title: 98/247/ECSC: Commission Decision of 21 January 1998 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 65 of the ECSC Treaty (Case IV/35.814 - Alloy surcharge) (Only the Dutch, French, German, Italian, Spanish and Swedish texts are authentic) (Text with EEA relevance)

eurovoc_concepts:
ECSC Treaty
fine
infringement of EU law
iron and steel industry
restriction on competition
sanction (EU)

text: 1. 4. 98 ‹ EN ‹ Official Journal of the European Communities L 100/55 II (Acts whose publication is not obligatory) COMMISSION COMMISSION DECISION of 21 January 1998 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 65 of the ECSC Treaty (Case IV/35. 814 — Alloy surcharge) (Only the Dutch, French, German, Italian, Spanish and Swedish texts are authentic) (Text with EEA relevance) (98/247/ECSC) THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, and in particular Article 65 thereof, Having regard to the information obtained by the Commission and the checks made pursuant to Article 47 of the Treaty, Having regard to the written comments submitted pursuant to Article 36 of the Treaty and noting that the parties to present oral comments, formally waived their right Whereas: (2) I. THE FACTS A. Procedure (1) from several consumers, Following reports in the specialised press and unof- the ficial complaints Commission initiated an investigation into the application by European stainless steel producers of a general price increase known as an ‘alloy surcharge’. On 16 March 1995, under Article 47 of the ECSC Treaty, the Commission asked a number of produ- the cers for data concerning the price changes, formula or method used to calculate the amounts applied, the circumstances and the date on which the formula was first used, as well as any sub- sequent amendments or applications. On the basis of the information obtained and, in particular, copies of circulars sent by the producers to their customers which announced a modification of the bases used to calculate the alloy surcharge, the Commission sent a statement of objections on 19 December 1995 to 19 undertakings. Having examined the file, the undertakings replied to the objections at the beginning of 1996. The replies prompted the Commission to under- take further investigations. Checks under Article 47 of the ECSC Treaty were carried out at Acerinox, Thyssen, ALZ, Outokumpu and Usinor Sacilor. Requests for in- formation were sent to Acerinox, Acciai Speciali Terni, ALZ, B(cid:148)hler, Olarra, Outokumpu and Usinor Sacilor. Sheffield, Krupp, Avesta The undertakings to which this Decision is addressed submitted their comments on the new statement of objections which the Commission sent to them on 24 April 1977 and which cancels and replaces that of 19 December 1995. In their replies, to put they formally waived their right forward their views at a hearing. L 100/56 ‹ EN ‹ Official Journal of the European Communities 1. 4. 98 B. The products C. The geographic market (3) (4) (5) process. Under Stainless steel is a type of special steel whose main property is resistance to corrosion. This resistance is achieved by the use of different alloying mate- rials (chrome, nickel, molybdenum) in the produc- tion EN least 10,5 % 10020:5. 2222. 1, steel containing at chrome and no more than 1,2 % carbon may be classed as stainless steel. There are three main types of stainless steel, depending on the composition of alloying material: CEN standard — austenitic steel, whose basic grade contains 18 % chrome and 8 % nickel, — ferritic steel, which may contain up to 30 % chrome, — martensitic steel, which contains up to 14 % chrome. Each of these types has different uses. Stainless steel is used in the form of flat products (plates or coils; hot-rolled or cold-rolled) and long products (bars, wire rod, sections; hot-rolled or fin- ished). Most of these products are ECSC products within the meaning of Article 81 of the Treaty. Flat products account for 82 % of sales of stainless flat products. Flat products continuously steel manufactured in the form of coil (hot-rolled wide or narrow strip) account for 93 % of flat products, the rest consisting in thick individually rolled sheet (reversing-mill plate). About 70 % of hot-rolled wide strip is then cold rolled to reduce thickness and give it special properties. The market for stainless steel flat products is highly concentrated. There are only six undertakings or groups in the Community which produce hot wide strip and cold-rolled plate. Five of the undertakings also produce reversing-mill plate. In the Krupp/Thyssen/Riva/Falck/Tadfin/AST case (1), the Commission noted that, according to the forecasts of stainless steel producers, there was a large amount of excess capacity which would persist over the next few years. (7) (8) (9) for which the market Unlike carbon steel, is regarded as mature, the market for stainless steel products is still expanding. Since 1950 production of all quantities of steel has grown by 2,4 % annu- ally, whereas production of stainless steel has grown by 5,8 % annually. During the same period the main producing and consuming regions have changed; North America gave way to Western Europe (EC plus EFTA) and then to Japan from the mid-1960s onwards. Today, the growth area is located in the newly industrialised countries, where the annual rate of growth is of the order of 16 %. A number of European producers have decided to follow this trend by investing in the areas that are net importers (America and south-east Asia). Exports by European firms outside Western Europe their total sales. By account contrast, into Western Europe account for less than 5 % of consumption there. for some 25 % of imports of stainless steel The relevant geographic market is Western Europe. There are no customs duties or legal or technical barriers to imports between the EFTA countries and the Community and, although producers have a large share of their respective domestic markets, trade between Member States is considerable. On the other hand, imports from third countries are relatively low. In the abovementioned AST de- cision, imports of cold-rolled products were es- timated at 3 % of total consumption (2). D. The parties The companies Acerinox SA, ALZ NV, Acciai Speciali Terni SpA, Avesta Sheffield AB, Krupp Thyssen Nirosta GmbH and Usinor SA account for almost 90 % of European output of stainless steel flat products in the form of coils (hot wide strip and cold sheet) and a very large proportion of the output of stainless steel long products. All in all, they account for over 80 % of European produc- tion of finished stainless steel products. 1. Acerinox SA (6) This Decision is addressed to the undertakings manufacturing flat products, and is restricted to ECSC products, namely hot-rolled flat products and cold-rolled flat products at least 500 mm wide. (10) Acerinox SA (‘Acerinox’) is a listed company in- corporated under Spanish law. Set up in 1970, the firm has modern plant and is known for its low costs and profitability. the Spanish producer of stainless long products Rold ´an SA and a US producer of stainless flat products. It controls 1. 4. 98 ‹ EN ‹ Official Journal of the European Communities L 100/57 (16) (17) (18) 2. ALZ NV (11) ALZ is a company incorporated under Belgian law that belongs to the Arbed group. Like Acerinox, ALZ was set up in the 1970s and manufactures stainless steel flat products. 3. AST SpA (12) Acciai Speciali Terni SpA (‘AST’) was set up on 1 January 1994, when ILVA’s steel-making activities were split up into three undertakings with a view to subsequent sale. AST’s main activity is the produc- tion of stainless steel flat products, electrical sheet and welded tubes, the last-named being produced by a subsidiary. On 24 December 1994 the Commission authorised the joint acquisition of AST by Fried. Krupp AG Hoesch-Krupp, Thyssen Stahl AG, AFL Falck, Tadfin SpA and FI. RE. Finanziaria SpA (Riva group). In December 1995 Krupp increased its share in AST from 50 % to 75 % by purchasing the shares held by Falck and Riva. 4. Avesta Sheffield AB (13) Avesta Sheffield AB (‘Avesta’) is controlled by British Steel. Avesta came into being as a result of a merger in 1992 between the British and Swedish stainless steel divisions. British Steel also controls the stainless long products manufacturers Fagersta Stainless AB (in Sweden) and British Steel Engin- eering Steels Holdings Limited (formerly United Engineering Steel) and a US manufacturer of stain- less steel flat products. 5. Krupp Thyssen Nirosta GmbH (14) Krupp Thyssen Nirosta GmbH was created on 1 January 1995 folllowing the merger of the stainless steel divisions of Thyssen Stahl AG and Fried. Krupp AG Hoesch Krupp which make products resistant to acids and high temperatures (3). It has agreed to assume full liability in the present case for events preceding its creation in regard to both Thyssen Stahl AG and Krupp Hoesch AG. This Decision is not, therefore, addressed to either of those undertakings. 6. Usinor SA (15) Ugine SA (‘Ugine’) was, at the time of the events in question, a subsidiary of the Usinor Sacilor group responsible for the production and sale of stainless steel. On 11 December 1995 Ugine SA became a division of Usinor Sacilor and thus lost its legal personality. Usinor Sacilor altered its trading name in June 1997 and is now known as Usinor SA. Usinor SA is the largest steel producer in Europe and one of the leading producers in the world. It also controls J & L Special Steels, a leading American producer of stainless cold-rolled sheet and holds a stake in the leading Thai producer of stainless cold-rolled sheet. E. Background: the alloy surcharge and its calculation The alloy surcharge is a price supplement which is calculated on the basis of the prices of alloys and is added to the basic price for stainless steel. The cost of the alloys used by stainless steel produ- cers (nickel, chromium and molybdenum) forms a very large proportion of the total production costs. The prices for these alloys are extremely volatile, which explains the desire of producers to offset the price fluctuations without recourse to frequent al- terations in the basic price. The application of the alloy surcharge has a purely financial basis. calculate Producers alloy surcharge to be applied in a given month (M) in the different Communities currencies as follows: amount of the the They calculate the average price of nickel, ferro- chromium and molybdenum in the two months preceding the month before the month of calcula- tion — in other words, M–2 and M–3. They compare the values thus obtained with the reference values since February 1994, namely: —ECU 3 750/tonne for nickel, —ECU 5 532/tonne for molybdenum, —ECU 777/tonne for ferro-chromium. If the difference between the average prices and the reference values is positive, a price supplement is added to the basic price for the month M. If it is negative, no increase is applied: there is no negative alloy surcharge. Such a situation occurred between 1991 and 1993, when alloy prices fell below the trigger values and producers applied a zero alloy surcharge. The amounts in excess of the trigger values are multiplied by the percentage of each alloy in the quality of steel concerned (for example, for quality AISI 304, there would be 9 % nickel and 18 % chromium and for quality AISI 316, 12 % nickel, 18 % chromium and 2,5 % molybdenum. L 100/58 ‹ EN ‹ Official Journal of the European Communities 1. 4. 98 (19) Calculation methods have varied, depending on the the period and the producer. In the course of inspections carried out under Article 47 of the ECSC Treaty in 1996 and in certain letters to the Commission, the producers stated that they had all been using the method described in the statement of objections of 19 December 1995 (with the exception of the trigger values) since 1988 (4). In its Decision Commission objected to an agreement and concerted practices between European producers of stainless cold- rolled flat products which related in particular to prices. The agreement was in force between at least May 1986 and October 1988. The decision was not contested. All the parties in question in the present proceedings were at the ‘Sendzimir club’ referred to in Decision 90/417/ ECSC. the time members of 90/417/ECSC (5), the F. The behaviour of the undertakings in December 1993 and January 1994 (20) The prices for alloys and stainless steel fell sharply in 1993. When nickel prices started to rise in September 1993, producers’ profits were consid- erably reduced. To remedy this, the producers of stainless flat products, with the exception of Outokumpu, agreed to hold a meeting in Madrid. Following that meeting, a number of contacts took place between the producers. 