title: 98/665/EC: Commission Decision of 25 February 1998 concerning aid awarded by Germany to HIBEG and by HIBEG via Krupp GmbH to Bremer Vulkan AG, facilitating the sale of Krupp Atlas Elektronik GmbH from Krupp GmbH to Bremer Vulkan AG [notified under document number C(1998) 582] (Only the German text is authentic) (Text with EEA relevance)

eurovoc_concepts:
Germany
State aid
common market
control of State aid
electrical industry
redemption

text: 25. 11. 98 EN Official Journal of the European Communities L 316/25 COMMISSION DECISION of 25 February 1998 concerning aid awarded by Germany to HIBEG and by HIBEG via Krupp GmbH to Bremer Vulkan AG, facilitating the sale of Krupp Atlas Elektronik GmbH from Krupp GmbH to Bremer Vulkan AG (notified under document number C(1998) 582) (Only the German text is authentic) (Text with EEA relevance) (98/665/EC) THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular the first subparagraph of Article 93(2) thereof, Having given notice in accordance with Article 93 to interested parties to submit their comments and having regard to those comments, Communities annulled Decision 93/412/EEC, ruling that it was insufficiently reasoned on four points, namely on the value of the new BV shares, the application of Council Directive 90/684/EEC of 21 December 1990 on aid to shipbuilding (4), as last amended by Directive 94/73/EC (5) (seventh Directive on aid to shipbuilding) distortion of competition and the effect on intra- Community trade and the alleged aid in favour of HIBEG. Whereas: I requested By letter dated 17 December 1991 Germany notified a guarantee given by the Freie Hansestadt Bremen/Land Bremen. The Commission, by letter dated 20 January 1992, from supplementary Germany. Germany’s answer of 4 March 1992 was received on 9 March 1992. On 6 May 1992 the Commission decided to open the procedure provided for in Article 93(2) of the EC Treaty. This was communicated to Germany by letter of 20 May 1992 which was published in the Official Journal of the European Communities (1). information On 6 April 1993 the Commission took a negative decision, Decision 93/412/EEC (2), by which it declared as incompatible with the common market aid awarded to the Hanseatische Industrie-Beteiligungen GmbH (HIBEG) and by HIBEG via Krupp GmbH (hereinafter ‘Krupp’) to Bremer Vulkan AG (hereinafter ‘BV’), facilitating the sale of Krupp Atlas Elektronik GmbH (hereinafter ‘KAE’) from Krupp to BV. By its judgment of 24 October 1996 in Joined Cases C-329/93, C-62/95 and C-63/95 (Germany and Others v. Commission (3)), the Court of Justice of the European In light of the Court’s ruling, the Commission is obliged to take a new final Decision in order to close the procedure. II The notification concerns a guarantee given by the Freie Hansestadt Bremen/Land Bremen to support the buying of KAE by BV from Krupp. Germany described a complex plan involving various transactions which, in combination, effect the sale of KAE to BV. In order to further diversify out of shipbuilding BV bought a 74,9 % share in KAE from Krupp. The price of DEM 350 million was not paid in cash but whith newly issued shares in BV. The following transactions took place or were agreed on: — 17 October 1991: the general meeting of shareholders of BV decides on an increase in the share capital, — 21 November 1991: Freie Hansestadt Bremen/Land Bremen gives a guarantee of DEM 126 million plus credit costs and interest to HIBEG, a public company ownded by the Land Bremen, the (1) OJ C 171, 7. 7. 1992, p. 3. (2) OJ L 185, 28. 7. 1993, p. 43. (3) [1996] ECR I-5151. (4) OJ L 380, 31. 12. 1990, p. 27. (5) OJ L 351, 31. 12. 1994, p. 10. L 316/26 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 25. 11. 98 — 26 November 1991: a share-swap between Krupp and BV whereby BV gives 2,8 million new BV shares (total value according to BV, DEM 350 million, i. e. DEM 125 per share) to Krupp in order to acquire a 74,9 % holding in KAE, — 26 November 1991: Krupp and HIBEG together found a Gesellschaft bürgerlichen Rechts (GbR), — 31 December 1991: Krupp and HIBEG bring both their agreed holdings into the GbR. Krupp contributes the 2,8 million BV shares and HIBEG contributes DEM 350 million in cash, financed by a bank credit partly covered by the Land’s guarantee mentioned above, the GbR, — 31 December 1991: on the basis of the agreement establishing the GbR gives a DEM 350 million advance to Krupp. HIBEG gets the irrevocable entitlement to sell the BV shares to a third person at a minimum price of DEM 125 per share. Every share sold reduces the holding of the two partners in the GbR, by effecting both a reduction of the balance owed on the advance to Krupp and a rapayment of the credit brought in by HIBEG, — 28 February 1994 (at the earliest) or 31 December 1994 (at the latest): the GbR is dissolved. The remaining BV shares are transferred to HIBEG while Krupp holds the balance of the advance. HIBEG has the option, agreed upon with the banks that gave it the credit, of repaying (part) of the credit by selling the BV shares to those banks for DEM 80 per share at the end of the credit term. This means that BV acquires from Krupp a 74,9 % share in KAE in exchange for 2,8 million BV shares. Within the framework of the GbR, Krupp exchanges those shares with HIBEG and Krupp receives DEM 350 million. At the time of the transaction, BV shares were quoted on the stock market at a value of around DEM 80 per share, i. e. the total of the 2,8 million shares was DEM 224 million. The Land Bremen/Freie Hansestadt Bremen supports HIBEG with a guarantee of DEM 126 million, the difference between the agreed purchase price of the share of KAE and the prevailing value of the shares, thereby allowing the sale of KAE to BV to take place. turn direct to the guarantor and does not have to go first to the debtor should the deptor be unable to pay. III In its assessment before commencing the procedure pursuant to Article 93(2), the Commission considered three questions: (1) whether aid is involved; (2) if so, how much aid is involved; and (3) who is receiving the supposed aid. Its position on the first question was affirmative. The average share price for BV shares in November to December 1991, when the most important transactions took place, was around DEM 80 per share. This price already reflected the lowering effect which a new share issue normally has, since as early as 17 October 1991 the general meeting of shareholders of BV had decided on the new issue. The issue price of new shares usually has to be below the market price of the shares in order to avoid failure of the Commission issue. Accordingly, concluded that DEM 80 per share was the maximum share price that could have been asked in an open issue. This view seemed confirmed by the banks’ willingness to accept the unsold shares by the end of the credit term at DEM 80 per share. the It is obvious that with the market price of DEM 80 per BV share, as determined by the Commission, BV could not have bought KAE. The 2,8 million shares are worth DEM 224 million and not DEM 350 million (the price for 74,9 % of KAE). HIBEG, wholly owned by the Land Bremen and therefore to be regarded as a public company, could only offer DEM 350 million in exchange for the new BV shares because the Land Bremen offered a guarantee for the difference of DEM 126 million. This DEM 126 million represents exactly the difference between DEM 350 million (the total credit) and DEM 224 million (the value of the shares on the basis of a market price of DEM 80 per share). The Commission therefore could not accept the implication that HIBEG’s involvement was normal commercial practice because, as Germany argues, the quoted price of BV shares averaged DEM 130,8 per share in 1990, even reaching DEM 170,5 per share on 1 June 1990, and fell at the end of 1991 as a consequence of the general down-turn in the stock market caused by the Gulf War. Germany in its letter of 4 March 1992 states that the guarantee, with the exception of some modifications, does fulfil the requirements of the Bürgschaftsrichtlinien des Landes Bremen, approved by the Commission by letter of 28 October 1991 (N 512/91). The main amendment that the letter mentions is that instead of an ‘Ausfallbürgschaft’ ‘selbst- schuldnerische Bürgschaft’ (absolute guarantee) is used, the difference being that in the latter case the creditor can (deficiency guarantee), a The Commission answered the second question as to how much aid was involved by looking at the same facts. On the basis of a market price of DEM 80 per share, the new BV shares were worth DEM 224 million. The difference as against the agreed purchase price for KAE of DEM 350 million, i. e. DEM 126 million, cannot be accounted for by commercial motives as explained above. Therefore the total value of this difference, being equal to the guarantee, has to be regarded as aid. 25. 11. 98 EN Official Journal of the European Communities L 316/27 At the time of the opening of the procedure, an answer to the third question as to the recipient of the aid could not be given. It depends on the assessment of what is the real commercial market price for KAE. If it is held that 74,9 % of KAE is worth only DEM 224 million then all the aid may be attributed to Krupp. If it is held, however, that the price of DEM 350 million for 74,9 % of KAE is a justifiable market price, then all the aid goes via HIBEG to BV to make it possible for BV to acquire 74,9 % of KAE. If the real market value of 74,9 % of KAE is between those two values, the aid is to be apportioned between BV and Krupp accordingly. the guarantee As to Germany’s reference to the Bürgschaftsrichtlinien des Landes Bremen (see II), the Commission could not accept that the guarantee fulfilled the requirements of the approved guarantee scheme. Not only is the form of instead of ‘Ausfallbürgschaft’) not in conformity with the approved scheme, but also the Commission could not agree, on the basis of the facts, that there is a normal relationship between the proceeds of the investment in GbR and the funds needed to service the loan, as required in the guarantee scheme. (‘selbstschuldnerisch’ Moreover, the guarantee scheme requires that securities be given as a collateral and that a premium of 0,5 % of the guarantee on delivery and 0,5 % annually be paid, yet neither requirement, on the basis of the available information, seemed to be met. Therefore, conformity with the approved guarantee scheme did not seem to be in evidence and, on the basis of Commission letters SG(89) D/4328 and SG(89) D/12772, Germany should have notified the guarantee before granting it, to enable the Commission to investigate it pursuant to Articles 92 and 93 of the EC Treaty. Against this background the Commission decided to initiate the Article 93(2) procedure in order to allow the Commission to examine the guarantee given by the Freie Hansestadt Bremen/Land Bremen on DEM 126 million plus credit costs and interest of the bank credit of HIBEG and HIBEG’s transactions with Krupp in the GbR and assess the common market. the overall compatibility with IV After publication of notice of the opening of the following other parties concerned procedure, submitted their comments: the — Bremer Vulkan AG, Bremen, and — Fried. Krupp AG, Essen. It pointed out the value of 74,9 % of KAE was at least DEM 350 million. this value was also acknowledged by BV in its letter inviting its shareholders to the meeting to approve the issue of new BV shares and that the value was also the subject of scrutiny by two independent consultancy/accountancy companies. that The comments received from the parties concerned were transmitted by the Commission to Germany by letter the German dated 16 September 1992 Government the opportunity to reply. to give V Germany reacted on the opening of the procedure by letter dated 1 July 1992. By letter dated 15 October 1992 it reacted to the comments of the other parties. By letter IV. E. 5 D/09810 dated 23 November 1992 the Commission requested additional information, to which Germany replied by letter dated 8 January 1993. The contents of the letter can be summarised as follows. 