title: QUESTION ECRITE no 543/98 de Gianfranco DELL'ALBA à la Commission. Financement européen pour le parc archéologique de Populonia (Livourne)

eurovoc_concepts:
European Regional Development Fund
Tuscany
archaeology
building industry
competence of the Member States
cultural heritage
environmental protection
heritage protection
nature reserve
parking area

formats: html pdf print

text: 9. 10. 98 FR Journal officiel des Communaute·s europe·ennes C 310/81 (98/C 310/107) QUESTION E· CRITE E-0542/98 pose·e par James Nicholson (I-EDN) a‘ la Commission (4 mars 1998) Objet: Re·gime public de pension base· sur le revenu Le gouvernement britannique a re·cemment modifie· la loi re·gissant le re·gime public de pension base· sur le revenu (SERPS). En conse·quence, une femme devenue veuve a‘ partir du 6 avril 2000 ne percevra que la moitie· de la pension de son mari. La Commission estime-t-elle que cette re·vision le·gislative est contraire a‘ l(cid:146)article 119 du Traite· (e·galite· des chances et de traitement entre hommes et femmes en matie‘re d(cid:146)emploi)? Re·ponse donne·e par M. Flynn au nom de la Commission (3 avril 1998) Concernant le proble‘me souleve· par l(cid:146)Honorable Parlementaire, la Commission doit pre·ciser que dans le domaine de la protection sociale, les E· tats membres sont libres de fixer leur propre politique en ce qui concerne l(cid:146)organisation et le fonctionnement des re·gimes de se·curite· sociale, pourvu que le droit communautaire en matie‘re d(cid:146)e·galite· de traitement entre hommes et femmes (article 119 du traite· CE, directives 79/7/CEE (1) et 86/378/CEE (2) telle que modifie·e par la directive 96/97/CE (3)) et celui relatif a‘ la se·curite· sociale des travailleurs migrants (article 51 du traite· CE et re‘glements (CEE) nos 1408/71 et 574/72, tels que mis a‘ jour par le re‘glement (CE) no 118/97 (4)), soient respecte·s. Par conse·quent, les E· tats membres peuvent, comme dans le cas d(cid:146)espe‘ce, adopter les re‘gles qui fixent le niveau des diffe·rentes prestations, pourvu que le droit communautaire pre·cite· soit respecte·. Il s(cid:146)ave‘re que la nouvelle re·glementation au Royaume-Uni applicable a‘ partir du 6 avril 2000 pour l(cid:146)octroi des prestations de survie n(cid:146)est pas en contradiction avec le droit communautaire existant et plus particulie‘rement la directive 79/7/CEE (e·galite· de traitement dans les re·gimes statutaires et le·gaux de se·curite· sociale), d(cid:146)autant plus que cette directive exclut de son champ d(cid:146)application les prestations des survivants. L(cid:146)article 119 du traite· CE ne s(cid:146)applique pas aux re·gimes statutaires. Il ne concerne que l(cid:146)e·galite· de re·mune·rations entre travailleurs masculins et fe·minins et couvre uniquement les re·gimes professionnels de se·curite· sociale. (1) (2) (3) (4) JO L 6 du 10. 1. 1979. JO L 225 du 12. 8. 1986. JO L 46 du 27. 2. 1997. JO L 28 du 30. 1. 1997. (98/C 310/108) QUESTION E· CRITE E-0543/98 pose·e par Gianfranco Dell(cid:146)Alba (ARE) a‘ la Commission (4 mars 1998) Objet: Financement europe·en pour le parc arche·ologique de Populonia (Livourne) Conside·rant que: › › la socie·te· Parchi Val di Cornia est charge·e d(cid:146)ame·nager dans la ne·cropole e·trusque de Populonia situe·e dans le golfe de Baratti (Livourne) un parc arche·ologique naturel finance· par le Fonds re·gional europe·en; la re·alisation de ce projet suscite de vives pre·occupations tant en ce qui concerne le respect et la conservation des caracte·ristiques environnementales de cette zone arche·ologique qui est demeure·e jusque-la‘ intacte, que le patrimoine arche·ologique lui-me(cid:136)me, e·tant donne· que: a) en relevant, en agrandissant et en cimentant les ruines d(cid:146)une ancienne ferme, a‘ proximite· des tombes, a e·te· e·difie·e une construction tre‘s voyante, qui ne cadre manifestement pas avec les ruines arche·ologiques adjacentes; b) dans cette me(cid:136)me zone arche·ologique, le projet pre·voit la construction d(cid:146)un parking devant accueillir plus de 2 000 voitures;


title: ΓΡΑΠΤΗ ΕΡΩΤΗΣΗ αρ θ. 553/98 του Alexandros ALAVANOS προς την Επ τροπή. Περιφερειακό Επιχειρησιακό Πρόγραμμα Αττικής- Υποπρόγραμμα 1 Μέτρο 2.

eurovoc_concepts:
Community support framework
Greece
storage of waste
waste management
waste recycling

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title: ΓΡΑΠΤΗ ΕΡΩΤΗΣΗ αρ θ. 563/98 του Ernesto CACCAVALE προς την Επ τροπή. Κακή χρήση των πιστώσεων του προγράμματος Life

eurovoc_concepts:
EU programme
Emilia-Romagna
degradation of the environment
environmental protection
freshwater
saltwater
stagnant water
use of aid
water treatment

text: 19. 11. 98 EL Epi·shmh Efhmeri·da tvn Eyrvpai¤kv· n Koinoth·tvn C 354/9 H Epitroph· ype·bale sto Koinoboy·lio ton apologismo· ajiolo·ghsh·w thw toy e·toyw 1997 kai to pro·gramma ergasi·aw gia to 1998 me ekti·mhsh toy ko·stoyw ajiolo·ghshw. (cid:211)son afora· thn perifereiakh· politikh· kai tiw ene·rgeiew ajiolo·ghshw poy a·rxise h Epitroph·, to ko·stow ayto· ei·nai thw ta·jhw tvn 4,5 ekat. ECU to 1997 kai oi proble·ceiw gia to 1998 ei·nai peri·poy 2,5 ekat. ECU symperilambanome·nvn tvn meuodologikv· n ergasiv· n. (cid:211)son afora· thn agrotikh· ana·ptyjh, oi dapa·new gia to 1997 ei·nai thw ta·jhw tvn 450. 000 ECU. (98/C 354/12) GRAPTH ERVTHSH E-0558/98 ypobolh· : Bryan Cassidy (PPE) prow thn Epitroph· (4 Marti·oy 1998) Ue·ma: Parakampth·riow sto Dorset, HB Ti prota·seiw e·xei dextei· h Epitroph· a) apo· thn Kybe·rnhsh toy HB kai b) apo· to Dhmotiko· Symboy·lio toy Dorset o·son afora· thn proteino·menh parakampth·rio toy Sandford kai Halton Heath (Wareham Dorset); Apa· nthsh toy k. Kinnock ej ono· matow thw Epitroph· w (8 Aprili·oy 1998) H Epitroph· den e·labe pote· pro·tash ek me·royw thw kybe·rnhshw toy Hnvme·noy Basilei·oy h· tvn arxv· n toy Dorset sxetika· me thn parakampth·ria odo· Sandford/Halton Heath kai vw ek toy·toy to e·rgo ayto· den symperielh·fuh stoyw koinotikoy·w prosanatolismoy·w gia thn ana·ptyjh toy dieyrvpai¤koy· dikty·oy metaforv· n (apo·fash EK ariu. 1692/96 (1)). (1) EE L 228 thw 9. 9. 1996. (98/C 354/13) GRAPTH ERVTHSH E-0563/98 ypobolh· : Ernesto Caccavale (UPE) prow thn Epitroph· (4 Marti·oy 1998) Ue·ma: Kakh· xrh·sh tvn pistv· sevn toy progra·mmatow Life Sthn perioxh· toy dh·moy thw Rabe·na thw Itali·aw se parauala·ssia perioxh· onomazo·menh Piallassa Baiona, zv· nh poy geitnia·zei me to perifereiako· pa·rko toy De·lta toy Pa·doy, kata· parabi·ash tvn ypoxrev· sevn kai toy dikaiv· matow tvn politv· n na aliey·oyn (ypoxre·vsh Sic. ZPS. IT 4700004 › Sy·mbash thw Be·rnhw kai toy Ramsa·r), o Dh·mow thw Rabe·na e·xei ektele·sei kai ejakoloyuei· na ektelei· e·rga, xvri·w kami·a a·deia h· synai·nesh, o·pvw proble·petai, thw epitroph·w politv· n gia th dhmioyrgi·a peiramatikv· n egkatasta· sevn fytoka·uarshw ej aiti·aw tvn opoi·vn ta y·data thw koila·daw tei·noyn na metablhuoy·n apo· yfa·lmyra se glyka·, me sobare·w syne·peiew gia thn aliei·a. Vw ek toy·toy, h ekte·lesh tvn e·rgvn aytv· n dhmioyrgei· sobaroy·w kindy·noyw gia to fysiko· periba·llon thw perioxh·w, e·rgvn ta opoi·a ekteloy·ntai kai me pistv· seiw apo· to koinotiko· pro·gramma LIFE. Zhtoy·me, synepv· w, apo· thn Epitroph·: na dieykrinisuoy·n a·mesa o·lew oi para·metroi toy ue·matow• na diereynhuei· h dynato·thta diakoph·w ka·ue parano·mvw xorhgoy·menhw xrhmatodo·thshw. Apa· nthsh thw kaw Bjerregaard ej ono·matow thw Epitroph· w (5 Mai(cid:143)oy 1998) Ba·sei tvn diaue·simvn plhroforiv· n, to peiramatiko· pra·sino sy·sthma dih·uhshw, sto opoi·o anafe·retai to Ajio·timo Me·low toy Koinoboyli·oy, den perilamba·netai se oiodh·pote e·rgo poy xrhmatodotei·tai sto plai·sio toy xrhmatodotikoy· me·soy LIFE. (cid:211)so gia tiw endexo·menew epiptv· seiw toy sthn perioxh· eidikh·w prostasi·aw (SPA) «Piallassa Baiona», h Epitroph· ua zhth·sei peraite·rv plhrofori·ew apo· tiw eunike·w arxe·w


title: Decizia Comisiei din 4 martie 1998 de modificare a Deciziei 97/467/CE de stabilire a listelor provizorii cu unitățile din țări terțe din care statele membre autorizează importurile de carne de iepure și de vânat de crescătorieText cu relevanță pentru SEE.