1. Meeting held in Madrid on 16 December 1993 (a) Participants (21) The meeting (hotel reservations and suchlike) was organized by Acerinox (6), which denies, however, having been the instigator. The meeting was attended by: — Acerinox: — ALZ: — AST: Mr Riestra Mr R. Mr Ronchi Moio and Mr — Avesta Sheffield: Mr T. and Mr W. — Krupp Hoesch Stahl AG: Mr Pl(cid:148)macher and Mr Hufen — Thyssen: — Ugine: (b) Purpose Mr Peek Mr Laquay Lepage. and Mr (22) According to the statements of the undertakings, the purpose of the meeting was to allow producers to exchange views on the possible reintroduction of an alloy surcharge as the most appropriate means of increasing prices and compensating for higher nickel prices. Acerinox stated: ‘Se celebr(cid:155) una reuni(cid:155)n en Madrid con fecha 15 de diciembre de 1993, que hab(cid:146)a sido acordada entre las partes para hablar (. ) de la problem ´atica situa- ci(cid:155)n del mercado de las materias primas del acero inoxidable y las fuertes oscilaciones de los precios de las mismas. ’ (7). In its statement, Avesta specifies that: ‘The meeting involved an exchange of views on the difficulties caused by the various price develop- ments described above and on the possible reintro- duction of an alloy surcharge to address these dif- ficulties. ’ (8). According to Krupp and Thyssen: ‘Dort sind die allgemein schlechte wirtschaftliche Lage sowie m(cid:148)gliche Auswege er(cid:148)rtert worden. ’ (9). Ugine stated (10): ‘Une r(cid:130)union a eu lieu (cid:133) Madrid (cid:133) l’h(cid:147)tel (. ) le 16 d(cid:130)cembre 1993 qui a permis de proc(cid:130)der (cid:133) un (cid:130)change de vues entre les producteurs d’acier inoxydable. ’ In its statement, AST even specifies (11) that it is in order to find a solution to the crisis that the under- takings met in Madrid: ‘In questo contesto, e al fine di trovare una via d’uscita dalla situazione di crisi, ebbe luogo un incontro tra i principali produttori di acciaio europei. ’ (c) Selecting the calculation method and reference values (23) Mr Laquay, a representative of Ugine, explained with the aid of a flip chart how the alloy surcharge had been applied in the past (12). According to Krupp and Thyssen: als hat Laquay Spezialist ‘Herr f(cid:129)r LZ-Berechnungen unter Zuhilfenahme eines Flip- Charts spontan und exemplarisch am Beispiel der von seinem Unternehmen in Frankreich gefor- derten Preise errechnet, welche zus(cid:132)tzlichen Erl(cid:148)se bei entsprechender Umstellung des Stoppreises im franz(cid:148)sischen Markt erzielbar w(cid:132)ren’ (13). (24) All the participants at the meeting said it was necessary to use the method adopted in 1991, and alter the reference values. 1. 4. 98 ‹ EN ‹ Official Journal of the European Communities L 100/59 Acerinox stated: ‘En la misma se plante(cid:155), ante las circunstancias ya conocidas de la volatilidad del mercado de las materias primas en el que Acerinox SA no tiene intervenci(cid:155)n alguna, la necesidad de aplicar el extra de aleaci(cid:155)n a los clientes con arreglo a una f(cid:155)rmula tradicional ya conocida y aplicada con los valores m ´as adecuados para paliar la cada vez m ´as especu- lativa situaci(cid:155)n de la LME’ (14). AST stated: ‘Nel corso di quell’incontro furono discusse le iniziative che ciascuno dei partecipanti intendeva prendere al riguardo, che aveva elaborato in prece- denza in totale autonomia (almeno per quanto riguarda AST). Dall’incontro emerse una naturale convergenza sull’adozione, come livello minimo della formula, del prezzo del nichel del settembre 1993’ (15). Avesta states that: ‘The participants exchanged similar views on the use of the alloy surcharge calculation mechanism previously applied. In the course of the exchange, the ASAB representatives put to the meeting their views on using the previously adopted calculation mechanism with new trigger values’ (16). In their statement, Krupp and Thyssen gave the following explanation: ‘Unter den gegebenen Umst(cid:132)nden lag daher die einzige M(cid:148)glichkeit, der Entwicklung zu begegnen, in dem Versuch, den wegen des fr(cid:129)heren Absin- kens des Preises der Legierungsmetalle unter den bisherigen Stoppreis ausgesetzten LZ wieder zu aktivieren. (. ) Im Rahmen des Treffens hat dann Herr Pl(cid:148)macher bekundet, daß Krupp k(cid:129)nftig als Stoppreis die niedrige Septembernotierung f(cid:129)r Ni zugrunde legen werde’ (17). Ugine stated: ‘Au cours de la r(cid:130)union, certains participants dont Ugine ont fait conna(cid:140)tre leur intention, assortie ou non de r(cid:130)serves, de reprendre l’application de la formule d’extra assortie d’un nouveau seuil de d(cid:130)clenchement (le point bas du cours du nickel en septembre) (cid:133) dater du 1er f(cid:130)vrier 1994’ (18). (25) The customers were already familiar with the mechanism. The September 1993 alloy prices (the lowest historical prices for nickel) were chosen as the new trigger thresholds. In its statement, Avesta states that calculations were carried out during the meeting using the September/October alloy prices and an approximate rate of exchange for that period: calculation of and an approximate rate of exchange for period’ (19). the previously adopted surcharge) that (d) Date of application (26) With regard to the date of application of the new alloy surcharge, most of the participants were in favour of applying it as soon as possible: 1 February 1994 was considered to be the most realistic date for first application. In its statement, Avesta speci- fies: ‘At the meeting, the participants also discussed an implementation date. 1 February was considered to be the earliest feasible date for introduction of the surcharge’ (20). Acerinox also states that: ‘La mayor(cid:146)a de los presentes eran partidarios de aplicar el extra de aleaci(cid:155)n lo m ´as pronto posi- ble’. (21). (27) Acerinox stated that it did not intend to apply the surcharge in Spain, as demand on the Spanish market was depressed: ‘Acerinox indic(cid:155) su intenci(cid:155)n de no aplicar el extra en Espa ˜na por considerar que no iba a ser positivo para el aumento de la demanda y para la industria espa ˜nola que estaba sumida en una profunda crisis’ (22). (e) Fax of 20 December 1993 (28) conclusions The fax (23) sent by Ugine on 20 December 1993 to producers participating in the meeting and to Outokumpu reflects the the meeting. Drafted in English, the fax details the calculation of the alloy surcharge including the trigger values, the ECU/USD exchange rate (USD 1,179/ECU for nickel, USD 1,182/ECU for chro- mium and USD 1,171/ECU for molybdenum), the reference months and standard alloy contents. of According to Avesta’s statement: ‘On 20 December 1993, ASAB received a fax from Mr Laquay of Ugine setting out details relating to the alloy surcharge calculation including trigger points, an ECU/USD exchange rate calculation, the monthly basis (i. e. M–2 and M–3) and standard reflected the contents. This document alloy exchange of views between producers’ (24). Ugine admits to sending the document in its state- ment: ‘Calculations were made at the meeting on the basis of new trigger values reflecting alloy prices in September/October 1993 (i. e. using the basis of ‘(cid:211) la suite de cette r(cid:130)union, Ugine a communiqu(cid:130) aux participants par t(cid:130)l(cid:130)copies les 20 d(cid:130)cembre 1993 et 11 janvier 1994 les bases et les r(cid:130)sultats des L 100/60 ‹ EN ‹ Official Journal of the European Communities 1. 4. 98 calculs fond(cid:130)s sur la formule qu’elle entendait adopter sur le march(cid:130) national fran(cid:135)ais ou euro- p(cid:130)en en cas de non alignement’ (25). In its reply to the statement of objections of 23 April 1997 Ugine refers to the fax as containing the conclusions of the Madrid meeting (26). AST could not rule out having either received or taken account of it in its decision: ‘La mancanza di conoscenza diretta dei dettagli non permette per(cid:149) di escludere in maniera categorica che vi sia stato qualche scambio di informazione. (. ) Dato l’apparente tenore di tali messaggi non si pu(cid:149) per il vero neppure escludere che AST ne sia stata influenzata nella determinazione dei valori utilizzati nella formula’ (27). February with details of the calculation in ECU/ tonne, a conversion table of the main European currencies and the comment that it would apply it only to austenitic steel. In their statements, all the undertakings mention the fax: ‘On 11 January 1994, Mr Laquay of Ugine sent a fax to Mr W. setting out Ugine’s internal calcula- tion of the alloy surcharge to be applied by it from 1 February 1994’ (34). (33) Up to 13 January 1994, contacts had taken place at least between Avesta and most of its competitors concerning the latter’s position on the alloy surcharge. Annexes 2 and 6 to Avesta’s statement point to the existence of some of these contacts. 2. Sequels to the Madrid meeting (29) In accordance with Article 60(2)(a) of the Treaty and pursuant to Decision 37/54/ECSC (28), as last amended by Decision 2515/86/ECSC (29), stainless steel producers must make public their price lists and conditions of sale. They fulfil that obligation by addressing them to the Commission and any other interested party at least two working days before applying them. Each time the price lists are amended, they must be made public and notified to the Commission. This is the legal background to the facts set out below which the Commission has identified as having taken place between the Madrid meeting and the publication of the alloy surcharges by the undertakings concerned. (30) On 20 December 1993 Avesta Sheffield warned its distribution subsidiaries of the probable introduc- tion of an alloy surcharge (30). On 22 December 1993 ALZ warned its sales subsi- diaries of the alloy sur- charge (31). the reintroduction of (31) On 6 January 1994 Ugine recalculated the figure using the same reference values, but with another, single ECU/USD exchange rate for all three alloys: ECU 1,17506/USD. This centesimal difference is minimal and its effect on the amount of the alloy surcharge is negligible (cf. point 37). On 10 January 1994 Avesta Sheffield carried out detailed alloy to surcharges. It used the ECU/USD exchange rate used at the Madrid meeting (32). calculations establish the Annex 2 is a fax dated 14 January 1994 from S. to W. The following extracts are relevant: ‘ALZ through their Swedish representative called this morning saying that he had been me instructed from his mill to start applying alloy extras as from the 1 of February and that he should get the exact alloy surcharge details from us. (. ) Outokumpu through S. also called me today and asked what we intend to do. I said that most likely we are going to apply the surcharge in the same way as announced by Ugine for the French market. (. ) He said they want to do the same in both Sweden and Finland and suggested that we contact him on Monday’ (35). Annex 6 is a fax dated 14 January 1994 and signed by W. It takes note of the positions of some of Avesta’s competitors, as follows: have announced ‘Ugine have announced surcharges effective 1 February 94 of 430 GBP 4,36, 304 GBP 47,55, 316 GBP 74,03. Acerinox that surcharges will be applied from 1. 4. 94 (yes April!!). Outokumpu are thought to be following this line but no confirmation yet. Thyssen expect to announce something next Monday. Krupp — we have no current information. Ilva have announced a base price change effective from February but applicable to stockists and not end-users. ALZ are still considering their position’ (36). (34) On 13 January ALZ informed its competitors by telex of the amounts of the surcharges it was going to publish (37). It informed the Commission of its price list only on 24 January 1994. (32) On 11 January 1994 Ugine sent all its competitors a fax (33) containing the alloy surcharges it was from 1 going to apply on the French market (35) On the same day, AST sent Outokumpu a fax repeating the contents of the fax which it had received from Ugine on 20 December 1993 and the calculations carried out by Ugine on 6 January (38). 1. 4. 98 ‹ EN ‹ Official Journal of the European Communities L 100/61 (36) On 17 January 1994 Ugine, AST and Krupp informed the Commission of the alloy surcharge they would be applying from 1 February. flat products, For in the countries without a domestic producer, the undertakings aligned their prices on the price list of a single producer. On the same day, Avesta decided it would formally reintroduce the alloy surcharge and informed its distributors, giving them precise instructions on the application procedures (39). On 19 January 1994, Thyssen notified the Commission of the alloy surcharges it would be applying from 1 February 1994. G. Application of the allow surcharge (37) On the basis of Article 60 of the ECSC Treaty, all the undertakings (with the exception of Acerinox) informed the Commission of the surcharges they intended to apply and the date of application: 1 February 1994. Acerinox, which informed the Commission of the new surcharges only in May 1994, nevertheless applied the amounts in certain Member States as early as February. The method used being identical, any differences in the final amounts are minor and are due to rounding-up or the exchange rate used. (38) The practical aspects of applying the surcharge are described in an Avesta memo of 17 January 1994. The following points are worth noting: ‘We will follow the rules set by the home producer in any given producer market, including applying the surcharge they declare. In each non-producer market a lead will be taken by one of the mills — W. will advise those markets concerned. The surcharge will not be imposed outside of the 17 European markets. We will need to secure appropriate price increases as soon as possible. ’ (40). (39) The practical aspects of applying the surcharge may be illustrated by three facts: the surcharge applied by the The amounts of irre- producers on a given market are identical, spective of that would have been obtained by converting the amount published in the tariffs. the amount In the United Kingdom, all the producers en- deavoured to apply the alloy surcharge retroactively, following Avesta’s lead. (40) In its statement, Avesta specifies: ‘In the national markets in which ASAB was neither the domestic producer nor, in markets with no domestic producer, the leading supplier, typ- ically, but not uniformly, ASAB would align on the domestic producer or leading supplier as was tradi- tional in the stainless steel industry generally. The German producer had, for example, traditionally been regarded as the leading supplier in Austria and ALZ the leading supplier in the Nederlands, whilst the Nordic producers had been regarded as leading suppliers in Denmark and Norway and the British producer in Ireland ’(41). (41) The producers finally sent letters to their customers announcing the amendment of the thresholds. The Commission has copies of some of the letters. The to the present following extracts are relevant proceedings: On 28 January 1994 Ugine Savoie UK Ltd informs its customers that the alloy surcharge is being reap- plied, as follows: ‘It has therefore been decided at a European level to reactivate the surcharge system to take into account the increase in alloy costs since September 1993, and this surcharge will be applied generally from 1st February 1994’ (42). On 31 January 1994 Thyssen Fine Steels Ltd writes to its customers: ‘For this reason, we have no choice but to imple- ment alloy surcharges on all stainless flat products in line with all other manufacturers. As in the for previous the surcharge has been agreed to account changes and costs ’ (43). surcharge situation, a clear basis for in relationship between prices II. LEGAL ASSESSMENT A. Article 65(1) 1. Background (42) Article 65(1) of the ECSC Treaty prohibits all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted prac- indirectly to prevent, tices restrict or distort normal competition within the common market, and in particular those tending to fix prices. tending directly or L 100/62 ‹ EN ‹ Official Journal of the European Communities 1. 