title: SCHRIFTELIJKE VRAAG nr. 42/98 van Heidi HAUTALA aan de Commissie. De verenigbaarheid met het EG-Verdrag van de Finse energieheffing voor 1 januari 1997

eurovoc_concepts:
EU law - national law
Finland
Sweden
competition
customs duties
electrical energy
energy policy
environmental protection
harmonisation of standards
import policy

text: 22. 6. 98 NL Publicatieblad van de Europese Gemeenschappen C 196/111 (98/C 196/154) SCHRIFTELIJKE VRAAG P-0042/98 van Heidi Hautala (V) aan de Commissie (15 januari 1998) Betreft: De verenigbaarheid met het EG-Verdrag van de Finse energieheffing voor 1 januari 1997 De advocaat-generaal van het Europese Hof van Justitie heeft zijn standpunt bekend gemaakt in de zaak Outokumpu Oy tegen de Finse staat. Outokumpu Oy is van mening dat de door de Finse staat opgelegde heffing op uit Zweden ingevoerde elektriciteit in strijd is met het Gemeenschapsrecht en eist restitutie van deze heffing. De advocaat-generaal steunt de eisen van Outokumpu Oy niet. De Commissie heeft Finland op 23 november 1995 meegedeeld dat zij de toenmalige Finse heffing op elektriciteit zag als een vorm van discriminatie die in strijd was met artikel 95 van het EG-Verdrag. Voornamelijk om deze reden besloot men in Finland om vanaf 1 januari 1997 bij de heffing op elektriciteit geen rekening meer te houden met het milieu. Volgens de advocaat-generaal houdt het EG-Verdrag geen verbod op energieheffingen in als daarmee vormen van energiewinning worden begunstigd die minder schadelijk zijn voor het milieu. Ook in de richtlijn betreffende het vervoer van elektriciteit is bepaald dat het energiebeleid niet alleen gericht moet zijn op kostenverlaging en concurrentieversterking, maar ook op de bevordering van milieuvriendelijke vormen van energiewinning. Indien het Hof van Justitie het standpunt van de advocaat-generaal overneemt, is de Commissie dan van mening dat de heffing op elektriciteit die in Finland voor 1997 van kracht was in strijd was met het EG-Verdrag of had Finland het recht om de toenmalige energieheffing, gericht op het verminderen van de CO2-uitstoot, te handhaven? Antwoord van de heer Monti namens de Commissie (17 februari 1998) Gezien de huidige stand van zaken kunnen wij de geachte afgevaardigde slechts antwoorden de uitspraak van het Hof van Justitie af te wachten. Iedere beschouwing over wat de Commissie zal doen, naar gelang van het resultaat van de dingen, is voorbarig. Na de uitspraak van het oordeel en rekening houdend met de motivering van het Hof van Justitie zal de Commissie de aangelegenheid bestuderen en haar conclusies trekken. Bij de uitspraak van het oordeel zal het duidelijk worden in hoeverre Finland vanuit het gezichtspunt van de communautaire wetgeving eventueel de toenmalige heffing op elektriciteit mag handhaven. De tweede vraag van de geachte afgevaardigde zal derhalve door de uitspraak van het Hof terzake worden beantwoord. Voorts zij erop gewezen dat de Commissie het niet in twijfel trekt dat de lidstaat het recht heeft belastingheffing te gebruiken in het kader van de milieubescherming, zolang deze heffing met het communautair recht verenigbaar is. (98/C 196/155) SCHRIFTELIJKE VRAAG P-0043/98 van Daniel Varela Suanzes-Carpegna (PPE) aan de Commissie (15 januari 1998) Betreft: Niet-naleving van de visserijovereenkomst met de EU door het Koninkrijk Marokko De eenzijdige beslissing van het Koninkrijk Marokko om de periode van biologische rust voor de koppotigen in 1998 tot vier maanden uit te breiden is in strijd met de bepalingen van de geldende visserijovereenkomst met de EU. Het is trouwens bekend dat Marokko de paaiplaatsen van koppotigen binnen de 12-mijlszone niet eerbiedigt, zodat de zogenaamde biologische rust niet meer is dan een pseudo-maatregel voor het behoud van de visrijkdommen. Kan de Commissie meedelen welke maatregelen zijn of zullen worden genomen om dit optreden van de Marokkaanse autoriteiten, dat in strijd is met de geldende visserijovereenkomst, te voorkomen?


title: INTERROGAZIONE SCRITTA n. 4042/97 dell'on. Jesús CABEZÓN ALONSO al Consiglio. Città europee della cultura

eurovoc_concepts:
European Union
European symbol
capital city
cultural event
culture
town

formats: html pdf print

text: C 223/44 IT Gazzetta ufficiale delle Comunita‘ europee 17. 7. 98 (98/C 223/49) INTERROGAZIONE SCRITTA E-4033/97 di Bryan Cassidy (PPE) alla Commissione (14 gennaio 1998) Oggetto: Regolamentazione britannica del 1996 relativa agli obblighi in materia di responsabilita‘ del produttore (rifiuti da imballaggi) Sa la Commissione che, in base alla normativa britannica suddetta, il mancato rispetto da parte di ogni impresa ad essa soggetta nel Regno Unito costituisce reato e che pertanto, se il Regno Unito non raggiungera‘ gli obiettivi stabiliti dalla direttiva 94/62/CE (1), tutte le imprese interessate da detta regolamentazione nel Regno Unito saranno ritenuti giuridicamente responsabili a titolo individuale? (1) GU L 365 del 31. 12. 1994, pag. 10. (98/C 223/50) INTERROGAZIONE SCRITTA E-4035/97 di Bryan Cassidy (PPE) alla Commissione (14 gennaio 1998) Oggetto: Regolamentazione britannica del 1996 relativa agli obblighi in materia di responsabilita‘ del produttore (rifiuti da imballaggi) Concorda la Commissione che la responsabilita‘ penale prevista dalla regolamentazione britannica va ben al di la‘ delle disposizioni della direttiva 94/62/CE (1)? (1) GU L 365 del 31. 12. 1994, pag. 10. Risposta comune data dalla Sig. ra Bjerregaard in nome della Commissione alle interrogazioni scritte E-4033/97 e E-4035/97 (24 febbraio 1998) Le direttive hanno un carattere vincolante per gli Stati membri cui sono rivolte, ma questi ultimi possono scegliere la forma e i mezzi di attuazione. Inoltre, l(cid:146)articolo 5 del trattato CE prescrive agli Stati membri di adottare tutte le misure necessarie atte ad assicurare l(cid:146)esecuzione degli obblighi derivanti dal trattato CE. Pertanto l(cid:146)adozione di sanzioni per mancata conformita‘ compete in larga misura alle autorita‘ nazionali. A questo proposito e‘ opportuno far riferimento alla sentenza della Corte di giustizia C-58/95. In questo caso, la Corte ha ritenuto che l(cid:146)articolo 5 e il terzo paragrafo dell(cid:146)articolo 189 del trattato CE debbano essere interpretati in maniera da non vietare ad uno Stato membro dal comminare sanzioni penali per garantire la conformita‘ alle direttive sui rifiuti, a condizione che queste sanzioni siano analoghe a quelle applicate in caso di violazioni, di natura e importanza simili, della normativa nazionale e siano, in ogni caso, efficaci, proporzionali e di carattere dissuasivo. (98/C 223/51) INTERROGAZIONE SCRITTA E-4042/97 di Jesu· s Cabezo·n Alonso (PSE) al Consiglio (15 gennaio 1998) Oggetto: Citta‘ europee della cultura Ha previsto il Consiglio dei ministri della cultura dell(cid:146)Unione europea di decidere in una data prossima quali citta‘ saranno nel 2001 capitali culturali europee? In caso affermativo, quante citta‘ otterranno tale designazione? In base a quali criteri saranno scelte le citta‘ che nel 2001 diverranno capitali culturali europee?


title: Ψήφισμα σχετικά με την έκθεση της Επιτροπής για την πρόσβαση στη συνεχή επαγγελματική κατάρτιση στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση (COM(97)0180 C4-0208/97)

eurovoc_concepts:
access to education
continuing education
professional qualifications
vocational training

formats: html print


title: Beslutning om udnævnelse af en særlig EU-repræsentant for Tibet

eurovoc_concepts:
China
Tibetan question
human rights
political prisoner


eurovoc_concepts:
CCT duties
award of contract
import
maize

formats: pdf print

text: L 10/18 DE Amtsblatt der Europäischen Gemeinschaften 16. 1. 98 VERORDNUNG (EG) Nr. 112/98 DER KOMMISSION vom 15. Januar 1998 bezüglich der im Rahmen der Ausschreibung gemäß der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 2505/97 eingereichten Angebote für die Einfuhr von Mais DIE KOMMISSION DER EUROPÄISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFTEN  gestützt auf den Vertrag zur Gründung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, gestützt auf die Verordnung (EWG) Nr. 1766/92 des Rates vom 30. Juni 1992 über die gemeinsame Markt- organisation für Getreide (1), zuletzt geändert durch die Verordnung (EG) Nr. 923/96 der Kommission (2), insbe- sondere auf Artikel 12 Absatz 1, auf die Ausschreibung eingegangenen Angebote nicht zu berücksichtigen. Unter Berücksichtigung insbesondere der Kriterien nach den Artikeln 6 und 7 der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1839/95 ist die Festsetzung einer Höchstkürzung des Zolls bei der Einfuhr nicht angezeigt Die in dieser Verordnung vorgesehenen Maßnahmen entsprechen der Stellungnahme des Verwaltungsaus- schusses für Getreide  in Erwägung nachstehender Gründe: HAT FOLGENDE VERORDNUNG ERLASSEN: Eine Ausschreibung über die Höchstkürzung des Zolls bei der Einfuhr von Mais nach Spanien wurde durch die Verordnung (EG) Nr. 2505/97 der Kommission (3) eröffnet. Nach Artikel 5 der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1839/95 der Kommission (4), geändert durch die Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1963/95 (5), kann die Kommission auf der Grundlage der eingereichten Angebote nach dem Verfahren des Artikels 23 der Verordnung (EWG) Nr. 1766/92 beschließen, die Artikel 1 Die im Rahmen der Ausschreibung der Kürzung des Zolls bei der Einfuhr von Mais gemäß Verordnung (EG) Nr. 2505/97 vom 9. bis zum 15. Januar 1998 einge- reichten Angebote werden nicht berücksichtigt. Artikel 2 Diese Verordnung tritt am 16. Januar 1998 in Kraft. Diese Verordnung ist in allen ihren Teilen verbindlich und gilt unmittelbar in jedem Mitgliedstaat. Brüssel, den 15. Januar 1998 Für die Kommission Franz FISCHLER Mitglied der Kommission (1) ABl. L 181 vom 1. 7. 1992, S. 21. (2) ABl. L 126 vom 24. 5. 1996, S. 37. (3) ABl. L 345 vom 16. 12. 1997, S. 27. (4) ABl. L 177 vom 28. 7. 1995, S. 4. (5) ABl. L 189 vom 10. 8. 1995, S. 22


