. 2. 2 14. 4. 4 14. 7. 1 17. 2 20. 2 20. 8 20. 15 21. 1 25. 2. 1. 1. 1 25. 2. 1. 2. 1 25. 2. 2. 3 25. 2. 6. 2 26. 2. 3 26. 2. 4 odst3 26. 2. 4 odst4 26. 2. 4 odst5 26. 2. 4 odst6 26. 5. 1 26. 5. 3. 2 26. 5. 5. 1. 2 26. 5. 6. 1. 2 26. 5. 7. 1. 4 26. 6. 1. 4 26. 6. 2. 3. 2 26. 6. 3. 4 26. 6. 5. 1-3 26. 6. 5. 2-1 26. 6. 5. 2-7 26. 6. 5. 4-1 26. 6. 5. 6 26. 6. 8. 4 26. 10. 3. 1 26. 6. 13. 5 26. 7. 2. 1 26. 5. 2. 1. 1 26. 5. 3. 3 26. 5. 5. 2. 1 26. 5. 6. 2. 1 26. 5. 7. 2 26. 6. 2. 1. 1 26. 6. 2. 4 26. 6. 3. 6 26. 6. 5. 1-4 26. 6. 5. 2-2 26. 6. 5. 2-8 26. 6. 5. 4-2 26. 6. 5. 7 26. 6. 8. 5 26. 6. 12. 1 26. 6. 13. 6 26. 7. 2. 2 26. 7. 4. 2. 2-1 26. 7. 4. 2. 2-2 26. 7. 4. 3. 3 26. 7. 5. 5 26. 8. 1. 2. 3. 6 26. 8. 1. 2. 4. 7 26. 8. 1. 2. 6. 3 26. 7. 4. 3. 4 26. 7. 5. 7. 1 26. 8. 1. 2. 4. 2 26. 8. 1. 2. 4. 8 26. 8. 1. 2. 6. 5 26. 5. 2. 1. 2 26. 5. 3. 4 26. 5. 5. 2. 3 26. 5. 6. 2. 4 26. 5. 7. 3 26. 6. 2. 1. 2 26. 6. 2. 5 26. 6. 4. 1 26. 6. 5. 1-5 26. 6. 5. 2-3 26. 6. 5. 2-9 26. 6. 5. 4-3 26. 6. 5. 8 26. 10. 2. 1 26. 6. 12. 2 26. 6. 13. 8 26. 7. 3. 1 26. 7. 4. 2. 3 26. 7. 4. 5. 1 26. 8. 1. 2. 2. 1 26. 8. 1. 2. 4. 3 26. 8. 1. 2. 4. 13 26. 8. 1. 2. 6. 6 26. 5. 2. 2 26. 5. 4. 1 26. 5. 5. 3. 1. 1 26. 5. 6. 3 26. 6. 1. 1 26. 6. 2. 1. 3 26. 6. 3. 1 26. 6. 4. 2. 2 26. 6. 5. 1-6 26. 6. 5. 2-4 26. 6. 5. 2-10 26. 6. 5. 4-4 26. 6. 5. 9 26. 10. 2. 2 26. 6. 12. 3 26. 6. 13. 9 26. 7. 3. 2 26. 7. 4. 2. 4odst1 26. 7. 4. 5. 2 26. 8. 1. 2. 2. 2 26. 8. 1. 2. 4. 4 26. 8. 1. 2. 5. 2 26. 8. 1. 2. 7. 1 11. 1. 2 12. 1. 2 13. 4 14. 2. 4 14. 5. 1 14. 8. 2 19. 1 20. 4 20. 10 20. 17 21. 3. 1 25. 2. 1. 1. 2. 2 25. 2. 1. 2. 3 25. 2. 4. 3 26. 2. 1. 1 26. 2. 4 odst2 26. 2. 4 odst8 26. 5. 3. 1 26. 5. 5. 1. 1. 2 26. 5. 6. 1. 1 26. 5. 7. 1. 3 26. 6. 1. 3 26. 6. 2. 3. 1 26. 6. 3. 3 26. 6. 5. 1-2 26. 6. 5. 1-8 26. 6. 5. 2-6 26. 6. 5. 3-2 26. 6. 5. 5. 2 26. 6. 7. 1 26. 10. 2. 5 26. 6. 13. 3 26. 7. 1 26. 7. 4. 2. 1 26. 7. 4. 3. 2 26. 7. 5. 3 26. 8. 1. 2. 3. 5 26. 8. 1. 2. 