4. 98 2. The agreement (43) Article 65 of the ECSC Treaty is infringed if the parties reach a consensus on a plan which limits or is likely to limit freedom by determining the lines of their mutual action or abstention from action in the market. No contrac- are sanctions or enforcement procedures tual required. Nor is it necessary for such a consensus to be made in writing. their commercial concluded, knowingly substitutes practical co- operation between them for the risks of competi- tion’. (46) In any event, the question whether the conduct of the undertakings in this case is to be described as an agreement or as a concerted practice has no bearing on the conclusion that such conduct is contrary to Article 65 of the ECSC Treaty. (44) (45) following the meeting, all In the present case, the Madrid meeting had a single aim: to secure an across-the-board increase in stainless steel prices to offset the rise in the price of alloys. A discussion took place of the different methods used in the past to calculate the alloy surcharge and, the undertakings took identical action. They applied to their sales in Europe, except in Spain and Portugal, from 1 February 1994, an alloy surcharge based on the method last used in 1991, taking the September 1993 prices as reference values. A consensus had therefore been reached. That consensus was confirmed in the fax from Ugine of 20 December 1993, with the result that the consensus must be defined as an agreement. The content of the circu- lars referred to above (point 41) confirms the def- inition. In any event, if the definition of the consensus as an agreement is disputed, the reintroduction by the stainless steel producers of the alloy surcharge by deliberately identical methods as to value and date the very least and without any doubt a is at In creating the concept of concerted practice. ‘concerted practice’, the Treaty the authors of intended to forestall the possibility of undertakings’ evading the prohibiton on concerted practices by colluding in an anti-competitive manner falling short of an agreement by, for example, informing each other in advance of the attitude each intends to adopt, so that each could regulate its commercial conduct its competitors in the knowledge that would behave in the same way. Thus, in its judgment in the ICI case of 13 July 1972 (44), the Court held that ‘Article 85 [of the EEC Treaty] draws a distinction between the concept of “concerted practices” and that of “agreements between undertakings” or of “decisions by associations of undertakings”; the object is to bring within the prohibition of that Article a form of coordination between under- takings which, without having reached the stage where an agreement properly so-called has been ‘states in paragraph 1 the scope of As the Court stated in its opinion delivered on 13 December 1961 at the request of the High Au- thority and the Council of Ministers concerning the interpretation of Article 65 of the ECSC Trea- ty (45), that Article, which contains the provisions giving effect to the prohibition in Article 4b of the the Treaty, prohibition by forbidding in general terms all agreements’. The prohibitation in Article 4, accor- ding to the Court, ‘is clearly intended to prevent undertakings from acquiring by means of restrictive practices a position which enables them to have or exploit markets. ’ The prohibition is ‘of strict appli- cation and distinguishes the system established by the Treaty. ’ 3. Purpose, effect and duration of the agreement (a) Purpose and effect of the agreement (47) The purpose of the agreement is the use by all undertakings, as from the same date, of lower and identical alloy reference values in the surcharge calculation method used previously, in order to raise prices. Since the ‘surcharges’ or supplements form part of the final price of the products in ques- tion, the purpose of the agreement is to fix part of the price. Article 65(1) specifically states that agree- ments and concerted practices tending directly or indirectly to fix prices restrict competition. (48) The agreement appreciably restricts competition. The undertakings concerned by this Decision account flat products. The impact on the market of a concerted increase in prices between them is thus necessarily considerable. for almost 90 % of stainless steel Furthermore, the alloy surcharge is a major com- ponent of the final price. The price increase re- sulting from the alloy surcharge depends partly on the amount of alloy used in the steel and partly on fluctuations in alloy prices. It may account for as much as 25 % of the total price. 1. 4. 98 ‹ EN ‹ Official Journal of the European Communities L 100/63 (49) As the purpose of for values the agreement is to restrict competition, it is not necessary to demonstrate that the market has actually been affected. It must be pointed out, however, the change in the that alloy surcharge was the reference followed by a virtual doubling of stainless steel prices between January 1994 and March 1995. While such a sharp increase cannot be explained solely by the change in the trigger values for the it did greatly alloy surcharge in February 1994, through the mechanical price contribute to it increase that the components of the price for stainless steel has been fixed at exactly the same level by all the producers since February 1994. it caused. In addition, one of (b) Duration of the information (50) It is clear from the documents on file that, whilst the principle of an alloy surcharge is not new and has been generally applied, the use of an identical calculation method by all the Community produ- cers for their sales in Western Europe dates back approximately to 1988. There is reason to believe, therefore, the agreement dates back to the same period and that the concerted modification of the reference values in 1994 is only a development thereof. that Nevertheless, the factual elements on which this conclusion is based are not sufficiently well- founded. It must therefore be concluded that the concerted action began at the Madrid meeting in December 1993 and has been pursued to date by all the undertakings with the exception of Avesta Sheffield, which announced in November 1996 that it had decided to use another calculation method. 4. Arguments of the parties (51) None of the addressees of the statement of objec- tions has contested the facts as described by the Commission. (56) (52) Avesta and Usinor do not dispute the legal assess- ment contained in the statement of objections and simply state that the infringement has ended with the adoption of a new calculation method (Avesta) or that it was an insolated measure (Usinor). (53) Krupp, AST and ALZ, on the other hand, whilst acknowledging the facts, challenge the Commis- sion’s perception of the Madrid meeting was simply an exchange of views the amended alloy surcharge reference and that them. They claim that values do not stem from an agreement or a concerted practice. This interpretation must be rejected for the reasons given above. (54) Lastly, Acerinox states that it informed its compet- itors at the Madrid meeting that it would not apply the surcharge on the Spanish market; according to Acerinox, this proves that it did not take part in any agreement. The fact that Acerinox took that position is explained by the particular characteris- tics of the Spanish market, where stainless steel consumption is lower than in other Member States. Acerinox, however, applied the surcharge outside Spain from February 1994, thus conforming to the decision taken at the Madrid meeting which it organised in full knowledge of the facts. In addition, all the undertakings argue that there are ‘extenuating circumstances’. (a) All the undertakings concerned argue that recourse to the calculation method is a long-established practice (55) It is necessary to distinguish between long-standing use of a calculation method which allows fluctu- ations in alloy prices to be reflected in product prices and the adoption of a uniform calculation method. The surcharge calculation includes values which may be compared to recommendations within the meaning of the 1968 Commisson notice con- cerning agreements, decisions and concerted prac- tices in the field of cooperation between enter- prises (46). The method clearly constitutes a restric- tion of competition It seems that the general application of the method in force in 1994 dates back to 1988 (with the exception of the trigger values). In its abovemen- tioned Decision 90/417/ECSC of 18 July 1990, the Commission found against an agreement and concerted practices between parties which related in particular to prices. The agreement had been in force at least between May 1986 and October 1988. The decision was not contested. The Commission does not, however, have sufficient evidence that the adoption of an identical calculation method was the result of concerted action as such. That is why the original adoption of the method is not the subject of the circum- this Decision. However, stances in which the surcharge trigger value was recently amended points to the existence, at least in the present case, of collusion in the setting of the value and the date of implementation. L 100/64 ‹ EN ‹ Official Journal of the European Communities 1. 4. 98 (57) (58) (59) (b) Some producers ( 4 7) tomers are in favour of method claim that cus- the surcharge The fact that customers accept a practice that is contrary to the competition rules does not make it it was precisely owing to lawful. What is more, complaints the Commission undertook its investigations. from certain customers that Indeed, the documents obtained in the course of the proceedings are evidence of the difficulties the producers encountered when they endeavoured to have the surcharge accepted by their customers. (e) Certain undertakings ( 5 0) alleged that the Commission encouraged them to adopt a common method (62) Commission policy concerning calculation models was determined in the late 1960s. The 1968 notice on cooperation between under- takings provides that agreements having as their the joint preparation of calculation sole object models do not restrict competition. However, calculation models containing specified rates of calculation must be regarded as recommendations that may lead to restraints of competition. (c) Some undertakings ( 4 8) minimise the practice objected to effect of the (63) In its Decision 80/257/ECSC (51), the Commission specified how calculation models could amount to recommendations: The undertakings claim on the one hand that the alloy surcharge was applied only to a small propor- tion of transactions and, on the other, that many customers benefited from fixed prices. They state that the increase in stainless steel prices in 1994 was not due to the amendment of the surcharge to the ratio of supply to trigger threshold but demand. to increase prices, These arguments must be rejected. In view of the fact that the concerted action was aimed at revising reference values in order it constitutes an infringement of Article 65 irre- spective of its effect on the market. In addition, the application of dissimilar conditions to comparable transactions constitutes an infringement of Article 60 of the ECSC Treaty, and undertakings are not entitled to rely on a possible infringement in order to attempt to conceal or deny the existence of an alloy established surcharge can, depending on the qualities and products concerned, account for up to 25 % of the final price. infringement. Finally, the (d) Several undertakings ( 4 9) pleaded the principle of legitimate expectation (60) According to those firms, the Commission could have deduced from the price lists sent to it under Article 60 that there was a single method of calcu- lation. The fact that it did not initiate proceedings under Article 65 created a legitimate expectation on the part of the firms that the use of a common method was lawful. (61) The undertakings simply notified the Commission of the amounts of the alloy surcharges they were applying, in the different currencies. The calcula- tion method itself was never sent to the Commis- sion, nor were the data on its implementation. indirectly when setting their ‘They encourage the user companies to work from the figures contained in the model, or at least to keep close to them, when calculating their costs and thus selling prices. To this extent it is immaterial whether the cost components are expressed in straight figures or in the form of percentage surcharges. Either way, what may once have been offered as a service to explain to companies the various ways of achieving cost-related price formation has become a means of exerting a real, powerful influence on their pricing policy. ’ The undertakings must therefore have been aware of the Commission’s position on the adoption of a single method of alloy surcharge. calculation for the (f) Several undertakings invoke the prin- ciple of market transparency laid down in Article 60 of the ECSC Treaty (64) Usinor states in its replies to the two statements of objections that the price control system known to industrial economists as the ‘basing point system’ provides specifically for an element of concerted action, and Thyssen Stahl AG claims that the trans- parency requirements of Article 60 of the Treaty require the suppliers to provide general informa- tion on their intended prices. (65) It is true that Article 60 of the Treaty stipulates that ‘the price lists and conditions of sale applied by undertakings within the common market must be made public’, but the prices and conditions must be adopted independently by each firm. They may not in any event be communicated to the parties concerned before the Commission is informed. The obligation to make the prices public does not 1. 