eurovoc_concepts:
export refund
milk
milk product

text: L 10/4 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 16. 1. 98 COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 105/98 of 15 January 1998 fixing the export refunds on milk and milk products THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, (a) prices ruling on third country markets; Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, (b) the most favourable prices in third countries of des- tination for third country imports; Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 804/68 of 27 June 1968 on the common organization of the market in milk and milk products (1), as last amended by Regula- tion (EC) No 1587/96 (2), and in particular Article 17 (3) thereof, Whereas Article 17 of Regulation (EEC) No 804/68 provides that the difference between prices in inter- national trade for the products listed in Article 1 of that Regulation and prices for those products within the Community may be covered by an export refund within the limits resulting from agreements concluded in ac- cordance with Article 228 of the Treaty; Whereas Regulation (EEC) No 804/68 provides that when the refunds on the products listed in Article 1 of the abovementioned Regulation, exported in the natural state, are being fixed account must be taken of:  the existing situation and the future trend with regard to prices and availabilities of milk and milk products on the Community market and prices for milk and milk products in international trade,  marketing costs and the most favourable transport charges from Community markets to ports or other points of export in the Community, as well as costs incurred in placing the goods on the market of the country of destination,  the aims of the common organization of the market in milk and milk products which are to ensure equi- librium and the natural development of prices and trade on this market,  the limits resulting from agreements concluded in accordance with Article 228 of the Treaty, and  the need to avoid disturbances on the Community market, and  the economic aspect of the proposed exports; Whereas Article 17 (5) of Regulation (EEC) No 804/68 provides that when prices within the Community are being determined account should be taken of the ruling prices which are most favourable for exportation, and that when prices in international trade are being determined particular account should be taken of: (c) producer prices recorded in exporting third countries, account being taken, where appropriate, of subsidies granted by those countries; and (d) free-at-Community-frontier offer prices; Whereas Article 17 (3) of Regulation (EEC) No 804/68 provides that the world market situation or the specific requirements of certain markets may make it necessary to vary the refund on the products listed in Article 1 of the abovementioned Regulation according to destination; Whereas Article 17 (3) of Regulation (EEC) No 804/68 provides that the list of products on which export refunds are granted and the amount of such refunds should be fixed at least once every four weeks; whereas the amount of the refund may, however, remain at the same level for more than four weeks; is applied only if the latter component Whereas, in accordance with Article 12 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1466/95 of 27 June 1995 on specific detailed rules for the application of export refunds on milk and milk products (3), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 2283/97 (4), the refund granted for milk products containing added sugar is equal to the sum of the two components, one of which is intended to take account of the quantity of milk products and the other is intended to take account of the quantity of added sucrose; whereas, however, the added sucrose was produced from sugar beet or cane harvested in the Community; whereas, for products falling within CN codes ex 0402 99 11, ex 0402 99 19, ex 0404 90 51, ex 0404 90 91 and ex 0404 90 93, with a fat content by weight not exceeding 9,5 % and a non-fatty milk content in the dry matter equal to or greater than 15 % by weight, the former abovementioned component is fixed for 100 kilograms of the whole product; whereas, the other products containing added sugar falling within CN codes 0402 and 0404, that component is calculated by multiplying the basic amount by the milk products content of the product concerned; whereas that basic amount is equal to the refund to be fixed for one kilogram of milk products contained in the whole product; ex 0404 90 53, for (1) OJ L 148, 28. 6. 1968, p. 13. (2) OJ L 206, 16. 8. 1996, p. 21. (3) OJ L 144, 28. 6. 1995, p. 22. (4) OJ L 314, 18. 11. 1997, p. 13. 16. 1. 98 EN Official Journal of the European Communities L 10/5 Whereas the second component is calculated by multi- plying the sucrose content of the product by the basic amount of the refund valid on the day of exportation for the products listed in Article 1 (1) (d) of Council Regula- tion (EEC) No 1785/81 of 30 June 1981 on the common organization of the markets in the sugar sector (1), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 1599/96 (2); Whereas the level of refund for cheeses is calculated for products intended for direct consumption; whereas the cheese rinds and cheese wastes are not products intended for this purpose; whereas, to avoid any confusion in inter- pretation, it should be specified that there will be no refund for cheeses of a free-at-frontier value less than ECU 230,00 per 100 kilograms; Whereas Commission Regulation (EEC) No 896/84 (3), as last amended by Regulation (EEC) No 222/88 (4), laid down additional provisions concerning the granting of refunds on the change from one milk year to another; whereas those provisions provide for the possibility of varying refunds according to the date of manufacture of the products; Whereas for the calculation of the refund for processed cheese provision must be made where casein or casein- ates are added for that quantity not to be taken into account; Whereas it follows from applying the rules set out above to the present situation on the market in milk and in particular to quotations or prices for milk products within the Community and on the world market that the refund should be as set out in the Annex to this Regulation; Whereas the measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Milk and Milk Products, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 The export refunds referred to in Article 17 of Regu- 1. lation (EEC) No 804/68 on products exported in the natural state shall be as set out in the Annex. 2. There shall be no refunds for exports to destination No 400 for products falling within CN codes 0401, 0402, 0403, 0404, 0405 and 2309. 3. There shall be no refunds for exports to destinations No 022, 024, 028, 043, 044, 045, 046, 052, 404, 600, 800 and 804 for products falling within CN code 0406. Article 2 This Regulation shall enter into force on 16 January 1998. This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 15 January 1998. For the Commission Franz FISCHLER Member of the Commission (1) OJ L 177, 1. 7. 1981, p. 4. (2) OJ L 206, 16. 8. 1996, p. 43. (3) OJ L 91, 1. 4. 1984, p. 71. (4) OJ L 28, 1. 2. 1988, p. 1. L 10/6 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 16. 1. 98 ANNEX to the Commission Regulation of 15 January 1998 fixing the export refunds on milk and milk products (in ECU/100 kg net weight unless otherwise indicated) Product code Destination (*) 0401 10 10 9000 0401 10 90 9000 0401 20 11 9100 0401 20 11 9500 0401 20 19 9100 0401 20 19 9500 0401 20 91 9100 0401 20 91 9500 0401 20 99 9100 0401 20 99 9500 0401 30 11 9100 0401 30 11 9400 0401 30 11 9700 0401 30 19 9100 0401 30 19 9400 0401 30 19 9700 0401 30 31 9100 0401 30 31 9400 0401 30 31 9700 0401 30 39 9100 0401 30 39 9400 0401 30 39 9700 0401 30 91 9100 0401 30 91 9400 0401 30 91 9700 0401 30 99 9100 0401 30 99 9400 0401 30 99 9700 0402 10 11 9000 0402 10 19 9000 0402 10 91 9000 0402 10 99 9000 0402 21 11 9200 0402 21 11 9300 0402 21 11 9500 0402 21 11 9900 0402 21 17 9000 0402 21 19 9300 0402 21 19 9500 0402 21 19 9900 0402 21 91 9100 0402 21 91 9200 0402 21 91 9300 0402 21 91 9400 0402 21 91 9500 0402 21 91 9600 0402 21 91 9700 0402 21 91 9900 0402 21 99 9100 0402 21 99 9200 0402 21 99 9300 0402 21 99 9400 0402 21 99 9500 970 * * * 970 * * * + 970 * * * + 970 * * * + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Amount of refund 2,327  2,327   3,597   3,597  4,551 5,302 4,551 5,302 6,803 10,50 15,77 6,803 10,50 15,77 38,32 59,85 66,00 38,32 59,85 66,00 75,22 110,55 129,01 75,22 110,55 129,01 68,00 68,00 0,6800 0,6800 68,00 90,54 95,38 102,60 68,00 90,54 95,38 102,60 103,34 104,05 105,34 112,58 115,09 124,73 130,38 136,76 103,34 104,05 105,34 112,58 115,09 Product code Destination (*) 0402 21 99 9600 0402 21 99 9700 0402 21 99 9900 0402 29 15 9200 0402 29 15 9300 0402 29 15 9500 0402 29 15 9900 0402 29 19 9200 0402 29 19 9300 0402 29 19 9500 0402 29 19 9900 0402 29 91 9100 0402 29 91 9500 0402 29 99 9100 0402 29 99 9500 0402 91 11 9110 0402 91 11 9120 0402 91 11 9310 0402 91 11 9350 0402 91 11 9370 0402 91 19 9110 0402 91 19 9120 0402 91 19 9310 0402 91 19 9350 0402 91 19 9370 0402 91 31 9100 0402 91 31 9300 0402 91 39 9100 0402 91 39 9300 0402 91 51 9000 0402 91 59 9000 0402 91 91 9000 0402 91 99 9000 0402 99 11 9110 0402 99 11 9130 0402 99 11 9150 0402 99 11 9310 0402 99 11 9330 0402 99 11 9350 0402 99 19 9110 0402 99 19 9130 0402 99 19 9150 0402 99 19 9310 0402 99 19 9330 0402 99 19 9350 0402 99 31 9110 0402 99 31 9150 0402 99 31 9300 0402 99 31 9500 0402 99 39 9110 0402 99 39 9150 0402 99 39 9300 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Amount of refund 124,73 130,38 136,76 0,6800 0,9054 0,9538 1,0262 0,6800 0,9054 0,9538 1,0262 1,0334 1,1258 1,0334 1,1258  4,551 13,30 16,29 19,81  4,551 13,30 16,29 19,81 8,991 23,42 8,991 23,42 10,50 10,50 75,22 75,22  0,0456 0,1269 15,33 18,40 24,46  0,0456 0,1269 15,33 18,40 24,46 0,0975 25,47 0,3832 0,6600 0,0975 25,47 0,3832 16. 1. 98 EN Official Journal of the European Communities L 10/7 Product code Destination (*) 0402 99 39 9500 0402 99 91 9000 0402 99 99 9000 0403 10 11 9400 0403 10 11 9800 0403 10 13 9800 0403 10 19 9800 0403 10 31 9400 0403 10 31 9800 0403 10 33 9800 0403 10 39 9800 0403 90 11 9000 0403 90 13 9200 0403 90 13 9300 0403 90 13 9500 0403 90 13 9900 0403 90 19 9000 0403 90 31 9000 0403 90 33 9200 0403 90 33 9300 0403 90 33 9500 0403 90 33 9900 0403 90 39 9000 0403 90 51 9100 0403 90 51 9300 0403 90 53 9000 0403 90 59 9110 0403 90 59 9140 0403 90 59 9170 0403 90 59 9310 0403 90 59 9340 0403 90 59 9370 0403 90 59 9510 0403 90 59 9540 0403 90 59 9570 0403 90 61 9100 0403 90 61 9300 0403 90 63 9000 0403 90 69 9000 0404 90 21 9100 0404 90 21 9910 0404 90 21 9950 0404 90 23 9120 0404 90 23 9130 0404 90 23 9140 0404 90 23 9150 0404 90 23 9911 0404 90 23 9913 0404 90 23 9915 0404 90 23 9917 0404 90 23 9919 0404 90 23 9931 0404 90 23 9933 0404 90 23 9935 0404 90 23 9937 0404 90 23 9939 0404 90 29 9110 0404 90 29 9115 0404 90 29 9120 0404 90 29 9130 0404 90 29 9135 0404 90 29 9150 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 970 * * * + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Amount of refund 0,6600 0,7522 0,7522   4,551 6,803   0,0456 0,0680 66,85 66,85 89,73 94,53 101,68 102,44 0,6685 0,6685 0,8973 0,9453 1,0168 1,0244 2,327   4,551 6,803 10,50 15,77 38,32 59,85 66,00 75,22 110,55 129,01   0,0456 0,0680 66,85  13,18 66,85 89,73 94,53 101,68  4,551 6,803 10,50 15,77 13,18 16,15 19,63 23,21 24,26 102,44 103,11 104,40 111,59 114,05 123,60 Product code Destination (*) 0404 90 29 9160 0404 90 29 9180 0404 90 81 9100 0404 90 81 9910 0404 90 81 9950 0404 90 83 9110 0404 90 83 9130 0404 90 83 9150 0404 90 83 9170 0404 90 83 9911 0404 90 83 9913 0404 90 83 9915 0404 90 83 9917 0404 90 83 9919 0404 90 83 9931 0404 90 83 9933 0404 90 83 9935 0404 90 83 9937 0404 90 89 9130 0404 90 89 9150 0404 90 89 9930 0404 90 89 9950 0404 90 89 9990 0405 10 11 9500 0405 10 11 9700 0405 10 19 9500 0405 10 19 9700 0405 10 30 9100 0405 10 30 9300 0405 10 30 9500 0405 10 30 9700 0405 10 50 9100 0405 10 50 9300 0405 10 50 9500 0405 10 50 9700 0405 10 90 9000 0405 20 90 9500 0405 20 90 9700 0405 90 10 9000 0405 90 90 9000 0406 10 20 9100 0406 10 20 9230 0406 10 20 9290 0406 10 20 9300 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 037 039 099 400 * * * 037 039 099 400 * * * 037 039 099 400 * * * Amount of refund 129,22 135,53 0,6685  15,20 0,6685 0,8973 0,9453 1,0168  0,0456 0,0680 0,1050 0,1577 15,20 18,24 24,24 25,22 1,0244 1,1159 0,4601 0,6600 0,7522 165,85 170,00 165,85 170,00 165,85 170,00 165,85 170,00 165,85 170,00 165,85 170,00 176,22 155,49 161,71 216,00 170,00    22,83 22,83 37,68   21,24 15,29 35,05   9,329 7,834 15,39 L 10/8 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 16. 1. 98 Product code Destination (*) Amount of refund Product code Destination (*) 0406 10 20 9610 0406 10 20 9620 0406 10 20 9630 0406 10 20 9640 0406 10 20 9650 0406 10 20 9660 0406 10 20 9830 0406 10 20 9850 0406 10 20 9870 0406 10 20 9900 0406 20 90 9100 0406 20 90 9913 0406 20 90 9915 0406 20 90 9917 0406 20 90 9919 037 039 099 400 * * * 037 039 099 400 * * * 037 039 099 400 * * * 037 039 099 400 * * * 037 039 099 400 * * * + 037 039 099 400 * * * 037 039 099 400 * * * + + + 037 039 099 400 * * * 037 039 099 400 * * * 037 039 099 400 * * * 037 039 099 400 * * *   30,98 30,98 51,11   31,42 31,42 51,83   35,06 35,06 57,86   51,54 48,35 85,03   42,95 25,44 70,86    15,93 13,38 26,28   19,31 16,22 31,87      35,62 31,59 58,77   47,01 42,12 77,56   49,94 44,75 82,41   55,82 50,02 92,10 0406 20 90 9990 0406 30 31 9710 0406 30 31 9730 0406 30 31 9910 0406 30 31 9930 0406 30 31 9950 0406 30 39 9500 0406 30 39 9700 0406 30 39 9930 0406 30 39 9950 0406 30 90 9000 0406 40 50 9000 + 037 039 099 400 * * * 037 039 099 400 * * * 037 039 099 400 * * * 037 039 099 400 * * * 037 039 099 400 * * * 037 039 099 400 * * * 037 039 099 400 * * * 037 039 099 400 * * * 037 039 099 400 * * * 037 039 099 400 * * * 037 039 099 400 * * * Amount of refund    9,54 8,346 17,88   13,99 12,25 26,24   9,54 8,346 17,88   13,99 12,25 26,24   20,36 17,81 38,17   13,99 12,25 26,24   20,36 17,81 38,17   20,36 17,81 38,17   23,02 21,14 43,16   24,15 21,14 45,28   54,55 32,98 90,00 16. 1. 98 EN Official Journal of the European Communities L 10/9 Product code Destination (*) Amount of refund Product code Destination (*) Amount of refund 0406 40 90 9000 0406 90 13 9000 0406 90 15 9100 0406 90 17 9100 0406 90 21 9900 0406 90 23 9900 0406 90 25 9900 0406 90 27 9900 0406 90 31 9119 0406 90 33 9119 0406 90 33 9919 037 039 099 400 * * * 037 039 099 400 * * * 037 039 099 400 * * * 037 039 099 400 * * * 037 039 099 400 * * * 037 039 099 400 * * * 037 039 099 400 * * * 037 039 099 400 * * * 037 039 099 400 * * * 037 039 099 400 * * * 037 039 099 400 * * *   56,01 32,98 92,42   60,16 60,16 99,26   62,17 62,17 102,58   62,17 62,17 102,58   61,63 44,53 101,68   36,51 18,57 75,31   36,98 21,16 76,25   33,48 18,57 69,06   38,17 25,56 62,99   38,17 25,56 62,99   34,36 20,33 56,69 0406 90 33 9951 0406 90 35 9190 0406 90 35 9990 0406 90 37 9000 0406 90 61 9000 0406 90 63 9100 0406 90 63 9900 0406 90 69 9100 0406 90 69 9910 0406 90 73 9900 0406 90 75 9900 0406 90 76 9300 037 039 099 400 * * * 037 039 099 400 * * * 037 039 099 400 * * * 037 039 099 400 * * * 037 039 099 400 * * * 037 039 099 400 * * * 037 039 099 400 * * * + 037 039 099 400 * * * 037 039 099 400 * * * 037 039 099 400 * * * 037 039 099 400 * * *   36,20 20,01 59,72 28,95 28,95 61,40 61,40 101,30   54,68 40,19 90,22   60,16 60,16 99,26 40,61 40,61 65,82 57,27 108,59 37,12 37,12 63,89 63,89 105,42 29,52 29,52 48,93 48,93 80,75    48,93 48,93 80,75   52,63 52,63 86,83   51,97 22,27 85,75   34,88 20,12 71,94 L 10/10 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 16. 1. 98 Product code Destination (*) Amount of refund Product code Destination (*) Amount of refund 0406 90 76 9400 0406 90 76 9500 0406 90 78 9100 0406 90 78 9300 0406 90 78 9500 0406 90 79 9900 0406 90 81 9900 0406 90 85 9910 0406 90 85 9991 0406 90 85 9995 037 039 099 400 * * * 037 039 099 400 * * * 037 039 099 400 * * * 037 039 099 400 * * * 037 039 099 400 * * * 037 039 099 400 * * * 037 039 099 400 * * * 037 039 099 400 * * * 037 039 099 400 * * * 037 039 099 400 * * *   40,07 23,22 82,65   38,60 23,22 79,62   32,73 18,14 67,50   40,07 20,12 82,65   40,07 23,22 82,65   30,31 19,23 62,51   53,71 47,61 88,63 28,95 28,95 59,27 59,27 97,79   54,68 40,19 90,22   51,97 21,16 85,75 0406 90 85 9999 0406 90 86 9100 0406 90 86 9200 0406 90 86 9300 0406 90 86 9400 0406 90 86 9900 0406 90 87 9100 0406 90 87 9200 0406 90 87 9300 0406 90 87 9400 0406 90 87 9951 0406 90 87 9971 0406 90 87 9972 + + 037 039 099 400 * * * 037 039 099 400 * * * 037 039 099 400 * * * 037 039 099 400 * * * + 037 039 099 400 * * * 037 039 099 400 * * * 037 039 099 400 * * * 037 039 099 400 * * * 037 039 099 400 * * * 099 400 * * *     29,74 27,65 61,34   30,78 30,30 63,48   34,58 34,28 71,32   43,80 40,24 90,34    24,78 24,78 51,11   28,27 28,02 58,31   30,66 30,66 63,25   42,19 42,19 87,04   42,07 34,41 86,78 16,03 13,67 33,07 16. 1. 98 EN Official Journal of the European Communities L 10/11 Product code Destination (*) Amount of refund Product code Destination (*) Amount of refund 0406 90 87 9973 0406 90 87 9974 0406 90 87 9979 0406 90 88 9100 0406 90 88 9105 0406 90 88 9300 2309 10 15 9010 2309 10 15 9100 2309 10 15 9200 2309 10 15 9300 2309 10 15 9400 2309 10 15 9500 2309 10 15 9700 2309 10 19 9010 037 039 099 400 * * * 037 039 099 400 * * * 037 039 099 400 * * * + 037 039 099 400 * * * 037 039 099 400 * * * + + + + + + + +   37,66 24,08 77,68   42,07 24,08 86,78   36,51 24,08 75,31    52,46 30,30 86,56   31,84 30,30 52,55         2309 10 19 9100 2309 10 19 9200 2309 10 19 9300 2309 10 19 9400 2309 10 19 9500 2309 10 19 9600 2309 10 19 9700 2309 10 19 9800 2309 10 70 9010 2309 10 70 9100 2309 10 70 9200 2309 10 70 9300 2309 10 70 9500 2309 10 70 9600 2309 10 70 9700 2309 10 70 9800 2309 90 35 9010 2309 90 35 9100 2309 90 35 9200 2309 90 35 9300 2309 90 35 9400 2309 90 35 9500 2309 90 35 9700 2309 90 39 9010 2309 90 39 9100 2309 90 39 9200 2309 90 39 9300 2309 90 39 9400 2309 90 39 9500 2309 90 39 9600 2309 90 39 9700 2309 90 39 9800 2309 90 70 9010 2309 90 70 9100 2309 90 70 9200 2309 90 70 9300 2309 90 70 9500 2309 90 70 9600 2309 90 70 9700 2309 90 70 9800 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +          13,85 18,47 23,09 27,70 32,32 36,94 40,63                  13,85 18,47 23,09 27,70 32,32 36,94 40,63 (*) The code numbers for the destinations are those set out in the Annex to Commission Regulation (EC) No 895/97 (OJ L 128, 21. 5. 1997, p. 1). However:  ‘099' covers all destination codes from 053 to 096 inclusive,  ‘970' covers the exports referred to in Article 34 (1) For destinations other than those indicated for each ‘product code', the amount of the refund applying is indicated by ***. Where no destination (‘+') is indicated, the amount of the refund is applicable for exports to any destination other than those referred to in Article 1 (2) and (3). (c) of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3665/87 (OJ L 351, 14. 12. 1987, p. 1). NB: The product codes and the footnotes are defined in Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3846/87 (OJ L 366, 24. 12. 1987, p. 1), as amended