4. 6 26. 8. 1. 2. 6. 2 11. 1. 1 12. 1. 1 13. 3-1 14. 2. 3 14. 4. 5 14. 8. 1 18 20. 3 20. 9 20. 16 21. 2 25. 2. 1. 1. 2. 1 25. 2. 1. 2. 2 25. 2. 3 25. 2. 7 26. 2. 4 odst1 26. 2. 4 odst7 26. 5. 2. 3 26. 5. 5. 1. 1. 1 26. 5. 5. 3. 2 26. 5. 7. 1. 1 26. 6. 1. 2 26. 6. 2. 2 26. 6. 3. 2 26. 6. 5. 1-1 26. 6. 5. 1-7 26. 6. 5. 2-5 26. 6. 5. 3-1 26. 6. 5. 5. 1 26. 6. 6. 1 26. 10. 2. 3 26. 6. 12. 4 26. 6. 13. 10 26. 7. 4. 1 26. 7. 4. 3. 1 26. 7. 4. 6 26. 8. 1. 2. 3. 2 26. 8. 1. 2. 4. 5 26. 8. 1. 2. 5. 3 13/Zv. 21 SL Uradni list Evropske unije 65 26. 8. 1. 2. 7. 3 26. 8. 1. 3. 3. 1 26. 8. 1. 3. 5. 2 26. 8. 1. 4. 3. 2 26. 9. 2 26. 9. 6. 2. 1 26. 11. 3. 1 26. 12. 3 27. 6 27. 11. 1. 4 27. 11. 3 27. 17. 1. 2 26. 8. 1. 2. 8. 1 26. 8. 1. 3. 3. 3 26. 8. 1. 3. 5. 3 26. 8. 1. 4. 5. 1 26. 9. 3 26. 9. 6. 2. 2 26. 11. 3. 2 26. 12. 4 27. 7 27. 11. 1. 5 27. 12. 1 27. 17. 1. 3 26. 8. 1. 2. 9. 1 26. 8. 1. 3. 3. 4 26. 8. 1. 3. 5. 4 26. 8. 2. 1 26. 9. 4 26. 11. 2. 1 26. 11. 5. 1 26. 12. 5 27. 10 27. 11. 2. 1 27. 12. 2 27. 17. 1. 4 27. 17. 1. 5. 4 27. 17. 2. 1. 1 27. 17. 2. 1. 2 27. 18. 1 27. 21. 4 31. 6. 1. 1 31. 6. 2. 1 31. 8. 3. 1 34. 2. 2 27. 18. 2 29. 3. 2. 6. 7 31. 6. 1. 2 31. 6. 2. 2 31. 10 34. 2. 3 27. 19 29. 3. 2. 6. 9 31. 6. 1. 5 31. 6. 2. 3 32. 11 34. 2. 5. 3 26. 8. 1. 2. 9. 2 26. 8. 1. 3. 4. 2 26. 8. 1. 3. 5. 5 26. 8. 2. 2 26. 9. 5 26. 11. 2. 2. 1 26. 12. 1 27. 3 27. 11. 1. 1 27. 11. 2. 2 27. 14. 3 27. 17. 1. 5. 1 27. 17. 2. 2 27. 20 29. 3. 3. 2 31. 6. 1. 6 31. 6. 2. 4 32. 12 34. 3 26. 8. 1. 2. 9. 4 26. 8. 1. 3. 4. 3 26. 8. 1. 4. 2. 1 26. 8. 2. 3 26. 9. 6. 1. 1 26. 11. 2. 2. 2 26. 12. 2. 1 27. 4 27. 11. 1. 2 27. 11. 2. 3 27. 14. 4 27. 17. 1. 5. 2 27. 17. 2. 3 27. 21. 1 29. 3. 3. 3 31. 6. 1. 7 31. 6. 2. 5 33. 6 26. 8. 1. 3. 1. 1 26. 8. 1. 3. 4. 8 26. 8. 1. 4. 3. 1 26. 8. 3 26. 9. 6. 1. 2 26. 11. 2. 3 26. 12. 2. 2 27. 5 27. 11. 1. 3 27. 11. 2. 4 27. 17. 1. 1 27. 17. 1. 5. 3 27. 17. 2. 5 27. 21. 3 29. 3. 3. 5 31. 6. 1. 8 31. 8. 1. 1 34. 2. 1


