



Lincoln’s First Inaugural Address

March 4, 1861


Fellow citizens of the United States: in compliance with a custom as
old as the government itself, I appear before you to address you
briefly and to take, in your presence, the oath prescribed by the
Constitution of the United States, to be taken by the President “before
he enters on the execution of his office.”

I do not consider it necessary, at present, for me to discuss those
matters of administration about which there is no special anxiety, or
excitement.

Apprehension seems to exist among the people of the Southern States
that by the accession of a Republican administration their property and
their peace and personal security are to be endangered. There has never
been any reasonable cause for such apprehension. Indeed, the most ample
evidence to the contrary has all the while existed and been open to
their inspection. It is found in nearly all the published speeches of
him who now addresses you. I do but quote from one of those speeches
when I declare that “I have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to
interfere with the institution of slavery in the States where it
exists. I believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no
inclination to do so.” Those who nominated and elected me did so with
full knowledge that I had made this and many similar declarations, and
had never recanted them. And, more than this, they placed in the
platform for my acceptance, and as a law to themselves and to me, the
clear and emphatic resolution which I now read:

    “Resolved: that the maintenance inviolate of the rights of the
    States, and especially the right of each State to order and control
    its own domestic institutions according to its own judgment
    exclusively, is essential to that balance of power on which the
    perfection and endurance of our political fabric depend, and we
    denounce the lawless invasion by armed force of the soil of any
    State or Territory, no matter under what pretext, as among the
    gravest of crimes.”

I now reiterate these sentiments; and, in doing so, I only press upon
the public attention the most conclusive evidence of which the case is
susceptible, that the property, peace, and security of no section are
to be in any wise endangered by the now incoming administration. I add,
too, that all the protection which, consistently with the Constitution
and the laws, can be given, will be cheerfully given to all the States
when lawfully demanded, for whatever cause—as cheerfully to one section
as to another.

There is much controversy about the delivering up of fugitives from
service or labor. The clause I now read is as plainly written in the
Constitution as any other of its provisions:

    “No person held to service or labor in one State, under the laws
    thereof, escaping into another, shall in consequence of any law or
    regulation therein be discharged from such service or labor, but
    shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or
    labor may be due.”

It is scarcely questioned that this provision was intended by those who
made it for the reclaiming of what we call fugitive slaves; and the
intention of the lawgiver is the law. All members of Congress swear
their support to the whole Constitution—to this provision as much as to
any other. To the proposition, then, that slaves whose cases come
within the terms of this clause “shall be delivered up”, their oaths
are unanimous. Now, if they would make the effort in good temper, could
they not with nearly equal unanimity frame and pass a law by means of
which to keep good that unanimous oath?

There is some difference of opinion whether this clause should be
enforced by national or by State authority; but surely that difference
is not a very material one. If the slave is to be surrendered, it can
be of but little consequence to him or to others by which authority it
is done. And should any one in any case be content that his oath shall
go unkept on a merely unsubstantial controversy as to _how_ it shall be
kept?

Again, in any law upon this subject, ought not all the safeguards of
liberty known in civilized and humane jurisprudence to be introduced,
so that a free man be not, in any case, surrendered as a slave? And
might it not be well at the same time to provide by law for the
enforcement of that clause in the Constitution which guarantees that
“the citizen of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and
immunities of citizens in the several States?”

I take the official oath today with no mental reservations, and with no
purpose to construe the Constitution or laws by any hypercritical
rules. And while I do not choose now to specify particular acts of
Congress as proper to be enforced, I do suggest that it will be much
safer for all, both in official and private stations, to conform to and
abide by all those acts which stand unrepealed, than to violate any of
them, trusting to find impunity in having them held to be
unConstitutional.

It is seventy-two years since the first inauguration of a President
under our national Constitution. During that period fifteen different
and greatly distinguished citizens have, in succession, administered
the executive branch of the government. They have conducted it through
many perils, and generally with great success. Yet, with all this scope
of precedent, I now enter upon the same task for the brief
Constitutional term of four years under great and peculiar difficulty.
A disruption of the Federal Union, heretofore only menaced, is now
formidably attempted.