title: WRITTEN QUESTION No. 64/98 by Gijs de VRIES to the Commission. Restrictions on direct marketing

eurovoc_concepts:
EU control
Germany
application of EU law
business start-up
complaint to the Commission
distance selling
exchange of information
freedom to provide services
intra-EU trade
record


title: PREGUNTA ESCRITA n. 4027/97 del Glenys KINNOCK al Consejo. Minas antipersonales y ayuda de la UE

eurovoc_concepts:
EU action
United Kingdom
accession to an agreement
aid system
conventional weapon
development aid
terms for aid
third country

text: C 196/64 ES Diario Oficial de las Comunidades Europeas 22. 6. 98 (98/C 196/87) PREGUNTA ESCRITA E-4027/97 de Glenys Kinnock (PSE) al Consejo (15 de enero de 1998) Asunto: Minas antipersonales y ayuda de la UE ¿Acoge el Consejo con satisfaccio·n la decisio·n del RU de reconsiderar la cuant(cid:14)·a de las ayudas al desarrollo destinadas a pa(cid:14)·ses que no «suscriben» el acuerdo de Ottawa sobre minas antipersonales? ¿No ser(cid:14)·a, entonces, oportuno que el Consejo recomendase a la UE la adopcio·n de medidas ana·logas contra los pa(cid:14)·ses beneficiarios de ayudas al desarrollo procedentes de la UE que continu·en produciendo y exportando minas antipersonales? Respuesta (30 de marzo de 1997) Hasta la fecha no se ha informado al Consejo sobre el contenido de la decisio·n que Su Sen(cid:152)or(cid:14)·a menciona en su pregunta, por lo que no ha debatido la cuestio·n. Sin embargo, Su Sen(cid:152)or(cid:14)·a estara· al corriente de que, en la Accio·n Comu·n relativa a las minas terrestres antipersonales, adoptada el 28 de noviembre de 1997, el Consejo recordo· su Resolucio·n sobre la lucha contra las minas terrestres antipersonales, de 22 de noviembre de 1996, en la que se especificaban determinadas medidas que podr(cid:14)·an adoptarse y los criterios por los que deber(cid:14)·a regirse la atribucio·n de los fondos destinados a las acciones de retirada de minas. Al mismo tiempo, la Unio·n Europea acogio· favorablemente los esfuerzos encaminados a fomentar la adhesio·n universal al Convenio para la prohibicio·n del uso, almacenamiento, produccio·n y traslado de minas antipersonales y para su destruccio·n, e indico· que centrar(cid:14)·a su atencio·n en aquellos pa(cid:14)·ses terceros que prosigan el suministro irresponsable y el uso indiscriminado de minas antipersonales. (98/C 196/88) PREGUNTA ESCRITA E-4037/97 de Joaqu(cid:14)·n Siso· Cruellas (PPE) a la Comisio·n (14 de enero de 1998) Asunto: Scrapie en el ganado ovino La posible relacio·n entre la encefalopat(cid:14)·a bovina, o enfermedad de las vacas locas, y la afeccio·n del ovino conocida como scrapie o tembladera obliga a tomar algunas medidas de precaucio·n. La palabra scrapie, con la que esta enfermedad es conocida por los autores anglosajones, significa «rascar» como s(cid:14)·ntoma ma·s llamativo de dicha enfermedad. El scrapie se caracteriza por un intenso prurito, incoodinacio·n motora progresiva, para·lisis y muerte. Esta enfermedad ha tomado actualidad por la aparicio·n de la encefalopat(cid:14)·a bovina y su contagio al hombre, ya que ambas enfermedades son producidas por un agente infeccioso no convencional, el prio·n, que afecta al hombre y a los animales. La principal fuente de infeccio·n en un reban(cid:152)o es la incorporacio·n de animales de cr(cid:14)·a provenientes de explotaciones infectas por contagio directo o por transmisio·n de los padres. El scrapie se desarrolla de forma muy lenta, en un espacio de dos a diez meses, siendo progresiva y fatal, y los animales afectados suelen ser mayores de un an(cid:152)o, especialmente entre los dos y los cuatro an(cid:152)os de edad, y manifiestan una visible pe·rdida de lana. El cuado lesional queda restringido a una aute·ntica encefalopat(cid:14)·a, del mismo cariz que el de las vacas locas, y au·n no existe tratamiento ni vacunas espec(cid:14)·ficas, debiendo sacrificarse todos los animales afectados y sus descendientes. Teniendo en cuenta el gran impacto que ha causado en el conjunto de la sociedad europea el tema de la enfermedad de las vacas locas, › ¿Ha realizado la Comisio·n alguna investigacio·n para conocer el alcance real del impacto del scrapie en la ganader(cid:14)·a ovina europea? De ser as(cid:14)·, ¿que· resultados se han obtenido? En caso negativo, ¿piensa realizarla? › ¿Que· medidas precautorias se esta·n llevando a cabo para evitar que esta enfermedad se convierta en «la enfermedad de las ovejas locas»?


title: ΚΑΝΟΝΙΣΜΟΣ (ΕΚ) αριθ. 109/98 ΤΗΣ ΕΠΙΤΡΟΠΗΣ της 15ης Ιανουαρίου 1998 για καθορισμό της μέγιστης επιστροφής κατά την εξαγωγή μαλακού σίτου στο πλαίσιο του διαγωνισμού που προβλέπεται στον κανονισμό (ΕΚ) αριθ. 1339/97

eurovoc_concepts:
award of contract
common wheat
export refund

text: 16. 1. 98 EL Επ(cid:148)σηµη Εφηµερ(cid:148)δα των Ευρωπαϊκ(cid:150)ν Κοινοτ(cid:147)των L 10/15 ΚΑΝΟΝΙΣΜΟΣ (ΕΚ) αριθ. 109/98 ΤΗΣ ΕΠΙΤΡΟΠΗΣ τηr 15ηr Ιανουαρ(cid:148)ου 1998 για καθορισµ(cid:149) τηr µ(cid:146)γιστηr επιστροφ(cid:147)r κατ(cid:145) την εξαγωγ(cid:147) µαλακο(cid:151) σ(cid:148)του στο πλα(cid:148)σιο του διαγωνισµο(cid:151) που προβλ(cid:146)πεται στον κανονισµ(cid:149) (ΕΚ) αριθ. 1339/97 Η ΕΠΙΤΡΟΠΗ ΤΩΝ ΕΥΡΩΠΑΪΚΩΝ ΚΟΙΝΟΤΗΤΩΝ, (cid:130)χονταr υπ(cid:149)ψη: τη συνθ(cid:147)κη για την (cid:148)δρυση τηr Ευρωπαϊκ(cid:147)r Κοιν(cid:149)τηταr, τον κανονισµ(cid:149) (ΕΟΚ) αριθ. 1766/92 του Συµβουλ(cid:148)ου, τηr 30(cid:147)r Ιουν(cid:148)ου 1992, περ(cid:148) δηµιουργ(cid:148)αr κοιν(cid:147)r οργαν(cid:150)σεωr αγορ(cid:145)r στον τοµ(cid:146)α των σιτηρ(cid:150)ν (1), (cid:149)πωr τροποποι(cid:147)θηκε τελευτα(cid:148)α απ(cid:149) τον κανονισµ(cid:149) (ΕΚ) αριθ. 923/96 (2), τον κανονισµ(cid:149) (ΕΚ) αριθ. 1501/95 τηr Επιτροπ(cid:147)r, τηr 29ηr Ιουν(cid:148)ου 1995, περ(cid:148) θεσπ(cid:148)σεωr ορισµ(cid:146)νων λεπτοµερ(cid:150)ν καν(cid:149)νων εφαρµογ(cid:147)r του κανονισµο(cid:151) (ΕΟΚ) αριθ. 1766/92 του Συµβουλ(cid:148)ου, (cid:149)σον αφορ(cid:145) τη χορ(cid:147)γηση επιστροφ(cid:150)ν κατ(cid:145) την εξαγωγ(cid:147), καθ(cid:150)r και τα µ(cid:146)τρα τα οπο(cid:148)α πρ(cid:146)πει να λαµβ(cid:145)νονται σε περ(cid:148)πτωση διαταραχ(cid:147)r τηr αγορ(cid:145)r στον τοµ(cid:146)α των σιτηρ(cid:150)ν (3), (cid:149)πωr τροποποι(cid:147)θηκε τελευτα(cid:148)α απ(cid:149) τον κανονισµ(cid:149) (ΕΚ) αριθ. 2052/97 (4), και ιδ(cid:148)ωr το (cid:145)ρθρο 7, Εκτιµ(cid:150)νταr: (cid:149)τι, µε τον κανονισµ(cid:149) (ΕΚ) αριθ. 1339/97 τηr Επιτροπ(cid:147)r (5), (cid:149)πωr τροποποι(cid:147)θηκε απ(cid:149) τον κανονισµ(cid:149) (ΕΚ) αριθ. 1884/ 97 (6), προκηρ(cid:151)χθηκε διαγωνισµ(cid:149)r για τον καθορισµ(cid:149) τηr επιστροφ(cid:147)r (cid:147)/και του φ(cid:149)ρου κατ(cid:145) την εξαγωγ(cid:147) µαλακο(cid:151) σ(cid:148)του προr (cid:149)λεr τιr τρ(cid:148)τεr χ(cid:150)ρεr εκτ(cid:149)r τηr Θ(cid:146)ουτα, Μελ(cid:148)λια και ορισµ(cid:146)νων χωρ(cid:150)ν ΑΚΕ· (cid:149)τι το (cid:145)ρθρο 7 του κανονισµο(cid:151) (ΕΚ) αριθ. 1501/95, προβλ(cid:146)- πει (cid:149)τι, µε β(cid:145)ση τιr ανακοινωθε(cid:148)σεr προσφορ(cid:146)r, η Επιτροπ(cid:147) δ(cid:151)ναται, σ(cid:151)µφωνα µε τη διαδικασ(cid:148)α που προβλ(cid:146)πεται στο (cid:145)ρθρο 23 του κανονισµο(cid:151) (ΕΟΚ) αριθ. 1766/92, να αποφα- σ(cid:148)σει να καθορ(cid:148)σει µια µ(cid:146)γιστη επιστροφ(cid:147) κατ(cid:145) την εξαγωγ(cid:147), λαµβ(cid:145)νονταr υπ(cid:149)ψη τα κριτ(cid:147)ρια που αναφ(cid:146)ρο- νται στο (cid:145)ρθρο 1 του κανονισµο(cid:151) (ΕΚ) αριθ. 1501/95· (cid:149)τι στην περ(cid:148)πτωση αυτ(cid:147), ο διαγωνισµ(cid:149)r κατακυρ(cid:150)νεται σ’ εκε(cid:148)νον (cid:147) σ’ εκε(cid:148)νουr εκ των προσφερ(cid:149)ντων των οπο(cid:148)ων η προσφορ(cid:145) ε(cid:148)ναι µικρ(cid:149)τερη (cid:147) (cid:148)ση απ(cid:149) τη µ(cid:146)γιστη επιστροφ(cid:147) καθ(cid:150)r και σ’ εκε(cid:148)νον (cid:147) σ’ εκε(cid:148)νουr των υποβαλλ(cid:149)ντων των οπο(cid:148)ων η προσφορ(cid:145) αφορ(cid:145) φ(cid:149)ρο κατ(cid:145) την εξαγωγ(cid:147)· (cid:149)τι η εφαρµογ(cid:147) των ανωτ(cid:146)ρω κριτηρ(cid:148)ων στην παρο(cid:151)σα κατ(cid:145)σταση τηr αγορ(cid:145)r του εν λ(cid:149)γω σιτηρο(cid:151) οδηγε(cid:148) στον καθορισµ(cid:149) τηr µ(cid:146)γιστηr επιστροφ(cid:147)r κατ(cid:145) την εξαγωγ(cid:147) στο ποσ(cid:149) που αναφ(cid:146)ρεται στο (cid:145)ρθρο 1· (cid:149)τι τα µ(cid:146)τρα που προβλ(cid:146)πονται στον παρ(cid:149)ντα κανονισµ(cid:149) ε(cid:148)ναι σ(cid:151)µφωνα µε τη γν(cid:150)µη τηr επιτροπ(cid:147)r διαχε(cid:148)ρισηr σιτηρ(cid:150)ν, ΕΞΕ∆ΩΣΕ ΤΟΝ ΠΑΡΟΝΤΑ ΚΑΝΟΝΙΣΜΟ: (cid:129)ρθρο 1 Για τιr προσφορ(cid:146)r που ανακοιν(cid:150)νονται στο πλα(cid:148)σιο του διαγωνισµο(cid:151) που προβλ(cid:146)πεται στον τροποποιηµ(cid:146)νο κανονι- σµ(cid:149) (ΕΚ) αριθ. 1339/97 απ(cid:149) 9 (cid:146)ωr 15 Ιανουαρ(cid:148)ου 1998, η µ(cid:146)γιστη επιστροφ(cid:147) κατ(cid:145) την εξαγωγ(cid:147) µαλακο(cid:151) σ(cid:148)του καθο- ρ(cid:148)ζεται σε 17,95 Ecu αν(cid:145) τ(cid:149)νο. (cid:129)ρθρο 2 Ο παρ(cid:150)ν κανονισµ(cid:149)r αρχ(cid:148)ζει να ισχ(cid:151)ει στιr 16 Ιανουαρ(cid:148)ου 1998. Ο παρ(cid:150)ν κανονισµ(cid:149)r ε(cid:148)ναι δεσµευτικ(cid:149)r ωr προr (cid:149)λα τα µ(cid:146)ρη του και ισχ(cid:151)ει (cid:145)µεσα σε κ(cid:145)θε κρ(cid:145)τοr µ(cid:146)λοr. Βρυξ(cid:146)λλεr, 15 Ιανουαρ(cid:148)ου 1998. Για την Επιτροπ(cid:147) Franz FISCHLER Μ(cid:146)λοr τηr Επιτροπ(cid:147)r (1) ΕΕ L 181 τηr 1. 7. 1992, σ. 21. (2) ΕΕ L 126 τηr 24. 5. 1996, σ. 37. (3) ΕΕ L 147 τηr 30. 6. 1995, σ. 7. (4) ΕΕ L 287 τηr 21. 10. 1997, σ. 14. (5) ΕΕ L 184 τηr 12. 7. 1997, σ. 7. (6) ΕΕ L 265 τηr 27. 9. 1997, σ. 73