1. The German Government does not agree that the value of the BV shares was or is DEM 80 per share, although this was the traded price at the end of 1991 on the stock market. According to the German Governement, the share price on the stock market does not reflect the situation of the individual company but is the expression of general national and international economic developments. The issued price was not to tbe based on the actual share price on the stock market but on past and future developments expectations. The German authorities assess the value of the BV shares at DEM 125 each at least, for the following reasons: and (a) the banks value the shares at DEM 125 per share or more. This is reflected in the fact that the banks give a credit on 50 to 60 % of the value of shares offered as security. It is only for the credit above that 50 to 60 % that the banks needed extra security, given by the Land Bremen in the form of the guarantee. The very fact that the banks are prepared to buy the shares in BV for DEM 80 per share at the end of the credit period indicates, on the basis of this same 50 to 60 % rule, that the banks estimated the value of BV shares to be at least DEM 125 per share. In answer to the Commission’s request for submission of bank analyses or reports pointing to such an evaluation, the German authorities answered that they could not supply such documents as it had no access to them; BV claimed to have received no aid and referred to the point of view of the German Government. Fried. Krupp AG was also of the opinion that it had received no aid, as (b) the share price of BV averaged DEM 130,8 per share in 1990 and even reached DEM 170,5 on L 316/28 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 25. 11. 98 later, as a 1 June 1990. The price consequence of the Gulf War and the down-turn in the economy, something that could not be foreseen at the time of the deal; fell (c) synergy effects would result from integrating KAE in BV; (d) a big block of shares (2,8 million shares is around 20 % of all BV shares) is more attractive to an investor than individual shares; (e) (f) the annual balance sheet of GbR, as approved by two independent accountants and tax advisers, testifies to the value of DEM 350 million for the 2,8 million BV shares; of the decisive date for the valuation of the shares was 12 July 1991, the date of the signature of a memorandum understanding. That memorandum, which was not to take effect until it had been approved by the parties’ supervisory organs, provided for an increase in BV’s capital by 2,8 million new shares, to which Krupp would the acquisition of those shares, Krupp was to transfer to BV its 74,9 % holding in KAE. The two parties to the agreement valued their contributions at DEM 350 million each, which means that the new BV shares were valued at DEM 125 each. In consideration of subscribe. 2. On the question as to the value of 74,9 % of KAE, Germany referred to extensive assessments made by two independent accountancy companies at the request of Krupp and BV at the time of the trans- action between the two last mentioned. Those two accountancy firms assessed the value of the holding in KAE at DEM 350 million. the gave following 3. As to whether the guarantee fulfils the requirements of the Bürgschaftsrichtlinien des Landes Bremen, Germany answer. The Bürgschaftsrichtlinie requires that guarantees be in principle (‘grundsätzlich’) ‘Ausfall’ guarantees. This means ‘selbstschuldnerisch’ guarantees are possible under the Bürgschaftsrichtlinie. As HIBEG is State-owned, an ‘Ausfall’ guarantee, with its possible insolvency procedures, inappropriate from an is economic point of view. that As regards the question whether the proceeds of the investment will, under normal conditions, be sufficient to service the loan, Germany answered that this depended on the valuation of the BV shares and referred in that respect to its arguments mentioned above (see 1). As regards the securities and premiums required under the Bürgschaftsrichtlinien, Germany answered that they were not necessary as HIBEG is State- owned. The premiums would only result in an internal transfer (‘Umbuchung’). As regards the notification before the granting of the guarantee, Germany commented that the notification had been made on 17 December 1991 and that the guarantee had only come into effect when the credit agreement became operative (end of December). in its 4. The Commission requested letters of 20 January, 20 May and 23 November 1992 information regarding ownership of BV (private and public). Germany gave as an answer that HIBEG owned, at the time of the deal, 0,08 % of the shares of BV and that the Land Bremen has no further participation. VI The first question to be answered in this final assessment of the facts is whether there is aid involved. The Commission’s answer, in line with its reasoning at the opening of the procedure (see III), is affirmative. The average share price for BV shares in November to December 1991, when the most important transactions took place, was around DEM 80 per share (DEM 84,94 in November and DEM 75,43 in December). According to the Commission, the share price on the stock market does reflect the situation of the individual company, in the context of general national and international trends. A central idea in the financial literature is that capital markets are efficient. This means that shareholders value a company by its future profit streams and the share price of a company whose shares are regularly traded on the stock market (as in the case of BV) reflects the present value of future profit streams and dividends. Indeed the capital market is generally considered, with the currency markets, to be the most efficient market because of its high transparency, rapid response to new information and high number of knowledgeable players. Thus the stock market price represents a genuine market evaluation of the share value as it reflects supply and demand equilibrium in a fully public, transparent environment. The issue price of new shares usually has to be below the market price of the shares in order to avoid a failure of the issue. (This situation should not be confused with that of a takeover bid where it is common for the bidding company to offer a premium on the current share price). This implies that, given the stock market price of around DEM 80, the issue price would have needed to be below DEM 80 per share. The Commission therefore concludes that DEM 80 per share is the maximum share price that could have been asked in an open and commercial issue. The reasons given by the German Government to value the shares of BV considerably higher at DEM 125 per share (see V) cannot be accepted. The transaction at a value of DEM 125 per share could take place only because of the granting of the guarantee covering the difference between DEM 125 and DEM 80 per share. 25. 11. 98 EN Official Journal of the European Communities L 316/29 Germany was unable to supply analyses or reports of the banks to support such a high valuation. The fact that the share price averaged DEM 130,8 in 1990 does not take account of the fact that the share price was consistently lower than DEM 100 since as early as 1981, with the exception of the periods from the end of 1985 until 1986 and from early 1989 until the end of 1990. The Commission does not accept that the decisive date for the valuation of the shares was 12 July 1991, the date of signature of the Memorandum of Understanding between BV and KAE. That was not a binding document. What counts is the date on which binding agreements are signed. The value at the time of the binding transaction incorporates all market expectations about future profits. Therefore the price of the shares at the time of the transactions is the relevant real (market) value. The value of the shares in the past is simply not relevant. Nor does the Commission accept that the valuation of DEM 125 per share could have been justified by any inside information available to the parties that the market did not have, for example with respect to the likely synergy effects. First, it is inconceivable that those effects could have covered the gap between DEM 80 and DEM 125. Secondly, there are market and industry analysts and large investors which normally have the same knowledge or are very quick in acquiring this knowledge which is then transmitted to the market. In the event that there had been any such inside information about synergy effects in this particular case, it must be assumed that HIBEG, in order to sell the shares at DEM 125, would have made this inside information public and widely known. A rapid positive market reaction had to be expected in the case of any significant synergy or other positive effects. However, the contrary was true. A posteriori the actual development of the BV share price contradicts the arguments advanced by Germany since the stock market price for BV shares fluctuated in 1992, 1993 and 1994 at a much lower level than DEM 125. From September to the end of December 1991 the stock market quotation for BV shares constantly declined (DEM 73,50 on 30 December 1991). In 1992 the price of the shares fluctuated below DEM 98 and fell by 30 December 1992 to DEM 68. In 1993 the price did not rise above DEM 100,80 (20 October) and in 1994 reached a maximum of DEM 106,50 on 5 January. HIBEG has stated that by the end of February 1994 it sold all its BV shares at an average of DEM 97,18 each. BV eventually went into liquidation in early 1996. As regards Germany’s argument that a big block of shares is more attractive to an investor than single shares, it is difficult to accept that this could give a plausible explanation of the difference between DEM 80 and DEM 125 per share. It should also be borne in mind that a new share issue runs the risk of having the effect of lowering the share price. Moreover, it is quite evident in this case that Krupp had no intention of selling KAE for the 2,8 million shares. It wanted cash and for this reason the Land Bremen was called upon. Through its investment arm HIBEG, the Land/City of Bremen was prepared to buy the 2,8 million shares for DEM 350 million and take the risk of selling the shares to repay the DEM 350 million credit that HIBEG obtained. As regards the approval of the balance sheet of GbR by two accountants/tax advisers the following should be noted: in general when an opening balance sheet is established, accountants have to apply the principle of prudent valuation (Vorsichtsprinzip) which means that they have to value any asset at the lowest possible level. If there is any market value, established for example by a stock exchange, that value is to be referred to. But if, as is the case with the BV shares, there is a recent established price which differs from the stock market price, accountants are allowed to take that price into account for their valuation. Accordingly, the accountants only referred to the price of DEM 350 million recently paid for the 2,8 million BV share package, which was established by Krupp and Bremer Vulkan in collaboration with the Bremen Senate through HIBEG and the bank consortium, so that one cannot talk in terms of an independent valuation of the accountants. The valuation only mirrored the valuation of the parties involved. It is obvious that at the market price for the new shares at the time of the main transactions of DEM 80, as determined by the Commission, BV could not have bought KAE. HIBEG could only act in the interest of BV and pursue the arrangements with Krupp in the GbR as described above (see II), as the risk was covered with the guarantee on DEM 126 million plus credit costs and interest. This DEM 126 million represents exactly the difference between DEM 350 million (the total credit and price of 74,9 % of KAE) and DEM 224 million (the value of the 2,8 million BV shares at DEM 80 per share). The Commission cannot accept the implication that HIBEG’s involvement in previous cases, HIBEG was intervening as the instrument of the Land Bremen in support of a company — BV — whose owners, despite many inquiries, remain unknown to the Commission. On a previous occasion, HIBEG took upon itself to guarantee the issue in 1987 of BV shares to finance the shipbuilding activities of BV. The guarantee to purchase the new shares not sold at issue was considered not to be a normal guarantee but to constitute aid for the full amount of the difference between the guaranteed price and a stock market based real value of the shares. That assessment by the Commission was not contested by Germany, nor was its approval of the aid under the prevailing aid ceiling of Council Directive is normal commercial practice. As L 316/30 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 25. 11. 