title: Opinion of the European Monetary Institute at the request of the United Kingdom under Article 109f(6) of the Treaty establishing the European Community (the “Treaty”) and Article 5.3 of the Statute of the EMI concerning a Bank of England Bill (CON/97/27)

eurovoc_concepts:
United Kingdom
central bank
convergence criteria
financial stability
monetary integration
national law

text: OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN MONETARY INSTITUTE 21 January 1998 at the request of the United Kingdom under Article 109f(6) of the Treaty establishing the European Community (the “Treaty”) and Article 5. 3 of the Statute of the EMI concerning a Bank of England Bill (CON/97/27) Introduction 1. On 31 October 1997 the EMI received from the Chief Secretary to H. M. Treasury a request for an opinion on a Bank of England Bill (“the bill”). 2. The EMI’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Article 1. 1, second and fifth indents, of the Council Decision of 22 November 1993 (93/717/EC) (“the Council Decision”) on consultation of the EMI by the authorities of the Member States on draft legislative provisions, as the bill contains inter alia provisions concerning the status and powers of the Bank of England (“the Bank”), instruments of monetary policy and rules applicable to financial institutions in so far as they influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. 3. The EMI has been informed that it may be of assistance to the process of public scrutiny of the bill within the UK if its opinion were to be available before the debate in parliamentary Committee on the bill. Whilst the EMI wishes to be helpful in this regard, it notes the provisions of the Council Decision that Member States shall ensure that the EMI is consulted at an appropriate stage to enable the consulting authority to have the EMI’s opinion before taking its decision on the substance of the draft legislation and that any time limit imposed upon the EMI may not be less than one month. The EMI therefore proposes to issue its general comments in time for the UK parliamentary Committee debate, and to finalise its opinion by the addition of more detailed comments at a later date. 4. Pursuant to notification given by the United Kingdom on 30 October 1997 that it does not intend to move to Stage Three, certain provisions of the Treaty and the ESCB/ECB statute set out in the third protocol to the Treaty (“the Statute”) do not apply to the United Kingdom, including - 2 - Article 107 (dealing with the independence of national central banks) and Article 108 (dealing with the compatibility of legislation). In consequence, there is no current legal requirement to ensure that, by the time the ESCB is established, national legislation, including the statutes establishing the Bank, has become compatible with the Treaty and the Statute, nor that the Bank satisfies the requirements for central bank independence. 5. Article 109e(5) of the Treaty provides that during the second stage each Member State shall, as appropriate, start the process leading to the independence of its central bank, in accordance with Article 108. While Article 109e(5) applies to the UK, Article 108 does not. Although the EMI understands that the bill is not intended to comply with the provisions of the Treaty, it considers that the bill is a step in the process towards the independence of the Bank, and welcomes it accordingly. 6. In this opinion the EMI will divide its comments into those which relate to central bank independence, which the EMI hopes may be helpful in clarifying the requirements for central bank independence established in the Treaty, and those which relate more widely to integration within the ESCB, which will be of most relevance if the UK intends to join the single currency. 7 The background to the views of the EMI is set out in its reports on the adaptation of national legislation (in particular the statutes of national central banks) the most recent of which is the report entitled “Legal Convergence in the Member States of the European Union as at August 1997”, published on 27 October 1997. The EMI noted in that report that further legislation would be required if the United Kingdom intended to join the single currency. The EMI notes that the bill embodies most of the reforms announced by the Chancellor of the Exchequer on 6 May 1997 and as referred to in the EMI’s report. Central bank independence. 8. The EMI notes that the bill provides for a higher degree of autonomy of the Bank. It welcomes this step. However, the provisions of the bill fall short of the level of independence required by the Treaty. 9. The EMI notes as a general matter that effective central bank independence cannot be restricted to operational aspects. In this regard it notes that, although the priority of the Bank’s monetary policy objective is clear, the requirement on the Treasury to set inflation targets and specify what the economic policy of the government is to be taken to be does not necessarily separate monetary policy from political decisions. This would be particularly so if there are frequent revisions of what price stability is to be taken to consist of or of the inflation target in the specification of economic policy. The EMI notes that such specifications are to be made by - 3 - the Treasury at least once a year. The EMI would emphasise that account should be taken of the time delay involved in the transmission of monetary policy impulses. The EMI understands that the Bank has traditionally identified a lag of 18 to 24 months before monetary policy becomes fully effective. Any alteration to the inflation target each year (a possibility not excluded by clause 12) might not allow for the existence of such lags. (In this context the EMI understands further that the UK government will monitor the UK’s inflation target and inflation measure in the light of the practices of the ECB. ) Further assessment in relation to independence (including functional independence) would be required as regards other ESCB-related tasks. 10. (Clause 1 of the bill) The arrangements proposed in the bill for the court of directors of the Bank continue to exclude from eligibility those who are in the service of the state. However, the arrangements do not meet the requirements for personal independence that derive from the Treaty and the Statute and which apply to the performance of ESCB-related tasks. Such tasks are not limited to the formulation and implementation of monetary policy. The EMI notes that the tenure of directors other than the Governor and the two Deputy Governors is to be three years, or in some cases even less, where the Treaty requires five; and that the possibility that conflicts of interest might arise is not excluded (indeed, an arrangement is made to resolve them at schedule 1, paragraph 13). The EMI would prefer for bodies making decisions on ESCB-related tasks an arrangement which would preclude any such conflict. 11. (Clause 7 of the bill) The power of the Treasury to require the Bank to publish additional information in relation to its accounts may not be consistent with the ESCB’s confidentiality regime. 12. (Clauses 10 and 19 of the bill) Article 107 of the Treaty prohibits any national central bank or any member of any of their decision-making bodies from seeking or taking instructions from, amongst others, any government. Whilst the bill removes from the Treasury the power to give directions to the Bank in relation to monetary policy, it also establishes a reserve power enabling the Treasury to give the Bank directions for limited periods if such are required in the public interest and by extreme economic circumstances. This would not be compatible with the requirements of the Treaty, in which the prohibition against giving such directions is absolute. 