4. 98 ‹ EN ‹ Official Journal of the European Communities L 100/65 justify holding a meeting having the object or effect of either influencing the conduct on the market of an actual or potential competitor or of disclosing to such a competitor the course of conduct which they themselves have decided to adopt or contemplate adopting on the market. (66) Usinor also states that the harmonisation of the alloy surcharge is a result of the ECSC system of price controls. None of the provisions of the Treaty or secondary legislation, however, call for the ap- plication of any surcharge and even less for its standardization. The decision to add a surcharge to a price list and the fixing of the amount is a matter for each individual firm. Article 60 does not allow undertakings to concert and fix prices between themselves. 5. Conclusion with regard to Article 65(1) (71) (72) In the ‘beams’ case, the Commission concluded (52) that since extras form part of the ultimate price to be paid for the products in the European Com- munity the agreements to harmonise extras were agreements to fix prices contrary to Article 65(1). therefore, In the present case, the Commission considers that the stainless steel producers referred to in this Decision increased prices in a concerted manner from 1 February 1994. The facts described above constitute an infringement of Article 65 of the Treaty. B. Fines (g) Some undertakings the Commission’s finding that the infringe- ment was continuous dispute (67) Usinor states in its reply to the statement of objec- tions of 23 April 1997 that the increase in one cost-component is a single, temporary occurrence, that contacts between the producers did not continue after January 1994 and that therefore the infringement cannot be described as being con- tinuous. (68) Avesta points out that it announced the introduc- tion of a new method in November 1996. (69) the infringement Thyssen Stahl AG claims that ended no later than July 1994, when nickel reached the earlier reference values. AST considers that the infringement was an isolated measure and that it ended in June 1994. (70) Only Avesta’s argument can be accepted, as the introduction of its new system had the effect of ending the application of the contested measure. The infringement consisted in a concerted revision the reference values for the alloy surcharge, of values which been not reamended independently by the undertakings concerned. The fact that nickel reached its former reference values in July 1994 is irrelevant, as the surcharge applied by the undertakings was neces- sarily higher than if the reference values had not been altered. subsequently have 1. Applicability of Article 65(5) (73) to Article 65(5) Pursuant the Commission may impose fines or periodic penalty payments on any undertaking which has entered into an agreement which is automatically void, or has enforced or attempted to enforce an agreement or decision which is automatically void, or has engaged in practices prohibited by paragraph 1 of that Article. The Commission may impose fines or periodic penalty payments not exceeding twice the turnover on the products which were the subject of the agreement, decision or practice prohibited by Article 65(1); if, however, the purpose of the agree- ment, decision or practice is to restrict production, this technical maximum may be raised to 10 % of the annual turnover of the undertakings in question in the case of fines, and 20 % of the daily turnover in the case of periodic penalty payments. development investment, or 2. Gravity of the infringement (74) An agreement or concerted practice aimed at a uniform increase of a cost component constitutes a serious infringement of Community law. The undertakings justify the decision on the grounds of the critical economic situation into which the combined effect of the rise in the price of alloys and fall in the price of stainless steel had plunged them. The Commission does not dispute the right of each undertaking to adopt, independently, it cannot, measures to deal with the situation; however, accept concerted action by virtually all the producers of to the content of such measures. flat products as stainless L 100/66 ‹ EN ‹ Official Journal of the European Communities 1. 4. 98 (75) In view of the blatant nature of the infringement, symbolic fines would not be appropriate. However, taking account of the economic and legal elements referred to above and the relative gravity of the infringement, the Commission does not consider that the infringement that is the subject of this Decision merits very substantial fines. (76) For these reasons the amount of the fine imposed to reflect the gravity of the infringement is set at ECU 4 million. onwards, it made the surcharge public only in May 1994 (54), with a view to applying it on its principal market (Spain) in June. (83) On the other hand, the economic situation in the sector at the end of 1993 was particularly critical. The price of nickel was rising rapidly, while the price of stainless steel was very low. It should be noted that this particular situation applies only to the very beginning of the concerted action. (77) All the undertakings referred to in this Decision are large. It is not necessary, therefore, to vary the amounts of the fines on that score. (84) These factors justify a reduction in the basic amount of 30 % for Acerinox and 10 % for all the other undertakings on the grounds of attenuating circumstances. (78) (79) (80) (81) 3. Duration of the infringement The Commission considers (in spite of the views it sets out in paragraph 50) that the concerted action began with the meeting in Madrid in December 1993 and has been pursued since then by all the undertakings concerned, with the exception of Avesta Sheffield, which announced in November 1996 that it intended to use another calculation method, and Thyssen Stahl AG, which withdrew from the stainless flat products sector on 1 January 1995. The amount imposed to take account of the gravity of the infringement should therefore be increased by ECU 1,6 million in the case of Acerinox, ALZ, AST, Krupp Hoesch Stahl and Usinor. Increases of ECU 0,4 million and ECU 1,2 million respectively are applied to Thyssen and Avesta. The basic amounts are therefore set at ECU 5,6 million for Acerinox, ALZ, AST, Krupp and Usinor, at ECU 5,2 million for Avesta and at ECU 4,4 million for Thyssen. 4. Aggravating or extenuating circumstances The Commission considers that Usinor played a major part in the concerted action: it was Usinor that did the calculations at the Madrid meeting and sent the conclusions of the meeting and the defin- the alloy surcharge to the itive calculation of producers after the meeting (53). This justifies an increase of 25 % in the basic amount for Usinor on the grounds of aggravating circumstances. (85) (86) (87) (88) 5. Applicability of the Commission notice on the non-imposition or reduction of fines in cartel cases (55) In their replies to the statement of objections of 19 December 1995, the undertakings concerned by this Decision did not deny the existence of a single method for the calculation of the alloy surcharge by the various European producers. The investigations carried out between July 1995 and December 1996 were aimed at determining any contacts between the undertakings prior to the modification of the surcharge reference values in 1994. Some of the undertakings categorically denied that any communication had taken place at all. In a statement made during the inspection on 25 September 1996, Acerinox said: ‘No recibieron informaci(cid:155)n’. (56). Following the inspection on 8 October 1996, Krupp and Thyssen stated in a letter dated 23 October 1996 that they had notified their decision only after 17 January 1994 (the same date on which they notified the surcharge to the Commis- sion) and had received information from their competitors only after the latter had notified their price lists to the Commission (57). (89) Ugine refused, during the inspection on 17 July 1996, to inform the Commission whether it had notified its competitors of its plans with regard to a surcharge (58). (82) The Commission also recognises that while Acerinox organised the Madrid meeting and applied the surcharge in Denmark from February (90) Other undertakings partially confirmed informa- tion already in the possession of the Commission. In reply to a request for information, ALZ stated: 1. 4. 98 ‹ EN ‹ Official Journal of the European Communities L 100/67 ‘ALZ herinnert zich niet in de periode van 1 augustus 1993 tot 1 februari 1994 inlichtingen ontvangen te hebben van andere producenten van roestvrij staal met betrekking tot de wijziging van (. ) de drempelwaarden van de legeringstoeslag. ALZ heeft vervolgens, rond 15 januari, aan de andere marktdeelnemers, d. w. z. cli(cid:137)nten, produ- centen en agenten, meegedeeld dat het voornemens was een legeringstoeslag bekend te maken voor leveringen vanaf 1 februari 1994’ (59). (97) Only Usinor and Avesta acknowledged the exis- tence of the concerted action. In addition, Avesta undertook, at the inspection on 18 October 1996, to examine its files carefully in order to trace any possible contacts. Some documentary evidence of such contacts was sent to the Commission on 31 October 1996. Avesta is the only undertaking to have put an end to the infringement by radically changing its method of calculating the alloy surcharge, thereby taking a major commercial risk. Usinor was the first to inform the Commission of the Madrid meeting. (91) AST stated in a letter of 31 October 1996: ‘L’AST precisa comunque di avere sentito dire che (cid:138) stato rinvenuto dalla Commissione il testo di un documento che l’AST avrebbe a sua volta successi- vamente ritrasmesso alla Outokumpu’ (60). (98) The statements and the replies to the objections submitted by Krupp-Thyssen-Nirosta GmbH, Thyssen Stahl AG, AST SpA and ALZ NV do not contribute anything new and dispute the existence of concerted action. (92) In December 1996 and January 1997, following Commission inspections at the offices of six of the addressees of this Decision, as well as Outokumpu and Edelstahl Witten Krefeld, the legal represent- atives of ALZ, AST, Avesta, Krupp-Thyssen and Usinor Sacilor and the representatives of Acerinox informed the Commission of their desire to co- operate in the current proceedings. Statements acknowledging the facts were sent to the Commis- sion by those undertakings on 17 December 1996 (Acerinox, ALZ, Avesta, Krupp and Thyssen, Usinor Sacilor) and on 10 January 1997 (AST). (93) The cooperation must be assessed in the light of the criteria laid down in the abovementioned Commission notice on the non-imposition or reduction of fines in cartel cases. (94) None of the undertakings qualifies for the condi- tions set out in the notice under Section B ‘Non- imposition of a fine or a very substantial reduction in its amount’ as none of them reported the agree- ment to the Commission before it started its invest- igations or, indeed, before it sent the statement of objections on 19 December 1995. (95) Nor do any of the undertakings qualify for the conditions set out in Section C ‘Substantial reduc- tion in a fine’. Only Avesta ended the infringement on 1 November 1996, but it was not the first to supply decisive evidence of the existence of the agreement. Such evidence was supplied in par- ticular by Outokumpu at the inspection on 17 October 1996. (96) All the undertakings may benefit to varying degrees from the provisions of Section D ‘Significant reduc- tion in a fine’. (99) Acerinox for its part acknowledges in its reply of 24 April 1997 to the statement of objections that concerted action was taken, but denied its involve- ment. (100) Thus, although certain undertakings (Usinor and the Commission Avesta) cooperated extensively, must also bear in mind that they did so extremely late. The cooperation shown by the other under- takings (Krupp, Thyssen, AST, ALZ and Acerinox) was more limited: the firms did not provide any documentary evidence or facts not already in the possession of the Commission and did not acknow- ledge the infringement. (101) This justifies a reduction of 10 % in the amount of the fine for all the undertakings except Avesta and Usinor, to which a reduction of 40 % is applied. 