opinion: In re James R. HOLLOWAY.
  No. 92-3085.
  United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
  Argued Feb. 12, 1993.
  Decided June 11, 1993.
  Elliott Schulder, Washington, DC, argued the cause for appellant.
  Ann Simon, Asst. U.S. Atty., Washington, DC, argued the cause for appellee. With her on the briefs were Jay B. Stephens, U.S. Atty. at the time the brief was filed, and John R. Fisher, Asst. U.S. Atty., Washington, DC.
  Three organizations filed a joint amicus curiae brief. Elizabeth Taylor, Washington, DC, was on the brief for Public Defender Service for District of Columbia. (James W. Klein, Washington, DC, also entered an appearance.) William B. Moffitt, Alexandria,
  VA, was on the brief for the Nat. Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers. Roger M. Adel-man, Washington, DC, was on the brief for the Criminal Law and Individual Rights Section of the District of Columbia Bar.
  Before: MIKVA, Chief Judge, WILLIAMS and HENDERSON, Circuit Judges.
  Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge STEPHEN F. WILLIAMS.
  Dissenting opinion filed by Chief Judge MIKVA.
  STEPHEN F. WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge:
  On October 8, 1991, in the course of a six-defendant drug trial (United States v. Rascoe), District Judge Norma Holloway Johnson entered an oral order holding one of the defense counsel, James R. Holloway, in criminal contempt. Judge Johnson later that day issued a written order and certificate of contempt pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 42(a). On March 10, 1992, Judge Johnson imposed sentence in the form of a $1,000 fine. Because we find that there was an adequate basis to support the contempt conviction and no procedural error, we affirm.
  Sufficiency of the Evidence
  Judge Johnson convicted appellant under 18 U.S.C. § 401, which provides that:
  A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or imprisonment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none other, as—
  (1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice;
  (2) Misbehavior of any of its officers in their official transactions;
  (3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command.
  Neither the contempt order, the contempt certificate, nor the record indicates which of the three subsections Judge Johnson invoked. Subsection (2) is clearly inapplicable: an attorney is not an “officer” of the court within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 401(2). See Cammer v. United States, 350 U.S. 399, 404-05, 76 S.Ct. 456, 458-59, 100 L.Ed. 474 (1956); In re Brown, 454 F.2d 999, 1003 (D.C.Cir.1971). Because we find the conviction valid under subsection (3), we need not address subsection (1).
  The elements of contempt under § 401(3) are straightforward. First, the alleged contemnor must “[d]isobe[y] or resist[ ] ... [the] lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command” of the court. 18 U.S.C. § 401(3). Of course, the relevant order or command must be sufficiently “clear and unequivocal at the time it is issued.” Traub v. United States, 232 F.2d 43, 47 (D.C.Cir.1955). Whether an order is clear enough depends on the context in which it is issued and the audience to which it is addressed. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 922 F.2d 1531, 1534 (11th Cir.1991); accord United States v. Turner, 812 F.2d 1552, 1567 (11th Cir.1987) (“[e]ven an egregiously vague order may be thought adequate to cover conduct so gross as to fall within its core.”).
  Second, although § 401(3) does not explicitly mention mens rea, wrongful intent is necessary. The disregard of authority must be willful; willfulness ‘“may be inferred if a lawyer’s conduct discloses a reckless disregard for his professional duty.’” In re Farquhar, 492 F.2d 561, 564 (D.C.Cir. 1973) (quoting Sykes v. United States, 444 F.2d 928, 930 (D.C.Cir.1971)); see also United States v. Greyhound Corp., 508 F.2d 529, 531-32 (7th Cir.1974) (stating that criminal contempt requires “a volitional act done by one who knows or should reasonably be aware that his conduct is wrongful”) (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted). While the reviewing court may not affirm if the cited conduct has not been contumacious, see United States v. Lumumba, 794 F.2d 806, 811 (2d Cir.1986), the analysis of intent properly encompasses the contemnor’s behavior in related incidents such as disobedience or resistance to other orders of the court. See id.; see also Farquhar, 492 F.2d at 564 (contrasting aberrational with recurrent lapses when analyzing intent).
