title: Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the 'Communication from the Commission - European capital markets for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises: prospects and potential obstacles to progress'

eurovoc_concepts:
capital market
financial market
investment
small and medium-sized enterprises
stock exchange

text: 27. 7. 98 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 235/13 6. 2. 1. Firstly, it calls upon the Commission to make concerted practical efforts to explain the workings of the Single Market, and so produce specific findings based on regularly documenting the practical consequences of EU measures. 6. 2. 2. Lastly, the Committee urges those Member State companies and entrepreneurs who consider it in their interest to establish themselves and operate in another market to roll up their sleeves, harness all their undoubted dynamism and exploit every opportunity they have to overcome by their own efforts as many obstacles as they can. Brussels, 27 May 1998. The President of the Economic and Social Committee Tom JENKINS Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Communication from the Commission — European capital markets for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises: prospects and potential obstacles to progress’ (98/C 235/04) On 13 May 1998 the European Commission decided to consult the Economic and Social Committee, under Article 198 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, on the above-mentioned communication. The Section for Industry, Commerce, Crafts and Services, which was responsible for preparing the Committee’s work on the subject, adopted its opinion on 6 May 1998. The rapporteur was Mr Pezzini. At its 355th plenary session (meeting of 27 May 1998) the Economic and Social Committee adopted the following opinion by 101 votes to one, with one abstention. 1. Overall remarks The European Commission is to be congratulated 1. 1. on its positive and sustained efforts to stimulate the creation of European capital markets suitable for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Its actions were described in an earlier Communication ‘Reporting on the feasibility of the creation of a European Capital Market for smaller entrepreneurially managed growing companies’ (1), on which the ESC did not deliver an opinion. These endeavours by the Commission respond- ed to an earlier request by the Committee to ‘carry out a feasibility study on the establishment of a recognized European capital market giving European firms, especially small firms, access to capital. ’ In this follow-up communication the Com- 1. 2. mission has produced a constructive document. Never- theless, there are certain points, such as the manner in (1) COM(95) 498 final, 25. 10. 1995. which EU securities legislation operates in practice, which have not received the detailed examination they deserve. There are others in which factors other than those put forward by the Commission are significant. There are a whole range of other factors besides 1. 3. the adequate provision of finance which determine whether firms will grow to a significant size. It was decided that the most significant of these deserved examination in this opinion in order that a better overall assessment of the problems might be made. A number of the recommendations made arise from a fact-finding mission by the ESC to the USA made in November 1997. This was largely inspired by the reference to the US capital markets in the introduction to the Commission communication and by the encouragement to examine the US situation given by Commission President Santer in his speech at the Economic and Social Committee on 28 October 1997. As a result, this opinion covers a much wider field than the Commission communication, which merely deals with capital markets for SMEs. C 235/14 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 27. 7. 98 1. 4. A further criticism of the communication is that it fails to make clear that the new European capital markets are only of value to companies which, whilst technically SMEs (under 250 employees, less than ECU 40 million capital turnover and ECU 27 million on the balance sheet), are either of medium-size, particularly innovative start-ups, or firms that are particularly capital intensive. the speedy and full application of existing European Union legislation would help. Finally, in the field of investment and the free movement of institutional capital, the Commission maintains that failure to remove discriminatory national restrictions could make the taking of infringement proceedings necessary. 1. 5. In the USA, too, only some 2 % of companies at the most, albeit those with above average prospects for growth, attract external funding from informal private investors (‘Business Angels’) or venture capital funds. The Commission estimates that there are perhaps 20 000 firms at the most in the whole of the European Union which might go on to have their shares traded on a stock market at some point. They are, however, the firms that hold the promise of enjoying the highest rates of growth and creating significant new employment, good reasons for the Commission to have devoted such a degree of attention to their financing needs which have historically been less well catered for in Europe than in the USA. 2. Summary of the Commission document 2. 1. The main objectives of the communication are to explore the potential barriers to the admittance to trading on capital markets of the shares of SMEs; to start a European-wide debate on the appropriate conditions for access to equity finance; to describe, and draw attention to the progress made by various initiatives to create new financial markets in the European Union such as ‘EASDAQ’ and ‘Euro-NM’; to outline the actions the Commission is currently taking and intends to take in the future to overcome the barriers to the development of SME-orientated capital markets and ensure their smooth operation. 2. 2. The communication identifies two main areas creating potential barriers to the development of these capital markets. The first relates to the attitudes, capacities and constraints originating within small and medium-sized enterprises themselves. In particular, the attitude of SMEs towards their financing, their expertise or lack of it in financial management, and the burdens which arranging an introduction on a stock market would place on them. 2. 3. The second group of potential obstacles concern: the cross-border trading of shares on pan-European stock markets; particular currency related problems; differences in taxation and national accountancy prac- tices; corporate governance and institutional investment. The Commission believes that in certain of these fields 3. Detailed comments on the communication 3. 1. Introduction Other than for the comments set out in section 1 of this opinion, the points made in the introduction are accepted. Further progress in the development of SME 3. 2. capital markets in the European Union, and their prospects. A number of capital markets more attuned to 3. 2. 1. the needs of innovative and rapidly-growing companies than have been traditional stock markets, now exist in Europe. Two, EASDAQ and EURO. NM, have pan-European ambitions. The London AIM (Alternative Investment Market) currently appears to be more focused upon the United Kingdom. 3. 2. 2. The growth rates of companies seeking admis- sion to these markets is likely to be far in excess of the 10 % cited in the second paragraph of page 2 of the Communication. When comparing sales in 1996 and 1997, three-quarters of the companies whose shares traded on the EASDAQ market experienced a growth in excess of 25 %. Nearly a third of all companies on the market showed a turnover increase of over 100 %. 3. 2. 3. The long-term success of these markets will depend on their admitting a sufficient number of innovative companies, as it is these who appear to particularly excite the interest of investors. Any initia- tives to increase their numbers, particularly in fields such as biotechnology, would make a welcome contribution. Unfortunately, there is no completely reliable method of determining at an early stage which are the companies that are likely to grow rapidly and be successful in the long-term. What largely determines their eventual ability to attract external investment is the perceived quality of their management. 3. 2. 4. Efforts need, therefore, to be concentrated on encouraging more business start-ups and seeing that they have access to finance, together with timely advice, so improving management quality and reducing the current high rate of mortality, some 50 % within the first five years of existence according to the European Observatory for Small Business. There are already good schemes in operation within the EU which can provide 27. 7. 98 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 235/15 guidance when policies are being developed. One exam- ple is the ‘Artigiancassa’ financial facility in Italy. such assistance a condition for receiving a loan guarantee. 3. 2. 4. 1. Given that undercapitalization and inability to provide security for loans is common among new firms: A loan guarantee facility for SMEs, with special arrangements for very small ‘micro’ loans, should be made available in all Member States. The means of delivery, whether through state organized schemes, or other mechanisms such as Mutual Guarantee Systems, would be for decision in the light of national circumstances. Given that many small enterprises do not adopt a limited company format, special attention needs to be given to their specific needs. Guarantees might not need to have as high an upper limit as in the US Small Business Administration scheme ($ 1 million, of which $ 750 000 is guaranteed) but at least ECU 250 000 would seem appropriate. Properly run, these facilities should not be a great burden on the public exchequer. Loan defaults in the US are currently less than 2,5 % of the total guaranteed and fees charged to firms for the granting of loans would offset part of this. Based on the experience of Mutual Guarantee Systems, the so called ‘Multiplier’, which enhances the ability of consortia to underwrite loans, has a multiplier of 22. That is, with a 50 % guarantee and a hypothetical venture capital fund of ECU 100, it would be possible to grant a loan of ECU 4 400. This figure allows for an insolvency rate of 4 % and the cost of investigating credit worthiness. Whilst the establishment of such a structure will not be as cheap as in the case of the SBA Score programme, where mentors only receive out of pocket expenses, it need not be overly expensive. In the last full year of the United Kingdom Small Firms Service (1990), keeping 300 advisers in the field only cost around ECU 14 million. The attendant reduction in both business failures and ill-advised start-ups makes the establishment of such structures a first-class national investment. There is reason to believe that by extending this system, the business failure rate will fall considerably, perhaps even by 80 %. 3. 2. 4. 3. Not all firms cease activities because of lack of finance or mismanagement. An unquantifiable number do so because they find regulatory burdens imposed upon them impossible to cope with. There must also be many who are deterred from starting a business because of the bureaucratic procedures involved. The European Commission and Member States recognize this, but action to address the problem needs to be speeded up. In the USA new firms only need to make arrange- ments to pay social security contributions and register with the tax authorities. Member States should reduce start-up formalities to what they consider to be the bare essentials in a similar manner, while bearing in mind the different economic and social structures. They should also consider raising VAT registration exemption levels, as already per- mitted by the VAT Directives, so assisting the very small business. A major reason for business failure is a lack 3. 2. 4. 2. of knowledge of the relevant sector and a lack of business and financial management skills. There is nothing magic about these and they can be imparted in the majority of cases providing the person giving the advice has the necessary business experience and counselling skills. The pity is that many of those most in need of advice seldom seek it. Each Member State, with the cooperation of the appropriate private-sector organizations, should ensure that business mentoring on a one-to-one basis is available at reasonable cost to any self-employed person or SME proprietor or manager. Mentors should have had business experience and be members of a professional body (which could include national SME and craft organizations) able to ensure they receive proper initial and on-going training. Con- sideration should be given to making the seeking of The administration of firms paying very small amounts of VAT costs more than it yields, so this reform would have no budgetary cost, whilst giving new firms a breathing space before having to absorb what is for many a complex system, requiring them to pay for external advice in order to ensure compliance. 3. 2. 4. 4. Unless considerable amounts of noise or harmful emissions are concerned it is easy to found a business in the USA and operate it from home. It has to be wondered whether firms such as Microsoft and Dell Computers, which both started in a garage, would ever have commenced operations in some parts of Europe. There is a need for public authorities to pay more attention to substance rather than form when authorizing new start ups, and to simplify authori- zation procedures. Restrictions on starting a business C 235/16 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 27. 7. 98 and operating it from a private home for a limited period should be relaxed where there is no question of public nuisance or inconvenience or harm to the environment or employees. apparently easier and cheaper to patent discoveries in the US. If a major objective is to encourage the 3. 2. 4. 5. creation of innovative firms, the US experience that their growth appears to take place most readily around universities or research centres needs to be noted. There are examples of such centres in Europe already, but not enough, neither are they yet sufficiently large. Top priorities should be the encouragement of the establishment of more high technology business parks around universities and other research centres and the improvement of the overall quality of those that already exist, thereby increasing the chance of commercial application of scientific discoveries. In each case it is also vital to provide back-up, in the shape of venture capital funds. There is a need for the Commission to examine current best practice in the Member States and to disseminate the results in order to encourage further developments. 3. 2. 4. 6. US academics seem far more willing to establish or participate in businesses than their European counterparts. One reason may be a greater availability of early stage and seed capital (a gap now being addressed following the Heads of Government Extraordinary Council on Employment in Luxembourg), coupled with expert business advice. Another one may be cultural, with far more emphasis being placed on academic rather than worldly success in Europe. An examination is needed into methods which would help make academics more aware of the possibility of developing commercial applications of their theo- retical knowledge, particularly within a business in which they have a stake. It may be necessary to consider incentives, such as the provision of more funds for pure research to the departments of academics who respond positively. Member States should also loosen traditional restrictions which prevent academics from undertaking any type of commercial activity. There will be practical problems to overcome, not least defining the ownership of intellectual property, particularly where the centres of learning involved are wholly funded by the state. Nevertheless, the existence of difficulties should not be made an excuse for inaction. 3. 2. 4. 7. cation of research in Europe may be that Another reason for less commercial appli- is it The intention of the Commission to produce early draft legislation aimed at creating a true European patent is warmly welcomed. The Council and the European Parliament are urged to rapidly consider and approve this legislation, along with the equally important draft Utility Model Directive. 3. 2. 4. 8. In the more enterprise-oriented areas of the United States, entrepreneurs who go bankrupt are not made to shoulder so much blame. The federate state laws allow them to learn from their mistakes and to get their business back on its feet or start a new one. Member States should examine their national legislation on bankruptcy and seek to amend it in order to limit the number of unnecessary bankruptcies and to give a greater chance of starting again to those who, though unsuccessful, acted in good faith. 3. 2. 