6. Particular GmbH case of Krupp Thyssen Nirosta (102) By letter dated 23 July 1997, Krupp Thyssen Nirosta GmbH stated that it was assuming liability for the acts of Thyssen Stahl AG and Krupp Hoesch Stahl AG since 1993. The enacting part of this Decision takes that into account. C. Non-applicability of Article 65(2) (103) Under Article 65(2), the Commission authorises specialisation agreements; or joint-buying or joint- selling agreements; or agreements strictly analogous in nature and effect provided that they meet certain conditions. On the supposition that there was a for authorisation formal agreement, no request L 100/68 ‹ EN ‹ Official Journal of the European Communities 1. 4. 98 within the meaning of Article 65 of the ECSC Treaty was made. In any event, such an agreement is not such as to belong to the categories that might qualify for authorisation. On the contrary, the Commission takes the view that such an agree- ment constitutes an agreement to fix or determine prices within the meaning of Article 65(1) of the ECSC Treaty, HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION: Article 1 Acerinox SA, ALZ NV, Acciai Speciali Terni SpA, Avesta Sheffield AB, Krupp Hoesch Stahl AG (Krupp Thyssen Nirosta GmbH as from 1 January 1995), Thyssen Stahl AG (Krupp Thyssen Nirosta GmbH as from 1 January 1995) and Ugine SA infringed Article 65(1) of the ECSC Treaty, in the case of Avesta Sheffield from December 1993 to November 1996 and, in the case of the other undertakings, up to the date of this Decision, namely by modifying and by applying in a concerted fashion the reference values used to calculate the alloy surcharge, such practice having both the object and the effect of restric- ting and distorting competition within the common market. Article 2 The following fines are hereby imposed in respect of the infringements described in Article 1: — Acerinox SA: — ALZ NV: — Acciai Speciali Terni SpA: — Avesta Sheffield AB: ECU 3 530 000 ECU 4 540 000 ECU 4 540 000 ECU 2 810 000 — Krupp Thyssen Nirosta GmbH: ECU 8 100 000 — Usinor SA: ECU 3 860 000 Article 3 The fines referred to in Article 2 shall be paid to the Commission of the European Communities within three months of the date of notification of this Decision to the following account numbers. Address Germany Dresdner Bank AG (BLZ 300 800 00) D(cid:129)sseldorf Belgium Soci(cid:130)t(cid:130) G(cid:130)n(cid:130)rale de Banque SA 3, Montagne du Parc B-1000 Bruxelles Spain Banco Espa ˜nol de Cr(cid:130)dito Calle Mesena, 80 E-28033 Madrid France Soci(cid:130)t(cid:130) G(cid:130)n(cid:130)rale Agence Centrale F-75428 Paris Cedex 09 Italy Banca Commerciale Italiana I-20121 Milan Sweden Nordbanken H68 S-105 71 Stockholm Account number for National currency ECU 2 114 628 2 114 628 00 210-0000107-62 210-0000107-62 137. 003-270 394. 002-278 30003-03010-00067030000/22 30003-03010-00077001001/73 961794/02/09 961794/49/56 3959 77 084 85 3968 77 4 76 76 1. 4. 98 ‹ EN ‹ Official Journal of the European Communities L 100/69 Upon expiry of that period, interest shall automatically be payable on the fines at the rate charged by the European Monetary Institute for transactions in ecus on the first working day of the month in which this Decision is adopted, plus 3,5 percentage points, namely 7,75 %. Article 4 Acerinox SA, ALZ NV, Acciai Speciali Terni SpA, Krupp Thyssen Nirosta GmbH and Usinor SA shall immediately put an end to the infringements referred to in Article 1 and shall inform the Commission within three months of being notified of this Decision of the measures they have taken to that end. The undertakings referred to in Article 1 shall refrain from repeating the acts or conduct specified in the said Article and from adopting any measure having an equi- valent effect. Article 5 This Decision is addressed to: 1. Acerinox SA, Santiago de Compostela 100, E-28035 Madrid; 2. ALZ NV, Industrieterrein Genk-Zuid Rechteroever, B-3600 Genk; 3. Acciai Speciali Terni SpA, Viale B. Brin 218, I-05100 Terni; 4. Avesta Sheffield AB, Vasagatan 8-10 P. O. Box 16377, S-10327 Stockholm; 5. Krupp Thyssen Nirosta GmbH, Alleestraße 165, D-44793 Bochum; 6. Usinor SA, La D(cid:130)fense 7, 13 Cours Valmy, F-92800 Puteaux. This Decision is enforceable pursuant to Article 92 of the Treaty. Done at Brussels, 21 January 1998. For the Commission Karel VAN MIERT Member of the Commission NOTES (1) Commission Decision 95/421/EC of 21 December 1994 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market IV/M. 484 — Krupp/Thyssen/Riva/Falck/ Tadfin/AST) (OJ L 251, 19. 10. 1995, p. 18). (Case (2) See footnote 1. (3) Commission Decision of 26 July 1994 authorising Fried. Krupp AG Hoesch-Krupp and Thyssen Stahl AG to set up a joint venture for the production of flat special stainless steel products that are resistant to acids and high temperatures. (4) See for example the statement by Acerinox dated 17 December 1996: ‘La f(cid:155)rmula en su estado actual viene apli- c ´andose desde el a ˜no 1988. ’ (‘The current formula has been applied since 1988. ’) or the statement by AST of 10 January 1997: ‘(. ) la Ilva SpA (che comprendeva la allora Divisione Acciai Speciali che, dopo la scissione del 1994 (cid:138) divenuta la AST) applicava l’extra di lega gi(cid:133) nel 1988’. (‘(. ) Ilva SpA (which then included the “special steels” division which, after the split in 1994, became AST) was already applying the alloy surcharge in 1988’). (5) Commission Decision 90/417/ECSC of 18 July 1990 relating to a proceeding under Article 65 of the ECSC Treaty con- cerning an agreement and concerted practices engaged in by European producers of cold-rolled stainless steel flat products (OJ L 220, 15. 8. 1990, p. 28). (6) Statement by Acerinox (see note 4): ‘Acerinox SA conforme lo muestran los hechos que posteriormente acontecieron, no promovi(cid:155) dicha reuni(cid:155)n, aunque si, una vez decidida por las partes su convocatoria en Madrid, a petici(cid:155)n de los asistentes, reserv(cid:155) un establecimiento para que la misma pudiera tener lugar. ’ (‘As subsequent events proved, Acerinox SA was not the initiator of this meeting even if, after the participants decided to meet in Madrid, and at their request, it booked a venue for that purpose’). (7) ‘A meeting was held in Madrid on 15 December 1993. The decision to hold the meeting was taken by the parties in order to discuss (. ) the critical situation in the market for the raw materials used in the production of stainless steel and the extreme volatility of the prices of these raw materials. ’ (8) Original version. (9) ‘The discussion concerned the generally poor situation as well as possible solutions. ’ (10) (11) ‘A meeting took place on 16 December 1993 at the Hotel [. ] in Madrid which allowed stainless steel producers to hold an exchange of views. ’ ‘In this context, and in order to find a solution to this crisis, a meeting was held between the leading European steel produ- cers’. (12) Acerinox statement: ‘El Sr Laquay expuso c(cid:155)mo se hab(cid:146)a apli- cado hist(cid:155)ricamente el extra de aleaci(cid:155)n’. (‘Mr Laquay explained how the alloy surcharge had been applied in the past’). (13) ‘Mr Laquay, as a specialist in calculating the alloy surcharge, calculated, with the aid of a flip chart and taking as example the prices applied by his undertaking in France, the addi- tional turnover that could be achieved by appropriately al- tering the trigger threshold on the French market’. L 100/70 ‹ EN ‹ Official Journal of the European Communities 1. 4. 98 (14) ‘At the meeting, the participants also examined whether it was necessary, in view of the instability of raw material prices, a market in which Acerinox has no influence, to apply the alloy surcharge to customers using the tried and tested method by means of the most appropriate reference values so as to counter the increasingly speculative nature of trans- actions on the London Metals Exchange. ’ bases and results based on the method it intended to use on the French domestic or European markets in the event of non-alignment’. (26) ‘Outokumpu a (cid:130)t(cid:130) inform(cid:130)e par t(cid:130)l(cid:130)copie des conclusions de la r(cid:130)union de Madrid de 20. 12. 1993’ (‘Outokumpu was informed by fax of the conclusions of the Madrid meeting on 20. 12. 1993’). (15) ‘At the meeting, participants discussed the initiatives they intended to take in this area, and those they had taken quite independently before (at least as regards AST). There was a natural convergence of views on the adoption, as a minimum level in the context of this formula, of the September 1993 nickel price. ’ (27) ‘The lack of direct knowledge of the details does not however make it possible to deny categorically that there were the apparent exchanges of content of these messages, it is likewise impossible to state that they did not influence AST in determining the values used in the method. ’ (. ) In view of information. (16) Original version. (17) ‘Under the circumstances, the only possible solution to halt the trend is to try to reintroduce the alloy surcharge, which had been suspended owing to the fall in prices for alloys below the trigger level applied till then (. ) At the meeting, Mr Pl(cid:148)macher then stated that Krupp would in future take the low September posted price for nickel as the trigger threshold. ’ (18) ‘During the meeting, certain participants, including Ugine, expressed their intention, with or without reservations, to reapply the alloy surcharge together with a new trigger threshold (the lowest nickel price in September) as from 1 February 1994. ’ (19) Original version. (20) Original version. (21) ‘A majority of those present was in favour of applying the surcharge as soon as possible. ’ (22) ‘Acerinox said it did not plan to apply the surcharge in Spain because it considered the measure would not help to increase demand and would not have a positive effect on Spanish industry which was in the depths of a severe crisis. ’ (23) Fax obtained at Outokumpu’s offices during the inspection on 17 October 1996. (24) Original version. (28) OJ 18 of the ECSC, 1. 8. 1954, p. 470. (29) OJ L 221, 7. 8. 1986, p. 14. (30) Avesta statement — Attachment 1: ‘Alloy surcharges are likely to be introduced on CR and CPP products from 1 February. The details may not be available until early January 1994 when I will let you know. ’ (31) Reply given by ALZ to the request for information. (32) Avesta statement: ‘On 10 January 1994, ASAB produced a full internal surcharge calculation for application in February. This internal calculation used the same trigger values as contained in Mr Laquay’s fax of 20 December 1993. ’ (33) Document obtained from the offices of Outokumpu. (34) Original text, from the Avesta statement. (35) Original text. (36) Original text. (37) Document taken from the offices of Outokumpu. (38) Document taken from the offices of Outokumpu. (25) ‘Following the meeting, Ugine notified participants by fax on 20 December 1993 and 11 January 1994 of the calculation (39) Avesta statement. 1. 4. 98 ‹ EN ‹ Official Journal of the European Communities L 100/71 (40) Original text. (41) Original text. (42) Original text. (43) Original text. (44) Judgment of 13 July 1972, Case 48/69 ICI v. Commission of the European Communities [1972] ECR 619. (45) Opinion 1-61 of 13 December 1961 of the Court of Justice [1961] ECR 505. (46) OJ C 75, 29. 7. 1968, p. 3. (47) ALZ, Avesta, AST, Krupp, Thyssen. (48) ALZ, AST, Krupp, Thyssen. (49) ALZ, AST, Avesta, Krupp, Thyssen, Usinor Sacilor. (50) AST, Krupp, Thyssen. (51) Commission Decision 80/257/ECSC of 8 February 1980 re- lating to a proceeding under Article 65 of the ECSC Treaty in respect of a price-fixing system for the sale of rolled steel products ex stock by stockholders on the German market (OJ L 62, 7. 3. 1980, p. 28, at paragraph 25). (60) (52) Commission Decision 94/215/ECSC of 16 February 1994 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 65 of the ECSC Treaty and concerted practices engaged in by European producers of beams (OJ L 116, 6. 5. 1994, p. 1, at paragraph 249). concerning agreements (53) See paragraphs 23, 28 and 32. (54) See paragraphs 21, 27, 33 and 37. (55) OJ C 207, 18. 7. 1996, p. 4. (56) (57) Inspection minutes — Krupp. (58) Inspection minutes — Ugine. (59) ‘We did not receive any information’. amendment of ‘ALZ does not recall having received from other stainless steel producers, between 1 August 1993 and 1 February 1994, alloy information concerning the surcharge trigger values. (. ) ALZ subsequently, towards 15 January, informed the other market operators, i. e. its cus- tomers, producers and agents, that it intended to announce the application of a new alloy surcharge from 1 February 1994. ’ ‘AST would point out, however, that it had heard that the Commission had discovered a document which AST in turn allegedly sent to Outokumpu’. the