title: Risoluzione sulle esecuzioni di massa nella Corea del Sud

eurovoc_concepts:
South Korea
death penalty
democratisation


title: REGLAMENTO (CE) N° 107/98 DE LA COMISIÓN de 15 de enero de 1998 por el que se fija la restitución máxima a la exportación de cebada en el marco de la licitación contemplada en el Reglamento (CE) n° 1337/97

eurovoc_concepts:
award of contract
barley
export refund

text: 16. 1. 98 ES Diario Oficial de las Comunidades Europeas L 10/13 REGLAMENTO (CE) No 107/98 DE LA COMISIÓN de 15 de enero de 1998 por el que se fija la restitución máxima a la exportación de cebada en el marco de la licitación contemplada en el Reglamento (CE) no 1337/97 LA COMISIÓN DE LAS COMUNIDADES EUROPEAS, Visto el Tratado constitutivo de la Comunidad Europea, Visto el Reglamento (CEE) no 1766/92 del Consejo, de 30 de junio de 1992, por el que se establece la organización común de mercados en el sector de los cereales (1), cuya última modificación la constituye el Reglamento (CE) no 923/96 de la Comisión (2), Visto el Reglamento (CE) no 1501/95 de la Comisión, de 29 de junio de 1995, por el que se establecen determi- nadas disposiciones de aplicación del Reglamento (CEE) no 1766/92 del Consejo en lo que respecta a la concesión de las restituciones a la exportación y a las medidas que deben adoptarse en caso de perburbación en el sector de los cereales (3), cuya última modificación la constituye el su Reglamento (CE) no 2052/97 (4), y, en particular, artículo 7, Considerando que el Reglamento (CE) no 1337/97 de la Comisión (5), ha abierto una licitación de la restitución y/o del gravamen a la exportación de cebada a todos los terceros países; Considerando que, en virtud del artículo 7 del Regla- mento (CE) no 1501/95, la Comisión, basándose en las ofertas comunicadas y con arreglo al procedimiento esta- blecido en el artículo 23 del Reglamento (CEE) no 1766/ 92, puede decidir fijar una restitución máxima a la expor- tación siguiendo los criterios a que se refiere el artículo 1 del Reglamento (CE) no 1501/95; que, en este caso, el contrato se adjudicará al licitador o licitadores cuya oferta sea igual o inferior a la restitución máxima, y al licitador o licitadores cuya oferta se refiere a un gravamen a la exportación; Considerando que la aplicación de los criterios precitados a la situación actual de los mercados del cereal conside- rado lleva a fijar la restitución máxima a la exportación en el importe indicado en el artículo 1; Considerando que las medidas previstas en el presente Reglamento se ajustan al dictamen del Comité de gestión de los cereales, HA ADOPTADO EL PRESENTE REGLAMENTO: Artículo 1 Para las ofertas comunicadas del 9 al 15 de enero de 1998 en el marco de la licitación contemplada en el Regla- mento (CE) no 1337/97, la restitución máxima a la expor- tación de cebada se fijará en 18,96 ecus por tonelada. Artículo 2 El presente Reglamento entrará en vigor el 16 de enero de 1998. El presente Reglamento será obligatorio en todos sus elementos y directamente aplicable en cada Estado miembro. Hecho en Bruselas, el 15 de enero de 1998. Por la Comisión Franz FISCHLER Miembro de la Comisión (1) DO L 181 de 1. 7. 1992, p. 21. (2) DO L 126 de 24. 5. 1996, p. 37. (3) DO L 147 de 30. 6. 1995, p. 7. (4) DO L 287 de 21. 10. 1997, p. 14. (5) DO L 184 de 12. 7. 1997, p. 1


title: Risoluzione sulle relazioni commerciali ed economiche transatlantiche

eurovoc_concepts:
EU relations
United States
World Trade Organisation
economic cooperation
economic relations
international cooperation
international trade
interparliamentary relations
political cooperation
trade cooperation
trade relations


title: ΚΑΝΟΝΙΣΜΟΣ (ΕΚ) αριθ. 106/98 ΤΗΣ ΕΠΙΤΡΟΠΗΣ της 15ης Ιανουαρίου 1998 για καθορισμό της μέγιστης επιστροφής κατά την εξαγωγή βρώμης στο πλαίσιο του διαγωνισμού που προβλέπεται στον κανονισμό (ΕΚ) αριθ. 1773/97

eurovoc_concepts:
award of contract
export refund
oats

text: L 10/12 EL Επ(cid:148)σηµη Εφηµερ(cid:148)δα των Ευρωπαϊκ(cid:150)ν Κοινοτ(cid:147)των 16. 1. 98 ΚΑΝΟΝΙΣΜΟΣ (ΕΚ) αριθ. 106/98 ΤΗΣ ΕΠΙΤΡΟΠΗΣ τηr 15ηr Ιανουαρ(cid:148)ου 1998 για καθορισµ(cid:149) τηr µ(cid:146)γιστηr επιστροφ(cid:147)r κατ(cid:145) την εξαγωγ(cid:147) βρ(cid:150)µηr στο πλα(cid:148)σιο του διαγωνισµο(cid:151) που προβλ(cid:146)πεται στον κανονισµ(cid:149) (ΕΚ) αριθ. 1773/97 Η ΕΠΙΤΡΟΠΗ ΤΩΝ ΕΥΡΩΠΑΪΚΩΝ ΚΟΙΝΟΤΗΤΩΝ, (cid:130)χονταr υπ(cid:149)ψη: τη συνθ(cid:147)κη για την (cid:148)δρυση τηr Ευρωπαϊκ(cid:147)r Κοιν(cid:149)τηταr, τον κανονισµ(cid:149) (ΕΟΚ) αριθ. 1766/92 του Συµβουλ(cid:148)ου, τηr 30(cid:147)r Ιουν(cid:148)ου 1992, περ(cid:148) δηµιουργ(cid:148)αr κοιν(cid:147)r οργαν(cid:150)σεωr αγορ(cid:145)r στον τοµ(cid:146)α των σιτηρ(cid:150)ν (1), (cid:149)πωr τροποποι(cid:147)θηκε τελευτα(cid:148)α απ(cid:149) τον κανονισµ(cid:149) (ΕΚ) αριθ. 923/96 (2), τον κανονισµ(cid:149) (ΕΚ) αριθ. 1501/95 τηr Επιτροπ(cid:147)r, τηr 29ηr Ιουν(cid:148)ου 1995, περ(cid:148) θεσπ(cid:148)σεωr ορισµ(cid:146)νων λεπτοµερ(cid:150)ν καν(cid:149)νων εφαρµογ(cid:147)r του κανονισµο(cid:151) (ΕΟΚ) αριθ. 1766/92 του Συµβουλ(cid:148)ου, (cid:149)σον αφορ(cid:145) τη χορ(cid:147)γηση επιστροφ(cid:150)ν κατ(cid:145) την εξαγωγ(cid:147), καθ(cid:150)r και τα µ(cid:146)τρα τα οπο(cid:148)α πρ(cid:146)πει να λαµβ(cid:145)νονται σε περ(cid:148)πτωση διαταραχ(cid:147)r τηr αγορ(cid:145)r στον τοµ(cid:146)α των σιτηρ(cid:150)ν (3), (cid:149)πωr τροποποι(cid:147)θηκε τελευτα(cid:148)α απ(cid:149) τον κανονισµ(cid:149) (ΕΚ) αριθ. 2052/97 (4), τον κανονισµ(cid:149) (ΕΚ) αριθ. 1773/97 τηr Επιτροπ(cid:147)r, τηr 12ηr Σεπτεµβρ(cid:148)ου 1997, περ(cid:148) ειδικο(cid:151) µ(cid:146)τρου παρ(cid:146)µβασηr για τα σιτηρ(cid:145) στη Vινλανδ(cid:148)α και τη Σουηδ(cid:148)α (5), (cid:149)πωr τροποποι- (cid:147)θηκε απ(cid:149) τον κανονισµ(cid:149) (ΕΚ) αριθ. 2133/97 (6), και ιδ(cid:148)ωr το (cid:145)ρθρο 8, Εκτιµ(cid:150)νταr: (cid:149)τι, µε τον κανονισµ(cid:149) (ΕΚ) αριθ. 1773/97, προκηρ(cid:151)χθηκε διαγωνισµ(cid:149)r για τον καθορισµ(cid:149) τηr επιστροφ(cid:147)r κατ(cid:145) την εξαγωγ(cid:147) βρ(cid:150)µηr που παρ(cid:145)γεται στη Vινλανδ(cid:148)α και στη Σουηδ(cid:148)α και προορ(cid:148)ζεται για εξαγωγ(cid:147) απ(cid:149) τη Vινλανδ(cid:148)α και τη Σουηδ(cid:148)α προr (cid:149)λεr τιr τρ(cid:148)τεr χ(cid:150)ρεr· (cid:149)τι το (cid:145)ρθρο 8 του κανονισµο(cid:151) (ΕΚ) αριθ. 1773/97, προβλ(cid:146)- πει (cid:149)τι, µε β(cid:145)ση τιr ανακοινωθε(cid:148)σεr προσφορ(cid:146)r, η Επιτροπ(cid:147) δ(cid:151)ναται, σ(cid:151)µφωνα µε τη διαδικασ(cid:148)α που προβλ(cid:146)πεται στο (cid:145)ρθρο 23 του κανονισµο(cid:151) (ΕΟΚ) αριθ. 1766/92, να αποφα- σ(cid:148)σει να καθορ(cid:148)σει µια µ(cid:146)γιστη επιστροφ(cid:147) κατ(cid:145) την εξαγωγ(cid:147), λαµβ(cid:145)νονταr υπ(cid:149)ψη τα κριτ(cid:147)ρια που αναφ(cid:146)ρο- νται στο (cid:145)ρθρο 1 του κανονισµο(cid:151) (ΕΚ) αριθ. 1501/95· (cid:149)τι στην περ(cid:148)πτωση αυτ(cid:147), ο διαγωνισµ(cid:149)r κατακυρ(cid:150)νεται σ’ εκε(cid:148)νον (cid:147) σ’ εκε(cid:148)νουr εκ των προσφερ(cid:149)ντων των οπο(cid:148)ων η προσφορ(cid:145) ε(cid:148)ναι µικρ(cid:149)τερη (cid:147) (cid:148)ση απ(cid:149) τη µ(cid:146)γιστη επι- στροφ(cid:147)· (cid:149)τι η εφαρµογ(cid:147) των ανωτ(cid:146)ρω κριτηρ(cid:148)ων στην παρο(cid:151)σα κατ(cid:145)σταση τηr αγορ(cid:145)r του εν λ(cid:149)γω σιτηρο(cid:151) οδηγε(cid:148) στον καθορισµ(cid:149) τηr µ(cid:146)γιστηr επιστροφ(cid:147)r κατ(cid:145) την εξαγωγ(cid:147) στο ποσ(cid:149) που αναφ(cid:146)ρεται στο (cid:145)ρθρο 1· (cid:149)τι τα µ(cid:146)τρα που προβλ(cid:146)πονται στον παρ(cid:149)ντα κανονισµ(cid:149) ε(cid:148)ναι σ(cid:151)µφωνα µε τη γν(cid:150)µη τηr επιτροπ(cid:147)r διαχε(cid:148)ρισηr σιτηρ(cid:150)ν, ΕΞΕ∆ΩΣΕ ΤΟΝ ΠΑΡΟΝΤΑ ΚΑΝΟΝΙΣΜΟ: (cid:129)ρθρο 1 Για τιr προσφορ(cid:146)r που ανακοιν(cid:150)νονται στο πλα(cid:148)σιο του διαγωνισµο(cid:151) που προβλ(cid:146)πεται στον κανονισµ(cid:149) (ΕΚ) αριθ. 1773/97 απ(cid:149) τιr 9 (cid:146)ωr τιr 15 Ιανουαρ(cid:148)ου 1998, η µ(cid:146)γιστη επιστροφ(cid:147) κατ(cid:145) την εξαγωγ(cid:147) βρ(cid:150)µηr καθορ(cid:148)ζεται σε 28,93 Ecu αν(cid:145) τ(cid:149)νο. (cid:129)ρθρο 2 Ο παρ(cid:150)ν κανονισµ(cid:149)r αρχ(cid:148)ζει να ισχ(cid:151)ει στιr 16 Ιανουαρ(cid:148)ου 1998. Ο παρ(cid:150)ν κανονισµ(cid:149)r ε(cid:148)ναι δεσµευτικ(cid:149)r ωr προr (cid:149)λα τα µ(cid:146)ρη του και ισχ(cid:151)ει (cid:145)µεσα σε κ(cid:145)θε κρ(cid:145)τοr µ(cid:146)λοr. Βρυξ(cid:146)λλεr, 15 Ιανουαρ(cid:148)ου 1998. Για την Επιτροπ(cid:147) Franz FISCHLER Μ(cid:146)λοr τηr Επιτροπ(cid:147)r (1) ΕΕ L 181 τηr 1. 7. 1992, σ. 21. (2) ΕΕ L 126 τηr 24. 5. 1996, σ. 37. (3) ΕΕ L 147 τηr 30. 6. 1995, σ. 7. (4) ΕΕ L 287 τηr 21. 10. 1997, σ. 14. (5) ΕΕ L 250 τηr 13. 9. 1997, σ. 1. (6) ΕΕ L 296 τηr 30. 10. 1997, σ. 29


