eurovoc_concepts:
competition
liberalisation of the market
systems interconnection
telecommunications
telephone charges

text: 19. 3. 98 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 84/3 Commission Communication on interconnection pricing in a liberalised telecommunications market (98/C 84/03) (Text with EEA relevance) 1. BACKGROUND for telecommunications The Community has developed a regulatory framework for that provides for open and competitive markets from 1st January 1998, with tran(cid:220) certain Member States. The sition periods Community market of 190 million fixed telephone lines presents opportunities for market entry into one of the fastest growing sectors of the economy. The market for telecommunications services in Europe has been growing at a rate of about 8(cid:216)% per annum (in nominal terms) since 1990, and OECD comparisons of competitive and non(cid:220)competitive markets indicate that growth rates can be expected to increase significantly following liberali(cid:220) in the sation. Current telecommunications Community is running at about ECU 40 billion per year. investment subject of Interconnection telecommunications. is of particular interconnection The importance to the development of a competitive market in the incumbent’s network is essential for most new entrants in order to access the existing base of telecommunications users regulatory framework for telecommunications sets out principles for interconnection to be level under the supervision of the national regulatory auth(cid:220) orities for telecommunications (NRAs). in a national market. The EU implemented at national to Publication by the Commission of Recommendations on Interconnection is foreseen in the European Parliament and Council Directive 97/33/EC on Interconnection in Telecommunications(cid:216)(˛). The aim of such Recommen(cid:220) dations is to assist the national regulatory authorities in carrying out their obligations under the Directive and the development of a genuine "facilitate thereby European home market’(cid:216)(ˇ). 2. (cid:217)THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR INTER(cid:220) CONNECTION The EU Regulatory Framework for interconnection is set out in Commission Directive 96/19/EC(cid:216)(—) (the "Full the EP and Council Competition’ Directive) and (˛)(cid:217)OJ L 199, 26. 7. 1997, p. 32. (ˇ)(cid:217)Directive 97/33/EC, recital 12. (—)(cid:217)OJ L 74, 22. 3. 1996, p. 13. Directive 97/33/EC on Interconnection in Telecom(cid:220) munications (the Interconnection Directive). In addition to the ex ante rules contained in these two Directives, the competition rules of the Treaty apply. Under the "Full Competition’ Directive, Member States have to ensure that telecommunications organisations publish, by 1 July 1997, the terms and conditions for interconnection to the basic functional components of their voice telephone service and their public switched telecommunications networks, intercon(cid:220) nection points and the interfaces offered according to market needs. Terms and conditions for interconnection, which lists, must be interconnect price non(cid:220)discriminatory, proportional and transparent, and based on objective criteria. including the include that Furthermore, by 1st January 1998, Member States must ensure telecommunications organisations provide interconnection on these terms and conditions to under(cid:220) takings authorised to provide such services or networks. The deadline for implementation of this Directive into national law was January 1997. "Full Competition’ Directive provides minimum The requirements concerning interconnection. The Intercon(cid:220) nection Directive, which came into force in August 1997 and is to be implemented into Member States’ national laws by 31 December 1997, goes further than the full competition Directive by laying down a harmonised set of principles for interconnection. In addition to the obli(cid:220) gation for fixed network operators with significant market power their networks at cost oriented prices, it sets out the super(cid:220) visory role of the national regulatory authorities who must, among other things, ensure publication of a "reference interconnection offer’ describing the terms and conditions for interconnection. interconnection to provide to Interconnection Directive The that agreements involving interconnection to fixed network operators with significant market power are made publicly available. requires also Certain Member States have been granted transition periods for liberalisation of voice telephone services and public telecommunications networks, with corresponding deferments for the publication deadlines referred to C 84/4 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 19. 3. 98 the above(cid:216)((cid:209)). However, Interconnection Directive requires all Member States to ensure publication of a "reference interconnection offer’ by 1 January 1998. ln the case of this reference interconnection offer is limited to the terms and conditions for interconnection of already liberalised services, i. e. mobile networks and cross(cid:220)border intercon(cid:220) nection of fixed and mobile(cid:216)((cid:210)) networks. transition countries, the scope of The application of the principles set out in Commission recommendations is without prejudice to the duty of the Member States and of undertakings to comply fully with the EU competition rules, taking account of the specific positions set out the Commission on the application of the competition rules to telecommunications in sector(cid:216)((cid:211)). the Communication agreements access from the in 3. (cid:217)COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION ON INTER(cid:220) CONNECTION PRICING ((cid:212)) 3. 1. Scope of the recommendation When two networks interconnect, each operator seeks to charge the other for resources provided. In the telecom(cid:220) munications sector, interconnection charges paid to the incumbent operator represent one of the largest costs incurred by new market entrants - often amounting to about 40(cid:216)% of expenditure. The most basic intercon(cid:220) nection service provided is that of call termination (i. e. delivering a call which originates on one network to its destination on another network), and the recommen(cid:220) dation concentrates on pricing principles for call termi(cid:220) nation. The cost of call termination is only one part - albeit a interconnection very important part - of the total ((cid:209))(cid:217)Later dates agreed for certain Member States: Ireland: Portugal: publication - 1. 7. 1999, full competition - 1. 1. 2000 publication - 1. 7. 1999, full competition - 1. 1. 2000 Luxembourg: publication - 1. 1. 1998, full competition - 1. 7. 1998 Greece: Spain: publication - 30. 6. 2000, full competition - 31. 12. 2000 publication - 1. 5. 1998, full competition - 30. 11. 1998. ((cid:210))(cid:217)Under the Interconnection Directive, some Member States may be granted a transition period for cross(cid:220)border inter(cid:220) connection of fixed and mobile networks. ((cid:211))(cid:217)OJ C 76, 11. 3. 1997, p. 9. ((cid:212))(cid:217)OJ L. (cid:216). (cid:216). ,. (cid:216). (cid:216). 1998. charges faced by a new entrant. It is important to stress that the comparative data in this document should not be taken as a comparison of the full interconnection charges facing a new entrant in each Member State. 3. 