eurovoc_concepts:
game meat
health legislation
import
livestock farming
rabbit meat
third country

formats: pdf print xhtml

text: 03/vol. 23 RO Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene 233 31998D0219 L 82/44 JURNALUL OFICIAL AL COMUNITĂȚILOR EUROPENE 19. 3. 1998 DECIZIA COMISIEI din 4 martie 1998 de modificare a Deciziei 97/467/CE de stabilire a listelor provizorii cu unitățile din țări terțe din care statele membre autorizează importurile de carne de iepure ș(cid:13)i de vânat de crescătorie (Text cu relevanță pentru SEE) (98/219/CE) COMISIA COMUNITĂȚILOR EUROPENE, ADOPTĂ PREZENTA DECIZIE: având în vedere Tratatul de instituire a Comunității Europene, având în vedere Decizia 95/408/CE a Consiliului din 22 iunie 1995 privind condițiile de întocmire, pentru o perioadă interimară, a listelor provizorii cu unitățile din țările terțe din care statele membre sunt autorizate să importe unele produse de origine animală, produse pescăreș(cid:13)ti ș(cid:13)i moluș(cid:13)te bivalve vii (1), astfel cum a fost modificată ultima dată prin Decizia 97/34/CE (2) a Consiliului, în special articolul 2 alineatul (4), întrucât, prin Decizia 97/467/CE (3) a Comisiei, astfel cum a fost modificată ultima dată prin Decizia 98/103/CE (4), au fost stabi- lite liste provizorii cu unități producătoare de carne de iepure ș(cid:13)i de vânat de crescătorie; întrucât Noua Zeelandă ș(cid:13)i Croația au transmis câte o listă cu unități producătoare de carne de iepure ș(cid:13)i de carne de vânat de crescătorie despre care autoritățile responsabile declară că sunt în conformitate cu normele comunitare; întrucât, în consecință, pentru Noua Zeelandă ș(cid:13)i Croația se poate stabili o listă provizorie cu unități producătoare de carne de iepure ș(cid:13)i de carne de vânat de crescătorie; întrucât măsurile prevăzute de prezenta decizie sunt conforme cu avizul Comitetului permanent veterinar, Articolul 1 Anexa la prezenta decizie se adaugă la anexa la Decizia 97/467/CE. Articolul 2 Prezenta decizie se aplică de la 20 februarie 1998. Articolul 3 Prezenta decizie se adresează statelor membre. Adoptată la Bruxelles, 4 martie 1998. Pentru Comisie Franz FISCHLER Membru al Comisiei (1) (2) (3) (4) JO L 243, 11. 10. 1995, p. 17. JO L 13, 16. 1. 1997, p. 33. JO L 199, 26. 7. 1997, p. 57. JO L 25, 31. 1. 1998, p. 96. 234 RO Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene 03/vol. 23 ANEXO — BILAG — ANHANG — ΠΑΡΑΡΤΗΜΑ — ANNEX — ANNEXE — ALLEGATO — BIJLAGE — ANEXO — LIITE — BILAGA „País: NUEVA ZELANDA / Land: NEW ZEALAND / Land: NEUSEELAND / Χώρα: ΝΕΑ ΖΗΛΑΝΔΙΑ / Country: NEW ZEALAND / Pays: NOUVELLE-ZÉLANDE / Paese: NUOVA ZELANDA / Land: NIEUW-ZEELAND / País: NOVA ZELÂNDIA / Maa: UUSI-SEELANTI / Land: NYA ZEELAND 1 2 DSP 2 Summit Venison Ltd 3 Kaimai 4 Tauranga DSP 3 PPCS Mossburn Mossburn Mossburn DSP 5 Game Meats NZ Ltd South Kaipara Head Helensville DSP 7 Mair Venison DSP 12 Progressive Venison Hokitika Hastings Hokitika Hastings DSP 16 Mair Venison Kennington Invercargill DSP 17 Mair Venison - Rotorua DSP 18 Venison Packers Feilding Limited DSP 19 Mountain River Processors DSP 20 Venex Limited Rotorua Feilding Rakaia Wairoa Rotorua Feilding Rakaia Wairoa DSP 23 PPCS Islington Islington Christchurch DSP 25 Otago Venison Ltd DSP 26 PPCS Burnside Limited DSP 27 Pacifica Venison Ltd Invermay Burnside Kotinga Mosgiel Dunedin Takaka DSP 28 Pacifica Venison Limited Oxford North Canterbury ME 50 Alliance Group Ltd Lorneville Lorneville Southland ME 56 AFFCO New Zealand Limited ME 117 Clover Export Limited Te Puke Gore Te Puke Gore PH 3 Waitaki Biosciences International Ltd Christchurch Christchurch PH 14 Richmond Limited Hastings Hastings 5 SH SH SH SH SH SH SH SH SH SH SH SH SH SH SH CP-CS CP-CS CP-CS CP-CS CP-CS PH 15 AFFCO New Zealand Limited Mount Maunganui South Mount Maunganui South CP-CS 6 b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b 03/vol. 23 RO Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene 235 1 2 3 4 PH 21 Mair Venison Ltd Kennington Invercargill PH 23 Mair Venison Ltd PH 26 McFarlane Laboratories NZ Ltd PH 27 Defiance Processors Limited PH 30 Progressive Venison Rotorua Avondale Dunedin Hastings Rotorua Auckland Dunedin Hastings PH 55 Canterbury Frozen Meat Company Limited Harewood Christchurch PH 58 PPCS Mossburn PH 69 F. J. Ramsey Meats (Paerata) Ltd PH 71 Progressive Meats Limited PH 83 Venex Limited Mossburn Paerata Hastings Wairoa Mossburn Auckland Hastings Wairoa PH 127 Game Meats NZ Ltd South Kaipara Head Helensville PH 131 Summit Venison Ltd PH 204 Constantia Foods Limited PH 206 Mair Venison Limited PH 208 Waitotara Meat Co Ltd PH 214 Garrett International Meats Ltd PH 353 PPCS Burnside Division PH 366 PPCS Islington Ltd PH 367 Venison Packers Fielding Limited PH 376 Otago Venison Ltd PH 391 Pacifica Venison Ltd PH 423 Mountain River Processors PH 436 BioProducts (New Zealand) Limited PH 469 Pacifica Venison Limited Kaimai Greerton Hokitika Tirau Penrose Burnside Islington Fielding Invermay Kotinga Rakaia Mosgiel Oxford Tauranga Tauranga Hokitika Tirau Auckland Dunedin Islington Fielding Mosgiel Takaka Rakaia Mosgiel North Canterbury 5 CP-CS CP-CS CP-CS CP-CS CP-CS CP-CS CP-CS CP-CS CP-CS CP-CS CP-CS CP-CS CP-CS CP-CS CP-CS CP-CS CP-CS CP-CS CP-CS CP-CS CP-CS CP-CS CP-CS CP-CS „País: CROACIA / Land: KROATIEN / Land: KROATIEN / Χώρα: ΚΡΟΑΤΙΑ / Country: CROATIA / Pays: CROATIE / Paese: CROAZIA / Land: KROATIË / País: CROÁCIA / Maa: KROATIA / Land: KROATIEN 1 2 201 Contractor d. o. o. 3 Zupanja 4 — 5 SH-CP 6 b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b” 6 a”


title: Monatliches Panorama der Europäischen Industrie. NUMMER 2/98 FEBRUAR 1998.

eurovoc_concepts:
consumer price
foreign trade
industrial statistics
price index
trade balance


title: 98/197/ΚΕΠΠΑ: Κοινή θέση της 4ης Μαρτίου 1998 που καθόρισε το Συμβούλιο βάσει του άρθρου Ι.2 της συνθήκης για την Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση, σχετικά με την πορεία θέσπισης ενός νομικά δεσμευτικού πρωτοκόλλου που θα ενισχύσει την τήρηση της σύμβασης για την απαγόρευση της ανάπτυξης, παραγωγής και αποθήκευσης βιολογικών και τοξινικών όπλων και για την καταστροφή τους (BTWC), και την εντατικοποίηση των σχετικών εργασιών της Ad Hoc ομάδας

eurovoc_concepts:
Treaty on European Union
biological weapon
common position
non-proliferation of arms
weapon of mass destruction