title: Resolução sobre as relações comerciais e económicas transatlânticas


eurovoc_concepts:
CCT duties
award of contract
import
maize
quantitative restriction
tariff reduction

text: 16. 1. 98 FI Euroopan yhteisöjen virallinen lehti L 10/17 KOMISSION ASETUS (EY) N:o 111/98, annettu 15 päivänä tammikuuta 1998, maissin tuontitullin enimmäisalennuksen vahvistamisesta asetuksessa (EY) N:o 2506/97 tarkoitetun tarjouskilpailun osana EUROOPAN YHTEISÖJEN KOMISSIO, joka ottaa huomioon Euroopan yhteisön perustamissopi- muksen, ottaa huomioon vilja-alan yhteisestä markkinajärjestelystä 30 päivänä kesäkuuta 1992 annetun neuvoston asetuksen (ETY) N:o 1766/92 (1), sellaisena kuin se on viimeksi muutettuna komission asetuksella (EY) N:o 923/96 (2), ja erityisesti sen 12 artiklan 1 kohdan, sekä katsoo, että komission asetuksella (EY) N:o 2506/97 (3) on avattu tarjouskilpailu, joka koskee enimmäisalennusta maissin tuontitullista Portugaliin, komission asetuksen (EY) N:o 1839/95 5 artiklan mukai- sesti (4), sellaisena kuin se on muutettuna asetuksella (EY) N:o 1963/95 (5), komissio voi asetuksen (ETY) N:o 1766/ 92 23 artiklassa säädettyä menettelyä noudattaen päättää tässä tuontitullin enimmäisalennuksen vahvistamisesta; vahvistamisessa erityisesti otettava asetuksen (EY) N:o 1839/95 6 ja 7 artiklassa säädetyt tarjouskilpailun voittaa se tarjouksen tekijä, perusteet; huomioon on jonka suuruinen tai sitä alhaisempi, tarjous tuontitullin on enimmäisalennuksen edellä tarkoitettujen perusteiden soveltamisesta kyseisen viljan tämänhetkiseen markkinatilanteeseen seuraa, että tuontitullin enimmäisalennukseksi olisi vahvistettava 1 ja artiklassa mainittu määrä, tässä asetuksessa säädetyt toimenpiteet ovat viljan hallin- tokomitean lausunnon mukaiset, ON ANTANUT TÄMÄN ASETUKSEN: 1 artikla Asetuksen (EY) N:o 2506/97 tarkoittaman tarjouskil- pailun rajoissa 9. 1. 1998–15. 1. 1998 jätettyjen tarjousten osalta maissin enimmäisalennukseksi vahvistetaan 60,85 ecua tonnia kohti 90 000 tonnin koko- naismäärään asti. tuontitullin 2 artikla Tämä asetus tulee voimaan 16 päivänä tammikuuta 1998. Tämä asetus on kaikilta osiltaan velvoittava, jäsenvaltioissa. ja sitä sovelletaan sellaisenaan kaikissa Tehty Brysselissä 15 päivänä tammikuuta 1998. Komission puolesta Franz FISCHLER Komission jäsen (1) EYVL L 181, 1. 7. 1992, s. 21 (2) EYVL L 126, 24. 5. 1996, s. 37 (3) EYVL L 345, 16. 12. 1997, s. 28 (4) EYVL L 177, 28. 7. 1995, s. 4 (5) EYVL L 189, 10. 8. 1995, s. 22


title: WRITTEN QUESTION No. 3986/97 by Georges BERTHU to the Council. Euro bank notes - distinctive national symbols

eurovoc_concepts:
European Monetary Institute
European Monetary System
abuse of power
action for annulment
euro
monetary crisis
paper money
single monetary policy

text: C 187/106 FI Euroopan yhteiso¤jen virallinen lehti 16. 6. 98 Saksassa Propolis-tuotteiden valmistukseen, jakeluun ja myyntiin sovelletaan la¤a¤keaineita koskevaa lainsa¤a¤da¤n- to¤a¤. Ta¤sta¤ syysta¤ na¤ita¤ tuotteita saa myyda¤ ainoastaan apteekeissa. Voiko komissio kertoa, missa¤ Euroopan unionin ja¤senvaltioissa mehila¤istarhan hoitajat voivat myyda¤ 1. Propolista suoraan tarhoilta? Onko ta¤ma¤ kyseisten tuotteiden saatavuudessa ilmeneva¤ ero sisa¤markkinoita koskevien ma¤a¤ra¤ysten 2. mukainen? Komission ja¤senen Martin Bangemannin komission puolesta antama vastaus (14. tammikuuta 1998) Komissiolla ei ole tietoa mehila¤ishoitajien harjoittaman propoliksen myynnin sa¤a¤ntelysta¤ eri ja¤senvaltioissa. La¤a¤kevalmisteita koskevien lakien, asetusten ja hallinnollisten ma¤a¤ra¤ysten la¤henta¤misesta¤ 26. tammikuuta 1965 annetun neuvoston direktiivin 65/65/ETY (1) 1 artiklassa ma¤a¤riteltyjen la¤a¤kkeiden myynti kuluttajille on edelleen ja¤senvaltioiden itsensa¤ sa¤a¤delta¤vissa¤, eika¤ asiasta ole yhteiso¤n lainsa¤a¤da¤nto¤a¤. Na¤in ollen ja¤senvaltiot voivat EY:n perustamissopimuksen 30-36 artiklan mukaisesti pita¤a¤ voimassa sa¤a¤nno¤ksia¤, joiden perusteella la¤a¤kkeita¤ saavat myyda¤ kuluttajille ainoastaan apteekit, seka¤ kielta¤a¤ muut myyntikanavat alueellaan. (1) EYVL 22, 9. 2. 1965. (98/C 187/160) KIRJALLINEN KYSYMYS E-3986/97 neuvostolle esitta¤ja¤(t): Georges Berthu (I-EDN) (15. tammikuuta 1998) Aihe: Euro-setelit ja kansalliset tunnusmerkit Euroopan rahapoliittisen instituutin (ERI) neuvosto omaksui 3. joulukuuta 1996 kannan, etta¤ euro-setelien olisi oltava kaikissa valtioissa samanlaisia ja ilman mita¤a¤n kansallisia tunnusmerkkeja¤. Ta¤ma¤ kanta aiheuttaa a¤killisesti suuren ongelman: jos setelit ovat kaikkialla samanlaisia ja jos ja¤rjestelma¤a¤ uhkaa vakava kriisi, mita¤a¤n valtiota ei ka¤yta¤nno¤ssa¤ voi (cid:148)irrottaa(cid:148). Ta¤ten kasvaa yleinen ra¤ja¤hdysvaara joissakin a¤a¤ritapauksissa. Katsooko neuvosto, etta¤ omaksumalla ta¤ma¤n poliittisen kannan, joka yhteiso¤n asiakirjoissa esitella¤a¤n usein lopullisena pa¤a¤to¤ksena¤, ERI:n neuvosto on ylitta¤nyt perustamissopimuksen 109 f artiklan 3 kohdassa sille annetun vallan valvoa tulevan setelin (cid:148)teknista¤ valmistelua(cid:148)? (98/C 187/161) KIRJALLINEN KYSYMYS E-3987/97 neuvostolle esitta¤ja¤(t): Georges Berthu (I-EDN) (15. tammikuuta 1998) Aihe: Euro-setelit ja kansalliset tunnusmerkit ERI:n neuvoston 3. joulukuuta 1996 omaksumasta kannasta, jolla kielleta¤a¤n kansalliset tunnusmerkit tulevissa euro-seteleissa¤, ei ole ollut todellista demokraattista keskustelua. Dublinin Eurooppa-neuvosto (13. › 14. jou- lukuuta 1996) vain (cid:148)ilmoitti(cid:148) asiasta, mutta sen johtopa¤a¤to¤ksissa¤ ei ole ja¤lkea¤ka¤a¤n nimenomaisesta hyva¤ksymi- sesta¤ tai edes mainintaa ta¤sta¤ yksityiskohdasta. Ta¤ma¤ ta¤ydellinen demokraattisen valvonnan puute on tosin omituisella tavalla ma¤a¤ra¤tty itse perustamissopi- muksessa, aivan toisin kuin mita¤ tulevista metallirahoista ma¤a¤ra¤ta¤a¤n. Katsooko neuvosto kuitenkin, etta¤ na¤in ta¤rkea¤ssa¤ asiassa ja¤senvaltioiden pita¤isi olla mukana pa¤a¤to¤ksenteossa tavalla tai toisella? Onko mahdollista, etta¤ ei ole minka¤a¤nlaista parlamentaarista valvontaa?


title: SKRIFTLIG FORESPØRGSEL nr. 3989/97 af Georges BERTHU til Rådet. Eurosedler - nationale kendetegn

eurovoc_concepts:
European Central Bank
European Monetary Institute
European Monetary System
euro
issuing of currency
monetary crisis
paper money
single monetary policy

text: 16. 6. 98 DA De Europ(cid:230)iske F(cid:230)llesskabers Tidende C 187/107 (98/C 187/162) SKRIFTLIG FORESP(cid:216)RGSEL E-3988/97 af Georges Berthu (I-EDN) til R(cid:229)det (15. januar 1998) Om: Eurosedler › nationale kendetegn R(cid:229)det for EMI traf den 3. december 1996 afgłrelse om, at de fremtidige eurosedler ikke skulle have nogen nationale kendetegn. Kan R(cid:229)det forklare den grundl(cid:230)ggende (cid:229)rsag til, at man er n(cid:229)et frem til denne lłsning for pengesedlerne, og hvorfor R(cid:229)det, łjensynlig lige omvendt, selv g(cid:229)r ind for den modsatte lłsning for młnterne? (98/C 187/163) SKRIFTLIG FORESP(cid:216)RGSEL E-3989/97 af Georges Berthu (I-EDN) til R(cid:229)det (15. januar 1998) Om: Eurosedler › nationale kendetegn R(cid:229)det for EMI traf den 3. december 1996 afgłrelse om, at de fremtidige eurosedler ikke skulle have nogen nationale kendetegn. Denne afgłrelse, som synes at v(cid:230)re truffet i medfłr af traktatens artikel 109 F, stk. 3, udl(cid:230)gges snart som endelig, snart som ikke-endelig. Under sidstn(cid:230)vnte hypotese henvises der til, at Den Europ(cid:230)iske Centralbank (ECB) i henhold til artikel 105 A, stk. 1, har eneret til at bemyndige udstedelse af pengesedler i F(cid:230)llesskabet. Den skal fłlgelig, s(cid:229) snart den er oprettet, bekr(cid:230)fte EMI(cid:146)s afgłrelse. Denne fortolkning af artikel 105 A, stk. 1, synes imidlertid alt for bred, da den under »udstedelse af pengesedler«, som er et monet(cid:230)rt-politisk begreb, medtager spłrgsm(cid:229)l om nationale kendetegn, hvilket er af grundl(cid:230)ggende forskellig art. Mener R(cid:229)det ikke ogs(cid:229), at en s(cid:229)dan fortolkning ville v(cid:230)re alt for bred? Ville det ikke desuden betyde, at et vigtigt principielt spłrgsm(cid:229)l blev lłst af et ikke-demokratisk organ, nemlig ECB? (98/C 187/164) SKRIFTLIG FORESP(cid:216)RGSEL E-3990/97 af Georges Berthu (I-EDN) til R(cid:229)det (15. januar 1998) Om: Eurosedler › nationale kendetegn R(cid:229)det for EMI traf den 3. december 1996 afgłrelse om, at de fremtidige eurosedler ikke skulle have nogen nationale kendetegn. I betragtning af at dette spłrgsm(cid:229)l i vidt omfang g(cid:229)r videre end befłjelserne til at »fłre tilsyn med den tekniske forberedelse af sedler« (artikel 109 F, stk. 3), og at det ogs(cid:229) er af en anden art end det monet(cid:230)re begreb »udstedelse af pengesedler« (artikel 105 A, stk. 1), mener R(cid:229)det da ikke, at det ville v(cid:230)re hensigtsm(cid:230)ssigt at finde et andet juridisk grundlag herfor? Kunne man ikke mene, at denne afgłrelse henhłrer under artikel 109 L, stk. 4, som indeholder bestemmelse om, at »R(cid:229)det tr(cid:230)ffer (. ) ogs(cid:229) de andre foranstaltninger, som er nłdvendige for en hurtig indfłrelse af ecuen (euroen) som medlemsstater(ne)s f(cid:230)lles valuta«? Ville en s(cid:229)dan fortolkning for łvrigt ikke v(cid:230)re den eneste, der kunne bevare staternes kontrol med en udpr(cid:230)get politisk afgłrelse? Samlet svar p(cid:229) skriftlige forespłrgsler E-3986/97, E-3987/97, E-3988/97, E-3989/97 og E-3990/97 (19. marts 1998) Ifłlge traktatens bestemmelser om kompetencefordeling har Den Europ(cid:230)iske Centralbank eneret til at bemyndige udstedelse af pengesedler i euro, herunder ogs(cid:229) til at bestemme disses udseende (traktatens artikel 105 A og artikel 16 i protokollen om statutten for Det Europ(cid:230)iske System af Centralbanker og Den Europ(cid:230)iske Centralbank)


title: Resolution on mass executions in South Korea


title: Ψήφισμα σχετικά με τη θανατική καταδίκη της Karla Faye Tucker στις Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες

eurovoc_concepts:
United States
death penalty


title: SKRIFTLIG FORESPØRGSEL nr. 43/98 af Daniel VARELA SUANZES- CARPEGNA til Kommissionen. Kongeriget Marokkos misligholdelse af fiskeriaftalen med EU

eurovoc_concepts:
Morocco
animal breeding
conservation of fish stocks
environmental protection
fisheries policy
fishery management
fishing agreement
mollusc