2. Cost orientation Interconnection Directive The imposes cost(cid:220)oriented interconnection charges on certain network operators with significant market power. The principle of cost orientation implies that the price charged for provision of a service should reflect the underlying costs incurred in providing that service. Thus in arriving at principles for interconnection pricing, it is necessary to analyse the way in which the act of interconnection imposes costs on a network. involved in a telecommunication Most of the costs incurred, for network are one(cid:220)off costs, which are trenches are dug, ducts and cable example, when installed, and when switches are purchased and programmed. Other on(cid:220)going costs also occur, such as for maintenance, switch reprogramming, and adminis(cid:220) tration costs. A fixed network has to be dimensioned according to the quality of service required during the period of peak traffic load which it will be required to handle. If a network has to handle peak hour traffic from other interconnected networks, additional capacity will be necessary to maintain the desired quality of service(cid:216)((cid:213)). An analysis of the capacity costs required to provide that service quality (given demand, or subsequently, actual interconnect traffic figures) will enable costs to be appor(cid:220) tioned among interconnecting parties. In an ideal situation, where an industry comprised estab(cid:220) lished market players with relatively stable market shares, capacity based charging would be the most efficient interconnect pricing rule. However these conditions do not apply telecommunications markets, and the usual basis for interconnect pricing is traffic based pricing - with adjustments as appropriate in newly liberalised ((cid:213))(cid:217)At times of the day when few calls are being made, little or no reconfiguration or investment in capacity will be required to handle additional traffic from interconnected networks, and so the costs incurred by the terminating network will be relatively small. At the peak period, however, an additional increment of traffic will require a corresponding addition in network capacity if the terminating network is to maintain the same service quality. Capacity investment represents the bulk of the additional costs incurred in a network when terminating interconnected traffic. 19. 3. 98 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 84/5 for time of day, day of week variations - such that the total interconnection costs of an efficient operator are recovered. traffic(cid:220)related forward looking 3. 3. Costing methodologies shown in the table below. Indeed, the Interconnection Directive recognises that interconnection based on a price level closely linked to the long run incremental cost for providing access to interconnection are appropriate for encouraging the rapid development of an open and competitive market’ (Recital 10). "charges for The issue of setting fair and efficient cost(cid:220)oriented inter(cid:220) connection prices is being faced in liberalised markets all around the world. There is a clear trend towards the use of a forward(cid:220)looking long run average incremental cost interconnection pricing, as (FL(cid:220)LRAIC) approach for The forward looking long run incremental cost provides an analytical framework which can be used to obtain an estimate of the cost that would be found in a fully competitive market. Table 1 - Current and planned cost methodologies for calculating interconnection charges in already liberalised markets Country and name of National Regulatory Authority (NRA) Regulatory involvement in determining Interconnection charges of incumbent Cost basis which NRA currently work with to calculate IC prices Costing standards to be used in future IC price calculations Australia AUSTEL Denmark Telestyrelsen New Zealand Competition Law Sweden Post(cid:216)&(cid:216)Telestyrelsen Negotiations between the parties under the threat of arbitration by the NRA FL LRIC(cid:216)(*) (Directly attributable incremental cost DAIC) FL LRIC(cid:216)(*) (DAIC) NRA approved reference price list. Negotiations between parties and dispute resolution with NRA Negotiations between the parties, where failure could give rise to direct regulation Negotiations between the parties, with future dispute resolution by NRA Fully Distributed Historic Costs FL LRIC(cid:216)(*) (from 1999) Apparently not based on explicit "top(cid:220)down’ or "bottom(cid:220)up’ No costing principles stated Fully Distributed Historic Costs (FDC) Modified FDC (likely to be transformed to modified LRIC) United Kingdom OFTEL Interconnection charges determined by the NRA Fully Distributed Historic Costs + Current Cost accounts FL LRIC(cid:216)(*) (from October 1997) USA FCC + State Commissions Negotiation, with right to arbitration. Proxy interconnect charges published by FCC Fully Distributed Historic Costs (may differ between the states) FL LRIC(cid:216)(*) (TELRIC) (*)(cid:217)FL(cid:218)(cid:218)Forward Looking LRIC Long run incremental costs C 84/6 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 19. 3. 98 In a competitive market, the price a firm pays for an asset or investment is not what governs its return. From the moment the investment is made (i. e. the time when the investment cannot be reversed without significant cost), the asset’s value to the firm depends on what the firm can do with that asset. It can either sell the asset to the highest bidder or it can use the asset to produce a good or service which the firm sells to generate an income. The goods or services produced with the help of that asset usually face competition from close substitutes produced by competitors. If any of those competitors has superior efficiency - such that it is able to supply a superior quality/price package to consumers - other less efficient market players will need to respond accordingly, rather than continue pricing on the basis of their embedded or historic costs. In other words, firms are compelled to look forward to survive, rather than backward to their original investments(cid:216)((cid:214)). The forward(cid:220)looking approach is implicit when ident(cid:220) ifying and measuring the economic or "real’ costs (i. e. LRIC) associated with the increment in output. In the particular case where the increment is a single unit, incremental costs will be the same as marginal costs. In the short run, the size of any increment is limited by the capacity of the firm’s existing productive assets. The long run however, is the time horizon in which the firm can undertake capital investment to increase this capacity. In this regard, the long run is the time horizon in which the firm could adjust (downwards or upwards) all of its its inputs, production plants, to meet a decrement or increment in the volume of production. Thus, the entire investment cost entailed in any point of interconnection, and any investment in network and switching capacity required to handle interconnected traffic, would be avoidable, and thus cost long measure(cid:216)(˛˝). The total of all such measures, including including the size of each and any of captured by a incremental run ((cid:214)) This is a major source of risk in market economies, and is one of the reasons that a firm’s value, as measured by the value of its shares, can change significantly in a short period. Only when a firm has substantial market power is it possible for it to demand from customers (or competitors in the case of interconnection) a price calculated to provide it with a required rate return on its past investments. Inter(cid:220) connection charges that are based on historic costs serve to protect an real pressure of a competitive market. the telecommunications characteristics of networks are rather different than is found in unregulated competitive markets, in a the corollary of LRAIC competitive market is known as the competitive price. incumbent from cost the (˛˝)(cid:217)While the incumbent operator’s own increment in traffic, would then form the total of all incremental interconnection costs. This figure would then be divided up in a fair and transparent manner between the notified operator and those interconnecting, with the result that the cost of interconnection to any party is the long run average incremental cost (LRAIC). Costs calculated in this way do not include an operator’s joint and common costs. In order to allow an operator to recover all its legitimate costs, the interconnection charge also needs to take account of the forward looking joint and common costs of an efficient operator, for example by means of "mark(cid:220)ups’ applied to the LRAIC of each service(cid:216)(˛˛). 3. 