text: L 75/2 EL Epi(cid:228)rglg Eugleqi(cid:228)da sxm Etqxpałjx(cid:228) m Joimosg(cid:228) sxm 12. 3. 98 JOIMG HERG sgy 4gy Laqsi(cid:228)ot 1998 pot jaho(cid:228) qire so Rtlbot(cid:228) kio b(cid:243)rei sot (cid:243)qhqot I. 2 sgy rtmhg(cid:228) jgy cia sgm Etqxpałjg(cid:228) Łmxrg, rvesij(cid:243) le sgm poqei(cid:228)a he(cid:228) rpirgy emo(cid:228) y molij(cid:243) derletsijot(cid:228) pqxsojo(cid:228) kkot pot ha emirvt(cid:228) rei sgm sg(cid:228) qgrg sgy rt(cid:228) lbargy cia sgm apaco(cid:228) qetrg sgy am(cid:243)pstngy, paqacxcg(cid:228) y jai apohg(cid:228) jetrgy biokocijx(cid:228) m jai sonimijx(cid:228) m o(cid:228) pkxm jai cia sgm jasarsqoug(cid:228) soty (BTWC), jai sgm emsasijopoi(cid:228)grg sxm rvesijx(cid:228) m eqcarix(cid:228) m sgy Ad Hoc ol(cid:243)day (98/197/JEPPA) SO RTLBOTKIO SGR ETQXPAæJGR EMXRGR, Łvomsay tpo(cid:228) wg sg rtmhg(cid:228) jg cia sgm Etqxpałjg(cid:228) Łmxrg, jai idi(cid:228)xy so (cid:243)qhqo I. 2, Ejsilx(cid:228) msay o(cid:228) si, rsiy 25 Iotmi(cid:228)ot 1996, so Rtlbot(cid:228) kio jaho(cid:228) qire sgm joimg(cid:228) he(cid:228) rg 96/408/JEPPA rvesij(cid:243) le sgm pqopaqa- rjetg(cid:228) sgy se(cid:228) saqsgy di(cid:243)rjewgy epamene(cid:228) sargy sgy rt(cid:228) lbargy cia sgm apaco(cid:228) qetrg sgy am(cid:243)pstngy, paqacxcg(cid:228) y jai apohg(cid:228) - jetrgy bajsgqiokocijx(cid:228) m (biokocijx(cid:228) m) jai sonimijx(cid:228) m o(cid:228) pkxm jai cia sgm jasarsqoug(cid:228) atsx(cid:228) m (BTWC) (1), JAHOQIRE SGM AJOKOTHG JOIMG HERG: (cid:210)qhqo 1 Rso(cid:228) voy sgy paqot(cid:228) ray joimg(cid:228) y he(cid:228) rgy ei(cid:228)mai ma pqoxhg(cid:228) rei sgm e(cid:228) cjaiqg jai epistvg(cid:228) okojkg(cid:228) qxrg sxm diapqaclaset(cid:228) rexm pot dien(cid:243)comsai rso pkai(cid:228)rio sgy Ad Hoc ol(cid:243)day BTWC cia sgm ejpo(cid:228) mgrg emo(cid:228) y molij(cid:243) derletsijot(cid:228) pqxsojo(cid:228) kkot pot ha jahieqx(cid:228) mei rt(cid:228) rsgla eke(cid:228) cvot jai rtllo(cid:228) quxrgy, so opoi(cid:228)o ha emirvt(cid:228) rei aposekerlasij(cid:243) sg rt(cid:228) lbarg. (cid:210)qhqo 2 Cia soty rjopot(cid:228) y sot (cid:243)qhqot 1, sa jq(cid:243)sg le(cid:228) kg hexqot(cid:228) m 1. o(cid:228) si, jas(cid:243) so 1998, g diehmg(cid:228) y joimo(cid:228) sgsa ha pqe(cid:228) pei ma apodx(cid:228) - rei twgkg(cid:228) pqoseqaio(cid:228) sgsa rsiy diapqaclaset(cid:228) reiy cia e(cid:228) ma pqxso(cid:228) jokko sgy BTWC jai ha pqxhg(cid:228) rotm apouarirsij(cid:243) siy eqcari(cid:228)ey sgy ol(cid:243)day, x(cid:228) rse oi diapqaclaset(cid:228) reiy epi(cid:228) sgy otri(cid:228)ay ma okojkgqxhot(cid:228) m le(cid:228) vqi so se(cid:228) koy sot 1998, jai so pqxso(cid:228) jokko ma ecjqihei(cid:228) apo(cid:228) lia eidijg(cid:228) di(cid:243)rjewg sxm jqasx(cid:228) m leqx(cid:228) m rsiy aqve(cid:228) y sot 1999. Sa jq(cid:243)sg le(cid:228) kg hexqot(cid:228) m rglamsijo(cid:228) ma dohei(cid:228) rsiy dia- 2. pqaclaset(cid:228) reiy sgy ol(cid:243)day o amacjai(cid:228)oy vqo(cid:228) moy x(cid:228) rse ma okojkgqxhot(cid:228) m rt(cid:228) msola. Sa jq(cid:243)sg le(cid:228) kg ha pie(cid:228) rotm, rso pkai(cid:228)rio sgy Ad Hoc ol(cid:243)day, x(cid:228) rse ma dohei(cid:228) epaqjg(cid:228) y vqo(cid:228) moy. Idiaise(cid:228) qxy, sa jq(cid:243)sg le(cid:228) kg ha rtmeqcarsot(cid:228) m x(cid:228) rse rsiy 3. diapqaclaset(cid:228) reiy ma episetvhei(cid:228) rtluxmi(cid:228)a rsa eng(cid:228) y rsoivei(cid:228)a, (1) EE L 168 sgy 6. 7. 1996, r. 3. sa opoi(cid:228)a e(cid:228) votm jemsqijg(cid:228) jai otrix(cid:228) dg rglari(cid:228)a cia sg rt(cid:228) msang emo(cid:228) y aposekerlasijot(cid:228) pqxsojo(cid:228) kkot pot ha emi- rvt(cid:228) ei sgm sg(cid:228) qgrg sgy BTWC: ˙ dgkx(cid:228) reiy cia e(cid:228) ma u(cid:243)rla ecjasars(cid:243)rexm jai dqarsg- qiosg(cid:228) sxm pot pihamo(cid:228) m ma apojsg(cid:228) rotm rglari(cid:228)a b(cid:243)rei sgy rt(cid:228) lbargy, x(cid:228) rse ma episetvhei(cid:228) lecakt(cid:228) seqg diau(cid:243)meia, ˙ pqo(cid:228) bkewg epirje(cid:228) wexm rsiy ecjasars(cid:243)reiy, x(cid:228) rse oi dgkx(cid:228) reiy ma ei(cid:228)mai ajqibei(cid:228)y jai pkg(cid:228) qeiy jai ma emirvthei(cid:228) g diau(cid:243)meia jai g elpirsort(cid:228) mg, ˙ pqo(cid:228) bkewg save(cid:228) xm jai aposekerlasijx(cid:228) m eqetmx(cid:228) m re peqi(cid:228)psxrg jasaccekole(cid:228) mxm paqabi(cid:243)rexm, oi opoi(cid:228)ey ha peqikalb(cid:243)motm e(cid:228) qetmey ecjasars(cid:243)rexm jai episo(cid:228) piey e(cid:228) qetmey, ˙ dgliotqci(cid:228)a emo(cid:228) y aposekerlasijot(cid:228) apo(cid:228) pketq(cid:243)y jo(cid:228) rsoty le okicoleke(cid:228) y lo(cid:228) milo ijamot(cid:228) ma tkopoig(cid:228) rei aposekerlasij(cid:243) so jai amenaqsg(cid:228) sot oqcamirlot(cid:228) pqorxpijo(cid:228) , pqxso(cid:228) jokko. Epi(cid:228)rgy, sa jq(cid:243)sg le(cid:228) kg ha rtmevi(cid:228)rotm ma pqoxhot(cid:228) m sgm 4. oijotlemijo(cid:228) sgsa sgy rt(cid:228) lbargy. (cid:210)qhqo 3 G dq(cid:243)rg pqoy tporsg(cid:228) qing sxm rso(cid:228) vxm pot jahoqi(cid:228)fomsai rsa (cid:243)qhqa 1 jai 2 amxse(cid:228) qx peqikalb(cid:243)mei: ˙ sgm ej le(cid:228) qoty sxm jqasx(cid:228) m lekx(cid:228) m amafg(cid:228) sgrg joimx(cid:228) m he(cid:228) - rexm jas(cid:243) siy diapqaclaset(cid:228) reiy, lesant(cid:228) (cid:243)kkxm jai sgm paqotri(cid:228)arg eidijx(cid:228) m eccq(cid:243)uxm jai pqos(cid:243)rexm rsgm ol(cid:243)- da, idi(cid:228)xy rsoty solei(cid:228)y jai sa rglei(cid:228)a le jemsqijg(cid:228) rgla- ri(cid:228)a pot jahoqi(cid:228)fomsai rso (cid:243)qhqo 2 paq(cid:243)cqauoy 3, ˙ diabg(cid:228) lasa sgy pqoedqi(cid:228)ay pqoy sa jq(cid:243)sg le(cid:228) qg, tpo(cid:228) siy pqoøpohe(cid:228) reiy jahoqi(cid:228)fomsai I. 5 paq(cid:243)cqauoy 3 sgy rtmhg(cid:228) jgy, x(cid:228) rse ma enaruakirhei(cid:228) g tporsg(cid:228) qing(cid:228) soty pqoy soty rso(cid:228) voty sot (cid:243)qhqot 2 sgy paqot(cid:228) ray joimg(cid:228) y he(cid:228) rgy, (cid:243)qhqo pot rso ˙ diabg(cid:228) lasa sgy pqoedqi(cid:228)ay, tpo(cid:228) siy pqoøpohe(cid:228) reiy pot oqi(cid:228)- fei so (cid:243)qhqo I. 5 paq(cid:243)cqauoy 3 sgy rtmhg(cid:228) jgy, pqoy sa jq(cid:243)sg sa opoi(cid:228)a dem e(cid:228) votm ajo(cid:228) lg tpocq(cid:243)wei sg rt(cid:228) lbarg BTWC jai pqoy sa jq(cid:243)sg sa opoi(cid:228)a sgm e(cid:228) votm lem tpo- cq(cid:243)wei akk(cid:243) dem sgm e(cid:228) votm ajo(cid:228) lg epijtqx(cid:228) rei, x(cid:228) rse ma pqoxhghei(cid:228) g oijotlemijo(cid:228) sgs(cid:243) sgy, 12. 3. 98 EL Epi(cid:228)rglg Eugleqi(cid:228)da sxm Etqxpałjx(cid:228) m Joimosg(cid:228) sxm L 75/3 ˙ epaue(cid:228) y lesant(cid:228) sxm jtbeqmg(cid:228) rexm sxm jqasx(cid:228) m lekx(cid:228) m, sgy Episqopg(cid:228) y jai sgy biolgvami(cid:228)ay, jahx(cid:228) y jai relim(cid:243)qia, le rso(cid:228) vo sgm jakt(cid:228) seqg jasamo(cid:228) grg lesant(cid:228) sxm ejpqorx(cid:228) pxm sgy etqxpałjg(cid:228) y biolgvami(cid:228)ay jai ejei(cid:228)mxm pot rtlle- se(cid:228) votm rsiy diapqaclaset(cid:228) reiy rso pkai(cid:228)rio sgy Ad Hoc ol(cid:243)day. (cid:210)qhqo 4 G paqot(cid:228) ra joimg(cid:228) he(cid:228) rg si(cid:228)hesai re irvt(cid:228) jas(cid:243) sgm gleqolgmi(cid:228)a ecjqi(cid:228)rex(cid:228) y sgy. (cid:210)qhqo 5 G paqot(cid:228) ra joimg(cid:228) he(cid:228) rg dgloriet(cid:228) esai rsgm Epi(cid:228)rglg Eug- leqi(cid:228)da. Bqtne(cid:228) kkey, 4 Laqsi(cid:228)ot 1998. Cia so Rtlbot(cid:228) kio O Pqo(cid:228) edqoy G. BROWN