13. (Clause 13(2) of the bill) The provisions for the members of the Monetary Policy Committee do not comply with the requirements of the Treaty and the Statute in that their tenure is to be for three years, or in some cases even less, instead of at least five (schedule 3, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the bill). Integration within the ESCB. - 4 - 14. The EMI notes that no provision has been made as regards the integration of the Bank into the ESCB. 15. (Clause 6 of the bill) The provisions set out in schedule 2 to the bill relating to cash ratio deposits are established as part of the arrangements for financing the Bank. Whilst the EMI acknowledges that they are not intended to be used as a monetary policy instrument, it notes that the holding of minimum reserves might be a monetary policy instrument in Stage Three and that such cash ratio deposits would need to be reviewed accordingly. 16 (Clause 7 of the bill) The proposed financial arrangements would have to be modified to take account of the financial provisions of the ESCB as set out in Chapter VI of the Statute. 17. (Clauses 11 and 12 of the bill) The Treaty requires that the primary statutory objective of the ESCB shall be the maintenance of price stability. The EMI notes that the bill provides that the primary objective of the Bank shall be to maintain price stability. However, this objective is qualified by relating only to monetary policy and by being subject to the power of the Treasury to specify what price stability is (a point which also affects independence). Whilst the general statement of the objective of price stability represents a welcome move towards the requirement of the Treaty, the EMI notes that the existence of the qualifications and, in particular, the power for the UK government to specify what price stability is would not be compatible with the requirements of the Treaty regarding national central banks becoming an integral part of the ESCB. 18 (Clauses 11 and 12 of the bill) The Bank’s secondary objective, again only in relation to monetary policy, is to support the economic policy of the UK government, including the government’s objectives for growth and employment. These provisions would not be consistent with the secondary objectives required by the Treaty, which include (Article 2 of the Statute) the support of the general economic policies of the Community with a view to contributing to the achievement of the Community’s objectives as laid down in Article 2 of the Treaty. 19. (Clause 13(1) of the bill) The bill establishes a Monetary Policy Committee which shall have responsibility for formulating monetary policy. All the members of the committee will be in the service of the Bank and will have relevant expertise. However, the existence of this responsibility would not be consistent with the monetary policy competences of the Governing Council of the ECB in Stage Three. 20. (Clauses 14 and 15 of the bill) The regime for the publication of information concerning discussions and decisions would not be consistent with the transfer to Community level of control over such publication. - 5 - Collection of statistical information. 21. (Clause 17 of the bill) The Bank’s power to obtain information mentions some but not all categories included in the reference reporting population as set out in Article 2 of the draft EU Council Regulation concerning the collection of statistical information by the ECB. Thus the category of (non-monetary) financial institutions included in Article 2(a) of the draft regulation is wider than in clause 17(3) of the bill; the bill does not mention economic entities holding cross- border positions, undertaking cross-border transactions, and issuing pre-paid cards. Moreover, the bill at 17(4) empowers the Treasury to determine which “financial affairs” of an undertaking should be reported on and at 17(5) to amend the categories of undertaking to which clause 17 applies. In particular, it should be noted that the EMI/ECB is not listed among the organisations which the Treasury must consult before doing so. This omission may be inconsistent with Article 5 of the Statute, which applies to the United Kingdom (whether or not it joins the single currency). Stability of financial institutions and markets. 22. (Part III of the bill) The EMI notes that the bill foresees a change in the organisation of prudential supervision. Parts III and IV of the bill concern inter alia rules applicable to financial institutions which influence the stability of financial institutions and markets. The EMI notes the proposed transfer of supervisory responsibility to the Financial Services Authority and trusts that the process of reorganisation will not affect the stability of the banking system and the financial markets. In this context the EMI notes that the Bank of England has already been party to a Memorandum of Understanding negotiated with the Treasury and the Financial Services Authority which accompanies the process of reorganisation of prudential supervision and in which the prudential supervisory functions in the new regime are explained. The EMI notes that the Bank will continue to be concerned with the stability of the banking system and that the Deputy Governor of the Bank responsible for financial stability will be an ex officio member of the Deposit Protection Board (clause 29 (2) (c) of the bill). The EMI considers these arrangements to be in conformity with Article 3. 3 of the Statute, which states that the ESCB shall contribute to the smooth conduct of policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system. 23. The EMI recalls that this is the general part of its opinion, and that more detailed comments are to be added at a later date. The EMI has no objection to this part of its opinion being made public. - 6 - On 10 November 1997 the EMI issued the first part of its opinion, containing the general comments it wished to make. This second and final part of the EMI’s opinion repeats above without amendment the first part and supplements it with the addition of the more detailed comments set out below. Central bank independence. 24. (Schedules 1 and 3 of the bill) Schedule 1, paragraph 3 and schedule 3, paragraph 2 respectively provide that a person appointed in place of a person who ceases to hold office before the end of the term for which he or she was appointed shall be appointed only for the remainder of that person’s term of office. The EMI notes that this may result in appointments of a very short length, in consequence of which the independence of those so appointed may be subject to influence which affects the level of independence required by the Treaty and Statute. Integration within the ESCB. 25. (Clause 18 of the bill) As noted at paragraph 20 above, the regime for publication of information concerning the discussions and decisions of the Monetary Policy Committee would not be consistent with the Treaty and Statute. In particular, the publication on a quarterly basis by the Bank of a report which contains a review of monetary policy decisions and an indication of the expected approach to meeting monetary and economic policy objectives in the future could, depending on the content of the report, be incompatible with the information provisions contained in the Statute and, possibly, with Article 10. 4 of the Statute which states that the proceedings of the ECB Governing Council shall be confidential and that the ECB Governing Council may decide to make the outcome of its deliberations public. 26. The EMI has no objection to the totality of its opinion being made public. 21 January 1998