4. Cost accounting systems for cost(cid:220)oriented The Interconnection Directive requires that organisations with obligations interconnection charges must implement cost accounting systems which interconnection are capable of demonstrating charges do indeed follow the principles of cost orien(cid:220) tation and transparency. The Directive does not specify a particular cost accounting system, but does require trans(cid:220) parency of the system used. that Currently most incumbent operators have accounting systems based on fully distributed historic costs which were developed in monopoly environments. However, it is clear from the above discussion that the use of historic costs is not consistent with a competitive market, and will tend to lead to an over(cid:220)statement of the interconnection costs. interconnection charges for calculating to the response information which In the new competitive environment, operators need to develop new accounting systems to provide is needed both for internal management purposes and for external regu(cid:220) latory purposes. The Commission is therefore recom(cid:220) mending that NRAs should set deadlines for implemen(cid:220) tation by incumbent operators of new cost accounting systems based on current costs and activity(cid:220)based accounts. National regulatory authorities will want to be assured that costs which appear to be common are into distributed to the fullest extent possible, taking (˛˛)(cid:217)Mark(cid:220)ups may be uniformly applied to the LRAIC of each service. Alternatively, NRAs could require that common costs be recovered on call origination, but not call termi(cid:220) nation. The underlying aim should be to ensure that common costs are not allocated in a disproportionate way to less competitive services. 19. 3. 98 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 84/7 account the relevant direct and indirect cost drivers. Activity based accounts which use current costs provide a "top(cid:220)down’ check through reconciliation with intercon(cid:220) nection costs calculated according "bottom(cid:220)up’ forward looking long run average incremental costs. to practice’ approach provide a check that interconnection charges proposed by an incumbent are consistent with an efficient competitive market. Experience suggests that it can take about 2 years for an incumbent operator to implement a new accounting system, although this period could decrease as cumu(cid:220) lative experience is gained in the sector. If the operators’ proposed interconnection charges lie outside the range of "best current practice’ charges given here, national regulatory authorities may use their rights under the Interconnection Directive to request justifi(cid:220) cation of the proposed charges. Where appropriate, NRAs can require retrospective changes to intercon(cid:220) nection charges. 3. 5. The use of "best current practice’ prices during the PRICES transition to LRAIC based systems 4. (cid:217)DERIVATION OF "CURRENT BEST PRACTICE’ involves building Recent years have seen considerable research carried out by regulatory institutions, consultancies, and academics into identifying the long run average incremental cost (LRAIC) of telephone networks, or parts of telephone networks. This "bottom(cid:220)up’ models whereby an economic/engineering model of an efficient network is developed, from which interconnection costs can be calculated by aggregating the costs of individual network elements. Reconciliation of the results of these models with the results obtained from "top(cid:220)down’ models (which take as their starting point the current cost accounts of an operator, and seeks to arrive at an inter(cid:220) connection cost by a process of allocation and elimi(cid:220) nation of cost elements) serve to demonstrate that the calculated interconnection costs are broadly accurate. These models have been subject to intense debate and analysis by regulators, market players, and academics alike. incorporated However, in most cases the results of this work have not yet been interconnection prices. At the present time, very few countries appear to be in a position to calculate per minute interconnection charges based on actual estimates of long(cid:220)run average incremental costs. into regulated 4. 1. Comparison of interconnection charges for call termination in Member States The interconnection charge per call minute (for call termination) varies with the path taken by the call. Depending on the locations of the point of intercon(cid:220) nection and the called user, there may be a different number of switching stages and links involved in delivering a call, and this can give rise to a complex tariff structure for interconnection. inter(cid:220)exchange In order to simplify comparisons, the approach taken in the recommendation is to examine the interconnection charges to the incumbent’s fixed public network under three different scenarios: (i) "Local’ level interconnection A call handed over for termination at the local level interconnection at (or nearest to) the represents local exchange to which the destination user is connected, and represent the lowest level of inter(cid:220) in a given connection charge which country. is available Therefore, as an interim measure, to be used until the information required to complete the calculation of "bottom(cid:220)up’ LRAIC(cid:220)based costs (cross(cid:220) checked where appropriate by top(cid:220)down models based on current cost accounts), and national regulatory auth(cid:220) orities have the experience, regulatory and economic resources to complete such a costing exercise, intercon(cid:220) nection charges obtained by employing a "best current is available, (ii) "Single transit’ interconnection (metropolitan level) Single transit interconnection allows access to all customers in a metropolitan region, such as a large city. This is likely to be the level of interconnection most often demanded by new entrants in a national market. C 84/8 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 19. 3. 98 (iii) "Double transit’ interconnection ("national’ level) Double transit interconnection allows access to all customers on the incumbent’s network ("national’ level’ interconnection). A call handed over at this level normally incurs the highest level of intercon(cid:220) nection charge. tariffs, interconnection Like retail tariffs may also include time(cid:220)of(cid:220)day variations for peak, off(cid:220)peak and intermediate periods, reflecting the network operator’s need to manage demand and network capacity jointly. To simplify comparison, the approach in the recommen(cid:220) dation is to examine only the highest peak rate intercon(cid:220) nection charges(cid:216)(˛ˇ). Only call(cid:220)related costs are included in the comparison; non traffic related costs, for example costs related to the provision of interconnection links or the number of interconnection ports utilised, are not included. Current charges for international call termination are not taken into account in the "best practice’ comparisons, because at present these charges are based on the accounting rate system and are not cost(cid:220)oriented. (There is increasing pressure to bring down the prices currently charged under the international accounting rate system, and this will be reinforced when the WTO agreement on basic telecommunications services becomes effective in 1998. From 1 January 1998, within the EU, the impli(cid:220) cations of Community law are that charges for cross(cid:220) border interconnection between Member States should be based on the cost of call termination at the national level. ) interconnection charges around the Comparison of world reveals very significant differences, not only in the actual charges but also in the relative charges for inter(cid:220) connection at these three different levels. This is not unexpected given that many of these charges are a result of negotiation and do not necessarily reflect an obli(cid:220) gation for cost(cid:220)orientation. Comparisons based on non(cid:220)EU countries are thus often of limited value at present. Since July 1997, most fixed network operators in EU Member States have published interconnection charges in line with Directive 96/19/EC. Current inter(cid:220) connection charges for call termination in EU Member their (˛ˇ)(cid:217)The duration of peak and off tariff periods, and their levels, varies considerably between it difficult to compare comparative price Member States and this makes "average’ prices. States are shown in Annex II of the recommendation (as of 1 September 1997). In some cases these are the charges proposed by incumbent operators and as such are still subject to approval and possible adjustment by national regulatory authorities. 