title: Regulamento (CE) nº 1969/98 da Comissão de 16 de Setembro de 1998 que fixa o montante máximo da restituição à exportação do açúcar branco para o sétimo concurso público parcial efectuado no âmbito do concurso público permanente referido no Regulamento (CE) nº 1574/98

eurovoc_concepts:
award of contract
export refund
white sugar

formats: pdf print

text: 17. 9. 98 PT Jornal Oficial das Comunidades Europeias L 255/15 REGULAMENTO (CE) Nº 1969/98 DA COMISS(cid:212)O de 16 de Setembro de 1998 que fixa o montante m(cid:145)ximo da restitui(cid:135)(cid:209)o (cid:133) exporta(cid:135)(cid:209)o do a(cid:135)(cid:156)car branco para o s(cid:130)timo concurso p(cid:156)blico parcial efectuado no (cid:131)mbito do concurso p(cid:156)blico permanente referido no Regulamento (CE) nº 1574/98 A COMISS(cid:212)O DAS COMUNIDADES EUROPEIAS, Tendo em conta o Tratado que institui a Comunidade Europeia, Tendo em contra o Regulamento (CEE) nº 1785/81 do Conselho, de 30 de Junho de 1981, que estabelece a organiza(cid:135)(cid:209)o comum de mercado no sector do a(cid:135)(cid:156)car (1), com a (cid:156)ltima redac(cid:135)(cid:209)o que lhe foi dada pelo Regulamento (CE) nº 1148/98 (2), e, nomeadamente, o nº 5, al(cid:146)nea b), do seu artigo 17º, Considerando que, por for(cid:135)a do Regulamento (CE) nº 1574/98 da Comiss(cid:209)o, de 22 de Julho de 1998, respeitante a um concurso p(cid:156)blico permanente para a determina(cid:135)(cid:209)o de direitos niveladores e/ou de restitui(cid:135)(cid:210)es (cid:133) exporta(cid:135)(cid:209)o de a(cid:135)(cid:156)car branco (3), procedeu-se a concursos p(cid:156)blicos parciais para a exporta(cid:135)(cid:209)o desse a(cid:135)(cid:156)car; Considerando que, nos termos do nº 1 do artigo 9º do Regulamento (CE) nº 1574/98, (cid:130) fixado um montante m(cid:145)ximo da restitui(cid:135)(cid:209)o (cid:133) exporta(cid:135)(cid:209)o, eventualmente, para o concurso p(cid:156)blico parcial em causa, tendo em conta, nomeadamente, a situa(cid:135)(cid:209)o e a evolu(cid:135)(cid:209)o previs(cid:146)vel do mercado do a(cid:135)(cid:156)car na Comunidade e no mercado mundial; Considerando que, ap(cid:155)s exame das ofertas, (cid:130) conveniente adoptar, para o s(cid:130)timo concurso p(cid:156)blico parcial, as dispo- si(cid:135)(cid:210)es referidas no artigo 1º; Considerando que as medidas previstas no presente regu- lamento est(cid:209)o em conformidade com o parecer do Comit(cid:130) de Gest(cid:209)o do A(cid:135)(cid:156)car, ADOPTOU O PRESENTE REGULAMENTO: Artigo 1º Para o s(cid:130)timo concurso p(cid:156)blico parcial de a(cid:135)(cid:156)car branco, efectuado no (cid:131)mbito do Regulamento (CE) nº 1574/98, o montante m(cid:145)ximo da restitui(cid:135)(cid:209)o (cid:133) exporta(cid:135)(cid:209)o (cid:130) fixado em 51,534 ecus por 100 quilogramas. Artigo 2º O presente regulamento entra em vigor em 17 de Setembro de 1998. O presente regulamento (cid:130) obrigat(cid:155)rio em todos os seus elementos e directamente aplic(cid:145)vel em todos os Estados-membros. Feito em Bruxelas, em 16 de Setembro de 1998. Pela Comiss(cid:209)o Franz FISCHLER Membro da Comiss(cid:209)o (1) JO L 177 de 1. 7. 1981, p. 4. (2) JO L 159 de 3. 6. 1998, p. 38. (3) JO L 206 de 23. 7. 1998, p. 7


title: Id-Deċiżjoni tal-Kummissjoni tas-16 ta' Settembru 1998 dwar regolament tekniku komuni għal terminali ta' aperturi żgħar ħafna ta' stazzjonijiet terrestri tas-satellita (VSATs) li jaħdmu fil-firxa ta' frekwenzi 4 GHz u 6 GHz (notifikati taħt id-dokument numru K (1998) 2723)Test b'relevanza għaż-ŻEE.