title: WRITTEN QUESTION No. 545/98 by Roberta ANGELILLI to the Commission. Cable car disaster caused by a US military aeroplane

eurovoc_concepts:
Autonomous Province of Trento
United States
air safety
air traffic
civil defence
civilian victim
judicial inquiry
man-made disaster
military aircraft
transport accident


title: SCHRIFTLICHE ANFRAGE Nr. 583/98 von José BARROS MOURA an die Kommission. Kinderarbeit

eurovoc_concepts:
Africa
EU relations
International Labour Office
Lomé Convention
child
child labour
child protection
children's rights
report
slavery

text: C 310/96 DE Amtsblatt der Europa¤ischen Gemeinschaften 9. 10. 98 Die internationalen Ausschreibungen werden im Amtsblatt der Gemeinschaft sowie im Amtsblatt der AKP-Staaten vero¤ffentlicht. In der Bekanntmachung der Ausschreibungen werden die Anschriften der Stellen angegeben, bei denen die Ausschreibungsunterlagen angefordert oder eingesehen werden ko¤nnen. (In Europa sind dies die Bu¤ros der Kommission in den Mitgliedstaaten und in Belgien die Dienststelle Ausschreibungen). Au(cid:223)erdem ko¤nnen die Informationen u¤ber den Stand der Projekte und der jeweiligen Ausschreibungen unter der Internet-Adresse der GD VIII: http://europa. eu. int/en/comm/dg08/dgviii. htm abgerufen werden. Die Teilnahme an den Ausschreibungen und den Auftra¤gen des EEF steht den Unternehmen der Mitgliedstaaten und den Unternehmen der AKP-Staaten zu gleichen Bedingungen offen. Die Termine der Bekanntgabe und die Auswahlkriterien sind je nach Auftrag verschieden. Die Frist fu¤r die Angebotseinreichung betra¤gt mindestens 90 Tage vom Zeitpunkt der Vero¤ffentlichung an gerechnet. Statistiken werden nur u¤ber die Zuschlagsempfa¤nger gefu¤hrt. Dem Herrn Abgeordneten und dem Generalse- kretariat des Parlaments werden die Statistiken fu¤r das Jahr 1996 u¤ber die wertma¤(cid:223)ige und anteilma¤(cid:223)ige Aufschlu¤sselung der Zuschla¤ge fu¤r international ausgeschriebene EEF-Auftra¤ge auf die Mitgliedstaaten direkt u¤bermittelt. (1) ABl. L 382 vom 31. 12. 1990. (98/C 310/128) SCHRIFTLICHE ANFRAGE E-0583/98 von Jose· Barros Moura (PSE) an die Kommission (4. Ma¤rz 1998) Betrifft: Kinderarbeit Das IAA vero¤ffentlichte ku¤rzlich einen Bericht u¤ber Kinder in Afrika, die meist unter schwersten, ausbeuteri- schen Bedingungen und zum Nachteil ihrer schulischen Bildung arbeiten und deren Zahl voraussichtlich um eine Million ja¤hrlich (laut Bericht von derzeit 80 Millionen auf 100 Millionen bis zum Jahr 2015) steigen wird. Angesichts der Verbindung zwischen diesem Problem, der Verschlechterung der wirtschaftlich- sozialen Lage in Afrika und der Verantwortung der EU im Rahmen des Abkommens von Lome· frage ich die Kommission, welche Ma(cid:223)nahmen sie ergreifen wird, um den Opfern dieser tragischen Zusammenha¤nge zu helfen? Antwort von Herrn Pinheiro im Namen der Kommission (1. April 1998) Der Herr Abgeordnete wird auf die Antwort der Kommission auf die schriftliche Anfrage P-3355/97 von Herrn Fernandez Martin (1) verwiesen. (1) ABl. C 158 vom 25. 5. 1998, S. 91. (98/C 310/129) SCHRIFTLICHE ANFRAGE P-0586/98 von Giovanni Burtone (PPE) an die Kommission (23. Februar 1998) Betrifft: Vorzugstarife von Alitalia › Versto(cid:223) gegen die Wettbewerbsregeln Die Fluggesellschaft Alitalia hat im Anschlu(cid:223) an einen Beschlu(cid:223) der Europa¤ischen Kommission einige (cid:132)Vorzugstarife(cid:147) abgeschafft, die fu¤r einige ihrer italienischen Flugstrecken, und insbesondere die Verbindungen zu den Inseln, galten. Diese Tarife hatten › einerseits in den letzten Monaten eine Zunahme des Fremdenverkehrs in den a¤u(cid:223)ersten Randgebieten des Landes (insbesondere in Sizilien und Sardinien) ermo¤glicht, was fu¤r diejenigen, die vom Fremdenverkehr leben, offensichtlich von Vorteil war, › andererseits zu einer Erleichterung von Reisen der Einwohner dieser Randgebiete ins u¤brige Italien gefu¤hrt


title: SCHRIFTLICHE ANFRAGE Nr. 603/98 von Bartho PRONK an die Kommission. Gesellschaftspolitische Erwachsenenbildung und ihr Stellenwert in der Bildungspolitik der Kommission

eurovoc_concepts:
EU financing
EU programme
European citizenship
adult education
aid to disadvantaged groups
civics
cultural policy
equal treatment
regional aid
social policy

text: C 310/100 DE Amtsblatt der Europa¤ischen Gemeinschaften 9. 10. 98 (98/C 310/133) SCHRIFTLICHE ANFRAGE E-0602/98 von Arthur Newens (PSE) an die Kommission (4. Ma¤rz 1998) Betrifft: Vergleich der staatlichen Altersrenten in den Mitgliedstaaten der Europa¤ischen Union Ko¤nnte die Kommission im Anschlu(cid:223) an ihre Antworten auf die schriftlichen Anfragen Nr. 2620/88 (1) und 792/92 (2) betreffend einen Vergleich der staatlichen Altersrenten in den Mitgliedstaaten der Europa¤ischen Union nun den fu¤r eine Einzelperson, die ihre Beitragsleistungen wa¤hrend der gesamten Arbeitszeit entrichtet hat, zum Zeitpunkt ihres gesetzlichen Rentenalters entsprechend den neuesten vorliegenden Zahlen nach dem letzten Stand berechneten Rentenwert mitteilen? (1) ABl. C 262 vom 16. 10. 1989, S. 58 (2) ABl. C 16 vom 21. 1. 1993, S. 5 Antwort von Herrn de Silguy im Namen der Kommission (20. April 1998) Die Kommission u¤bermittelt dem Herrn Abgeordneten und dem Sekretariat des Parlaments erste Scha¤tzungen im Rahmen einer Untersuchung von Eurostat zur Aktualisierung der 1990 erstmals vero¤ffentlichten (cid:132)Altersversor- gungsquotienten › Band 1(cid:147). Die gesamte Methodik und endgu¤ltige Scha¤tzungen fu¤r die acht untersuchten Mitgliedstaaten werden im Juni 1998 vero¤ffentlicht. (98/C 310/134) SCHRIFTLICHE ANFRAGE E-0603/98 von Bartho Pronk (PPE) an die Kommission (4. Ma¤rz 1998) Betrifft: Gesellschaftspolitische Erwachsenenbildung und ihr Stellenwert in der Bildungspolitik der Kommis- sion Sieht die Kommission die gesellschaftspolitische Erwachsenenbildung als Basis des Zusammenwachsens der EU und wenn ja, wie meint sie in ihrem Programm diesem Anspruch gerecht zu werden? Stimmt es, da(cid:223) es keine eigene Haushaltslinie fu¤r Erwachsenenbildung gibt? Stimmt es, da(cid:223) die Kommission gesellschaftspolitische Themen nur im Augenblick ihrer Aktualita¤t fu¤r die Kommission (z. B. Euro) fo¤rdert, aber den NGO keine Mo¤glichkeit zur Finanzierung der von den NGO gewa¤hlten Themen durch die Kommission gibt? Wo gibt es Mo¤glichkeiten zur Finanzierung von Bildungsveranstaltungen zu ethischen Themen und Wertefragen sowie methodischen Fragen der gesellschaftspolitischen Bildung im Rahmen der Erwachsenenbildung, die durch NGO getragen werden? Ist die Kommission bereit, die gesellschaftspolitische Erwachsenenbildung als eigenen Bildungssektor neben Universita¤ts-, Berufs- und Schulbildung anzuerkennen und zu fo¤rdern? Antwort von Frau Cresson im Namen der Kommission (8. April 1998) Die Kommission mi(cid:223)t der Entwicklung der Erwachsenenbildung gro(cid:223)e Bedeutung bei. Das SOCRATES- Programm soll die europa¤ische Zusammenarbeit im Bereich der Erwachsenenbildung verbessern und so bei den Erwachsenen den Gedanken der europa¤ischen Staatsbu¤rgerschaft, der sozialen Integration und das Wissen u¤ber die kulturellen Unterschiede zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten fo¤rdern. Fu¤r die Erwachsenenbildung gibt es keine eigene Haushaltslinie. Der hierfu¤r vorgesehene Haushalt ist im SOCRATES-Programm (Aktion 3. 5. A) enthalten


title: PERGUNTA ESCRITA n. 563/98 do Deputado Ernesto CACCAVALE à Comissão. Má utilização dos fundos do programa LIFE