4. 2. Calculation of "best current practice’ prices The "best current practice’ prices given in the recommen(cid:220) dation are based on the interconnection charges in the three lowest priced Member States. The precise calcu(cid:220) lations are explained in Annex II of the recommendation. The so derived are expressed as a range which is considered to be wide enough to take account of recognised cost differences between Member States. "best current practice prices’ Insufficient empirical evidence Cost differences between EU Member States may occur as a result of factors such as average density of connections, labour costs, or permitted rate of return on capital employed. is currently available to make a full evaluation of the effect of each of these factors, but the evidence that does exist indicates that such differences are unlikely to be large enough to invalidate the "best current practice’ charges recommended here. The difference between the top and bottom bands of the recommended "best current practice’ charges varies from 60(cid:216)% (local level interconnection) to 100(cid:216)% (metropolitan level interconnection). 5. (cid:217)OTHER ISSUES RELATED TO INTERCONNECTION PRICING 5. 1. Categories of interconnecting organisation The Interconnection Directive grants certain categories of organisation the right and obligation to negotiate interconnection with each other. The organisations concerned may be in the same Member State or in different Member States. There are four such categories of organisation, identified in Annex II of the Directive. tariffs, The Directive allows different terms and conditions for interconnection to be set for different categories of organisations which are authorised to provide networks and services, where such differences can be objectively justified on the basis of the type of interconnection provided and/or the relevant national licensing conditions. 19. 3. 98 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 84/9 link in both Different charges based on the relevant national licensing conditions must be objectively justified. Some Member States have indicated that in order to achieve strong competition infrastructure and services, their intercon(cid:220) licensing/authorisation framework may nection conditions for an organisation to its level of investment in infrastructure. Such a policy has to be applied in a way that is consistent with other provisions, in the Directive, concerning non(cid:220)discrimi(cid:220) inter alia nation, and should not to any restriction or distortion of competition. In particular, fixed and mobile operators with significant market power must apply similar conditions in similar circumstances to intercon(cid:220) nected organisations providing similar services, and must provide information to others under the same conditions and of the same quality as they provide for their own services, or those of their subsidiaries or partners. interconnectlion facilities and lead 5. 1. 1. Interconnection with Mobile operators fixed and mobile Interconnection charges between networks have tended to be considerably higher than networks. interconnection Differences between Member States intercon(cid:220) nection charges for mobile operators have in turn been a contributing factor to the differing rates of growth in mobile telephony between Member States. fixed in the between charges The cost of call termination on a mobile network is in most cases not subject to price regulation under the Interconnection Directive. The one exception occurs if the mobile operator is designated by its NRA as having significant market power on the national market for interconnection (i. e. the fixed market for interconnection and the mobile market for interconnection combined). In this connection, the Commission has made the following statement to the European Parliament(cid:216)(˛—): the public "The Commission confirms that Article 7(1) of the Inter(cid:220) connection Directive is to be applied to all organisations operating telecommunications networks and/or publicly available telecommunications services as set out in Parts 1 and 2 of Annex I [i. e. fixed network operators(cid:129), which have been notified by national regu(cid:220) latory authorities as having significant market power, and only to those organisations. ’ this that statement are implications of The the Commission does not support on the basis of the Inter(cid:220) connection Directive a general obligation for cost oriented interconnection tariffs on mobile operators that do not have significant market power on the national market for interconnection. This is without prejudice to the duty of Member States and of undertakings to fully comply with the EU competition rules, taking account of the specific positions set out in the Communication from the Commission on the application of the competition rules to access agreements in the telecommunications sector. However, the cost of conveying a particular call from a point of interconnection to its destination on the termi(cid:220) nating fixed network is basically the same whether the call originates on a mobile network or another fixed network, and therefore there is no justification for the large differences in interconnection charges imposed by fixed network operators depending on the type of network on which the call originated. The "best practice’ interconnection charges set out in the recommendation are applicable for interconnection by mobile networks operators as well as by other fixed network operators on a non(cid:220)discriminatory basis. The fact that a mobile operator may have a different licence or authorisation does not justify differentiation in interconnection tariffs for the same call termination services provided by a fixed network operator with significant market power. 5. 1. 2. Interconnection with organisations in other Member States today’s (pre(cid:220)1998) A characteristic of telecommuni(cid:220) cations market is that an operator in one Member State inter(cid:220) that originates traffic and bills customers can connect with the national operator in a second Member State in order to deliver traffic, without needing to be authorised in the second Member State(cid:216)(˛(cid:209)). The Inter(cid:220) connecting operator neither owns nor operates infra(cid:220) structure in the destination Member State, and in the case of transit via third countries or use of satellite links or submarine cables, may lease rather than own some parts of the infrastructure used for delivery of traffic to the destination Member State. The average interconnection charges paid by a mobile operator may of course differ from those paid by another fixed network operator as a result of variations in the distribution of point of interconnection, call desti(cid:220) nations, call durations, and differences in the "time of day’ calling pattern. (˛—)(cid:217)EP Proc(cid:127)s verbal, para. 2(cid:220)122, 10. 6. 1997, p. 48. (˛(cid:209))(cid:217)Under the international accounting rate system, this usually happens at a virtual point of interconnection approximately in the middle of the international half circuit. C 84/10 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 19. 3. 