  In deciding whether the evidence is sufficient to support a contempt conviction, we use the familiar standard for any criminal conviction, asking whether “a fair-minded and reasonable trier of fact [could] accept the evidence as probative of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt”. In re Joyce, 506 F.2d 373, 376 (5th Cir.1975); accord In re Brown, 454 F.2d 999, 1008 (D.C.Cir.1971).
  The key colloquy — set forth verbatim in Judge Johnson’s certificate of contempt and in Appendix A to this opinion — occurred during Holloway’s direct examination of Officer Darrell Young, conducted by Holloway on behalf of his client, Kelvin Rascoe. Before that passage, Young testified that he prepared an arrest form for Rascoe — known as a “PD 163” — that contained a narrative statement of facts relating to the arrest and alleged offense. Young also confirmed the earlier testimony of Officer Edward Trues-dale, who said that Young, in preparing the statement of facts for his PD 163, had relied on information provided by Truesdale and a third officer. In addition, Young confirmed Truesdale’s testimony that Young had not personally observed any of the events reported in Young’s PD 163. See Tr. 10/8 at 70-71, 74, 76-77; see also Tr. 9/30 at 48-49.
  After eliciting that evidence, Holloway proceeded to ask Young a series of questions regarding what information did and did not appear in the fact statement of his PD 163. See Tr. 10/8 at 72-73. Following an objection, the court ruled the line of inquiry impermissible because Young had no personal knowledge about any of the information in the statement. See id. at 73. This ruling led to a question from Holloway, to which Young replied unequivocally, “I don’t have any personal knowledge of the crime being committed” — namely, the “transaction ... indicated in that first paragraph [of the PD 163].” Id. at 77 (latter quotation taken from appellant’s question).
  Now we come to the incident that is at issue and is quoted in full in Appendix A. First, Holloway asked the court for permission to mark for identification a document in the court’s own case files — a “Gerstein statement”, i e., an affidavit filed to provide a proper basis for the judicial finding of probable cause that Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975), requires to justify restraint after an arrest. That document contained a narrative statement to which yet another officer, Robert Condit, had sworn after Young completed his PD 163. Holloway stated that he wanted to show Young the Gerstein affidavit to enable Young to compare it to his PD 163 and to offer an opinion on whether Condit photocopied the statement of facts from Young’s PD 163 onto the Gerstein affidavit. The Court ruled that such an opinion would be “totally irrelevant”. Tr. 10/8 at 78.
  Hplloway responded that he wanted to have Young make the comparison in preparation for a planned examination of Condit about where he obtained the information for his Gerstein statement. Although it is difficult to tell exactly what Holloway was trying to achieve by having Young compare the statement of facts from his PD 163 with the text of Condit’s Gerstein affidavit (which contained an obvious photocopy of the PD 163’s statement), as best as we can tell Holloway was pursuing this inquiry in a roundabout effort to avoid an earlier evidentiary ruling of the court. Whether that was his purpose or not, Judge Johnson’s prior ruling is worth a look, as it parallels her ruling here and thus illuminates Holloway’s state of mind.
  In the prior ruling, the judge barred Holloway from attempting to impeach Officer Truesdale — the only witness with firsthand knowledge of the events surrounding the arrest — with the contents of Young’s PD 163. See Tr. 9/30 at 50-51, 55-56. Truesdale had testified that when he confronted Rascoe while executing the search of the house, Ras-coe was tossing ziplock bags containing white rocks into the air and onto the floor. Holloway confronted Truesdale with the PD 163 that Truesdale had prepared for Rascoe’s girlfriend/codefendant, in which Truesdale stated that he saw Rascoe tossing ziplock bags containing white rocks onto the floor; Truesdale’s PD 163 did not mention his tossing them into the air. See id. at 55-56. If Holloway could have confronted Truesdale with Young’s PD 163, in which Young also stated that Rascoe was tossing the bags onto the floor (i.e., he too omitted any “into the air” reference), he could have reemphasized the “discrepancy” that he had already shown in Truesdale’s testimony. Judge Johnson properly refused to allow such questioning, which would have been cumulative and which in any event lacked a foundation such as a showing that Truesdale saw Young’s PD 163 and adopted it, a possibility Truesdale expressly denied. See id. at 49. Putting that aside, however, it appears that Holloway wanted Young to attest that Condit’s affidavit contained a photocopy of the statement of facts from Young’s PD 163 so that Holloway later could revisit the “into the air” discrepancy when questioning Condit.