98 87/167/EEC of 26 January 1987 on aid to shipbuilding (6) (sixth Directive on aid to shipbuilding) by letter of 16 October 1990. The foregoing also answers the question as to how much aid is involved. As when the procedure commenced, this can be calculated as the full amount covered by the guarantee. On the basis of a market price of DEM 80 per BV share, the 2,8 million BV shares are worth DEM 224 million. The difference with the price for KAE of DEM 350 million, i. e. DEM 126 million, cannot be accounted for by commercial motives. The total of this difference, being equal to the total guarantee, has to be viewed as aid. HIBEG could pay DEM 350 million for the BV shares, which were worth no more than DEM 224 million only with the cover of the guarantee. On the question of the recipient of the aid, Germany’s answer concerning the value of the 74,9 % holding in KAE confirms the hypothesis that the DEM 350 million value, established in negotiations between two equal partners on the market, reflects the real market value of the 74,9 % stake. The Commission considers that to be confirmed by Germany’s explanation that the value of 74,9 % of KAE was set at DEM 350 million by two independent accountancy firms (see V). This means that the final recipient of the aid is BV. The total of the transactions and the aid involved made it possible for BV to acquire 74,9 % of KAE worth DEM 350 million not for cash but in exchange for 2,8 million BV shares worth DEM 224 million. Under the arrangement chosen, the aid was given by HIBEG, subject to the conclusion of the transaction between BV and Krupp, in the form of a cash payment. In this regard it is important to note that Germany in its different letters described the whole arrangement as seeking to achieve the diversification of BV through the buying of KAE. Although it was Krupp that received the cash payment direct from HIBEG within the agreements concerning the GbR, it is BV which effectively improves its financial position through the cash contribution by HIBEG and the related State guarantee and which is therefore the final aid recipient. Hansestadt Bremen, Germany’s answer cannot be accepted by the Commission. It is disputable whether the text of the Bürgschaftsrichtlinien, as notified to the Commission by letter dated 31 July 1991, allows ‘selbst- schuldnerische Bürgschaften’ instead of ‘Ausfallbürgschaf- ten’. Article 2. 1 of the Bürgschaftsrichtlinie provides: ‘Die Bürgschaften werden grundsätzlich gegenüber Kredit- instituten im Sinne von § 1 des Gesetzes über das Kredit- wesen als Ausfallbürgschaften übernommen’. As regards the securities and premiums required under the Richtlinie, it is clear that, as these were not required from HIBEG, this constitues a deviation from the approved Richtlinien. The fact that no securities and premiums were required from HIBEG in itself constitues aid. The costs of the guarantee should have weighed on the transaction between Krupp and HIBEG. Consequently, the guarantee should have been notified in accordance with the Commission’s letters SG(89) D/4328 of 5 April 1989 and SG(89) D/12772 of 12 October 1989 before it was granted, and not, as Germany did, before it became ‘operational’. The Commission has also considered whether the notified aid should be assessed under the provisions of the seventh Directive on aid to shipbuilding. As can be seen from BV’s annual report for 1991, the total share of shipbuilding in BV’s overall results for 1991 was 42,4 %. It is therefore arguable whether BV could be said to have been active principally in shipbuilding. Moreover, the fact that BV had shipyards does not mean that aid to BV has necessarily to be examined under the seventh Directive on aid to shipbuilding. This depends on which of BV’s activities is being aided. Only if the aid had been awarded in favour of shipbuilding activities could it be argued that the seventh Directive on aid to shipbuilding applied. In this particular case, the BV activity being aided was marine and defence electronics. Similarly, the fact that KAE was operating in the fields of marine and defence electronics did not make it a shipbuilding company within the meaning of Article 1 of the seventh Directive on aid to shipbuilding (‘shipbuilding is building of metal hulled sea-going vessels’). Thus the Commission concludes that the acquisition of KAE by BV does not come within the scope of the seventh Directive on aid to shipbuilding. Germany’s unwillingness or inability to supply full information on the ownership of BV makes it impossible for the Commission to discover why it is necessary in the present case for HIBEG (0,08 % shareholder) and the Land Bremen, rather than the company’s own shareholders, to supply finance. Germany failed to notify those aid measures in advance pursuant to Article 93(3) of the EC Treaty. Germany notified the aid only after the guarantee had been given and after Krupp and BV had sold or bought 74,9 % of KAE and after HIBEG and Krupp had founded GbR. VII As to whether the guarantee fulfils the requirements of the Bürgschaftsrichtlinien des Landes Bremen/Freie (6) OJ L 69, 12. 3. 1987, p. 55. Since Germany did not notify the aid before granting it, as it should have done pursuant to Article 93(3) of the EC Treaty, the Commission was unable to make known its view on the measures before they were implemented. The aid was thus illegal under Community law from the date on which it was granted. 25. 11. 98 EN Official Journal of the European Communities L 316/31 VIII At the time of the transactions in question (KAE was later merged with the BV subsidiary STN, which in turn was taken over by a consortium led by Rheinmetall), KAE’s main activities were in the fields of marine and defence electronics (echo-sounding techniques, signal- and data-processing). There is competition in the Community between producers in these fields and there is trade between the Member States in the products involved. According to the 1991 yearly report of (K)AE (the name of KAE was changed to AE after the acquisition by BV), KAE itself achieved part of its turnover within the Community. Of its DEM 689 million turnover for 1991, DEM 45 million was derived from business with other Member States. For 1990 those figures were respectively DEM 578 million and DEM 30 million. KAE had a workforce of 3 242 in 1990 and its profits in the period from 1986 to 1990 ranged from DEM 11 million to DEM 20,2 million. Within the marine and defence electronics sector, KAE operates in a number of specialised markets for which there is evidence to show that intra-Community trade exists. Such information is summarised in the following table: Imports from other Member States 1991 the the acquisition of KAE In its invitation to the general meeting of BV on 17 October 1991, the Board made clear its hope that through long-term international competitiveness of its marine electronics subsidiary STN would be enhanced. The BV Board also referred to the expected rapid realisation of synergy effects through the fusion of KAE and STN. The very aim of the acquisition of the 74,9 % stake in KAE was clearly to improve the competitive position of BV in the marine and defence electronics sector. Moreover, the aid enabled BV to strengthen its position in that sector without having to bear the full costs. Following the acquisition of KAE, the share of the BV Group’s total turnover accounted for by electronics and systems design was forecast to increase to 55 to 60 %. The sector was characterised by strong competition. According to the data available at the time of the acquisition, there were more than 40 companies in the defence electronics sector alone with a turnover in excess of ECU 30 million. Consequently, the aid which Germany granted to BV and HIBEG affects trade between Member States and distorts competition between marine and defence electronics manufactures within the meaning of Article 92(1) of the EC Treaty. Different products categories IX Country 8531 (1) 8526 (2) 9014 (3) (ECU million) France 114 Belgium/Luxembourg Netherlands Germany Italy United Kingdom Ireland Denmark Greece Portugal Spain 49 51 48 36 72 16 14 12 18 41 36 21 20 70 20 11 3 11 7 3 7 130 11 63 55 64 190 3 18 0,5 5 11 (1) 8531: electric sound or visual signalling apparatus. (2) 8526: radar apparatus, radio navigational aid apparatus and radio remote control apparatus. (3) 9014: direction finding compasses, other navigational instruments and appliances. Article 92(1) of the EC Treaty lays down the principle that aid having the characteristics specified therein is incompatible with the common market. The derogations from that principle set out in Article 92(2) of the EC Treaty do not apply to the case in point, given the nature and objectives of the aid. The aid in this case does not have a social character, does not serve to make good the damage caused by natural disasters nor is it aid granted to the economy of certain areas of the Federal Republic of Germany affected by the division of Germany. As regards the exception pursuant to Article 92(3)(a), the the economic aid was not designed development of an area where the standard of living is abnormally serious or where underemployment. Nor has Germany attempted to justify the aid on such grounds. to promote there low is As far the derogation pursuant to Article 92(3)(b) is concerned, the aid was clearly not intended to promote a project of common European interest or to remedy a serious disturbance in the German economy. Nor has Germany attempted to justify the aid on such grounds. As regards the derogation pursuant to Article 92(3)(c) of the Treaty for aid to facilitate the developement of certain economic activities or of certain economic areas, L 316/32 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 25. 11. 98 where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest, the Commission has examined the aid on its sectoral and regional aspects. In both respects, it is important to note that the aid given to BV is investment aid to help BV buy an already existing company (KAE) and not to create new production facilities or employment. It is also important to refer to Part VIII, in which it is clearly shown that there is competition between the Member States in the products involved. As regards the sectoral aspect, it is the sector which receives investment that is of importance. This case concerns the electronics sector in which KAE operates. As there is no Community sectoral justification for this aid, it has to be regarded as adversely affecting trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest. The aid would give BV, in operating KAE, an unjustified advantage over KAE’s competitors on the market, which did not and will not receive such aid. Germany has not, indeed, attempted to justify the aid on such grounds. As regards the regional aspect, Bremen is an area eligible for assistance on the national level (‘Gemeinschaftsaufgabe: Verbesserung der regionalen Wirtschaftsstruktur’) and Community level (‘Objective 2 area’). However, the aid in this case was not, as is required, granted as part of an approved regional scheme but was given as an ad hoc investment aid. In addition, the buying of an existing company or part of an existing company cannot be viewed as an investment eligible for aid under the previously mentioned ‘Gemeinschaftsaufgabe’, as no employment is thereby created and as Germany has not supplied any evidence or indication that KAE would have had to close had it not been sold to BV. Consequently, the aid cannot be justified on the basis of regional grounds pursuant to Article 92(3)(c) of the EC Treaty. Furthermore, Germany did not notify the aid as regional aid nor attempt to justify it on regional grounds. of Justice in Case C-301/87 France v. Commission (‘Boussac’ case) (7), HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION: Article 1 Aid in favour of Bremer Vulkan AG totalling DEM 126 million, granted within the context of the acquisition of 74,9 % of the capital of Krupp Atlas Elektronik GmbH through Hanseatische Industrie-Beteiligungen GmbH, is unlawful, since it was granted in breach of the procedural rules laid down in Article 93(3) of the EC Treaty. Furthermore, the aid is also incompatible with the common market purusant to Article 92(1) of the Treaty, since it does not meet any of the conditions for exemption provided for in Article 92(2) and (3) of the Treaty. Article 2 Germany shall ensure that the aid of DEM 126 1. million to Bremer Vulkan AG referred to in Article 1 is to Hanseatische Industrie-Beteiligungen GmbH within two months of the notification of this Decision. recovered fully paid and 2. Germany shall recover the amount of aid referred to in Article 1, in accordance with the procedures and provisions of national law, in particular those relating to interest on arrears payable on State claims, with interest running from the date on which the unlawful aid was granted. 3. Germany shall inform the Commission, within two months of the notification of this Decision, of the measures taken to comply with it. X Article 3 In conclusion, the aid granted by the Freie Hansestadt Bremen/Land Bremen to BV via HIBEG is not compatible with the common market, since it was granted illegally in breach of Article 93(3) of the EC Treaty and furthermore does not meet any of the conditions provided for in Article 92(2) and (3) of the Treaty. The aid must be revoked and any aid granted must be repaid in accordance with the judgment of the Court This Decision is addressed to the Federal Republic of Germany. Done at Brussels, 25 February 1998. For the Commission Karel VAN MIERT Member of the Commission (7) [1990] ECR I-307, paragraph 22