98 authorised "cross(cid:220)border This practice of interconnection’ will remain a feature of the post(cid:220)1998 liberalised EU market, and the principle of non(cid:220)discrimination requires that all operators (ie equivalent incumbents treatment when delivering traffic to another Member State. This has implications for both the authorisation procedures in the Member States and the reference inter(cid:220) connection offer. in one Member State and new entrants) receive public providing cost of universal service obligations can be shared among organisations telecommunications networks and/or voice telephony services. The Directive requires charges for interconnection to be separated from charges related to universal service contribution; this includes any supplementary charges resulting from temporary type charges). ("access deficit’ imbalances tariff Firstly, it means that all points of interconnection open to national operators should also be open to authorised operators in other Member States who wish to deliver cross(cid:220)border traffic. Secondly it means that an operator that merely interconnects to deliver traffic, and that is not offering services or providing infrastructure in the destination Member State, should not have to be auth(cid:220) orised or established in the destination Member State. The ONP Voice Telephony Directive 95/62/EC requires telephone tariffs to be cost oriented. Thus compensation for tariff imbalances ("access deficit’ type charges) are only permissible where a national regulatory authority tariff constraints on an operator relating to the speed of tariff re(cid:220)balancing, in accordance with Article 12(2) of Directive 95/62/EC. An operator that does not have regulatory constraints on its retail tariffs cannot claim access deficit type contributions. imposes Thirdly it is proposed that the reference interconnection offer should include - as a discrete unbundled element of the interconnection offer - terms and conditions and tariffs for the transmission link between the actual point of interconnection and the border(cid:216)(˛(cid:210)). This will alleviate the administrative problems which could otherwise hamper the development of competition for telecom(cid:220) munications services between Member States, and will avoid discrimination and between incumbent operators providing cross(cid:220)border services. entrants new the point of For competitive equality, it should also be possible for an operator from another Member State who merely terminates traffic to rent such a transmission link (i. e. the link between the border) from an alternative infrastructure provider where available, without needing to be authorised or established in the destination Member State, and without affecting the status of the operator with regard to the terms and conditions for interconnection(cid:216)(˛(cid:211)). interconnection and 5. 2. Universal service and other supplementary charges The Interconnection Directive allows Member States to the net set up universal service schemes, whereby The purpose of a universal service charge is to ensure that the social cost of universal service in a Member State is shared by the players on that market. It is not appropriate for the social costs in one Member State to be subsidised by telephone users in all other Member States. Thus, contributions to universal service should not be imposed either directly or indirectly on organi(cid:220) sations which merely interconnect to deliver traffic to a Member State and do not actually offer telecommuni(cid:220) cations services in that Member State. rate system, accounting In the same way, an "access deficit’ implies that profits from national and international services provide a cross(cid:220) subsidy to the "local access’ business. Presently, under the international incumbent operators are earning significant revenues when termi(cid:220) nating calls from other countries. The "excess profits’ earned from incoming calls from other Member States represent a cross(cid:220)subsidy to consumers in one Member State from callers in all the other Member States. Thus when operators in other Member States interconnect to deliver traffic to a Member State, it is inappropriate that they should contribute either directly or indirectly to any access deficit type scheme in that Member State. terminating (˛(cid:210))(cid:217)The "border’ needs to be interpreted in an appropriate manner taking into account the type of infrastructure used eg satellite, submarine cable or terrestrial circuit. (˛(cid:211))(cid:217)Some Member States may have different terms and conditions for interconnection depending on whether or not the interconnecting party owns and operates telecommuni(cid:220) cations infrastructure. In accordance with the principle of non(cid:220)discrimination, it follows that when calculating the contributions to be made by operators in a Member State to universal service costs or access deficits, the traffic of these operators which is incoming from other Member States should not be taken level of into account when assessing the contributions. 19. 3. 98 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 84/11 6. CONSULTATION The key points covered by the recommendation were set out in a working document prepared by the Commission Services (DGXIII). Following an initial presentation to the ONP Committee(cid:216)(˛(cid:212)) at its meeting on 10 July 1997, the working document was discussed in detail at a second meeting of the ONP Committee on 10 September 1997. In accordance with the inter(cid:220)institutional modus vivendi on advisory committee procedures, the agenda for the ONP Committee meeting of 10 September 1997 (˛(cid:212))(cid:217)An advisory committee comprising representatives of Member States, set up under Article 9(1) of Directive 90/387/ECC. and a copy of the working document were sent to the European Parliament. Further consultation on the working document was held with market players at a public workshop held in Brussels on 9 September and attended by approximately 200 people. the basis of Comments received as a result of this consultation have been taken into accouant. There is general support for the Commission to provide guidance in the areas covered by the recommendation, but incumbent operators and new entrants hold different views concerning the recom(cid:220) mended "best current practice’ prices


title: 98/245/JAI: Action commune du 19 mars 1998 adoptée par le Conseil sur la base de l'article K.3 du traité sur l'Union européenne, établissant un programme d'échanges, de formation et de coopération destiné aux personnes responsables de l'action contre la criminalité organisée (programme Falcone)

eurovoc_concepts:
EU financing
EU programme
cooperation policy
fight against crime
joint action
organised crime

formats: html pdf print

text: L 99/8 FR Journal officiel des Communaute´s europe´ennes 31. 3. 98 ACTION COMMUNE du 19 mars 1998 adopte´e par le Conseil sur la base de l’article K. 3 du traite´ sur l’Union europe´enne, e´tablissant un programme d’e´changes, de formation et de coope´ration destine´ aux personnes responsables de l’action contre la criminalite´ organise´e (programme Falcone) (98/245/JAI) LE CONSEIL DE L’UNION EUROPÉENNE, vu le traite´ sur l’Union europe´enne, et notamment son article K. 3, paragraphe 2, point b), et son article K. 8, paragraphe 2, vu l’initiative concerte´e du Grand-Duche´ de Luxembourg et de la Commission, (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) conside´rant que les États membres conside`rent la lutte contre la criminalite´ organise´e sous toutes ses formes comme une question d’inte´reˆt commun; conside´rant les conclusions du Conseil europe´en d’Amsterdam de juin 1997 approuvant le pro- gramme d’action relatif à la criminalite´ organi- se´e (1) e´tabli par le groupe d’experts à haut niveau, telles que refle´te´es dans la re´solution du Conseil du 18 de´cembre 1997 portant fixation des priorite´s de la coope´ration dans le domaine de la justice et des affaires inte´rieures pour la pe´riode du 1er janvier 1998 à la date d’entre´e en vigueur du traite´ d’Am- sterdam (2); conside´rant que les États membres sont conscients de la ne´cessite´ d’une approche coordonne´e et mul- tidisciplinaire de la pre´vention et de la re´pression tant au niveau le´gislatif qu’au niveau ope´ration- nel; conside´rant qu’il y a lieu de centrer le pre´sent programme sur des actions contribuant à la re´alisa- tion et au suivi du programme d’action relatif à la criminalite´ organise´e; conside´rant que, à cet effet, la mise en place d’un cadre pour le soutien de mesures destine´es à facili- ter la mise en œuvre du plan d’action, et notam- ment des actions de rencontres et d’e´changes multi- disciplinaires, des recherches et e´tudes ainsi que (1) JO C 251 du 15. 8. 1997, p. 1. (2) JO C 11 du 15. 1. 