eurovoc_concepts:
import licence
quantitative restriction
rice
tariff quota
third country

formats: pdf print

text: L 17/18 ‹ FI ‹ Euroopan yhteisöjen virallinen lehti 22. 1. 98 KOMISSION ASETUS (EY) N:o 144/98, annettu 21 päivänä tammikuuta 1998, neuvoston asetuksessa (EY) N:o 1522/96 säädetyn järjestelmän mukaisesti vuoden 1998 tammikuun viiden ensimmäisen työpäivän kuluessa jätetyistä riisin ja rikkoutuneiden riisinjyvien tuontitodistushakemuksista EUROOPAN YHTEISÖJEN KOMISSIO, joka ottaa huomioon Euroopan yhteisön perustamissopimuk- sen, rikkoutuneiden riisinjyvien ottaa huomioon riisin ja tuontia koskevien tiettyjen tariffikiintiöiden avaamisesta ja hallinnoinnista 24 päivänä heinäkuuta 1996 annetun neuvoston asetuksen (EY) N:o 1522/96 (1), sellaisena kuin se on muutettuna komission asetuksella (EY) N:o 112/ 97 (2), ja erityisesti sen 5 artiklan 2 kohdan, sekä katsoo, että asetuksen (EY) N:o 1522/96 5 artiklan 2 kohdan mukaan komissio päättää kymmenen päivän kuluessa todistusha- kemusten viimeisestä jättöpäivästä, mikä määrä hake- ja vahvistaa muksen kattamista määristä saadaan tuoda, ja seuraavassa osuudessa käytettävissä olevat määrät, vuoden 1998 tammikuun viitenä ensimmäisenä työpäi- vänä jätettyihin hakemuksiin liittyvien määrien ja käytet- tävissä olevien määrien vertailu osoittaa, että todistukset voidaan antaa yhtenäistä alennusprosenttia soveltamalla, ON ANTANUT TÄMÄN ASETUKSEN: 1 artikla Asetuksessa (EY) N:o 1522/96 säädetyn järjestelmän mukaisesti vuoden 1998 tammikuun viiden ensimmäisen työpäivän aikana jätettyjen riisin ja rikkoutuneiden riisin- jyvien tuontitodistuksia koskeviin hakemuksiin, joista on vähennysprosentit ilmoitettu komissiolle, vahvistetaan liitteessä. sovellettavat 2 artikla Tämä asetus tulee voimaan 22 päivänä tammikuuta 1998. Tämä asetus on kaikilta osiltaan velvoittava, jäsenvaltioissa. ja sitä sovelletaan sellaisenaan kaikissa Tehty Brysselissä 21 päivänä tammikuuta 1998. Komission puolesta Franz FISCHLER Komission jäsen (1) EYVL L 190, 31. 7. 1996, s. 1 (2) EYVL L 20, 23. 1. 1997, s. 23 22. 1. 98 ‹ FI ‹ Euroopan yhteisöjen virallinen lehti L 17/19 LIITE Asetuksen (EY) N:o 1522/96 5 artiklan 2 kohta Seuraavan osuuden osalta haettuihin määriin ja käytettävissä oleviin määriin sovellettava vähennyskerroin: a) 2 artiklan 1 kohdan a alakohdassa tarkoitettu kiintiö, CN-koodiin 1006 30 kuuluva kokonaan hiottu riisi ja osittain hiottu riisi Alkuperämaa Vähennys- prosentti Huhtikuun 1998 osuudesta käytettävissä oleva määrä (tonnia) Thaimaa Australia Muut alkuperämaat 0 — — (1) 1 019 1 805 (1) Vahvistetaan lähiaikoina avattavia tammikuun 1998 lisäeriä koskevien todistusten antamista koskevan päätöksen yhteydessä. b) 2 artiklan 1 kohdan b alakohdassa tarkoitettu kiintiö, CN-koodiin 1006 20 kuuluva esikuorittu riisi Alkuperämaa Vähennys- prosentti Huhtikuun 1998 osuudesta käytettävissä oleva määrä (tonnia) Australia Thaimaa Muut alkuperämaat 0 — — 7 822 1 812 117 c) 2 artiklan 1 kohdan c alakohdassa tarkoitettu kiintiö, CN-koodiin 1006 40 00 kuuluvat rikkoutuneet riisinjyvät Alkuperämaa Vähennys- prosentti Huhtikuun 1998 osuudesta käytettävissä oleva määrä (tonnia) Thaimaa Australia Guyana Amerikan yhdysvallat Muut alkuperämaat 0 11,51 0 0 0 (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) Vahvistetaan lähiaikoina avattavia tammikuun 1998 lisäeriä koskevien todistusten antamista koskevan päätöksen yhteydessä


title: WRITTEN QUESTION No. 4191/97 by Rijk van DAM , Bartho PRONK to the Commission. The situation of Christian minorities in Turkey

eurovoc_concepts:
Christianity
EU relations
Orthodoxy
Türkiye
democratisation
denominational education
freedom of religious beliefs
human rights
religious discrimination
religious group

formats: html print


title: WRITTEN QUESTION No. 4178/97 by Daniel VARELA SUANZES- CARPEGNA to the Commission. Cohesion policy and culture

eurovoc_concepts:
EU programme
cultural policy
economic and social cohesion
job creation
regional policy
structural policy

formats: html pdf print

text: C 304/14 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 2. 10. 98 (98/C 304/20) WRITTEN QUESTION E-4178/97 by Daniel Varela Suanzes-Carpegna (PPE) to the Commission (21 January 1998) Subject: Cohesion policy and culture Article 128(4) of the EC Treaty states that the Community shall take cultural aspects into account in its action under other provisions of the Treaty. Can the Commission say what monitoring and control measures have been adopted in this connection, especially in the context of Community structural policy? Can the Commission say to what extent this aspect will be taken into account in the forthcoming reform of the Structural Funds? What strategy, objectives and guidelines will accompany this reform with regard to the impact of the cultural sector on cohesion policy? Answer given by Mrs Wulf-Mathies on behalf of the Commission (2 March 1998) The Commission takes account of the cultural factor during negotiation and approval of the programming documents. For example, the Commission made explicit reference to culture in its guidelines to the Member States for the new objective 2 programmes (1997-1999). However, the definition of programme priorities is a matter for the regional and local authorities concerned. For example, the regions themselves decide whether and in what form they will give priority to integration of culture within their programmes. The Commission may not impose any type of (cid:145)quota(cid:146) as regards culture as this would conflict with the principle of subsidiarity. The Commission considers culture as an important area of potential job creation to be included in the future programmes. At the same time the Commission does not consider it necessary to include culture explicitly as a specific eligible action in the new regulations because it is already covered by the existing scope. The link with regional development and job creation will remain a necessary condition for assistance aimed at economic and social cohesion. (98/C 304/21) WRITTEN QUESTION E-4180/97 by Riitta Myller (PSE) to the Commission (21 January 1998) Subject: Preparation in the Commission of the interim report on the EU(cid:146)s northern dimension The enlargement of the EU in 1995 to include the Nordic countries Sweden and Finland moved the Union(cid:146)s centre of gravity northwards. The decision on launching negotiations with the new candidate countries on membership and preparations for membership, together with the need to develop the EU(cid:146)s policy on Russia, further reinforces the significance of the northern dimension in the Union(cid:146)s policies. The Presidency conclusions from the Luxembourg summit contain the following statement concerning the northern dimension: (cid:145)The European Council noted the Finnish proposal concerning a northern dimension for the policies of the Union and requests the Commission to submit an interim report on this subject at a forthcoming European Council meeting in 1998(cid:146). The importance of the northern dimension was also referred to in the report submitted by the Commission (at the instructions of Luxembourg) on regional cooperation. I would therefore ask the Commissioner responsible what preparations the Commission has made to ensure that sufficient resources are available for the drafting of the interim report, and how it intends to link the northern dimension to the work of future European Councils