5. Another factor which will determine whether or not these markets are successful is whether there will be sufficient interest from investors. So far, levels of interest by institutional investors appear encouraging, more questions arise in respect of private investors. One reason for the lack of interest in equities by individual European investors, referred to in the seventh paragraph of Section II, is certainly cultural. Europe is not an enterprise culture in the same way as is the USA. When it comes to investment, the security provided by fixed-interest investments has been traditionally more important than the potential for higher returns offered by equity investment. It can be anticipated that the creation of a single European currency will tend to change investor attitudes. Rates of return on government securities will tend to be lower, as will the amounts issued. This means that investors will need to consider alternatives. Already, 3. 2. 6. investor attitudes do seem to be changing and another factor in the apparent lack of interest in equities may have been a lack of opportunity. Recent evidence, including the success of privatization issues, shows that there may be a more pent-up demand than estimated. In any case, the majority of smaller private investors are likely to hold their stakes in equities indirectly, through collective investments and those made by insurance companies and pension funds. It is important that these institutional investors are not restricted in their investment policies by outdated national rules, which will become increasingly irrelevant in a single currency zone (see also point 3. 4. 1. 2. 5). 27. 7. 98 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 235/17 3. 2. 7. Growing companies are capital hungry and lack of funds frequently inhibits their rate of growth in Europe. This is less so in the USA where a greater variety of sources exist. In the USA informal private investors or ‘Business Angels’, who are frequently successful businessmen, are prepared to invest relatively substantial sums (said to be in the range of $ 50 000 to $ 100 000) in businesses with the potential for fast growth. In addition, the advice and contacts they can bring to the company are said to be as valuable as the money they invest. An encouragement they receive is that they are allowed to offset losses against tax payable on other activities under defined circumstances. Similar investors do appear to exist in Europe, but the picture is uneven and potential investors complain that it is difficult to locate suitable companies. The US Small Business Administration has recently tried to improve links in the US by establishing a national data base promoting contacts. The Member States should examine how informal private investment might be encouraged, both through tax incentives and the establishment of contact networks, where these do not already exist. 3. 2. 7. 1. When the informal private investor’s partici- pation is no longer sufficient, Venture Capital Funds should theoretically take over for the higher-growth firm, effectively bridging the gap until it has reached the point where a stock market floatation is possible. In practice, even in the USA, this only happens in the case of a very small number of companies as median investment sizes become increasingly large. The US Small Business Administration has endeavoured to fill some of the gap by providing guarantees for smaller venture capital investments. The Council having acknowledged that a problem exists (Point 48 of the Luxembourg Conclusions), the Commission has reacted by tabling a draft proposal for a Decision permitting such guarantees to be given. This proposal will be the subject of a separate Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee. 3. 2. 8. A noteworthy feature of the American scene is the number of small companies that grow to medium- size. One reason may lie in the field of capital taxation, which was reduced in the US in the 1980s. Owners of a business are more willing to take the risks involved in growing rapidly if they are allowed to keep a substantial part of the results of success should they eventually float the company on a stock exchange or sell it. If they do not wish to do either, they may be interested in handing it down to younger members of the family without incurring succession duties which bleed the company of finance it needs for trading and funding further expansion. Member States should examine the effects of capital taxes and succession duties on SME growth and introduce reforms where necessary. This is some- thing which the Committee has advocated on a number of occasions. It is after all the total yield rather than the actual rates of these taxes which should be important to governments. 3. 2. 9. Another necessity is the provision of high- quality information, particularly on new share issues, to investors. For larger share issues this is a complex but practical possibility, but for smaller offerings this is currently made difficult where cross-border issues are concerned by two main factors. The first is the absence of a common definition of a public offer within the European Union. The second the restrictive manner in which the mutual recognition provisions of the Prospectus Directive (1) are being interpreted by the Member States. They are frequently requiring trans- lations of what are massive documents, together with a considerable amount of additional information, together with the placing of expensive advertisements in national newspapers. This is perfectly legal, but forces issuers of ‘SME stocks’ to limit an Initial Public Offer of shares to one Member State, relying elsewhere on private placements of shares with professional investors. In addition, the widely differing national rules on advertis- ing effectively exclude many private investors, either through ignorance or because only a private placement is taking place in their country of residence. These two factors have the unfortunate result of restricting liquidity in the after-market and reducing share prices. Unless these difficulties are overcome it will be virtually impossible to tap the pool of funds and interest in the shares of innovative SMEs that potentially exists in Europe. Neither will it be possible for the SME capital markets to provide funding for Europe’s future commer- cial and industrial ‘champions’ in the way they otherwise could. 3. 3. Potential obstacles to the listing of SMEs on stock exchanges Five questions are asked by the Commission in this section of the Communication. They are addressed in the same order. (1) 89/298/EEC (Council Directive coordinating the require- ments for the drawing-up, scrutiny and distribution of the prospectus to be published when transferable securities are offered to the public). C 235/18 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 27. 7. 98 3. 3. 1. D o e s a s u f f i c i e n t n u m b e r o f S M E s e x i s t i n E u r o p e w h i c h a r e s u i t a b l e s t o c k m a r k e t a r i p e a n d f l o t a t i o n , h o w c a n s o , i f t h e s e b e i d e n t i f i e d ? f o r a n d It would appear from the partial studies 3. 3. 1. 1. made to date, and mentioned in the Commission’s Communication, that sufficient firms with the willing- ness and the potential exist, but whether many are yet ready, or even aware of the opportunities presented by a stock exchange flotation is less certain. Given that firms tend to be reticent about revealing their affairs to strangers, and there being much less information available in the public domain than in the USA, it is difficult to think of methods by which they might be identified. Perhaps professional advisers (bankers, lawyers, accountants) and organizations (chambers of commerce, etc. ) might be induced to help in the identification of firms who are potential candidates for flotation. a barrier to proceeding. Considerable effort is required, which must be coupled with the high cost of diverting management time from the development of the company. These requirements are, however, inseparable from the transparency required by both investors and market regulators. It is difficult to see how the Commission suggestion of making private companies adopt similar standards of financial transparency would address the problem. It would merely place an additional burden on companies not seeking and never intending to seek external equity finance. 3. 3. 3. 2. As to the other suggestion, that financial training being provided for companies preparing a prospectus, it is the it must be pointed out that sponsors to the issue, not the company, who prepare the prospectus and the reporting accountants who satisfy themselves as to the accuracy and presentation of the figures. It is to be hoped that companies who had reached this stage would also have developed a reasonable level of financial expertise. Otherwise, they are likely to encounter problems in meeting the on-going obligations of a public limited company. 3. 3. 2. A r e o w n e r s o f S M E s w h i c h a r e t o f l o t a t i o n w i l l i n g r e a d y a c c e p t d i m i n u t i o n p o s s i b l e o f c o n t r o l w h i c h a p u b l i c s h a r e i s s u e i s o f t e n t a k e n t o i m p l y ? f o r t h e 3. 3. 4. D o h a v e a c c e s s t h e S M E s n e c e s s a r y a n d s u p p o r t n e c e s s a r y t o p r e p a r e a n s h a r e s I n i t i a l P u b l i c O f f e r i n g o f ( a n I P O ) ? t o a d v i c e s p e c i a l i s t 3. 3. 2. 1. If they are not ready to accept the reality that they will suffer some diminution of control and will be answerable to a wider public than hitherto, owners of SMEs should not contemplate a flotation. In many instances a reluctance to accept this reality is a gener- ational problem. As many of those who founded businesses after the second world war retire, those who succeed them seem much more willing to give up a certain measure of control in return for external funding and the greater opportunities for expansion that follow. Also, those that have been in receipt of venture capital, or have attracted informal private investment, have already become accustomed to outside scrutiny of their decision-making. The Commission’s idea that more companies might come forward if there were publicly supported campaigns to bring home to suitable SMEs the advantages of flotation is worthy of further consider- ation, although advice about the most suitable market for the company and similar matters, clearly fall within the remit of a professional adviser. Potential IPOs valued at less than ECU 100 3. 3. 4. 1. million could well face a problem in that they are unlikely to be of interest to the larger investment banking houses. In some of the main financial centres smaller investment services firms do exist who are prepared to bring issues of quite a low value to the market, but this situation is not universal and difficulties in obtaining proper support and assistance could arise. This is of concern because one important factor determining whether or not investors are attracted to an issue is the name of its sponsor. It is, after all, they who act as filter/selector, trainer/preparer and on-going hand holder of SMEs coming to a stock market. It is to be hoped that Economic and Monetary Union, along with increased competition in the financial markets, will lead to the appearance of more investment firms prepared to take on smaller share issues, perhaps even outside their main country of establishment. 3. 3. 3. D o h a v e t h e w i l l i n g n e s s S M E s s k i l l s n e c e s s a r y t o a n d f i n a n c i a l m e e t i n f o r - m a t i o n a n d t r a n s p a r e n c y r e q u i r e - q u o - m e n t s t a t i o n ? s t o c k m a r k e t f i n a n c i a l h i g h t h e o f a 3. 3. 5. A r e a n d S M E s w i l l i n g a b l e t o t h e p r o c e s s b e a r t h e h i g h c o s t o f i n o f l i s t i n g , s t o c k e x c h a n g e t h e t e r m s o f b o t h a n I P O a n d o f o n g o i n g c o s t s o f a l i s t i n g ? a The need to produce a high level of financial 3. 3. 3. 1. information in preparation for a flotation can constitute Costs of an issue are high, although the figure 3. 3. 5. 1. of 20 % of the funds raised quoted in the Communication 27. 7. 98 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 235/19 must refer to a very small issue. NASDAQ indicates a typical cost might range from 7 % to 9 % of the value of the issue. To offer special help with the costs of an IPO to SMEs making very small issues would not be of particular assistance as fees are not paid until after the new capital has been raised. In any case, stock markets are unenthusiastic about such issues, which tend to be illiquid after flotation and on-going fees charged hard to justify. 3. 3. 5. 2. Some efforts are being made to meet the requirements of smaller SMEs, only a minority of whom are going to be high technology companies with international ambitions and two seem worthy of mention: — the Union of Chambers of Commerce in Lombardy, Italy, has just established a second-tier capital market for companies with a capital of ECU 0,5 million upwards; — the Irish Stock Exchange launched its ‘Developing Companies Market’ in January 1997. This provides a capital market with less onerous conditions than those applying to stocks on the Official List, in- cluding a requirement for only one year’s accounts rather than three. Also, only 10 % of the shares have to be issued to the public. More initiatives of this nature creating ‘nursery’ capital markets, which are comparatively cheap to join, would seem to be required. 3. 3. 5. 3. In addition to the two examples quoted in the previous paragraph, there is the longer-established German ‘Freiverkehr’ over-the-counter market, on which the shares of some 500 companies are traded. 3. 3. 5. 4. The creation of an Internet market might, for the shares of smaller SMEs in particular, be one solution worthy of encouragement. In June 1997 the Australian Stock Exchange (AS) announced its intention to launch an ‘Alternative Capital Market’ in 1998 on which unlisted companies of any size would be able to seek investments via the Internet. The AS calculates that there are about 1 million SMEs in Australia, of whom 10 % might have real potential for growth and 2 % interested in seeking outside equity capital. Companies seeking to join the market would have to make use of ‘sponsors’ approved and supervised by the AS, who would have to vet the information posted on the Internet by their client companies. Some mandatory information would have to be included, but nothing as complex as a prospectus would be required. 3. 3. 5. 5. In the USA some companies are beginning to make offerings of shares via the Internet. A prospectus has to be produced and filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission but the companies themselves set share prices, leading to a lack of transparency in the after market. So far, it would appear that the majority of shares issued by this means have been sold to investors located in fairly close geographical proximity to the company. 3. 3. 5. 6. A rather more sophisticated new form of issue, ‘Public Venture Offerings’, aimed at medium-sized companies, is now being offered in the USA, also via the Internet. Typical amounts raised are between $ 5 million and $ 10 million. A prospectus has to be filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission and with the regulatory authority in each of the States in which stock will be offered. The offer can then be advertised without restriction and be subscribed to by up to five institutional and an unlimited number of private investors. Stock cannot be traded for a period of 18 months from the date of issue. This form of funding is hard to tap, possibly because of its newness. Out of 2 000 firms expressing interest, one investment firm only agreed to launch offerings for four. Nevertheless, this appears to be a financing instrument with potential. 3. 3. 5. 7. One problem to be faced if similar develop- ments are to be encouraged in Europe is that of adequate regulation and the avoidance of fraud. Even the US Securities and Exchange Commission is not yet in a position to issue a set of rules, meaning that it may well fall to the Commission to be the first to comprehensively face this issue, hopefully establishing a framework of rules within which a meaningful, transparent and honest market in the shares of SMEs may develop. The positive efforts made by the European Com- mission in the field of electronic commerce are acknowledged and supported. Building on this, the European Commission and the Member States are asked to launch consultations, preferably main- taining liaison with the US Securities and Exchange Commission, in order to devise a framework of rules appropriate to cover securities offered to investors by means of the Internet. C 235/20 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 27. 7. 98 3. 4. Potential barriers to the cross-border trading of shares on SME capital markets 3. 4. 1. P o i n t s r a i s e d b y t h e C o m m i s s i o n 3. 4. 1. 1. Currency-related problems The Commission view that these can only be solved by the introduction of the euro and the consequent impetus to cross-border trading in securities is endorsed. This will of course depend on the number of Member States participating from the outset and cannot be viewed in isolation from the performance of the EU economy. 3. 4. 1. 2. The regulation of securities trading at the EU level 3. 4. 1. 2. 