while public health and biodefense often have overlapping elements , the capabilities needed to support each mission are not identical .
thus , the dhs scientific response to ebola required initial investments of time and resources to develop additional capabilities and protocols , contributing to the time lag in obtaining actionable results .
we are currently working to expand capabilities to hasten our next response , which should generate results weeks to months faster in the next crisis .
this includes identifying and establishing protocols for working with a wide range of disease transmission matrices ( ie , blood , sweat , tears , etc ) and surfaces that may harbor microbes ( eg , wood , carpet , furniture , clothing ) . by developing agent - agnostic capabilities , dhs s&t will be able to respond quickly and efficiently to a broad array of public health events , generating complete , informative , actionable data no matter what the future threats might be .
generating and using a master question list for ebola was central to s&t 's communication , research prioritization , and response .
it allowed us to work closely across the federal government including hhs , dod , and the white house via the ebola task force through informal communication , regular meetings , scientific information sharing , and formal coordination to maximize unique resources and mission space while collectively supporting a synergistic response .
it is by no means revolutionary that organizing known information and using it to make informed decisions is helpful , but a crisis response is less about breakthroughs and more about systematic application of tried and true principles .
we are currently working to develop master question lists for a number of diseases representing high - impact human health risks .
these master question lists follow the same general structure as the ebola list , with careful attention to ensure a broad applicability .
for example , one category is  decontamination : what are effective methods to neutralize the virus in the environment ?  rather than ebola - specific questions , such as  how are west africa ebola treatment units decontaminated ?  these categories , as delineated for ebola in figure 1 , allow a guided flexibility to adapt the master question list framework to a variety of pathogens .
master question lists will aid in research prioritization by identifying where current knowledge gaps reside , matching gaps to existing roles and responsibilities across the us government , and preventing duplication of effort .
developing these knowledge resources in advance will facilitate better communication and a faster , more organized response , both within dhs and across the federal government .
this success was recently demonstrated with the zika virus outbreak , where dhs developed a master question list , which was requested by and shared with departments across the interagency .
in addition , we have collected 76 scientific and technical questions asked of us in the frenetic days following the initial ebola diagnosis in the united states , including questions from dhs components , academics , private companies , and us and international government groups .
while some of these requests were specific to one group , many more were broadly applicable .
often , questions were relevant to multiple groups despite being asked by a single group .
the majority of the requests could be answered from existing information , highlighting the need for scientific expertise to be available for crisis response .
the questions affecting the broadest stakeholder base were regarding screening and surveillance ( likely due to the fear of the virus entering the united states and spreading domestically ) . analysis also showed that s&t had the most information to share , and the office of health affairs was the biggest  customer  of this information ( this group also had the largest overlap with cdc mission areas ) .
working together with the dhs offices of policy , health affairs , and fema , s&t is helping our department define the requirements to codify and implement policy changes to improve future responses .
this includes identifying the needs and responsibilities of each group and establishing best practices for information sharing between groups .
we have identified what information was requested by each group to support their ebola response , and we are asking them to expand that input by viewing all 76 requests to see where the needs and resources of others might be helpful .
we will then attempt to extrapolate the needs and responsibilities to a broader , disease - agnostic set of requirements .
these exercises will strengthen the communication infrastructure and highlight where information is available , leading to faster future responses for dhs and the federal government .
we never want a crisis , but one good thing that comes out of critical situations is that they bring people together in a unity of effort .
dhs employees from all the components and scattered across the country were reaching out to each other to ensure a safe and effective response . by nature
we always turn to those we know and trust , but an ad hoc communication network is not ideal , as it results in pockets of information sharing , filtering of requests and results , and exclusion of those who may not be connected but very much need to know .
for example , the safety of reusable equipment was discussed extensively to ensure healthcare facilities would not inadvertently infect nave patients and also to ensure that diagnostic samples were not contaminated by previously used equipment . preexisting laboratory expertise was leveraged to alleviate concerns , and this information was broadly shared within ad hoc networks .
however , there were clear failures , such as when a new group was referred to dhs almost a year later asking the same questions .
a faster , more effective , and broader network can be created by identifying positions rather than individuals . at dhs s&t , we have approached this problem through parallel top - down and bottom - up approaches , identifying the positions we think are relevant in each dhs component as well as asking components to identify relevant experts .
in addition , future crises will be addressed through the strong executive secretariat system that exists for coordinating decision making and managing information flow .
these communication mechanisms and experts will be part of the information - sharing exercises described above .
all dhs components and elements will have the opportunity to promote the needs and capabilities of their organization , establishing formal relationships for future responses . in a crisis situation
, each party has a limited time - frame in which to contribute and have an impact .
while no response will ever be perfect , we should all strive to use the best available data to make decisions .