title: 98/184/EG: Kommissionens beslut av den 25 februari 1998 om ett frågeformulär för medlemsstaternas rapporter om genomförande av rådets direktiv 94/67/EG om förbränning av farligt avfall (genomförande av rådets direktiv 91/692/EEG) (Text av betydelse för EES)

eurovoc_concepts:
EU Member State
European Commission
dangerous substance
national implementing measure
report
waste incineration

formats: html pdf print

text: L 67/48 ‹ SV ‹ Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning 7. 3. 98 KOMMISSIONENS BESLUT av den 25 februari 1998 om ett fr(cid:134)geformul(cid:132)r f(cid:148)r medlemsstaternas rapporter om genomf(cid:148)rande av r(cid:134)dets direktiv 94/67/EG om f(cid:148)rbr(cid:132)nning av farligt avfall (genomf(cid:148)rande av r(cid:134)dets direktiv 91/692/EEG) (Text av betydelse f(cid:148)r EES) (98/184/EG) EUROPEISKA GEMENSKAPERNAS KOMMISSION HAR ANTAGIT DETTA BESLUT De (cid:134)tg(cid:132)rder som f(cid:148)reskrivs i detta beslut (cid:132)r f(cid:148)renliga med yttrandet fr(cid:134)n den kommitt(cid:130) som uppr(cid:132)ttats i enlighet med artikel 6 i ovan n(cid:132)mnda direktiv. med beaktande av F(cid:148)rdraget om uppr(cid:132)ttandet av Euro- peiska gemenskapen, H(cid:142)RIGENOM F(cid:153)RESKRIVS F(cid:153)LJANDE. med beaktande av r(cid:134)dets direktiv 91/692/EEG av den 23 december 1991 om att standardisera och rationalisera rapporterna om genomf(cid:148)randet av vissa direktiv om milj(cid:148)n (1), s(cid:132)rskilt artiklarna 5 och 6 i detta, Artikel 1 Det fr(cid:134)geformul(cid:132)r som bifogas detta beslut, och som skall anv(cid:132)ndas i samband med r(cid:134)dets direktiv 94/67/EG om f(cid:148)rbr(cid:132)nning av farligt avfall, antas h(cid:132)rmed. med beaktande av r(cid:134)dets direktiv 94/67/EG om f(cid:148)rbr(cid:132)n- ning av farligt avfall (2), och med beaktande av f(cid:148)ljande: Artikel 2 skall Medlemsstaterna som anv(cid:132)nda underlag n(cid:132)r de utarbetar den rapport som de skall l(cid:132)mna till kommissionen i enlighet med artikel 5 i direktiv 91/ 692/EEG och artikel 17 i direktiv 94/67/EG. fr(cid:134)geformul(cid:132)ret I artikel 17 i direktiv 94/67/EG fastst(cid:132)lls att medlemssta- terna skall rapportera om genomf(cid:148)randet av detta direktiv i enlighet med artikel 5 i direktiv 91/692/EEG. Artikel 3 Detta beslut riktar sig till medlemsstaterna. Rapporten skall utarbetas p(cid:134) grundval av fr(cid:134)geformul(cid:132)r eller mallar som kommissionen fastst(cid:132)ller i enlighet med f(cid:148)rfarandet i artikel 6 i direktiv 91/692/EG. Den f(cid:148)rsta rapporten kommer att omfatta (cid:134)ren fr(cid:134)n och med 1998 till och med 2000. Utf(cid:132)rdat i Bryssel den 25 februari 1998. P(cid:134) kommissionens v(cid:132)gnar Ritt BJERREGAARD Ledamot av kommissionen (1) EGT L 377, 31. 12. 1991, s. 48. (2) EGT L 365, 31. 12. 1994, s. 34. 7. 3. 98 ‹ SV ‹ Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning L 67/49 BILAGA FR(cid:143)GEFORMUL(cid:142)R f(cid:148)r medlemsstaternas rapport om inf(cid:148)rlivande och genomf(cid:148)rande av direktiv 94/67/EG om f(cid:148)rbr(cid:132)nning av farligt avfall I f(cid:148)rekommande fall skall det anges vilka uppgifter som redan l(cid:132)mnats till kommissionen. I. INF(cid:153)RLIVANDE I NATIONELL LAGSTIFTNING 1. a) Har kommissionen erh(cid:134)llit detaljerade uppgifter om de lagar och andra f(cid:148)rfattningar som antagits f(cid:148)r att f(cid:148)lja detta direktiv? b) Om inte, varf(cid:148)r? (Ja/nej) II. GENOMF(cid:153)RANDE AV DIREKTIVET 1. a) Vilka allm(cid:132)nna (cid:134)tg(cid:132)rder har vidtagits i enlighet med artikel 3. 1 f(cid:148)r att f(cid:148)rebygga en f(cid:148)rorening av milj(cid:148)n f(cid:148)rorsakad av konstruktionen, utrustningen och driften av f(cid:148)rbr(cid:132)nningsanl(cid:132)ggningar? b) Om uppgifter om detta finns att tillg(cid:134) anges det antal tillst(cid:134)nd som beviljats i enlighet med artikel 3. 1 och respektive driftskapacitet. 2. a) Vilka allm(cid:132)nna krav f(cid:148)r beviljande av tillst(cid:134)nd till samf(cid:148)rbr(cid:132)nning har inf(cid:148)rts i enlighet med artikel 3. 4? b) Har undantag fr(cid:134)n den procentsats som kr(cid:132)vs i artikel 3. 3 beviljats under de f(cid:148)rsta sex m(cid:134)naderna efter idrifttagandet i enlighet med artikel 3. 4? (Ja/nej) c) Om ja, varf(cid:148)r? d) Om uppgifterna finns att tillg(cid:134) anges det antal tillst(cid:134)nd som beviljats och den totala avfallsm(cid:132)ngd som samf(cid:148)rbr(cid:132)nts i enlighet med artikel 3. 3. 3. Vilka allm(cid:132)nna (cid:134)tg(cid:132)rder har vidtagits i enlighet med artikel 4 f(cid:148)r att s(cid:132)kerst(cid:132)lla att allm(cid:132)nheten f(cid:134)r tillg(cid:134)ng till den information som f(cid:148)reskrivs i denna artikel? 4. a) Vilka allm(cid:132)nna (cid:134)tg(cid:132)rder avseende leverans och mottagande av avfall har vidtagits f(cid:148)r att f(cid:148)rhindra eller minska de negativa effekterna p(cid:134) milj(cid:148)n i enlighet med artikel 5? b) Om uppgifterna finns att tillg(cid:134) anges det antal undantag fr(cid:134)n artikel 5. 2 och 5. 3 som beviljats i enlig- het med artikel 5. 4. 5. a) Har andra krav (cid:132)n de i artikel 6. 2 beviljats i enlighet med artikel 6. 4? b) Om ja anges antalet f(cid:148)rekommande fall och f(cid:148)r varje fall anges villkoren f(cid:148)r tillst(cid:134)ndet och resultaten av de kontroller som g(cid:148)rs. c) Vilka allm(cid:132)nna (cid:134)tg(cid:132)rder har vidtagits f(cid:148)r att f(cid:148)lja artikel 6. 3? d) Vilka allm(cid:132)nna (cid:134)tg(cid:132)rder har vidtagits i enlighet med artikel 6. 6 f(cid:148)r att s(cid:132)kerst(cid:132)lla att den luftf(cid:148)rorening i markniv(cid:134) som f(cid:148)rorsakas av utsl(cid:132)pp till luft inte (cid:132)r betydande? (Ja/nej) L 67/50 ‹ SV ‹ Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning 7. 3. 98 6. a) Vilka allm(cid:132)nna (cid:134)tg(cid:132)rder har vidtagits f(cid:148)r att uppfylla kraven i artiklarna 6. 5, 7. 1 och 7. 2? b) Vilka best(cid:132)mmelser r(cid:148)rande de l(cid:132)ngsta till(cid:134)tna tidsperioderna f(cid:148)r driftsstopp, driftsst(cid:148)rningar eller fel- funktioner i reningsutrustning eller m(cid:132)tutrustning i enlighet med artikel 12. 2 har inf(cid:148)rts, och vilka best(cid:132)mmelser har inf(cid:148)rts i enlighet med artikel 12. 1 f(cid:148)r att s(cid:132)kerst(cid:132)lla att de beh(cid:148)riga myndigheterna omedelbart underr(cid:132)ttas, om de gr(cid:132)nsv(cid:132)rden f(cid:148)r utsl(cid:132)pp som avses i artiklarna 6. 5, 7. 1 och 7. 2 (cid:148)ver- skrids? c) Har andra gr(cid:132)nsv(cid:132)rden f(cid:148)r utsl(cid:132)pp av f(cid:148)roreningar (cid:132)n de som f(cid:148)reskrivs i artikel 7 fastst(cid:132)llts i de natio- nella best(cid:132)mmelserna? d) Om ja anges grunderna f(cid:148)r detta och de enskilda utsl(cid:132)ppsv(cid:132)rdena f(cid:148)r varje f(cid:148)rorening. e) Vilka (cid:134)tg(cid:132)rder har vidtagits f(cid:148)r att fastst(cid:132)lla l(cid:132)mpliga gr(cid:132)nsv(cid:132)rden och riktv(cid:132)rden f(cid:148)r utsl(cid:132)pp i enlighet med artikel 7. 4? (Ja/nej) 7. Vilka allm(cid:132)nna (cid:134)tg(cid:132)rder har vidtagits f(cid:148)r att minimera utsl(cid:132)pp av avloppsvatten i enlighet med artikel 8? 8. a) Vilka allm(cid:132)nna (cid:134)tg(cid:132)rder har vidtagits i enlighet med artikel 9 f(cid:148)r att f(cid:148)lja direktiven 75/442/EEG och 91/689/EEG? b) Om uppgifterna finns att tillg(cid:134) anges om den energi som alstras vid f(cid:148)rbr(cid:132)nningen (cid:134)tervinns och, om till(cid:132)mpligt, typ av (cid:134)tervinning och verkningsgrad. 9. Vilka allm(cid:132)nna (cid:134)tg(cid:132)rder har vidtagits f(cid:148)r att s(cid:132)kerst(cid:132)lla (cid:148)verensst(cid:132)mmelse med kraven f(cid:148)r m(cid:132)tningar i enlighet med artikel 10, inbegripet kraven i bilaga III? 10. Vad g(cid:132)ller artikel 13. 2 anges det antal anm(cid:132)lningar som erh(cid:134)llits ang(cid:134)ende fullst(cid:132)ndiga nedl(cid:132)ggningar av anl(cid:132)ggningar, inbegripet f(cid:148)rbr(cid:132)nningskapacitet, antal timmar och driftsperiod


title: Kommissionens förordning (EG) nr 443/98 av den 25 februari 1998 om betalning för vissa kvantiteter ris som övertagits av det grekiska interventionsorganet för regleringsåret 1996/1997

