title: Report on the implementation of the Interinstitutional Agreement of 29 October 1993 on budgetary discipline and improvement of the budgetary procedure - Proposals for renewal

eurovoc_concepts:
budget policy
budgetary discipline (EU)
budgetary procedure
interinstitutional agreement

text: COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES Brussels, 18. 03. 1998 COM(1998) 165 final REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERINSTITUTIONAL AGREEMENT OF 29 OCTOBER 1993 ON BUDGETARY DISCIPLINE AND IMPROVEMENT OF THE BUDGETARY PROCEDURE PROPOSALS FOR RENEWAL (presented by the Commission) SUMMARY In accordance with paragraph 25 of the Interinstitutional Agreement of 29 October 1993 the Commission is presenting this report to the budgetary authority on the application of the Interinstitutional Agreement and on the amendments which need to be made to it in the light of experience. Implementation of the Interinstitutional Agreement of 29 October 1993 The Commission has reviewed both the application of the financial framework over the period 1993-99 and the implementation of the provisions of the Agreement designed to improve the budgetary procedure. • The period divides into two as regards application of the financial framework. From 1993 to 1996 economic growth was not as high as expected, demonstrating that a margin for unforeseen expenditure of 0. 01% (iNP was inadequate; annua! budgets were at levels very close to the financial perspective ceilings and there was significant underspending in 1994 and 1995. By contrast, from 1997 onwards economic growth picked up, a stricter budgetary policy was introduced leaving substantial margins beneath the financial perspective ceilings and outturn figures improved distinctly. • From the point of view of the improvement of the budgetary procedure, the 1993 Interinstitutional Agreement has failed to produce lasting solutions to the problems of classification of expenditure and legal bases. On the other hand, in accordance with their pledge to improve implementation of the 1982 Joint Declaration, the institutions came to an agreement on the question of entering financial provisions in legislative instruments (Joint Declaration of 6 March 1995). Moreover, even though the first application resulted in a dispute, the interinstitutional collaboration procedure set up by the 1993 Interinstitutional Agreement worked satisfactorily, going beyond what had been agreed by the institutions. This must, however, still be confirmed in the budgetary procedure for 1999. Guidelines for a new agreement Since the verdict on the 1993 Interinstitutional Agreement is broadly positive, it is proposed that the fundamental rules be retained. However, certain provisions could be amended in the light of experience and also because of the tighter financial constraints proposed by Agenda 2000. The proposals concern the management of the financial framework and the budgetary procedure proper. For reasons of simplification and rationalisation, the Commission is also taking the opportunity offered by the renewal of the Inlcrinstitulional Agreement to propose updating and consolidating all the interinstitutional agreements and joint declarations on budgetary matters. c^. • The amendments or additions which the Commission is proposing to provisions relating to the management of the financial framework are essentially on three points: In a context where the financial framework will offer less latitude over the period 2000-2006, the Commission is proposing that the management of the financial perspective be given an extra margin of flexibility. The aim would be to allow transfers, during and in accordance with the budgetary procedure, of allocations between headings 3 and 4 up to a limited amount, without escaping the need to leave a margin unused. Part of any balance remaining at the end of a year could give rise to a limited amount of additional expenditure in the course of the following year on requirements of significant political importance to be agreed in advance. In line with the new financial management arrangements proposed for the Structural Funds, the Commission takes the view that it is no longer necessary to provide in principle for the transfer to subsequent years of allocations for the Funds which have not been used. Decommitments would be governed by the relevant provisions of the Financial Regulation. The financial perspective will have to be adjusted if new Member States join the Community by incorporating, beneath the expenditure ceilings, the margins left available with an eye to enlargement. The Interinstitutional Agreement should leave open the possibility of revising the financial framework on this occasion should the allocations planned for enlargement prove inadequate. regards improvement of As interinstitutional collaboration, the Commission is proposing, in addition to the consolidation of existing agreements and joint declarations, the budgetary procedure and to determine in the Interinstitutional Agreement the classification of existing budget headings and to have the classification of new headings agreed by the two arms of the budgetary authority under the conciliation procedure; should they fail to agree, the Commission's proposal would be deemed approved; to relax the provisions of the Joint Declaration of 6 March 1995 on the entry of financial provisions in legislative instruments in order to restore a certain margin of manoeuvre to the budgetary authority in a context where the scope of legislative codecision has been extended by the Treaty of Amsterdam; to clarify, if it has not already been done, the issue of legal bases; to formalise the recently observed conciliation practice which has been extended to cover all expenditure. 1b CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 1 £ I. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTEKINS HÏTJ TIONAL AGREEMENT 1 # OF 29 OCTOBER 1993 A. APPLICATION OF TUB FINANCIAL FRAMEWORK /. The macroeconomic context and budgetary guidelines (a) 1993 to 1996 (b) From 1997 onwards 2. The main conclusions B. IMPROVEMENT OF THE BUDGETARY PROCEDURE 1 2 2 3 4 8 /. Collaboration between the institutions has gradually gained substance. H 2. Continuing problem of the classification of expenditure 3. Improvement of the application of the 19H2 Joint Declaration: results still incomplete (a) rintry of financial provisions in legislative instruments (b) The issue of legal bases 4. Use of budget reserves II. GUIDELINES FOR A NEW AGREEMENT A. MANAGEMENT OF THE FINANCIAL FRAMEWORK /. Retention of existing provisions 2. Provisions concerning certain categories of expenditure (a) Heading 2 (b) Heading 6 9 10 10 10 // 11 12 12 12 12 13 3. Increased flexibility in management of the financial framework. 14 (a) Between certain headings of the financial perspective 14 7 C (b) From one year to the next 4. Duration of the financial perspective (a) An adjustment clause for the financial perspective (b) Extension of the financial perspective B. BUDGETARY PROCEDURE AND INTERINSTITUTIONAL COLLABORATION 1. The new provisions and the changes to be made to the existing agreement (a) Classification of expenditure (b) Interplay between legislative powers and budgetary powers 2. Consolidation of the existing provisions (a) Application of the maximum rate of increase (b) Late presentation of a letter of amendment for agriculture (c> Coordination of the most recent agreements 3. Enlarged scope for the conciliation procedure 15 15 15 16 16 16 16 17 19 19 19 I() 20 ANMEX 1JL INTRODUCTION the Paragraph 25 of the Interinstitutional Agreement of 29 October 1993 requires Commission to present, before 1 July 1998, a report on the application of the Agreement and on the amendments which need to be made to it in the light of experience. The current agreement followed on from the one concluded in 1988. It took over most of the principles and objectives of the earlier one, subject to certain clarifications and additional provisions. to impose budgetary discipline in a framework ensuring that adequate resources are available and offering scope for an orderly growth in expenditure to match the priorities set in the medium term, and to improve the annual budgetary procedure by means of closer collaboration between the institutions. Its aims are twofold: This report sets out what can be learned from the application of the 1993 Agreement and These proposals are proposes a number of guidelines for renewal beyond 1999. financial consistent with others presented by the Commission concerning the new framework, the reform of the CAP, the new Structural Funds regulations, the introduction of pre-accession aid and the operation of the Guarantee fund. the Commission will propose a new Immediately after presenting interinstitutional agreement, with a financial perspective framework, to be agreed by the institutions for 2000-2006, as an integral part. The new agreement should be concluded in time to be applied for the preparation of the 2000 budget, the first one to be concerned. report, this The Commission will also present proposals for appropriate amendments to the Council Decision of 31 October 1994 on budgetary discipline. I. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERINSTITUTIONAL AGREEMENT OF 29 OCTOBER 1993 A. Application of the financial framework1 The financial framework for 1993-99 was set by the Edinburgh European Council in December 1992. It was endorsed by the European Parliament in October Î993 when the Interinstitutional Agreement was concluded. At that point some of the 1994 expenditure ceilings were raised by small amounts to allow non-compulsory expenditure to grow that year in line with the maximum rate of increase. Apart from the unavoidable adjustment which had to be made in 1995 to accommodate the new resources and requirements of a Union with three new Member States, the financial framework has not been amended,2 whereas the previous financial perspective The principal figures on the application of the financial framework are shown in the tables and charts annexed. I he financial framework applying from 1993 to 1999, with the technical adjustments in line with movements in prices and GNP and adjustments required by conditions of implementation, is set out in Table I. Table 2 compares this framework with the appropriations entered in the budget and the outturn figures. table for 1988-92 was revised seven times. What is more, the present framework looks set to expire leaving substantial margins available beneath the ceilings. from features of the specific Apart the main explanations of these results lie in the development of the macroeeonomic situation the Union's throughout the period and the budgetary policy guidelines governing finances. It is against this backdrop that the actual application of the Agreement's provisions on budgetary discipline must be viewed. the original framework, financial /. The macroeeonomic context and budgetary guidelines The application of the financial framework can be divided into two periods. (a) 1993 to 1996 • Growth appreciably lower than expected The growth assumption underlying the financial perspective table was an annual average rate in real terms of 2. 5% over the entire period. Actual growth from 1993 to 1996 in relation figures currently available the most (November 1997), was only an annual average of 1. 5%. This average did, indeed, cover some fairly substantial fluctuations which were not accurately re I lee ted in the forecasts used for the successive annual technical adjustments (see Chart I ). the basis of to 1992, on recent This unexpectedly low real growth rate had two consequences: the narrow safety margin of 0. 01% of (iNP which had been left available between the own resources ceiling and the limit on total appropriations for payments was used up completely at the very outset (see Table 2 and Chart 2); actual own resources fell well short of the forecasts used for drawing up the budget, generating negative balances which had to be accommodated beneath the ceiling. The adjustment of the financial perspective following enlargement of the Union in 1995 eased these tight constraints which otherwise would probably have meant lowering the ceilings in the financial framework itself, as is allowed by the second subparagraph of paragraph 8 of the Agreement, in order to ensure compliance with the own resources ceiling. In addition to raising the ceilings to cover the requirements connected with enlargement, this adjustment restored the margin available beneath (he own resources ceiling and then raised it to 0. 