  Regardless of where Holloway may have been trying to go with his examination, Judge Johnson informed him that he must first establish a foundation by inquiring whether Young had ever seen the Gerstein affidavit before. Id. at 79. Appellant asked “I cannot ask [Young] to compare the two documents?” and the court responded, “No, no, no.” Id. at 81. After Holloway asked the judge to explain her ruling, the judge obliged him, explaining yet again the prerequisite to his use of the document — “you must ask him if he has seen that document, not just those paragraphs contained in it”. Id. at 82.
  Appellant proceeded with his examination and asked Young, “Do you know what that document is?” Id. at 83. Yet again Judge Johnson stepped in and informed Holloway that he was not heeding her directive, telling him that “we must determine if he’s ever seen it before.” Id. Judge Johnson then herself asked the witness whether he had ever seen the document before. After the witness said, “No, Ma’am”, the judge reminded Holloway about the required threshold showings and their absence. Id.
  Appellant doggedly persisted down the precluded path and asked again if the witness knew what the document was. As before, the judge intervened, this time pointedly telling Holloway “[i]f he has never seen it before, we are not going to ask him if he knows what it is.” Id. at 84. Appellant then tried to avoid the clear import of the judge’s statement, slyly asking Young, “Have you seen it now? Have you looked at it just now?” Id. Young said “Yeah, I see it now”, and Holloway then asked Young, “Can you now tell us what ... that document is?” Id.
  After sustaining the prosecutor’s objection, the judge laid down a clear warning: “This is the last time I’m going to tell you the objection is sustained.” Id. Undeterred, appellant persisted in his effort to have Young look at the Gerstein statement and compare it with his PD 163, and asked Young whether he “recognize[d] any of the wording set forth in that document?” Id. At this point Judge Johnson held him in contempt. Id.
  In challenging the conviction, appellant argues that “the terms of the district court’s ‘order’ concerning the permissible scope of questioning on the Condit affidavit were unclear.” Appellant’s Brief at 37. A study of the transcript convinces us that Judge Johnson had made herself as clear as language permits. Through her repeated explanations, the questions she asked the witness, and her rulings in response to objections, the judge made it plain that she would not allow the witness to compare the wording in the documents unless it were first established that the witness had seen the Gerstein affidavit before. Appellant and amici seek to interject some ambiguity into the judge’s directions, but the record belies their Derrida-like efforts; Holloway’s penultimate, disingenuous question — whether the witness had seen the documents “now” — makes clear that he knew what the judge meant. “To provide a defense to criminal contempt, [a] mistaken construction [of an order] must be one which was adopted in good faith and which, given the background and purpose of the order, is plausible.” United States v. Greyhound Corp., 508 F.2d 529, 532 (7th Cir.1974). Moreover, an alleged contemnor may not avoid an otherwise legitimate conviction “by ‘twisted interpretations’ or ‘tortured constructions’ of the provisions of the order.” Id. (internal citations omitted). That is exactly what Holloway seeks to do here. In context, Judge Johnson clearly conveyed the message that she would not allow Young to be questioned about Condit’s affidavit unless Young had seen the affidavit before.
  Our review of the conviction under § 401(3) also requires us to decide whether a reasonable factfinder could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant disobeyed Judge Johnson’s orders with culpable intent. Holloway’s devious pretense that it would be enough if Young saw the document in court that very day (a theory that would make Judge Johnson’s ruling completely meaningless) points strongly in the direction of willfulness. A “mere ‘paper compliance’ will support a finding of willfulness.” Greyhound, 508 F.2d at 532. We need not, however, rest on the cited colloquy alone. Other episodes of Holloway’s conduct in the Rascoe trial render the conclusion that he acted with culpable intent almost inescapable. See Lumumba, 794 F.2d at 811 (relying on non-cited conduct in the same trial as evidence of intent); Farquhar, 492 F.2d at 564 (similar).