eurovoc_concepts:
Greece
intervention agency
rice

text: L 56/10 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning 26. 2. 98 KOMMISSIONENS F(cid:153)RORDNING (EG) nr 443/98 av den 25 februari 1998 om betalning f(cid:148)r vissa kvantiteter ris som (cid:148)vertagits av det grekiska interven- tionsorganet f(cid:148)r reglerings(cid:134)ret 1996/1997 EUROPEISKA GEMENSKAPERNAS KOMMISSION HAR ANTAGIT DENNA F(cid:153)RORDNING De (cid:134)tg(cid:132)rder som f(cid:148)reskrivs i denna f(cid:148)rordning (cid:132)r f(cid:148)ren- fr(cid:134)n F(cid:148)rvaltningskommitt(cid:130)n f(cid:148)r liga med yttrandet spannm(cid:134)l. med beaktande av F(cid:148)rdraget om uppr(cid:132)ttandet av Euro- peiska gemenskapen, med beaktande av r(cid:134)dets f(cid:148)rordning (EG) nr 3072/95 av den 22 december 1995 om den gemensamma organisa- tionen av marknaden f(cid:148)r ris (1), senast (cid:132)ndrad genom f(cid:148)rordning (EG) nr 192/98, s(cid:132)rskilt artikel 8 b i denna (2), och med beaktande av f(cid:148)ljande: I artikel 6. 2 i f(cid:148)rordning (EG) nr 1528/96 av den 30 juli 1996 om (cid:148)vertagande av paddyris av interventionsorganen och fastst(cid:132)llande av de korrigeringsbelopp, till(cid:132)gg och avdrag som skall till(cid:132)mpas (3) f(cid:148)reskrivs att interventions- organet f(cid:134)r (cid:148)verta paddyriset p(cid:134) den plats det befinner sig i st(cid:132)llet f(cid:148)r p(cid:134) den handelsort som utsetts av s(cid:132)ljaren. I enlighet med denna best(cid:132)mmelse har paddyris (cid:148)verta- gits och lagrats i Grekland i s(cid:132)ljarens lager. I m(cid:134)nga fall hade denna vara redan varit lagrad i flera m(cid:134)nader innan den (cid:148)vertogs. F(cid:148)r att s(cid:132)kerst(cid:132)lla en sund f(cid:148)rvaltning f(cid:148)re- faller det motiverat att, f(cid:148)re den definitiva betalningen av de (cid:148)vertagna kvantiteterna, g(cid:148)ra en kontrollber(cid:132)kning av de ber(cid:148)rda kvantiteterna enligt den s. k. volymetriska kontrollmetoden. Erfarenheten har visat att det med h(cid:132)nsyn till varans naturliga volymminskning (cid:132)r rimligt med en skillnad i vikt p(cid:134) omkring 6 % mellan den vikt som registreras vid inv(cid:132)gningen och det v(cid:132)rde som erh(cid:134)lls med hj(cid:132)lp av denna ber(cid:132)kningsmetod. Det b(cid:148)r d(cid:132)rf(cid:148)r fastst(cid:132)llas att betalningen skall grunda sig p(cid:134) den ber(cid:132)kning som gjorts med ovann(cid:132)mnda metod, med till(cid:132)gg av toleransmarginalen. S(cid:132)ljaren b(cid:148)r emellertid f(cid:134) m(cid:148)jlighet att beg(cid:132)ra att betalningen skall basera sig p(cid:134) den vikt som fastst(cid:132)lls vid en v(cid:132)gning. Om i ett s(cid:134)dant fall den fastst(cid:132)llda vikten (cid:132)r l(cid:132)gre (cid:132)n den kvantitet som anges i det skriftliga anbud som dessf(cid:148)rinnan inl(cid:132)mnats till till procentsatsen f(cid:148)r till(cid:134)tet svinn vid lagring, b(cid:148)r s(cid:132)ljaren b(cid:132)ra kostnaderna f(cid:148)r v(cid:132)gningen. Ytterligare tekniska best(cid:132)mmelser b(cid:148)r antas. interventionsorganet, och h(cid:132)nsyn har tagits (1) EGT L 329, 30. 12. 1995, s. 18. (2) EGT L 20, 27. 1. 1998, s. 16. (3) EGT L 190, 31. 7. 1996, s. 25. H(cid:142)RIGENOM F(cid:153)RESKRIVS F(cid:153)LJANDE. Artikel 1 Det grekiska interventionsorganet skall under perioden 1 april–30 september 1997 betala de kvantiteter ris som det, enligt artikel 6. 2 i f(cid:148)rordning (EG) nr 1528/96, har (cid:148)vertagit i s(cid:132)ljarens lager p(cid:134) de villkor som anges i denna f(cid:148)rordning. F(cid:148)re varje betalning skall detta organ g(cid:148)ra en ber(cid:132)kning, enligt den s. k. volymetriska kontrollmetoden, av de kvan- titeter som s(cid:132)ljaren i enlighet med artikel 4 i f(cid:148)rordning (EG) nr 1528/96 l(cid:132)mnat in en skriftlig ans(cid:148)kan om. Artikel 2 1. Betalning skall erl(cid:132)ggas f(cid:148)r den kvantitet som anges i den skriftliga ans(cid:148)kan som n(cid:132)mns i artikel 1 och som s(cid:134)vida denna uppges kvantitet inte (cid:148)verstiger den kvantitet som fastst(cid:132)llts med hj(cid:132)lp av den s. k. volymetriska kontrollmetoden med mer (cid:132)n 6 %. lagerbokf(cid:148)ring, lagerh(cid:134)llarens i i lagerh(cid:134)llarens 2. Om den kvantitet som anges i ans(cid:148)kan och som uppges lagerbokf(cid:148)ring (cid:148)verstiger den kvantitet som fastst(cid:132)llts enligt den volymetriska kontroll- metoden med mer (cid:132)n 6 % skall betalning erl(cid:132)ggas f(cid:148)r som fastst(cid:132)llts enligt den sistn(cid:132)mnda den kvantitet metoden, med till(cid:132)gg av 6 %. P(cid:134) 3. s(cid:132)ljarens beg(cid:132)ran skall betalning emellertid erl(cid:132)ggas f(cid:148)r den kvantitet som fastst(cid:132)llts efter en v(cid:132)gning som skall utf(cid:148)ras av interventionsorganet. Om den vikt som fastst(cid:132)lls vid denna v(cid:132)gning (cid:132)r l(cid:132)gre (cid:132)n den kvantitet som anges i den skriftliga ans(cid:148)kan som anges i artikel 1, minskad med procentsatsen f(cid:148)r normalt till(cid:134)tet svinn vid lagring enligt artikel 2 i f(cid:148)rordning (EEG) nr 147/91, skall kostnaderna f(cid:148)r v(cid:132)gningen b(cid:132)ras 26. 2. 98 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning L 56/11 av s(cid:132)ljaren. Om den fastst(cid:132)llda vikten (cid:148)verensst(cid:132)mmer med den kvantitet som anges i ans(cid:148)kan minskad med ovann(cid:132)mnda procentsats skall kostnaderna b(cid:132)ras av inter- ventionsorganet. teter som vid en senare v(cid:132)gning saknas i f(cid:148)rh(cid:134)llande till den kvantitet som k(cid:148)pts upp av interventionsorganet. Denna artikel skall inte till(cid:132)mpas i de fall d(cid:134) artikel 2. 3 till(cid:132)mpas. Artikel 3 Artikel 4 Lagerh(cid:134)llaren skall (cid:134)terbetala varans v(cid:132)rde till interven- tionsorganet och betala alla kostnader f(cid:148)r inlagring, uttag ur lager och lagring samt f(cid:148)r finansiering av de kvanti- Denna f(cid:148)rordning tr(cid:132)der i kraft den tredje dagen efter det att den har offentliggjorts i Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning. Denna f(cid:148)rordning (cid:132)r till alla delar bindande och direkt till(cid:132)mplig i alla medlemsstater. Utf(cid:132)rdad i Bryssel den 25 februari 1998. P(cid:134) kommissionens v(cid:132)gnar Franz FISCHLER Ledamot av kommissionen


title: Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the 'Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) on the organization of a labour force sample survey in the Community'

eurovoc_concepts:
economic statistics
labour market
sample survey
unemployment
working population