02% of GNP for the end of the period. • Annual budgets very close to the expenditure ceilings During the first four years of application of the financial framework, the budgets adopted each year (including supplementary and amending budgets) left only very small margins in appropriations for commitments beneath the ceilings set in the financial perspective (see Table 3 and Chart 3). For the most part these margins were beneath the agricultural guideline. The margins for headings 3, 4 and 5 were negligible. Although the margins in total appropriations for payment were bigger, they were still on the small side. • Marked underspending in 1994 and 1995 for both these years appropriations totalling around IX'U 5 billion for commitments and KCU 8. 5 billion for payments were not used and not carried over to the following year. In this under-utilisation (see fable 3 and Charts 3 to 5): two areas of expenditure were mainly concerned by terms of amounts, - expenditure on the common agricultural policy, mainly because of the relatively favourable conditions on a number of markets and an increase in costs connected with the 1992 reform that was not as high as expected. The volume of appropriations not used dropped sharply, however, in 1996; - expenditure on the Structural Funds, the reason being the time taken to adopt and introduce the arrangements for the new programming period which started in 1994. This mainly concerned objectives 2, 5a and 5b and the Community initiatives. Utilisation In accordance with for objective 1 operations was satisfactory. paragraph 10 of the Agreement the allocations not used in 1994 and 1995 gave rise to transfers of HCU 3. 1 billion in appropriations for commitments to subsequent years. Utilisation rates for appropriations for payments were even lower. However, there was a marked upturn in 1996: during that year the outturn in commitments was slightly (FCU 300 million) higher than the initial allocation for the Structural Funds, thus clearing a little of the accumulated backlog. The improvement in utilisation rates was even more marked for payments. In relative terms there was also an appreciable slowdown, from 1995 onwards, in the clearance of commitments for external action and, to a lesser extent, internal policies. (b) From 1997 onwards In a number of respects 1997 marked a major turning point in the application of the financial framework. • A more favourable economic situation According to the most recent economic forecasts available, the real growth rate for the Union's GNP in the last three years of the period covered by the financial perspective should average just over 2. 5% a year (see ('hart 1). The margin between the own resources ceiling and the limit on total appropriations for payments should therefore be 0. 03% of GNP as forecast at the time of enlargement. • A new approach to budget policy A new budget policy approach became evident in 1997, was accentuated when the 1998 budget was established and should continue in 1999, at least in the preliminary draft budget that the Commission will be presenting. Prior to this the budget was drafted mainly by reference to the ceiling set by the financial perspective. The margins which could be left available beneath these ceilings were therefore at the heart of the debate between the institutions and tended inevitably to contract as the budgetary procedure advanced and compromises had to be found on the priorities to be set. From 1997 onwards the limit on the increase in total spending, linked to the budgetary restrictions applied by Member States at national level became the main reference marker for spending both on operations and on the institutions' staff. The budgets adopted for 1997 and 1998 are based on a very small increase in total appropriations for payments of 0. 5% and 1. 4% respectively in nominal terms, thereby leaving very substantial margins (0. 07% then 0. 13% of GNP) beneath an own resources ceiling which itself was rising (see Table 2 and Chart 2). Total appropriations for commitments increased by more (3% in 1997 and 2. 1% in 1998), meaning that the underlying ratio between commitments and payments in the financial framework was increased. Account was thus taken of the pattern in earlier years of a slower rate of clearance of commitments. Moreover, as the allocations in commitments for structural operations had privileged status, they had to be entered in the budget in full. As a result, the margins available in the 1997 budget beneath the expenditure ceilings in commitments are still very small and mainly concern agricultural spending. In the 1998 budget, on the other hand, large margins are left for all the headings with the sole exception of structural operations, where status (sec Table 3). the allocations have privileged • The improvement in outturn was confirmed in 1997 The improvement in budget outturn which began to show through in 1996 was by and large confirmed in 1997. All headings were concerned for commitments with the exception of heading 2. The improvement was even more marked in payments for all headings. There was a deterioration in the level of utilisation in appropriations for commitments for structural operations in relation to 1996, with an underspend of around ECU 1. 5 billion. Two points do, however, need to be made. - First, the appropriations entered in the budget for 1997 included, in addition to the initial allocation, the amounts not used in 1994 and 1995. While it was not possible to eliminate the backlog accumulated in these two years, the basic allocation for 1997 was used almost in full. Second, undcr-utilisation concerned Community in commitments essentially initiatives, whereas outturn was satisfactory or at any rate better than the previous year for all the other structural operations. 2. The main conclusions Since it was renewed in 1992 the financial perspective framework has confirmed its value as an instrument of budgetary discipline which can be applied in whatever economic and budgetary context. The rules of operation now seem well established and accepted. Some more specific conclusions can nevertheless be drawn from this experience. • Margin beneath own resources ceiling too narrow to begin with The margin of 0. 01% of GNP left available for contingencies in the financial framework the uncertainties of inadequate Iklinburgh proved agreed at In the very first year that the new financial framework macroeconomic developments. for coping with 4 was applied, the margin was used up as a result of the slowdown in economic activity, and the expenditure estimates in the budget could only be covered in full because "other revenue" was available in addition to own resources. Had it not been for the adjustment of the financial perspective in connection with enlargement, the amount of own resources available would have been below the ceiling originally set for total appropriations for payments throughout the entire period. • A degree of constraint not evenly applied between the different categories of expenditure The priorities and the forecasts of budget requirements by major category of expenditure on which the financial framework was originally based can change over time. The revision procedure provided for in paragraphs 11-13 of the Agreement would allow any necessary adjustments to be made, provided the own resources ceiling is not exceeded and due account is taken of the possibilities of reallocating expenditure. No use was made of this procedure during the reference period. It would not have been feasible at the start of the period because no margins were available either beneath the ceilings for the individual headings or beneath the own resources ceiling. The proposal which the Commission presented in individual headings in order to strengthen certain internal policies which could promote growth and employment was not endorsed by the Council. in 1996 for redeploying and reclassifying expenditure All in all, the degree of constraint imposed by the initial ceilings was uneven as between the categories of expenditure. - By the end of 1992 it was already clear that a margin would probably be available at the end of the period beneath the agricultural guideline. This has proved to be true, despite the difficulties on the beef market, and each year the actual expenditure outturn has been well below the allocations entered in the budget. Although the guideline may have imposed some constraint in decisions on agricultural legislation, this was not really the case in terms of budget execution. Attention has focused more this area and of monitoring in improving expenditure on ways of developments when the budget is being implemented. forecasts - The allocations for heading 2 (Structural operations) were set in terms of expenditure targets. They increased significantly over the period (see Table 4). Implementation of the Structural Funds fell behind schedule at the start of the programming period mainly for objectives 2, 5a and 5b and the Community initiatives. This shows that a rapid rise in planned allocations can, initially at least, encounter problems of management and of installation of joint financing arrangements which do not particularly concern the main beneficiaries. - The allocations for heading 4 (External action) have the highest rate of increase over the period (see Table 4). In this connection it should be borne in mind that there were no upheavals with financial consequences on the international scene on the scale of the events during the earlier period, and the heading 4 allocations were afforded a large measure of protection from various uncertainties by the introduction of reserves for emergency aid and loan guarantees (see below). - The growth allowed (Administrative expenditure) was much smaller over the period, and the ceilings imposed much more for headings 3 (Interna! policies) and 5 5 ^ of a constraint. Evidence of this can be seen in the fact that heading 3 was regularly at the heart of the budgetary debate between the institutions even though it represents only about 6% of total expenditure. As regards administrative expenditure, given the major building programmes undertaken by certain institutions and the growth in expenditure on pensions, the ceiling set meant that other than for enlargement staff numbers have remained virtually unchanged and sustained efforts have been made in terms of redeployment and rationalisation. • Relationship between appropriations for commitments and appropriations for payments In the financial perspective the ceiling on appropriations for payments required is set on the assumption that the full amounts available under the ceilings of the various headings in appropriations for commitments will be entered in the budget and actually used. It is also based on payment schedules by category of expenditure which are considered normal for systems which are fully operational with existing regulations and experience acquired. On the basis of actual outturn and development of outstanding commitments, it is in fact possible, under the first subparagraph of paragraph 10 of the Agreement, to adjust the level of the ceiling on appropriations for payments if this is considered necessary. At the start of the period the increase in the volume of outstanding commitments was much stronger than implicitly allowed for in the financial perspective, mainly because of the sluggish progress of implementation of the Structural Funds, which would eventually produce, by a catching-up phenomenon, an increase in payment requirements. It was not, however, felt necessary to alter the growth path for the ceiling on appropriations for payments, since this appeared high enough to cover foreseeable needs. In addition the budgetary authority, when adopting