I hold that, in contemplation of universal law and of the Constitution,
the Union of these States is perpetual. Perpetuity is implied, if not
expressed, in the fundamental law of all national governments. It is
safe to assert that no government proper ever had a provision in its
organic law for its own termination. Continue to execute all the
express provisions of our National Constitution, and the Union will
endure forever—it being impossible to destroy it except by some action
not provided for in the instrument itself.

Again, if the United States be not a government proper, but an
association of States in the nature of contract merely, can it, as a
contract, be peaceably unmade by less than all the parties who made it?
One party to a contract may violate it—break it, so to speak; but does
it not require all to lawfully rescind it?

Descending from these general principles, we find the proposition that
in legal contemplation the Union is perpetual confirmed by the history
of the Union itself. The Union is much older than the Constitution. It
was formed, in fact, by the Articles of Association in 1774. It was
matured and continued by the Declaration of Independence in 1776. It
was further matured, and the faith of all the then thirteen States
expressly plighted and engaged that it should be perpetual, by the
Articles of Confederation in 1778. And, finally, in 1787 one of the
declared objects for ordaining and establishing the Constitution was
“_to form a more perfect Union._”

But if the destruction of the Union by one or by a part only of the
States be lawfully possible, the Union is _less_ perfect than before
the Constitution, having lost the vital element of perpetuity.

It follows from these views that no State upon its own mere motion can
lawfully get out of the Union; that Resolves and Ordinances to that
effect are legally void; and that acts of violence, within any State or
States, against the authority of the United States, are insurrectionary
or revolutionary, according to circumstances.

I therefore consider that, in view of the Constitution and the laws,
the Union is unbroken; and to the extent of my ability I shall take
care, as the Constitution itself expressly enjoins upon me, that the
laws of the Union be faithfully executed in all the States. Doing this
I deem to be only a simple duty on my part; and I shall perform it so
far as practicable, unless my rightful masters, the American people,
shall withhold the requisite means, or in some authoritative manner
direct the contrary. I trust this will not be regarded as a menace, but
only as the declared purpose of the Union that it _will_
Constitutionally defend and maintain itself.

In doing this there needs to be no bloodshed or violence; and there
shall be none, unless it be forced upon the national authority. The
power confided to me will be used to hold, occupy, and possess the
property and places belonging to the government, and to collect the
duties and imposts; but beyond what may be necessary for these objects,
there will be no invasion, no using of force against or among the
people anywhere. Where hostility to the United States, in any interior
locality, shall be so great and universal as to prevent competent
resident citizens from holding the Federal offices, there will be no
attempt to force obnoxious strangers among the people for that object.
While the strict legal right may exist in the government to enforce the
exercise of these offices, the attempt to do so would be so irritating,
and so nearly impracticable withal, that I deem it better to forego for
the time the uses of such offices.

The mails, unless repelled, will continue to be furnished in all parts
of the Union. So far as possible, the people everywhere shall have that
sense of perfect security which is most favorable to calm thought and
reflection. The course here indicated will be followed unless current
events and experience shall show a modification or change to be proper,
and in every case and exigency my best discretion will be exercised
according to circumstances actually existing, and with a view and a
hope of a peaceful solution of the national troubles and the
restoration of fraternal sympathies and affections.

That there are persons in one section or another who seek to destroy
the Union at all events, and are glad of any pretext to do it, I will
neither affirm nor deny; but if there be such, I need address no word
to them. To those, however, who really love the Union may I not speak?

Before entering upon so grave a matter as the destruction of our
national fabric, with all its benefits, its memories, and its hopes,
would it not be wise to ascertain precisely why we do it? Will you
hazard so desperate a step while there is any possibility that any
portion of the ills you fly from have no real existence? Will you,
while the certain ills you fly to are greater than all the real ones
you fly from—will you risk the commission of so fearful a mistake?