title: QUESTION ECRITE no 4173/97 de Daniel VARELA SUANZES- CARPEGNA à la Commission. Politique de cohésion et culture

eurovoc_concepts:
EU programme
Structural Funds
cultural policy
culture
development plan
economic and social cohesion
job creation
public economy
regional development

text: C 196/92 FR Journal officiel des Communaute·s europe·ennes 22. 6. 98 Dans le cadre de la politique de cohe·sion, la communication souligne que «la culture n(cid:146)est pas une simple activite· publique qui ge·ne‘re des cou(cid:136)ts supple·mentaires, mais aussi une part extre(cid:136)mement importante de l(cid:146)e·conomie prive·e, assortie d(cid:146)un potentiel de croissance conside·rable de nature a‘ stimuler les aspects cre·ateurs, innovateurs et producteurs des e·conomies locales et re·gionales». Les exemples fournis dans la communication en sont une illustration. (98/C 196/128) QUESTION E· CRITE E-4173/97 pose·e par Daniel Varela Suanzes-Carpegna (PPE) a‘ la Commission (21 janvier 1998) Objet: Politique de cohe·sion et culture La Commission indique dans sa communication COM(96)512 final, intitule·e «Politique de cohe·sion et culture: une contribution a‘ l(cid:146)emploi» (page 6), qu(cid:146)environ 400 millions d(cid:146)e·cus ont e·te· alloue·s directement au domaine culturel au titre des programmes des Fonds structurels pour la pe·riode 1989-1993. La Commission pourrait-elle indiquer quels ont e·te· les projets culturels cofinance·s, en pre·cisant le pays, l(cid:146)objectif re·gional dans lequel s(cid:146)inscrivait le projet, le cou(cid:136)t total d(cid:146)exe·cution et le montant du cofinancement communautaire? (98/C 196/129) QUESTION E· CRITE E-4174/97 pose·e par Daniel Varela Suanzes-Carpegna (PPE) a‘ la Commission (21 janvier 1998) Objet: Politique de cohe·sion et culture La Commission pourrait-elle indiquer quels sont les projets culturels cofinance·s par les Fonds structurels au cours de la pe·riode de programmation 1994-1999, en pre·cisant le pays, l(cid:146)objectif re·gional dans lequel s(cid:146)inscrit le projet, le cou(cid:136)t total d(cid:146)exe·cution et le montant du cofinancement communautaire? Re·ponse commune aux questions e·crites E-4173/97 et E-4174/97 donne·e par Mme Wulf-Mathies au nom de la Commission (9 mars 1998) Le chiffre cite· par l(cid:146)Honorable Parlementaire s(cid:146)appuie sur une e·valuation re·alise·e pour la Commission par des consultants exte·rieurs. Comme le pre·cisait la communication, tous les chiffres en rapport avec des activite·s culturelles ne sont que des estimations et doivent donc e(cid:136)tre envisage·s avec prudence. Il est particulie‘rement difficile, notamment, d(cid:146)isoler les aspects culturels a‘ l(cid:146)inte·rieur des programmes, e·tant donne· qu(cid:146)ils apparaissent souvent sous d(cid:146)autres rubriques telles que tourisme, petites et moyennes entreprises (PME) ou formation. Dans la mesure ou‘ les E· tats membres adoptent et exe·cutent des projets de Fonds a‘ finalite· structurelle a‘ l(cid:146)inte·rieur de programmes sous leur propre responsabilite·, la Commission n(cid:146)a pas d(cid:146)information syste·matique sur les projets dans le domaine de la culture. Cependant, la communication pre·sentait plusieurs exemples inte·ressants qui illustraient une inte·gration innovatrice de la culture dans le de·veloppement re·gional et la cre·ation d(cid:146)emplois. (98/C 196/130) QUESTION E· CRITE E-4175/97 pose·e par Daniel Varela Suanzes-Carpegna (PPE) a‘ la Commission (21 janvier 1998) Objet: Politique de cohe·sion et culture La Commission pourrait-elle fournir des informations sur les projets-pilotes de nature culturelle cofinance·s au cours de la pe·riode de programmation 1989-1993 ainsi qu(cid:146)au cours de la pe·riode actuelle de programmation (1994-1999) dans le cadre de l(cid:146)article 10 du re‘glement FEDER, en pre·cisant le pays, l(cid:146)objectif re·gional dans lequel s(cid:146)inscrit le projet, le cou(cid:136)t total et le montant du cofinancement communautaire?


title: INTERROGAZIONE SCRITTA n. 4144/97 dell'on. Mirja RYYNÄNEN alla Commissione. Importanza della riforestazione per il problema mondiale dei gas a effetto serra

eurovoc_concepts:
EU financing
afforestation
development aid
fire protection
forest conservation
greenhouse gas
pollution control measures
third country
tropical forest
wood industry