text: 27. 4. 98 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 129/65 Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) on the organization of a labour force sample survey in the Community’ (98/C 129/15) On 25 February 1998 the Economic and Social Committee, acting under the third paragraph of Rule 23 of its Rules of Procedure, decided to draw up an Opinion, on the above-mentioned proposal. The Economic and Social Committee appointed Mr Kenneth Walker as main rapporteur and asked him to prepare the work at hand. At its 352nd plenary session (meeting of 25 February 1998), the Economic and Social Committee adopted the following opinion by 70 votes in favour, one against and one abstention. 1. Introduction 1. 1. In order to carry out its tasks, in particular the monitoring of trends in employment and unemployment (Annual Report to the Council following the Essen Summit), to identify the regions most affected by unemployment (eligibility for the Structural Funds — Objective 2) and to analyze the situation of individuals and households on the labour market, the Commission wishes to have regular, comparable, recent and represen- tative regional data on unemployment in the Member States. 1. 2. The Community Labour Force Survey currently consists of putting together the national labour force surveys conducted in the Member States. Although formally harmonized (1), these surveys essentially retain their own specific features as adopted to meet national requirements. Subsisting differences include the frequency of 1. 2. 1. reporting, the definition of the reference period, the units observed, the survey coverage, the observation methods, the sample design, the extrapolation methods and the questionnaires. The country-to-country compa- rability of the data obtained, particularly on employment and unemployment, is therefore seriously impaired. 1. 3. One of the obstacles to achieving more compa- rable survey methods is the inertia of large sample surveys; reforming a national labour force survey rep- resents a considerable investment of resources in terms of sample design, organization of data processing and general survey infrastructure. It is not until a Member State has actually begun to overhaul its survey that there is any real chance of progress. For this reason, the proposed regulation defines a target while allowing the Member States the option of conducting only an annual survey in the Spring, for a transitional period. 1. 4. Limiting the costs of implementing the continu- ous survey has been a major consideration; spreading (1) Council Regulation (EEC) 3711/91, 16. 12. 1991. data collection over the whole year should make for a more rational organization of the operations and more efficient use of computer resources; the accuracy levels set do not generally imply an excessive increase in the size of the annual sample; the requirement to use the household as the sampling unit has been dropped in order to accommodate those Member States which prefer to base their sample on individuals, on condition that the other requirements regarding households are met; and certain variables included in the current series of surveys have been dropped. 1. 5. In line with the principle of subsidiarity, only data on the variables used to determine activity status and underemployment are required to be collected in direct personal interviews conducted according to very strict common guidelines, which are deemed to be essential for ensuring an acceptable degree of compara- bility of the results. For the remaining variables, the wording and sequence of the questions are not subject to Community guidelines but are left to the discretion of the Member State or the information required may be obtained from other sources. 1. 5. 1. Furthermore, the target structure does not require a sample rotation scheme so that Member States can use the survey plan which most effectively takes account of specific national features. 2. The Commission’s proposals 2. 1. Member States would be required to conduct a labour force survey each year. 2. 1. 1. The survey would be a continuous survey providing quarterly and annual results. However, those Member States which were unable to implement a continuous survey would be permitted to conduct an annual survey only, to be carried out in the Spring. 2. 1. 2. The information to be collected in the survey would relate generally to the situation during the course of the week (taken to run from Monday to Sunday) preceding the interview, known as the reference week. C 129/66 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 27. 4. 98 2. 1. 3. In the case of a continuous survey, the reference weeks would be spread uniformly throughout the year. The interview would normally take place in the week following the reference week. The reference week and the date of the interview would not be permitted to be more than five weeks apart, except in the third quarter. The reference quarters and years would be respectively groups of 13 and 52 weeks. working age, the standard error at national level for the estimate of changes between two successive quarters did not exceed 2 % of the sub-population concerned. 2. 3. 2. 1. For Member States with populations between one million and twenty million, this requirement would be relaxed to 3 %. 2. 2. The survey would be carried out on a sample of those residing in the economic territory of each Member State at the time of the survey. The sample could be selected on the basis of either an individual or a household. Regardless of whether the sampling unit were an individual or a household, information would be collected in respect of all persons residing in the household but, where the sampling unit was an individ- ual, the information required in respect of other members of the household would be reduced. A household is a physical concept, i. e. all persons residing in the same premises are deemed to constitute a household, regard- less of their relationship to each other. 2. 2. 1. The principal scope of the survey would consist of persons residing in private households on the econ- omic territory of each Member State; where possible, this main population would be supplemented by persons residing in collective households. The survey would not be limited to those of working age. 2. 2. 2. The variables used to determine labour status and underemployment would have to be obtained by interviewing the person concerned or, if this were not possible, another member of the same household. Other information could be obtained from alternative sources, including administrative records, provided that the data obtained were of equivalent quality. 2. 3. The proposed regulation lays down certain reliability criteria to ensure the representativeness of the sample. 2. 3. 1. In order to ensure a reliable foundation for comparative analysis, at Community level as well as at the level of the Member State and of specific regions, the sampling plan would have to guarantee that for characteristics relating to 5 % of the population of working age the relative standard error for the estimation of annual averages (or of the Spring estimates in the case of an annual Spring survey) at NUTS II level did not exceed 8 %, assuming the design effect for the variable ‘unemployment’. 2. 3. 1. 1. would be exempt from this requirement. Regions with less than 300 000 inhabitants 2. 3. 2. In the case of a continuous survey, the sample design would have to guarantee that, for sub-populations which constituted about 5 % of the population of 2. 3. 2. 2. Member States with a population below one million would be exempt from these precision requirements concerning changes. 2. 3. 3. Where the survey was carried out only in the Spring, at least a quarter of the survey units would have to be taken from the previous survey and at least a quarter would have to form part of the following survey. 2. 3. 4. Where non-response to certain questions result- ed in missing data, statistical imputation would normally be applied. 2. 3. 5. The weighting factors would be calculated taking into account the probability of selection and external data relating to the distribution of the popu- lation being surveyed by sex, age (in five-year age groups) and region (NUTS II level), where such external data were sufficiently reliable. The same weighting factor would be applied to all members of the same household. 2. 3. 5. 1. Member States would have to provide Euro- stat with whatever information it required concerning the organization and methodology of the survey and, in particular, would have to indicate the criteria adopted for the design and size of the sample. The list of survey characteristics on which data 2. 4. would have to be collected is set out in Appendix 1. It is divided into 13 modules; which are sub-divided into a total of 85 questions. Where the sampling unit was an individual, the information required in respect of other members of the household would exclude modules g, h, i and j. 2. 4. 1. A further set of variables, known as ‘ad hoc’ modules might be added to the information required from time to time. These supplementary modules could cover such aspects as organization of work, accidents at work and the transition from education to work. The volume of an ad hoc module would not exceed the volume of module c. 2. 4. 1. 1. A programme of ad hoc modules covering several years would be drawn up each year, not less that twelve months prior to the reference period for any module in the programme. The programme would specify for each ad hoc module the subject, the Member States and regions covered, the reference period, the sample size (equal to or less than the main sample) and the deadline for the transmission of results (which might be different from the deadline for the survey as a whole). 27. 4. 98 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 129/67 The Member States would be entitled to make it 2. 5. compulsory to reply to the survey. 2. 6. The results would be required to be forwarded to Eurostat, duly checked, by each Member State for each person questioned (without indication of name or address) within twelve weeks of the end of the reference quarter in the case of a continuous survey and within nine months of the end of the reference period in the case of an annual Spring survey. 2. 7. A report on the implementation of the Regulation would be submitted by the Commission to the Parliament and the Council every three years, commencing in the year 2000. The report would evaluate in particular the quality of the statistical methods employed by the Member States. 2. 8. The Commission would be assisted by the Statistical Programme Committee set up under Decision (EEC, Euratom) No 89/382, acting within the framework of the ‘regulatory committee’ procedure. The Com- mission would adopt measures which would apply immediately. However, if these measures were not in accordance with the opinion of the Committee, the Commission would refer them to the Council forthwith and delay application of the measures. The Council, acting by a qualified majority, could decide to reject the measures within a period of three months, failing which the measures would be applied. 2. 9. Regulation (EEC) No 3711/91 would be repealed. 3. General Comments The ESC considers that the availability of reliable 3. 1. and detailed information on the characteristics of the labour market, including the characteristics of employment and the nature and extent of the unemploy- ment situation in the various Member States, and on the different regions within individual Member States, is essential to the development of a coherent and coordinated strategy to reduce unemployment levels in the European Union. By the same token, it is obvious that such statistics need to be prepared on a comparable and consistent basis if they are to be of real value. 3. 1. 1. The Committee therefore welcomes the Com- mission’s present proposal as constituting a positive step in this direction. 3. 2. The ESC feels that the comparability of the statistics would be greatly enhanced if all Member States were to conduct the survey on a continuous basis, as is currently the case in a majority of Member States. The Committee therefore hopes that the transitional phase during which Member States would be given the option to conduct an annual survey in the Spring will be curtailed as much as possible and that within the reasonably near future there will be a situation in which every Member State conducts a continuous survey. This should not impose an undue burden, either on the administrative departments of the Member States or on the interviewees. 3. 3. The accuracy of a sample survey is heavily dependent on the extent to which the sample is selected on a truly random basis. The ESC therefore endorses the proposition that Member States may be entitled to make it compulsory to reply to the survey, since non-response impairs the random nature of the sample. The sample should be selected on a common basis. The ESC considers that on-going differences 3. 3. 1. between the Member States in the content of the questionnaires and in the way in which the question- naires are administered and interpreted constitute a weakness in the system which will vitiate the true comparability of the results obtained and it would like to see a greater degree of harmonization in this area. The ESC feels that 3. 3. 2. the harmonization of surveys should make it possible to calculate and publish unemployment rates in both the restricted and broad senses of the term as defined by the ILO. The ESC considers that the current practice of expressing the unemployment rate in the restricted sense does not allow a correct assessment of the unemployment problem and may make it difficult to compare data from different Member States, which is all the more serious when such data is then used by the Commission as the basis for its proposed schedule of Structural Fund distribution. 3. 4. The ESC believes that these surveys can be of considerable use in determining the true level of unemployment by identifying, for example, those per- sons who have not registered as unemployed because they do not consider that there is any real prospect of obtaining work but who would, nevertheless, like to work if the opportunity were there. They could also provide interesting data on part-time working by dis- tinguishing between those who work part-time because that is what they wish to do and those who do so because that is all that is available; to this end, questions should be directed at both the wish to extend and the wish to curtail working hours, with a view to providing reliable statistics on full-time equivalent employment. Other relevant elements on which to focus attention would be the various types of employment contract and the provision of differentiated data on temporary work. C 129/68 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 27. 4. 98 3. 4. 1. The use of ‘ad hoc’ modules offers significant potential for obtaining detailed information on employ- ment levels, specific aspects of the unemployment situation and contractual arrangements. 4. Conclusion The Committee regrets that it was not consulted 4. 1. on the proposed regulation, obliging it to issue an own-initiative opinion. 3. 5. The ESC approves the proposal for the Com- mission to be assisted by the Statistical Programme Committee, acting within the ‘regulatory committee’ framework. The ESC approves the Commission’s proposal 4. 2. for a Council Regulation on the organization of a labour force sample survey in the Community. Brussels, 25 February 1998. The President of the Economic and Social Committee Tom JENKINS APPENDIX to the opinion of the Economic and Social Committee Survey characteristics 1. Data shall be collected on: a) demographic background: — sequence number in the household — sex — year of birth — date of birth in relation to the end of the reference period — marital status — relationship to reference person — sequence number of spouse — sequence number of father — sequence number of mother — nationality — number of years of residence in the Member State — country of birth (optional) — nature of participation in the survey (direct participation or proxy through another member of the household) b) labour status: — labour status during the reference week — reason for not having worked though having a job — search for employment for person without employment — type of employment sought (self-employed or employee) — methods used to find a job — availability to start work c) employment characteristics of the main job: — professional status — economic activity of local unit — occupation — number of persons working at the local unit 27. 4. 98 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 129/69 — country of place of work — region of place of work — year and month when the person started working in the current employment — permanency of the job (and reasons) — duration of temporary job or work contract of limited duration — full-time/part-time distinction (and reasons) — working at home d) hours worked: — number of hours per week usually worked — number of hours actually worked — main reason for hours worked being different from person’s usual hours e) second job: — existence of more than one job — professional status — economic activity of the local unit — number of hours actually worked f) visible underemployment: — wish to work usually more than the current number of hours (optional in the case of an annual survey) — looking for another job and reasons for doing so — type of employment sought (as employee or otherwise) — methods used to find another job — reason why the person is not seeking another job (optional in the case of an annual survey) — availability to start work — number of hours of work wished for (optional in the case of an annual survey) g) search for employment: — type of employment sought (full-time or part-time) — duration of search for employment — situation of person immediately before starting to seek employment — registration at public employment office and whether receiving benefits — willingness to work for person not seeking employment — reason why person has not sought work h) education and training: — participation in education or training during previous four weeks — purpose — level — place — total length — total number of hours — highest successfully completed level of education or training — year when this highest level was successfully completed — received vocational training within a dual system i) previous work experience of person not in employment: — existence of previous employment experience — year and month in which the person last worked — main reason for leaving last job or business — professional status in last job — economic activity of local unit in which person last worked — occupation of last job j) situation one year before the survey: — main labour status — professional status — economic activity of local unit in which person was working — country of residence — region of residence C 129/70 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 27. 4. 98 k) main labour status (optional) l) income (optional) m) technical items relating to the interview: — year or survey — reference week — interview week — member state — region of household — degree of urbanization — serial number of household — type of household — type of institution — weighting factor — sub-sample in relation to the preceding survey (annual survey) — sub-sample in relation to the following survey (annual survey) — sequence number of the survey wave Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) on the application of Articles 92 and 93 of the EC Treaty to certain categories of horizontal state aid’ (98/C 129/16) On 7 October 1997 the Commission decided to consult the Economic and Social Committee, under Article 198 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, on the above-mentioned proposal. The Section for Industry, Commerce, Crafts and Services, which was responsible for preparing the Committee’s work on the subject, adopted its opinion on 6 February 1998. The rapporteur was Mr van Dijk. At its 352nd plenary session (meeting of 25 February 1998) the Economic and Social Committee adopted the following opinion with 70 votes in favour and four abstentions. 1. Introduction c) aid granted to the economy of certain areas of the Federal Republic of Germany. The EC Treaty regards state aid as being generally 1. 1. incompatible with the common market. Articles 92 and 93 of the EC Treaty are devoted to this subject, and Article 94 specifies how decisions are to be reached on the measures to be taken. The Treaty considers the following forms of aid 1. 2. to be compatible with the common market: a) aid having a social character, granted to individual consumers, provided that such aid is granted without discrimination related to the origin of the products concerned; b) aid to make good the damage caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences; In addition, the following forms of state aid may 1. 3. be considered to be compatible: a) aid to promote the economic development of areas where the standard of living is abnormally low or where there is serious underemployment; b) aid to promote an important project of European interest or to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State; c) aid to stimulate certain economic activities or econ- omic areas, where such aid does not adversely affect the common interest;


title: Regolamento (CE) n. 445/98 della Commissione del 25 febbraio 1998 relativo alla vendita, a prezzi fissati forfettariamente in anticipo, di carni bovine detenute da taluni organismi d'intervento e destinate alla trasformazione nella Comunità

eurovoc_concepts:
EU Member State
beef
intervention agency
meat processing industry
product quality
sale