text: 22. 6. 98 DA De Europ(cid:230)iske F(cid:230)llesskabers Tidende C 196/111 (98/C 196/154) SKRIFTLIG FORESP(cid:216)RGSEL P-0042/98 af Heidi Hautala (V) til Kommissionen (15. januar 1998) Om: Den finske elafgifts forenelighed med traktaten inden den 1. 1. 1997 EF-Domstolens generaladvokat er kommet med sit forslag til afgłrelse i sagen Outokumpu Oy mod den finske stat. Outokumpu Oy har kr(cid:230)vet, at den finske stat kompenserer for den importafgift, som er blevet p(cid:229)lagt virksomhedens import af elektricitet fra Sverige, og den mener, at afgiften er en importtold, som er i strid med f(cid:230)llesskabsretten. Generaladvokatens holdning imłdekommer ikke kravene fra Outokumpu Oy. Den 23. 11. 1995 meddelte Kommissionen Finland, at den ans(cid:229) den dav(cid:230)rende finske elafgift for at v(cid:230)re diskrimination, der var i strid med traktatens artikel 85. Hovedsagelig som fłlge af dette afstod Finland fra den 1. 1. 1997 at lade elafgiften v(cid:230)re styrende for miljłet. Ifłlge generaladvokaten forbyder traktaten ikke beskatning af elektricitet, der indfłres til fordel for produktionsmetoder, der er mindre skadelige for miljłet, ogs(cid:229) i direktivet om elekricitetsoverfłrsel p(cid:229)peges det, at energipolitikken ikke kun skal gennemfłres for at nedbringe udgifterne eller opretholde konkurrencen, men at der ogs(cid:229) skal tages hensyn til energiens forenelighed med miljłet. Hvis Domstolen fłlger generaladvokaten forslag til afgłrelse, beder Kommissionen ogs(cid:229) i dette tilf(cid:230)lde oplyse, om den mener, at elafgiften, der var i kraft i Finland inden 1997, var i strid med traktaten, eller at Finland havde ret til at bevare den dav(cid:230)rende skattemodel til begr(cid:230)nsning af CO2-emissioner fra elproduktionen? Svar afgivet p(cid:229) Kommissionens vegne af Mario Monti (17. februar 1998) I betragtning af sagens nuv(cid:230)rende stadium kan svaret til det (cid:230)rede medlem kun blive, at man m(cid:229) afvente EF-Domstolens afgłrelse i sagen. Det er for tidligt for Kommissionen at overveje, hvad den vil głre, eftersom det afh(cid:230)nger af sagens udfald. Efter dommens afsigelse og under hensyntagen til EF-Domstolens r(cid:230)sonnement vil Kommissionen analysere sagen og drage sine konklusioner. N(cid:229)r dommen er afsagt, vil det st(cid:229) klart, i hvilket omfang Finland › set ud fra et f(cid:230)llesskabsretligt synspunkt › eventuelt kunne have opretholdt den tidligere elafgiftsmodel. Det (cid:230)rede medlems andet spłrgsm(cid:229)l vil derfor blive besvaret, n(cid:229)r EF-Domstolen har truffet sin afgłrelse i sagen. Kommissionen har som bekendt ikke anf(cid:230)gtet medlemsstaternes ret til at benytte beskatning med henblik p(cid:229) at fremme miljłbeskyttelsen, forudsat at en s(cid:229)dan beskatning er forenelig med f(cid:230)llesskabsretten. (98/C 196/155) SKRIFTLIG FORESP(cid:216)RGSEL P-0043/98 af Daniel Varela Suanzes-Carpegna (PPE) til Kommissionen (15. januar 1998) Om: Kongeriget Marokkos misligholdelse af fiskeriaftalen med EU Kongeriget Marokkos ensidige beslutning om at udvide det biologiske stop for fangst af bl(cid:230)ksprutter til fire m(cid:229)neder i 1998 er i modstrid med bestemmelserne i fiskeriaftalen med EU. Desuden er det almindeligt kendt, at Marokko ikke respekterer bl(cid:230)ksprutternes yngleomr(cid:229)der inden for 12-milegr(cid:230)nsen, hvorfor det fingerede biologisk begrundede fangstforbud ene og alene er en pseudo-foranstaltning til bevarelse af fiskeressourcerne. Vil Kommissionen oplyse, hvilke foranstaltninger der allerede er iv(cid:230)rksat, og hvilke foranstaltninger den agter at iv(cid:230)rks(cid:230)tte for at forhindre de marokkanske myndigheder i et s(cid:229)dant skridt, der er i modstrid med den g(cid:230)ldende fiskeriaftale?


title: ΓΡΑΠΤΗ ΕΡΩΤΗΣΗ αρ θ. 4055/97 του Yiannis ROUBATIS προς το Συμβούλ ο. Η έκθεση της Διεθνούς Αμνηστείας για την κατάσταση των ανθρωπίνων δικαιωμάτων στην Τουρκία

eurovoc_concepts:
Amnesty International
Türkiye
death penalty
democracy
forced disappearance
human rights
prisoner
report
torture
young person

text: C 223/46 EL Epi·shmh Efhmeri·da tvn Eyrvpai¤kv· n Koinoth·tvn 17. 7. 98 (98/C 223/53) GRAPTH ERVTHSH E-4050/97 ypobolh· : Stephen Hughes (PSE) prow thn Epitroph· (14 Ianoyari·oy 1998) Ue·ma: Cyxo-organiko· sy·ndromo (cid:201)xontaw ypo·ch to fa·sma tvn parago·ntvn poy synde·ontai me to cyxo-organiko· sy·ndromo poia ei·nai ta isxy·onta o·ria e·kueshw tvn ato·mvn stoyw en lo·gv para·gontew sta dekape·nte kra·th me·lh; Ypa·rxoyn para·gontew poy e·xoyn apagoreyuei· kai a·lloi syndeo·menoi me anegnvrisme·na epaggelmatika· atyxh·mata; Se poio baumo· e·xoyn lhfuei· me·tra ypokata·stashw apo· ta kra·th me·lh se sxe·sh me toyw para· gontew poy uevroy·ntai perisso·tero epiki·ndynoi; Apa·nthsh toy k. Flynn ej ono·matow thw Epitroph· w (30 Ianoyari·oy 1998) H Epitroph· zh·thse apo· ton Eyrvpai¤ko· Organismo· gia thn Asfa·leia kai thn Ygei·a sthn Ergasi·a na thw para·sxei texnike·w plhrofori·ew sxetika· me to ue·ma poy e·uije to Ajio·timo Me·low. H Epitroph· ua apanth·sei plh·rvw sto Ajio·timo Me·low o·tan la·bei ayte·w tiw plhrofori·ew. (98/C 223/54) GRAPTH ERVTHSH E-4055/97 ypobolh·: Yiannis Roubatis (PSE) prow to Symboy·lio (15 Ianoyari·oy 1998) Ue·ma: H e·kuesh thw Dieunoy·w Amnhstei·aw gia thn kata·stash tvn anurvpi·nvn dikaivma·tvn sthn Toyrki·a Sth ne·a (cid:201)kuesh thw Dieunoy·w Amnhstei·aw gia thn kata·stash tvn Anurvpi·nvn Dikaivma·tvn sthn Toyrki·a, h teleytai·a kathgorei·tai gia basanismoy·w anhli·kvn, ektele·seiw kai ejafani·seiw kratoyme·nvn. Sy·mfvna me ta stoixei·a thw Dieunoy·w Amnhstei·aw, to 1997 sthn Toyrki·a 25 a·toma skotv· uhkan kata· th dia·rkeia thw kra·thsh·w toyw env· a·lla 23 agnooy·ntai meta· thn sy·llhch· toyw. Ervta·tai to Symboy·lio: 1. Poia· me·tra skopey·ei na la·bei prokeime·noy na stamath·sei o empaigmo·w thw Eyrvpai¤kh·w (cid:201)nvshw apo· tiw diadoxike·w toyrkike·w kybernh·seiw kai na la·bei te·low h synexizo·menh apara·dekth kata·stash tvn Anurvpi·- nvn Dikaivma·tvn sthn Toyrki·a; 2. Ti skopey·ei na ka·nei v· ste na gi·nei epite·loyw synei·dhsh sthn politikh· kai strativtikh· hgesi·a thw Toyrki·aw o·ti den mporoy·n na synexi·zoyn na basani·zoyn kai na skotv· noyn toyw i·dioyw toyw poli·tew thw xv· raw toyw th stigmh· poy h dieunh·w koino·thta parakoloyuei· me apotropiasmo· tiw ejeli·jeiw ayte·w; (98/C 223/55) GRAPTH ERVTHSH E-0262/98 ypobolh· : Yiannis Roubatis (PSE) prow to Symboy·lio (17 Febroyari·oy 1998) Ue·ma: H (cid:201)kuesh thw Dieunoy·w Amnhsti·aw gia thn kata·stash tvn Anurvpi·nvn Dikaivma·tvn sthn Toyrki·a Sthn ne·a (cid:201)kuesh thw Dieunoy·w Amnhsti·aw gia thn kata·stash tvn Anurvpi·nvn Dikaivma·tvn sthn Toyrki·a, h teleytai·a kathgorei·tai gia basanismoy·w anhli·kvn, ektele·seiw kai ejafani·seiw kratoyme·nvn. •Sy·mfvna me ta stoixei·a thw Dieunoy·w Amnhsti·aw, to 1997 sthn Toyrki·a 25 a·toma skotv· uhkan kata· th dia·rkeia thw kra·thsh·w toyw env· a·lla 23 agnooy·ntai meta· thn sy·llhch· toyw. Ervta·tai to Symboy·lio: 1. Poia· me·tra skopey·ei na la·bei prokeime·noy na stamath·sei o empaigmo·w thw Eyrvpai¤kh·w (cid:201)nvshw apo· tiw diadoxike·w toyrkike·w kybernh·seiw kai na la·bei te·low h synexizo·menh apara·dekth kata·stash tvn Anurvpi·- nvn Dikaivma·tvn sthn Toyrki·a; 2. Ti· skopey·ei na ka·nei v· ste na gi·nei epite·loyw synei·dhsh sthn politikh· kai strativtikh· hgesi·a thw Toyrki·aw o·ti den mporoy·n na synexi·zoyn na basani·zoyn kai na skotv· noyn toyw i·dioyw toyw poli·tew thw xv· raw toyw,. th stigmh· poy h dieunh·w koino·thta parakoloyuei· me apotropiasmo· tiw ejeli·jeiw ayte·w;


text: 16. 1. 98 PT Jornal Oficial das Comunidades Europeias L 10/15 REGULAMENTO (CE) Nº 109/98 DA COMISSÃO de 15 de Janeiro de 1998 que fixa a restituição máxima à exportação de trigo mole no âmbito do concurso referido no Regulamento (CE) nº 1339/97 A COMISSÃO DAS COMUNIDADES EUROPEIAS, Tendo em conta o Tratado que institui a Comunidade Europeia, Tendo em conta o Regulamento (CEE) nº 1766/92 do Conselho, de 30 de Junho de 1992, que estabelece a organização comum de mercado no sector dos cereais (1), com a última redacção que lhe foi dada pelo Regula- mento (CE) nº 923/96 da Comissão (2), Tendo em conta o Regulamento (CE) nº 1501/95 da Comissão, de 29 de Junho de 1995, que estabelece normas de execução do Regulamento (CEE) nº 1766/92 do Conselho, no que diz respeito à concessão de restitui- ções à exportação, bem como as medidas a tomar em caso de perturbação, no sector dos cereais (3), com a última redacção que lhe foi dada pelo Regulamento (CE) nº 2052/97 (4), e, nomeadamente, o seu artigo 7º, Considerando que, pelo Regulamento (CE) nº 1339/97 da Comissão (5), alterado pelo Regulamento (CE) nº 1884/ /97 (6), foi aberto um concurso para a restituição e/ou a imposição à exportação de trigo mole para todos os países terceiros à excepção de Ceuta, Melilha e determinados Estados ACP; Considerando que o artigo 7º do Regulamento (CE) nº 1501/95 prevê que a Comissão pode, com base nas propostas comunicadas, de acordo com o processo previsto no artigo 23º do Regulamento (CEE) nº 1766/92, decidir sobre a fixação duma restituição máxima à expor- tação, tendo em conta os critérios previstos no artigo 1º do Regulamento (CE) nº 1501/95; que, neste caso, será adjudicatário(s) o(s) proponente(s) (serão) declarado(s) cuja(s) proposta(s) se situa(m) a um nível igual ou inferior ao da restituição máxima, assim como o(s) proponente(s) cuja(s) proposta(s) incide(m) sobre uma imposição de exportação; Considerando que a aplicação dos critérios acima refe- ridos à situação actual dos mercados do cereal em questão leva a fixar a restituição máxima de exportação no montante referido no artigo 1º; Considerando que as medidas previstas no presente regu- lamento estão em conformidade com o parecer do Comité de Gestão dos Cereais, ADOPTOU O PRESENTE REGULAMENTO: Artigo 1º No que diz respeito às propostas apresentadas de 9 a 15 de Janeiro de 1998 no âmbito do concurso referido no Regulamento (CE) nº 1339/97 alterado, a restituição máxima à exportação do trigo mole é fixada em 17,95 ecus por tonelada. Artigo 2º O presente regulamento entra em vigor em 16 de Janeiro de 1998. O presente regulamento é obrigatório em todos os seus elementos e directamente aplicável em todos os Estados-membros. Feito em Bruxelas, em 15 de Janeiro de 1998. Pela Comissão Franz FISCHLER Membro da Comissão (1) JO L 181 de 1. 7. 1992, p. 21. (2) JO L 126 de 24. 5. 1996, p. 37. (3) JO L 147 de 30. 6. 1995, p. 7. (4) JO L 287 de 21. 10. 1997, p. 14. (5) JO L 184 de 12. 7. 1997, p. 7. (6) JO L 265 de 27. 9. 1997, p. 73


text: C 187/106 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 16. 6. 98 In Germany propolis preparations are subject to the law on pharmaceuticals as regards their manufacture, marketing and sale. For this reason they can be sold only by pharmacists. Can the Commission say in which European Union countries propolis can be bought directly from 1. bee-keepers? 2. Are the different approaches consistent with the rules of the single market? Answer given by Mr Bangemann on behalf of the Commission (14 January 1998) The Commission has no information concerning the regulation of the sale of propolis by bee-keepers in the different Member States. The supply of medicinal products within the meaning of Article 1 of Directive 65/65/EEC of 26 January 1965 on the approximation of provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action relating to proprietary medicinal products (1) to the public continues to be a matter for the Member States and there exists no Community legislation in this field. This gives Member States the possibility to maintain provisions in accordance with Articles 30-36 of the EC Treaty that restrict the supply of medicinal products to the public to pharmacies and to interdict any other form of supply to the public on their territory. (1) OJ 22, 9. 2. 1965. (98/C 187/160) WRITTEN QUESTION E-3986/97 by Georges Berthu (I-EDN) to the Council (15 January 1998) Subject: Euro bank notes › distinctive national symbols At its meeting on 3 December 1996 the Council of the European Monetary Institute (EMI) decided that both sides of Euro bank notes were to be identical in all countries and were to be devoid of any distinctive national symbols. This position amounts to settling, in a roundabout way, a crucial question: if the bank notes are indistinguishable from one country to another, it will be virtually impossible to (cid:145)uncouple(cid:146) a country in the event of a serious crisis threatening the survival of the system. In certain borderline cases, therefore, the risks of complete collapse would be increased. Does the Council not agree that in adopting this political position › which is frequently presented as a definitive decision in European documents › the EMI Council has exceeded the terms of Article 109f(3) of the Treaty which only gives it the power to supervise the (cid:145)technical preparation(cid:146) of the future bank notes? (98/C 187/161) WRITTEN QUESTION E-3987/97 by Georges Berthu (I-EDN) to the Council (15 January 1998) Subject: Euro bank notes › distinctive national symbols The position adopted by the EMI Council on 3 December 1996 prohibiting distinctive national symbols on the future European bank notes does not appear to have been the subject of a proper democratic debate. The Dublin European Council (13 and 14 December 1996) seems merely to have been (cid:145)informed(cid:146) of it, but there is no sign in its conclusions of explicit approval or even of a mere mention of this specific point. Although this total lack of democratic supervision is, and though it may seem, provided for by the Treaty itself, unlike the arrangements made for the future coins, does the Council not agree that on such an important point the Member States should be involved in the decision in some way? Is it conceivable that there should be a complete lack of parliamentary supervision at any level?