: ( 1 ) clearly define research in the context of the larger problem . why should policymakers ( and through them , the public ) care about your research ?
this can be set up in advance by developing research directions and project plans where applications ( ie , guiding policy ) are an end - goal .
( 2 ) ensure results are actionable and clear ; note risks , but do not obscure conclusions with an excess of footnotes and nuances .
( 3 ) present results in a way that will maximize their impact on nontechnical communities .
some scientific journals have begun to include a short author summary in addition to the abstract .
this could be an ideal place to convey actionable results to decision makers in clear , nontechnical terms .
the article will still contain all the relevant technical details , and those will be available to anyone reading the article , but this  executive summary  can concisely guide nontechnical audiences .
after all , do n't we all want to see our science improve the world ? while all of this may be challenging , there are many great resources available to improve science communication skills , such as the alan alda center for communicating science at stony brook university or the american association for the advancement of science , among others . for government decision makers ,
we recommend actively seeking out and leveraging scientific information and experts when making decisions and determining policy .
increasingly , science and technology are inextricably dual - use , meaning that they drive both new threats and the needed solutions to our nation 's challenges .
cultivation and use of a technical core is inextricably linked to meeting the demands of the future , and experts are necessary to help chart a successful course .
we at dhs s&t are developing a new initiative called the science advisory group of experts ( sage ) to help us incorporate science early and often in decision - making processes .
this effort pre - identifies scientists in academia or private industry with recognized expertise pertaining to dhs mission areas who are willing to be on stand - by to provide technical advice and support practical decision making based on actionable scientific data , particularly in the event of a crisis . to our colleagues in government
, we are willing to share this  rolodex of expertise .  and to our fellow scientists , if you are interested in joining the sage team , please contact dhs s&t . at the time of this writing
, there are a number of diseases threatening both the united states and international communities .
the zika virus outbreak has been declared a public health emergency , and mers , chikungunya , avian influenza , and measles are also of concern .
we want to prepare before an emergency to ensure that our response is better , faster , and cheaper , no matter what or where the disease might be .
we need to develop protocols , methods , information resources , and communication plans as part of our response infrastructure and have that infrastructure and expertise embedded in our response plans before the next outbreak occurs .
we need to work with the policy and technical communities to ensure that , where possible , actionable scientific data are used to shape decisions and guide operations .
it is our hope that melding science , policy , and decision making will result in faster and more effective responses to future crises .
 the department of homeland security 's ( dhs ) science and technology ( s&t ) directorate plays a role in public health that extends beyond biodefense . 
 these responsibilities were exercised as part of the 2014 - 16 ebola outbreak , leading to productive and beneficial contributions to the international public health response and improved operations in the united states . 
 however , we and others have identified numerous areas for improvement . 
 based on our successes and lessons learned , we propose a number of ways that dhs , the interagency , and academia can act now to ensure improved responses to future public health crises . 
 these include pre - developing scientific capabilities to respond agnostically to threats , and disease - specific master question lists to organize and inform initial efforts . 
 we are generating dhs - specific playbooks and tools for anticipating future needs and capturing requests from dhs components and our national and international partners , where efforts will also be used to refine and exercise communication and information - sharing practices . 
 these experiences and improvement efforts have encouraged discussions on the role of science in developing government policy , specifically responding to public health crises . 
 we propose specific considerations for both scientists and government decision makers to ensure that the best available science is incorporated into policy and operational decisions to facilitate highly effective responses to future health crises . 
Pre-develop Scientific Capabilities
Identify Questions Before They Are Asked
Communicate Through Established Positions