eurovoc_concepts:
export refund
raw sugar
white sugar

text: 22. 1. 98 EN Official Journal of the European Communities L 17/5 COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 140/98 of 21 January 1998 fixing the export refunds on white sugar and raw sugar exported in its unaltered state THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 1785/81 of 1 June 1981 on the common organization of the markets in the sugar sector (1), as last amended by Regula- tion (EC) No 1599/96 (2), and in particular point (a) of the first subparagraph of Article 19 (4) thereof, Whereas Article 19 of Regulation (EEC) No 1785/81 provides that the difference between quotations or prices on the world market for the products listed in Article 1 (1) (a) of that Regulation and prices for those products within the Community may be covered by an export refund; Whereas Regulation (EEC) No 1785/81 provides that when refunds on white and raw sugar, undenatured and exported in its unaltered state, are being fixed account must be taken of the situation on the Community and world markets in sugar and in particular of the price and cost factors set out in Article 17a of that Regulation; whereas the same Article provides that the economic aspect of the proposed exports should also be taken into account; Whereas the refund on raw sugar must be fixed in respect of the standard quality; whereas the latter is defined in Article 1 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 431/68 of 9 April 1968 determining the standard quality for raw sugar and fixing the Community frontier crossing point for calculating cif prices for sugar (3), as amended by Regula- tion (EC) No 3290/94 (4); whereas, this refund should be fixed in accordance with Article 17a (4) of Regulation (EEC) No 1785/81; whereas candy sugar is defined in Commission Regulation (EC) No 2135/95 of 7 September 1995 laying down detailed rules of application for the grant of export refunds in the sugar sector (5); whereas the refund thus calculated for sugar containing added flavouring or colouring matter must apply to their sucrose content and, accordingly, be fixed per 1 % of the said content; furthermore, the world market Whereas the specific requirements of certain markets may make it necessary to vary the refund for sugar according to destination; situation or Whereas, in special cases, the amount of the refund may be fixed by other legal instruments; the representative market Whereas rates defined in Article 1 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 3813/92 (6), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 150/95 (7), are used to convert amounts expressed in third country currencies and are used as the basis for determining the agricultural conversion rates of the Member States’ currencies; whereas detailed rules on the application and determina- tion of these conversions were set by Commission Regu- lation (EEC) No 1068/93 (8), as last amended by Regula- tion (EC) No 1482/96 (9); Whereas the refund must be fixed every two weeks; whereas it may be altered in the intervening period; Whereas it follows from applying the rules set out above to the present situation on the market in sugar and in particular to quotations or prices for sugar within the Community and on the world market that the refund should be as set out in the Annex hereto; Whereas the measures provided for in this Regulation are the Management in accordance with the opinion of Committee for Sugar, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 The export refunds on the products listed in Article 1 (1) (a) of Regulation (EEC) No 1785/81, undenatured and exported in the natural state, are hereby fixed to the amounts shown in the Annex hereto. Article 2 This Regulation shall enter into force on 22 January 1998. (1) OJ L 177, 1. 7. 1981, p. 4. (2) OJ L 206, 16. 8. 1996, p. 43. (3) OJ L 89, 10. 4. 1968, p. 3. (4) OJ L 349, 31. 12. 1994, p. 105. (5) OJ L 214, 8. 9. 1995, p. 16. (6) OJ L 387, 31. 12. 1992, p. 1. (7) OJ L 22, 31. 1. 1995, p. 1. (8) OJ L 108, 1. 5. 1993, p. 106. (9) OJ L 188, 27. 7. 1996, p. 22. L 17/6 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 22. 1. 98 This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 21 January 1998. For the Commission Franz FISCHLER Member of the Commission to the Commission Regulation of 21 January 1998 fixing the export refunds on white sugar and raw sugar exported in its unaltered state ANNEX Product code 1701 11 90 9100 1701 11 90 9910 1701 11 90 9950 1701 12 90 9100 1701 12 90 9910 1701 12 90 9950 1701 91 00 9000 1701 99 10 9100 1701 99 10 9910 1701 99 10 9950 Amount of refund (cid:190) ECU/100 kg (cid:190) 36,66 33,91 36,66 33,91 (1) (1) (2) (1) (1) (2) (cid:190) ECU/1 % of sucrose (cid:253) 100 kg (cid:190) 0,3985 (cid:190) ECU/100 kg (cid:190) 39,85 39,46 39,46 (cid:190) ECU/1 % of sucrose (cid:253) 100 kg (cid:190) 1701 99 90 9100 0,3985 (1) Applicable to raw sugar with a yield of 92 %; if the yield is other than 92 %, the refund applicable is calculated in accordance with the provisions of Article 17a (4) of Regulation (EEC) No 1785/81. (2) Fixing suspended by Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2689/85 (OJ L 255, 26. 9. 1985, p. 12), as amended by Regulation (EEC) No 3251/85 (OJ L 309, 21. 11. 1985, p. 14)


title: SKRIFTLIG FORESPØRGSEL nr. 4147/97 af Gastone PARIGI til Kommissionen. Direkte forhandlinger mellem olieselskaberne og bestyrerne af tankstationer, hvad angår eksklusive købsaftaler i Italien

eurovoc_concepts:
EU law - national law
Italy
application of EU law
competition law
exclusive purchasing agreement
inter-company agreement
international negotiations
motor fuel
oil industry


title: 98/90/CE: Decisione della Commissione del 21 gennaio 1998 che chiude il procedimento antidumping relativo alle importazioni di diidrostreptomicina originaria della Repubblica popolare cinese

eurovoc_concepts:
China
anti-dumping duty
anti-dumping legislation
chemical product
import