the 1997 and 1998 budgets, opted to place much tighter limits on the growth of appropriations for payments than on that of appropriations for commitments. But this policy could only go so far, firstly because the utilisation rate in payments picked up significantly from 1996 onwards, and secondly, unless there is to be a constant slackening in the rate of clearance of commitments or systematic underutilisation of commitment appropriations, the growth in appropriations for payments must inevitably catch up with that of appropriations for commitments. • Re-entry in the budget of allocations not used for structural operations When the Delors I and II packages were adopted, the institutions wanted to underscore the priority attached to strengthening economic and social cohesion by giving the heading 2 allocations in the financial perspective a privileged status. In particular they decided that unused allocations should be transferred automatically to subsequent years as amounts in excess of the ceiling. Experience has shown that there are limits and risks involved with the near automatic nature of these transfers: - re-entry of unused appropriations in budgets for subsequent years is possible only if a margin is available beneath the own resources ceiling. However, the size of this - - margin cannot always be calculated accurately when the transfer decision has to be taken; » there is a good case for using this mechanism if the reason for the underspend is temporary difficulties in implementing programmes. In the event of permanent implementation and absorption problems, successive transfers produce a snowball effect and provide no incentive to get to the root of the problems; the effect of such transfers is that the same expenditure is repeatedly entered in the financial perspective and successive budgets until it is implemented. This could give a distorted image of actual budget developments. When the budget policy line is to set an overall limit on the increase in total expenditure from one year to the next, as has been the case since. 1997, the need to allow for amounts to be re-entered in the budget imposes further restrictions on the possible growth of other categories of expenditure. • Implementation of the reserves in heading 6 of the financial perspective In 1993 the institutions decided to set up two new reserves alongside the monetary reserve - the emergency aid reserve and the loan guarantee reserve - with two objectives in mind: first of all. , to avoid too frequent application of the revision procedure and second to make it possible to mobilise quickly the resources required to deal with unforeseen events. - Monetary reserve For a temporary period up to the end of 1997 this reserve was given the broader assignment of covering the permanent cost of the monetary realignments within the EMS between 1 September 1992 and 31 October 1994. But the reserve was not mobilised during the period. In 1995 and 1996 expenditure resulting from fluctuations in the ecu/dollar parity was financed from the appropriations available in heading 1. What is more, in 1997 ECU 44 million in savings resulting from the favourable shift in the ecu/dollar parity was transferred to the reserve. - Reserve for loan guarantees3 The purpose of this reserve is to endow the Guarantee fund and, should that Fund not have sufficient resources, to make additional direct payments in the event of a debtor defaulting on a This Guarantee Reserve-Guarantee Fund mechanism performed its assigned role perfectly. loan guaranteed by the general budget. It served as a framework for the development of lending operations guaranteed by the general budget, prompting the Council and the EIB to improve the programming of their lending to non-member countries. The resources available to the mechanism were adequate, from 1994 to 1997 just over 80% of the reserve's allocation was used, guaranteeing a total volume of new lending The operation of the Guarantee Reserve-Guarantee Fund mechanism is analysed in detail in the specific report presented by the Commission. operations of ECU 7. 5 billion. The Fund's resources have now reached the target figure set in the regulation of 10% of guaranteed loans outstanding. The defaults that the Fund has had to cover have never resulted in aggregate disbursements in excess of 5% of the amount outstanding. The result has been that the allocations under heading 4 of the financial perspective for expenditure on external action have been shielded from the unforeseeable impact which activation of the guarantee would have had if this mechanism had not existed. - Reserve for emergency aid This reserve was used, as intended, to cover specific aid requirements in non-member countries, primarily for humanitarian operations, in circumstances which could not be foreseen when the budget was drawn up, either as a result of new events or of a major and unexpected development in existing situations. Calls were made on (he reserve each year except in 1997, when additional humanitarian aid needs of ECU 120 million in appropriations for commitments and ECU 150 million in appropriations for payments were covered by transfers from other items in heading 4. from 1993 to 1996 the average rate of use of the reserve was just over 75%; without it there would have had to be some very tricky juggling of appropriations in heading 4 during the year or even revisions of the ceiling. However, some of the practical arrangements for drawing on the reserve weakened the specific character of the instrument and hence the reason for its existence. It is not because the reserve exists that there is no need to make adequate allocation under heading 4 for humanitarian aid to cope with average foreseeable requirements each year. But it was found that these allocations were constantly underestimated during the period and extra resources had to be found during the year by calling on the reserve even though in question were entirely it was not always clearly demonstrated unforeseen. that the events On the other hand the reserve should be mobilised as soon as unforeseen situations arise, involving large and urgent requirements, in order not to compromise humanitarian aid operations already programmed. B. Improvement of the budgetary procedure The new procedures introduced in the 1993 Agreement have gradually given life to a very encouraging practice of collaboration between the institutions. Some difficulties, connected with the classification of expenditure, were still encountered at the start of the period, as was demonstrated by the dispute between the two arms of the budgetary authority over the 1995 budget. The objective set by the institutions in 1993 of improving implementation of the 1982 Joint Declaration was not fully achieved. /. Collaboration between the institutions has gradually gained substance The 1993 Agreement introduced an inlerinstitutional collaboration procedure involving an exchange of views on budget priorities and conciliation on compulsory expenditure. Although initially this procedure did not live up to the high expectations placed in it, it did gradually generate a conciliation mentality which tended to gather momentum and continue throughout the budgetary procedure. The trialogue meeting on budget priorities is held before the Commission takes its decision on the preliminary draft budget. The discussion at this stage between the two arms of the budgetary authority remained fairly formal to begin with, as the Council was not always in a position to express its own priorities. The discussion on the 1998 budget, however, demonstrated that this procedure could produce satisfactory results if it was launched, upstream, by an the Commission's internal discussion on budget priorities and provided the institutions were prepared to continue discussion in the subsequent stages of the budgetary procedure, In this way it was possible to come to an dealing impartially with the entire budget. agreement for 1998 on the principle and detailed arrangements of a strict budgetary policy covering all items of expenditure. trialogue meeting coming just after informal After the first application of the procedure ended in a dispute in 1994, conciliation on compulsory expenditure has also gradually produced satisfactory results. The two arms of the budgetary authority were able to agree on the amounts to be entered in the EAGGF Guarantee items of the budget in which Parliament had special interest, which made it possible to overcome, without necessarily settling, the differences of opinion about classification of expenditure. the conciliation procedure as a result of the compromise reached by the institutions at the trialogue meeting on 8 April 1997 on the possibility of presenting a letter of amendment in October, after the normal deadline, to adjust the forecasts of agricultural expenditure. The institutions held a trialogue meeting at the end of November 1997 to discuss the ad-hoc letter of amendment on the EAGGF Guarantee Section. Further advances were made with A further spin-off from conciliation in the budgetary procedure for 1997 was the adoption of the Joint Declaration of 12 December 1996 on improving the budgetary authority on fisheries agreements. information for Even though the 1993 Interinstitutional Agreement restricts conciliation to compulsory expenditure alone, it has by and large been extended in practice to the entire budget and has continued to be applied by the institutions beyond the Council's first reading. Even though these good results were confirmed with the establishment of the lc)()8 budget, they are still fragile and will have to be consolidated in the budgetary procedure for ll)()() 2. Continuing problem of the classification of expenditure This issue is still unresolved for the headings on which no compromise was reached in the Agreement (headings 2 and 3), i. e. essentially heading 1. The new conciliation procedure on compulsory expenditure was initially used by Parliament as an opportunity not only to discuss the amounts involved (which is what the Council and the Commission considered was the purpose) but also to argue about classification. After Parliament had unilaterally classified certain EAGGF Guarantee items as non-compulsory expenditure in the 1995 budget, the Council brought an action before the Court of Justice which annulled the budget. Since then the institutions have not really got down to discussing classification of all items of expenditure, despite the undertaking given when agreement was reached on the 1995 budget. 3. Improvement of the application of the 1982 Joint Declaration: results still incomplete The Joint Declaration of 30 June 1982, which is one of the fundamental instruments for Community public finances, sets the stage for balanced interinstitutional relations between the two arms of the budgetary authority and also between the legislative authority and the budgetary authority. This includes the undertaking by the Council not to enter maximum amounts in basic instruments and in return Parliament's acceptance of the need for a proper legal basis before appropriations entered in the budget can be used. The need for a legal basis was restated in the 1998 Interinstitutional Agreement and then again in the 1993 Interinstitutional Agreement. What is more a statement annexed to the the 1982 1993 Agreement confirmed Joint Declaration concerning legal bases and maximum amounts and pledged action by the institutions to improve application of these principles. the principles set out the validity of in On 6 July 1994 the Commission accordingly sent to the budgetary authority a communication covering the two issues of "amounts deemed necessary" and legal bases. (a) Entry of financial provisions in legislative instruments On 6 March 1995 Parliament, the Council and the Commission signed a joint declaration in which they rejected the practice of "amounts deemed necessary" and made allowance for the new legal situation resulting from the introduction, in certain areas, of the legislative codecision procedure. This joint declaration provides that: • multiannual programmes adopted under include reference amounts which are binding on the institutions during the annual budgetary procedure; the codecision procedure will • multiannual programmes based on the codecision procedure will not include such amounts. Should the Council still wish to enter a financial reference in such an instrument, it will be taken as illustrative of the will of the legislative authority. The financial reference is not, therefore, binding on the institutions during the budgetary procedure. instruments not covered by In practice, however, the Council has systematically entered financial references in the instruments it has adopted. (b) The issue of legal bases Article 22 of the Financial Regulation, taking up the wording of Title IV, paragraph 3 (c) of the 1982 Joint Declaration, lays down the principle that appropriations entered in the budget for any significant Community action may not be used until a basic instrument has first been adopted. The interpretation of this hard-won compromise between the institutions involved in the budgetary debate has given rise to disputes and the budget even today still has many items without a legal basis which cannot always be clearly justified. This has prompted the institutions to try to negotiate, on the basis of a Commission proposal, new rules and procedures in a bid to improve interinstitutional collaboration 10 and sound financial management. These negotiations arc currently on hold because of the cases brought before the Court of Justice. Agreement needs to be found as a matter of urgency, otherwise it will not be possible to implement the budget properly. 