1. The European Union has some 18 equity markets and 18 regulatory organizations. The USA has three principal or ‘national’ stock markets, all highly efficient and doing a good job for investors and companies. Since 1996, when Congress passed legislation which overrode State regulations where stocks traded on these markets were concerned, they have just one regulator, the Securities and Exchange Commission. At present, the fragmented European regulatory structure, together with the investment firms operating within it, cannot compete effectively with the US model. Currently, EU legislation on financial ser- 3. 4. 1. 2. 2. vices permits the free movement of capital and provides for the right of establishment. What is missing is any consistent interpretation of the rules by national regulatory bodies. This, together with the inconsistent manner in which the options provided for in financial services legislation have been exercised at the national level, are possibly the most fundamental problems remaining in relation to the organization and operation of stock markets in the EU. The single currency alone will not provide the solution — although it will be a start — as its full benefits will not be felt within the financial services sector under the current legislative and regulatory regime. 3. 4. 1. 2. 3. Particular problems exist in terms of the provisions of the Prospectus Directive when companies seek admission to a market outside their home Member State. The directive does not provide for the automatic mutual recognition of a prospectus prepared under the provisions of Article 12 in order to gain admission to regulated markets, even though this has been vetted by a competent authority. Some authorities are prepared to issue a certificate certifying they have vetted a prospectus, others will not. Indeed the current patch- work of national regulatory arrangements, reflecting the different ways in which certain of the options contained in its articles have been perfectly legally transposed into the laws of the Member States does not make achieving mutual recognition under the terms of Article 21(1) of the Prospectus Directive as easy as it should be. 3. 4. 1. 2. 4. As pointed out in point 3. 2. 9, major diffi- culties also arise because of the requirement by some competent authorities for the translation of the prospec- tus and the addition of additional information specific to that Member State concerning local income tax aspects, financial organizations retained to act as paying agents for the issuer in that Member State, and the way in which notices to investors have to be published. In practice, they are placing an almost impossible burden on smaller issuers. 3. 4. 1. 2. 5. To allow such anomalies to remain will undermine some of the benefits of a single European currency as well as placing European capital markets at a disadvantage compared with those in the USA. Capital markets in the USA are not only efficient, they offer choice to companies and broaden opportunities for investors. The fundamental reason appears to be the regulatory climate, which ensures transparency and fosters competition. This in turn increases market size and reduces costs, both for investors and companies raising capital. Even though the European Union now has an overall framework of rules governing financial markets and services these are extremely complex, are supplemented by specific national provisions and policed by national regulators. The European Commission and the Member States need to consider whether the present legislative and regulatory regime encourages the deepening of capital markets which is now essential and take appropriate steps to amend it, particularly the Prospectus Directive. This would not need major change to turn into an effective instrument, but would require some of the Member States to forego some of the legislative options they now enjoy, which were framed at a time when financial markets were far more national in character than they are now becoming. Whilst a European regulatory body, along the lines of the Securities and Exchange Commission, is unlikely to be created for the foreseeable future, 27. 7. 98 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 235/21 greater efforts are needed to ensure that enforcement at the national level is more coherent than is now the case. fast changing business environment would be unneces- sarily restricted, further handicapping Europe in its attempts to compete with the rest of the world. 3. 4. 1. 3. Differences in national laws and practices 3. 4. 1. 3. 1. Taxation Whilst the Commission is correct in saying that double taxation agreements exist in most instances, this is not the case for all Member States, with two being particularly deficient in this regard. Nevertheless, it is apparently the lack of information about national peculiarities rather than the differences themselves which cause problems. This deficiency is something that the Commission might consider addressing through the drawing up of a comprehensive guide, or encouraging its production. 3. 4. 1. 3. 2. Accounting standards The Commission view that these do not create a major problem is endorsed, although it would be helpful to analysts, who are the source of much public information on companies, if more accounts were prepared in accordance with international accounting standards. This is, however, something for stock exchanges to deal with through internal rules, not the European Commission. For this to work effectively, however, some Member States will have to amend national legislation, as already agreed in principle, in order to permit companies to use international standards. It is understood this is something they have undertaken to carry out and they are urged to do so speedily. 3. 4. 1. 3. 3. Corporate governance 3. 4. 1. 3. 3. 1. A Europe-wide debate on what would be a necessary level of corporate governance standards appears to have value, but there must be doubts about any solution based on legal provisions, particularly given the difficulty in framing either a directive which could gain agreement in the Council, or sets of national rules that would be at all coherent. An initial difficulty is to adequately define 3. 4. 1. 3. 3. 2. corporate governance. The definition adopted by Ernst & Young in a report drawn up for the Commission as: ‘all the rules on functioning and control that govern corporate existence in a given historical and geographical framework’ is extremely broad. An attempt to translate this into legislation, particularly at the European level given the under developed nature of even the most basic concepts of corporate governance in some Member States, could prove an extremely complex undertaking. A danger is that the flexibility management needs in a 3. 4. 1. 3. 3. 3. Even codes of conduct have to have an element of flexibility if they are not to prove unduly onerous for the smaller private company. One European stock market already lays down certain basic principles of corporate governance which companies whose shares are admitted to trading have to meet and continue to meet: — the Board of Directors must have at least two independent members (which excludes all executives or employees of the company or its subsidiaries, a shareholder with a beneficial interest exceeding 20 % and any individual having a relationship likely to affect their independence of judgement); — a Remuneration Committee, composed entirely of independent directors and operating in line with the best international practices when setting remuner- ation and incentive packages for directors and executives, must be established; — an Audit Committee, with a majority of members being independent directors, must also be created and maintained; — all related party transactions must be reviewed on an on-going basis, using a body with an independent majority, such as the Audit Committee, which should also review situations where possible conflicts of interest appear to arise. 3. 4. 1. 3. 3. 4. If other European stock exchanges were to make similar binding rules, corporate governance problems in respect of public limited companies, at least as far as the overall conduct of executive directors was concerned, would be largely overcome. Other problems may manifest themselves in the future. Given the relative newness of this subject, there could be merit in adopting a step by step approach, only attempting to deal with abuses as they arise, preferably by means other than legislation. 3. 4. 1. 3. 4. Institutional investment Two fundamental reasons for a lower volume of funding available for venture capital investment in Europe is that there are less fully-funded pension schemes in existence and where they do, considerable constraints on their investment policies exist in some Member States. It is believed that the creation of more such schemes will become essential given the demographic problems facing Europe in the next century and in order C 235/22 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 27. 7. 98 to maximize their performance these funds will need to be able to obtain the higher returns obtainable from investments. The making significant venture capital Commission position, underlying the importance of institutional investment for the success of these markets and the need for the removal of outdated and unnecessary restrictions on investment by pension funds, is endorsed. assurance of the reliability of such a market. When coupled with the stringent rules imposed on firms whose shares are traded upon it, it is clearly inappropriate for rules to apply, or be judged by regulators to apply, which are more stringent than those applied to ‘official stock exchanges’. The Commission is asked to examine how this anomaly might be overcome. Pension funds should, subject to proper safeguards which are strictly supervised, have freedom to devise investment strategies which are in the best interests of the members of such funds. 4. 2. The US experience 4. Other significant points requiring consideration 4. 1. The restricted concept of the ‘Regulated Market’ 4. 1. 1. The legal concept of the ‘Regulated Market’ only applies in the case of the Investment Services and Capital Adequacy Directives, not to any of the other EU directives on financial services. This has a number of potential consequences: i) It would appear that shares admitted to trading could actually be classified as unlisted securities under certain circumstances, even though they had to meet standards of regulation and transparency as strict, or stricter, than those imposed by an ‘official’ stock exchange. ii) Should the classification of ‘unlisted securities’ be applied, financial services firms may have to accord them a nil weighting when calculating solvency ratios, so restricting institutional investment. iii) Investment firms dealing in UCITS (Undertakings for collective investments in transferable securities) may, under the provisions of national law following on from Directive No 85/611/EEC, have to carry out a ‘due diligence’ investigation of the regulated market concerned before making any investments in shares traded upon it. iv) Directive No 88/627/EEC on the information to be published when a major holding in a listed company is acquired or disposed of does not apply. This could lead to a situation where a substantial holding could be built up in a company traded on these markets, with the acquirer having no obligation to inform either the company or the market concerned. It is presumed that the Commission regarded 4. 1. 2. the designation ‘regulated market’ to carry with it an 4. 2. 1. Whilst there are major economic and social differences between the USA and the European Union, there appear to be lessons to be learned from the former which could improve the situation of SMEs, particularly financially, but also with regard to management con- sultancy. This could assist the creation of more new firms and therefore jobs. To adopt new initiatives or adapt existing 4. 2. 2. structures in the light of those lessons would not mean that the whole of Europe would become a hive of entrepreneurial activity. Many areas in the USA certainly do not warrant that description. Growth in innovative industries and services (demarcating the two becomes increasingly difficult) seems to be concentrated in centres of excellence, largely based either around academic institutions or in areas such as that west of Washington DC. 4. 2. 3. Part of the reason for the high levels of new firm creation in the US is cultural, with a spirit of entrepreneurship, independence and flexibility more common in the population. Trying to inculcate a more entrepreneurial spirit in Europe through the educational system, something which the Commission apparently intends to foster, will take time, at least a generation. 4. 2. 4. Public policy in Europe must be directed to facilitating the creation of new businesses and ensuring that there is a lower death rate among firms in their first five years of life than in the USA and that more are given the opportunity to grow to medium size. 4. 2. 5. The objective must be to give SMEs, particu- larly those that are new, access to assistance. How it is delivered, whether through government agencies, contractors, or otherwise is a matter of choice for Member States, preferably after consultation with the social partners. They should, however, ensure that the ‘displacement effect’ is kept to the minimum. That is, assistance should not be granted in such a form that it provides an unfair short-term competitive advantage. 27. 7. 98 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 235/23 5. Analysis of the Commission’s conclusions It is impossible to challenge the Commission 5. 1. conclusions as set out in the Communication, except to say that the process of achieving the objective of a genuine SME equity culture in Europe may be a long process. This will be less so given a new and positive commitment from legislators and national regulatory authorities to reduce unnecessary barriers. In particular, it is essential that innovation in the securities markets is not retarded, or even stifled, by regulatory problems. It must always be borne in mind that the main purpose of securities’ laws and that of regulators is to: — regulate the relationships between share dealer and client so that the latter is not treated unfairly or exposed to the risk of fraud; — protect investors more generally against fraud and market manipulation. 5. 2. It is not to try to guard them against market risk or to protect specific national market interests, something that will prove increasingly difficult to achieve in today’s global financial markets. The primary economic role of the equity markets 5. 3. is to channel passive savings into productive investments. What the investment firms cannot do currently is to ensure the optimum level of liquidity in the market because of the restrictive attitude of national regulators and legislators in regard to the approval of prospectuses, the definition of a public offer and what qualifies as a ‘Euro-security’ (see Article 3(f) of the Prospectus Direc- tive 89/298/EEC). The Commission should ensure that this Article of the Directive is correctly implemented at the national level. 5. 4. What Europe needs in order to maximize levels of firm and job creation, aided by efficient financial markets as in the USA, but maintaining its distinct social identity, is: — a greater flow of good companies seeking admission to stock markets. This means increasing total busi- ness numbers; making sure they do not suffer shortages of finance; have access to informed busi- Brussels, 27 May 1998. ness advice; do not have their progress retarded by unnecessary regulatory burdens; and can legally protect their innovations more easily; — the encouragement of a greater flow of investment into equity capital at all stages of company develop- ment; — the availability of ‘nursery’ equity markets, probably at the regional level, from which companies can move to larger national and pan-European markets when they have reached an appropriate stage of development, as well as the utilization of the possi- bilities offered by the Internet; and, — the reform of European securities regulation in order to promote greater transparency and competition and to allow the efficient operation of a truly pan-European financial services sector. 5. 5. It is recognized that in each instance some of the Member States may already have perfectly adequate mechanisms to address the problem raised, whilst more are likely to be introduced as a result of the Extraordinary European Council on Employment held in November 1997. The objective of these recommendations is to encourage the development of an overall framework that facilitates SME development and the creation of new jobs in all parts of the European Union through filling the gaps in the support framework that remain. This, in turn, will have positive effects on overall economic prosperity in the European Union, considering that most companies are SMEs. The form in which measures are introduced will depend on the traditions and structures in each Member State. 6. Additional comments 6. 1. The Committee welcomes the positive policy developments outlined in the Commission Communi- cation ‘Risk Capital: A Key to Job Creation in the European Union’ (1). It also notes that the vast majority of suggested initiatives follow the same approach as in this Opinion. In endorsing the views contained therein, the Committee asks to be consulted on the continued evolution of policy in this area. (1) COM(98) 522 final. The President of the Economic and Social Committee Tom JENKINS