text: L 17/42 IT Gazzetta ufficiale delle Comunità europee 22. 1. 98 DECISIONE DELLA COMMISSIONE del 21 gennaio 1998 che chiude il procedimento antidumping relativo alle importazioni di diidro- streptomicina originaria della Repubblica popolare cinese (98/90/CE) LA COMMISSIONE DELLE COMUNITÀ EUROPEE, visto il trattato che istituisce la Comunità europea, visto il regolamento (CE) n. 384/96 del Consiglio, del 22 dicembre 1995, relativo alla difesa contro le importazioni oggetto di dumping da parte di paesi non membri della Comunità europea (1), modificato dal regolamento (CE) n. 2331/96 del Consiglio (2), in particolare l’articolo 9, para- grafo 2, previa consultazione del comitato consultivo, considerando quanto segue: (1) A. PROCEDURA PRECEDENTE In seguito ad una denuncia presentata dal «Conseil européen des Fédérations de l’industrie chimique» (CEFIC) per conto dell’unico produttore noto di diidrostreptomicina nella Comunità europea, con regolamento (CEE) n. 3836/91 (3), il Consiglio ha istituito un dazio antidumping definitivo sulle importazioni di diidrostreptomicina (in appresso denominata «DHS»), classificata al codice NC 2941 20 10, originaria della Repubblica popolare cinese. L’aliquota del dazio ammontava a 20,16 ECU per chilogrammo di DHS di base oppure alla diffe- renza tra il prezzo CIF e 58,4 ECU per chilo- grammo di DHS di base, qualora quest’ultimo importo fosse superiore. Per due società cinesi, specificamente menzionate nel dispositivo del regolamento, il dazio ammon- tava a 14,9 ECU per chilogrammo di DHS di base oppure, qualora quest’ultimo importo fosse supe- riore, alla differenza tra il prezzo CIF e 53,16 ECU per chilogrammo di DHS di base. B. INCHIESTA AI FINI DEL RIESAME (2) La Commissione ha successivamente ricevuto da un importatore della Comunità, che agiva per conto di un esportatore cinese, la richiesta di abro- gare le misure in vigore. Il richiedente sosteneva che non vi fosse più un’industria comunitaria di DHS danneggiata dalle importazioni in questione. Le prove di un cambiamento della situazione (3) (4) (5) (6) contenute nella domanda sono state considerate sufficienti per giustificare l’apertura di un’inchiesta ai fini del riesame ai sensi dell’articolo 11, para- grafo 3, del regolamento (CE) n. 384/96 (in appresso denominato «regolamento di base»). Con un avviso pubblicato nella Gazzetta ufficiale delle Comunità europee, la Commissione ha annunciato il riesame, ai sensi dell’articolo 11, paragrafo 3, del regolamento di base, del regola- mento (CEE) n. 3836/91. Dato che nella richiesta non si faceva riferimento a un cambiamento della situazione relativa al dumping, il riesame, avviato il 4 gennaio 1996 (4), è stato limitato inizialmente agli aspetti relativi al pregiudizio. figuravano la mutata Da un esame preliminare della situazione è emerso che nella Comunità rimaneva un unico produttore di DHS. Si è riscontrato tuttavia che la situazione era cambiata a tal punto da giustificare un riesame completo di dumping e pregiudizio. Tra i nuovi elementi composizione dell’industria interna (l’unico produttore a presen- tare inizialmente denuncia, Rhône-Poulenc, aveva cessato la produzione, ma esisteva un altro produt- tore nella Comunità) e informazioni secondo cui il Giappone, il paese analogo utilizzato per l’inchiesta in iniziale, non fabbricava più il prodotto questione. Inoltre, risultava che i prezzi all’esporta- zione cinesi fossero notevolmente aumentati. Le implicazioni di tale evoluzione sono state conside- rate tali da giustificare un riesame completo di dumping e pregiudizio. Dopo aver consultato il comitato consultivo al riguardo, la Commissione, di propria iniziativa, ha riesame a deciso di estendere la portata del dumping e pregiudizio. Ai sensi dell’articolo 11, paragrafo 3, del regolamento di base, con un avviso pubblicato nella Gazzetta ufficiale delle Comu- nità europee (5), è stato avviato un riesame. La il Commissione produttore, gli esportatori e gli importatori notoria- mente interessati, nonché gli utilizzatori del prodotto. ufficialmente informato ha L’inchiesta riguardava inizialmente il 1995 e, in seguito all’estensione della portata del riesame, l’in- chiesta relativa alle pratiche di dumping riguardava il periodo compreso tra il 1o gennaio 1996 e il 30 novembre 1996. (1) GU L 56 del 6. 3. 1996, pag. 1. (2) GU L 317 del 6. 12. 1996, pag. 1. (3) GU L 362 del 31. 12. 1991, pag. 1. (4) GU C 1 del 4. 1. 1996, pag. 4. (5) GU C 386 del 20. 12. 1996, pag. 9. 22. 1. 98 IT Gazzetta ufficiale delle Comunità europee L 17/43 (7) (8) (9) il Essendo in corso alla scadenza delle misure, riesame verteva anche sulle circostanze di cui all’articolo 11, paragrafi 2 e 7, del regolamento di base. La Commissione ha raccolto e verificato tutte le informazioni ritenute necessarie ai fini della deter- minazione. Essa ha inviato questionari alle parti notoriamente interessate e ha ricevuto una risposta dalle società sotto elencate. Sono state effettuate visite di verifica presso le sedi del produttore comunitario, degli importatori non collegati che hanno collaborato e di due società di utilizzatori, compresa una collegata al produttore comunitario. Tutte le parti che ne hanno fatto richiesta hanno ottenuto un’audizione. a) Produttore comunitario Norbrook Manufacturing Ltd (NML, Irlanda) b) Produttori/esportatori nella Repubblica popo- lare cinese  Long March Pharmaceutical Plant  Shangai Fourth Pharmaceutical Plant c) Importatori nella Comunità  Helm AG (Germania)  Tocelo Chemicals BV (Paesi Bassi) d) Utilizzatori comunitari  Intervet International (Akzo-Nobel group, Paesi Bassi)  Sanofi-SNA (Francia)  Laboratoires Virbac (Francia)  Laboratorios Syva (Spagna)  Norbrook Laboratories Ltd (Irlanda del Nord, collegata a NML) C. PRODOTTO IN ESAME E PRODOTTO SIMILE 1. Prodotto in esame Il prodotto oggetto della presente inchiesta è lo stesso dell’inchiesta iniziale, ossia la DHS, un agente antiinfettivo ottenuto mediante idrogena- zione della streptomicina, generalmente combinata con altri antibiotici quali la procaina penicillina per la produzione di medicinali di base usati in campo veterinario (dosi iniettabili «pen-strep»). Tali prodotti finali sono diventati prodotti di base e vengono ampiamente utilizzati nel settore della medicina preventiva nell’allevamento di bovini, suini e ovini. Tra le applicazioni meno diffuse figura una serie di altri prodotti veterinari quali gli unguenti e le sospensioni oleose. un’unica materia prima, la streptomicina, ottenuta attraverso un processo di fermentazione e prodotta essenzialmente nella Repubblica popolare cinese. Entrambe sono destinate alle medesime applica- zioni, soprattutto formulati «pen-strep» impiegati in campo veterinario. Alcuni utilizzatori affermavano che il formulato liquido prodotto e venduto dall’industria comuni- taria non potesse essere confrontato con la DHS in polvere prodotta ed esportata dalla Repubblica popolare cinese poiché il procedimento impiegato per i due prodotti non può essere il medesimo. La Commissione ha riscontrato tuttavia che, benché la DHS in forma commercializzata prodotta e venduta dall’industria Comunitaria e quella importata in forma secca dalla Repubblica popolare formula cinese hanno la medesima chimica e le medesime proprietà ed esattamente lo stesso impiego (essenzialmente la produzione di medicinali «pen-strep») e sono, nel complesso, intercambiabili. liquida, Ai fini della presente inchiesta, tali prodotti sono pertanto considerati prodotti simili ai sensi dell’ar- ticolo 1, paragrafo 4, del regolamento di base. D. SVILUPPI SUL MERCATO COMUNITARIO 1. Industria comunitaria a è emerso produttore comunitario che Rhône-Poulenc, (11) Dall’inchiesta l’unico presentare denuncia nell’inchiesta iniziale del 1990, ha cessato la produzione di DHS nel maggio 1994. Attual- mente, la Norbrook