eurovoc_concepts:
computer terminal
harmonisation of standards
satellite communications
technical regulations
waveband

text: 13/Vol. 21 MT Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali ta’ l-Unjoni Ewropea 69 31998D0577 L 278/43 IL-ĠURNAL UFFIĊJALI TAL-KOMUNITAJIET EWROPEJ 15. 10. 1998 ID-DEĊIŻJONI TAL-KUMMISSJONI tas-16 ta’ Settembru 1998 dwar regolament tekniku komuni għal terminali ta’ aperturi żgħar ħafna ta’ stazzjonijiet terrestri tas-satellita (VSATs) li jaħdmu fil-firxa ta’ frekwenzi 4 GHz u 6 GHz (notifikati taħt id-dokument numru K (1998) 2723) (Test b’relevanza għaż-ŻEE) (98/577/KE) IL-KUMMISSJONI TAL-KOMUNITAJIET EWROPEJ, Wara li kkunsidrat it-Trattat li jistabbilixxi il-Komunità Ewropea, Wara li kkunsidrat id-Direttiva 98/13/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tat-12 ta’ Frar 1998 li għandha x’taqsam mat-tagħmir terminali ta’ telekomunikazzjonijiet u tagħmir ta’ stazzjon terres- tri tas-satellita, inkluż ir-rikonoxximent reċiproku tal-konformità tagħhom (1), u b’mod partikolari l-Artikolu 7(2), it-tieni inċiż, tagħha, il-miżura li l-Kummissjoni adottat tiddentifika t-tip ta’ Billi tagħmir ta’ stazzjon terrestri tas-satellitali għalih hu meħtieġ rego- lament tekniku komuni, kif ukoll id-dikjarazzjoni tal-qasam ta’ applikazzjoni assoċjat miegħu skond l-Artikolu 7(2), l-ewwel inċiż; Billi għandhom ikunu adottati l-istandards armonizzati li jikkor- rispondu, jew partijiet ta’ dawn, li jimplimentaw il-ħtiġijiet essenz- jali li għandhom ikunu ttrasformati f’regolamenti tekniċi komuni; Billi biex tkun assigurata l-kontinwità ta’ aċċess għas-swieq għall- manifatturi, huwa meħtieġ li jkun permess li jsiru arranġamenti ta’ transizzjoni fir-rigward ta’ tagħmir approvat skond ir-regolamenti nazzjonali ta’ l-approvazzjoni tat-tip; Billi l-proposta ġiet sottomessa lill-Kumitat (ACTE), skond l-Arti- kolu 29(2); Billi r-regolament tekniku komuni li għandu jkun adottat f’din id-Deċiżjoni huwa bi qbil ma’ l-opinjoni ta’ l-ACTE, 2. Din id-Deċiżjoni tistabbilixxi regolament tekniku komuni li jkopri terminali ta’ aperturi żgħar ħafna ta’ stazzjonijiet terrestri tas-satellita (VSATs) li jaħdmu fil-firxa ta’ frekwenzi 4 GHz u 6 GHz. Artikolu 2 1. Ir-regolament tekniku komuni għandu jinkludi fih l-istandard armonizzat imħejji mill-korp relevanti ta’ standardizzazzjoni li jimplimenta sal-limitu applikabbli l-ħtiġiet essenzjali li għalihom jirreferi l-Artikolu 17 tad-Direttiva 98/13/KE. Ir-riferenza għall- istandard hija mniżżla fl-Anness. ta’ tas-satellita kopert b’din 2. Tagħmir stazzjon terrestri tekniku id-Deċiżjoni għandu jikkonforma mar-regolament komuni li għalih jirreferi l-paragrafu 1, għandu jissodisfa l-ħtiġiet essenzjali li għalihom jirreferi l-Artikolu 5(a) u (b) tad-Direttiva 98/13/KE, u għandu jissodisfa l-ħtiġiet ta’ kull Direttiva oħra applikabbli, partikolarment id-Direttivi tal-Kunsill 