text: 26. 2. 98 ‹ IT ‹ Gazzetta ufficiale delle Comunità europee L 56/15 REGOLAMENTO (CE) N. 445/98 DELLA COMMISSIONE del 25 febbraio 1998 relativo alla vendita, a prezzi fissati forfettariamente in anticipo, di carni bovine detenute da taluni organismi d’intervento e destinate alla trasformazione nella Comunità LA COMMISSIONE DELLE COMUNITÀ EUROPEE, visto il trattato che istituisce la Comunità europea, visto il regolamento (CEE) n. 805/68 del Consiglio, del 27 giugno 1968, relativo all’organizzazione comune dei mercati nel settore delle carni bovine (1), modificato da ultimo dal regolamento (CE) n. 2634/97 (2), in particolare l’articolo 7, paragrafo 3, considerando che l’applicazione delle misure d’intervento nel settore delle carni bovine ha determinato la forma- zione di scorte in vari Stati membri; che, per evitare un prolungamento eccessivo dell’ammasso, è opportuno mettere in vendita una parte di queste scorte ai fini della loro trasformazione nella Comunità; considerando che occorre assoggettare tale vendita alle norme stabilite dai regolamenti della Commissione (CEE) n. 2173/79 (3), modificato da ultimo dal regolamento (CE) n. 2417/95 (4), (CEE) n. 3002/92 (5), modificato da ultimo dal regolamento (CE) n. 770/96 (6), e (CEE) n. 2182/77 (7), modificato da ultimo dal regolamento (CE) n. 2417/95, fatte salve determinate eccezioni connesse all’uso partico- lare al quale i prodotti sono destinati; considerando che, per garantire una vendita regolare e permanente, è necessario applicare in particolare le dispo- sizioni di cui al titolo I del regolamento (CEE) n. 2173/79; considerando che, per garantire una gestione economica della scorte, è necessario disporre che gli organismi d’intervento vendano innanzitutto le carni immagazzinate da più tempo; considerando che è opportuno derogare al disposto dell’articolo 2, paragrafo 2, secondo comma, del regola- mento (CEE) n. 2173/79, tenuto conto delle difficoltà amministrative che l’applicazione di tale norma crea in alcuni Stati membri; considerando che per garantire il miglior controllo possi- bile sulla destinazione delle carni bovine d’intervento occorre prevedere, oltre alle misure fissate dal regola- (1) GU L 148 del 28. 6. 1968, pag. 24. (2) GU L 356 del 31. 12. 1997, pag. 13. (3) GU L 251 del 5. 10. 1979, pag. 12. (4) GU L 248 del 14. 10. 1995, pag. 39. (5) GU L 301 del 17. 10. 1992, pag. 17. (6) GU L 104 del 27. 4. 1996, pag. 13. (7) GU L 251 dell’1. 10. 1977, pag. 60. mento (CEE) n. 3002/92, misure di controllo basate su verifiche fisiche quantitative e qualitative; considerando che le misure previste dal presente regola- mento sono conformi al parere del comitato di gestione per le carni bovine, HA ADOTTATO IL PRESENTE REGOLAMENTO: Articolo 1 1. Si procede alla vendita di circa: — 400 tonnellate di quarti anteriori non disossati, dete- nute dall’organismo d’intervento portoghese; — 3 000 tonnellate di quarti anteriori non disossati, dete- nute dall’organismo d’intervento teèdesco; — 1 000 tonnellate di quarti anteriori non disossati, dete- nute dall’organismo d’intervento austriaco; — 450 tonnellate di quarti anteriori non disossati, dete- nute dall’organismo d’intervento danese; — 2 000 tonnellate di quarti anteriori non disossati, dete- nute dall’organismo d’intervento francese; — 3 000 tonnellate di quarti anteriori non disossati, dete- nute dall’organismo d’intervento italiano; — 2 000 tonnellate di quarti anteriori non disossati, dete- nute dall’organismo d’intervento spagnolo; — 400 tonnellate di quarti anteriori non disossati, dete- nute dall’organismo d’intervento irlandese; — 3 000 tonnellate di carni bovine disossate, detenute dall’organismo d’intervento irlandese; — 850 tonnellate di carni bovine disossate, detenute dall’organismo d’intervento danese; — 3 000 tonnellate di carni bovine disossate, detenute dall’organismo d’intervento francese; — 3 000 tonnellate di carni bovine disossate, detenute dall’organismo d’intervento del Regno Unito. Nell’allegato I figurano informazioni dettagliate concer- nenti i prodotti e i prezzi di vendita. 2. Fatte salve le disposizioni previste dal presente rego- lamento, i prodotti di cui al paragrafo 1 sono venduti conformemente alle disposizioni dei regolamenti (CEE) n. 2173/79, in particolare titoli I e III, (CEE) n. 2182/77 e (CEE) n. 3002/92. L 56/16 ‹ IT ‹ Gazzetta ufficiale delle Comunità europee 26. 2. 98 Gli interessati possono richiedere le informazioni 3. relative ai quantitativi disponibili e ai i prodotti sono immagazzinati agli indirizzi indicati nell’al- legato II del presente regolamento. in cui luoghi 4. Per ogni prodotto menzionato nell’allegato I, gli organismi d’intervento interessati vendono innanzitutto le carni immagazzinate da più tempo. 5. In deroga al disposto dell’articolo 2, paragrafo 2, secondo comma, del regolamento (CEE) n. 2173/79, le domande d’acquisto non recheranno l’indicazione del deposito frigorifero o dei depositi frigoriferi in cui sono immagazzinati i prodotti richiesti. Articolo 2 1. La domanda d’acquisto è valida soltanto se presen- tata da, o a nome di, una persona fisica o giuridica che nel corso dei dodici mesi precedenti l’entrata in vigore del presente regolamento abbia fabbricato prodotti trasformati contenenti carni bovine e sia iscritta in un registro nazio- nale dell’IVA. La domanda deve inoltre essere presentata, o fatta presentare per proprio conto, da uno stabilimento di trasformazione riconosciuto ai sensi dell’articolo 8 della direttiva 77/99/CEE del Consiglio (1). Articolo 3 1. Le carni acquistate ai sensi del presente regolamento devono essere trasformate in prodotti conformi alle defi- nizioni dei prodotti «A» o «B» di cui ai paragrafi 2 e 3. 2. Per «prodotto A» si intende un prodotto traformato dei codici NC 1602 10 00, 1602 50 31, 1602 50 39 o 1602 50 80, che non contiene carni diverse da carni bovine, con un rapporto collageno/proteine non superiore allo 0,45 % (2) e contenente in peso almeno il 20 % (3) di carne magra, frattaglie e grasso esclusi (4), il cui peso netto totale è costituito per almeno l’85 % da carne e gelatina. Il prodotto deve subire un trattamento termico sufficiente per garantire la coagulazione delle proteine della carne in tutto il prodotto e non presentare pertanto tracce di liduido rossastro sulla superficie di taglio quanto è sezio- nato secondo un piano che passa per la sua parte più grossa. Per «prodotto B» si intende un prodotto trasformato 3. contenente carni bovine diverso: — da quelli specificati all’articolo 1, paragrafo 1, lettera a), del regolamento (CEE) n. 805/68, oppure — da quelli specificati al paragrafo 2. Ai fini del primo comma non vanno presi in considera- zione gli stabilimenti per la vendita al dettaglio o la risto- razione, né gli stabilimenti collegati ad un punto di vendita al dettaglio nei quali le carni siano trasformate e vendute al consumatore finale. Tuttavia, un prodotto trasformato del codice NC 0210 20 90 che è stato essiccato o affumicato in modo tale da aver perso completamente il colore e la consistenza della carne fresca e con un rapporto acqua/proteine non superiore a 3,2 è considerato un prodotto B. In deroga al disposto dell’articolo 3, paragrafi 1 e 2, la domanda deve 2. del regolamento (CEE) n. 2182/77, essere corredata: Articolo 4 — dell’impegno scritto dell’acquirente di trasformare le carni acquistate nei prodotti specificati all’articolo 3, entro il termine di cui all’articolo 5, paragrafo 1, del regolamento (CEE) n. 2182/77; Gli Stati membri predispongono un sistema di 1. controlli fisici e documentali per garantire che tutta la carne venga trasformata conformemente alle disposizioni dell’articolo 3. — dell’indicazione precisa dello stabilimento o degli stabilimenti in cui le carni acquistate saranno trasfor- mate. L’acquirente di cui al paragrafo 1 può delegare per 3. iscritto un mandatario a prendere in consegna i prodotti acquistati. In tal caso, il mandatario presenta la domanda d’acquisto dell’acquirente da lui rappresentato unitamente alla delega scritta di cui sopra. 4. Gli acquirenti e i mandatari di cui ai paragrafi prece- denti tengono una contabilità aggiornata che consente di determinare la destinazione e l’utilizzazione dei prodotti, in particolare per controllare la corrispondenza tra i quan- titativi dei prodotti acquistati e trasformati. (1) GU L 26 del 31. 1. 1977, pag. 85. Il sistema deve prevedere controlli fisici quantitativi e qualitativi all’inizio, durante e dopo le operazioni di trasformazione. A tal fine i trasformatori debbono essere in grado di dimostrare, in qualsiasi momento, l’identità e l’impiego delle carni mediante un’adeguata contabilità di produzione. (2) Determinazione del tenore in collageno: viene considerato co- me tenore in collageno il tenore in idrossiprolina moltiplicato per il fattore 8. Il tenore in idrossiprolina deve essere determi- nato secondo il metodo ISO 3496-1978. (3) Il tenore di carne bovina magra, escluso il grasso, è determina- to in base alla procedura d’analisi indicata nell’allegato del re- golamento (CEE) n. 2429/86 della Commissione (GU L 210 dell’1. 8. 1986, pag. 39). (4) Le frattaglie comprendono: testa o parti della testa (comprese le orecchie), piedi, coda, cuore, mammelle, fegato, reni, ani- melle (timo e pancreas), cervello, polmoni, gola, «onglet», mil- za, lingua, omento, colonna vertebrale, pelle commestibile, or- gani di riproduzione (utero, ovaie e testicoli), tiroide, ipofisi. 26. 2. 98 ‹ IT ‹ Gazzetta ufficiale delle Comunità europee L 56/17 Nell’ambito della verifica tecnica del metodo di produ- zione da parte dell’autorità competente può essere ammessa, se necessario, una certa tolleranza per le perdite da essudazione e le rifilature. Per poter verificare la qualità del prodotto fisico e stabilire la corrispondenza con la ricetta del trasformatore, gli Stati membri effettuano prelievi di campioni rappresentativi e analisi su questi prodotti. I costi di queste operazioni sono a carico del trasformatore. Su richiesta del trasformatore, lo Stato membro può 2. autorizzare il disossamento dei quarti anteriori in uno stabilimento diverso da quello previsto per la trasforma- zione, a condizione che le operazioni attinenti siano effet- tuate nello stesso Stato membro sotto idoneo controllo. 