  The first of these occurred during a two-day pre-trial suppression hearing. Appellant was cross-examining Officer Condit in an effort to establish the defectiveness of a search warrant executed at a house where Rascoe lived; if the warrant were shown to be defective, Rascoe could have excluded crack cocaine that the police found in his hands when he was confronted during the search. Appellant’s theory was that Condit knew the dwelling was a rooming house before applying for the warrant but nevertheless described the structure as a unitary dwelling in his affidavit. See Tr. 9/24 at 72-75. The witness repeatedly testified that he did not know it was a rooming house. The appellant persisted in his questioning and ultimately the judge sustained an objection and told him that he was “beating a dead horse.” Tr. 9/24 at 75. The following disobedience of an explicit order then occurred:
  By Mr. Holloway:
  Q. After you entered the house [to execute the warrant] on March 8, you discovered, did you not, that, in fact, this was a rooming house divided up into separate rooms; right?
  [The prosecutor]: Your Honor, I will object for the purpose of what they discovered on March 8 is irrelevant to this motion hearing.
  The Court: What he discovered once he got in is irrelevant, and I will sustain the objection.
  By Mr. Holloway:
  Q. You now know, do you not, sir, that, in fact, that this residence is a rooming house?
  The prosecutor: Objection, Your Honor. The Court: Mr. Holloway, how many times do I have to tell you not to ask the question? Now, I just told you that that last question was inappropriate. You came back and asked the same question again. Now, Mr. Holloway, you are an experienced attorney, very experienced attorney, and I would not like to have to hold you in contempt of Court for defying a direct order. Do not ever ask a question again that I have just ruled is inadmissible.
  (Tr. 9/24 at 75-76.)
  The next morning, prior to selection of the jury, Holloway moved to withdraw as counsel in the Rascoe ease. Tr. 9/25 at 13-14. An exchange occurred between him and the judge (set out in full in Appendix B), in which the judge made clear her insistence on obedience to her rulings. In denying the motion, she assured Holloway that he should have nothing to fear because she had not held anyone in contempt in her eighteen years as a judge. At the same time, however, she warned him at least three times (see emphases) that he would be expected to comply with her orders. Prior warnings are evidence of willfulness when they go unheeded. See In re Niblack, 476 F.2d 930, 932 (D.C.Cir.1973).
  A third incident involved the cross-examination of an expert witness, a chemist, who had analyzed narcotics found in Rascoe’s bedroom. Counsel for one of Rascoe’s co-defendants had sought and had obtained an in limine ruling prohibiting questions about a crack pipe that was seized at the same time as the cocaine and placed in the same evidence envelope. (No criminal charges were filed against Rascoe or any of his co-defendants relating to the pipe). After ruling in the co-defendant’s favor, the judge stated that “no one is going to mention that crack pipe that is in Exhibit No. 11 [the evidence envelope]”. Tr. 10/3 at 11; see also id. at 17-18. Holloway told the court that he intended to introduce evidence about the crack pipe in Rascoe’s defense case, and the judge informed Holloway that that was permissible. Id. at 11. Holloway later sought a further clarification of the court’s ruling, asking the judge if she “would prohibit any cross-examination as to any other items [i.e., the crack pipe] that would be in the [evidence envelope]?” Judge Johnson responded, “Most assuredly, because there was nothing on direct about it.” Id. at 20.
  During his cross-examination, Holloway took the envelope containing the pipe and asked the chemist if there was any “residue in that item.” Id. at 48. Both the defense attorney who won the in limine ruling and the prosecutor objected, and, after sustaining the objections, Judge Johnson called Holloway to the bench and asked him why he had asked his question. After hearing the explanation, Judge Johnson found that appellant had been “determined to avoid following a direct instruction of the court”, that he had asked the question about the pipes even though she had told him he “should not ask any such questions about those pipes”, and that “there is no way you misunderstood me.” Id. at 50-51.
  After reviewing the cited colloquy, the episodes of prior disobedience and the judge’s explicit warnings, we find that a reasonable trier of fact could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Holloway “willful[ly] disregarded] or disobe[yed]” Judge Johnson’s orders about the permissible scope of examination of Officer Young. Farquhar, 492 F.2d at 564; accord Sykes v. United States, 444 F.2d 928, 930 (D.C.Cir.1971). Therefore all of the elements of a § 401(3) offense could properly be found.