text: 19. 11. 98 PT Jornal Oficial das Comunidades Europeias C 354/9 A Comissa(cid:152)o apresentou ao Parlamento o seu balan(cid:231)o de avalia(cid:231)a(cid:152)o de 1997, assim como o seu programa de trabalhos para 1998, acompanhados de uma estimativa dos custos dae avalia(cid:231)a(cid:152)o. Para a pol(cid:14)·tica regional e as ac(cid:231)o(cid:152)es de avalia(cid:231)a(cid:152)o iniciadas pela Comissa(cid:152)o esse custo e· da ordem de 4,5 milho(cid:152)es de ECU em 1997, sendo as previso(cid:152)es para 1998 de cerca de 2,5 milho(cid:152)es de ECU, incluindo os trabalhos metodolo·gicos. A t(cid:14)·tulo do desenvolvimento rural as despesas de 1997 sa(cid:152)o de cerca de 450 000 ECU. (98/C 354/12) PERGUNTA ESCRITA E-0558/98 apresentada por Bryan Cassidy (PPE) a‘ Comissa(cid:152)o (4 de Mar(cid:231)o de 1998) Objecto: Estrada de circunvala(cid:231)a(cid:152)o em Dorset (Reino Unido) Que contactos estabeleceram com a Comissa(cid:152)o o Governo brita(cid:136)nico e o County Council de Dorset a respeito do projecto de tra(cid:231)ado da estrada de circunvala(cid:231)a(cid:152)o de Sandford/Halton Heath, em Wareham (Dorset)? Resposta dada pelo Comissa·rio Kinnock em nome da Comissa(cid:152)o (8 de Abril de 1998) A Comissa(cid:152)o nunca foi abordada pelo Governo do Reino Unido ou pelas autoridades de Dorset relativamente a‘ estrada de circunvala(cid:231)a(cid:152)o de Sandford e Halton Heath, pelo que a inclusa(cid:152)o dessa estrada nas orienta(cid:231)o(cid:152)es comunita·rias para o desenvolvimento da rede transeuropeia de transportes na(cid:152)o foi considerada (Decisa(cid:152)o no 1692/96 CE (1)). (1) JO L 228 de 9. 9. 1996. (98/C 354/13) PERGUNTA ESCRITA E-0563/98 apresentada por Ernesto Caccavale (UPE) a‘ Comissa(cid:152)o (4 de Mar(cid:231)o de 1998) Objecto: Ma· utiliza(cid:231)a(cid:152)o dos fundos do programa LIFE No territo·rio do munic(cid:14)·pio de Ravena (Ita·lia), numa zona em comunica(cid:231)a(cid:152)o com o mar, chamada Pialassa Baiona, zona adjacente ao parque regional do delta do Po·, em viola(cid:231)a(cid:152)o de diversas normas e do direito de explora(cid:231)a(cid:152)o comum da pesca (norma ZPS. IT 4700004 › Conven(cid:231)a(cid:152)o de Berna e de Ramsar), o munic(cid:14)·pio de Ravena efectuou e continua ainda a efectuar trabalhos, sem a autoriza(cid:231)a(cid:152)o nem o acordo da comissa(cid:152)o de cidada(cid:152)os prevista, para implantar uma instala(cid:231)a(cid:152)o experimental de fito- depura(cid:231)a(cid:152)o, que esta· a transformar a a·gua salobra em a·gua doce, com graves danos para a actividade da pesca. Esta zona, de nota·vel valor ecolo·gico, encontra-se, por conseguinte, em perigo em virtude dos trabalhos realizados, nomeadamente com a ajuda de fundos obtidos no a(cid:136)mbito do projecto comunita·rio LIFE. Nestas circunsta(cid:136)ncias, podera· a Comissa(cid:152)o esclarecer toda esta questa(cid:152)o e considerar a possibilidade de suspender todo o financiamento que se venha a revelar ileg(cid:14)·timo? Resposta dada pela Comissa·ria Bjerregaard em nome da Comissa(cid:152)o (5 de Maio de 1998) Com base na informa(cid:231)a(cid:152)o dispon(cid:14)·vel, a instala(cid:231)a(cid:152)o experimental de fito-depura(cid:231)a(cid:152)o mencionada pelo Senhor Deputado na(cid:152)o faz parte de qualquer projecto financiado no quadro do instrumento financeiro LIFE. No que diz respeito ao seu potencial impacto sobre a zona de protec(cid:231)a(cid:152)o especial (ZPE) «Piallassa Baiona», a Comissa(cid:152)o solicitara· a‘s autoridades nacionais informa(cid:231)o(cid:152)es complementares


title: WRITTEN QUESTION No. 579/98 by Amedeo AMADEO to the Commission. International transport of passengers

eurovoc_concepts:
carriage of passengers
common transport policy
fraud
free competition
freedom to provide services
international transport
liberalisation of the market
protective clause

text: C 402/16 Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning SV 22. 12. 98 Svar fr(cid:229)n Monika Wulf-Mathies p(cid:229) kommissionens v(cid:228)gnar (7 maj 1998) Enligt den finansiella (cid:246)versikt som (cid:228)ndrades den 21 oktober 1997 uppg(cid:229)r de offentliga medlen f(cid:246)r (cid:229)tg(cid:228)rd 1. 2 i det operativa programmet (cid:148)Attika(cid:148) (Eeleonas) som programplanerats till och med 1997 till 5,3 miljoner ecu. Vid det senaste m(cid:246)te som (cid:246)vervakningskommittØn f(cid:246)r gemenskapens st(cid:246)dramar (CCA) h(cid:246)ll den 31 oktober 1997 gjordes inga (cid:228)ndringar av de regionala programmen. F(cid:246)r de tekniska detaljerna r(cid:246)rande den programplanerade verksamheterna samt kring deras framskridande och eventuella f(cid:246)rseningar ber kommissionen parlamentsledamoten att v(cid:228)nda sig till de regionala myndigheter i Attika som (cid:228)r ansvariga f(cid:246)r genomf(cid:246)randet av CCA. Det anslagsbelopp som hade anv(cid:228)nts vid slutet av 1997 (cid:246)verskrider den prognos f(cid:246)r 1997 som (cid:228)ndrades den 21 oktober 1997 och det uppg(cid:229)r till 6,4 miljoner ecu. (98/C 402/017) SKRIFTLIG FR¯GA E-0579/98 fr(cid:229)n Amedeo Amadeo (NI) till kommissionen (4 mars 1998) ˜mne: Internationella passagerartransporter Med h(cid:228)nvisning till artikel 2. 1. 3 i f(cid:246)rordning (EEG) 684/92 (1) av den 16 mars 1992 undrar jag om kommissionen (cid:228)r medveten om att denna artikel, vilken f(cid:246)reskriver ett system med tillst(cid:229)nd f(cid:246)r alla parallella turer som v(cid:228)nder sig till samma kundkrets, helt och h(cid:229)llet strider mot artikel 4. 2 i samma f(cid:246)rordning och att denna motstridighet har lett till utnyttjande av regelbundna specialturer som t(cid:228)cks av ett kontrakt. 1. ˜r kommissionen beredd att vidta (cid:229)tg(cid:228)rder f(cid:246)r att f(cid:229) ett slut p(cid:229) de (cid:148)piratturer(cid:148) som tolereras av vissa medlemsstater? 2. Av vilken orsak sker ingen liberalisering av de regelbundna turer som kr(cid:228)ver tillst(cid:229)nd, s(cid:229) att dessa kan (cid:246)ppnas f(cid:246)r konkurrensen fr(cid:229)n de f(cid:246)retag som har grundats i medlemsstaterna, eftersom de specialturer som betraktas som (cid:148)regelbundna(cid:148) inte kr(cid:228)ver tillst(cid:229)nd och d(cid:228)rf(cid:246)r kan anpassas till de befintliga regelbundna turerna och ers(cid:228)tta dessa med ett kontrakt? (1) EGT L 74, 20. 3. 1992, s. 1. (98/C 402/018) SKRIFTLIG FR¯GA E-0580/98 fr(cid:229)n Amedeo Amadeo (NI) till kommissionen (4 mars 1998) ˜mne: Internationella passagerartransporter I enlighet med artikel 4. 2 i r(cid:229)dets f(cid:246)rordning (EEG) 684/92 (1) av den 16 mars 1992 skall de regelbundna specialturer som definieras i artikel 2. 1. 2 andra stycket punkterna a) › d) inte kr(cid:228)va tillst(cid:229)nd p(cid:229) villkor att de t(cid:228)cks av ett kontrakt mellan organisat(cid:246)ren och transport(cid:246)ren. Anser kommissionen att det (cid:228)r l(cid:228)mpligt att de regelbundna turer som motsvarar definitionen av s(cid:229)dana turer, och som i enlighet med artikel 2. 1. 2 andra stycket punkterna a) › d) inte kr(cid:228)ver tillst(cid:229)nd, systematiskt kan utf(cid:246)ras parallellt med de befintliga regelbundna turer som kr(cid:228)ver tillst(cid:229)nd och p(cid:229) s(cid:229) s(cid:228)tt ta (cid:246)ver kunder fr(cid:229)n dessa? (1) EGT L 74, 20. 3. 1992, s. 1


title: PREGUNTA ESCRITA n. 599/98 del Panayotis LAMBRIAS a la Comisión. Importante contaminación por benceno en la provincia del Ática

eurovoc_concepts:
Central Greece
anti-pollution device
atmospheric pollutant
carcinogenic substance
lead
metal pollution
motor car
petrol
pollution control
vehicle parts


title: Reglamento (CE) n° 515/98 de la Comisión de 4 de marzo de 1998 por el que se fija, para el mes de febrero de 1998, el tipo de conversión agrario específico para el importe del reembolso de los gastos de almacenamiento en el sector del azúcar

eurovoc_concepts:
agri-monetary policy
redemption
representative rate
storage cost
sugar