73/23/KEE (2) u 89/336/KEE (3). Artikolu 3 Korpi notifikati maħtura biex iwettqu l-proċeduri li għalihom jirreferi l-Artikolu 10 tad-Direttiva 98/13 għandhom, f’dak li jirrigwarda tagħmir ta’ stazzjon terrestri tas-satellita li jkun kopert bl-Artikolu 1(1) ta’ din id-Deċiżjoni, jużaw jew jassiguraw l-użu ta’ l-istandard armonizzat li għalih jirreferi l-Anness wara n-notifika ta’ din id-Deċiżjoni. ADOTTAT DIN ID-DEĊIŻJONI: Artikolu 1 1. Din id-Deċiżjoni tapplika għal tagħmir ta’ stazzjon terrestri tas- satellita li jaqa’ fl-iskop ta’ l-istandard armonizzat li hu identifikat fl-Artikolu 2(1). Artikolu 4 1. Regolamenti nazzjonali għal approvazzjoni tat-tip li jkopru tagħmir fi ħdan l-iskop ta’ l-istandard armonizzat li għaliha jirre- feri l-Anness jieqfu milli jkunu applikabbli b’effett minn tliet xhur wara d-data ta’ l-adozzjoni ta’ din id-Deċiżjoni. (1) ĠU L 74, tat-12. 3. 1998, p. 1. (2) ĠU L 77, tas-26. 3. 1973, p. 29. (3) ĠU L 139, tat-23. 5. 1989, p. 19 70 MT Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali ta’ l-Unjoni Ewropea 13/Vol. 21 2. Tagħmir ta’ stazzjon terrestri tas-satellita, approvat taħt dawn ir-regolamenti nazzjonali għall-approvazzjoni tat-tip jistgħu jkompli jitqiegħdu fis-suq nazzjonali u jiitqiegħdu fis-servizz. Din id-Deċiżjoni hija indirizzata lill-Istati Membri. Magħmula fi Brussel, is-16 ta’ Settembru1998. Artikolu 5 Għall-Kummissjoni Martin BANGEMANN Membru tal-Kummissjoni 13/Vol. 21 MT Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali ta’ l-Unjoni Ewropea 71 ANNESS Referenza għall-istandard armonizzat applikabbli L-istandard armonizzat li għalih jirreferi l-Artikolu 2 tad-Deċiżjoni hu Stazzjonijiet terrestri u sistemi tas-satellita (SES); terminali ta’ aperturi żgħar ħafna (VSAT) li jittrasmettu biss, li jitrassmettu u li jirċievu, stazzjonijiet terrestri tas- satellita li jirċievu biss u li jaħdmu fil-firxa ta’ frekwenzi 4 GHz u 6 GHz ETSI Istitut Ewropew ta’ Normi tat-Telekomunikazzjonijiet Segretarjat ta’ ETSI TBR43: Mejju 1998 (eskluża d-daħla) Tagħrif addizzjonali L-Istitut Ewropew ta’ l-Istandards ta’ Telekomunikazzjoni hu rikonoxxut skond id-Direttiva tal-Kunsill 83/189/KEE (1). L-istandard armonizzat li għalih jirreferi hawn fuq ġie prodott skond mandat maħruġ bi qbil ma’ proċeduri relevanti tad-Direttiva tal-Kunsill 83/189/KEE. It-test sħiħ tal-istandard armonizzat li għalih jirreferi hawn fuq jista’ jinkiseb mill-: Istitut Ewropew ta’ l-Istandards ta’ Telekomunikazzjoni 650 Route des Lucioles, F-06921 Sophia Antipolis Cedex. Kummissjoni tal-Komunitajiet DGXIII/A/2 - (BU 31, 1/7) Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat 200, B-1049 Bruxelles/Brussel. jew minn kull organizzazzjoni oħra responsabbli milli tagħmel disponibbli l-istandards ta’ ETSI, li lista tagħhom tin- sab fuq l-Internet fl-indirizz www. ispo. cec. be. (1) ĠU L 109, tas-26. 4. 1983, p. 8