title: WRITTEN QUESTION No. 1624/98 by Amedeo AMADEO to the Commission. Fifth framework programme for RTDD (budget for implementation)

eurovoc_concepts:
EU programme
competitiveness
employment policy
higher education
innovation
quality of life
research and development
scientific research
small and medium-sized enterprises
technological change

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text: C 31/62 Euroopan yhteis(cid:246)jen virallinen lehti FI 5. 2. 1999 (1999/C 31/081) KIRJALLINEN KYSYMYS E-1624/98 esitt(cid:228)j(cid:228)(t): Amedeo Amadeo (NI) komissiolle (27. toukokuuta 1998) Aihe: Tutkimusta ja teknologista kehitt(cid:228)mist(cid:228) koskeva viides puiteohjelma (rahoitusohje) Viite: Asiakirja KOM(97) 0439 lopull. › 97/0119 COD › 97/0120 CNS (1). Voiko komissio varmistaa keskeisiin toimiin liittyen, ett(cid:228) 1. 2. kaikissa keskeisiss(cid:228) toimissa s(cid:228)ilytet(cid:228)(cid:228)n tarkoituksenmukainen prosenttiosuus esittely- ja innovaatiotoimia sek(cid:228) pk-yrityksi(cid:228) varten tutkimus- ja innovaatiotoimien v(cid:228)lisen vuorovaikutuksen tukemiseksi markkinoilla, yhten(cid:228)istet(cid:228)(cid:228)n ja n(cid:228)in ollen j(cid:228)rkeistet(cid:228)(cid:228)n ehdotettujen keskeisten toimien sis(cid:228)lt(cid:246) korvaamalla ne mahdolli- suuksien mukaan komission viitoittamilla telemaattisilla ohjelmilla, 3. m(cid:228)(cid:228)ritet(cid:228)(cid:228)n kymmenkunta keskeist(cid:228) tointa, teknologisen kehitt(cid:228)misen ja jotka liittyv(cid:228)t esittelyn puiteohjelmaan, ja yksi toimi, joka liittyy Euratom-puiteohjelmaan, ja m(cid:228)(cid:228)r(cid:228)t(cid:228) niille riitt(cid:228)v(cid:228)sti varoja, valvoa niiden kyky(cid:228) saada rahoitusta sek(cid:228) niiden tieteellist(cid:228) tasoa ja strategista n(cid:228)kyvyytt(cid:228), tutkimuksen, 4. 5. asettaa rahoituksen saamisen ehdoksi keskeisiin toimiin tulokset, joihin on p(cid:228)(cid:228)sty ja jotka on vahvistettu, jotta v(cid:228)ltet(cid:228)(cid:228)n toimien pys(cid:228)htyminen viideksi vuodeksi ja tutkimuksen, teknologisen kehitt(cid:228)misen ja esittelyn v(cid:228)h(cid:228)ist(cid:228) teknist(cid:228) ja innovatiivista tasoa merkitsevien toimien (cid:148)pakollinen(cid:148) rahoitus, varmistetaan nykyaikaiset, yksinkertaiset ja avoimet hallintaj(cid:228)rjestelm(cid:228)t, joilla taataan hallinnollisten kulujen pysyminen kurissa ja m(cid:228)(cid:228)r(cid:228)aikojen noudattaminen jakamalla vastuu t(cid:228)sm(cid:228)llisesti niin, ett(cid:228) byrokratia ja p(cid:228)(cid:228)t(cid:246)ksenteko rajataan ja p(cid:228)(cid:228)t(cid:246)ksenteko ryhm(cid:228)n(cid:228) varataan vain korkeimmille asianosaisten komissaarien tasoille? (1) EYVL C 291, 25. 9. 1997, s. 15›16. (1999/C 31/082) KIRJALLINEN KYSYMYS E-1625/98 esitt(cid:228)j(cid:228)(t): Amedeo Amadeo (NI) komissiolle (27. toukokuuta 1998) Aihe: Tutkimusta ja teknologista kehitt(cid:228)mist(cid:228) koskeva viides puiteohjelma (rahoitusohje) Viitteet: (cid:148)Muutettu ehdotus Euroopan parlamentin ja neuvoston p(cid:228)(cid:228)t(cid:246)kseksi tutkimusta, teknologista kehitt(cid:228)- mist(cid:228) ja esittely(cid:228) koskevasta Euroopan yhteis(cid:246)n viidennest(cid:228) puiteohjelmasta (1998›2000)(cid:148) ja (cid:148)Muutettu ehdotus neuvoston p(cid:228)(cid:228)t(cid:246)kseksi tutkimus- ja koulutustoimintaa koskevasta Euroopan atomienergiayhteis(cid:246)n (Euratom) viidennest(cid:228) puiteohjelmasta (1998›2002(cid:148)) (KOM(97) 0439 lopull. › 97/0119 COD › 97/0120 CNS) (1). Voiko komissio m(cid:228)(cid:228)r(cid:228)t(cid:228), ett(cid:228) rahavarojen my(cid:246)nt(cid:228)misen ehtona on tietyn prosenttiosuuden varaaminen akatee- misen ja teollisuusmaailman v(cid:228)lisille vaihtotoimille, yliopistoille ja pk-yrityksille, suurille tutkimuskeskuksille, teollisuuden laboratorioille ja pk-yrityksille? (1) EYVL C 291, 25. 9. 1997, s. 15-16. (1999/C 31/083) KIRJALLINEN KYSYMYS E-1626/98 esitt(cid:228)j(cid:228)(t): Amedeo Amadeo (NI) komissiolle (27. toukokuuta 1998) Aihe: Tutkimusta ja teknologista kehitt(cid:228)mist(cid:228) koskeva viides puiteohjelma (rahoitusohje) Viitteet: (cid:148)Muutettu ehdotus Euroopan parlamentin ja neuvoston p(cid:228)(cid:228)t(cid:246)kseksi tutkimusta, teknologista kehitt(cid:228)- mist(cid:228) ja esittely(cid:228) koskevasta Euroopan yhteis(cid:246)n viidennest(cid:228) puiteohjelmasta (1998-2000)(cid:148) ja (cid:148)Muutettu ehdotus neuvoston p(cid:228)(cid:228)t(cid:246)kseksi tutkimus- ja koulutustoimintaa koskevasta Euroopan atomienergiayhteis(cid:246)n (Euratom) viidennest(cid:228) puiteohjelmasta (1998-2002(cid:148)) (KOM(97) 0439 lopull. › 97/0119 COD › 97/0120 CNS) (1)


title: Regolamento (CE) n. 1076/98 della Commissione del 27 maggio 1998 che modifica l'allegato II del regolamento (CEE) n. 2377/90 del Consiglio che definisce la procedura comunitaria per la determinazione dei limiti massimi di residui di medicinali veterinari negli alimenti di origine animale (Testo rilevante ai fini del SEE)

eurovoc_concepts:
animal product
food inspection
public health
veterinary drug
veterinary legislation
waste