formats: pdf print

text: L 65/14 ES Diario Oficial de las Comunidades Europeas 5. 3. 98 REGLAMENTO (CE) No 515/98 DE LA COMISI(cid:222)N de 4 de marzo de 1998 por el que se fija, para el mes de febrero de 1998, el tipo de conversi(cid:155)n agrario espec(cid:146)fico para el importe del reembolso de los gastos de almacenamiento en el sector del az(cid:156)car LA COMISI(cid:222)N DE LAS COMUNIDADES EUROPEAS, Visto el Tratado constitutivo de la Comunidad Europea, Visto el Reglamento (CEE) no 1785/81 del Consejo, de 30 de junio de 1981, por el que se establece la organizaci(cid:155)n com(cid:156)n de mercados en el sector del az(cid:156)car (1), cuya (cid:156)ltima modificaci(cid:155)n la constituye el Reglamento (CE) no 1599/96 (2), Visto el Reglamento (CEE) no 3813/92 del Consejo, de 28 de diciembre de 1992, relativo a la unidad de cuenta y a los tipos de conversi(cid:155)n aplicables en el marco de la Pol(cid:146)- tica Agr(cid:146)cola Com(cid:156)n (3), cuya (cid:156)ltima modificaci(cid:155)n la constituye el Reglamento (CE) no 150/95 (4), Visto el Reglamento (CEE) no 1713/93 de la Comisi(cid:155)n, de 30 de junio de 1993, por el que se establecen disposi- ciones especiales para la aplicaci(cid:155)n del tipo de conversi(cid:155)n agrario en el sector del az(cid:156)car (5), cuya (cid:156)ltima modifica- ci(cid:155)n la constituye el Reglamento (CE) no 59/97 (6), y, en particular, el apartado 3 de su art(cid:146)culo 1, Considerando que el apartado 2 del art(cid:146)culo 1 del Regla- mento (CEE) no 1713/93 establece que el importe del reembolso de los gastos de almacenamiento contem- plados en el art(cid:146)culo 8 del Reglamento (CEE) no 1785/81 se convertir(cid:145) en moneda nacional mediante un tipo de conversi(cid:155)n agrario espec(cid:146)fico igual a la media, calculada pro rata temporis, de los tipos de conversi(cid:155)n agrarios aplicables durante el mes de almacenamiento; que dicho tipo de conversi(cid:155)n agrario espec(cid:146)fico se debe fijar cada mes para el mes anterior; Considerando que la aplicaci(cid:155)n de dichas disposiciones conducen a la fijaci(cid:155)n, para el mes de febrero de 1998, del tipo de conversi(cid:155)n agrario espec(cid:146)fico del importe del reembolso de los gastos de almacenamiento en las distintas monedas nacionales con arreglo a lo recogido en el anexo del presente Reglamento, HA ADOPTADO EL PRESENTE REGLAMENTO: Art(cid:146)culo 1 El tipo de conversi(cid:155)n agrario espec(cid:146)fico correspondiente al mes de febrero de 1998 que se utilizar(cid:145) para la conver- si(cid:155)n a cada una de las monedas nacionales del importe del reembolso de los gastos de almacenamiento contem- plado en el art(cid:146)culo 8 del Reglamento (CEE) no 1785/81 ser(cid:145) el fijado en el anexo. Art(cid:146)culo 2 El presente Reglamento entrar(cid:145) en vigor el 5 de marzo de 1998. Ser(cid:145) aplicable con efecto desde el 1 de febrero de 1998. El presente Reglamento ser(cid:145) obligatorio en todos sus elementos y directamente aplicable en cada Estado miembro. Hecho en Bruselas, el 4 de marzo de 1998. Por la Comisi(cid:155)n Franz FISCHLER Miembro de la Comisi(cid:155)n (1) DO L 177 de 1. 7. 1981, p. 4. (2) DO L 206 de 16. 8. 1996, p. 43. (3) DO L 387 de 31. 12. 1992, p. 1. (4) DO L 22 de 31. 1. 1995, p. 1. (5) DO L 159 de 1. 7. 1993, p. 94. (6) DO L 14 de 17. 1. 1997, p. 25. 5. 3. 98 ES Diario Oficial de las Comunidades Europeas L 65/15 ANEXO del Reglamento de la Comisi(cid:155)n, de 4 de marzo de 1998, por el que se fija, para el mes de febrero de 1998, el tipo de conversi(cid:155)n agrario espec(cid:146)fico del importe del reembolso de los gastos de almacenamiento en el sector del az(cid:156)car Tipos de conversi(cid:155)n agrarios 1 ecu = 40,9321 7,54917 1,98243 312,011 167,153 6,68769 0,788784 1 973,93 2,23273 13,9485 201,803 6,02811 8,75582 0,695735 Franco belga y franco luxemburgu(cid:130)s Corona danesa Marco alem(cid:145)n Dracma griega Peseta espa(cid:157)ola Franco franc(cid:130)s Libra irlandesa Lira italiana Flor(cid:146)n neerland(cid:130)s Chel(cid:146)n austriaco Escudo portugu(cid:130)s Marco finland(cid:130)s Corona sueca Libra esterlina


title: EFTA Surveillance Authority Decision No 45/98/COL of 4 March 1998 on the 13th amendment to the procedural and substantive rules in the field of State aid

eurovoc_concepts:
EFTA countries
State aid
aid system
competition law
export credit insurance