title: Schengenin säännöstö - Toimeenpanevan komitean päätös, tehty 16 päivänä syyskuuta 1998, henkilötarkastusten lakkauttamista Kreikan sisärajoilla tutkivan komitean asettamisesta (SCH/Com-ex (98) 43 rev)


title: Kommissionens förordning (EG) nr 1967/98 av den 16 september 1998 om fastställande av de representativa priserna och tilläggsbeloppen för import av melass inom sockersektorn

eurovoc_concepts:
CCT duties
import
molasses
representative price

text: 17. 9. 98 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning L 255/11 KOMMISSIONENS FÖRORDNING (EG) nr 1967/98 av den 16 september 1998 om fastställande av de representativa priserna och tilläggsbeloppen för import av melass inom sockersektorn EUROPEISKA GEMENSKAPERNAS KOMMISSION HAR ANTAGIT DENNA FÖRORDNING med beaktande av Fördraget om upprättandet av Euro- peiska gemenskapen, med beaktande av rådets förordning (EEG) nr 1785/81 av den 30 juni 1981 om den gemensamma organisationen av marknaden för socker (1), senast ändrad genom förordning (EG) nr 1148/98 (2), med beaktande av kommissionens förordning (EG) nr 1422/95 av den 23 juni 1995 om tillämpningsföreskrifter för import av melass inom sockersektorn och om ändring av förordning (EEG) nr 785/68 (3), särskilt artiklarna 1. 2 och 3. 1 i denna, och med beaktande av följande: I förordning (EG) nr 1422/95 föreskrivs att cif-import- priset för melass, i fortsättningen kallat ”representativt i enlighet med kommissionens skall pris” förordning (EEG) nr 785/68 (4). Detta pris bör fastställas för den standardkvalitet som definieras i artikel 1 i den förordningen. fastställas Det representativa priset för melass beräknas för ett gräns- övergångsställe i gemenskapen, i detta fall Amsterdam. Detta pris bör beräknas med utgångspunkt i de mest förmånliga uppköpsmöjligheterna på världsmarknaden, vilka fastställs på grundval av noteringarna eller priserna på den marknaden, justerade efter eventuella kvalitets- skillnader i förhållande till standardkvaliteten. Standardk- valiteten för melass har definierats i förordning (EEG) nr 785/68. Vid fastställandet av de mest förmånliga uppköpsmöjlig- heterna på världsmarknaden bör hänsyn tas till all infor- mation om anbud på världsmarkanden, priser som regi- strerats på viktigare marknader i tredje land och försälj- ningskontrakt som ingåtts i internationell handel och som kommit till kommissionens kännedom antingen direkt eller via medlemsstaterna. I enlighet med artikel 7 i förordning (EEG) nr 785/68 får detta fastställande bygga på genomsnittet av flera priser, på villkor att detta genom- snitt kan betraktas som representativt för den faktiska marknadsutvecklingen. Informationen skall inte beaktas när det inte är fråga om varor av sund och god marknadsmässig kvalitet eller om det pris som anges i anbudet endast gäller en liten kvan- titet och inte är representativt för marknaden. Dessutom skall det bortses från anbudspriser som inte kan antas vara representativa för den faktiska marknadsutvecklingen. För att få upplysningar om melass av standardkvalitet som är jämförbara måste, allt efter den erbjudna melassens kvalitet, priserna höjas eller sänkas i förhållande till de resultat som erhållits i enlighet med artikel 6 i förordning (EEG) nr 785/68. Ett representativt pris får i undantagsfall förbli oförändrat under en begränsad period när det anbudspris som legat till grund för det föregående fastställandet av det represen- tativa priset till kommissionens kännedom och de anbudspriser som finns tillgängliga inte verkar vara tillräckligt representativa för den faktiska marknadsutvecklingen och skulle medföra plötsliga och väsentliga förändringar av det representativa priset. inte har kommit finns en skillnad mellan utlösningspriset När det för produkten i fråga och det representativa priset bör till- läggsbeloppen för import fastställas på de villkor som anges i artikel 3 i förordning (EG) nr 1422/95. Om importtullen upphävs tillfälligt i enlighet med artikel 5 i förordning (EG) nr 1422/95 bör särskilda belopp fast- ställas för dessa tullar. Tillämpningen av dessa bestämmelser medför att de representativa priserna och tilläggsbeloppen för import av produkterna i fråga bör fastställas så som anges i bilagan till denna förordning. De åtgärder som föreskrivs i denna förordning är förenliga från Förvaltningskommittén för socker. med yttrandet HÄRIGENOM FÖRESKRIVS FÖLJANDE. Artikel 1 De representativa priser och de tilläggsbelopp som skall tillämpas vid import av den produkt som avses i artikel 1 i förordning (EG) nr 1422/95 fastställs i enlighet med bilagan. (1) EGT L 177, 1. 7. 1981, s. 4. (2) EGT L 159, 3. 6. 1998, s. 38. (3) EGT L 141, 24. 6. 1995, s. 12. (4) EGT L 145, 27. 6. 1968, s. 12. Artikel 2 Denna förordning träder i kraft den 17 september 1998. L 255/12 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning 17. 9. 98 Denna förordning är till alla delar bindande och direkt tillämplig i alla medlemsstater. Utfärdad i Bryssel den 16 september 1998. På kommissionens vägnar Franz FISCHLER Ledamot av kommissionen BILAGA Förordning om fastställande av de representativa priserna och tilläggsbeloppen för import av melass inom sockersektorn KN-nummer Representativt pris i ecu per 100 kg nettovikt av produkten i fråga Tilläggsbelopp i ecu per 100 kg nettovikt av produkten i fråga Den tull i ecu som skall tas ut på grund av det upphävande som avses i artikel 5 i förordning (EG) nr 1422/95 per 100 kg nettovikt av produkten i fråga (2) 1703 10 00 (1) 1703 90 00 (1) 6,49 7,83 0,19 0,00 (cid:190) (cid:190) (1) Fastställande för den standardkvalitet som definieras i artikel 1 i den ändrade förordningen (EEG) nr 785/68. (2) Detta belopp skall i enlighet med artikel 5 i förordning (EG) nr 1422/95 ersätta den tullsats som Gemensamma tulltaxan föreskriver för dessa produkter