  Use of Summary Contempt Procedure
  Appellant also alleges that it was improper for the presiding judge to employ the summary procedures of Fed.R.Crim.P. Rule 42(a) instead of the notice and hearing procedures of Rule 42(b). He is mistaken.
  A judge unquestionably has the “power, for the purpose of maintaining order in the courtroom, to punish summarily and without notice or hearing contemptuous conduct committed in his presence and observed by him.” Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 497, 94 S.Ct. 2697, 2702-03, 41 L.Ed.2d 897 (1974) (citing Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 9 S.Ct. 77, 32 L.Ed. 405 (1888)). When a judge invokes that power, we review the decision that summary procedures were necessary very deferentially — for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Meyer, 462 F.2d 827, 843 (D.C.Cir.1972).
  Judge Johnson unquestionably was on solid ground in determining that the necessity of preserving order justified use of Rule 42(a). By the time the judge actually held Holloway in contempt, she had repeatedly warned him — without any apparent effect — to heed her rulings on pain of potential contempt. In the line of questioning that produced the contempt conviction, she at least three times reiterated her order about the threshold showing required to inquire about the Gerstein affidavit, and warned Holloway in open court that his continued inquiries violated the order. By the time Judge Johnson moved under Rule 42(a), she had a compelling need to terminate the improper questioning of Young, to deter future intentional violations of her orders, and to vindicate judicial authority to control the courtroom.
  As appellant correctly notes, precedent reflects the “principle that only ‘[tjhe least possible power adequate to the end proposed’ should be used in contempt cases.” United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309, 319, 95 S.Ct. 1802, 1808, 44 L.Ed.2d 186 (1975) (quoting Anderson v. Dunn, 19 (6 Wheat.) U.S. 204, 231, 5 L.Ed. 242 (1821)). During the course of the trial, however, appellant repeatedly had been told that certain lines of questioning were impermissible and also that failure to comply with orders could lead to contempt. None of this worked. Moreover, in the line of questioning that led to the conviction, Judge Johnson tried a variety of less drastic measures before holding appellant in contempt — explaining the basis for her ruling and reiterating the order, intervening to conduct the critical questioning herself, issuing another, more pointed, warning, and finally saying, “Mr. Holloway, this is the last time I’m going to tell you the objection is sustained.” Tr. 10/8 at 84. Only then did the judge hold appellant in summary contempt. Given her heroic efforts to win compliance, one is hard pressed to see what lesser remedy she could reasonably have employed. The record certainly gives no basis for thinking that more orders, warnings, or threats would have produced improvement.
  Finally, Holloway claims that the interest in a “fair and impartial assessment of the charges” required Judge Johnson to forego Rule 42(a)’s summary procedures and to refer the matter to another judge. The cases indeed bar the use of summary contempt procedures when alleged misconduct is of “such a personal nature” as to create actual or likely “embroilment” between the judge and alleged contemnor, or where “the judge adopts an adversary posture with respect to the alleged contemnor, even if he has not been personally attacked.” United States v. Meyer, 462 F.2d 827, 841 (D.C.Cir.1972); accord Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 501, 503, 94 S.Ct. 2697, 2704, 2705, 41 L.Ed.2d 897 (1974). Neither is present here. Holloway made no personal attacks on the judge. Compare Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 456, 458, 91 S.Ct. 499, 500, 501, 27 L.Ed.2d 532 (1971) (contempt could not be tried by presiding judge after alleged con-temnor in open court called the judge, inter alia, a “dirty sonofabitch,” and told him to “[g]o to hell”). Nor is there any evidence that Judge Johnson adopted an adversary posture with respect to the appellant — unless we treat as such her insistence on remaining in charge. But to do so would seem to rule out summary contempt across the board, which Rule 42 plainly does not contemplate.