text: L 154/14 ‹ IT ‹ Gazzetta ufficiale delle Comunit(cid:133) europee 28. 5. 98 REGOLAMENTO (CE) N. 1076/98 DELLA COMMISSIONE del 27 maggio 1998 che modifica l’allegato II del regolamento (CEE) n. 2377/90 del Consiglio che definisce la procedura comunitaria per la determinazione dei limiti massimi di residui di medicinali veterinari negli alimenti di origine animale (Testo rilevante ai fini del SEE) LA COMMISSIONE DELLE COMUNIT(cid:211) EUROPEE, visto il trattato che istituisce la Comunit(cid:133) europea, visto il regolamento (CEE) n. 2377/90 del Consiglio, del 26 giugno 1990, che definisce una procedura comunitaria per la determinazione dei limiti massimi di residui di medicinali veterinari negli alimenti di origine animale (1), modificato da ultimo dal regolamento (CE) n. 1000/98 (2) della Commissione, in particolare gli articoli 6, 7 e 8, considerando che, a norma del regolamento (CEE) n. 2377/90, (cid:138) necessario stabilire limiti massimi di residui per tutte le sostanze farmacologicamente attive impiegate nei medicinali veterinari della Comunit(cid:133) destinati ad essere somministrati agli animali da produzione alimen- tare; considerando che i limiti massimi di residui devono venire stabiliti solo in seguito a valutazione, da parte del comitato per i medicinali veterinari, di tutte le informa- zioni relative alla sicurezza dei residui presenti nelle sostanze destinate al consumatore di prodotti alimentari di origine animale e relative agli effetti dei residui sulla lavorazione industriale dei generi alimentari; considerando che, nel fissare i limiti massimi di residui dei medicinali veterinari presenti nei prodotti alimentari di origine animale, (cid:138) necessario precisare le specie animali in cui tali residui possono comparire, nonch(cid:130) i livelli di residui che possono essere presenti nei singoli tessuti prelevati dall’animale cui era stato somministrato il prodotto (tessuto campione) e la natura del residuo che interessa ai fini del controllo dei residui (residuo marca- tore); organi che vengono spesso rimossi delle carcasse nel commercio internazionale; che (cid:138) pertanto necessario determinare dei limiti massimi di residui anche per i tessuti muscolari o adiposi; considerando che, nel caso di medicinali veterinari desti- nati alle specie ovaiole, agli animali da latte o alle api limiti massimi di residui mellifere, occorre fissare dei anche per le uova, il latte o il miele; considerando che praziquantel, procaina, butorfanolo tratato e 2-amminoetanolo devono essere inseriti nell’alle- gato II del regolamento (CEE) n. 2377/90; considerando che va concesso un periodo di 60 giorni prima dell’entrata in vigore del presente regolamento, al fine di consentire agli Stati membri di modificare in maniera appropriata le autorizzazioni di commercializza- zione dei medicinali veterinari rilasciate in base alla diret- tiva 81/851/CEE del Consiglio (3), modificata dalla diret- tiva 93/40/CEE (4), per tenere conto delle disposizioni del presente regolamento; considerando che le misure previste dal presente regola- mento sono conformi al parere del comitato permanente per i medicinali veterinari, HA ADOTTATO IL PRESENTE REGOLAMENTO: Articolo 1 L’allegato II del regolamento (CEE) n. 2377/90 (cid:138) sostituito dal testo dell’allegato al presente regolamento. considerando che, al fine di agevolare le operazioni rego- lari per il controllo dei residui, occorre di norma fissare, sulla base della pertinente normativa comunitaria, dei limiti massimi di residui per i tessuti campione, per il fegato o per i reni; che tuttavia il fegato e i reni sono Articolo 2 Il presente regolamento entra in vigore il sessantesimo giorno successivo alla sua pubblicazione nella Gazzetta ufficiale delle Comunit(cid:133) europee. (1) GU L 224 del 18. 8. 1990, pag. 1. (2) GU L 142 del 14. 5. 1998, pag. 18. (3) GU L 317 del 6. 11. 1981, pag. 1. (4) GU L 214 del 24. 8. 1993, pag. 31. 28. 5. 98 ‹ IT ‹ Gazzetta ufficiale delle Comunit(cid:133) europee L 154/15 Il presente regolamento (cid:138) obbligatorio in tutti i suoi elementi e direttamente applicabile in ciascuno degli Stati membri. Fatto a Bruxelles, il 27 maggio 1998. Per la Commissione Martin BANGEMANN Membro della Commissione L 154/16 ‹ IT ‹ Gazzetta ufficiale delle Comunit(cid:133) europee 28. 5. 98 ALLEGATO L’allegato II del regolamento (CEE) n. 2377/90 (cid:138) modificato come segue: 2. Composti organici Sostanze farmacologicamente attive Specie animale Altre disposizioni «2-Amminoetanolo Tutte le specie da produzione alimentare Butorfanolo tratrato Praziquantel Procaina Equidi Equidi Tutte le specie da produzione alimentare» Esclusivamente per via endovenosa


title: Advies van het Economisch en Sociaal Comité over het "Voorstel voor een richtlijn van het Europees Parlement en de Raad houdende wijziging van Richtlijn 92/23/EEG van de Raad betreffende banden voor motorvoertuigen en aanhangwagens daarvan alsmede de montage ervan"

eurovoc_concepts:
Community certification
commercial vehicle
motor vehicle
noise protection
pneumatic tyre

text: C 235/24 NL Publicatieblad van de Europese Gemeenschappen 27. 7. 98 Advies van het Economisch en Sociaal Comité over het „Voorstel voor een richtlijn van het Europees Parlement en de Raad houdende wijziging van Richtlijn 92/23/EEG van de Raad betreffende banden voor motorvoertuigen en aanhangwagens daarvan alsmede de montage ervan” (1) (98/C 235/05) De Raad heeft op 6 januari 1998 besloten, overeenkomstig de bepalingen van artikel 100 A van het Verdrag tot oprichting van de Europese Gemeenschap, het Economisch en Sociaal Comité te raadplegen over het voornoemde voorstel. De Afdeling voor industrie, handel, ambacht en diensten, die met de voorbereiding van de desbetreffende werkzaamheden was belast, heeft haar advies op 6 mei 1998 goedgekeurd. Rapporteur was de heer Bagliano. Het Economisch en Sociaal Comité heeft tijdens zijn 355e Zitting (vergadering van 27 mei 1998) het volgende advies uitgebracht, dat zonder stemmen tegen (101 stemmen vo´ o´r en 2 onthoudingen) is goedgekeurd. 1. Inleiding 1. 1. Met dit Commissievoorstel wordt een lacune opgevuld in het geheel van maatregelen die tot dusver zijn genomen ter bestrijding van door het wegverkeer veroorzaakte geluidshinder. 1. 2. Richtlijn 70/157/EEG betreffende het toegestane geluidsniveau van motorvoertuigen heeft namelijk alleen betrekking op geluidshinder door uitlaatpijpen en de mechanische delen van motorvoertuigen en de terugdrin- ging daarvan. Dat waren destijds ontegenzeggelijk de voornaamste oorzaken van geluidshinder. 1. 2. 1. Nu de in dat opzicht aan motorvoertuigen gestelde technische eisen door de opeenvolgende wij- zigingen van die Richtlijn steeds strenger zijn geworden, is de in paragraaf 1. 2 bedoelde geluidshinder beduidend afgenomen. Daarentegen is het probleem van geluidshin- der door het contact van de banden met het wegdek (hierna: het rolgeluid) steeds meer op de voorgrond getreden. 1. 3. Dat blijkt ook uit artikel 4 van de laatste wijziging van Richtlijn 70/157/EEG (Richtlijn 92/97/EEG van 19 december 1992), waarin is bepaald dat de Raad op grond van een „door de Commissie in te dienen voorstel” over verdere maatregelen moet besluiten die „met name ten doel hebben de veiligheidseisen in overeenstemming te brengen met de noodzaak het geluid veroorzaakt door het contact van de luchtbanden met het wegdek te beperken”. Het onderhavige richtlijnvoorstel is het antwoord daarop. 1. 3. 1. Het betreft hier een wijziging op Richtlijn 92/93/EEG van de Raad betreffende banden voor motor- voertuigen en aanhangwagens daarvan alsmede de montage ervan, waarin nog geen gewag wordt gemaakt van het geluidsprobleem. De voorgestelde wijziging behelst de bepaling van een methode om het rolgeluid te meten en van het maximale rolgeluid dat voor de diverse soorten banden is toegestaan. 2. Algemene opmerkingen Dit richtlijnvoorstel is van toepassing op alle 2. 1. soorten banden die zijn gemonteerd op motorvoertuigen van categorie M1 en op (lichte èn zware) bedrijfsvoertui- gen van de categoriee¨n M2, M3, N1, N2 en N3, alsmede op de aanhangwagens daarvan. Uitgesloten zijn (1) PB C 30 van 28. 1. 1998, blz. 8. motorvoertuigen die een andere gebruiksbestemming hebben dan het vervoer van personen of goederen, maar die toch af en toe op de weg komen (bv. landbouwtrekkers). 2. 1. 1. Ook vanwege dit ruime toepassingsgebied heeft de Commissie een gemeenschappelijke meetmethode uitgewerkt, waarbij echter voor de bepaling van de maximale geluidsniveaus onderscheid wordt gemaakt tussen de verschillende categoriee¨n motorvoertuigen. In iedere categorie vindt dan ook nog een differentiatie plaats: — op grond van de nominale velgdiameter van de band, in het geval van personenwagens (waardoor rekening wordt gehouden met beperkingen in verband met de wegligging en het gebruik voor speciale doeleinden); — op grond van het specifieke gebruik van de banden in het geval van (normaal, winter of speciaal), bedrijfsvoertuigen. 2. 1. 2. Zo is geprobeerd om technische eisen vast te leggen ter vermindering van het rolgeluid van een band, zonder afbreuk te doen aan de veiligheid. 2. 1. 3. De diverse rolgeluidsniveaus van dezelfde ban- den, maar bij verschillende soorten wegdek (of uiteen- lopende weersomstandigheden), vallen echter niet onder het toepassingsgebied van deze richtlijn. In verband daarmee wijst het Comité erop dat in de twaalfde overweging van Richtlijn 92/97/EEG van 19 december 1992 uitdrukkelijk wordt gesteld dat de studies van en het onderzoek naar numerieke waarden moeten worden voortgezet om voor de gelijkvormigheid van wegen objectieve criteria te kunnen vaststellen. 3. Tijdschema 3. 1. Krachtens dit richtlijnvoorstel worden deze voor- schriften met ingang van 1 oktober 2001 van kracht. Dat geldt zowel voor alle nieuwe soorten banden die in de handel worden gebracht als voor nieuwe personenwa- gens, waarop alleen banden mogen worden gemonteerd die aan deze voorschriften beantwoorden. 3. 2. Vanaf 1 oktober 2005 moeten alle banden die in de handel worden gebracht, aan de voorschriften van deze richtlijn beantwoorden. 27. 7. 98 NL Publicatieblad van de Europese Gemeenschappen C 235/25 De volgende banden vallen niet onder het toepas- 3. 3. singsgebied van deze richtlijn: ringen die de automobielindustrie in dat opzicht al heeft doorgevoerd. — banden die bestemd zijn om te worden gemonteerd op voertuigen die voor het eerst vo´ o´r 1 oktober 1980 zijn geregistreerd; — reservebanden voor tijdelijk gebruik, banden van de snelheidscategorie kleiner dan 80 km/u of banden met een nominale velgdiameter kleiner dan of gelijk aan 254 mm. 4. Opmerkingen 4. 1. Volgens de voorgestelde methode wordt het rolgeluid gemeten van de banden van een voertuig dat met een normale snelheid van 80 km/u, een uitgeschakel- de motor en de versnellingspook in de vrijstand, over een genormaliseerd wegdek rijdt. 4. 1. 1. De maatregelen die worden genomen om deze voorschriften na te leven, zullen dus een optimaal effect qua vermindering van de geluidshinder van het wegverkeer sorteren buiten stedelijke agglomeraties en op wegen waar vlot kan worden doorgereden. Daarentegen wordt het rolgeluid van de banden 4. 1. 2. van voertuigen niet gemeten op het ogenblik waarop gas wordt gegeven of wordt afgeremd, d. w. z. onder de omstandigheden die zich het meest voordoen in stadsverkeer of bij files en/of opstoppingen. Het Comité ziet in dat er momenteel voor dergelijke, in se belangrijke metingen nog geen methode voorhanden is. 4. 2. Technische oplossingen die nodig zijn om ook onder speciale omstandigheden (bv. op besneeuwde of onverharde wegen) de goede werking van banden te garanderen, rechtvaardigen de hoge grenswaarden van dit richtlijnvoorstel. Voorts is het ook legitiem, gedifferentieerde 4. 2. 1. grenswaarden vast te leggen voor banden (van personen- wagens) waarvan de kenmerken afgestemd moeten zijn op de prestaties van de personenwagens waarop zij zijn gemonteerd, teneinde een optimale rijveiligheid te garanderen. Het Comité stemt met die aanpak in. 4. 3. De voorgestelde geluidsniveaus zijn evenwichtig, omdat deze van de bandenindustrie dan wel een grote inspanning vragen, maar toch vanuit industrieel oogpunt binnen de gestelde termijnen kunnen worden bereikt. Bovendien komen deze geluidsniveaus 4. 3. 1. te- gemoet aan de vraag van het publiek naar maatregelen ter vermindering van de geluidshinder van het autoverkeer. Tevens vormen zij opnieuw een bijdrage aan de verbete- Brussel, 27 mei 1998. 4. 4. De in dit richtlijnvoorstel vastgelegde data voor de inwerkingtreding ervan bieden de bandenindustrie voldoende tijd om zich aan de nieuwe voorschriften aan te passen. 4. 4. 1. De Raad zal echter in overleg met de industrie moeten nagaan in hoeverre er al soorten banden beschik- baar zijn die voldoen aan de voorschriften die zullen gaan gelden voor alle modellen voertuigen die in 2001 worden geproduceerd, omdat vanaf dat jaar alleen nog maar banden op voertuigen mogen worden gemonteerd die aan de grenswaarden van dit richtlijnvoorstel beant- woorden. 4. 4. 2. Het Comité acht het realistisch om voor nieuw geregistreerde voertuigen (oude modellen) twee jaar langer de tijd te geven (dus tot 2003), zodat 2001 alleen het referentiejaar blijft voor voertuigen met een nieuwe typegoedkeuring (nieuwe modellen). 4. 5. Van belang is de opmerking van de Commissie dat deze voorschriften een eerste stap zijn in de strijd tegen door het rolgeluid van banden veroorzaakte geluidshinder en dat de effecten daarvan zowel op de bandenmarkt als op het milieu in een later stadium opnieuw moeten worden gee¨valueerd. 4. 5. 1. De desbetreffende zin in de Toelichting op het richtlijnvoorstel (punt 5, blz. 3) zou bijgevolg — in aangepast vorm — als zesde „Overweging” in de tekst van de richtlijn zelf moeten worden opgenomen: „Overwegende dat deze voorschriften ter beperking van het rolgeluid een eerste stap vormen in de strijd tegen deze geluidsbron en dat deze voorschriften in een later stadium moeten worden gee¨valueerd in het licht van de gevolgen ervan op de markt en de omgeving, gezien ook het steeds groter belang dat zal worden gehecht aan het soort wegdek als bron van geluidshinder;” Dit voorstel voor een overweging moet in samenhang worden gezien met de in paragraaf 2. 1. 3 geciteerde twaalfde overweging van Richtlijn 92/97/EEG. 5. Conclusies Het Comité stemt in met de doelstellingen achter dit richtlijnvoorstel en dringt er met name op aan dat: — rekening wordt gehouden met zijn opmerking in paragraaf 4. 4 van dit advies; — in een „Overweging” duidelijker wordt gewezen op de noodzaak van een evaluatie in een later stadium van de efficie¨ntie van deze maatregelen. De voorzitter van het Economisch en Sociaal Comité T. JENKINS