title: SCHRIFTELIJKE VRAAG nr. 4189/97 van de leden Eolo PARODI , Guido VICECONTE aan de Commissie. Communautaire financiering van de restauratie van het Petruzzelli-theater in Bari

eurovoc_concepts:
Apulia
EU financing
Italy
Veneto
architectural heritage
cultural heritage
heritage protection
performing arts
regional development

formats: html pdf print

text: C 196/96 NL Publicatieblad van de Europese Gemeenschappen 22. 6. 98 (98/C 196/135) SCHRIFTELIJKE VRAAG E-4189/97 van Eolo Parodi (UPE) en Guido Viceconte (UPE) aan de Commissie (21 januari 1998) Betreft: Communautaire financiering van de restauratie van het Petruzzelli-theater in Bari Op 27 oktober 1991 werd het Petruzzelli-theater in Bari, dat tussen 1898 en 1903 is gebouwd, door een uitslaande brand verwoest. Dit theater dat in 1954 werd uitgeroepen tot een cultuurgoed van nationaal historisch en artistiek belang en in 1967 tot een traditionele opera, is het enige theater in Europa dat nog in particuliere handen is. Het beroemde Italiaanse theater (cid:132) La Fenice(cid:148) in Venetie¤ werd in 1996 door eenzelfde lot getroffen en volledig verwoest. Laatstgenoemd theater kreeg, terecht, op Europees niveau aanzienlijke middelen voor zijn gedeeltelijke restauratie toebedeeld. Het Petruzzelli-theater van Bari heeft echter op onverklaarbare wijze slechts 80. 000 ecu gekregen voor de gedeeltelijke restauratie van de foyer. 1. Is de bescheiden omvang van de communautaire financiering het gevolg van het feit dat het Petruzzelli- theater, in tegenstelling tot de andere Europese theaters, in particuliere handen is? 2. Vindt de Commissie het niet noodzakelijk en zeer dringend stappen te ondernemen om communautaire middelen ter beschikking te stellen voor de voltooiing van de restauratie van het Petruzzelli-theater, aangezien de familie Messeni Nemagna, de eigenares van het theater, niet over de resterende som beschikt om de laatste hand aan de restauratie te leggen? Antwoord van de heer Oreja namens de Commissie (26 februari 1998) 1. In het kader van steun aan proefprojecten ter conservering van het Europees architectonisch erfgoed voor 1994 › waarvan het onderwerp betrekking had op theaters › heeft het Petruzelli-theater te Bari, italie¤, een bijdrage van de zijde van de Commissie ontvangen van 80 000 ecu. In 1995, 1996 en 1997 heeft de Commissie, ter voorbereiding van het Raphae¤l-programma andere acties gelanceerd ter ondersteuning van de conservering vanhet architectonisch erfgoed, die gewijd waren aan diverse, als prioritair beschouwde, onderwerpen (religieuze en barokke gebouwen, versierde gevels en pre-industrie¤le architectuur). 2. In het kader van de regionale ontwikkelingsacties (Structuurfondsen) vormde de herbouw van het theater een van de interventies van maatregel 6. 3 (cid:132)recuperatie van cultuurgoederen(cid:148) van het door de structuurfondsen medegefinancierde operationele programma ten behoeve van de regio Puglia voor de periode 1994-1999. Volgens van de Italiaanse autoriteiten ontvangen inlichtingen is op grond daarvan een verzoek om financiering ingediend, maar is dit in deze fase niet door de Italiaanse regionale autoriteiten ontvankelijk verklaard omdat niet was voldaan aan bepaalde vastgestelde voorwaarden om voor steun in aanmerking te kunnen komen. Aangezien het hier om particulier bezit gaat, hoewel het van algemeen belang is en winst oplevert, moet, overeenkomstig de reglementaire bepalingen, het niveau van de voorziene medefinanciering beperkt blijven tot een percentage van de voor steun in aanmerking komende kosten. (98/C 196/136) SCHRIFTELIJKE VRAAG E-4190/97 van Ernesto Caccavale (UPE) aan de Commissie (21 januari 1998) Betreft: Elektriciteitsleidingen en magnetische velden: gezondheidsrisico(cid:146)s Milieu-organisaties van Europees belang, zoals CODACONS en LEGAMBIENTE, protesteren met klem tegen de verklaringen van Enel, die een monopoliepositie heeft in de elektriciteitsdistributie in Italie¤, over de bouw van een grote elektriciteitscentrale in Striano


title: INTERROGAZIONE SCRITTA n. 4134/97 dell'on. Konstantinos HATZIDAKIS alla Commissione. Chiarimenti in merito alla direttiva 96/92/CE

eurovoc_concepts:
GATT
World Trade Organisation
electrical energy
energy production
invitation to tender
liberalisation of the market
natural gas
restriction on competition
single market
supplies contract

formats: html print


title: SCHRIFTLICHE ANFRAGE Nr. 4200/97 von José GARCÍA-MARGALLO Y MARFIL an die Kommission. Agenda 2000 und Ziel 1: Arbeitslose Bevölkerung 1993-1997

eurovoc_concepts:
EU aid
EU regional policy
European Investment Bank
Eurostat
Structural Funds
gross domestic product
regional aid
regional statistics
terms for aid

text: 21. 10. 98 DE Amtsblatt der Europa¤ischen Gemeinschaften C 323/15 (98/C 323/19) SCHRIFTLICHE ANFRAGE E-4200/97 von Jose· Garc(cid:14)·a-Margallo y Marfil (PPE) an die Kommission (21. Januar 1998) Betrifft: Agenda 2000 und Ziel 1: Arbeitslose Bevo¤lkerung 1993-1997 Der Generaldirektor fu¤r Regionalpolitik und Koha¤sion, Eneko Landa·buru, zog Ende November vor der Presse in Erwa¤gung, elf europa¤ische Regionen, darunter Valencia (Spanien) aus den Ziel-1-Regionen herauszunehmen, und zwar in U¤ bereinstimmung mit den Vorschla¤gen der Kommission zur Ku¤rzung der Mittel der Strukturfonds im Hinblick auf den Beitritt neuer La¤nder. Diese Scha¤tzung erfolgte auf der Grundlage vorla¤ufiger Daten, u¤ber die die Kommission verfu¤gt. Nichtsdestot- rotz geht aus den offiziellen Statistiken von Eurostat fu¤r den konkreten Fall Valencia hervor, da(cid:223) das Pro-Kopf-BIP dieser autonomen Region 1993 74,9% des Gemeinschaftsdurchschnitts betrug und 1994 noch niedriger war, na¤mlich 73,6%. Der Schwellenwert, um unter das Ziel 1 zu fallen, liegt bei 75%, weshalb nichts darauf hindeutet, da(cid:223) Valencia in unmittelbarer Zukunft die objektiven Bedingungen nicht mehr erfu¤llen wird. Sollte das durchschnittliche Einkommen wa¤hrend des Zeitraums 1993-1997 als Kriterium dienen, um das BIP zu berechnen, ist es wichtig, die makroo¤konomischen Daten dieser Regionen in jedem einzelnen der in Betracht kommenden Jahre zu kennen. Wie hoch war in den Jahren 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996 und 1997 der Anteil der arbeitslosen Bevo¤lkerung an der Gesamtbevo¤lkerung in den unten aufgefu¤hrten Regionen? A¤ tolien, Mazedonien, Thessalien, Kreta, Peloponnes, Zentralgriechenland, Epirus, Attika, Ionische Inseln, Achaia, griechisches Festland (Griechenland) Hennegau (Belgien) Thu¤ringen, Brandenburg, Ostberlin, Sachsen-Anhalt, Sachsen, Mu¤nster (Deutschland) Galicien, Estremadura, Kastilien-La Mancha, Kastilien und Leo·n, Ceuta und Melilla, Valencia, Asturien, Andalusien, Kanarische Inseln, Murcia (Spanien) Valenciennes, Avesnes, Douai, Korsika, u¤berseeische Departements (Frankreich) Ulster, Connauaught, Leinster (Irland) Molise, Apulien, Sizilien, Basilikata, Sardinien, Kalabrien, Kampanien (Italien) Flevoland (Niederlande) Burgenland (O¤ sterreich) Nordportugal, Alentejo, Algarve, Lissabon, Vale do Tejo, Zentrum (Portugal) Islands Enterprise, Highlands, Merseyside, Nordirland (Vereinigtes Ko¤nigreich) (98/C 323/20) SCHRIFTLICHE ANFRAGE E-4201/97 von Jose· Garc(cid:14)·a-Margallo y Marfil (PPE) an die Kommission (21. Januar 1998) Betrifft: Agenda 2000 und Ziel 1: Durchschnittliches Einkommen 1993-1997 Der Generaldirektor fu¤r Regionalpolitik und Koha¤sion, Eneko Landa·buru, zog Ende November vor der Presse in Erwa¤gung, elf europa¤ische Regionen, darunter Valencia (Spanien) aus den Ziel-1-Regionen herauszunehmen, und zwar in U¤ bereinstimmung mit den Vorschla¤gen der Kommission zur Ku¤rzung der Mittel der Strukturfonds im Hinblick auf den Beitritt neuer La¤nder. Diese Scha¤tzung erfolgte auf der Grundlage vorla¤ufiger Daten, u¤ber die die Kommission verfu¤gt. Nichtsdestot- rotz geht aus den offiziellen Statistiken von Eurostat fu¤r den konkreten Fall Valencia hervor, da(cid:223) das Pro-Kopf-BIP dieser autonomen Region 1993 74,9% des Gemeinschaftsdurchschnitts betrug und 1994 noch niedriger war, na¤mlich 73,6%. Der Schwellenwert, um unter das Ziel 1 zu fallen, liegt bei 75%, weshalb nichts darauf hindeutet, da(cid:223) Valencia in unmittelbarer Zukunft die objektiven Bedingungen nicht mehr erfu¤llen wird. Sollte das durchschnittliche Einkommen wa¤hrend des Zeitraums 1993-1997 als Kriterium dienen, um das BIP zu berechnen, ist es wichtig, die makroo¤konomischen Daten dieser Regionen in jedem einzelnen der in Betracht kommenden Jahre zu kennen


title: PERGUNTA ESCRITA n. 4159/97 do Deputado Leonie van BLADEL à Comissão. Projecto TACIS não realizado na Rússia

eurovoc_concepts:
EU aid
EU programme
Netherlands
Russia
building subsidy
financial aid
supermarket
technical cooperation

text: 17. 7. 98 PT Jornal Oficial das Comunidades Europeias C 223/65 No quadro das ac(cid:231)o(cid:152)es lan(cid:231)adas pela Comissa(cid:152)o apo·s ter tomado conhecimento dos factos evocados pelos Senhores Deputados, foi enviada a‘s autoridades espanholas uma carta solicitando informa(cid:231)o(cid:152)es complementares. Em resposta a este pedido de informa(cid:231)o(cid:152)es, as autoridades espanholas indicaram com o projecto em questa(cid:152)o tinha sido sujeito a um processo de avalia(cid:231)a(cid:152)o de impacte ambiental no quadro do qual tinha sido recolhida a opinia(cid:152)o pu·blica. Na seque(cid:136)ncia da consulta do pu·blico, foram solicitados ao dono da obra estudos complementares relativos nomeadamente a‘ hidrogeologia, utiliza(cid:231)a(cid:152)o de produtos fitossanita·rios e efeitos sobre a fauna. Segundo as autoridades espanholas, estes estudos bem como outros relato·rios de que a Comunidade Auto·noma dispo(cid:152)e, demostram que o projecto em questa(cid:152)o na(cid:152)o exercera· repercusso(cid:152)es negativas sobre as aves que esta(cid:152)o na origem da designa(cid:231)a(cid:152)o da zona como ZPE. Com base nestas informa(cid:231)o(cid:152)es, a Comissa(cid:152)o na(cid:152)o apurou a existe(cid:136)ncia de uma infrac(cid:231)a(cid:152)o das obriga(cid:231)o(cid:152)es resultantes da Directiva 92/43/CEE supramencionada. (1) JO L 103 de 25. 4. 1979. (98/C 223/78) PERGUNTA ESCRITA E-4159/97 apresentada por Leonie van Bladel (UPE) a‘ Comissa(cid:152)o (21 de Janeiro de 1998) Objecto: Projecto TACIS na(cid:152)o realizado na Ru·ssia 1. O Estado neerlande(cid:136)s e o seu consultor, a Koninklijke Ahold NV, foram, em 4 de Dezembro de 1997, processados pelo seu parceiro russo, Tonar, que reclama uma indemniza(cid:231)a(cid:152)o de nove milho(cid:152)es de florins em virtude da cessa(cid:231)a(cid:152)o abusiva de um programa de ajuda TACIS (TAGOS) lan(cid:231)ado pela UE. O aco·rda(cid:152)o do Tribunal de Amsterda(cid:152)o considera ilegal a cessa(cid:231)a(cid:152)o do programa de aux(cid:14)·lio. Tanto o Estado neerlande(cid:136)s como a Koninklijke Ahold NV se recusam a resolver de forma correcta a questa(cid:152)o da indemniza(cid:231)a(cid:152)o, obrigando, assim, o seu parceiro russo a um processo oneroso, inu·til e moroso. A Comissa(cid:152)o tem conscie(cid:136)ncia de que o processo, que se espera venha a durar va·rios anos, tera·, independentemente do seu resultado positivo ou negativo para o queixoso, efeito nefasto sobre futuros programas de subven(cid:231)a(cid:152)o e sobre a confian(cid:231)a mu·tua e a estabilidade das rela(cid:231)o(cid:152)es com a Europa Oriental? A Comissa(cid:152)o na(cid:152)o considera que se trata de uma grosseira neglige(cid:136)ncia por parte da Koninklijke Ahold NV, que a decisa(cid:152)o do Tribunal de Amsterda(cid:152)o considerou obrigada ao pagamento de uma indemniza(cid:231)a(cid:152)o, bem como por parte do Estado neerlande(cid:136)s, que recusa qualquer forma de concerta(cid:231)a(cid:152)o razoa·vel com a parte lesada › no caso em apre(cid:231)o, o parceiro russo Tonar? 2. No estudo encomendado pela UE e efectuado pela Koninklijke Ahold NV demonstra-se que a instala(cid:231)a(cid:152)o de uma unidade de come·rcio grossista de produtos alimentares ou, eventualmente, de um centro de distribui(cid:231)a(cid:152)o, se reveste de um interesse extremamente priorita·rio. A Koninklijke Ahold NV registou esta conclusa(cid:152)o como prioridade no seu relato·rio de Agosto de 1992. A Comissa(cid:152)o na(cid:152)o considera estranho que o pa(cid:14)·s que fornece a ajuda › neste caso, os Pa(cid:14)·ses Baixos › no quadro do programa de ajuda TACIS recuse dar satisfa(cid:231)a(cid:152)o aos principais desejos do pa(cid:14)·s que recebe a ajuda › neste caso, a Ru·ssia › e que os compromissos ja· conclu(cid:14)·dos pelos Pa(cid:14)·ses Baixos com os russos na(cid:152)o sejam devidamente respeitados, mesmo depois de se ter provado que os russos aceitaram plenamente todas as condi(cid:231)o(cid:152)es que lhes foram impostas pela Unia(cid:152)o Europeia e pelo Ministe·rio neerlande(cid:136)s dos Assuntos Econo·micos? Resposta de H. Van den Broek em nome da Comissa(cid:152)o (4 de Fevereiro de 1998) A Comissa(cid:152)o remete o Senhor Deputado para a resposta a‘ sua pergunta escrita E-3887/97 (1). O projecto mencionado pelo Senhor Deputado, que e· objecto de um lit(cid:14)·gio entre a parte russa e a parte neerlandesa, foi financiado pelo governo neerlande(cid:136)s. Uma vez que na(cid:152)o implicou qualquer financiamento Tacis, a Comissa(cid:152)o na(cid:152)o pode intervir na mate·ria. A Comissa(cid:152)o procura assegurar uma sinergia entre o Tacis e os programas de assiste(cid:136)ncia te·cnica dos Estados-membros. No entanto, tal na(cid:152)o significa que a Comissa(cid:152)o possa influenciar a execu(cid:231)a(cid:152)o ou impor condi(cid:231)o(cid:152)es relativamente aos programas dos Estados-membros, como sugere a pergunta. (1) Ver p. 30