1998, p. 1. d’autres formes d’ame´lioration des compe´tences et des me´thodes ope´rationnelles de dimension euro- pe´enne au be´ne´fice des personnes responsables de l’action contre la criminalite´ organise´e, est de nature à accroître et à faciliter la lutte contre ce phe´nome`ne et à re´duire, là où ils existent, les obstacles à une coope´ration, notamment douanie`re, policie`re et judiciaire, accrue entre les États mem- bres dans ce domaine; (6) (7) (8) (9) conside´rant que ces objectifs peuvent eˆtre re´alise´s plus efficacement au niveau de l’Union europe´enne qu’à celui de chaque État membre, en raison des synergies qui de´coulent de l’e´change des expe´rien- ces spe´cifiques disponibles dans les États membres ainsi que des e´conomies d’e´chelle attendues et des effets cumulatifs des actions envisage´es; conside´rant que la pre´sente action commune est sans pre´judice des compe´tences de la Communaute´ europe´enne et ne porte donc pas atteinte aux mesures communautaires prises, ou susceptibles d’eˆtre prises, dans les domaines vise´s par le plan d’action; conside´rant toutefois que les aspects re´pressifs et judiciaires touchant à ces domaines peuvent eˆtre pris en compte à l’inte´rieur du pre´sent programme, lorsqu’ils s’inscrivent en comple´ment des actions communautaires; qu’il est ne´cessaire, de`s lors, de retenir, dans la mise en œuvre du pre´sent pro- gramme, une approche extensive du phe´nome`ne de la criminalite´ organise´e, y compris le crime e´cono- mique, la fraude, la corruption et le blanchiment d’argent; conside´rant qu’il y a lieu que la pre´sente action commune n’empie`te pas sur d’autres programmes relevant du titre VI du traite´ et qu’il convient, de`s lors, de re´ajuster les priorite´s annuelles de ces programmes pour en exclure à l’avenir les actions relevant spe´cifiquement de la mise en œuvre du programme d’action relatif à la criminalite´ organi- se´e; 31. 3. 98 FR Journal officiel des Communaute´s europe´ennes L 99/9 (10) conside´rant que la pre´sente action commune n’af- fecte pas les re`gles de proce´dure existantes en matie`re de coope´ration douanie`re, policie`re et judi- ciaire; 3. Le pre´sent programme comporte les cate´gories d’ac- tions suivantes: — formation, (11) conside´rant que le Conseil a adopte´, entre autres, comme instrument de lutte contre la criminalite´ organise´e, l’action commune du 22 avril 1996 concernant un cadre d’e´change de magistrats de liaison visant à l’ame´lioration de la coope´ration judiciaire entre les États membres de l’Union euro- pe´enne (1); (12) conside´rant qu’un montant de re´fe´rence financie`re, au sens du point 2 de la de´claration du Parlement europe´en, du Conseil et de la Commission du 6 mars 1995 est inse´re´ dans la pre´sente action com- mune pour l’ensemble de la dure´e du programme, sans que cela n’affecte les compe´tences de l’autorite´ budge´taire de´finies par le traite´; (13) conside´rant que la pre´sidence a consulte´ le Parle- ment europe´en conforme´ment à l’article K. 6 du traite´, A ADOPTÉ LA PRÉSENTE ACTION COMMUNE: — projets conjoints destine´s à ame´liorer les compe´tences et les me´thodes ope´rationnelles dans la coope´ration en matie`re de lutte contre la criminalite´ organise´e, — programmes de stages, organisations de rencontres et de se´minaires, — activite´s de recherche, e´tudes spe´cialise´es, y compris celles de faisabilite´ ope´rationnelle, et e´valuation, — circulation et e´change d’informations, ainsi que toute autre forme d’action susceptible de contri- buer à la mise en œuvre du programme d’action relatif à la criminalite´ organise´e. 4. Le financement d’actions au titre du pre´sent pro- gramme exclut le recours cumulatif à d’autres program- mes relevant du titre VI du traite´ et à d’autres program- mes de financement communautaires, à l’exception des programmes communautaires visant spe´cifiquement à soutenir les efforts des pays candidats se pre´parant à adhe´rer à l’Union europe´enne. Article 2 Le montant de re´fe´rence financie`re pour l’exe´cution du programme, pour la pe´riode mentionne´e à l’article 1er, paragraphe 1, est de 10 millions d’e´cus. Article premier Les cre´dits annuels sont autorise´s par l’autorite´ budge´tai- re dans la limite des perspectives financie`res. 1. Il est e´tabli, pour la pe´riode 1998-2002, un pro- gramme de promotion d’initiatives coordonne´es, de´nom- me´ Falcone, destine´ aux personnes responsables de la lutte contre la criminalite´ organise´e en vue de faciliter la mise en œuvre et le suivi du programme d’action relatif à la criminalite´ organise´e. 2. Aux fins de la pre´sente action commune, on entend par «personnes responsables de la lutte contre la crimina- lite´ organise´e», les cate´gories de personnes suivantes, pour autant qu’elles aient une compe´tence en la matie`re en vertu de leur le´gislation nationale: les juges, les procu- reurs, les services de police et des douanes, les fonction- naires publics, les services publics charge´s des questions fiscales, de la surveillance des e´tablissements financiers et des marche´s publics ainsi que de la lutte contre la fraude et la corruption, les repre´sentants des milieux profession- nels susceptibles d’eˆtre concerne´s par la mise en œuvre de certaines recommandations figurant dans le plan d’action susmentionne´ ainsi que les milieux universitaires et scien- tifiques. Article 3 Sous re´serve des dispositions de l’article 1er, paragraphe 4, peuvent eˆtre pris en conside´ration, au titre de la formation, les projets visant les objectifs suivants: — la connaissance re´ciproque des aspects spe´cifiques des re´glementations et le´gislations, ainsi que des proce´du- res et des pratiques applicables aux diffe´rents aspects de la lutte contre la criminalite´ organise´e vise´es dans le plan d’action, tant au niveau de la pre´vention que de la re´pression et des poursuites, — la pre´paration de modules pe´dagogiques pour des actions de formation, d’e´changes et de stages, de confe´rences ou de se´minaires organise´s en application du pre´sent programme. Article 4 (1) JO L 105 du 27. 4. 1996, p. 1. Peuvent eˆtre prises en conside´ration, au titre de la coope´- ration entre les États membres, des projets conjoints L 99/10 FR Journal officiel des Communaute´s europe´ennes 31. 3. 98 ayant une dure´e limite´e, y compris les aspects lie´s à leur pre´paration, et la mise à disposition temporaire d’experts, organise´s par les personnes responsables de la lutte contre la criminalite´ organise´e. Ces projets sont destine´s à ame´- liorer les compe´tences et les me´thodes ope´rationnelles dans la lutte contre les diverses formes de criminalite´ organise´e. L’unite´ «Drogues» Europol et, apre`s l’entre´e en vigueur de la convention, Europol seront invite´s à participer aux projets qui rele`vent de leur compe´tence. Article 5 Peuvent eˆtre prises en conside´ration, au titre des projets de stages, d’e´changes et de l’organisation de rencontres et de se´minaires, les initiatives visant les objectifs suivants: — l’organisation de visites et de stages de dure´e limite´e aupre`s d’organismes publics auxquels ont e´te´ confe´- re´es des responsabilite´s particulie`res dans le domaine de la lutte contre la criminalite´ organise´e, — l’organisation et la tenue de se´minaires sur des aspects spe´cifiques relatifs à la criminalite´ organise´e. Article 6 En ce qui concerne les e´tudes de faisabilite´ et les recher- ches, il convient d’accorder la priorite´ à celles qui sont recommande´es spe´cifiquement dans le plan d’action; en outre, les projets visant les objectifs suivants peuvent eˆtre pris en conside´ration: — la de´finition de normes et de me´thodologies commu- nes en vue de faciliter l’identification du phe´nome`ne et la collecte des donne´es, tout en tenant compte des lois des États membres en matie`re de protection des donne´es, — l’exe´cution de recherches scientifiques, techniques ou comparatives sur des aspects spe´cifiques de la lutte contre la criminalite´ organise´e ou la coordination de recherches en la matie`re, — la comparaison et l’e´valuation des instruments direc- tement ou indirectement applicables à la lutte contre la criminalite´ organise´e (pre´vention, re´pression, pour- suite), y compris, le cas e´che´ant, les instruments et proce´dures employe´s par les pays candidats, afin d’identifier les possibilite´s de de´finition de politiques communes de lutte contre la criminalite´ organise´e ou de mesures de rapprochement ou d’harmonisation qui pourraient constituer un objectif à long terme de l’Union europe´enne, — la comparaison et l’e´valuation des pratiques de lutte contre la criminalite´ organise´e employe´es par les