text: 23. 4. 98 ‹ EN ‹ Official Journal of the European Communities L 120/27 EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AREA EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY DECISION No 45/98/COL of 4 March 1998 on the 13th amendment to the procedural and substantive rules in the field of State aid THE EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY, has amended the procedural and substantive rules in the field of State aid (1), adopted on 19 January 1994 (2), as last amended on 17 December 1997 (3), as follows. The following rules on short-term export-credit insurance and list of marketable risk countries (for the purpose of application of the rules in Chapter 17A on short-term export-credit in- surance) shall be added to the State aid Guidelines as a new chapter, Chapter 17A, and a new Annex IX, respectively: ‘17A. SHORT-TERM EXPORT-CREDIT INSURANCE (1) 17A. 1. Introduction (1) Export subsidies directly affect competition in the market place between rival potential suppliers of goods and services. Recognising their pernicious effects, the European Commission and the EFTA Surveillance Authority have consistently condemned export aid in intra-EEA trade (2). However, although EEA States’ support for their exports outside the EEA can also affect competition within the EEA (3), neither the Commission nor the EFTA Surveillance Authority have systematically intervened in this field under the respective State aid rules of the EC Treaty (Articles 92, 93 and 94) or the EEA Agreement (Article 61 and Article 1 of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agree- ment). There have been several reasons for this. First, within the European Community this area is partly governed by the provisions of the EC Treaty relating to external trade (Articles 112 and 113). Secondly, it is not only competition within the Community or the EEA that is affected by aid for exports to third countries, but also the competitive- ness of EEA exporters vis-(cid:133)-vis those of the EEA States’ trading partners, which give similar aid. Finally, progress in controlling aid has been achieved in the OECD and WTO. (1) Hereinafter referred to as the State aid Guidelines. (2) OJ L 231, 3. 9. 1994, p. 1; EEA Supplement to OJ 32, 3. 9. 1994. (3) OJ C 38, 5. 2. 1998, p. 19; EEA Supplement to OJ 5, 5. 2. 1998, p. 214. L 120/28 ‹ EN ‹ Official Journal of the European Communities 23. 4. 98 (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) While the Commission has, until the adoption of the communication corresponding to the present rules, refrained from exercising its State aid control powers in the areas of export credits and export-credit insurance, work by the European Council’s Export Credits Group (4) and cases before the Court of Justice of the European Communities (5) have, in the Commission’s opinion, shown that in one area at least, that of short-term export-credit the actual or potential distortions of competition in the Community may justify action by the Commission under the State aid rules without waiting for progress on other fronts. insurance, The EEA Agreement does not provide for a common trade policy vis-(cid:133)-vis third coun- tries and consequently does not contain provisions corresponding to those in Articles 112 and 113 of the EC Treaty. The Agreement therefore does not restrict the freedom of the EFTA States, in the same way as the EC Treaty does for EC Member States, to promote trade with third countries, provided such measures do not affect trade between the Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement. However, as stated above, measures of this kind can affect competition and trade within the EEA. Furthermore, distortions of competition can occur not only between exporters in different EEA States in their trade within and outside the EEA, but also between export-credit insurers offering their services within the EEA. The Authority therefore considers that as concerns applic- ability of Article 61 of the EEA Agreement and Article 1 of Protocol 3 to the Surveil- lance and Court Agreement to short-term export-credit insurance, the situation is similar as for the application of Articles 92 and 93 of the EC Treaty. In other words the actual or potential distortion of competition and trade within the EEA calls for action by the Authority under the State aid rules. the export-credit The purpose of these rules is to remove distortions of competition due to State aid in that sector of insurance business in which there is competition between public or publicly supported export-credit insurers and private export-credit insurers. This commercial sector of export-credit insurance relates to the insurance of short-term export-credit risks on trade within the EEA and with many countries outside it. Such risks are termed “marketable” and will be defined in Section 17A. 2. The defini- tion currently comprises only so-called “commercial”, as opposed to “political”, risks in trade within the EEA and with the majority of OECD countries, listed in Annex IX to these guidelines. While EFTA States have made considerable efforts to eliminate aid from the commercial sector of export-credit insurance, the good functioning of the EEA Agreement requires safeguards to ensure a level playing field in all circumstances. The present rules do not deal with the insurance of medium and long-term export- credit risks which are largely non-marketable at the present time. In that area, the factors which have led the Commission and the EFTA Surveillance Authority to refrain from extensive use of its State aid control powers still militate against such action. Section 17A. 2 of these rules describes the structure of the export-credit insurance market. As for the commercial or market sector, in which private insurers operate and which is covered by these rules, it distinguishes between, on the one hand, private export-credit insurers and, on the other hand, public or publicly supported insurers. It also explains why and to what extent the State aid provisions of the EEA Agreement apply. Finally, in Section 17A. 4, the Authority states what action it considers necessary to ensure that any remaining State aid of the types listed in Section 17A. 3 is removed from the market sector and requests the EFTA States pursuant to Article 1(1) of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement to take such action, if required. 23. 4. 98 ‹ EN ‹ Official Journal of the European Communities L 120/29 17A. 2. Market and non-market sectors of short-term export-credit insurance (1) (2) (3) (4) The report of the Council’s Export-Credit Group referred to in a footnote to paragraph 17A. 1(2) (hereinafter referred to as “the report”), complaints to the Commission by private export-credit insurers and cases before the Court of Justice of the European Communities, have shown that in some Member States the same “official” export-credit agencies that insure the medium and long-term risks of exporters for the account or with the guarantee (6) of the State also operate for the account or with the guarantee of the State in parts of the short-term export-credit insurance market where they are in competition with private export-credit insurers that have no such links with the State. Preliminary examination by the EFTA Surveillance Authority indicates that this is also the case in two of the three EFTA States parties to the EEA Agreement, namely Norway and Iceland. The “official” export-credit agencies in question may be government departments, State-owned or State-controlled companies or wholly privately-owned and controlled companies. For the purposes of these rules, such agencies will be termed “public or publicly supported export-credit insurers”. As well as the “official” agencies operating in both the medium/long and short-term fields, some privately owned and controlled export-credit insurers that only provide short-term insurance may be supported by their governments through guarantees or equivalent reinsurance arrange- ments for some segments of their business. These insurers, too, must be categorised as “public or publicly supported”. On the other hand, export-credit insurers mainly or exclusively engaged in the short term that do not operate for the account or with the guarantee (7) of the State for any of their business will be termed “private export-credit insurers”. The report showed that when public or publicly supported export-credit insurers operated for the account of or with the guarantee of the State on parts of the short-term market where they were in competition with private insurers, they enjoyed certain financial advantages which could distort competition against private insurers. In no country did public or publicly supported export-credit insurers have a monopoly for short-term business. One of the most difficult areas dealt with by the report was the provision of reinsurance by the State, either directly or indirectly. The report identified reinsurance arrangements which provide 100 % cover and are equivalent to guarantees as a subsidy. It is now recognised that reinsurance facilities whereby the State only participates in or supple- ments a private-sector reinsurance treaty may also give insurers benefiting from them an advantage over private insurers not receiving such cover, thereby distorting competition. Despite the recent improvements made, with public or publicly supported export-credit insurers increasingly hiving off their short-term business to separate companies or intro- ducing separate accounting, it has been noted above that action is still needed to create the desired level playing field. The first task is to identify the sector in which a compet- itive market exists. The report used as the decisive criterion for distinguishing the market sector, whether or not private reinsurance was available generally, rather than only in individual cases. It was observed that the answer was generally “yes” for commer- cial risks on non-public buyers, but that for political risks (including risks on public buyers, currency transfer risks and non-commercial, catastrophe risks) the capacity available was so inadequate that cover for such risks was clearly not to be regarded as a market activity. On the basis of an analysis of the private reinsurance market by reference to the three criteria of duration, location and nature of risks insured, the report considered “marketable” risks to involve commercial risks with a risk period of normally a maximum of three years for exports worldwide. L 120/30 ‹ EN ‹ Official Journal of the European Communities 23. 4. 98 (5) (6) (7) (8) Subsequent comments from EC Member States, EFTA States, business associations and insurers indicated that generally speaking that definition was too broad. Most of those submissions agreed with the report that political risks should be excluded because the private reinsurance market was not large enough, and they preferred a maximum risk period of two years for commercial risks. Also, it appeared to be very difficult to reinsure on the private market the commercial risk of protracted default in non-OECD coun- tries. In view of the close links between protracted default and insolvency, protracted default risks being liable to turn into insolvency, and the resulting need to classify both risks in the same category (marketable or non-marketable), it is prudent to exclude all commer- cial risks on non-OECD countries from the definition of marketable risks and from the scope of these rules for the time being. Finally, it appears that at present there are still difficulties in obtaining private reinsurance of commercial risk in some OECD coun- tries. In view of the above, “marketable” risks are defined for the purposes of these rules as commercial risks on non-public debtors (8) established in the countries listed in Annex IX to these guidelines. For such risks the maximum risk period (that is, manufacturing period plus credit period with normal Berne Union starting point and usual credit term) is less than two years. All other risks (that is, political, catastrophe (9) risks and commercial risks on public buyers and on countries not listed in Annex IX) are considered not yet to be mar- ketable. (9) “Commercial risks” are defined for the purposes of these rules as: — arbitrary repudiation of a contract by a debtor, that is, any arbitrary decision by a non-public debtor to interrupt or terminate the contract without legitimate reason, — arbitrary refusal by a non-public debtor to accept the goods covered by the contract without legitimate reason, — insolvency of a non-public debtor or his guarantor, — non-payment by a non-public debtor or by a guarantor of a debt resulting from the contract, that is, protracted default. (10) The capacity of the private reinsurance market varies. This means that the definition of marketable risks is not immutable and may change over time; for example, it might be extended to cover political risks. The definition will therefore have to be reviewed regu- larly (namely, at least once a year) by the Authority. The Authority will consult the EFTA States and, if appropriate, other interested parties on such reviews. In so far as necessary, changes to the definition will have to take account of the scope of EEA legis- lation governing export-credit insurance, in order to avoid any conflict or legal uncer- tainty. 17A. 3. Factors distorting competition between private and public or publicly supported export-credit insurers (1) The factors that may distort competition in favour of public or publicly supported export-credit insurers insuring marketable risks include (10): — de jure or de facto State guarantees of borrowing and losses. Such guarantees enable insurers to borrow at rates lower than the normal market rates or make it possible for them to borrow money at all. Furthermore, they obviate the need for insurers to reinsure themselves on the private market, 23. 4. 98 ‹ EN ‹ Official Journal of the European Communities L 120/31 — any difference in obligations, compared with private insurers, to maintain adequate provisions. It should be noted than when Council Directive 73/239/EEC (11) was amended by Directive 87/343/EC (12) it was understood that the exclusion of export- credit insurance operations for the account of or guaranteed by the State (Article 2(2) (d) of the original Directive) did not include operations in the field of short-term commercial risks which public or publicly supported export-credit insurers effected for their own account and not guaranteed by the State (13). This means that to insure short-term commercial risks, public or publicly supported insurers must have a certain amount of own funds (solvency margin, including guarantee fund) and tech- nical provisions (notably an equalisation reserve) and must have obtained authorisa- tion in accordance with Article 6 et seq. of Directive 73/239/EEC, — relief or exemption from taxes normally payable (such as company taxes and taxes levied on insurance policies), — awards of aid or provisions of capital by the State. With regard to the latter, the prin- ciple should be observed that, unless the State is acting as would a private investor in a market economy, capital injections involve State aid (14); provision by the State of services in kind, such as access to and use of State infrastructure, facilities or priv- ileged information (for instance, information about debtors gathered by embassies) on terms not reflecting their cost, and reinsurance by the State, either directly, or indirectly via a public or publicly-supported export-credit insurer, on terms more favourable than those available from the private reinsurance market, which leads either to under-pricing of the reinsurance or to the artificial creation of capacity that would not be forthcoming from the private market. (2) (3) (4) The types of treatment listed in paragraph 17A. 3(1) give, or may give, the export-credit insurers that receive them a financial advantage over other export-credit insurers. Such financial advantages granted to certain enterprises distort competition and constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. Article 61(1) is applicable to all measures which grant a financial or economic advantage to certain enterprises or products and involve a charge on, or a loss to public funds, whether actual or contingent, and for which nothing or little is required from the bene- ficiary concerned, in so far as such measures affect trade between Contracting Parties and distort or threaten to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods (15). The financial advantages listed in paragraph 17A. 3(1) in respect of marketable risks as defined in paragraphs 17A. 2(7) to (9) affect intra-EEA trade in services. Moreover, they lead to variations in the insurance cover available for marketable risks in different EEA States, thereby distorting competition between companies in EEA States and having secondary effects on intra-EEC trade regardless of whether intra-EEA exports outside the territories of the Contracting Parties are concerned (16). The exceptions provided for in Article 61 of the EEA Agreement do not apply to aid for the insurance of marketable risks. The distorting effects of such aid within the EEA outweigh any possible national or common EEA interest in supporting exports. That view has been confirmed by the judgment of the European Court of Justice in Case C-63/89, which was directly concerned with the issue addressed by the present rules. The Court held that although the Directive on partial harmonisation of equalisation reserves for insurance companies, L 120/32 ‹ EN ‹ Official Journal of the European Communities 23. 