title: Komission asetus (EY) N:o 1973/98, annettu 16 päivänä syyskuuta 1998, oliiviöljyn vientitukien vahvistamisesta

eurovoc_concepts:
export refund
olive oil

text: 17. 9. 98 FI Euroopan yhteisöjen virallinen lehti L 255/27 KOMISSION ASETUS (EY) N:o 1973/98, annettu 16 päivänä syyskuuta 1998, oliiviöljyn vientitukien vahvistamisesta EUROOPAN YHTEISÖJEN KOMISSIO, joka ottaa huomioon Euroopan yhteisön perustamissopi- muksen, ottaa huomioon rasva-alan yhteisestä markkinajärjestelystä 22 päivänä syyskuuta 1966 annetun neuvoston asetuksen N:o 136/66/ETY (1), sellaisena kuin se on viimeksi muutettuna asetuksella (EY) N:o 1581/96 (2), ja erityisesti sen 3 artiklan 3 kohdan, sekä katsoo, että hinta asetuksen N:o 136/66/ETY 3 artiklan mukaan silloin, kun yhteisön on maailmanmarkkinanoteerauksia korkeampi, kyseisten hintojen välinen erotus voidaan korvata oliiviöljyn kolmansiin maihin suuntautuvaa vientiä koskevalla vientituella, oliiviöljyn vientituen vahvistamista ja myöntämistä koskevat yksityiskohtaiset säännöt annetaan komission asetuksessa (ETY) N:o 616/72 (3), sellaisena kuin se on viimeksi muutettuna asetuksella (ETY) N:o 2962/77 (4), asetuksen N:o 136/66/ETY 3 artiklan 3 kohdan mukaan tuen on oltava sama kaikkialla yhteisössä, asetuksen N:o 136/66/ETY 3 artiklan 4 kohdan mukaan oliiviöljyn tuki on vahvistettava ottaen huomioon tilanne ja kehitysnäkymät, jotka koskevat oliiviöljyn hintoja ja saatavuutta yhteisön markkinoilla ja oliiviöljyn hintoja maailmanmarkkinoilla; jos oliiviöljyn suotuisimpia notee- rauksia ei voida kuitenkaan määrittää maailmanmarkkina- tilanteen vuoksi, voidaan ottaa huomioon tärkeimpien kilpailevien kasviöljyjen hinta näillä markkinoilla ja edus- tavan jakson aikana todettu erotus tämän hinnan ja olii- viöljyn hinnan välillä; tuen määrä ei saa olla suurempi kuin oliiviöljyn yhteisön hinnan ja maailmanmarkkina- hinnan välinen erotus, joka on tarkistettu tarvittaessa tuot- teiden aiheutuvien kustannusten huomioon ottamiseksi, viennistä maailmanmarkkinoille 136/66/ETY 3 artiklan 3 kohdan asetuksen N:o kolmannen alakohdan b kohdan mukaan voidaan päättää tuen vahvistamisesta tarjouskilpailu koskee tuen määrää ja se voidaan rajoittaa tiettyihin tarjouskilpailulla; määrämaihin sekä tiettyihin määriin, laatuihin ja tarjonta- muotoihin, asetuksen N:o 136/66/ETY 3 artiklan 3 kohdan toisen alakohdan mukaan oliiviöljyn tuet voidaan vahvistaa erisuuruisiksi määrämaan mukaan, jos maailmanmarkki- tiettyjen markkinoiden erityisvaatimukset natilanne tai sitä edellyttävät, tuet olisi vahvistettava vähintään kerran kuukaudessa; niitä voidaan tarvittaessa muuttaa muuna aikana, näiden yksityiskohtaisten sääntöjen soveltamisesta olii- viöljyalan nykyiseen markkinatilanteeseen ja erityisesti tämän tuotteen hintaan yhteisössä ja kolmansien maiden markkinoilla seuraa, että tuki olisi