All profess to be content in the Union if all Constitutional rights can
be maintained. Is it true, then, that any right, plainly written in the
Constitution, has been denied? I think not. Happily the human mind is
so constituted that no party can reach to the audacity of doing this.
Think, if you can, of a single instance in which a plainly written
provision of the Constitution has ever been denied. If by the mere
force of numbers a majority should deprive a minority of any clearly
written Constitutional right, it might, in a moral point of view,
justify revolution—certainly would if such a right were a vital one.
But such is not our case. All the vital rights of minorities and of
individuals are so plainly assured to them by affirmations and
negations, guaranties and prohibitions, in the Constitution, that
controversies never arise concerning them. But no organic law can ever
be framed with a provision specifically applicable to every question
which may occur in practical administration. No foresight can
anticipate, nor any document of reasonable length contain, express
provisions for all possible questions. Shall fugitives from labor be
surrendered by national or State authority? The Constitution does not
expressly say. May Congress prohibit slavery in the Territories? The
Constitution does not expressly say. _Must_ Congress protect slavery in
the Territories? The Constitution does not expressly say.

From questions of this class spring all our constitutional
controversies, and we divide upon them into majorities and minorities.
If the minority will not acquiesce, the majority must, or the
government must cease. There is no other alternative; for continuing
the government is acquiescence on one side or the other.

If a minority in such case will secede rather than acquiesce, they make
a precedent which in turn will divide and ruin them; for a minority of
their own will secede from them whenever a majority refuses to be
controlled by such minority. For instance, why may not any portion of a
new confederacy a year or two hence arbitrarily secede again, precisely
as portions of the present Union now claim to secede from it? All who
cherish disunion sentiments are now being educated to the exact temper
of doing this.

Is there such perfect identity of interests among the States to compose
a new Union, as to produce harmony only, and prevent renewed secession?

Plainly, the central idea of secession is the essence of anarchy. A
majority held in restraint by constitutional checks and limitations,
and always changing easily with deliberate changes of popular opinions
and sentiments, is the only true sovereign of a free people. Whoever
rejects it does, of necessity, fly to anarchy or to despotism.
Unanimity is impossible; the rule of a minority, as a permanent
arrangement, is wholly inadmissible; so that, rejecting the majority
principle, anarchy or despotism in some form is all that is left.

I do not forget the position, assumed by some, that Constitutional
questions are to be decided by the Supreme Court; nor do I deny that
such decisions must be binding, in any case, upon the parties to a
suit, as to the object of that suit, while they are also entitled to
very high respect and consideration in all parallel cases by all other
departments of the government. And while it is obviously possible that
such decision may be erroneous in any given case, still the evil effect
following it, being limited to that particular case, with the chance
that it may be overruled and never become a precedent for other cases,
can better be borne than could the evils of a different practice. At
the same time, the candid citizen must confess that if the policy of
the government, upon vital questions affecting the whole people, is to
be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant
they are made, in ordinary litigation between parties in personal
actions, the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to
that extent practically resigned their government into the hands of
that eminent tribunal. Nor is there in this view any assault upon the
court or the judges. It is a duty from which they may not shrink to
decide cases properly brought before them, and it is no fault of theirs
if others seek to turn their decisions to political purposes.

One section of our country believes slavery is _right_, and ought to be
extended, while the other believes it is _wrong_, and ought not to be
extended. This is the only substantial dispute. The fugitive-slave
clause of the Constitution, and the law for the suppression of the
foreign slave-trade, are each as well enforced, perhaps, as any law can
ever be in a community where the moral sense of the people imperfectly
supports the law itself. The great body of the people abide by the dry
legal obligation in both cases, and a few break over in each. This, I
think, cannot be perfectly cured; and it would be worse in both cases
_after_ the separation of the sections than _before_. The foreign
slave-trade, now imperfectly suppressed, would be ultimately revived,
without restriction, in one section, while fugitive slaves, now only
partially surrendered, would not be surrendered at all by the other.