  Propriety of the Sentence
  Finally, appellant claims that Judge Johnson’s sentence on the contempt conviction — a $1,000 fine — was excessive. We review a criminal contempt sentence for “abuse of discretion”, Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 188, 78 S.Ct. 632, 645, 2 L.Ed.2d 672 (1958), but with a direct power to revise. Noting that Congress had imposed no specific limit on contempt punishments, Justice Harlan wrote in Green that “[ajppellate courts have ... a special responsibility for determining that the [contempt] power is not abused, to be exercised if necessary by revising themselves the sentences imposed.” Id. When assessing the propriety of a sentence, this court considers factors such as “the necessity of achieving compliance with the court’s order, the gravity of the offense, ... the importance of deterring such acts in the future,” and “the financial resources of the offending party.” Drivers, Chauffeurs and Helpers Local No. 639 v. Penello, 420 F.2d 632, 634 (D.C.Cir.1969).
  After considering those factors, we do not find the fine excessive. First, we are unpersuaded by Holloway’s argument that because he obeyed after being held in contempt (and evidently engaged in no further misconduct thereafter), and because Judge Johnson did not actually impose the fine until months after the event, we may infer that a $1,000 fine was unnecessary to gain compliance with the order. Such an argument is nonsense; as soon as Judge Johnson held Holloway in contempt, he was on notice that something would happen, possibly something quite drastic. If we reduce the fine to a trivial amount, future contemnors will face less of a hazard. Similarly, while we appreciate that as an assistant federal public defender Holloway does not earn a salary at the top of the range for lawyers, the fine cannot have a material deterrent effect if it is trivial. In addition, while the conduct at issue did not involve threats toward the judge or disrespectful conduct, it is nonetheless serious to ignore one’s duty to “protect the processes of orderly trial, which is the supreme object of the lawyer’s calling.” Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 13, 75 S.Ct. 11, 13, 99 L.Ed. 11 (1954) (Frankfurter, J.) (quoting Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 14, 72 S.Ct. 451, 457, 96 L.Ed. 717 (1952)). Finally, we note that Holloway was no courtroom tyro: he has practiced for twelve years, and “has been engaged in the practice of federal criminal defense work exclusively for over ten (10) years” with Federal Defender Offices in Chicago, the Virgin Islands, and Washington, D.C. Affidavit of James R. Holloway at 2, filed with Motion to Vacate Conviction. During those years, appellant has “represented hundreds of criminal defendants.” Pre-Sen-tencing Statement of James R. Holloway, Sent.Tr. 3/10/92 at 15. Given Holloway’s willingness repeatedly to disregard the judge’s orders, and thereby also to undermine the court’s authority, we do not think it an abuse of discretion to assess punishment in the form of a $1,000 fine.
  Appellant and amici have embellished their briefs with unexceptionable remarks about the critical role that an independent and unbowed bar plays in preserving the liberty that defines our nation and that we are sworn to protect. We agree. As the Supreme Court stated in In re McConnell:
  it is ... essential to a fair administration of justice that lawyers be able to make honest good-faith efforts to present their clients’ cases. An independent judiciary and a vigorous, independent bar are both indispensable parts of our system of justice.
  370 U.S. 230, 236, 82 S.Ct. 1288, 1292, 8 L.Ed.2d 434 (1962).
  Nonetheless, the advocate in our legal system is expected to abide by the rulings of the presiding judge. “[I]f the ruling is adverse, it is not counsel’s right to resist it ... his right is only respectfully to preserve his point for appeal.” Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 9, 72 S.Ct. 451, 454, 96 L.Ed. 717 (1952). Absent such a requirement, trials would wander down every by-way, no matter how impermissible, in a sprawling chaos that would render the adjudication close to random. In the long run, such chaos is hardly in the interests of defendants as a whole, much less in the interest of society.
  The judgment of conviction and sentence are affirmed.
  So ordered.
  APPENDIX A
  On October 8, 1991, during trial in United States v. Rascoe, the following colloquy occurred. It was cited in full by Judge Johnson as the basis for her contempt conviction of appellant James R. Holloway.
  [Tr. 10/8, p. 77] Mr. Holloway: Judge, I would like to mark something that’s in the file and show the witness something that’s in the file.
  The Court: No. You can tell me what you want from the file, and Mrs. Pacori will get it out, but you are not going to mark anything in that file.
  Mr. Holloway: There’s a paperclip where it is.
  The Court: Tell me what you want.