vahvistettava liitteessä mainitun suuruiseksi, neuvoston asetuksen (ETY) N:o 3813/92 (5), sellaisena kuin se on viimeksi muutettuna asetuksella (EY) N:o 150/ 95 (6), 1 artiklassa määriteltyjä edustavia markkinakursseja käytetään kolmannen maan valuuttana ilmoitetun määrän muuntamiseen ja niiden perusteella määritetään jäsenval- tioiden valuuttojen maatalouden muuntokurssit; muunto- kurssien vahvistamista ja soveltamista koskevat yksityis- kohtaiset säännöt annetaan komission asetuksessa (ETY) N:o 1068/93 (7), sellaisena kuin se on viimeksi muutettuna asetuksella (EY) N:o 961/98 (8), ja rasvojen hallintokomitea ei ole antanut lausuntoa puheen- johtajansa asettamassa määräajassa, ON ANTANUT TÄMÄN ASETUKSEN: 1 artikla Asetuksen N:o 136/66/ETY 1 artiklan 2 kohdan c alakoh- dassa tarkoitettujen tuotteiden vientituet vahvistetaan liit- teessä mainitun suuruisiksi. 2 artikla Tämä asetus tulee voimaan 17 päivänä syyskuuta 1998. (1) EYVL 172, 30. 9. 1966, s. 3025/66 (2) EYVL L 206, 16. 8. 1996, s. 11 (3) EYVL L 78, 31. 3. 1972, s. 1 (4) EYVL L 348, 30. 12. 1977, s. 53 (5) EYVL L 387, 31. 12. 1992, s. 1 (6) EYVL L 22, 31. 1. 1995, s. 1 (7) EYVL L 108, 1. 5. 1993, s. 106 (8) EYVL L 135, 8. 5. 1998, s. 5 L 255/28 FI Euroopan yhteisöjen virallinen lehti 17. 9. 98 Tämä asetus on kaikilta osiltaan velvoittava, jäsenvaltioissa. ja sitä sovelletaan sellaisenaan kaikissa Tehty Brysselissä 16 päivänä syyskuuta 1998. Komission puolesta Franz FISCHLER Komission jäsen LIITE oliiviöljyn vientitukien vahvistamisesta 16 päivänä syyskuuta 1998 annettuun komission asetukseen (ecua/100 kg) Tuotekoodi Tuen määrä (1) 1509 10 90 9100 1509 10 90 9900 1509 90 00 9100 1509 90 00 9900 1510 00 90 9100 1510 00 90 9900 6,00 0,00 5,50 0,00 0,00 0,00 (1) Komission asetuksen (ETY) N:o 3665/87 (EYVL L 351, 14. 12. 1987, s. 1), sellaisena kuin se on muutettuna, 34 artiklassa tarkoitettujen määräpaikkojen sekä kolmansiin maihin suuntautuvan viennin osalta. Huom. : Tuotekoodit ja alaviitteet määritellään komission asetuksessa (ETY) N:o 3846/87, sellaisena kuin se on muutettuna


title: Ψήφισμα για το Ισλάμ και την ευρωπαϊκή ημερίδα για τον Αβερόη

eurovoc_concepts:
EU Member State
EU situation
Islam
cultural event
integration of migrants


title: Informations sur les politiques de l'Union européenne.

eurovoc_concepts:
EU policy
database
dissemination of EU information


title: Résolution législative portant avis du Parlement européen sur la proposition de décision du Conseil concernant la position communautaire au sein du Conseil d"association sur la participation de l"Estonie aux programmes communautaires dans le domaine de la culture (COM(98)0239 C4-0321/98 98/ 0147(CNS))(Procédure de consultation)

eurovoc_concepts:
Central and Eastern European Countries
EU programme
Estonia
accession to the European Union
cultural policy