4. Use of budget reserves Article 19 of the Financial Regulation provides that the budget may include "provisional appropriations" and "contingency reserves". The Commission's view is that the purpose of such reserves should be to facilitate budget management by making it possible to allocate appropriations to a budget heading during the year for an operation which had not been fully finalised when the budget was voted, in particular where the legal basis had still not been adopted. In recent years Parliament has tended to make more and more use of this instrument, making the release of the appropriations subject to all kinds of conditions, often very remote from the purpose of the budgetary heading concerned. Its interpretation of the use which could be made of the budgetary reserve has been very broad and debatable on certain points. While the appropriations for a given year are authorised by what ought to be a single budgetary act, this widespread use of reserves results in authorisation being given on various occasions during the year. The mobilisation of the appropriations entered in reserve also allows the budgetary authority to interfere in budget execution even though this Finally, although budget implementation is subject to ex post control, Parliament's practice means that it is de facto subject to ex ante control, in that the Commission may have to state how it intends to use appropriations before they can be transferred to the operational headings. is a matter exclusively for the Commission. There is therefore a good case for clarifying in the Financial Regulation the rules governing the use of budget reserves II. GUIDELINES FOR A NEW AGREEMENT As the Interinstitutional Agreement has on the whole worked satisfactorily, there is therefore no need for far-reaching changes to the existing rules. On the other hand there have in recent years been many declarations and interinstitutional agreements on budget matters, and this has rather blurred the legal situation in this area. Because of this complexity and of the existence in certain instruments of provisions which no longer have any raison d'être given past experience or new rules, the Commission believes that the renewal of the Interinstitutional Agreement should be taken as an opportunity to update and coordinate all the interinstitutional agreements and joint declarations on budgetary matters. The Commission's proposal is that various points should be added or clarified to make a clear distinction between the two purposes of the Interinstitutional Agreement, namely implementation of the financial perspective and improvement of the budgetary procedure. 11 A. Management of the financial framework I he proposals concerning the structure, content and amount of the various headings in the financial framework are contained in the communication on the renewal of the financial perspective. This communication deals only with the provisions governing application of the financial framework. These provisions remain valid for the same length of time as the financial perspective, and this could be stipulated in the Agreement. On the question of changes to be made, the Commission believes that maintaining the own resources ceiling at 1. 27% of GNP, as proposed in the communication on the renewal of the financial perspective, must be offset by more flexible management of the financial framework, in particular to make it possible to contend with unforeseen requirements. /. Retention of existing provisions Subject to certain clarifications or possible redrafting, the Commission is proposing that the principle and procedures for the following provisions be kept unchanged: - - the concept of ceiling applicable to the various headings and, for heading 1, the principle of the agricultural guideline for which the method of calculation and scope are set out in the Decision on budgetary discipline; the establishment of these ceilings in constant prices and the annual technical adjustment in line with inflation and GNP growth; acceptance of the maximum rate of increase deriving from budgets established within the limit of the financial perspective; the undertaking by the two arms of the budgetary authority to leave, as a rule, margins available beneath the ceilings of the financial perspective; the possibility of an adjustment in line with the conditions of implementation in order to ensure an orderly progression between commitments and payments; }' - the possibility of revising the financial perspective by the majority required for budget decisions; - the procedures in force for the mobilisation of the reserves. 2. Provisions concerning certain categories of expenditure (a) Heading 2 The relatively privileged status of the allocations for heading 2 is maintained in the rules governing the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund, the new Interinstitutional Agreement should again contain an undertaking by the two arms of the budgetary authority to comply with the allocations provided for in the financial perspective for the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund (paragraph 21 of the 1()()3 Agreement). 12 Two of the amendments proposed in the new Structural Funds regulations should, however, be reflected in the new Agreement. The first concerns the conditions of implementation of the Structural Funds. Each year the budget commitments would correspond to the annual programming instalments. Amounts committed but not paid in the two years following their entry in the budget would be automatically cancelled and a decision on whether to make the appropriations available again would be governed by the existing provisions of the Financial Regulation. This new approach to the management of the Structural funds would mean that it should no longer be necessary to arrange for the transfer to subsequent years of amounts not used in a given year, which would involve raising the ceiling of the corresponding heading of the financial perspective. However, should there be delays at the start of the period in preparing the programming, such a transfer would be authorised for allocations not used during the first year covered by the financial perspective. The second amendment concerns the index-linking of the allocations for the Structural Funds. To facilitate the programming of Structural Fund operations, the deflators to be used for adjusting, prior to entry in the budget, the annual allocations originally set in constant prices should be set in advance in the new rules. The lnterinstitutional Agreement should therefore provide that for the "Structural funds" subheading the annual technical adjustment would be based on the same deflators. There could be a mid-term review of the index base in the light of actual inflation but without any ex post adjustment of allocations for earlier years. (b) Heading 6 - Monetary reserve The usefulness of this reserve was not confirmed during the period 1993-99. What is more, fluctuations in the dollar rate should have less influence on agricultural expenditure in future as a result of the proposed reform of the CAP and assuming that it will be agreed to adjust the euro/dollar parity in the letter of amendment presented in the autumn. For this reason it is planned to gradually eliminate the allocations for this reserve as proposed in the communication on the renewal of the financial perspective. During this period the provisions of the lnterinstitutional Agreement governing the operation of this reserve would continue to apply. - Reserve for loan guarantees As the Guarantee Reserve - Guarantee Fund mechanism has served its assigned purpose, it is proposed that the operating rules currently contained in the lnterinstitutional Agreement for this reserve be kept unchanged. The new parameters proposed in the report on the operation of this mechanism would nevertheless result in a reduction in the allocation for the loan guarantee reserve provided that this did not add any further constraint on lending capacity. - Reserve for emergency aid In order to restore the emergency aid reserve to its genuine function, which is to provide a rapid response to specific and unforeseeable needs, three amendments are proposed. 13 Provided that the corresponding operational headings are allocated sufficient resources to cover average requirements each year, the first step could be to clarify the criterion for mobilising the reserve. In future the reserve should not be called on to cover needs which exceed what was expected in existing situations. Only needs arising out of genuinely new and unforeseeable events would be covered by the reserve. Secondly, it is proposed that it be stipulated that the reserve must be drawn on when such a requirement is identified, even if amounts are still available in the relevant operational items under heading 4 of the financial perspective, provided that the programmed spending indicates that the amounts will be used in full. Finally the reserve should be mobilised only for significant amounts. The Commission is therefore proposing that the text of the Interinstitutional Agreement should leave a neutral margin of at least EUR 15 million to be covered by redeployment. In this way it would be possible to reduce the allocation for the reserve as proposed in the communication on the renewal of the financial perspective. 