3. Non si applica l’articolo 1 del regolamento (CEE) n. 2182/77. Articolo 5 1. L’importo della cauzione di cui all’articolo 15, para- grafo 1, del regolamento (CEE) n. 2173/79 è fissato a 12 ECU/100 kg. L’importo della cauzione di cui all’articolo 4, para- 2. grafo 1, del regolamento (CEE) n. 2182/77 è fissato: — per i quarti anteriori non disossati, a 1 000 ECU; — per le carni bovine disossate, a 1 500 ECU. 3. In deroga all’articolo 5, paragraro 3, del regolamento (CEE) n. 2182/77, la trasformazione in prodotti finiti di cui all’articolo 3 di tutte le carni acquistate costituisce un’esigenza principale. — la casella 104 dell’esemplare di controllo T5 deve essere completata da una o più delle seguenti diciture: — Para transformación [Reglamentos (CEE) no 2182/77 y (CE) no 445/98] — Til forarbejdning (forordning (EØF) nr. 2182/77 og (EF) nr. 445/98) — Zur Verarbeitung bestimmt (Verordnungen (EWG) Nr. 2182/77 und (EG) Nr. 445/98) — Cia letapo˜igsg [jamomislo˜i 2182/77 jai (EJ) aqih. 445/98] (EOJ) aqih. — For processing (Regulations (EEC) No 2182/77 and (EC) No 445/98) — Destinés à la transformation [règlements (CEE) no 2182/77 et (CE) no 445/98] — Destinate alla trasformazione [regolamenti (CEE) n. 2182/77 e (CE) n. 445/98] — Bestemd om te worden verwerkt (Verordeningen (EEG) nr. 2182/77 en (EG) nr. 445/98) — Para transformaç˜ao 2182/77 e (CE) nº 445/98] [Regulamentos (CEE) nº — Jalostettavaksi (Asetukset (ETY) N:o 2182/77 ja (EY) N:o 445/98) — För bearbetning (Förordningarna (EEG) nr 2182/77 och (EG) nr 445/98); — la casella 106 dell’esemplare di controllo T5 deve recare la data in cui è stato concluso il contratto di vendita. Articolo 6 Articolo 7 In deroga al disposto dell’articolo 9 del regolamento (CEE) n. 2182/77, oltre alle menzioni previste dal regola- mento (CEE) n. 3002/92: Il presente regolamento entra in vigore il settimo giorno successivo alla sua pubblicazione nella Gazzetta ufficiale delle Comunità europee. Il presente regolamento è obbligatorio in tutti i suoi elementi e direttamente applicabile in ciascuno degli Stati membri. Fatto a Bruxelles, il 25 febbraio 1998. Per la Commissione Franz FISCHLER Membro della Commissione L 56/18 ‹ IT ‹ Gazzetta ufficiale delle Comunità europee 26. 2. 98 ANEXO I — BILAG I — ANHANG I — PAQAQTGLA I — ANNEX I — ANNEXE I — ALLEGATO I — BIJLAGE I — ANEXO I — LIITE I — BILAGA I Estado miembro Medlemsstat Mitgliedstaat Jq ˜ator l ˜ekor Member State État membre Stato membro Lidstaat Estado-membro Jäsenvaltio Medlemsstat Productos (1) Produkter (1) Erzeugnisse (1) Pqoˇi ˜omta (1) Products (1) Produits (1) Prodotti (1) Producten (1) Produtos (1) Tuotteet (1) Produkter (1) Cantidad aproximada (toneladas) Tilnærmet mængde (tons) Ungefähre Mengen (Tonnen) Jat ˜a pqos ˜eccisg pos ˜otgta (t ˜omoi) Approximate quantity (tonnes) Quantité approximative (tonnes) Quantità approssimativa (tonnellate) Hoeveelheid bij benadering (ton) Quantidade aproximada (toneladas) Arvioitu määrä (tonneina) Ungefärlig kvantitet (ton) Precio de venta expresado en ecus por tonelada Salgspriser i ECU/ton Verkaufspreise, ausgedrückt in ECU/Tonne Til ˜er pyk ˜gseyr ejvqaf ˜olemer se Ecu am ˜a t ˜omo Selling prices expressed in ecus per tonne Prix de vente exprimés en écus par tonne Prezzi di vendita espressi in ecu per tonnellata Verkoopprijzen uitgedrukt in ECU per ton Preço de venda expresso em ecus por tonelada Myyntihinta ecuina tonnilta Försäljningspris i ecu per ton a) Carne con hueso — Kød, ikke udbenet — Fleisch mit Knochen — Jq ˜eata le j ˜ojaka — Bone-in-beef — Viande avec os — Carni non disossate — Vlees met been — Carne com osso — Luullinen naudanliha — Kött med ben DEUTSCHLAND — Vorderviertel DANMARK ITALIA IRELAND FRANCE ÖSTERREICH PORTUGAL ESPA (cid:5)NA — Forfjerdinger (A) — Quarti anteriori — Forequarters — Quartiers avant — Vorderviertel — Quartos dianteiros — Cuartos delanteros 3 000 450 3 000 400 2 000 1 000 400 2 000 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000 b) Carne deshuesada — Udbenet kød — Fleisch ohne Knochen — Jq ˜eata wyq˜ir j ˜ojaka — Boneless beef — Viande désossée — Carni senza osso — Vlees zonder been — Carne desossada — Luuton naudanliha — Benfritt kött DANMARK Interventionsslag (INT 18) Interventionsbryst (INT 23) FRANCE UNITED KINGDOM IRELAND Jarret arrière d’intervention (INT 11) Flanchet d’intervention (INT 18) Jarret avant d’intervention (INT 21) Épaule d’intervention (INT 22) Poitrine d’intervention (INT 23) Avant d’intervention (INT 24) Intervention shank (INT 11) Intervention flank (INT 18) Intervention shin (INT 21) Intervention shoulder (INT 22) Intervention brisket (INT 23) Intervention forequarter (INT 24) Intervention shank (INT 11) Intervention flank (INT 18) Intervention shin (INT 21) Intervention shoulder (INT 22) Intervention brisket (INT 23) Intervention forequarter (INT 24) 50 800 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 1 300 1 300 1 450 1 300 1 450 1 700 1 400 1 550 1 200 1 000 1 200 1 800 1 100 1 600 1 300 1 100 1 300 1 500 1 200 1 450 26. 2. 98 ‹ IT ‹ Gazzetta ufficiale delle Comunità europee L 56/19 (1) Véanse los anexos V y VII del Reglamento (CEE) no 2456/93 de la Comisión (DO L 225 de 4. 9. 1993, p. 4), cuya ´ultima modificación la constituye el Reglamento (CE) no 2602/97 (DO L 351 de 23. 12. 1997, p. 20). (1) Se bilag V og VII til Kommissionens forordning (EØF) nr. 2456/93 (EFT L 225 af 4. 9. 1993, s. 4), senest ændret ved forordning (EF) nr. 2602/97 (EFT L 351 af 23. 12. 1997, s. 20). (1) Vgl. Anhänge V und VII der Verordnung (EWG) Nr. 2456/93 der Kommission (ABl. L 225 vom 4. 9. 1993, S. 4), zuletzt geändert durch die Verordnung (EG) Nr. 2602/97 (ABl. L 351 vom 23. 12. 1997, S. 20). (1) Bk ˜epe paqaqt ˜glata V jai VII tou jamomislo ˜u (EOJ) aqih. 2456/93 tgr Epitqop ˜gr (EE L 225 tgr 4. 9. 1993, s. 4), tom jamomisl ˜o (EJ) aqih. 2602/97 (EE L 351 tgr 23. 12. 1997, s. 20). ˜opyr tqopopoi ˜ghgje tekeuta˜ia ap ˜o (1) See Annexes V and VII to Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2456/93 (OJ L 225, 4. 9. 1993, p. 4), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 2602/97 (OJ L 351, 23. 12. 1997, p. 20). (1) Voir annexes V et VII du règlement (CEE) no 2456/93 de la Commission (JO L 225 du 4. 9. 1993, p. 4). Règlement modifié en dernier lieu par le règlement (CE) no 2602/97 (JO L 351 du 23. 12. 1997, p. 20). (1) Cfr. allegati V e VII del regolamento (CEE) n. 2456/93 della Commissione (GU L 225 del 4. 9. 1993, pag. 4), modificato da ultimo dal regolamento (CE) n. 2602/97 (GU L 351 del 23. 12. 1997, pag. 20). (1) Zie bijlagen V en VII van Verordening (EEG) nr. 2456/93 van de Commissie (PB L 225 van 4. 9. 1993, blz. 4); laatstelijk gewijzigd bij Verordening (EG) nr. 2602/97 (PB L 351 van 23. 12. 1997, blz. 20). (1) Ver anexos V e VII do Regulamento (CEE) nº 2456/93 da Comiss˜ao (JO L 225 de 4. 9. 1993, p. 4). Regulamento com a ´ultima redacç˜ao que lhe foi dada pelo Regulamento (CE) nº 2602/97 (JO L 351 de 23. 12. 1997, p. 20). (1) Katso komission asetuksen (ETY) N:o 2456/93 (EYVL L 225, 4. 9. 1993, s. 4), sellaisena kuin se on viimeksi muutettuna asetuksella (EY) N:o 2602/97 (EYVL L 351, 23. 12. 1997, s. 20) liite V ja VII. (1) Se bilaga V och VII i kommissionens förordning (EEG) nr 2456/93 (EGT L 225, 4. 9. 1993, s. 4), senast ändrad genom förordning (EG) nr 2602/97 (EGT L 351, 23. 12. 1997, s. 20). L 56/20 ‹ IT ‹ Gazzetta ufficiale delle Comunità europee 26. 2. 98 ANEXO II — BILAG II — ANHANG II — PAQAQTGLA II — ANNEX II — ANNEXE II — ALLEGATO II — BIJLAGE II — ANEXO II — LIITE II — BILAGA II Direcciones de los organismos de intervención — Interventionsorganernes adresser — Anschriften der Interventionsstellen — Dieuh ˜umseir tym oqcamisl ˜ym paqelb ˜aseyr — Addresses of the intervention agencies — Adresses des organismes d’intervention — Indirizzi degli organismi d’intervento — Adressen van de interventiebureaus — Endereços dos organismos de intervenç˜ao — Interventioelinten osoitteet — Interventionsorganens adresser BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND Bundesanstalt für Landwirtschaft und Ernährung (BLE) Postfach 180203, D-60083 Frankfurt am Main Adickesallee 40 D-60322 Frankfurt am Main Tel. : (49) 69 1564-704/772; Telex: 411727; Telefax: (49) 69 15 64-790/791 DANMARK Ministeriet for Fødevarer, Landbrug og Fiskeri EU-direktoratet Kampmannsgade 3 DK-1780 København V Tlf. (45) 33 92 70 00; telex 151317 DK; fax (45) 33 92 69 48, (45) 33 92 69 23 ESPA (cid:5)NA FEGA (Fondo Espa ˜nol de Garantía Agraria) Beneficencia, 8 E-28005 Madrid Tel. : (34 1) 347 65 00, 347 63 10; télex: FEGA 23427 E, FEGA 41818 E; fax: (34 1) 521 98 32, 522 43 87 FRANCE OFIVAL 80, avenue des Terroirs-de-France F-75607 Paris Cedex 12 Téléphone: (33 1) 44 68 50 00; télex: 215330; télécopieur: (33 1) 44 68 52 33 ITALIA AIMA (Azienda di Stato per gli interventi nel mercato agricolo) Via Palestro 81 I-00185 Roma Tel. 49 49 91; telex: 61 30 03; telefax: 445 39 40/445 19 58 IRELAND Department of Agriculture, Food and Forestry Agriculture House Kildare Street IRL-Dublin 2 Tel. Telex 93292 and 93607, telefax (01) 661 62 63, (01) 678 90 11, ext. 2278 and 3806 (01) 678 52 14 and (01) 662 01 98 ÖSTERREICH AMA-Agrarmarkt Austria Dresdner Straße 70 A-1201 Wien Tel. : (431) 33 15 12 20; Telefax: (431) 33 15 12 97 26. 2. 98 ‹ IT ‹ Gazzetta ufficiale delle Comunità europee L 56/21 PORTUGAL Instituto Nacional de Intervenç˜ao e Garantia Agrícola Rua Fernando Curado Ribeiro, nº 4-G P-1600 Lisboa Tel. : (351-1) 751 85 00; telefax: (351-1) 751 86 15 UNITED KINGDOM Intervention Board Executive Agency Kings House 33 Kings Road Reading RG1 3BU Berkshire Tel. (01189) 58 36 26 Fax (01189) 56 67 50