  Mr. Holloway: There’s a paperclip where it is.
  The Court: Pass me the file.
  Mr. Holloway: There’s a pink paperclip.
  The Court: You’d better approach the bench.
  (At the bench)
  The Court: Why do you choose to show this to that officer?
  Mr. Holloway: Judge, that is the statement of facts that he wrote on the 163 word-for-word. I’m going to show it to him and ask him to compare the statement in that document to the [Tr. 10/8, p. 78] statement of facts that he wrote on the 163 he compared, and to compare those two statements as to whether they are identical or not.
  The Court: Well, this statement is sworn to on the 9th of March, 1991, and it is sworn to by Robert Condit. So, maybe Robert Condit chose to take that man’s statement exactly. How can he tell us where Condit got this from? This thing— Mr. Holloway: That was not my question. My only question would be to ask him to look at that and compare it to the statement that he prepared and to give us — to give us his indication of whether this statement — how that statement compares to the statement that he wrote.
  The Court: Totally irrelevant.
  Mr. Holloway: It’s very relevant, Judge. It’s the foundation I’m laying for questions to Officer Condit as to that statement of facts and where it came from, and whether that statement represents the statement of facts that was prepared by this witness, and whether he got that statement of facts from the 163 statement of facts prepared by this witness. And Your Honor can look at them. I will bring the 163 up here so you can look at it.
  The Court: You don’t have to.
  Mr. Holloway: They’re identical. They’re word-for-word, identical.
  The Court: So?
  [Tr. 10/8, p. 79] Mr. Holloway: In fact, it looks like it’s been xeroxed, that the statement of facts from the 163 has been xeroxed onto this Gerstein statement of facts that was filed.
  The Court: The what?
  Mr. Holloway: Gerstein, G-E-R-S-T-EI-N, the statement of facts that was filed in the Superior Court the following day. The Court: But my point to you, Mr. Holloway, and I will repeat it again, that 163 is dated March 8, 1991, is it not? Mr. Holloway: Yes.
  The Court: All right. This statement is sworn to on the 9th of March, 1991.
  Mr. Holloway: But it could have been prepared on the 8th, Judge. We can ask the witness if he knows. Just because it was sworn on the 9th—
  The Court: Excuse me, Mr. Holloway. There is absolutely nothing on here that demonstrates that this witness, Mr. Young, has ever seen this particular document before. There is absolutely nothing.
  Now, if you want to present it to him and ask him if he has ever seen this particular document before, and not its contents, but the document itself, I will permit you to do that. But because it may have the same contents, because in fact Condit may have just taken his 163 and xeroxed it to swear to it doesn’t carry any more weight than that.
  [Tr. 10/8, p. 80] Now, if you want to give this to this witness to determine whether he has ever seen this document before as opposed to these contents, I would think that that would be relevant. I will hear from you.
  Mr. Christian: Your honor, I don’t think he can cross examine this witness as to the contents provided in that document that is sworn to by, I believe, Officer Condit. He can show him, but other than cross-examining or questioning him about the contents, I don’t think he should be permitted to.
  The Court: As I said, I don’t see its relevance. It appears improper to me. Anybody else care to be heard?
  Mr. Huebner: No, your Honor, thank you. The Court: All right. As I said, I am always very particular about doing this. If there is ever to your knowledge again any document in the official court jacket that you might like to use, tell my clerk and we will see if we can arrange to xerox it for you, because I’m not going to let you bother with this. Nothing should be removed from this jacket save by the clerk of court, under the rules of court, all right. So, if you ever, ever need anything again, simply ask us and we will be happy to do it, okay.
  You may pass that to Mrs. Pacori or you may use it as you see fit.
  [Tr. 10/8, p. 81] Mr. Holloway: Thanks judge.
  The Court: Pursuant to my instructions, of course. I guess I’d better tell you that.
  Mr. Holloway: Judge, can I have it — can I have it removed?
  The Court: No, you may not. No, sir, not now. No, sir.
  Mr. Holloway: I can’t have it marked either?
  The Court: No.
  Mr. Holloway: Can I have a copy made? Can I have a copy made?