3. Increased flexibility in management of the financial framework The procedure for revising the financial perspective, the arrangements for which are to remain unchanged, must be reserved for relatively large and lasting alterations to the financial framework and must be applied ahead of the preparation of the budgets concerned. For more specific requirements arising while the budget is being drawn up or implemented in a financial framework which in future will offer less latitude, it is proposed that the new Agreement offer additional but limited margins of flexibility. (a) Between certain headings of the financial perspective The possibility would be provided of transferring, for a given year, allocations between certain headings of the financial perspective by means of a more flexible procedure than that of revision. In the light of experience and following the same reasoning that was used for setting the various expenditure ceilings, this possibility would be restricted to headings 3 (Internal policies) and 4 (External action). Heading 1 continues to be governed by the agricultural guideline, the principle of which is laid down in the Decision on budgetary discipline. The allocations for heading 2 have privileged status. Administrative expenditure under heading 5 cannot really be considered interchangeable with operational expenditure. Finally, heading 6 covers reserves specifically intended to enable the Union to contend with unforeseen expenditure without jeopardising the financing of current policies. To ensure that the financial perspective continues to act as an expenditure framework, the possibility of transferring allocations between the two headings would be restricted as follows: - the transferable amount would be subject to a ceiling, set as an absolute amount of, say, EUR 100 million; 14 - a margin would at all events have to remain available beneath the ceiling of the original heading. This means that the margin beneath the original heading would have to be say EUR 100 million more than the transfer made; - the facility could not be used for the same reasons, i. e. to provide additional resources for the same budget items, the following year. The transfer would be possible during the annual budgetary procedure (or the procedure concerning a supplementary and amending budget), without formal adjustment of the ceilings concerned. The Commission, however, would not be allowed to make use of the possibility when presenting its preliminary draft. There would be conciliation between the two arms of the budgetary authority, in accordance with the arrangements laid down, before this transfer mechanism could be applied. (b) From one year to the next Underutilisation of appropriations for payments in the outturn for a given year gives rise to positive balances which are entered in the budget for the following year by means of a supplementary and amending budget and are deducted from the amount of own resources called in for that year. An estimate of the balance can also be entered in the draft budget, during the budgetary procedure, by means of a letter of amendment. The Commission is proposing that the new Agreement should provide for part of any positive budget balance from the previous year to be used to cover significant political requirements agreed in advance. It could be agreed that the budgetary authority would be allowed to vote expenditure - in appropriations for commitments and outside the financial perspective ceilings - for a maximum of say EUR 500 million, provided that these appropriations were covered by corresponding underutilisation in the previous budget and that the positive balance from the previous year was at least equal to this amount. The two arms of the budgetary authority would have to reach explicit agreement on the use of this possibility and on the corresponding amount within the limit set. 4. Duration of the financial perspective (a) An adjustment clause for the financial perspective The new financial framework for 2000-2006 comes at a point in time when it will have to the requirements of finance both enlargement to include new Member States. the development of Community policies and The financial framework which will be adopted for a fifteen-member Union with amounts being left available for an initial enlargement will have to be adjusted, by agreement between the two arms of the budgetary authority, when the new members actually arrive. This will mean restoring to the various headings of the financial perspective all or part of the amounts left available and if these are not sufficient to meet the needs of enlargement, to revise the financial perspective without exceeding the own resources ceiling. A clause providing for this should be included in the new Agreement. 15 (b) Extension of the financial perspective The rule governing the extension of the financial perspective, as contained paragraph 25 of the current Agreement, could be clarified and simplified. in It should first be confirmed that unless one of the parties expressly refuses any extension, the agreement will continue to be extended year by year until the entry into force of a new financial perspective. As the current Agreement provides that the ceilings will be adjusted on the basis of the average increase observed over the preceding period, it does not guarantee compatibility between expenditure and the own resources ceiling. In order to be consistent with the general philosophy of the financial perspective, there should be a link in the extension clause with the past growth of expenditure and also with the own resources available. The Commission is therefore proposing that in the event of the financial perspective being extended, the ceilings in force will be raised by the average annual rate of increase over the period 2000-2006 with the rate of increase of each of the headings being restricted to the increase in GNP. B. Budgetary procedure and intcrinstitutional collaboration The Commission is proposing that all the provisions in this area be consolidated, subject for to appropriate adjustments or additions intcrinstitutional collaboration. the procedures in particular in As the provisions concerned are not directly linked to the existence of a financial framework, they must be of a permanent nature. This means that the legal instrument constituted by the Interinstitutional Agreement should be concluded for an indefinite period even if: - allowance should be made for the possibility of adding further provisions if new agreements were to be reached between the institutions on specific points; - the provisions relating to the management of the financial framework would cease to apply if no such financial framework existed. /. 77w? new provisions and the changes to be made to the existing agreement (a) Classification of expenditure The 1982 Joint Declaration, which addresses the compulsory - non-compulsory issue from the angle of classification criteria and classification procedure, has not produced a satisfactory solution. It would appear that any attempt to define new objective criteria, compatible with the Treaty, for distinguishing between the two types of expenditure and providing an unassailable classification is doomed to failure. The Commission therefore believes that the institutions should agree on the classification of expenditure in the Interinstitutional Agreement. The Commission proposes that rural development measures and all other expenditure financed by the EAGGF Guarantee 16 Section which is not linked to common market organisations (veterinary measures, promotion schemes) should be included in the category of non-compulsory expenditure. The same would also apply to headings 2 and 3 expenditure, as agreed in the 1993 Agreement. Under heading 4 the Commission proposes the Community's contribution to the EBRD capital and to fisheries agreements (other than those to international organisations) should be considered compulsory expenditure. For heading 5 the classification would be that of the present budget. that The Commission is proposing that the classification of new budget items be agreed under In the absence of agreement a conciliation procedure extended to the entire budget. between the two arms of the budgetary authority on the classification of expenditure, the Commission's proposed classification in its preliminary draft budget would be deemed approved (cf. negative codecision procedure which already applies for mobilisation of reserves). (b) Interplay between legislative powers and budgetary powers • Entry of financial provisions in legislative instruments The Treaty of Amsterdam extends the scope of legislative codecision, to include areas where financial aspects are substantial. This procedure now concerns the following areas:4 - non-discrimination on the grounds of nationality (Article 6) free movement of Union citizens (Article 8a) free movement of workers, including social security for migrant workers (Articles 49 and 51 ) right of establishment, including coordination of special provisions on grounds of public policy, public security or public health (Articles 54 and 56) - access to activities as self-employed persons and in particular mutual recognition of diplomas, certificates and other evidence of formal qualifications (Article 57) - services (Article 66) - transport (Articles 75 and 84) - harmonisation of national legislation for the establishment and functioning of the single market (Article 100a) - incentive measures in the field of employment (Article 109r) - customs cooperation (Article 116) social policy (Article 118) 4 The Treaty articles mentioned correspond to the old numbering which is still in force. 17 - equal opportunities and pay for men and women (Article 119) - implementing decisions relating to the European Social Fund (Article 125) - education, vocational training and youth (Articles 126 and 127) - culture (Article 128) public health (Article 129) - consumer protection (Article 129a) - trans-European networks (Article 129d) - implementing decisions relating to the European Regional Development Fund (Article 130e) - research and technological development (Articles 130i and 130o) - environment (Article 130s) - development cooperation (Article 130w) - fight against fraud (Article 209a) statistics (Article 213a) - establishment of an independent supervisory body for the protection of personal data (Article 213b). This extension of the use of the codecision procedure, combined with the provisions of the Joint Declaration of 6 March 1995, may severely hamstring the budgetary authority, even though it should be allowed a certain amount of discretion for reasons of institutional balance and budgetary policy. The Commission accordingly takes the view that the content of the Joint Declaration should be reviewed in the light of the new situation created by the Treaty of Amsterdam. The principle set out in the Joint Declaration of 6 March 1995, whereby the institutions undertake to comply during the budgetary procedure with the reference amounts set in the legislative codecision procedure, can be retained. However, the two arms of the budgetary authority should be given the possibility of agreeing during the conciliation procedure to depart from these amounts. 5 If the Council and Parliament fail to agree on an amount other than that set by the legislative authority, the arm of the budgetary authority which has the last say would be allowed to depart by up to 10% from the reference amount. This margin of manoeuvre would not, however, apply to Social Fund and ERDF expenditure, given their privileged status, nor to research expenditure, since the Treaty states that the allocations set in the framework programme constitute a maximum amount. 18 • Legal bases The new Agreement could state what is offered in return for recognition of the principle that appropriations earmarked for a Community operation cannot be used until a legal basis exists: - items with an allocation of less than a certain amount, subject to the principle of budget specification, - preparatory action and pilot projects, with an indication of how long they may continue without a legal basis, autonomous operations, i. e. generic action for which the Treaty alone constitutes an adequate legal basis. 2. Consolidation of the existing provisions (a) Application of the maximum rate of increase The issues relating to the application of the weighted average rate are addressed in the Joint Declaration of 30 June 1982. The agreement stales in particular to what the maximum rate of increase applies, the circumstances in which the two arms of the budgetary authority can agree to set a new maximum rate and Parliament's margin of manoeuvre. The Commission proposes Interinstitutional Agreement, since perspective is not applied. that these provisions be kept unchanged they are only really relevant in if the the new financial (b) Late presentation of a letter of amendment for agriculture The Commission is proposing that the new Interinstitutional Agreement should formalise the consensus reached that such a letter of amendment should be given only one reading. The scope of the letter of amendment could be extended to cover expenditure on fisheries It should be the opportunity to adjust the distribution between amounts agreements. entered against the heading and those contained in reserve in the preliminary draft budget on the basis of the agreements which will be in force on I January of the budget year in question. (c) Coordination of the most recent agreements • Joint Declaration of 12 December 1996 on improving information to the budgetary authority on fisheries agreements The purpose of this declaration was to guarantee Parliament better information about the budgetary implications of agreements being negotiated. It also states that Parliament and the Council will endeavour to agree on the amount of appropriations involved during the ad hoc conciliation procedure on compulsory expenditure provided for in Annex II of the 1993 Interinstitutional Agreement. 