title: WRITTEN QUESTION No. 43/98 by Daniel VARELA SUANZES- CARPEGNA to the Commission. Moroccan failure to comply with the fisheries agreement with the EU

text: 22. 6. 98 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning C 196/111 (98/C 196/154) SKRIFTLIG FR¯GA P-0042/98 fr(cid:229)n Heidi Hautala (V) till kommissionen (15 januari 1998) A¤mne: Den finska elskattemodellens o¤verenssta¤mmelse med grundfo¤rdraget fo¤re den 1 januari 1997 EG-domstolens generaladvokat har meddelat sin st(cid:229)ndpunkt i m(cid:229)let Outokumpu Oy mot Republiken Finland. Outokumpu Oy har kra¤vt att finska staten skall ersa¤tta skatten p(cid:229) den el som bolaget importerat fr(cid:229)n Sverige. Bolaget anser att denna skatt a¤r en s(cid:229)dan importtull som fo¤rbjuds i gemenskapslagstiftningen. Generaladvoka- tens st(cid:229)ndpunkt sto¤djer inte Outokumpu Oy:s krav. Kommissionen underra¤ttade den 23 november 1995 Finland om att den ans(cid:229)g den d(cid:229)varande finska elskatten utgo¤ra s(cid:229)dan diskriminering som avses i artikel 95 i grundfo¤rdraget. Det var till stor del av detta ska¤l man fr(cid:229)n och med den 1 januari 1997 slopade den miljo¤avgift som fanns inbakad i elskatten. Enligt generaladvokaten fo¤rbjuder grundfo¤rdraget inte elbeskattning som fra¤mjar ur miljo¤ha¤nsyn mindre skadliga produktionsmetoder. A¤ ven i direktivet om o¤verfo¤ring av el konstateras att energi(cid:229)tga¤rder inte bo¤r vidtas endast av kostnadssa¤nkande orsaker och fo¤r uppra¤tth(cid:229)llande av konkurrens, utan att man a¤ven bo¤r beakta energins la¤mplighet ur miljo¤synpunkt. Anser kommissionen a¤ven i det fall att domstolens beslut fo¤ljer generaladvokatens st(cid:229)ndpunkt att den elskatt som tilla¤mpades i Finland fo¤re 1997 stred mot grundfo¤rdraget, eller skulle Finland ha haft ra¤tt att bibeh(cid:229)lla den d(cid:229)varande skattemodellen som minskade koldioxidutsla¤ppen inom elproduktionen? Svar fr(cid:229)n Mario Monti p(cid:229) kommissionens va¤gnar (17 februari 1998) I det nuvarande skedet av fo¤rfarandet kan svaret till parlamentsledamoten endast bli att EG-domstolens avgo¤rande bo¤r inva¤ntas. Alla funderingar kring vad kommissionen kan ta¤nkas go¤ra beroende p(cid:229) resultatet av fo¤rfarandet a¤r fo¤rhastade. Efter det att domen har avkunnats kommer kommissionen att analysera fr(cid:229)gan och dra sina slutsatser med beaktande av EG-domstolens resonemang. Na¤r domen har avkunnats kommer det att visa sig i vilken utstra¤ckning Finland skulle ha kunnat uppra¤tth(cid:229)lla den tidigare modellen fo¤r elbeskattning med tanke p(cid:229) gemenskapsra¤tten. Parlamentsledamotens andra fr(cid:229)ga kommer da¤rfo¤r att besvaras genom EG-domstolens beslut i fr(cid:229)gan. Det a¤r ska¤l att komma ih(cid:229)g att kommissionen inte har ifr(cid:229)gasatt medlemsstatens ra¤tt att anva¤nda beskattning i miljo¤fra¤mjande syfte om en s(cid:229)dan beskattning a¤r fo¤renlig med gemenskapsra¤tten. (98/C 196/155) SKRIFTLIG FR¯GA P-0043/98 fr(cid:229)n Daniel Varela Suanzes-Carpegna (PPE) till kommissionen (15 januari 1998) A¤mne: Marockos brott mot fiskeriavtalet med EU Marockos ensidiga beslut att fo¤rla¤nga den biologiska (cid:229)terha¤mtningsperioden fo¤r bla¤ckfisk fo¤r 1998 strider mot besta¤mmelserna i det nu ga¤llande fiskeriavtalet med EU. Det a¤r ocks(cid:229) ka¤nt att Marocko inte respekterar bla¤ckfiskens lekplatser innanfo¤r gra¤nsen 12 sjo¤mil fr(cid:229)n kusten, vilket betyder att dessa biologiska (cid:229)terha¤mt- ningsperioder bara a¤r sken(cid:229)tga¤rder fo¤r resursbevarande. Kan kommissionen informera om vilka (cid:229)tga¤rder den redan vidtagit och vilka (cid:229)tga¤rder den avser att vidta fo¤r att hindra de marockanska myndigheterna fr(cid:229)n att p(cid:229) detta sa¤tt bryta mot det nu ga¤llande fiskeriavtalet?


title: Ψήφισμα σχετικά με τις τρομοκρατικές επιθέσεις στη Χώρα των Βάσκων

eurovoc_concepts:
Basque Country
Spain
homicide
terrorism


title: WRITTEN QUESTION No. 4229/97 by Ulf HOLM to the Council. Treaty of Amsterdam publicity campaign

eurovoc_concepts:
EU law - national law
European treaties
Germany
Sweden
access to EU information
advertising
dissemination of EU information
impact of advertising
public awareness campaign

text: 22. 6. 98 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 196/105 (98/C 196/146) WRITTEN QUESTION P-4229/97 by Ulf Holm (V) to the Council (15 January 1998) Subject: Treaty of Amsterdam publicity campaign In the autumn, Sweden(cid:146)s Ministry of Foreign Affairs launched a large-scale propaganda campaign costing about SKR 9 million to promote the Treaty of Amsterdam. The material used in the campaign contains many factual errors, however, and the text is mainly devoted to examples of what are referred to as Swedish (cid:145)successes(cid:146) on employment, the environment and equal opportunities. Yet the German Foreign Affairs Ministry(cid:146)s publication (cid:145)Der Abschluss der Regierungskonferenz › eine Gesamtwertung(cid:146), for instance, does not even mention the issues highlighted in the Swedish campaign. Instead, it sets out in detail the aim of the Treaty of Amsterdam, namely further development of the common foreign and security policy, greater police and judicial cooperation and making the Union more effective by increasing its supranational dimension and curbing Member States(cid:146) rights of veto, so as to make enlargement possible. The differences in the content of the material are so great that readers cannot help wondering if these texts refer to the same Treaty of Amsterdam. Instead of a public debate, we have thus got one-way communication, in which the authorities tell the public how things stand. In view of this, will the Council state: it is possible for information material produced by the governments of two Member States to differ so much? Whether it considers it ethically correct for governments to use their powers and for taxpayers(cid:146) money to be spent to run (cid:145)politically(cid:146) very biased information campaigns about the EU which also contain factual errors? Answer (30 March 1998) The Honourable Member will kindly note that it is not for the Council to express an opinion on the information supplied by Member States in connection with the Amsterdam Treaty, which is currently subject to ratification by the Member States. Through the Office for Official Publications of the European Communities the General Secretariat of the Council contributed to the publication of the texts of the Treaty of Amsterdam and of the consolidated versions of the Treaties. These publications may be consulted free of charge on the Internet via the General Secretariat of the Council(cid:146)s website (http://ue. eu. int). The texts are accompanied by descriptive summaries involving the liability of neither the Community institutions nor the Member States. (98/C 196/147) WRITTEN QUESTION P-4230/97 by Pierluigi Castagnetti (PPE) to the Commission (14 January 1998) Subject: Approval of the 1997-1999 Single Planning Document for the Region Friuli Venezia Giulia The Region of Friuli Venezia Giulia submitted to the Commission the Single Planning Document for the period 1997-1999 at the beginning of August. Despite intensive negotiations and assurances that the decision-making process would be rapidly concluded, the Document has still not been approved by the Commission. Can the Commission state the reasons for the delay? Is the Commission aware that the unjustified delay in the adoption of a decision on the subject is causing the regional government obvious difficulties in the execution of the planned measures?


title: Ψήφισμα σχετικά με το αποτέλεσμα των εκλογών στην Κένυα

eurovoc_concepts:
Kenya
national election


title: SCHRIFTELIJKE VRAAG nr. 4055/97 van Yiannis ROUBATIS aan dee Raad. Rapport van Amnesty International over de toestand van de mensenrechten in Turkije

text: C 223/46 NL Publicatieblad van de Europese Gemeenschappen 17. 7. 98 (98/C 223/53) SCHRIFTELIJKE VRAAG E-4050/97 van Stephen Hughes (PSE) aan de Commissie (14 januari 1998) Betreft: Psycho-organisch syndroom Wat zijn de blootstellingslimieten in de vijftien lidstaten voor de familie van agentia die in verband worden gebracht met het psycho-organisch syndroom? Gelden er verboden voor bepaalde agentia? Worden bepaalde agentia in enige lidstaat in verband gebracht met erkende vormen van arbeidsgerelateerd letsel? In welke mate heeft er in de lidstaten vervanging plaatsgevonden met betrekking tot de als meest gevaarlijk beschouwde agentia? Antwoord van de heer Flynn namens de Commissie (30 januari 1998) De Commissie heeft het Europees agentschap voor de veiligheid en de gezondheid op het werk verzocht om technische informatie over het door de geachte afgevaardigde genoemde probleem. Wanneer de Commissie deze informatie zal hebben ontvangen, zal zij de geachte afgevaardigde een volledig antwoord geven. (98/C 223/54) SCHRIFTELIJKE VRAAG E-4055/97 van Yiannis Roubatis (PSE) aan de Raad (15 januari 1998) Betreft: Rapport van Amnesty International over de toestand van de mensenrechten in Turkije In het laatste rapport van Amnesty International over de toestand van de mensenrechten in Turkije wordt dit land ervan beschuldigd jongeren te folteren en gevangenen te executeren en te doen verdwijnen. Volgens Amnesty International zijn in 1997 in Turkije 25 personen tijdens hun gevangenschap vermoord en zijn 23 personen sedert hun arrestatie vermist. Kan de Raad antwoorden op de volgende vragen: 1. Welke maatregelen denkt de Raad te nemen om te voorkomen dat de Europese Unie nog langer bespottelijk wordt gemaakt door de achtereenvolgende Turkse regeringen en om een eind te stellen aan de voortdurende onaanvaardbare toestand van de mensenrechten in Turkije? 2. Wat denkt hij te doen om de politieke en militaire leiders van Turkije eindelijk te doen inzien dat zij niet kunnen doorgaan met het folteren en het doden van de burgers van hun land, dit terwijl de internationale gemeenschap met afgrijzen deze ontwikkelingen volgt? (98/C 223/55) SCHRIFTELIJKE VRAAG E-0262/98 van Yiannis Roubatis (PSE) aan de Raad (17 februari 1998) Betreft: Rapport van Amnesty International over de toestand van de mensenrechten in Turkije In het laatste rapport van Amnesty International over de toestand van de mensenrechten in Turkije wordt dit land ervan beschuldigd jongeren te folteren en gevangenen te executeren en te doen verdwijnen. Volgens Amnesty International zijn in 1997 in Turkije 25 personen tijdens hun gevangenschap vermoord en zijn 23 personen sedert hun arrestatie vermist. Kan de Raad antwoorden op de volgende vragen: 1. Welke maatregelen denkt de Raad te nemen om ervoor te zorgen dat de Europese Unie niet langer voor de gek wordt gehouden door de achtereenvolgende Turkse regeringen en dat een eind wordt gesteld aan de voortdurende onaanvaardbare toestand van de mensenrechten in Turkije? 2. Wat denkt hij te doen om de politieke en militaire leiders van Turkije eindelijk te doen inzien dat zij niet kunnen doorgaan met het folteren en het doden van de burgers van hun land, dit terwijl de internationale gemeenschap met afgrijzen deze ontwikkelingen volgt?