4. 98 which exempted export-credit insurance operations for the account of or guaranteed by the State, was not unlawful, the factors distorting competition between private and public or publicly supported export-credit insurers “might justify recourse to legal action to penalise infringement of the provisions” (i. e. of Article 92 of the EC Treaty) (17). In its judgment in Case C-44/93, the Court assumed that the advantages in question consti- tute State aid and confirmed that the Commission might take action to secure their withdrawal. 17A. 4. Actionrequiredtoeliminatedistortionsofcompetitioninshort-termexport- credit insurance with respect to marketable risks (1) (2) State aid of the types listed in paragraph 17A. 3(1), which is enjoyed by publicly supported export-credit insurers for the marketable risks defined in paragraphs 17A. 2(7) to (9), may distort competition and would therefore be ineligible for exemption under the State aid rules of the EEA Agreement. The EFTA States are therefore requested within the meaning of Article 1(1) of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement to amend, where necessary, their export- credit insurance systems for marketable risks in such a way that the granting of State aid of the following types to public or publicly supported export-credit insurers in respect of such risks is ended before 1 January 1999: (a) State guarantees for borrowing or losses; (b) exemption from the requirement to constitute adequate reserves and the other requirements listed in the second indent of paragraph 17A. 3(1); (c) relief or exemption from taxes or other charges normally payable; (d) award of aid or provisions of capital or other forms of finance in circumstances in which a private investor acting under normal market conditions would not invest in the company or on terms a private investor would not accept; (e) provision by the State of services in kind, such as access to and use of State infra- structure, facilities or privileged information (for instance, information about debtors gathered by embassies), on terms not reflecting their cost; (f) reinsurance by the State, either directly, or indirectly via a public or publicly- supported export-credit insurer, on terms more favourable than those available from the private reinsurance market, which leads either to under-pricing of the rein- surance cover or to the artificial creation of capacity that would not be forthcoming from the private market. (3) However, pending the outcome of the review mentioned in paragraph 17A. 4(6), existing complementary State reinsurance arrangements remain permissible for an interim period, provided that: — the State reinsurance is a minority element in the insurer’s overall reinsurance package, — where the reinsurance treaties of the insurer combine marketable and non-mar- ketable risks, and any State reinsurance thus unavoidably attaches to marketable risk, the level of State reinsurance for marketable risks must not exceed that which would have been available from the private reinsurance market if reinsurance had been sought for those risks in isolation, — the State reinsurance does not act so as to enable the insurer to insure business on individual buyers beyond the limits set by the participating private-market rein- surers, — the premium for State reinsurance demonstrably reflects the risk, is calculated using commercial market techniques and, where an equivalent market premium rate is available, is at least equal to that rate, — the State reinsurance for marketable risks is open to all credit insurers who are able to satisfy the common eligibility criteria. 23. 4. 98 ‹ EN ‹ Official Journal of the European Communities L 120/33 (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) For the purposes of complying with paragraphs 17A. 4(2) to (3), public or publicly- supported export-credit insurers will, at the very least, have to keep a separate adminis- tration and separate accounts for their insurance of marketable risks and non-marketable risks for the account or with the guarantee of the State, demonstrating that they do not enjoy State aid in their insurance of marketable risks. The accounts for business insured on the insurer’s own account should comply with the act referred to in point 12b of Annex IX to the EEA Agreement (18). Furthermore, an EFTA State providing reinsurance cover to an export-credit insurer by way of participation or involvement in private sector reinsurance treaties covering both marketable and non-marketable risks will have to demonstrate that its arrangements do not involve State aid within the meaning of paragraph 17A. 4(2)(f). For this purpose the EFTA Surveillance Authority, in close liaison with the EFTA States, will continuously, as from the publication of these rules, monitor such arrange- ments on the basis of six-monthly reports submitted by EFTA States concerned and by February 1999 will carry out a complete review of such arrangements. The review will take into account all the knowledge and experience acquired in the mean time about the operation of the short-term export-credit insurance market, and EFTA States’ inter- vention therein, from the reports on implementation supplied under paragraph 17A. 4(14) from the first of the annual reviews to be undertaken under paragraph 17A. 4(15) and from any notifications of use of the escape clause under paragraphs 17A. 4(8) to (13). Should the review find that the arrangements in an EFTA State involve State aid, the EFTA State will be required to terminate them by the end of 1999 at the latest. The principle that export-credit insurance for marketable risks should be provided by public or publicly supported export-credit insurers only if the financial advantages listed in paragraphs 17A. 4(2), subject to paragraph 17A. 4(3), are withdrawn from them may be departed from in the circumstances set out in paragraphs (8) to (13) (escape clause). In certain countries, cover for marketable export-credit risks may be temporarily un- insurers or from public or publicly-supported available from private export-credit export-credit insurers operating for their own account, owing to a lack of insurance or reinsurance capacity. Therefore those risks are temporarily considered to be non-mar- ketable. In such circumstances, those temporarily non-marketable risks may be taken on to the account of a public or publicly-supported export-credit insurer for non-marketable risks insured for the account of or with the guarantee of the State. The insurer should, as far as possible, align its premium rates for risks with the rates charged elsewhere by private export-credit insurers for the type of risk in question. (10) An EFTA State intending to use the escape clause should immediately notify the EFTA Surveillance Authority of its draft decision. That notification should contain a market report demonstrating the unavailability of cover for the risks in the private insurance market by producing evidence thereof from two large, well-known international private export-credit insurers as well as a national credit insurer, thus justifying the use of the escape clause. Alternatively, evidence of unavailability of cover in the private insurance market may possibly be demonstrated by means of a market report by an independent consultant which the Authority considers reliable and impartial. The notification should, moreover, contain a description of the conditions which the public or publicly supported export-credit insurer intends to apply in respect of such risks. (11) Within two months of the receipt of such notification, the Authority will examine whether the use of the escape clause is in conformity with the above conditions and compatible with the EEA Agreement. L 120/34 ‹ EN ‹ Official Journal of the European Communities 23. 4. 98 (12) (13) (14) (15) If the Authority finds that the conditions for the use of the escape clause are fulfilled, its decision on compatibility is limited to two years from the date of the decision, provided that the market conditions justifying the use of the escape clause do not change during that period. Furthermore, the Authority may, in consultation with the EFTA States, revise the condi- tions for the use of the escape clause; it may also decide to discontinue it or replace it with another appropriate system. These rules will apply from 1 January 1998 until the end of the year 2002. The EFTA States are requested to inform the EFTA Surveillance Authority within two months of notification of these rules, whether they accept its recommendations. Furthermore, by 1 January 1999 at the latest, the EFTA States must inform the Authority of the action they have taken to comply herewith. Should it appear either through those reports or otherwise that the systems in operation in the EFTA States still involve State aid, the Authority will assess such aid pursuant to Article 61 of the EEA Agreement and Article 1 of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement, in accordance with the policy set out above. In cooperation with the EFTA States and interested parties, the Authority will review the definition of marketable risks and the operation of the present rules in the light of market developments and possible EEA-relevant legislation. All information received by the Authority from EFTA States and interested parties in connection with such reviews will, with the permission of the supplier of the information, be made available to all the other participants in the review. (1) This chapter corresponds to the communication of the Commission to the Member States pursuant to Article 93(1) of the EC Treaty applying Articles 92 and 93 of the Treaty to short- term export-credit insurance (OJ C 281, 17. 9. 1997, p. 4). (2) In its Seventh report on competition policy (1977), point 242, the European Commission stated that export aids in intra-Community trade “cannot qualify for derogation whatever their intensity, form, grounds or purpose”. (3) See judgment of the Court of Justice in Case C-142/87 Belgium v. Commission [1990] ECR I-959. See also Case C-44/93 Assurances du Cr(cid:130)dit v. OND and Belgium [1994] ECR I-3829, paragraph 30. (4) “L’assurance cr(cid:130)dit et le march(cid:130) unique 1992 (court-terme)”, report presented to the coordi- nation group, rapporteur P. Callut. (5) See Case C-63/89 Assurances du Cr(cid:130)dit and Cobac v. Council and Commission [1991] ECR I-1799, and Case C-44/93 Assurances du Cr(cid:130)dit v. OND and Belgium [1994] ECR I-3829. (6) In some cases, medium and long-term business may be conducted not under a guarantee, but under a comprehensive reinsurance agreement with the government. (7) Or with equivalent reinsurance arrangements. (8) Or non-public guarantors. A public debtor or guarantor is a debtor or guarantor who, in one form or another, represents the public authority itself and cannot either judicially or adminis- tratively be declared insolvent. For the purposes of these rules, publicly-owned or publicly- controlled companies resident in the countries listed in Annex IX to these guidelines as a marketable risk country and subject to the normal provisions of private company law are considered to be non-public debtors/guarantors. (9) That is, war, revolution, natural disasters, nuclear accidents, and so forth, not so-called “commercial, catastrophe risks” (catastrophic accumulations of loss on individual buyers or countries) which may be covered by excess of loss reinsurance and are commercial risks. 23. 4. 98 ‹ EN ‹ Official Journal of the European Communities L 120/35 (10) The tying by a public or publicly supported export-credit insurer of insurance of non-marke- table risks to the acceptance of cover for marketable risks might infringe Article 54 of the EEA Agreement. Such action could both be the subject of proceedings by the EFTA Surveil- lance Authority or the Commission and challenged in the courts and before national compe- tition authorities. (11) First Council Directive 73/239/EEC of 24 July 1973 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the taking-up and pursuit of the business of direct insurance other than life assurance (OJ L 228, 16. 8. 1973, p. 3), see point 2 of Annex IX to the EEA Agreement. (12) Council Directive 87/343/EEC of 22 June 1987 amending Directive 73/239/EEC on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the taking-up and pursuit of the business of direct insurance other than life assurance (OJ L 185, 4. 7. 1987, p. 72), see third indent of point 2 of Annex IX to the EEA Agreement. (13) See judgment of the Court of Justice in Case C-63/89, Assurances du Credit and Cobac v. Council and Commission, cited in footnote 5, p. 1848 (paragraph 22). (14) See Chapters 19 and 20 of the present State aid Guidelines. (15) See judgments of the Court of Justice in Case 30/59 Steenkolenmijnen v. High Authority [1961] ECR pp. 1 to 19; Case 173/73 Italy v. Commission [1974] ECR, p. 709, Case 730/79 Philip Morris v. Commission [1980] ECR, p. 2671. (16) In its judgment in Case C-142/87 Belgium v. Commission, cited in a footnote to paragraph 17 A. 1(1), the European Court of Justice held that not only aid for intra-Community exports, but also aid for exports outside the Community can influence intra-Community competition and trade. Both types of operation are insured by export-credit insurers and aid with respect to both can therefore have effects on intra-Community competition and trade. (17) See paragraph 24 of the Judgment by the European Court of Justice in Case C-63/89 cited in a footnote to paragraph 17 A. 1(3). Advocate-General Tesauro, in his opinion in the case, considered that when there is competition between private and public or publicly backed export-credit insurers, “it is highly doubtful whether the States can legitimately provide financial backing for public operators. To do so might be incompatible with the rules on public aid. ” ([1991] ECR I-1835, point 15). (18) Council Directive 91/674/EEC of 19 December 1991 on the annual accounts and consoli- dated accounts of insurance undertakings (OJ L 374, 31. 12. 1991, p. 7), as adapted for the purpose of the EEA Agreement by EEA Joint Committee Decision No 7/94 (OJ L 160, 28. 6. 1994; EEA Supplement to OJ 17, 28. 6. 1994). ’ ‘ANNEX IX LIST OF MARKETABLE RISK COUNTRIES FOR THE PURPOSE OF APPLICA- TION OF THE RULES IN CHAPTER 17A ON SHORT-TERM EXPORT-CREDIT INSURANCE Countries which are Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement Austria Belgium Denmark L 120/36 ‹ EN ‹ Official Journal of the European Communities 23. 4. 98 Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Spain Sweden United Kingdom Iceland Liechtenstein Norway Other countries which are members of the OECD and which are considered to be marketable risk countries Australia Canada Japan New Zealand Switzerland United States of America’ Done at Brussels, 4 March 1998. For the EFTA Surveillance Authority Knut ALMESTAD The President