19 The institutions have not seen eye-to-eye on the distribution of appropriations to be entered under the operational heading and those to be held in reserve, and also on whether authorisation should be given to implement an agreement provisionally without waiting until Parliament has delivered its opinion. These points should be clarified when the new Interinstitutional Agreement is negotiated. - On the first point it should be stated that the operational heading will carry all appropriations corresponding to fisheries agreements which are certain to enter into force during the year. On the second point, a sufficient lapse of time - 6 months say - should be allowed between Parliament being informed about the terms and financial implications of the that agreement and Parliament can deliver its opinion in advance. After the 6 months the appropriations could be used. the corresponding appropriations actually being used, so • The Interinstitutional Agreement of 17 July 1997 on the financing of the common foreign and security policy This Interinstitutional Agreement, which was negotiated in parallel with the Treaty of Amsterdam, is designed to prevent potential conflicts between the political decision to initiate a joint action and the financing of such action which is a matter for Parliament to decide since the expenditure is non-compulsory. The institutions agreed to step up budgetary conciliation, by trying to secure agreement on the amounts to be entered in the budget, and the exchange of information on the content of the joint action. 3. Enlarged scope for the conciliation procedure The Commission believes that the broader scope now given to the conciliation procedure, which has developed into a key instrument in the budgetary procedure, should be written into the Interinstitutional Agreement. This conciliation should be extended to the entire budget, i. e. including non-compulsory expenditure. In view of the other proposals made in this report, a number of additional questions should be addressed by the conciliation procedure. - The first concerns the classification of expenditure. - The second concerns application of the proposed flexibility between headings 3 and 4 of the financial perspective. At the conciliation stage the two arms of the budgetary authority should consider whether any "transfers" envisaged by one or other arm of the budgetary authority should in fact be made and what the amount should be. - Thirdly, the institutions should use the conciliation procedure to secure agreement on the amounts to be entered in the budget for fisheries agreements and the CFSP, as provided in the Joint Declaration of 12 December 1996 and the interinstitutional agreement of 17 July 1997. - If necessary the institutions could also agree, under this procedure, to depart from the reference amounts set by the legislative authority, in accordance with the Joint Declaration of 6'March 1995, for multiannual programmes adopted by codecision. 20 This conciliation stage would, as at present, come before the Council's first reading. It would resume after the two arms of the budgetary authority had each given the budget its first reading. This second stage would be held at the same time as the Council's second reading, which would allow the institutions to discuss the letter of amendment for agriculture to be presented in October. 21 ANNEX Application of the financial framework 1993-99 List of tables and charts Table 1 : Table 2: Chart 1 : (hart 2: fable 3: Chart 3: Financial framework actually applied from 1993 to 1999. Appropriations for commitments. ECU million. Comparison between financial perspective, budget and outturn, from 1993 to 1998. ECU million. Cumulative GNP growth rates for the Union. Percentage in real terms. Base 1992. Total appropriations for payments. Budget and outturn. Percentage of (iNP (data and forecasts from November l()()7). Margins beneath the financial perspective ceilings. Budget and outturn. ECU million at current prices. Margins beneath the financial perspective ceilings. Total expenditure in commitments and payments. Budget and outturn. ECU million at current prices. Chart 4: Appropriations for commitments not implemented. ECU million at current prices. Chart 5: » Appropriations for payments not implemented. I leadings 2, 3 and 4. ECU million at current prices. fable 4: Average annual rate of increase, 1993-1999 in real terms, of expenditure ceilings in initial financial perspective. âÀ TABLE 1 Financial framework actually applied from 1993 to 1999 APPROPRIATIONS FOR COMMITMENTS ECU MILLION 1. COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY 36657 36465 37944 40828 41805 43263 45205 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999(*) Current prices 2. STRUCTURAL OPERATIONS Structural Funds Cohesion Fund EEA financial mechanism 3. INTERNAL POLICIES 4. EXTERNAL ACTION 5. ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE 6. RESERVES Monetary reserve Guarantee reserve Emergency aid reserve 7. COMPENSATION 22192 23176 26329 29131 31477 20627 21323 24069 26579 28620 1565 1853 0 0 4109 4370 2152 108 5060 4120 4311 4895 3421 1522 1000 313 209 0 3634 4022 1530 1000 318 212 1146 500 323 323 0 1547 2444 108 5337 5264 4191 1152 500 326 326 701 2749 108 5603 5622 4352 1158 500 329 329 212 33461 30482 2871 108 6003 6201 4541 1176 500 338 338 99 39025 35902 3118 5 6386 6870 4723 1192 500 346 346 0 8. TOTAL APPROPRIATIONS FOR COMMITMENTS 72021 73486 80943 86604 90229 94744 103401 9. TOTAL APPROPRIATIONS FOR PAYMENTS 68611 70352 77229 82223 85807 90581 96380 Appropriations for payments as % of GNP MARGIN (% of GNP) OWN RESOURCES CEILING (% of GNP) 1,20 0,00 1,20 1,20 0,00 1,20 1,20 0,01 1,21 1,20 0,02 1,22 1,22 0,02 1,24 1,23 0,03 1,26 1,23 0,04 1,27 (*) Provisional amounts for heading 2 (proposal by the Commission for the adjustment to take account of the conditions of implementation) IMPACT OF REVISIONS AND ADJUSTMENTS IN LINE WITH THE CONDITIONS OF IMPLEMENTATION 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 45 75 55 175 120 Revision (October 1993) Heading 3: stimulation of economic activity (commitments) Heading 4: Middle-East peace process (commitments) Heading 5; depreciation of ecu against BEF (commitments) Overall ceiling - appropriations for commitments Ceiling - appropriations for payments Adjustment in line with conditions of implementation (April 1995) Heading 2: Transfer for Structural Funds (commitments) Overall ceiling - appropriations for commitments Ceiling - appropriations for payments Adjustment in line with conditions of implementation (April 1996) Heading 2; Transfer for Structural Funds (commitments) Heading 2: Transfer for Cohesion Fund (commitments) Overall ceiling - appropriations for commitments Ceiling - appropriations for payments Adjustment in line with conditions of implementation (April 1997) Heading 2. Transfer for Structural Funds (commitments) Heading 2: Transfer for Cohesion Fund (commitments) Overall ceiling - appropriations for commitments Ceiling - Appropriations for payments 869 869 935 869 869 696 380 11 391 186 434 1000 1000 633 - 5 00 - 3 00 173 693 693 632 1045 17 1062 300 3$ Table 2 Comparison between financial perspective, budget and outturn, from 1993 to 1998 ECU million r~ 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 FP Budget Outturn FP Budget Outturn FP Budget Outturn FP Budget Outturn FP Budget nuviaiuirar I FP Budget Outturn Appropriations for commitments 1. Common agricultural policy 36. 657 35. 352 35. 032 36. 465 34. 787 32. 970 37. 944 36. 894 34. 503 40. 828 40. 828 39. 360 41. 805 40. 805 40. 423 43. 263 40. 437 2. Structural operations 22. 192 22. 192 22. 178 23,176 23. 176 21. 430 26. 329 26. 329 24. 243 29. 131 29. 131 28. 614 31. 477 31. 477 30. 078 33. 461 33. 461 Structural Funds Cohesion Fund EEA financial mechanism 3. Internal policies 4. External action (1) 20. 627 20. 627 20. 614 21. 323 21. 323 19. 577 24. 069 24. 069 22. 001 26. 579 26. 579 26. 083 28. 620 28. 620 27. 226 30. 482 30. 482 1. 565 1. 565 1. 565 1. 853 1. 853 1. 853 2. 152 2. 152 2. 152 2. 444 2. 444 2. 444 2. 749 2. 749 2. 749 2. 871 2. 871 '4. 109 4. 108 4. 066 4. 370 4. 365 4. 339 5. 060 5. 055 5. 018 5. 337 5. 321 5. 219 5. 603 5. 601 5. 519 6. 003 5. 756 4. 120 4. 115 4. 294 4. 311 4. 297 4. 483 4. 895 4. 873 5. 061 5. 264 5. 264 5. 524 5. 622 5. 601 5. 476 6. 201 5. 731 108 108 90 108 108 87 108 108 103 108 108 5. Administrative expenditure 3. 421 3. 417 3. 365 3. 634 3. 634 3. 581 4. 022 3. 999 3. 924 4. 191 4. 184 4. 121 4. 352 4. 284 4. 209 4. 541 4. 353 6. Reserves Monetary reserve Loan guarantee reserve Emergency aid reserve 7. Compensation 1. 522 1. 224 14 1. 530 1. 530 294 1. 146 1. 146 251 1. 152 1. 152 235 1. 158 1. 158 286 1. 176 1. 176 1. 000 1. 000 0 1. 000 1. 000 313 209 15 209 14 0 318 212 318 212 0 294 0 500 323 323 500 323 323 0 251 0 1. 547 1. 547 1. 547 500 326 326 701 500 326 326 701 0 235 0 701 500 329 329 212 500 329 329 212 0 286 0 212 500 338 338 99 500 338 338 99 Total approps. for commitments 72. 021 70. 408 68. 949 73. 486 71. 789 67. 098 80. 943 79. 843 74. 546 86. 604 86. 580 83. 773 90. 229 89. 137 86. 203 94. 744 91. 013 Total appropriations for payments 68. 611 66. 858 64. 783 70. 352 68. 355 59. 273 77. 229 75. 438 66. 547 82. 223 81. 943 77. 089 85. 807 82. 366 79. 342 90. 581 83. 529 (1) The outturn figures include the transfer of ECU 209 million from the emergency aid reserve in 1993, ECU 212 million in 1994. ECU 235. 5 million in 1995 and ECU 326 million in 1996. ^ Chart 1 Cumulative GNP growth rates for the Union. Percentage in real terms. Base 1992. 25 20 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 — 1: Initial assumption of 2. 5% per year — 2: Growth rate envisaged at time of annual technical adjustments - 3: Actual growth rate (or end-1997 forecast) Chart 2 Total appropriations for payments. Budget and outturn Percentage of GNP (November 1997 figures and forecasts) 1. 3 1. 25 1. 2 1. 15 A \ 1. 1 \ \ 1. 05 11 - • ™ • • • * * •' s * £^*. ^ / ^ ^ / V-— •/• ----- - 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 su • •• Own resources ceiling I - Payments-budget •—Payments-outturn (provisional figures for 1997) Table 3 largins beneath the financial perspective ceilings. Budget (B) and outturn (0), ECU million at current prices 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 B 0 B O B O B O B Provis. O B O B O 1. Common agri. policy 1. 305 1. 625 1. 678 3. 495 1. 050 3. 441 Monetary reserve 2. Structural operations Structural Funds Cohesion Fund EEA financial mechanism 3. Internal policies 4. External action Emergency aid reserve 5. Administration 0 0 0 0 1 5 0 4 Loan guarantee reserve 298 1. 000 14 14 0 43 35 56 299 0 0 0 0 5 14 0 0 0 1. 000 1. 746 1. 746 0 31 40 53 24 - - - - 0 0 0 0 0 5 22 0 23 0 0 500 2. 086 2. 068 0 18 42 157 98 72 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 0 0 7 0 0 1. 468 1. 000 1. 382 2. 826 500 517 496 0 21 118 66 70 91 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 21 0 68 0 0 500 1. 399 1. 394 0 5 84 146 0 0 0 0 0 247 470 0 143 188 43 0 0 0 1. 613 3. 072 1. 697 6. 389 1. 100 6. 397 24 2. 831 1. 092 4. 026 3. 731 1. 753 3. 828 1. 997 11. 079 1. 791 10. 682 280 4. 910 3. 441 6. 465 7. 052 7. Compensation Total commitments Total payments SU Chart 3 Margins beneath the financial perspective ceilings. Total expenditure in commitments and payments. Budget and outturn. ECU million at current prices. 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 -1000 -2000 -3000 -4000 -5000 -6000 -7000 -8000 -9000 -10000 -11000 -12000 • Commitments-Budget - •• Payments-Budget —•—Commits. -Outturn (provis. figs. for 1997) - A - Payments-Outturn (provis. figs. for 1997) 1993 1994 1995 1996 '997 Chart 4 ions for commitments not implemented. ECU million (at current prices) -1000 -2000 -3000 -4000 -5000 -6000 Provisional figures for " 99" % • Others H Heading 2 • Heading 1 Chart 5 Appropriations for payments not implemented. Headings 2, 3 and 4 ECU million (at current prices) 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 -1000 -2000 -3000 -4000 -5000 -6000 tf -7000 Provisional figures for 1997 • Heading 4 • Heading 3 • Heading 2 Table 4: Average annual rate of increase, 1993 to 1999 in real terms, of expenditure ceilings in initial financial perspective • _. Ceilings 3 II i Average annual growth rate (%). A. At current prices Initial financial perspective for EUR 12 Financial perspective after adjustment for enlargement 1. Common agricultural policy Guideline 2. Structural operations 3. Internal policies 4. External action 5. Administrative expenditure Total appropriations for commitment Total appropriations for payments 5,5 4,4 6,0 2,9 3,3 3,3 6,4 5,8 7,1 3,8 3,9 3,9 2! ISSN 0254-1475 COM(98) 165 final DOCUMENTS EN 01 11 06 09 Catalogue number : CB-CO-98-193-EN-C ISBN 92-78-32500-7 Office for Official Publications of the European Communities L-2985 Luxembourg U