Manufacturing Ltd (Irlanda) è l’unico produttore comunitario di DHS. Quasi tutta la produzione della Norbrook Manufacturing Ltd è trasferita internamente alla sua società collegata, Norbrook Laboratories Ltd (NLL) per la fabbrica- zione di medicinali «pen-strep». La quota di mercato comunitaria della Norbrook Manufactu- ring Ltd (che comprende sia le vendite sul mercato aperto, trasferimenti di prodotti utilizzati soltanto all’interno del gruppo Norbrook) era pari complessivamente a 24 % nel 1995 e durante il periodo dell’inchiesta. Per quanto riguarda la quota di mercato aperto della Norbrook, dato che meno dell’1 % delle sue vendite è stato destinato a clienti indipendenti, essenzialmente in Spagna, la quota del mercato aperto comunitario è trascurabile. sia i 2. Prodotto simile (10) La DHS viene essenzialmente esportata da esporta- tori/produttori cinesi sotto forma di solfato in polvere, ma viene altresì prodotta allo stato liquido nella Comunità. Entrambe le forme derivano da (12) Durante il periodo dell’inchiesta, il consumo comunitario apparente globale di DHS è stato valutato a 234 tonnellate. Su base indicizzata, il consumo è sceso da 100 nel 1993 a 87 durante il periodo dell’inchiesta. 2. Consumo L 17/44 IT Gazzetta ufficiale delle Comunità europee 22. 1. 98 3. Importazioni in Giappone, Va sottolineato che, oltre alla Rhône-Poulenc nella Comunità, nel 1993, la Meiji ha cessato la produzione di DHS. I produttori cinesi sembrano ormai dominare il mercato mondiale della DHS visto che i principali gruppi chimici hanno cessato la produzione di DHS solfato. La Cina è il principale fornitore del mercato comuni- tario (98 % delle importazioni dirette nella Comu- nità e 75 % del consumo comunitario complessivo nel periodo dell’inchiesta) e in pratica l’unico sul mercato aperto comunitario. Va fornitore in seguito all’istituzione inoltre sottolineato che, codice NC del 2941 20 10 nel 1991, le importazioni cinesi di DHS sono state effettuate in larga misura sotto altri codici non soggetti al dazio, evadendo così le misure antidumping. antidumping dazio per il Nel periodo dell’inchiesta, le esportazioni cinesi nella Comunità ammontavano a 176 tonnellate, per un valore di 7,9 milioni di ECU (1). I prezzi medi cinesi hanno registrato una crescita del 25 % nel 1994 e del 5 % nel 1995. Essi sono aumentati di un ulteriore 7 % nel periodo dell’inchiesta. Altre importazioni (Romania, Svizzera) sono attual- mente trascurabili. (16) (13) (14) E. DUMPING 1. Paese analogo Poiché la Repubblica popolare cinese è considerata un paese non retto da un’economia di mercato, per stabilire un valore normale per le esportazioni cinesi la Commissione ha cercato un paese terzo ad economia di mercato che avesse prodotto quan- tità sufficienti di DHS durante il periodo dell’in- chiesta. Sono stati presi in considerazione i fabbri- canti del prodotto in questione in Brasile, India, Romania e Stati Uniti, ma nessuno di questi ha voluto o potuto collaborare all’inchiesta della Commissione. In mancanza di un paese terzo disponibile, l’unica alternativa consisteva nell’uti- lizzare quale mercato analogo per la determina- zione del valore normale il mercato comunitario, ai sensi dell’articolo 2, paragrafo 7, del regolamento di base. 2. Valore normale (15) Dato che l’unico produttore comunitario non ha venduto il prodotto in questione in quantità suffi- cienti a clienti indipendenti sul mercato comuni- tario, il valore normale è stato calcolato in base al costo di produzione, maggiorato di un congruo margine per le spese generali, amministrative e di vendita e per i profitti. tuttavia, Poiché, le sue vendite del prodotto analogo o della stessa categoria generale di prodotti sono state insufficienti, in mancanza di altre fonti (1) Stime provenienti da dati Eurostat, codici NC 2941 20 10 e 2941 20 20. d’informazione attendibili i servizi della Commis- sione hanno esaminato se gli importi delle spese generali, amministrative e di vendita e dei profitti potessero essere determinati sulla stessa base utiliz- zata nell’inchiesta iniziale. Nell’inchiesta iniziale, il Giappone è stato utiliz- zato come paese analogo, e le spese generali, amministrative e di vendita sono state determinate sulla base di quelle sostenute dall’unico produttore giapponese che ha collaborato. Per quanto riguarda il margine di profitto, nell’inchiesta iniziale è stata applicata un’aliquota del 5 %, tenuto conto del fatto che il prodotto in questione è una materia agricolo per un prima utilizzata nel prodotto farmaceutico di base maturo. Dato che l’adeguatezza di tale metodo non è stata contestata, si è deciso di utilizzarlo come base per determinare le spese generali, amministrative e di vendita e il margine di profitto. settore 3. Prezzo all’esportazione I due produttori/esportatori cinesi che hanno risposto al questionario rappresentavano quasi la totalità delle esportazioni cinesi del prodotto in questione nella Comunità. Dato che le vendite per esportazione nella Comunità degli esportatori cinesi che hanno collaborato sono state effettuate direttamente a importatori indipendenti, i prezzi all’esportazione sono stati determinati, in confor- mità dell’articolo 2, paragrafo 8, del regolamento di base, sulla base dei prezzi realmente pagati o paga- bili da importatori indipendenti forniti dagli espor- tatori che hanno collaborato. 4. Confronto (17) Ai fini di un confronto equo, il prezzo all’esporta- zione è stato adeguato al livello FOB al porto cinese e il valore normale è stato analogamente adeguato il livello FOB al confine nazionale. Dal confronto tra il prezzo all’esportazione e il valore normale sulla base della media ponderata è emerso un margine di dumping dell’1,5 %, ossia trascurabile. F. REITERAZIONE DEL DUMPING (18) esaminare reiterazione del l’eventuale Per dumping, va sottolineato che i prezzi unitari cinesi di DHS hanno continuato ad aumentare dal 1993, con una crescita totale del 40 % fino al periodo dell’inchiesta e durante il medesimo. Nel corso di tale periodo, anche il volume delle importazioni è aumentato in maniera tale da rappresentare attual- mente il 98 % delle importazioni dirette nella Comunità. 22. 1. 98 IT Gazzetta ufficiale delle Comunità europee L 17/45 Tale evoluzione è dovuta essenzialmente al fatto che ormai la Cina è l’unico fornitore sul mercato aperto comunitario. Tale situazione rispecchia il fatto che ormai la concorrenza sul mercato per la DHS è limitata. Dato che nessun elemento fa prevedere un cambiamento della situazione, la Commissione ritiene improbabile una reiterazione del dumping delle importazioni cinesi. Non sono state presentate argomentazioni contrarie. H. CONCLUSIONI (20) Alla risultanze luce delle sopraindicate, si il procedimento riguardante è concluso che le importazioni di DHS originaria della Repubblica popolare cinese deve essere chiuso e che il dazio antidumping in vigore dovrebbe scadere, DECIDE: G. PREGIUDIZIO E INTERESSE COMUNITARIO Articolo unico (19) Alla luce delle conclusioni in materia di dumping, non si è ritenuto necessario sviluppare gli aspetti relativi al pregiudizio e all’interesse comunitario riscontrati durante l’inchiesta, dato che ciò non avrebbe modificato le conclusioni raggiunte. Il produttore comunitario è stato informato delle risultanze della Commissione e ha contestato le cifre utilizzate per l’evoluzione dei prezzi cinesi, determinate dalla Commissione sulla base dei dati di Eurostat. Non sono state fornite tuttavia altre informazioni fondate in grado di alterare le conclu- sioni della Commissione al riguardo. È chiuso il procedimento antidumping riguardante le importazioni di diidrostreptomicina classificata ai codici NC 2941 20 10 e 2941 20 20, originaria della Repubblica popolare cinese. Fatto a Bruxelles, il 21 gennaio 1998. Per la Commissione Leon BRITTAN Vicepresidente