servi- ces ope´rationnels (polices, douanes, magistrats) afin d’identifier les moyens d’ame´liorer et, le cas e´che´ant, de coordonner les me´thodes concerne´es. Article 7 Peuvent eˆtre pris en conside´ration, au titre de la diffusion et de l’e´change d’informations, les projets visant les objectifs suivants, pre´vus dans le programme d’action relatif à la criminalite´ organise´e: — l’aide à la mise en place de re´seaux de points de contacts pour faciliter l’e´change d’informations et les proce´dures de coope´ration entre les services concerne´s (syste`me de collecte et d’analyse des donne´es, services re´pressifs et judiciaires ainsi qu’e´quipes inte´gre´es plu- ridisciplinaires); — l’aide à la cre´ation et au de´veloppement de banques de donne´es ou de re´seaux te´le´matiques de documenta- tion reprenant les le´gislations et la jurisprudence en matie`re de lutte contre la criminalite´ organise´e, afin de faciliter l’action des personnes responsables de la lutte contre la criminalite´ organise´e; — la diffusion de renseignements sur les actions vise´es aux articles 3, 5 et 6 et, le cas e´che´ant, sur les actions vise´es à l’article 4. Article 8 1. Pour be´ne´ficier d’un financement communautaire, un projet doit pre´senter un inte´reˆt pour l’Union europe´enne et associer au moins deux États membres. 2. Les entite´s responsables des projets peuvent eˆtre des organismes publics ou prive´s, y compris des instituts de recherche ainsi que des e´tablissements charge´s de la formation de base ou de la formation continue. 3. Les projets à financer sont soumis à une proce´dure de se´lection tenant compte, entre autres, des crite`res sui- vants: — la compatibilite´ des sujets concerne´s avec les travaux entrepris ou pre´vus dans les priorite´s multiannuelles de coope´ration arreˆte´es par le domaine de la justice et des affaires inte´rieures et, plus particulie`rement, avec le programme d’action relatif à la criminalite´ organise´e, le Conseil dans — l’apport fait à l’e´laboration ou à la mise en œuvre d’instruments adopte´s ou devant eˆtre adopte´s en application du titre VI du traite´, — la comple´mentarite´ des diffe´rents projets, — le nombre et la nature des services ou des cate´gories de personnes auxquels ils s’adressent, — la qualite´ de l’e´tablissement responsable, — le degre´ de pre´paration des participants, — la possibilite´ de tirer profit des re´sultats obtenus pour renforcer la coope´ration entre les États membres. 31. 3. 98 FR Journal officiel des Communaute´s europe´ennes L 99/11 4. Dans le but de familiariser les pays candidats à l’adhe´sion avec l’acquis de l’Union europe´enne dans ce domaine et de les aider à se pre´parer à adhe´rer, les responsables de ces pays ou encore ceux d’autres pays tiers, lorsque cela est dans l’inte´reˆt de ces projets, peuvent y participer. Article 9 Les de´cisions quant au financement ainsi que les contrats qui en de´coulent pre´voient un suivi et un contrôle finan- cier de la Commission ainsi que des ve´rifications par la Cour des comptes. Article 10 1. Tous les types de de´penses directement imputables à la mise en œuvre du projet et engage´es pendant une pe´riode de´termine´e, fixe´e par contrat, sont susceptibles d’eˆtre finance´s. 2. L’intervention financie`re du budget communautaire ne de´passe pas 80 % du coût du projet. 3. Les frais de traduction et d’interpre´tation ainsi que les frais de traitement informatique et les de´penses pour l’acquisition de biens durables ou de consommation ne sont pris en compte que dans la mesure où ils repre´sen- tent un soutien ne´cessaire à la re´alisation du projet et ne sont couverts qu’à concurrence de 50 % de la subvention, ou de 80 % si la nature meˆme du projet les rend indispensables. 4. Les de´penses affe´rentes aux locaux, e´quipements col- lectifs et re´mune´rations des fonctionnaires de l’État et des organismes publics ne sont susceptibles d’eˆtre couvertes que dans la mesure où elles correspondent à des affecta- tions et à des tâches qui ne sont pas lie´es à une destination ou une fonction nationales, mais, spe´cifique- ment, à la mise en œuvre du projet. Article 11 1. La Commission est charge´e de l’exe´cution des actions pre´vues par la pre´sente action commune et en fixe les modalite´s d’application, y compris les crite`res de couver- ture des coûts. 2. Elle fixe chaque anne´e, avec le concours de spe´cialis- tes de la lutte contre la criminalite´ organise´e, qui seront de´signe´s par les membres du comite´ vise´ à l’article 12, le projet de programme annuel de mise en œuvre de la pre´sente action commune quant aux priorite´s the´mati- ques et à la re´partition des cre´dits disponibles entre les domaines d’action. À cet e´gard, il est tenu compte des re´sultats de l’e´valuation des actions effectue´e conforme´- ment au paragraphe 3. 3. Elle proce`de chaque anne´e à une e´valuation des actions mene´es pour exe´cuter le programme de l’anne´e e´coule´e. Article 12 1. La Commission est assiste´e par un comite´ compose´ d’un repre´sentant par État membre et pre´side´ par un repre´sentant de la Commission. le projet de pro- 2. La Commission soumet au comite´ gramme annuel, vise´ à l’article 11, paragraphe 2, ainsi que des propositions portant sur les modalite´s d’applica- tion et l’e´valuation des actions. L’avis est e´mis par le comite´ statuant à l’unanimite´ dans un de´lai de deux mois. Ce de´lai peut eˆtre re´duit par le pre´sident pour des motifs d’urgence. Le pre´sident ne prend pas part au vote. En l’absence d’un avis favorable rendu dans les de´lais fixe´s, la Commission soit retire sa proposition, soit soumet une proposition au Conseil qui se prononce à l’unanimite´ dans les deux mois. 3. De`s l’adoption du programme annuel, la Commission le transmet sans de´lai au Parlement europe´en et informe en permanence le comite´ des vues de celui-ci. Article 13 1. Les projets pour lesquels un financement est demande´ sont soumis à la Commission pour examen, dans un de´lai qui sera fixe´ dans le programme annuel vise´ à l’article 11, paragraphe 2. 2. La Commission instruit les projets qui lui sont soumis avec l’assistance des experts vise´s à l’article 11, paragra- phe 2. 3. En ce qui concerne les financements allant jusqu’à 50 000 e´cus, le repre´sentant de la Commission soumet un projet au comite´ vise´ à l’article 12, paragraphe 1. Le comite´, statuant à la majorite´ pre´vue à l’article K. 4, paragraphe 3, second aline´a, du traite´, e´met son avis sur ce projet dans un de´lai que le pre´sident peut fixer en fonction de l’urgence. Le pre´sident ne prend pas part au vote. L’avis est inscrit au proce`s-verbal; en outre, chaque État membre a le droit de demander que sa position figure à ce proce`s-verbal. La Commission tient le plus grand compte de l’avis e´mis par le comite´. Elle informe le comite´ de la manie`re dont elle a tenu compte de cet avis. L 99/12 FR Journal officiel des Communaute´s europe´ennes 31. 3. 98 4. En ce qui concerne les financements qui de´passent 50 000 e´cus, la Commission soumet au comite´ vise´ à l’article 12, paragraphe 1, la liste des projets qui lui ont e´te´ soumis dans le cadre du programme annuel. Elle indique les projets qu’elle retient et motive sa se´lection. Le comite´ e´met son avis sur les divers projets dans un de´lai de deux mois à la majorite´ pre´vue à l’article K. 4, paragraphe 3, second aline´a, du traite´. Le pre´sident ne prend pas part au vote. En l’absence d’un avis favorable rendu dans les de´lais fixe´s, la Commission soit retire le ou les projets en question, soit les soumet, avec l’avis e´ventuel du comite´, au Conseil qui se prononce dans les deux mois à la majorite´ pre´vue à l’article K. 4, paragraphe 3, second aline´a, du traite´. Article 14 1. Les actions vise´es par le pre´sent programme et finan- ce´es par le budget ge´ne´ral des Communaute´s europe´ennes sont ge´re´es par la Commission conforme´ment au re`gle- ment financier du 21 de´cembre 1977 applicable au bud- get ge´ne´ral des Communaute´s europe´ennes (1). 2. Lorsqu’elle pre´sente les propositions de financement vise´es à l’article 13 ainsi que les e´valuations vise´es à l’article 11, la Commission tient compte des principes de bonne gestion financie`re et, notamment, d’e´conomie et de rapport coût/efficacite´ vise´s à l’article 2 du re`glement financier. Article 15 1. La Commission organise une e´valuation du pro- gramme par des experts neutres, externes au programme, qui seront de´signe´s en accord avec le comite´ vise´ à l’article 12. 2. La Commission pre´pare chaque anne´e un rapport re´capitulatif des actions engage´es et de l’e´valuation re´ali- se´e, qu’elle adresse au Parlement europe´en et au Conseil. Le premier rapport est transmis au plus tard à la fin de l’anne´e au cours de laquelle l’ensemble des actions au titre du premier exercice budge´taire est termine´. Article 16 La pre´sente action commune entre en vigueur le jour de son adoption. Elle est applicable jusqu’au 31 de´cembre 2002, pe´riode à l’issue de laquelle elle peut eˆtre reconduite. Article 17 La pre´sente action commune est publie´e au Journal officiel. Fait à Bruxelles, le 19 mars 1998. Par le Conseil Le pre´sident J. STRAW (1) JO L 356 du 31. 12. 1977, p. 1. Re`glement modifie´ en dernier lieu par le re`glement (CE) no 2444/97 (JO L 340 du 11. 12. 1997, p. 1)