title: ΓΡΑΠΤΗ ΕΡΩΤΗΣΗ αρ θ. 784/98 του Roberta ANGELILLI προς την Επ τροπή. Νομοθετικές διατάξεις της Ιταλίας όσον αφορά το εμπόριο

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trade licence

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text: 9. 10. 98 EL Epi·shmh Efhmeri·da tvn Eyrvpai¤kv· n Koinoth·tvn C 310/129 (98/C 310/173) GRAPTH ERVTHSH E-0784/98 ypobolh· : Roberta Angelilli (NI) prow thn Epitroph· (18 Marti·oy 1998) Ue·ma: Nomouetike·w diata·jeiw thw Itali·aw o·son afora· to empo·rio To pro·sfato nomouetiko· dia·tagma peri· ryumi·sevw emporikv· n uema·tvn poy ene·krine to Symboy·lio Ypoyrgv· n thw Italikh·w Dhmokrati·aw stiw 16 Ianoyari·oy 1998 (kat(cid:146) ejoysiodo·thsh toy a·ruroy 4 toy No·moy 59/97) proble·pei thn kauolikh· kata·rghsh thw a·deiaw gia tiw mikre·w emporike·w epixeirh·seiw me·xri 300 t. m. (a·ruro 4), thn kata·rghsh thw ypoxre·vshw eggrafh·w sto emporiko· mhtrv· o gia a·skhsh emporikv· n drasthrioth·tvn (a·ruro 5) kai thn ypagvgh· tvn dekatessa·rvn oma·dvn proi¤o·ntvn se dy·o mo·no kathgori·ew: ta edv· dima kai ta mh edv· dima proi¤o·nta (a·ruro 5, eda·fio 1). Oi diata·jeiw ayte·w ua epife·royn anarxi·a sthn agora· kai ua diatara·joyn sobara· thn isorropi·a toy tome·a me epizh·miew syne·peiew gia tiw mikre·w mona·dew poy antiprosvpey·oyn peri·poy 900. 000 mikre·w epixeirh·seiw• epi·shw, ua epife·royn apv· leia 60. 000 peri·poy ue·sevn ergasi·aw. Pre·pei na shmeivuei· o·ti me to dia·tagma ayto· h shmerinh· aji·a tvn adeiv· n (shmantikh· se polle·w periptv· seiw) gia a·skhsh emporikv· n drasthrioth·tvn ua ekmhdenisuei·. To me·tro ayto· ua bla·cei oikonomika· o·soyw ei·xan h·dh la·bei thn a·deia prin apo· thn efarmogh· thw dia·tajhw kai ende·xetai na parabia·sei to a·ruro 85 thw Synuh·khw EK. Pra· gmati, ua dhmioyrgh·sei pleonektikoy·w o·royw gia tiw ne·ew epixeirh·seiw oi opoi·ew ua mporoy·san na askh·soyn aue·mito antagvnismo· epeidh· den yfi·stantai -o·pvw kata· to pareluo·n- to ko·stow gia thn eki·nhsh thw emporikh·w drasthrio·thta· w toyw. Te·low, h eleyue·rvsh poy eisa· getai gia ta emporika· katasth·mata epifa·neiaw me·xri 300 t. m. ua epife·rei yperbolikh· ay·jhsh tvn mini-market, tvn mikrv· n emporikv· n katasthma·tvn kai apouhkv· n poy pvloy·n me meivme·new time·w h· leitoyrgoy·n me to sy·sthma tvn ekptv· sevn, se mi·a pragmatiko·thta agora·w o·pvw ei·nai thw Itali·aw o·poy h me·sh epifa·neia emporikoy· katasth·matow kymai·netai apo· 100 t. m. e·vw 120 t. m. Ypo· to pri·sma tvn anvte·rv ervta·tai h Epitroph·: Den kri·nei o·ti ta en lo·gv me·tra anti·keintai stiw diata·jeiw tvn odhgiv· n 64/223/EOK (1) kai 68/363/EOK (2) 1. sxetika· me to lianiko· kai to xondriko· empo·rio; Den kri·nei o·ti ta en lo·gv me·tra anti·keintai se o·,ti presbey·ei to «Pra·sino Bibli·o gia to Empo·rio» (Delti·o 2. thw Epitroph·w tvn Eyrvpai¤kv· n Koinoth·tvn › Symplh·rvma, ariu. 2/97), to opoi·o, env· ue·tei vw sto·xo th megaly·terh eleyue·rvsh toy tome·a, ypogrammi·zei thn ana·gkh na ikanopoihuei· h en lo·gv apai·thsh xvri·w na teuoy·n se ki·ndyno oi ue·seiw ergasi·aw; 3. Den kri·nei o·ti ta en lo·gv me·tra ende·xetai na apoboy·n eiw ba·row toy eley·ueroy antagvnismoy·; 4. Poia ei·nai h genikh· a·poch thw Epitroph·w epi· toy ue·matow aytoy·; (1) EE 56, 04. 04. 1964, sel. 863. (2) EE L 260, 22. 10. 1968, sel. 1. Apa· nthsh toy/thw k, Monti ej ono·matow thw Epitroph· w (28 Mai(cid:143)oy 1998) Epi· toy paro·ntow, h Epitroph· ejeta·zei diejodika· to pro·blhma poy e·uese to Ajio·timow Me·low toy Koinoboyli·oy kai de ua paralei·cei na thn enhmerv· sei sxetika· to taxy·tero dynato·. (98/C 310/174) GRAPTH ERVTHSH P-0787/98 ypobolh· : Doeke Eisma (ELDR) prow thn Epitroph· (5 Marti·oy 1998) Ue·ma: Oi ki·ndynoi poy apeiloy·n to koyna·bi (meles meles) sto Hnvme·no Basi·leio Gnvri·zei h Epitroph· peri· thw e·kueshw Kerb, sy·mfvna me thn opoi·a den yfi·statai ako·mh kammi·a episthmonikh· apo·deijh gia th meta·dosh thw fymati·vshw (TB) tvn booeidv· n apo· ta koyna·bia sta zv· a kai h opoi·a synista· sygxro·nvw, prow epibebai·vsh toy vw a·nv sympera·smatow, thn ejo·ntvsh o·lvn tvn koynabiv· n epi· pentaeti·a, se de·ka perioxe·w 100 tetragvnikv· n xiliome·trvn, kauv· w kai thn ejo·ntvsh o·lvn tvn koynabiv· n se zv· nh thw i·diaw perime·troy efo·son e·xei emfanisuei· s(cid:146)ayth· h TB tvn booeidv· n, gegono·w poy ua stoi·xize thzvh· se 10. 000 e·vw 15. 000 koyna·bia; Den symmeri·zetai h Epitroph· thn a·poch o·ti oydo·lvw synista· tai paro·moio pei·rama; Den kri·nei h Epitroph· o·ti h ene·rgeia ayth· antibai·nei prow thn efarmozo·menh sto Hnvme·no Basi·leio politikh·, kata· syne·peia de kai prow thn eyrvpai¤kh· periballontikh· politikh· poy thn empne·ei;


title: PREGUNTA ESCRITA n. 711/98 de los diputados Amedeo AMADEO , Salvatore TATARELLA a la Comisión. Legislación alimentaria - Salud del consumidor

eurovoc_concepts:
approximation of laws
consumer information
consumer protection
food inspection
foodstuffs legislation
labelling
mutual recognition principle
public health

text: C 386/34 Diario Oficial de las Comunidades Europead ES 11. 12. 98 (98/C 386/043) PREGUNTA ESCRITA E-0710/98 de Amedeo Amadeo (NI) y Salvatore Tatarella (NI) a la Comisi(cid:243)n (18 de marzo de 1998) Asunto: Legislaci(cid:243)n alimentaria › Salud del consumidor En relaci(cid:243)n con los principios generales de la legislaci(cid:243)n alimentaria de la Uni(cid:243)n Europea (Libro Verde de la Comisi(cid:243)n) y con la salud del consumidor y seguridad alimentaria (Comunicaci(cid:243)n de la Comisi(cid:243)n) (COM(97)0176 y COM(97)0183), ¿No considera la Comisi(cid:243)n que es incumbencia de los Estados miembros, como rectificaci(cid:243)n de la Directiva 83/ 89/CEE, especificar que las normas nacionales no constituyen obstÆculos al mercado interior? (98/C 386/044) PREGUNTA ESCRITA E-0711/98 de Amedeo Amadeo (NI) y Salvatore Tatarella (NI) a la Comisi(cid:243)n (18 de marzo de 1998) Asunto: Legislaci(cid:243)n alimentaria › Salud del consumidor En relaci(cid:243)n con los principios generales de la legislaci(cid:243)n alimentaria de la Uni(cid:243)n Europea (Libro Verde de la Comisi(cid:243)n) y con la salud del consumidor y seguridad alimentaria (Comunicaci(cid:243)n de la Comisi(cid:243)n) (COM(97)0176 y COM(97)0183), ¿No considera la Comisi(cid:243)n que s(cid:243)lo las cuestiones meramente tØcnicas se han de gestionar a travØs de los procedimientos de comitØ y que las cuestiones fundamentales han de seguir siendo objeto de decisi(cid:243)n pol(cid:237)tica? (98/C 386/045) PREGUNTA ESCRITA E-0712/98 de Amedeo Amadeo (NI) y Salvatore Tatarella (NI) a la Comisi(cid:243)n (18 de marzo de 1998) Asunto: Legislaci(cid:243)n alimentaria › Salud del consumidor En relaci(cid:243)n con los principios generales de la legislaci(cid:243)n alimentaria de la Uni(cid:243)n Europea (Libro Verde de la Comisi(cid:243)n) y con la salud del consumidor y seguridad alimentaria (Comunicaci(cid:243)n de la Comisi(cid:243)n) (COM(97)0176 y COM(97)0183), ¿No estima la Comisi(cid:243)n que los principios HACCP deber(cid:237)an ser vÆlidos para toda la cadena alimentaria, desde el productos hasta el consumidor, independientemente del tipo y de las dimensiones de la empresa de que se trate? (98/C 386/046) PREGUNTA ESCRITA E-0713/98 de Amedeo Amadeo (NI) y Salvatore Tatarella (NI) a la Comisi(cid:243)n (18 de marzo de 1998) Asunto: Legislaci(cid:243)n alimentaria › Salud del consumidor En relaci(cid:243)n con los principios generales de la legislaci(cid:243)n alimentaria de la Uni(cid:243)n Europea (Libro Verde de la Comisi(cid:243)n) y con la salud del consumidor y seguridad alimentaria (Comunicaci(cid:243)n de la Comisi(cid:243)n) (COM(97)0176 y COM(97)0183), ¿No considera la Comisi(cid:243)n que la armonizaci(cid:243)n de las normas de calidad deber(cid:237)a aplicarse s(cid:243)lo para lo que concierne a las cuestiones sanitarias, mientras que los obstÆculos al comercio creados por los requisitos nacionales de calidad se han de tratar con la aplicaci(cid:243)n coherente del principio del reconocimiento rec(cid:237)proco?


title: Regolamento (CE) n. 613/98 della Commissione del 18 marzo 1998 che modifica gli allegati II, III e IV del regolamento (CEE) n. 2377/90 del Consiglio, che definisce la procedura comunitaria per la determinazione dei limiti massimi di residui di medicinali veterinari negli alimenti di origine animale (Testo rilevante ai fini del SEE)

eurovoc_concepts:
animal product
food inspection
public health
veterinary drug
veterinary legislation
waste

text: L 82/14 ‹ IT ‹ Gazzetta ufficiale delle Comunità europee 19. 3. 98 REGOLAMENTO (CE) N. 613/98 DELLA COMMISSIONE del 18 marzo 1998 che modifica gli allegati II, III e IV del regolamento (CEE) n. 2377/90 del Consiglio, che definisce la procedura comunitaria per la determinazione dei limiti massimi di residui di medicinali veterinari negli alimenti di origine animale (Testo rilevante ai fini del SEE) LA COMMISSIONE DELLE COMUNITÀ EUROPEE, visto il trattato che istituisce la Comunità europea, visto il regolamento (CEE) n. 2377/90 del Consiglio, del 26 giugno 1990, che definisce una procedura comunitaria per la determinazione dei limiti massimi di residui di medicinali veterinari negli alimenti di origine animale (1), modificato da ultimo dal regolamento (CE) n. 426/98 della Commissione (2), in particolare gli articoli 6 e 8, considerando che, a norma del regolamento (CEE) n. 2377/90, è necessario stabilire limiti massimi di residui per tutte le sostanze farmacologicamente attive impiegate nei medicinali veterinari della Comunità destinati ad essere somministrati agli animali da produzione alimen- tare; considerando che i limiti massimi di residui devono venire stabiliti solo in seguito a valutazione, da parte del comitato per i medicinali veterinari, di tutte le informa- zioni relative alla sicurezza dei residui presenti nelle sostanze destinate al consumatore di prodotti alimentari di origine animale e relative agli effetti dei residui sulla lavorazione industriale dei generi alimentari; considerando che, nel fissare i limiti massimi di residui dei medicinali veterinari presenti nei prodotti alimentari di origine animale, è necessario precisare le specie animali in cui tali residui possono comparire, nonché i livelli di tessuti residui che possono essere presenti nei singoli prelevati dall’animale cui era stato somministrato il prodotto (tessuto campione) e la natura del residuo che interessa ai fini del controllo dei residui (residuo marca- tore); considerando che, al fine di agevolare le operazioni rego- lari per il controllo dei residui, occorre di norma fissare, sulla base della pertinente normativa comunitaria, dei limiti massimi di residui per i tessuti campione, per il fegato o per i reni; che tuttavia il fegato e i reni sono organi che vengono spesso rimossi dalle carcasse nel commercio internazionale; che è pertanto necessario determinare dei limiti massimi di residui anche