title: SKRIFTLIG FORESPØRGSEL nr. 1747/98 af Freddy BLAK til Kommissionen. Kvinder diskrimineres stadig i dansk pensionslov

eurovoc_concepts:
Denmark
gender equality
national law
pension scheme
position of women
sexual discrimination

text: C 354/120 DA De Europ(cid:230)iske F(cid:230)llesskabers Tidende 19. 11. 98 Svar (20. juli 1998) I traktatens artikel 126, stk. 1, hedder det, at »F(cid:230)llesskabet bidrager til udviklingen af et hłjt 1. uddannelsesniveau ved at fremme samarbejdet mellem medlemsstaterne og om nłdvendigt at stłtte og supplere disses indsats, med fuld respekt for medlemsstaternes ansvar for undervisningsindholdet og opbygningen af uddannelsessystemerne samt deres kulturelle og sproglige mangfoldighed. « Indfłrelse eller genindfłrelse af latinundervisningen i den pligtige del af skolernes l(cid:230)seplaner i 2. medlemsstaterne henhłrer under medlemsstaternes ansvar med hensyn til undervisningsindholdet og opbygnin- gen af uddannelsessystemet. R(cid:229)det har ikke f(cid:229)et forelagt forslag fra Kommissionen om at tilskynde til et samarbejde mellem medlemsstaterne p(cid:229) omr(cid:229)det. (98/C 354/194) SKRIFTLIG FORESP(cid:216)RGSEL P-1737/98 af Luciano Schifone (NI) til Kommissionen (20. maj 1998) Om: Initiativer fra Europakommissionen i forbindelse med naturkatastrofen i Campanien Regionen Campanien er for nylig blevet ramt af en alvorlig naturkatastrofe, som har łdelagt hele landsbyer og kostet hundreder af ofre og tusinder af hjemlłse. P(cid:229) młdet den 11. maj udtrykte Europa-Parlamentet gennem formanden Gil-Robles Europas solidaritet med den s(cid:229) h(cid:229)rdt prłvede befolkning. Der henvises til kommiss(cid:230)r Montis erkl(cid:230)ring om, at Kommissionen muligvis kan tr(cid:230)ffe afgłrelse om »en eller anden form for konkret indgreb«. Vil Kommissionen meddele, hvilke bevillinger den vil vedtage til fordel for regionen Campanien og de katastroferamte kommuner, p(cid:229) hvilket tidspunkt og til hvilke betingelser? Svar afgivet p(cid:229) Kommissionens vegne af Jacques Santer (15. juni 1998) Som svar p(cid:229) det (cid:230)rede medlems spłrgsm(cid:229)l skal Kommissionen minde om, at den har givet sine synspunkter til kende i Parlamentet ved den aktuelle og uops(cid:230)ttelige debat den 14. maj 1998 om oversvłmmelserne i Campania. Ved denne lejlighed bekr(cid:230)ftede og uddybede den sine oprindelige intentioner. Kommissionen henviser det (cid:230)rede medlem til Kommissionens erkl(cid:230)ring samt til svaret p(cid:229) skriftlig forespłrgsel P-1618/98 fra Ernesto Caccavale. (98/C 354/195) SKRIFTLIG FORESP(cid:216)RGSEL P-1747/98 af Freddy Blak (PSE) til Kommissionen (27. maj 1998) Om: Kvinder diskrimineres stadig i dansk pensionslov Selvom det fra 1. juli 1999 bliver forbudt at forskelsbehandle m(cid:230)nd og kvinder p(cid:229) pensionsomr(cid:229)det i Danmark, vil mindst 450. 000 danske kvinder alligevel f(cid:229) mindre i pension end deres mandlige kollegaer. N(cid:230)sten en halv million kvinder indbetaler allerede til en pensionskasse, der systematisk stiller kvinder ringere end m(cid:230)nd. Disse kvinder vil ikke blive omfattet af den lov(cid:230)ndring, der tr(cid:230)der i kraft i juli 1999


title: Reglamento (CE) n° 1073/98 de la Comisión de 27 de mayo de 1998 por el que se fan las restituciones a la exportación del azúcar blanco y del azúcar en bruto sin perfeccionar

eurovoc_concepts:
export refund
raw sugar
white sugar

formats: pdf print

text: 28. 5. 98 ES Diario Oficial de las Comunidades Europeas L 154/5 REGLAMENTO (CE) No 1073/98 DE LA COMISIÓN de 27 de mayo de 1998 por el que se fijan las restituciones a la exportación del azúcar blanco y del azúcar en bruto sin perfeccionar LA COMISIÓN DE LAS COMUNIDADES EUROPEAS, Visto el Tratado constitutivo de la Comunidad Europea, Visto el Reglamento (CEE) no 1785/81 del Consejo, de 1 de junio de 1981, por el que se establece una organización común de mercados en el sector del azúcar (1), cuya última modificación la constituye el Reglamento (CE) no 1599/ 96 (2), y, en particular, la letra a) del primer párrafo del apartado 4 de su artículo 19, Considerando que, en virtud de lo dispuesto en el artículo 19 del Reglamento (CEE) no 1785/81, la diferencia entre las cotizaciones o los precios en el mercado mundial de los productos contemplados en la letra a) del apartado 1 del artículo 1 de dicho Reglamento y los precios de dichos productos en la Comunidad puede cubrirse mediante una restitución a la exportación; Considerando que, con arreglo a lo dispuesto en el Regla- mento (CEE) no 1785/81, las restituciones para el azúcar blanco y en bruto sin desnaturalizar y exportados sin perfeccionar deben fijarse teniendo en cuenta la situación en el mercado comunitario y en el mercado mundial del azúcar y, en particular, los elementos de precio y de costes contemplados en el artículo 17 bis de dicho Reglamento; que, con arreglo al mismo artículo, procede tener en cuenta también el aspecto económico de las exporta- ciones previstas; Considerando que, para el azúcar en bruto, la restitución debe fijarse para la calidad tipo; que ésta ha sido definida en el artículo 1 del Reglamento (CEE) no 431/68 del Consejo, de 9 de abril de 1968, por el que se determina la calidad tipo para el azúcar en bruto y el punto de paso de frontera de la Comunidad para el cálculo de los precios cif en el sector del azúcar (3), modificado por el Regla- mento (CE) no 3290/94 (4); que dicha restitución debe fijarse, además, con arreglo a lo dispuesto en el apartado 4 del artículo 17 bis del Reglamento (CEE) no 1785/81; que el Reglamento (CE) no 2135/95 de la Comisión, de 7 de septiembre de 1995, relativo a las modalidades de aplica- ción de la concesión de las restituciones a la exportación en el sector del azúcar (5), ha definido el azúcar cande; que el importe de la restitución calculado de tal modo en lo que se refiere a los azúcares aromatizados o con adición de colorantes debe aplicarse a su contenido en sacarosa y, por consiguiente, fijarse por el 1 % de dicho contenido; Considerando que la situación del mercado mundial o las exigencias específicas de determinados mercados pueden requerir la diferenciación de la restitución para el azúcar según su destino; Considerando que, en casos especiales, el importe de la restitución puede fijarse mediante actos de naturaleza diferente; Considerando que los tipos representativos de mercado definidos en el artículo 1 del Reglamento (CEE) no 3813/ 92 del Consejo (6), cuya última modificación la constituye el Reglamento (CE) no 150/95 (7), se utilizan para convertir importe expresado en las monedas de los terceros el países y sirven de base para la determinación de los tipos de conversión agraria de las monedas de los Estados miembros; que las disposiciones de aplicación y de deter- minación de tales conversiones se establecen en el Regla- mento (CEE) no 1068/93 de la Comisión (8), cuya última modificación la constituye el Reglamento (CE) no 961/ 98 (9); Considerando que la restitución debe fijarse cada dos semanas; que puede modificarse en el intervalo; Considerando que la aplicación de dichas modalidades a la situación actual de los mercados en el sector del azúcar y, en particular, a las cotizaciones o precios del azúcar en la Comunidad y en el mercado mundial conduce a fijar la restitución en los importes indicados en el Anexo del presente Reglamento; Considerando que las medidas previstas en el presente Reglamento se ajustan al dictamen del Comité de gestión del azúcar, HA ADOPTADO EL PRESENTE REGLAMENTO: Artículo 1 Las restituciones a la exportación de los productos mencionados en la letra a) del apartado 1 del artículo 1 del Reglamento (CEE) no 1785/81 sin perfeccionar o desnaturalizados se fijarán a los importes consignados en el Anexo. Artículo 2 El presente Reglamento entrará en vigor el 28 de mayo de 1998. (1) DO L 177 de 1. 7. 1981, p. 4. (2) DO L 206 de 16. 8. 1996, p. 43. (3) DO L 89 de 10. 4. 1968, p. 3. (4) DO L 349 de 31. 12. 1994, p. 105. (5) DO L 214 de 8. 9. 1995, p. 16. (6) DO L 387 de 31. 12. 1992, p. 1. (7) DO L 22 de 31. 1. 1995, p. 1. (8) DO L 108 de 1. 5. 1993, p. 106. (9) DO L 135 de 8. 5. 1998, p. 5. L 154/6 ES Diario Oficial de las Comunidades Europeas 28. 5. 98 El presente Reglamento será obligatorio en todos sus elementos y directamente aplicable en cada Estado miembro. Hecho en Bruselas, el 27 de mayo de 1998. Por la Comisión Franz FISCHLER Miembro de la Comisión del Reglamento de la Comisión, de 27 de mayo de 1998, por el que se fijan las restituciones a la exportación del azúcar blanco y del azúcar en bruto sin perfeccionar ANEXO Código del producto Importe de la restitución 1701 11 90 9100 1701 11 90 9910 1701 11 90 9950 1701 12 90 9100 1701 12 90 9910 1701 12 90 9950 1701 91 00 9000 1701 99 10 9100 1701 99 10 9910 1701 99 10 9950 (cid:190) ecus/100 kg (cid:190) 41,05 39,70 41,05 39,70 (1) (1) (2) (1) (1) (2) (cid:190) ecus/1 % de sacarosa × 100 kg (cid:190) 0,4463 (cid:190) ecus/100 kg (cid:190) 44,63 44,48 44,48 (cid:190) ecus/1 % de sacarosa × 100 kg (cid:190) 1701 99 90 9100 0,4463 (1) El presente importe será aplicable al azúcar en bruto de un rendimiento del 92 %. Si el rendimiento del azúcar en bruto exportado se aparta del 92 %, el importe de la restitución aplicable se calculará con arreglo a lo dispuesto en el apartado 4 del artículo 17 bis del Reglamento (CEE) no 1785/81. (2) Fijación suspendida por el Reglamento (CEE) no 2689/85 de la Comisión (DO L 255 de 26. 9. 1985, p. 12), modificado por el Reglamento (CEE) no 3251/85 (DO L 309 de 21. 11. 1985, p. 14)