Physically speaking, we cannot separate. We cannot remove our
respective sections from each other, nor build an impassable wall
between them. A husband and wife may be divorced, and go out of the
presence and beyond the reach of each other; but the different parts of
our country cannot do this. They cannot but remain face to face, and
intercourse, either amicable or hostile, must continue between them. Is
it possible, then, to make that intercourse more advantageous or more
satisfactory after separation than before? Can aliens make treaties
easier than friends can make laws? Can treaties be more faithfully
enforced between aliens than laws can among friends? Suppose you go to
war, you cannot fight always; and when, after much loss on both sides,
an no gain on either, you cease fighting, the identical old questions
as to terms of intercourse are again upon you.

This country, with its institutions, belongs to the people who inhabit
it. Whenever they shall grow weary of the existing government, they can
exercise their _constitutional_ right of amending it, or their
_revolutionary_ right to dismember or overthrow it. I cannot be
ignorant of the fact that many worthy and patriotic citizens are
desirous of having the national Constitution amended. While I make no
recommendation of amendments, I fully recognize the rightful authority
of the people over the whole subject, to be exercised in either of the
modes prescribed in the instrument itself; and I should, under existing
circumstances, favor rather than oppose a fair opportunity being
afforded the people to act upon it. I will venture to add that to me
the convention mode seems preferable, in that it allows amendments to
originate with the people themselves, instead of only permitting them
to take or reject propositions originated by others not especially
chosen for the purpose, and which might not be precisely such as they
would wish to either accept or refuse. I understand a proposed
amendment to the Constitution—which amendment, however, I have not
seen—has passed Congress, to the effect that the Federal Government
shall never interfere with the domestic institutions of the States,
including that of persons held to service. To avoid misconstruction of
what I have said, I depart from my purpose not to speak of particular
amendments so far as to say that, holding such a provision to now be
implied Constitutional law, I have no objection to its being made
express and irrevocable.

The chief magistrate derives all his authority from the people, and
they have conferred none upon him to fix terms for the separation of
the states. The people themselves can do this also if they choose; but
the executive, as such, has nothing to do with it. His duty is to
administer the present government, as it came to his hands, and to
transmit it, unimpaired by him, to his successor.

Why should there not be a patient confidence in the ultimate justice of
the people? Is there any better or equal hope in the world? In our
present differences is either party without faith of being in the
right? If the Almighty Ruler of Nations, with his eternal truth and
justice, be on your side of the North, or on yours of the South, that
truth and that justice will surely prevail, by the judgment of this
great tribunal, the American people.

By the frame of the government under which we live, this same people
have wisely given their public servants but little power for mischief;
and have, with equal wisdom, provided for the return of that little to
their own hands at very short intervals. While the people retain their
virtue and vigilance, no administration, by any extreme of wickedness
or folly, can very seriously injure the government in the short space
of four years.

My countrymen, one and all, think calmly and _well_ upon this whole
subject. Nothing valuable can be lost by taking time. If there be an
object to _hurry_ any of you in hot haste to a step which you would
never take _deliberately_, that object will be frustrated by taking
time; but no good object can be frustrated by it. Such of you as are
now dissatisfied, still have the old Constitution unimpaired, and, on
the sensitive point, the laws of your own framing under it; while the
new administration will have no immediate power, if it would, to change
either. If it were admitted that you who are dissatisfied hold the
right side in the dispute, there still is no single good reason for
precipitate action. Intelligence, patriotism, Christianity, and a firm
reliance on him who has never yet forsaken this favored land, are still
competent to adjust in the best way all our present difficulty.

In _your_ hands, my dissatisfied fellow-countrymen, and not in _mine_,
is the momentous issue of civil war. The government will not assail
_you_. You can have no conflict without being yourselves the
aggressors. _You_ have no oath registered in heaven to destroy the
government, while _I_ shall have the most solemn one to “preserve,
protect, and defend it.”

I am loathe to close. We are not enemies, but friends. We must not be
enemies. Though passion may have strained, it must not break our bonds
of affection. The mystic chords of memory, stretching from every
battlefield and patriot grave to every living heart and hearthstone all
over this broad land, will yet swell the chorus of the Union when again
touched, as surely they will be, by the better angels of our nature.