title: SCHRIFTLICHE ANFRAGE Nr. 4227/97 von Maartje van PUTTEN an die Kommission. Evaluierungsbericht über die Mönchsrobbe im Mittelmeerraum im Ostatlantik

eurovoc_concepts:
Atlantic Ocean
EU programme
Mediterranean Sea
dissemination of EU information
marine mammal
project evaluation
protection of animal life
research report

text: C 223/76 DE Amtsblatt der Europa¤ischen Gemeinschaften 17. 7. 98 (98/C 223/94) SCHRIFTLICHE ANFRAGE E-4227/97 von Maartje van Putten (PSE) an die Kommission (21. Januar 1998) Betrifft: Evaluierungsbericht u¤ber die Mo¤nchsrobbe im Mittelmeerraum im Ostatlantik Die Kommission hat im Rahmen des LIFE-Programms verschiedene Untersuchungen der Mitgliedstaaten u¤ber die Mo¤nchsrobbe finanziert. Diese Untersuchungen erfolgten sowohl im Mittelmeerraum als auch im Ostatlantik. Anschlie(cid:223)end hat die Kommission eine Evaluierung dieser im Rahmen des LIFE-Programms finanzierten Untersuchungen durchgefu¤hrt. Der Evaluierungsbericht ist bis heute noch nicht vero¤ffentlicht. Kann die Kommission › auch im Hinblick auf den Grundsatz der Transparenz in der Verwaltung › 1. mitteilen, warum sie diesen Evaluierungsbericht noch nicht vero¤ffentlicht hat? 2. Kann sie mitteilen, wann sie diesen Evaluierungsbericht doch noch zu vero¤ffentlichen gedenkt? Antwort von Frau Bjerregaard im Namen der Kommission (27. Februar 1998) In dem Bericht, auf den sich die Frau Abgeordnete bezieht, werden keine Forschungsprojekte bewertet, sondern die Ergebnisse einer Rechnungspru¤fung und technischen Kontrolle von GANAT- und LIFE-Projekten wiedergegeben. Diese Pru¤fung zielte darauf ab, den Nutzen der aus Gemeinschaftsmitteln finanzierten Projekte zu untersuchen. Obwohl es sich um einen internen Bericht zur Verbesserung der Abwicklung und Verwaltung der LIFE-Projekte handelt, hat die Kommission auf Anfrage jeder interessierten Person eine Kopie der Schlu(cid:223)folgerungen u¤bermittelt. Abgeordnete, die ihr Interesse an den Schlu(cid:223)folgerungen bekundet hatten, haben diese bereits erhalten. Auch der Frau Abgeordneten und dem Generalsekretariat des Parlaments wurde direkt eine Kopie zugesandt. (98/C 223/95) SCHRIFTLICHE ANFRAGE E-4228/97 von Ian White (PSE) an den Rat (22. Januar 1998) Betrifft: Altersgrenze fu¤r Stellenbewerbungen Wie rechtfertigt es der Rat, da(cid:223), laut einer Anzeige im britischen Sunday Telegraph vom 30. November 1997, Bewerber fu¤r die Stelle eines U¤ bersetzers englischer Muttersprache nach dem 31. Dezember 1961 geboren sein mu¤ssen? Antwort (11. Mai 1998) Der Herr Abgeordnete wird zuna¤chst auf Artikel 1 des das Auswahlverfahren betreffenden Anhangs III des Statuts, der die Entscheidung u¤ber das Ho¤chstalter fu¤r die Einstellung von Beamten eindeutig der Anstellungs- beho¤rde u¤berla¤(cid:223)t, sowie auf die Rechtsprechung in dieser Frage hingewiesen, der zufolge (cid:132)die Anstellungsbe- ho¤rde u¤ber ein weites Ermessen bei der Aufstellung der Teilnahmebedingungen fu¤r ein Auswahlverfahren verfu¤gt(cid:147) (1). Es ist vielleicht ganz generell nu¤tzlich, die Vorgeschichte des von dem Herrn Abgeordneten angesprochenen Themas in Erinnerung zu rufen. Zu Beginn der neunziger Jahre haben sich die zusta¤ndigen parita¤tischen Gremien mit der Frage befa(cid:223)t, ob das Alter als Auswahlkriterium eine Rolle spielen soll. Zu dieser Zeit wurde u¤berwiegend zugunsten der Aufhebung jeder Altersgrenze pla¤diert, um insbesondere Mu¤ttern, die ihre Arbeit unterbrochen hatten, die Wiedereinglie- derung ins Arbeitsleben zu ermo¤glichen


title: WRITTEN QUESTION No. 4145/97 by Antoinette SPAAK to the Commission. Transcription of Directive 94/80/EC by Member States

eurovoc_concepts:
Belgium
EU law - national law
France
local election
national implementing measure
nationality
residence
right to stand for election
right to vote

text: C 196/86 FI Euroopan yhteiso¤jen virallinen lehti 22. 6. 98 Komission ja¤senen Edith Cressonin komission puolesta antama vastaus (5. maaliskuuta 1998) Vuonna 1997 Comenius-ohjelmalle myo¤nnetty kokonaisbudjetti (Sokrates-ohjelman II luku 2 toimintamuoto) oli 4,8 miljoonaa ecua. Komissio on rahoittanut Comenius-ohjelman puitteissa useita romanilasten koulutukseen liittyvia¤ hankkeita: › vuonna 1997 rahoitettiin 13:a hanketta yhteensa¤ 1 036 000 eculla; na¤ihin monivuotisiin hankkeisiin osallistui la¤hes 120 yhteistyo¤kumppania, › vuonna 1996 rahoitettiin 27:a¤a¤ hanketta yhteensa¤ 1 119 625 eculla, › vuonna 1995 rahoitettiin 44:a¤a¤ hanketta yhteensa¤ 1 173 728 eculla. Kansalliset koordinaattorit ehdottavat hankkeita komissiolle. Viimeksi pidetyssa¤ kansallisten koordinaattorien kokouksessa komissio kiinnitti osallistujien huomion ehdotettujen hankkeiden lukuma¤a¤ra¤a¤n. Nuorten Eurooppa -projektin yhteydessa¤ komissio on rahoittanut 11:ta¤ romaninuoriin liittyva¤a¤ hanketta yhteensa¤ 310 000 eculla. (98/C 196/120) KIRJALLINEN KYSYMYS E-4143/97 komissiolle esitta¤ja¤(t): Francisco Sanz Ferna·ndez (PSE) (21. tammikuuta 1998) Aihe: Sokrates-ohjelma Voiko komissio kertoa, miten Sokrates-ohjelmaan niputetut toimet ovat jakautuneet maittain vuonna 1997? Komission ja¤senen E· dith Cressonin komission puolesta antama vastaus (25. helmikuuta 1998) Arvoisan parlamentin ja¤senen kannattaa tutustua yhteiso¤n talousarvion rahoitusosuuksista tehtyyn Euroopan parlamentille 14. lokakuuta 1997 toimitettuun tutkimukseen. (98/C 196/121) KIRJALLINEN KYSYMYS E-4145/97 komissiolle esitta¤ja¤(t): Antoinette Spaak (ELDR) (21. tammikuuta 1998) Aihe: Direktiivin 94/80/EY saattaminen osaksi ja¤senvaltioiden kansallista lainsa¤a¤da¤nto¤a¤ Voisiko komissio tehda¤ yhteenvedon siita¤, mitka¤ ja¤senvaltiot ovat ja mitka¤ eiva¤t ole saattaneet osaksi kansallista lainsa¤a¤da¤nto¤a¤a¤n neuvoston 19 pa¤iva¤na¤ joulukuuta 1994 antamaa direktiivia¤ 94/80/EY (1) niiden unionin kansalaisten kunnallista a¤a¤nioikeutta ja vaalikelpoisuutta koskevista yksityiskohtaisista sa¤a¤nno¤ista¤, jotka asuvat ja¤senvaltiossa, jonka kansalaisia he eiva¤t ole? (1) EYVL L 368, 31. 12. 1994, s. 38


title: WRITTEN QUESTION No. 4202/97 by José GARCÍA-MARGALLO Y MARFIL to the Commission. Agenda 2000 and Objective 1: funds received 1993-1997

eurovoc_concepts:
Community of Valencia
European Regional Development Fund
Structural Funds
economic statistics
gross domestic product
investment
regional policy
regional statistics
structural policy