title: Verordening (EG) nr. 1073/98 van de Commissie van 27 mei 1998 tot vaststelling van de restituties bij uitvoer van witte en ruwe suiker in onveranderde vorm

text: 28. 5. 98 NL Publicatieblad van de Europese Gemeenschappen L 154/5 VERORDENING (EG) Nr. 1073/98 VAN DE COMMISSIE van 27 mei 1998 tot vaststelling van de restituties b¶ uitvoer van witte en ruwe suiker in onveran- derde vorm DE COMMISSIE VAN DE EUROPESE GEMEENSCHAPPEN, Gelet op het Verdrag tot oprichting van de Europese Gemeenschap, Gelet op Verordening (EEG) nr. 1785/81 van de Raad van 1 juni 1981 houdende een gemeenschappel¶ke ordening der markten in de sector suiker (1), laatstel¶k gew¶zigd b¶ Verordening (EG) nr. 1599/96 (2), inzonderheid op artikel 19, lid 4, eerste alinea, onder a), Overwegende dat krachtens artikel 19 van Verordening (EEG) nr. 1785/81 het verschil tussen de noteringen of de pr¶zen op de wereldmarkt voor de in artikel 1, lid 1, onder a), van die verordening genoemde producten en de pr¶zen voor deze producten in de Gemeenschap over- brugd kunnen worden door een restitutie b¶ de uitvoer; Overwegende dat krachtens Verordening (EEG) nr. 1785/ 81 de restituties voor witte suiker en ruwe suiker, welke niet gedenatureerd en in onveranderde vorm uitgevoerd z¶n, vastgesteld moeten worden rekening houdend met de toestand op de markt van de Gemeenschap en op de wereldmarkt voor suiker, en vooral met de in artikel 17 bis van genoemde verordening bedoelde pr¶s- en koste- nelementen; dat volgens dit artikel eveneens met het economische aspect van de voorgenomen uitvoertrans- actie rekening moet worden gehouden; Overwegende dat voor ruwe suiker de restitutie vastgesteld moet worden voor de standaardkwaliteit die bepaald is in artikel 1 van Verordening (EEG) nr. 431/68 van de Raad van 9 april 1968 houdende vaststelling van de standaard- kwaliteit voor ruwe suiker en van de plaats van grens- overschr¶ding van de Gemeenschap voor de berekening van de cif-pr¶zen in de sector suiker (3), gew¶zigd b¶ Verordening (EG) nr. 3290/94 (4); dat deze restitutie bovendien werd vastgesteld overeenkomstig artikel 17 bis, lid 4, 1785/81; dat kand¶suiker in Verordening (EG) nr. 2135/95 van de Commissie van 7 september 1995 inzake uitvoeringsbepa- lingen voor de toekenning van uitvoerrestituties in de sector suiker (5) werd omschreven; dat het aldus berekende restitutiebedrag voor gearomatiseerde suiker en suiker waaraan kleurstoffen z¶n toegevoegd, moet gelden voor van Verordening (EEG) nr. de hoeveelheid sacharose in de betreffende suiker en b¶gevolg worden vastgesteld per percent sacharosegehalte; Overwegende dat de toestand op de wereldmarkt of de b¶zondere eisen van bepaalde markten het noodzakel¶k kunnen maken de restitutie voor suiker naar gelang van de bestemming te variëren; Overwegende dat in b¶zondere gevallen het bedrag van de restitutie kan worden vastgesteld b¶ besluiten van verschillende aard; Overwegende dat de in artikel 1 van Verordening (EEG) nr. 3813/92 van de Raad (6), laatstel¶k gew¶zigd b¶ Veror- dening (EG) nr. 150/95 (7), gedefinieerde representatieve marktkoersen worden gebruikt voor de omrekening van het in de valuta van derde landen aangegeven bedrag en dat deze koersen de grondslag z¶n voor de bepaling van de landbouwomrekeningskoersen van de valuta’s van de lidstaten; dat de nadere voorschriften voor de toepassing en de vaststelling van deze omrekeningskoersen z¶n vast- gesteld b¶ Verordening (EEG) nr. 1068/93 van de Commissie (8), laatstel¶k gew¶zigd b¶ Verordening (EG) nr. 961/98 (9); Overwegende dat de restitutie elke twee weken moet worden vastgesteld; dat de restitutie tussent¶ds gew¶zigd kan worden; Overwegende dat de toepassing van deze regels op de huidige situatie van de suikermarkt en met name op de noteringen of pr¶zen van suiker in de Gemeenschap en op de wereldmarkt voert tot het vaststellen van de resti- tutie ter hoogte van de in de b¶lage aangegeven bedragen; Overwegende dat de in deze verordening vervatte maatre- gelen in overeenstemming zijn met het advies van het Comité van beheer voor suiker, HEEFT DE VOLGENDE VERORDENING VASTGESTELD: Artikel 1 De restituties b¶ de uitvoer in onveranderde vorm van de in artikel 1, lid 1, onder a), van Verordening (EEG) nr. 1785/81 genoemde producten, welke niet gedenatureerd z¶n, worden vastgesteld overeenkomstig de bedragen aangegeven in de b¶lage. Artikel 2 Deze verordening treedt in werking op 28 mei 1998. (1) PB L 177 van 1. 7. 1981, blz. 4. (2) PB L 206 van 16. 8. 1996, blz. 43. (3) PB L 89 van 10. 4. 1968, blz. 3. (4) PB L 349 van 31. 12. 1994, blz. 105. (5) PB L 214 van 8. 9. 1995, blz. 16. (6) PB L 387 van 31. 12. 1992, blz. 1. (7) PB L 22 van 31. 1. 1995, blz. 1. (8) PB L 108 van 1. 5. 1993, blz. 106. (9) PB L 135 van 8. 5. 1998, blz. 5. L 154/6 NL Publicatieblad van de Europese Gemeenschappen 28. 5. 98 Deze verordening is verbindend in al haar onderdelen en is rechtstreeks toepassel¶k in elke lidstaat. Gedaan te Brussel, 27 mei 1998. Voor de Commissie Franz FISCHLER Lid van de Commissie B(cid:246)LAGE b¶ de verordening van de Commissie van 27 mei 1998 tot vaststelling van de restituties b¶ uitvoer van witte en ruwe suiker in onveranderde vorm Productcode 1701 11 90 9100 1701 11 90 9910 1701 11 90 9950 1701 12 90 9100 1701 12 90 9910 1701 12 90 9950 Restitutiebedrag (cid:190) in ecu/100 kg (cid:190) 41,05 39,70 41,05 39,70 (1) (1) (2) (1) (1) (2) (cid:190) in ecu/1 % sacharose × 100 kg (cid:190) 1701 91 00 9000 0,4463 1701 99 10 9100 1701 99 10 9910 1701 99 10 9950 (cid:190) in ecu/100 kg (cid:190) 44,63 44,48 44,48 (cid:190) in ecu/1 % sacharose × 100 kg (cid:190) 1701 99 90 9100 0,4463 (1) Dit bedrag geldt voor ruwe suiker met een rendement van 92 %. Indien het rendement van de geëxporteerde ruwe suiker afw¶kt van 92 %, wordt het bedrag van de toe te passen restitutie berekend overeenkomstig het bepaalde in artikel 17 bis, lid 4, van Verordening (EEG) nr. 1785/81. (2) Vaststelling geschorst door Verordening (EEG) nr. 2689/85 van de Commissie (PB L 255 van 26. 9. 1985, blz. 12), gew¶zigd b¶ Verordening (EEG) nr. 3251/85 (PB L 309 van 21. 11. 1985, blz. 14)


title: 1998 m. gegužės 27 d. valstybių narių vyriausybių atstovų sprendimas, paskiriantis Europos Bendrijų Pirmosios instancijos teismo narius

eurovoc_concepts:
General Court (EU)
appointment of staff
member of the Court of Justice (EU)

text: 01/1 t. LT Europos Sąjungos oficialusis leidinys 443 41998D0380 L 171/30 EUROPOS BENDRIJŲ OFICIALUSIS LEIDINYS 1998 6 17 VALSTYBIŲ NARIŲ VYRIAUSYBIŲ ATSTOVŲ SPRENDIMAS 1998 m. gegužės 27 d. paskiriantis Europos Bendrijų Pirmosios instancijos teismo narius (98/380/EB, EAPB, Euratomas) EUROPOS BENDRIJŲ VALSTYBIŲ NARIŲ VYRIAUSYBIŲ ATSTOVAI, NUSPRENDĖ: atsižvelgdami į Europos bendrijos steigimo sutartį, ypač į jos 168a straipsnį, atsižvelgdami į Europos anglių ir plieno bendrijos steigimo sutartį, ypač į jos 32d straipsnį, atsižvelgdami į Europos atominės energijos bendrijos steigimo sutartį, ypač į jos 140a straipsnį, į 1988 m. spalio 24 d. Tarybos sprendimą atsižvelgdami 88/591/EAPB, EEB, Euratomas dėl Europos Bendrijų Pirmosios instancijos teismo įsteigimo (1), kadangi Josef Azizi, Kornelius Paulus Briet, Marc Jaeger, Andreas Kalogeropoulus, Koenraad Lenaerts, Rui Manuel Gens de Moura Ramos, Virpi Tiili ir Bo Vesterdorf kadencija baigiasi 1998 m. rug- pjūčio 31 d. ; kadangi Pirmosios instancijos teismo nariai iš dalies turėtų būti pakeisti laikotarpiu nuo 1998 m. rugsėjo 1 d. iki 2004 m. rug- pjūčio 31 d. ; kadangi siekiant užbaigti dalinį Pirmosios instancijos teismo narių pakeitimą bus būtina paskirti teisėją vėliau, 1 straipsnis Toliau išvardyti asmenys skiriami teisėjais į Pirmosios instancijos teismą laikotarpiui nuo 1998 m. rugsėjo 1 d. iki 2004 m. rugpjū- čio 31 d. : Josef Azizi, Marc Jaeger. Koenraad Lenaerts, Rui Manuel Gens de Moura Ramos, Virpi Tiili, Bo Vesterdorf, Michael Vilaras. Šis sprendimas skelbiamas Europos Bendrijų oficialiajame leidinyje. 2 straipsnis Priimta Briuselyje, 1998 m. gegužės 27 d. Pirmininkas S. WALL (1) OL L 319, 1988 11 25, p. 1. Klaidų sąrašas: OL C 215, 1989 8 21, p. 1. Spendimas su paskutiniais pakeitimais, padarytais Sprendimu 95/1/Euratomas, EAPB, EB, suderinančiu dokumentus dėl naujų vals- tybių narių įstojimo į Europos Sąjungą (OL L 1, 1995 1 1, p. 1)