title: Resolution on the terrorist attacks in the Basque country


title: SCHRIFTELIJKE VRAAG nr. 1/98 van Alexandros ALAVANOS aan de Commissie. Controle op luchtvaartuigen uit derde landen

eurovoc_concepts:
air safety
air traffic control
air transport
aircraft
civil aviation
international standard
safety standard
third country

text: C 196/106 NL Publicatieblad van de Europese Gemeenschappen 22. 6. 98 Antwoord van mevrouw Wulf-Mathies namens de Commissie (6 februari 1998) De Commissie kan tot haar genoegen meedelen dat het gecombineerde programmeringsdocument in het kader van doelstelling 2 voor Friuli-Venezia-Giulia voor de periode 1997-1999 op 18 december 1997 is goedgekeurd. De Commissie betreurt de vertraging die in de besluitvorming is opgetreden en die in hoofdzaak was toe te schrijven aan de noodzaak meer duidelijkheid te verkrijgen over bepaalde aspecten van de voorstellen van de regio. Zij zal alles in het werk stellen om de regio te helpen het hoofd te bieden aan de uitvoeringsproblemen die hiervan het gevolg zouden kunnen zijn. (98/C 196/148) SCHRIFTELIJKE VRAAG P-0001/98 van Alexandros Alavanos (GUE/NGL) aan de Commissie (15 januari 1998) Betreft: Controle op luchtvaartuigen uit derde landen Op 17 december 1997 is in Griekenland een Oekra(cid:14)¤ense (cid:132)Jakovlev(cid:148) gecrasht en bij deze ramp kwamen alle passagiers en de bemanning om het leven. Ook al zijn de officie¤le resultaten van het onderzoek naar de oorzaak van het ongeluk nog niet bekend gemaakt, toch kan men zich afvragen of de veiligheidsvoorschriften werden nageleefd, of het vliegtuig voor de vlucht afdoende gecontroleerd werd en of de bemanning voldoende Engels kende. Op 17 februari 1997 heeft de Commissie een voorstel voor een richtlijn van de Raad ingediend (cid:132)houdende invoering van een veiligheidsbeoordeling van luchtvaartuigen uit derde landen die gebruik maken van luchthavens in de Gemeenschap(cid:148)en dit voorstel werd behandeld in de plenaire vergadering van het Europees Parlement in de vergaderperiode van november 1997. Kan de Commissie op grond van de door haar uitgevoerde studies zeggen welke landen van de Europese Unie reeds controles uitvoeren op vliegtuigen uit derde landen, en wat deze controles precies inhouden? Behoort Griekenland tot de landen die grondige controles uitvoeren? Zal de Commissie, gezien de ernst van de kwestie en de lange periode die nog zal verlopen tot de richtlijn volledig is goedgekeurd en wordt toegepast in de lidstaten, initiatieven nemen om de lidstaten te verplichten onverwijld een pakket maatregelen te nemen inzake de controle op luchtvaartuigen uit derde landen, zodat de risico(cid:146)s op nieuwe ongelukken onmiddellijk worden verminderd? Antwoord van de heer Kinnock namens de Commissie (6 februari 1998) Volgens het Verdrag van Chicago inzake de burgerluchtvaart hebben staten het recht om een platforminspectie uit te voeren wanneer zij vermoeden dat een buitenlands vliegtuig niet aan de internationale veiligheidsnormen beantwoordt. Het voorstel van de Commissie (1) maakt beter gebruik van dit bestaande recht door van de lidstaten te verlangen dat zij dergelijke inspecties onder bepaalde omstandigheden uitvoeren, dat zij informatie verzamelen en uitwisselen, dat zij onveilige vliegtuigen aan de grond houden en dat zij eventueel gezamenlijke maatregelen treffen. De Commissie heeft begrepen dat de meeste, zij het niet alle, lidstaten al sinds enige tijd op eigen initiatief platforminspecties uitvoeren. De Commissie wordt niet altijd op de hoogte gesteld van deze inspecties en weet niet of dergelijke inspecties ook in Griekenland plaatsvinden. De Commissie kent daarentegen wel de lidstaten die al informatie uitwisselen en de inwerkingtreding van de voorgestelde richtlijn dus niet hebben afgewacht. Het gaat om Belgie¤, Denemarken, Duitsland, Frankrijk, Ierland, Luxemburg, Nederland, Portugal, Zweden en het Verenigd Koninkrijk. De Commissie weet dat er ten minste nog twee andere lidstaten zijn die platforminspecties uitvoeren, maar dat zij om juridische redenen nog niet aan de informatie-uitwisseling deelnemen. Om het de lidstaten mogelijk te maken nog voor de inwerkingtreding van de richtlijn een deel van de maatregelen toe te passen, verleent de Commissie financie¤le steun voor de opzet en exploitatie van een database waarin al meer dan 1400 inspectierapporten zijn opgenomen, die ten minste in vijf gevallen tot een vliegverbod hebben geleid. (1) COM(97) 55 def. van 17. 2. 1997


title: WRITTEN QUESTION No. 25/98 by Glenys KINNOCK to the Commission. Situation in Algeria

eurovoc_concepts:
Algeria
EU aid
financial aid
humanitarian aid
technical cooperation
terms for aid

text: 16. 6. 98 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 187/139 3. What control mechanisms does the Commission have to make it more difficult for front organizations to obtain subsidies under false pretences? Did the controls fail in the case of the Moholm subsidies and will the Commission now scrutinize this case in greater detail to reclaim any subsidies paid in error? Answer given by Mr Fischler on behalf of the Commission (2 February 1998) The aid to which the Honourable Member refers was presumably granted in the framework of the Swedish agri-environment programme (cid:145)Miljo¤programmet(cid:146). This programme includes a measure to support organic farming, if beneficiaries agree to fulfil certain undertakings, such as not to use pesticides. The (cid:145)Miljo¤programmet(cid:146) implements Council Regulation (EEC) No 2078/92 of 30 June 1992 on agricultural production methods compatible with the requirements of the protection of the environment and the maintenance of the country (1) in Sweden and is co-financed by the Community. Member States implement the programmes, receive applications from individual farmers, check if the applicants fulfil the objective conditions as set out in the Regulation, make necessary controls and carry out sanctions if needed. The Commission is therefore not directly responsible for the administrative implementation of the scheme and is not systematically informed on individual aid files. The programme was prepared and put forward by Sweden for approval and the Commission examined it to ensure its conformity with the agri-environment regulation (Regulation (EEC) No 2078/92). (1) OJ L 215, 30. 7. 1992. (98/C 187/213) WRITTEN QUESTION E-0012/98 by Philippe Monfils (ELDR) to the Commission (29 January 1998) Subject: Implementation of the (cid:145)Daphne(cid:146) programme The Commission(cid:146)s (cid:145)Daphne(cid:146) programme, launched under a budgetary item providing ECU 3 million for action to combat abuse, lays down the criteria for projects to qualify for funding. Can the Commission provide me with a list of the projects selected, the name and addresses of the bodies responsible for these projects, and the funds allocated to each one? Answer given by Mrs Gradin on behalf of the Commission (26 February 1998) In view of the length of its answer, the Commission is sending it direct to the Honourable Member and to Parliament(cid:146)s Secretariat. (98/C 187/214) WRITTEN QUESTION P-0025/98 by Glenys Kinnock (PSE) to the Commission (15 January 1998) Subject: Situation in Algeria Would the Commission please issue a statement on the current situation in Algeria? Would it also identify what efforts have been made, or are planned, to determine the causes of the massacres which have taken place and to promote a political solution? What has been the response of the Algerian authorities to any such initiatives?


title: 98/88/ΕΚ: Απόφαση της Επιτροπής της 15ης Ιανουαρίου 1998 για την τροποποίηση της απόφασης 97/252/ΕΚ για την κατάρτιση προσωρινών καταλόγων επιχειρήσεων τρίτων χωρών από τις οποίες τα κράτη μέλη επιτρέπουν τις εισαγωγές γάλακτος και προϊόντων με βάση το γάλα που προορίζονται για κατανάλωση από τον άνθρωπο (Κείμενο που παρουσιάζει ενδιαφέρον για τον ΕΟΧ)

eurovoc_concepts:
Croatia
health control
human nutrition
import
milk
milk product

text: 22. 1. 98 ‹ EL ‹ Επ˜ισηµη Εφηµερ˜ιδα των Ευρωπαˇικ ˜ων Κοινοτ ˜ητων L 17/31 ΑΠΟVΑΣΗ ΤΗΣ ΕΠΙΤΡΟΠΗΣ τηr 15ηr Ιανουαρ˜ιου 1998 για την τροποπο˜ιηση τηr απ ˜οφασηr 97/252/ΕΚ για την κατ ˜αρτιση προσωριν ˜ων καταλ ˜ογων επιχειρ ˜ησεων τρ˜ιτων χωρ ˜ων απ ˜ο τιr οπο˜ιεr τα κρ ˜ατη µ ˜ελη επιτρ ˜επουν τιr εισαγωγ ˜εr γ ˜αλακτοr και προιˇ ˜οντων µε β ˜αση το γ ˜αλα που προορ˜ιζονται για καταν ˜αλωση απ ˜ο τον ˜ανθρωπο (Κε˜ιµενο που παρουσι ˜αζει ενδιαφ ˜ερον για τον ΕΟΧ) (98/88/ΕΚ) Η ΕΠΙΤΡΟΠΗ ΤΩΝ ΕΥΡΩΠΑ˘ΙΚΩΝ ΚΟΙΝΟΤΗΤΩΝ, ˜Εχονταr υπ ˜οψη: τη συνθ ˜ηκη για την ˜ιδρυση τηr Ευρωπαˇικ ˜ηr Κοιν ˜οτηταr, την απ ˜οφαση 95/408/ΕΚ του Συµβουλ˜ιου, τηr 22αr Ιουν˜ιου 1995, σχετικ ˜α µε τιr λεπτοµ ˜ερειεr κατ ˜αρτισηr, για µια µετα- βατικ ˜η περ˜ιοδο, προσωριν ˜ων καταλ ˜ογων επιχειρ ˜ησεων τρ˜ιτων χωρ ˜ων απ ˜ο τιr οπο˜ιεr επιτρ ˜επεται στα κρ ˜ατη µ ˜ελη να εισ ˜αγουν ορισµ ˜ενα προˇι ˜οντα ζωικ ˜ηr προ ˜ελευσηr, προˇι- ˜οντα αλιε˜ιαr και ζ ˜ωντα δ˜ιθυρα µαλ ˜ακια (1), ˜οπωr τροποποι- ˜ηθηκε τελευτα˜ια απ ˜ο την απ ˜οφαση 97/34/ΕΚ (2), και ιδ˜ιωr το ˜αρθρο 2 παρ ˜αγραφοr 1, ˜οτι η Επιτροπ ˜η ˜εχει λ ˜αβει, εκ µ ˜ερουr τηr Κροατ˜ιαr, ˜εναν κατ ˜αλογο επιχειρ ˜ησεων, συνοδευ ˜οµενο απ ˜ο εγγυ ˜ησειr σ ˜υµφωνα µε τιr οπο˜ιεr οι επιχειρ ˜ησειr αυτ ˜εr πληρο ˜υν τιr σχετικ ˜εr υγειονοµικ ˜εr απαιτ ˜ησειr τηr Κοιν ˜οτηταr, και ˜οτι, σε περ˜ιπτωση µη τ ˜ηρησηr αυτ ˜ων των απαιτ ˜ησεων απ ˜ο µ˜ια επιχε˜ιρηση, ενδ ˜εχεται να ανασταλο ˜υν οι εξαγωγικ ˜εr τηr δραστηρι ˜οτητεr προr την Ευρωπαˇικ ˜η Κοιν ˜οτητα· ˜οτι τα µ ˜ετρα που προβλ ˜επονται στην παρο ˜υσα απ ˜οφαση ε˜ιναι σ ˜υµφωνα µε τη γν ˜ωµη τηr µ ˜ονιµηr κτηνιατρικ ˜ηr επιτροπ ˜ηr, Εκτιµ ˜ωνταr: ΕΞΕ∆ΩΣΕ ΤΗΝ ΠΑΡΟΥΣΑ ΑΠΟVΑΣΗ: ˜οτι, µε την απ ˜οφαση 95/340/ΕΚ τηr Επιτροπ ˜ηr (3), ˜οπωr τροποποι ˜ηθηκε τελευτα˜ια απ ˜ο την απ ˜οφαση 96/584/ΕΚ (4), καταρτ˜ιστηκε κατ ˜αλογοr των τρ˜ιτων χωρ ˜ων απ ˜ο τιr οπο˜ιεr τα κρ ˜ατη µ ˜ελη επιτρ ˜επουν τιr εισαγωγ ˜εr γ ˜αλακτοr και προˇι ˜οντων µε β ˜αση το γ ˜αλα· ˜οτι, για τιr χ ˜ωρεr που εµφα˜ινονται στον κατ ˜αλογο αυτ ˜ο, οι ˜οροι υγειονοµικο ˜υ ελ ˜εγχου και η κτηνιατρικ ˜η πιστοπο˜ιηση που απαιτο ˜υνται για την εισαγωγ ˜η γ ˜αλακτοr και προˇι ˜οντων µε β ˜αση το γ ˜αλα, καθορ˜ιστηκαν µε την απ ˜οφαση 95/343/ΕΚ τηr Επιτροπ ˜ηr (5), ˜οπωr τροποποι ˜ηθηκε τελευ- τα˜ια απ ˜ο την απ ˜οφαση 97/115/ΕΚ (6)· ˜οτι µε την απ ˜οφαση 97/252/ΕΚ τηr Επιτροπ ˜ηr (7), ˜οπωr τροποποι ˜ηθηκε τελευτα˜ια απ ˜ο την απ ˜οφαση 98/87/ΕΚ (8), καταρτ˜ιστηκαν προσωρινο˜ι κατ ˜αλογοι επιχειρ ˜ησεων τρ˜ιτων χωρ ˜ων απ ˜ο τιr οπο˜ιεr τα κρ ˜ατη µ ˜ελη επιτρ ˜επουν τιr εισαγω- γ ˜εr γ ˜αλακτοr και προˇι ˜οντων µε β ˜αση το γ ˜αλα που προορ˜ι- ζονται για καταν ˜αλωση απ ˜ο τον ˜ανθρωπο· ˜Αρθρο 1 Το παρ ˜αρτηµα τηr απ ˜οφασηr 97/252/ΕΚ συµπληρ ˜ωνεται ˜οσον αφορ ˜α τη απ ˜ο το παρ ˜αρτηµα τηr παρο ˜υσαr απ ˜οφασηr, Κροατ˜ια. ˜Αρθρο 2 Η παρο ˜υσα απ ˜οφαση απευθ ˜υνεται στα κρ ˜ατη µ ˜ελη. Βρυξ ˜ελλεr, 15 Ιανουαρ˜ιου 1998. Για την Επιτροπ˜η Franz FISCHLER Μ˜ελοr τηr Επιτροπ˜ηr (1) ΕΕ L 243 τηr 11. 10. 1995, σ. 17. (2) ΕΕ L 13 τηr 16. 1. 1997, σ. 33. (3) ΕΕ L 200 τηr 24. 8. 1995, σ. 38. (4) ΕΕ L 255 τηr 9. 10. 1996, σ. 20. (5) ΕΕ L 200 τηr 24. 8. 1995, σ. 52. (6) ΕΕ L 42 τηr 13. 2. 1997, σ. 16. (7) ΕΕ L 101 τηr 18. 4. 1997, σ. 46. (8) Βλ ˜επε σελ˜ιδα 28 τηr παρο ˜υσαr Επ˜ισηµηr Εφηµερ˜ιδαr. L 17/32 ‹ EL ‹ Επ˜ισηµη Εφηµερ˜ιδα των Ευρωπαˇικ ˜ων Κοινοτ ˜ητων 22. 1. 98 ANEXO — BILAG — ANHANG — ΠΑΡΑΡΤΗΜΑ— ANNEX — ANNEXE — ALLEGATO — BIJLAGE — ANEXO — LIITE — BILAGA País: CROACIA / Land: KROATIEN / Land: KROATIEN / Χ ˜ωρα: Κροατ˜ια / Country: CROATIA / Pays: CROATIE / Paese: CROAZIA / Land: KROATIË / País: CRO ATIA / Maa: KROATIA / Land: KROATIEN 1 5 7 11 56 79 2 3 4 5 «Vindija» d. d. VARAZDIN ZUPANIJA VARAZDINSKA «Paska Sirana» d. d. PAG ZUPANIJA ZADARSKA «Ledo» d. d. ZAGREB ZUPANIJA ZAGREBACKA IPK «Osijek» d. d. OSIJEK ZUPANIJA OSJECKOBARANJSKA PPI «Zdenka» d. d. VELIKI ZDENCI ZUPANIJA BJELOVARSKO-BILOGORSKA 145 «Sirela» d. d. BJELOVAR ZUPANIJA BJELOVARSKO-BILOGORSKA 146 «Kim» d. d. KARLOVAC ZUPANIJA KARLOVACKA 159 «Dukat» d. d. ZAGREB ZUPANIJA ZAGREBACKA