title: Ühine Seisukoht, 19. märts 1998, mille nõukogu on Euroopa Liidu lepingu ar-tik-li J.2 alusel määratlenud Jugoslaavia Liitvabariigi vastaste piiravate meetmete kohta

eurovoc_concepts:
EU visa policy
Serbia and Montenegro
export restriction
international sanctions
military equipment
repression
terrorism

text: 18/1. kd ET Euroopa Liidu Teataja 51 31998E0240 L 95/1 EUROOPA ÜHENDUSTE TEATAJA 27. 3. 1998 ÜHINE SEISUKOHT, 19. märts 1998, mille nõukogu on Euroopa Liidu lepingu artikli J. 2 alusel määratlenud Jugoslaavia Liitvabariigi vastaste piiravate meetmete kohta (98/240/ÜVJP) EUROOPA LIIDU NÕUKOGU, — teeks konstruktiivset koostööd, et rakendada kontaktgrupi avalduse lõikes 6 sätestatud meetmeid; võttes arvesse Euroopa Liidu lepingut, eriti selle artiklit J. 2, ning arvestades, et: hiljutised sündmused Jugoslaavia Liitvabariigis, eelkõige jõu kasu- tamine albaanlaste kogukonna vastu Kosovos, kujutavad endast lubamatut inimõiguste rikkumist ja seavad ohtu piirkonna julge- oleku; Euroopa Liit mõistab teravalt hukka Kosovo Vabastusarmee ja kõigi teiste rühmituste või üksikisikute poolt toime pandud terrorismi- ja vägivallaaktid; liit mõistab teravalt hukka rahumeelse poliitiliste vaadete väljen- damise mahasurumise vägivalla teel; artiklites 1–4 sätestatud piiravaid meetmeid, sealhulgas majandus- ja/või finantssuhete piiramist, peetakse vajalikuks; sellised meet- med vaadatakse viivitamata uuesti läbi, kui Jugoslaavia Liitvaba- riigi valitsus võtab eespool põhjendustes osutatud meetmed; kui eespool nimetatud samme ei astuta ja repressioonid Kosovos jätkuvad, võtab liit täiendavaid rahvusvahelisi meetmeid, eelkõige taotleb Jugoslaavia Liitvabariigi ja Serbia valitsuse välismaal asu- vate rahaliste vahendite külmutamist, ON MÄÄRATLENUD KÄESOLEVA ÜHISE SEISUKOHA: Artikkel 1 12. märtsil avaldas 9. märtsi 1998. aasta avaldusele; 1998 liit toetust kontaktgrupi Euroopa Liit kinnitab ühise seisukohaga 96/184/ÜVJP (1) endise Jugoslaavia suhtes kehtestatud relvaekspordiembargot. liit nõuab, et Jugoslaavia Liitvabariigi valitsus astuks tõhusaid samme vägivalla peatamiseks ja võtaks endale kohustuse leida Kosovo küsimusele poliitiline lahendus rahumeelse dialoogi teel Kosovo albaania kogukonnaga, ning eelkõige: — tooks välja politsei eriüksused ja lõpetaks julgeolekujõudude tegevuse tsiviilelanikkonna vastu, Artikkel 2 Jugoslaavia Liitvabariigile ei võidakse kasutada siserepressioonideks või terrorismiks. tarnita mingit varustust, mida Artikkel 3 — lubaks Rahvusvahelisel Punase Risti Komiteel ja teistel huma- nitaarabiorganisatsioonidel, samuti liidu ja teiste saatkondade esindajatel Kosovosse siseneda, Serbias kehtestatakse moratoorium valitsuse poolt rahastatava ekspordikrediiditoetuse suhtes kaubandusele ja investeeringutele, sealhulgas erastamise rahastamise suhtes valitsuse poolt. — kohustuks avalikult alustama dialoogi Kosovo albaania kogu- konna juhtidega, (1) EÜT L 58, 7. 3. 1996, lk 1. 52 ET Euroopa Liidu Teataja 18/1. kd Artikkel 4 Artikkel 5 1. Jugoslaavia Liitvabariigi ja Serbia kõrgematele ametnikele, kes on vastutavad Jugoslaavia Liitvabariigi julgeolekujõudude repres- sioonide eest Kosovos, ei anta viisasid. 2. Lisas loetletud isikud, kes kannavad selget vastutust julgeole- kuküsimustes, kantakse liikmesriikide territooriumile mitteluba- tavate isikute nimekirja. Kui Jugoslaavia Liitvabariigi võimud ei anna rahvusvahelise üldsuse nõudmistele järele, lisatakse sinna nimekirja veel teisi Jugoslaavia Liitvabariigi ja Serbia kõrgemaid ametnikke, kes on vastutavad repressioonide eest Kosovos. Erand- juhtudel võib teha erandeid, kui see aitab kaasa liidu eluliste ees- märkide saavutamisele. Nõukogu ajakohastab nimekirja vastavalt sündmuste arengule Kosovos. Käesolev ühine seisukoht jõustub selle vastuvõtmise päeval. Artikkel 6 Käesolev ühine seisukoht avaldatakse Euroopa Ühenduste Teatajas. Brüssel, 19. märts 1998 Nõukogu nimel eesistuja J. STRAW 18/1. kd ET Euroopa Liidu Teataja 53 LISA Vlajko Stojlkovic (Serbia siseminister) Vlastimir Djordjevic (Riikliku Julgeolekutalituse juhataja) Dragisa Ristivojevic (Riikliku Julgeolekutalituse juhataja asetäitja) Obrad Stevanovic (siseministri abi) Jovica Stanisic (siseministri abi: Serbia riik-liku julgeolekuteenistuse ülem) Radomir Markovic (siseministri abi: riik-liku julgeolekuteenistuse ülema asetäitja) Frenki Simatovic (riigi erijõudude ülem) David Gajic (Kosovo julgeolekuülem) Lubinko Cvetic (Kosovo julgeolekuülema asetäitja) Veljko Odalovic (Kosovo piirkonna juhataja asetäitja)


title: Verordening (EG) nr. 628/98 van de Commissie van 19 maart 1998 houdende tijdelijke schorsing van de afgifte van uitvoercertificaten voor bepaalde zuivelproducten en vaststelling van de mate waarin op nog niet afgewikkelde aanvragen voor uitvoercertificaten kan worden ingegaan

eurovoc_concepts:
export licence
milk
powdered milk

formats: pdf print

text: 20. 3. 98 NL Publicatieblad van de Europese Gemeenschappen L 85/13 VERORDENING (EG) Nr. 628/98 VAN DE COMMISSIE van 19 maart 1998 houdende t¶del¶ke schorsing van de afgifte van uitvoercertificaten voor bepaalde zuivelproducten en vaststelling van de mate waarin op nog niet afgewikkelde aanvragen voor uitvoercertificaten kan worden ingegaan DE COMMISSIE VAN DE EUROPESE GEMEENSCHAPPEN, Gelet op het Verdrag tot oprichting van de Europese Gemeenschap, Gelet op Verordening (EEG) nr. 804/68 van de Raad van 27 juni 1968 houdende een gemeenschappel¶ke ordening der markten in de sector melk en zuivelproducten (1), laatstel¶k gew¶zigd b¶ Verordening (EG) nr. 1587/96 (2), Gelet op Verordening (EG) nr. 1466/95 van de Commissie van 27 juni 1995 tot vaststelling van de specifieke bepa- lingen inzake de toepassing van de uitvoerresittuties voor de sector melk en zuivelproducten (3), laatstel¶k gew¶zigd b¶ Verordening (EG) nr. 2497/97 (4), en met name op artikel 8, lid 3, Overwegende dat de markt voor bepaalde zuivelproducten gekenmerkt wordt door een onzekere situatie; dat moet worden voorkomen dat speculatieve aanvragen worden tussen ingediend die zowel marktdeelnemers kunnen leiden als de continu(cid:139)teit van de uitvoer van deze producten in de rest van de lopende perioden in gevaar kunnen brengen; dat de afgifte van tot concurrentiedistorsies certificaten voor de betrokken producten t¶del¶k moet worden geschorst en geen certificaten voor deze producten moeten worden afgegeven waarvoor de aanvraag in behandeling is, HEEFT DE VOLGENDE VERORDENING VASTGESTELD: Artikel 1 1. De afgifte van de uitvoercertificaten voor producten van de GN-codes 0402 21 en 0402 29 wordt geschorst voor het t¶dvak van 20 tot en met 26 maart 1998. 2. Nog niet afgewikkelde aanvragen voor certificaten voor producten van de GN-codes 0402 21 en 0402 29 die op of na 20 maart 1998 afgegeven hadden moeten worden, worden niet ingewilligd, met uitzondering van de in artikel 6, lid 1, van Verordening (EG) nr. 1466/95 bedoelde certificaten. Artikel 2 Deze verordening treedt in werking op 20 maart 1998. Deze verordening is verbindend in al haar onderdelen en is rechtstreeks toepassel¶k in elke lidstaat. Gedaan te Brussel, 19 maart 1998. Voor de Commissie Franz FISCHLER Lid van de Commissie (1) PB L 148 van 28. 6. 1968, blz. 13. (2) PB L 206 van 16. 8. 1996, blz. 21. (3) PB L 144 van 28. 6. 1995, blz. 22. (4) PB L 345 van 16. 12. 1997, blz. 12