title: Kommissionens förordning (EG) nr 1078/98 av den 27 maj 1998 om inledande av en anbudsinfordran för bidrag eller avgift för export av korn till alla tredje länder

eurovoc_concepts:
barley
export
export refund
export tax
third country

text: L 154/20 ‹ SV ‹ Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning 28. 5. 98 KOMMISSIONENS F(cid:153)RORDNING (EG) nr 1078/98 av den 27 maj 1998 om inledande av en anbudsinfordran f(cid:148)r bidrag eller avgift f(cid:148)r export av korn till alla tredje l(cid:132)nder EUROPEISKA GEMENSKAPERNAS KOMMISSION HAR ANTAGIT DENNA F(cid:153)RORDNING med beaktande av F(cid:148)rdraget om uppr(cid:132)ttandet av Euro- peiska gemenskapen, F(cid:148)r att ett anbudsf(cid:148)rfarande som g(cid:132)ller export skall utfalla v(cid:132)l (cid:132)r det n(cid:148)dv(cid:132)ndigt att fastst(cid:132)lla en minsta kvantitet samt tidsfristen och formen f(cid:148)r (cid:148)verl(cid:132)mnande av de ingivna anbuden till de beh(cid:148)riga myndigheterna. De (cid:134)tg(cid:132)rder som f(cid:148)reskrivs i denna f(cid:148)rordning (cid:132)r f(cid:148)renliga med yttrandet fr(cid:134)n F(cid:148)rvaltningskommitt(cid:130)n f(cid:148)r spannm(cid:134)l. med beaktande av r(cid:134)dets f(cid:148)rordning (EEG) nr 1766/92 av den 30 juni 1992 om den gemensamma organisationen av (cid:132)ndrad genom marknaden f(cid:148)r kommissionens f(cid:148)rordning (EG) nr 923/96 (2), spannm(cid:134)l (1), senast med beaktande av kommissionens f(cid:148)rordning (EG) nr 1501/95 av den 29 juni 1995 om vissa till(cid:132)mpningsf(cid:148)re- skrifter f(cid:148)r r(cid:134)dets f(cid:148)rordning (EEG) nr 1766/92 vad avser beviljande av exportbidrag och de (cid:134)tg(cid:132)rder som skall vidtas vid st(cid:148)rningar inom spannm(cid:134)lssektorn (3), senast (cid:132)ndrad genom f(cid:148)rordning (EG) nr 2052/97 (4), s(cid:132)rskilt artikel 4 i denna, och med beaktande av f(cid:148)ljande: Med tanke p(cid:134) den aktuella situationen p(cid:134) marknaden f(cid:148)r spannm(cid:134)l (cid:132)r det l(cid:132)mpligt att inleda en anbudsinfordran f(cid:148)r det exportbidrag eller den exportavgift som avses i artikel 4 i f(cid:148)rordning (EG) nr 1501/95 i fr(cid:134)ga om korn. I f(cid:148)rordning (EG) nr 1501/95 fastst(cid:132)lls till(cid:132)mpningsf(cid:148)re- skrifter f(cid:148)r anbudsf(cid:148)rfarandet vad g(cid:132)ller best(cid:132)mmande av exportbidraget och exportavgiften. Ett av (cid:134)tagandena inom ramen f(cid:148)r anbudsinfordran (cid:132)r f(cid:148)rpliktelsen att l(cid:132)mna in en ans(cid:148)kan om exportlicens. En s(cid:132)kerhet f(cid:148)r anbudsgiv- ningen p(cid:134) 12 ecu/ton som st(cid:132)lls vid inl(cid:132)mnandet av anbudet kan garantera att denna f(cid:148)rpliktelse uppfylls. Det (cid:132)r n(cid:148)dv(cid:132)ndigt att fastst(cid:132)lla en s(cid:132)rskild giltighetstid f(cid:148)r de licenser som utf(cid:132)rdas inom ramen f(cid:148)r denna an- budsinfordran. Denna giltighetstid b(cid:148)r (cid:148)verensst(cid:132)mma med behoven p(cid:134) v(cid:132)rldsmarknaden f(cid:148)r odlingss(cid:132)song 1998/99. F(cid:148)r att s(cid:132)kerst(cid:132)lla att alla parter behandlas lika (cid:132)r det n(cid:148)dv(cid:132)ndigt att f(cid:148)reskriva att alla utf(cid:132)rdade licenserna skall ha samma giltighetstid. (1) EGT L 181, 1. 7. 1992, s. 21. (2) EGT L 126, 24. 5. 1996, s. 37. (3) EGT L 147, 30. 6. 1995, s. 7. (4) EGT L 287, 21. 10. 1997, s. 14. H(cid:142)RIGENOM F(cid:153)RESKRIVS F(cid:153)LJANDE. Artikel 1 En anbudsinfordran f(cid:148)r 1. exportbidrag och/eller exportavgift enligt artikel 4 i f(cid:148)rordning (EG) nr 1501/95 skall inledas. Anbudsinfordran g(cid:132)ller korn som skall exporteras till 2. alla tredje l(cid:132)nder. 3. Anbudsinfordran (cid:132)r (cid:148)ppen till och med den 27 maj 1999. Under den tiden skall veckovisa anbudsinfordringar (cid:132)ga rum, vars kvantiteter och inl(cid:132)mningsdatum anges i tillk(cid:132)nnagivandet om anbudsinfordran. Artikel 2 Ett anbud (cid:132)r inte giltigt om det inte g(cid:132)ller minst 1 000 ton. Artikel 3 Den s(cid:132)kerhet som avses i artikel 5. 3 a i f(cid:148)rordning (EG) nr 1501/95 skall vara 12 ecu/ton. Artikel 4 1. D(cid:134) giltighetstiden f(cid:148)r de exportlicenser som utf(cid:132)rdas i enlighet med artikel 8. 1 i f(cid:148)rordning (EG) nr 1501/95 fastst(cid:132)lls skall dessa licenser, trots artikel 21. 1 i kommis- sionens f(cid:148)rordning (EEG) nr 3719/88 (5), anses vara utf(cid:132)r- dade den dag anbudet l(cid:132)mnats in. (5) EGT L 331, 2. 12. 1988, s. 1. 28. 5. 98 ‹ SV ‹ Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning L 154/21 2. De exportlicenser som utf(cid:132)rdas inom ramen f(cid:148)r det aktuella anbudsf(cid:148)rfarandet skall g(cid:132)lla fr(cid:134)n och med dagen f(cid:148)r deras utf(cid:132)rdande i enlighet med punkt 1, till och med utg(cid:134)ngen av den fj(cid:132)rde m(cid:134)naden d(cid:132)rp(cid:134). Dock kan licenser, som har utgivits f(cid:148)re den 1 juli 1998, anv(cid:132)ndas f(cid:148)rst fr(cid:134)n och med detta datum. Artikel 5 1. Kommissionen skall artikel 23 i f(cid:148)rordning (EEG) nr 1766/92 besluta i enlighet med f(cid:148)rfarandet i — att fastst(cid:132)lla ett h(cid:148)gsta exportbidrag med h(cid:132)nsyn s(cid:132)rskilt till kriterierna i artikel 1 i f(cid:148)rordning (EG) nr 1501/95, eller — att fastst(cid:132)lla en l(cid:132)gsta exportavgift med h(cid:132)nsyn s(cid:132)rskilt till kriterierna i artikel 1 i f(cid:148)rordning (EG) nr 1501/95, eller — att inte fullf(cid:148)lja anbudsinfordran. skall 2. N(cid:132)r ett h(cid:148)gsta exportbidrag har kontraktet tilldelas den eller de anbudsgivare vars anbud (cid:132)r p(cid:134) samma niv(cid:134) eller l(cid:132)gre (cid:132)n det h(cid:148)gsta bidraget, samt den eller de anbudsgivare vars anbud avser en exportav- gift. fastst(cid:132)llts en l(cid:132)gsta exportavgift har 3. N(cid:132)r skall kontrakt tilldelas den eller de anbudsgivare vars anbud ligger p(cid:134) samma niv(cid:134) som den l(cid:132)gsta exportavgiften eller p(cid:134) en h(cid:148)gre niv(cid:134). fastst(cid:132)llts Artikel 6 De ingivna anbuden skall genom medlemsstaternas f(cid:148)rmedling n(cid:134) kommissionen senast en och en halv timme efter utg(cid:134)ngen av tidsfristen f(cid:148)r det veckovisa inl(cid:132)mnandet av anbuden, s(cid:134) som den anges i tillk(cid:132)nnagi- velsen om anbudsinfordran. De skall (cid:148)verl(cid:132)mnas enligt tabellen i bilaga I och till de telex- och telefaxnummer som anges i bilaga II. Om inga anbud l(cid:132)mnats skall medlemsstaterna underr(cid:132)tta kommissionen om detta inom den tid som anges i f(cid:148)reg(cid:134)- ende stycke. Artikel 7 De klockslag som fastst(cid:132)llts f(cid:148)r inl(cid:132)mnande av anbud (cid:132)r belgisk tid. Artikel 8 Denna f(cid:148)rordning tr(cid:132)der i kraft dagen efter det att den har offentliggjorts i Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning. Denna f(cid:148)rordning (cid:132)r till alla delar bindande och direkt till(cid:132)mplig i alla medlemsstater. Utf(cid:132)rdad i Bryssel den 27 maj 1998. P(cid:134) kommissionens v(cid:132)gnar Franz FISCHLER Ledamot av kommissionen L 154/22 ‹ SV ‹ Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning 28. 5. 98 BILAGA I Veckovis anbudsinfordran f(cid:148)r bidrag eller avgift f(cid:148)r export av korn till alla tredje l(cid:132)nder (F(cid:148)rordning (EG) nr 1078/98) (Sista datum f(cid:148)r inl(cid:132)mnande av anbud [datum/tid]) 1 2 3 Anbudsgivarens nummer Kvantitet i ton A B Exportavgiftens belopp i ecu/ton Exportbidragets belopp i ecu/ton 1 2 3 etc. 28. 5. 98 ‹ SV ‹ Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning L 154/23 BILAGA II Endast f(cid:148)ljande telex- och telefaxnummer i Bryssel (GD VI/C/1) f(cid:134)r anv(cid:132)ndas: — Telex: — Telefax: — 22037 AGREC B, — 22070 AGREC B (grekiska bokst(cid:132)ver). — 295 25 15, — 296 49 56