per i tessuti muscolari o adiposi; considerando che, nel caso di medicinali veterinari desti- nati alle specie ovaiole, agli animali da latte o alle api mellifere, occorre fissare dei limiti massimi di residui anche per le uova, il latte o il miele; considerando che nitrato di potassio, dl-aspartato di potas- sio, glucuronato di potassio e glicerofosfato di potassio devono essere inseriti nell’allegato II del regolamento (CEE) n. 2377/90; considerando che, in attesa dei risultati definitivi delle indagini scientifiche, florfenicolo e moxidectina devono essere inseriti nell’allegato III del regolamento (CEE) n. 2377/90; scientifiche, considerando che, in attesa dei risultati definitivi delle indagini limiti massimi provvisori di residui precedentemente definiti nell’allegato III del regolamento (CEE) n. 2377/90 deve essere estesa per solfossido di albendazolo e carprofene; il periodo di durata dei considerando l’impossibilità di fissare limiti massimi di residui per metronidazole dal momento che qualsiasi limite di tali residui nei prodotti alimentari di origine animale può costituire un rischio per la salute dei consu- matori; che pertanto deve essere inserito nell’allegato IV del regolamento (CEE) n. 2377/90; considerando che va concesso un periodo di 60 giorni prima dell’entrata in vigore del presente regolamento, al fine di consentire agli Stati membri di modificare in maniera appropriata le autorizzazioni di commercializza- zione dei medicinali veterinari rilasciate in base alla diret- tiva 81/851/CEE del Consiglio (3), modificata dalla diret- tiva 93/40/CEE (4), per tenere conto delle disposizioni del presente regolamento; considerando che le misure previste dal presente regola- mento sono conformi al parere del comitato permanente per i medicinali veterinari, HA ADOTTATO IL PRESENTE REGOLAMENTO: Articolo 1 Gli allegati II, III e IV del regolamento (CEE) n. 2377/90 sono sostituiti dal testo dell’allegato al presente regola- mento. Articolo 2 Il presente regolamento entra in vigore il sessantesimo giorno successivo alla pubblicazione nella Gazzetta uffi- ciale delle Comunità europee. (1) GU L 224 del 18. 8. 1990, pag. 1. (2) GU L 53 del 24. 2. 1998, pag. 3. (3) GU L 317 del 6. 11. 1981, pag. 1. (4) GU L 214 del 24. 8. 1993, pag. 31. 19. 3. 98 ‹ IT ‹ Gazzetta ufficiale delle Comunità europee L 82/15 Il presente regolamento è obbligatorio in tutti i suoi elementi e direttamente applicabile in ciascuno degli Stati membri. Fatto a Bruxelles, il 18 marzo 1998. Per la Commissione Martin BANGEMANN Membro della Commissione L 82/16 ‹ IT ‹ Gazzetta ufficiale delle Comunità europee 19. 3. 98 » 1 0 0 2. 7. 1 ’ l o n o d a c s i r o s i v v o r p R M L i l G - r o p o r p n i e l l e p e o l o c s u M g k / g l 0 0 0 1 i l a r u t a n i n o i z i c s e P i e d e o l o c i n e f r o l f i d a m m o S e m o c i t a r u s i m i t i l o b a t e m i o u s a n i m m a - o l o c i n e f r o l f i n o i z i s o p s i d e r t l A o v i t t e i b o i t u s s e T R M L e l a m i n a e i c e p S e r o t a c r a m o u d i s e R e z n a t s o S e t n e m a c i g o l o c a m r a f e v i t t a o l o c i n e f r o l F « i t a l e r r o c i t s o p m o c e o l o c i n e f r o l F. 1 1 2 1. i n o i z i s o p s i d e r t l A e l a m i n a e i c e p S e v i t t a e t n e m a c i g o l o c a m r a f e z n a t s o S O T A G E L L A : e u g e s e m o c o t a c i f i d o m e n e i v I I o t a g e l l a ’ L. A e h c i n a g r o n i e z n a t s o S. 1 e r a t n e m i l a e n o i z u d o r p a d e i c e p s e l e t t u T o i s s a t o p i d o t a r t i N « e r a t n e m i l a e n o i z u d o r p a d e i c e p s e l e t t u T o i s s a t o p i d o t a t r a p s a - L D e r a t n e m i l a e n o i z u d o r p a d e i c e p s e l e t t u T o i s s a t o p i d o t a n o r u c u l G » e r a t n e m i l a e n o i z u d o r p a d e i c e p s e l e t t u T o i s s a t o p i d o t a f s o f o r e c i l G : e u g e s e m o c o t a c i f i d o m e n e i v I I I o t a g e l l a ’ L. B i v i t t e f n i t n a i t n e g A i c i t o i b i t n A. 2 1. 1 » 0 0 0 2. 1. 1 ’ l o n o d a c s i r o s i v v o r p R M L i l G o t a g e F g k / g l 0 0 0 1 o n a i g a f , i n i v o , i n i v o B - s o f l o s , o l o z a d n e b l a i d a m m o S - a d n e b l a i d o d i s s o f l o S « i n o i z i s o p s i d e r t l A o v i t t e i b o i t u s s e T R M L e l a m i n a e i c e p S e r o t a c r a m o u d i s e R e z n a t s o S e t n e m a c i g o l o c a m r a f e v i t t a o s s a r g , o l o c s u M g k / g l 0 0 1 e n e R g k / g l 0 0 5 e t t a L g k / g l 0 0 1 i n i v o , i n i v o B i d e n o f l o s , o l o z a d n e b l a i d o d i s o l o z a d n e b l a e o l o z a d n e b l a a t a c i d n i , e n o f l o s o n i m m a - 2 o l o z a d n e b l a e m o c o l o z i t i s s a r a p o d n e i l g o r t n o c i v i t t a i t n e g A i l o z a d i m i z n e b - o r p e i l o z a d i m i z n e B. i r a t i s s a r a p i t n a i t n e g A. 1 2. 2. 1 1 2. 19. 3. 98 ‹ IT ‹ Gazzetta ufficiale delle Comunità europee L 82/17 » 0 0 0 2. 1. 1 ’ l o n o d a c s i r o s i v v o r p R M L i l G o l o c s u M g k / g l 0 5 i d i u q E a n i t c e d i x o M a n i t c e d i x o M « i n o i z i s o p s i d e r t l A e n o i p m a c i t u s s e T R M L e l a m i n a e i c e p S e r o t a c r a m o u d i s e R e z n a t s o S e t n e m a c i g o l o c a m r a f e v i t t a e n i t c e m r e v A. 1 3 2. i t i s s a r a p o t c e i l g e i t i s s a r a p o d n e i l g o r t n o c i v i t t a i t n e g A. 3 2. o s s a r G g k / g l 0 0 5 o t a g e F g k / g l 0 0 1 e n e R g k / g l 0 5 i e d i o r e t s n o n i r o t a m m a l f n i t n a i t n e g A. 1 4. i r o t a m m a l f n i t n a i t n e g A. 4 » 0 0 0 2. 1. 1 ’ l o n o d a c s i r o s i v v o r p R M L i l G e n e r , o t a g e F g k / g l 0 0 0 1 i n i v o B e n e f o r p r a C e n e f o r p r a C « i n o i z i s o p s i d e r t l A e n o i p m a c i t u s s e T R M L e l a m i n a e i c e p S e r o t a c r a m o u d i s e R e z n a t s o S e t n e m a c i g o l o c a m r a f e v i t t a o c i n o i p o r p l i r a o d i c a ’ l l e d i t a v i r e D. 1 1 4. o l o c s u M g k / g l 0 5 o s s a r G g k / g l 0 0 1 o s s a r g , o l o c s u M g k / g l 0 0 5 e n e r , o t a g e F g k / g l 0 0 0 1 i d i u q E. o m i s s a m e t i m i l n u c l a o t i l i b a t s e r e s s e ò u p n o n i l a u q e l r e p e v i t t a e t n e m a c i g o l o c a m r a f e z n a t s o s e l l e d o c n e l E : e u g e s e m o c o t a c i f i d o m e n e i v V I o t a g e l l a ’ L. C. » e l o z a d i n o r t e M «


title: WRITTEN QUESTION No. 755/98 by Carmen DÍEZ DE RIVERA ICAZA to the Commission. PVC toys

eurovoc_concepts:
approximation of laws
carcinogenic substance
early childhood
harmonisation of standards
health risk
marketing restriction
plastics
product safety
toxic substance
toy industry

text: 18. 1. 1999 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning C 13/5 (1999/C 13/007) SKRIFTLIG FR¯GA E-0750/98 fr(cid:229)n Allan Macartney (ARE) till kommissionen (18 mars 1998) ˜mne: Transportblockader och fri r(cid:246)rlighet f(cid:246)r varor Blockaderna i Frankrike, som genomf(cid:246)rdes b(cid:229)de av lastbilschauff(cid:246)rer och fiskare, har lett till s(cid:229)v(cid:228)l aff(cid:228)rsf(cid:246)rluster som vinstf(cid:246)rluster f(cid:246)r m(cid:229)nga skotska f(cid:246)retag, och (cid:228)ven om begr(cid:228)nsad kompensation har beviljats, s(cid:229) har ingen kompensation getts till f(cid:246)retag som inte befann sig i Frankrike vid den aktuella tidpunkten eller som inte kunde komma in i Frankrike som direkt f(cid:246)ljd av blockaderna. Kan kommissionen bekr(cid:228)fta att den inte kunde eller kan g(cid:246)ra n(cid:229)got f(cid:246)r att till(cid:229)ta fri r(cid:246)rlighet av varor fr(cid:229)n en medlemsstat till en annan, med tanke p(cid:229) blockaderna som p(cid:229)verkade den fria r(cid:246)rligheten mellan F(cid:246)renade kungariket och Frankrike? Borde inte Frankrike som en medlemsstat med skyldigheter enligt artikel 30 i f(cid:246)rdraget att f(cid:246)rbjuda (cid:229)tg(cid:228)rder med kvantitativa effekter h(cid:229)llas ansvarigt f(cid:246)r de f(cid:246)rluster som f(cid:246)retag drabbats av p(cid:229) b(cid:229)da sidor av Engelska kanalen som en direkt f(cid:246)ljd av blockaderna? Planerar kommissionen n(cid:229)gra (cid:229)tg(cid:228)rder mot Frankrike f(cid:246)r att inte ha vidtagit n(cid:246)dv(cid:228)ndiga och l(cid:228)mpliga (cid:229)tg(cid:228)rder f(cid:246)r att s(cid:228)kerst(cid:228)lla fri r(cid:246)rlighet f(cid:246)r varor, eller anser kommissionen att utslaget i domstolen nyligen (m(cid:229)l C-265/95) betr(cid:228)ffande blockering av den spanska importen av tomater r(cid:228)cker f(cid:246)r att s(cid:228)kerst(cid:228)lla att den franska regeringen kommer att vidta l(cid:228)mpliga och snabba (cid:229)tg(cid:228)rder i framtiden? Med tanke p(cid:229) den bristf(cid:228)lliga kompensationen till dem som p(cid:229)verkades negativt och att Frankrikes regering inte vidtagit n(cid:229)gra (cid:229)tg(cid:228)rder f(cid:246)r att s(cid:228)kerst(cid:228)lla den fria r(cid:246)rligheten, (cid:228)r inte ytterligare (cid:229)tg(cid:228)rder mot Frankrike faktiskt n(cid:246)dv(cid:228)ndiga f(cid:246)r att f(cid:246)r det f(cid:246)rsta s(cid:228)kerst(cid:228)lla att det os(cid:228)kra klimat som blockaderna skapat inte till(cid:229)ts forts(cid:228)tta, och f(cid:246)r det andra att bevilja kompensation till alla f(cid:246)retag som drabbats av f(cid:246)rluster som en direkt f(cid:246)ljd av bristen p(cid:229) fri r(cid:246)rlighet? Svar fr(cid:229)n Mario Monti p(cid:229) kommissionens v(cid:228)gnar (16 juni 1998) Som parlamentsledamoten mycket riktigt p(cid:229)pekar ans(cid:229)g domstolen (1) att Frankrike hade brutit mot artikel 30 i EG-f(cid:246)rdraget j(cid:228)mf(cid:246)rd med artikel 5 i EG-f(cid:246)rdraget genom att inte ha vidtagit l(cid:228)mpliga (cid:229)tg(cid:228)rder f(cid:246)r att skydda den fria r(cid:246)rligheten f(cid:246)r frukt och gr(cid:246)nsaker inom sitt territorium. Domstolen betraktade d(cid:228)rmed f(cid:246)r f(cid:246)rsta g(cid:229)ngen en medlemsstats underl(cid:229)tenhet att agera f(cid:246)r att f(cid:246)rhindra verksamhet som sker p(cid:229) initiativ av privatpersoner som en statlig (cid:229)tg(cid:228)rd som (cid:228)r of(cid:246)renlig med artikel 30. Det (cid:229)ligger s(cid:229)ledes de nationella domstolarna att beakta de r(cid:228)ttsliga principer som slogs fast i den ovann(cid:228)mnda domen i samband med bed(cid:246)mningen av r(cid:228)ttigheterna f(cid:246)r de privatpersoner som eventuellt kommer att v(cid:228)cka talan vid dessa domstolar. Faktum (cid:228)r att dessa privatpersoner kan f(cid:229) ers(cid:228)ttning f(cid:246)r den skada som de har (cid:229)samkats genom s(cid:229)dana hinder som (cid:228)r of(cid:246)renliga med artikel 30 i EG-f(cid:246)rdraget och som parlamentsledamoten n(cid:228)mner. Kommissionen har (cid:229) sin sida p(cid:229) grundval av artikel 235 i EG-f(cid:246)rdraget framlagt ett f(cid:246)rslag till r(cid:229)dets f(cid:246)rordning (2) om inf(cid:246)randet av en ingripandemekanism som g(cid:246)r det m(cid:246)jligt f(cid:246)r kommissionen att anmoda en medlemsstat att vidta n(cid:246)dv(cid:228)ndiga och proportionella (cid:229)tg(cid:228)rder f(cid:246)r att undanr(cid:246)ja vissa typer av handelshinder. Detta f(cid:246)rslag befinner sig f(cid:246)r n(cid:228)rvarande p(cid:229) granskning hos parlamentet och r(cid:229)det. (1) M(cid:229)l C-265/95 av den 9 december 1997, kommissionen mot Frankrike. (2) KOM(97) 619 slutlig. (1999/C 13/008) SKRIFTLIG FR¯GA E-0755/98 fr(cid:229)n Carmen D(cid:237)ez de Rivera Icaza (PSE) till kommissionen (18 mars 1998) ˜mne: Plastleksaker Europeiska unionens R(cid:229)dgivande vetenskapliga kommittØ f(cid:246)r giftiga och milj(cid:246)farliga kemiska f(cid:246)reningar har bekr(cid:228)ftat att leksaker av mjukplast inneh(cid:229)ller och avger stora m(cid:228)ngder giftiga (cid:228)mnen. Kan kommissionen meddela om den avser att vidta s(cid:229)dana (cid:229)tg(cid:228)rder som kommittØn f(cid:246)reslagit betr(cid:228)ffande plastleksaker?