title: PREGUNTA ESCRITA n. 4212/97 del Bryan CASSIDY a la Comisión. Sentencia del Tribunal Europeo de Justicia (TEJ) del 26 de octubre de 1996 en el asunto de Elida Gibbs Limited (asunto C317/94)

eurovoc_concepts:
Germany
competition law
complaint to the Commission
consumer protection
national law
reduced price
sales promotion


title: ΓΡΑΠΤΗ ΕΡΩΤΗΣΗ αρ θ. 4222/97 του Ursula SCHLEICHER προς την Επ τροπή. Εισαγωγή γενετικά μεταλλαγμένων οργανισμών από τις ΗΠΑ και τον Καναδά

eurovoc_concepts:
Canada
United States
environmental impact
environmental risk prevention
genetically modified organism
import (EU)
market approval


title: INTERROGAZIONE SCRITTA n. 4132/97 dell'on. Reimer BÖGE alla Commissione. Politica della pesca nel Mar baltico

eurovoc_concepts:
Baltic Sea
agreement (EU)
catch quota
enlargement of the Union
fisheries policy
fishing agreement
fishing controls
fishing licence
fishing regulations


title: Bildungsprogramme in Deutschland.

eurovoc_concepts:
EU programme
Germany
education policy
vocational training


title: SCHRIFTELIJKE VRAAG nr. 4167/97 van Simon MURPHY aan de Commissie. Het beweerde gebruik van zwerfhonden en -katten voor onderzoeksdoeleinden aan Belgische universiteiten

eurovoc_concepts:
Belgium
EC Directive
animal experimentation
application of EU law
domestic animal
medical research
protection of animals
scientific research
university

text: C 223/66 NL Publicatieblad van de Europese Gemeenschappen 17. 7. 98 (98/C 223/79) SCHRIFTELIJKE VRAAG E-4167/97 van Simon Murphy (PSE) aan de Commissie (21 januari 1998) Betreft: Het beweerde gebruik van zwerfhonden en -katten voor onderzoeksdoeleinden aan Belgische universiteiten Kan de Commissie naar aanleiding van de door de British Union for the Abolition of Vivisection (Britse vereniging tegen vivisectie) bij de Commissie ingediende formele klacht 97/4379 over het gebruik van zwerfhonden en -katten voor onderzoeksdoeleinden in Belgie¤ bevestigen of er intussen een antwoord van de Belgische autoriteiten is binnengekomen? Is de Commissie bereid, indien het gebruik van zwerfhonden en -katten in strijd met richtlijn 86/609/EEG (1) voor onderzoeksdoeleinden wordt bevestigd, de inleiding van een inbreukprocedure tegen Belgie¤ voor het Hof van Justitie in overweging te nemen? (1) PB L 358 van 18. 12. 1986, blz. 1. Antwoord van mevrouw Bjerregaard namens de Commissie (27 februari 1998) De Commissie kan het geachte parlementslid bevestigen dat de Belgische instanties gehoor hebben gegeven aan de verzoeken van de Commissie om informatie. De Commissie kan ook bevestigen dat mocht worden bewezen dat er in overtreding van Richtlijn 86/609/EEG van de Raad van 24 november 1986 inzake de onderlinge aanpassing van de wettelijke en bestuursrechtelijke bepalingen van de lidstaten betreffende de bescherming van dieren die voor experimentele en andere wetenschappelijke doeleinden worden gebruikt (1) zwerfhonden en -katten voor onderzoekdoeleinden worden gebruikt, en dat de betrokken lidstaat nalaat iets tegen deze situatie te doen, zij kan overwegen een inbreukprocedure tegen de betrokken lidstaat in te leiden. Indien de vermeende inbreuken op de richtlijn door de nationale instantie zijn onderzocht en de nodige maatregelen tot handhaving zijn genomen en indien er gerechtelijke stappen zijn ondernomen overeenkomstig de relevante nationale regels, dan valt moeilijk vol te houden dat de betrokken lidstaat er niet voor heeft gezorgd dat de onder zijn jurisdictie vallende natuurlijke of rechtspersonen de richtlijn naleven. Enkel en alleen het feit dat er overtredingen voorkomen is op zich niet voldoende om aan te tonen dat een lidstaat de communautaire wetgeving overtreedt aangezien nooit kan worden gegarandeerd dat alle regels te allen tijde worden nageleefd door alle natuurlijke of rechtspersonen. Wel is het de plicht van de lidstaat om de noodzakelijke maatregelen te treffen om iedere inbreuk op de bepalingen van de richtlijn te bee¤indigen. De Commissie zal dan ook de door het geachte parlementslid genoemde klacht onderzoeken in het licht van bovenstaande overwegingen. (1) PB L 358 van 18. 12. 1986. (98/C 223/80) SCHRIFTELIJKE VRAAG E-4179/97 van Daniel Varela Suanzes-Carpegna (PPE) aan de Commissie (21 januari 1998) Betreft: Cohesie- en cultuurbeleid Zowel de Raad (besluit van 30. 6. 1997) als de Commissie (verklaring in besluit 2228/97/EG (1) tot vaststelling van een communautair actieprogramma op het gebied van het cultureel erfgoed › Raphae¤l-programma) hebben zich uitgesproken voor de invoering van een kaderinstrument op het gebied van cultuur. De Commissie heeft aangekondigd dat zij terzake zo spoedig mogelijk een voorstel voor een algemeen programma zou indienen. Kan de Commissie informatie verstrekken over het tijdschema, de doelstellingen, de richtsnoeren en de inhoud van toekomstige kaderprogramma voor cultuur, waarop dit voorstel betrekking heeft? (1) PB L 305 van 8. 11. 1997, blz. 31