text: C 196/100 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning 22. 6. 98 (98/C 196/139) SKRIFTLIG FR¯GA E-4202/97 fr(cid:229)n Jose· Garc(cid:14)·a-Margallo y Marfil (PPE) till kommissionen (21 januari 1998) A¤mne: Agenda 2000 och m(cid:229)l 1: fondmedel 1993-1997 Eneko Landa·buru, generaldirekto¤r med ansvar fo¤r regional- och sammanh(cid:229)llningspolitik, lade fram ett fo¤rslag info¤r pressen i slutet av november om att elva europeiska regioner, bl. a. Valencia (Spanien), inte la¤ngre skulle utgo¤ra m(cid:229)l 1-regioner, i enlighet med kommissionens fo¤rslag att minska strukturfonderna innan de nya la¤nderna ansluter sig. Generaldirekto¤ren gjorde denna bedo¤mning p(cid:229) grundval av prelimina¤ra uppgifter som kommissionen fo¤rfogar o¤ver. Eurostats officiella statistik visar emellertid fo¤r Valencias del att denna autonoma regions BNP (cid:229)r 1993 utgjorde 74,9 % av gemenskapens genomsnittliga BNP och att procentfo¤rh(cid:229)llandet (cid:229)r 1994 var a¤nnu la¤gre, na¤mligen 73,6 %. Taket fo¤r att godka¤nnas som m(cid:229)l 1-region ligger p(cid:229) 75 %. Ingenting tyder s(cid:229)lunda p(cid:229) att Valencia omedelbart skulle falla utanfo¤r kriterierna fo¤r m(cid:229)l 1. Ifall den genomsnittliga inkomsten i regionerna under (cid:229)ren 1993-1997 utnyttjades som kriterium fo¤r att bera¤kna BNP, skulle det vara viktigt att ka¤nna till nationalekonomiska uppgifter om dessa regioner fo¤r varje (cid:229)r som beaktas. Hur stora belopp ur strukturfonderna (m(cid:229)l 1) mottog de nedan uppra¤knade regionerna (cid:229)ren 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997? Regioner: › Thrakien, Makedonien, Thessalien, Kreta, Peloponnesos, Centralgrekland, Epirus, Attika, Joniska o¤arna, Achaia, Fastlandsgrekland (Grekland) › Hainaut (Belgien) › Thu¤ringen, Brandenburg, O¤ stberlin, Sachsen-Anhalt, Sachsen, Munster (Tyskland) › Galicien, Extremadura, Kastilien-La Mancha, Kastilien-Leon, Ceuta och Melilla, Comunidad Valenciana, Asturien, Andalusien, Kanarieo¤arna, Murcia (Spanien) › Valanciennes, Avesnes, Douai, Korsika, de franska utomeuropeiska departementen (Frankrike) › Ulster, Connauaught, Leinster (Irland) › Molise, Apulien, Sicilien, Basilicata, Sardinien, Kalabrien, Kampanien (Italien) › Flevoland (Nederla¤nderna) › Burgerland (O¤ sterrike) › Nordportugal, Alentejo, Algarve, Lissabon, Vale do Tejo, Centrala Portugal (Portugal) › Enterprise Islands, Highlands, Merseyside, Nordirland (Fo¤renade kungariket) (98/C 196/140) SKRIFTLIG FR¯GA E-4203/97 fr(cid:229)n Jose· Garc(cid:14)·a-Margallo y Marfil (PPE) till kommissionen (21 januari 1998) A¤mne: Agenda 2000 och m(cid:229)l 1: investeringar 1993-1997 Eneko Landa·buru, generaldirekto¤r med ansvar fo¤r regional- och sammanh(cid:229)llningspolitik, lade fram ett fo¤rslag info¤r pressen i slutet av november om att elva europeiska regioner, bl. a. Valencia (Spanien), inte la¤ngre skulle utgo¤ra m(cid:229)l 1-regioner, i enlighet med kommissionens fo¤rslag att minska strukturfonderna innan de nya la¤nderna ansluter sig. Generaldirekto¤ren gjorde denna bedo¤mning p(cid:229) grundval av prelimina¤ra uppgifter som kommissionen fo¤rfogar o¤ver. Eurostats officiella statistik visar emellertid fo¤r Valencias del att denna autonoma regions BNP (cid:229)r 1993 utgjorde 74,9 % av gemenskapens genomsnittliga BNP och att procentfo¤rh(cid:229)llandet (cid:229)r 1994 var a¤nnu la¤gre, na¤mligen 73,6 %. Taket fo¤r att godka¤nnas som m(cid:229)l 1-region ligger p(cid:229) 75 %. Ingenting tyder s(cid:229)lunda p(cid:229) att Valencia omedelbart skulle falla utanfo¤r kriterierna fo¤r m(cid:229)l 1. Ifall den genomsnittliga inkomsten i regionerna under (cid:229)ren 1993-1997 utnyttjades som kriterium fo¤r att bera¤kna BNP, skulle det vara viktigt att ka¤nna till nationalekonomiska uppgifter om dessa regioner fo¤r varje (cid:229)r som beaktas


title: REGLAMENTO (CE) N° 145/98 DE LA COMISIÓN de 21 de enero de 1998 por el que se fijan los derechos de importación en el sector del arroz

eurovoc_concepts:
CCT duties
import
rice
third country

formats: pdf print

text: L 17/20 ‹ ES ‹ Diario Oficial de las Comunidades Europeas 22. 1. 98 REGLAMENTO (CE) No 145/98 DE LA COMISIÓN de 21 de enero de 1998 por el que se fijan los derechos de importación en el sector del arroz LA COMISIÓN DE LAS COMUNIDADES EUROPEAS, Visto el Tratado constitutivo de la Comunidad Europea, Visto el Reglamento (CE) no 3072/95 del Consejo, de 22 de diciembre de 1995, por el que se establece la organiza- ción com ´un de mercados en el sector del arroz (1), Visto el Reglamento (CE) no 1503/96 de la Comisión, de 29 de julio de 1996, por el que se establecen las disposi- ciones de aplicación del Reglamento (CE) no 3072/95 del Consejo en lo referente a los derechos de importación en el sector del arroz (2), cuya ´ultima modificación la consti- tuye el Reglamento (CE) no 1403/97 (3), y, en particular, el apartado 1 de su artículo 4, Considerando que el artículo 11 del Reglamento (CE) no 3072/95 establece la percepción de los derechos del arancel aduanero com ´un con motivo de la importación de los productos mencionados en el artículo 1 del citado Reglamento; que, no obstante, el derecho de importación para los productos indicados en el apartado 2 de dicho artículo es igual al precio de intervención v ´alido para estos productos en el momento de su importación, incre- mentado en un porcentaje seg ´un se trate de arroz descas- carillado o blanqueado, y reducido en el precio de impor- tación, siempre que el derecho no sobrepase los tipos de los derechos del arancel aduanero com ´un; Considerando que, en virtud de lo establecido en el apar- tado 3 del artículo 12 del Reglamento (CE) no 3072/95, los precios de importación cif se calculan tomando como base los precios representativos para el producto de que se trate en el mercado mundial o en el mercado comunitario de importación del producto; no 3072/95 en lo que respecta a los derechos de importa- ción en el sector del arroz; Considerando que los derechos de importación son apli- cables hasta la entrada en vigor de otros nuevos; que también permanecen vigentes si no se dispone de ninguna cotización en las fuentes de referencia a que se refiere el artículo 5 del Reglamento (CE) no 1503/96 durante las dos semanas anteriores a la siguiente fijación periódica; funcionamiento Considerando que, para permitir el normal del régimen de derechos por importación, es necesario utilizar para el c ´alculo de estos ´ultimos los tipos de mercado registrados durante un período de referencia; Considerando que la aplicación del Reglamento (CE) no 1503/96 conduce a fijar los derechos de importación conforme a los Anexos del presente Reglamento, HA ADOPTADO EL PRESENTE REGLAMENTO: Artículo 1 En el Anexo I del presente Reglamento se establecen, sobre la base de los datos recogidos en el Anexo II, los derechos de importación del sector del arroz mencionados en los apartados 1 y 2 del artículo 11 del Reglamento (CE) no 3072/95. Artículo 2 Considerando que el Reglamento (CE) no 1503/96 esta- blece las disposiciones de aplicación del Reglamento (CE) El presente Reglamento entrar ´a en vigor el 22 de enero de 1998. El presente Reglamento ser ´a obligatorio en todos sus elementos y directamente aplicable en cada Estado miembro. Hecho en Bruselas, el 21 de enero de 1998. Por la Comisión Franz FISCHLER Miembro de la Comisión (1) DO L 329 de 30. 12. 1995, p. 18. (2) DO L 189 de 30. 7. 1996, p. 71. (3) DO L 194 de 23. 7. 1997, p. 2. 22. 1. 98 ‹ ES ‹ Diario Oficial de las Comunidades Europeas L 17/21 ANEXO I del Reglamento de la Comisión, de 21 de enero de 1998, por el que se fijan los derechos de importación aplicables al arroz y al arroz partido Código NC 1006 10 21 1006 10 23 1006 10 25 1006 10 27 1006 10 92 1006 10 94 1006 10 96 1006 10 98 1006 20 11 1006 20 13 1006 20 15 1006 20 17 1006 20 92 1006 20 94 1006 20 96 1006 20 98 1006 30 21 1006 30 23 1006 30 25 1006 30 27 1006 30 42 1006 30 44 1006 30 46 1006 30 48 1006 30 61 1006 30 63 1006 30 65 1006 30 67 1006 30 92 1006 30 94 1006 30 96 1006 30 98 1006 40 00 Derecho de importación (5) (en ecus/t) Terceros países (excepto ACP y Bangladesh) (3) (7) ACP Bangladesh (1) (2) (3) (4) Basmati India y Pakist ´an (6) Egipto (8) 0,00 0,00 (7) (7) (7) (7) (7) (7) (7) (7) 324,86 324,86 324,86 225,56 324,86 324,86 324,86 225,56 (7) (7) (7) (7) (7) (7) (7) (7) (7) (7) (7) (7) (7) (7) (7) (7) (7) 130,91 130,91 130,91 130,91 130,91 130,91 130,91 130,91 158,09 158,09 158,09 108,44 158,09 158,09 158,09 108,44 251,59 251,59 251,59 251,59 251,59 251,59 251,59 251,59 251,59 251,59 251,59 251,59 251,59 251,59 251,59 251,59 78,38 202,88 202,88 202,88 202,88 202,88 202,88 202,88 202,88 243,65 243,65 243,65 169,17 243,65 243,65 243,65 169,17 399,75 399,75 399,75 399,75 399,75 399,75 399,75 399,75 399,75 399,75 399,75 399,75 399,75 399,75 399,75 399,75 123,00 (1) Sin perjuicio de la aplicación de las disposiciones contempladas en los artículos 12 y 13 del Reglamento (CEE) no 715/90 del Consejo (DO L 84 de 30. 3. 1990, p. 85), modificado. (2) Con arreglo a lo dispuesto en el Reglamento (CEE) no 715/90, los derechos de importación no se aplicar ´an a los productos originarios de los Estados de Africa, del Caribe y del Pacífico e importados directamente en el departamento de ultramar de la Reunión. (3) El derecho por la importación de arroz en el departamento de ultramar de la Reunión se establece en el apartado 3 del artículo 11 del Reglamento (CE) no 3072/95. (4) El derecho por las importaciones de arroz, excepto las de arroz partido (código NC 1006 40 00), originarias de Bangladesh se aplicar ´a con arreglo al régimen establecido en los Reglamentos (CEE) no 3491/90 del Consejo (DO L 337 de 4. 12. 1990, p. 1) y (CEE) no 862/91 de la Comisión (DO L 88 de 9. 4. 1991, p. 7), modificado. (5) La importación de productos originarios de los PTU quedar ´a exenta de derechos de importación, de conformidad con dispuesto en el apartado 1 del artículo 101 de la Decisión 91/482/CEE del Consejo (DO L 263 de 19. 9. 1991, p. 1) modificada. (6) El arroz sin c ´ascara de la variedad Basmati originario de la India y de Pakist ´an ser ´a objeto de una reducción de 250 ecus/t [artículo 4 bis del Reglamento (CE) no 1503/96, modificado]. (7) Derecho de aduana fijado en el arancel aduanero com ´un. (8) El derecho por las importaciones de arroz originario y procedente de Egipto se aplicar ´a con arreglo al régimen establecido en los Reglamentos (CE) no 2184/96 del Consejo (DO L 292 de 15. 11. 1996, p. 1) y (CE) no 196/97 de la Comisión (DO L 31 de 1. 2. 1997, p. 53). L 17/22 ‹ ES ‹ Diario Oficial de las Comunidades Europeas 22. 1. 98 ANEXO II C ´alculo de los derechos de importación del sector del arroz Paddy Tipo Indica Tipo Japónica Arroz partido Descascarillado Blanco Descascarillado Blanco 1. Derecho de importación (ecus/t) (1) 225,47 533,00 321,82 533,00 2. Elementos de c ´alculo: a) Precio cif Arag (ecus/t) b) Precio fob (ecus/t) c) Fletes marítimos (ecus/t) d) Fuente — — — — 374,74 309,68 305,07 351,29 — — — — 277,34 323,56 27,73 27,73 USDA USDA Operadores Operadores (1) — — — — (1) Derecho de aduana fijado en el Arancel aduanera com ´un


title: QUESTION ECRITE no 4136/97 de David BOWE à la Commission. Dose létale 50 % et produits toxiques

eurovoc_concepts:
OECD
animal experimentation
chemical product
environmental protection
product safety
public health
scientific research
toxic substance