  The Court: We don’t have time to do that now. You have it marked with that pink paperclip, and that’s as much marking as you are going to do.
  Mr. Holloway: I need to identify it for the record.
  The Court: You will have to identify it by the fact that it’s a March 19 — a March 9, 1991, affidavit by Robert Condit. That’s all you can do right now. Later today I can get Mrs. Pacori to do it but not now. That’s it, Mr. Holloway.
  Mr. Holloway: Is Your Honor — just clarification as to what I can ask or not ask. The Court: I have already told you the limits.
  Mr. Holloway: I cannot ask him to compare the two documents?
  The Court: No, no, no.
  [Tr. 10/8, p. 82] Mr. Holloway: Why is that improper, Judge?
  The Court: If this man has never seen that document before — and that’s why I told you you must ask him if he has seen that document, not just those paragraphs contained on it — then he can’t testify to it. Mr. Holloway: Well, can he look at it now? I mean, can he look at it now and compare it.
  The Court: He may not compare it until you have made certain determinations, Mr. Holloway. And I don’t know how often I have to say that. That’s the third time I have repeated it.
  (In open court:)
  The Court: Mr. Young, if you will come back now, please.
  Why don’t you use the pink — keep the pink paperclip on it so we can use that as an identifying mark.
  By Mr. Holloway:
  Q: Sir, I’m showing you a document entitled “United States v. Kelvin Rascoe.” It is a document dated March 9, 1991.
  Mr. Christian: Your Honor, he can identify it if he can recognize it.
  The Court: He can say that. Go ahead.
  By Mr. Holloway:
  Q: It is a document dated March 9, 1991. It is signed by Robert W. Condit, and it has the number 91-0183 on it and it [Tr. 10/8, p. 83] has a pink paperclip. Would you look at this please.
  The Court: He’s asking you to look at it to determine whether or not you have ever seen that document before.
  By Mr. Holloway:
  Q: Have you had a chance to look at it?
  A: Yes, I have.
  Q: Okay. Do you know what that document is?
  The Court: No, no, no. First of all, we just determine if he’s ever seen it before. That’s the first step.
  Have you ever seen that document before now?
  Mr. Holloway: Judge—
  The Witness: No, ma’am.
  Mr. Holloway: Judge, I would ask the Court to allow counsel to complete his examination.
  The Court: Excuse me, Mr. Holloway. The purpose of our last bench conference in which I ruled on that legal question said that the first thing' you just do is determine whether he has ever seen this document before, and his answer is no, he has not seen it before today.
  Was not that your answer?
  The Witness: Yes, ma’am.
  The Court: You may proceed.
  By Mr. Holloway:
  Q: Do you know what that document is?
  Mr. Christian: Objection, Your Honor.
  [Tr. 10/8, p. 84] The Court: If he has never seen it before, we are not going to ask him if he knows what it is.
  By Mr. Holloway:
  Q: Have you seen it now? Have you looked at it just now?
  A: Yeah, I see it now.
  Q: Okay. Having looked at it now, can you now tell us what it is, what that document is?
  Mr. Christian: Objection, Your Honor. The Court: The objection is sustained. And, Mr. Holloway, this is the last time I’m going to tell you the objection is sustained.
  By Mr. Holloway:
  Q. Do you recognize any of the wording set forth in that document?
  Mr. Christian: Objection, Your Honor. The Court: Mr. Holloway, approach the bench, please.
  (At the bench:)
  The Court: Mr. Holloway, I hold you in summary contempt of this court and I shall sentence you at the conclusion of this trial. Ask another question — ask that question another way and I shall hold you in summary contempt again.
  Mr. Holloway: Your Honor—
  The Court: I have ruled.
  Mr. Holloway: Your Honor—
  [Tr. 10/8, p. 85] The Court: Let’s proceed.
  Mr. Holloway: May I make—
  The Court: There is nothing for you to say after a ruling.
  (In open court:)
  The Court: Mr. Young, you may resume the witness stand.
  Mr. Holloway: That’s all I have, Your Honor. Thank you. Thank you, sir.
  APPENDIX B
  [Tr. 9/25, p. 33] By Mr. Holloway: [Because of indications by the court that you would hold me in contempt, as you indicated yesterday, and having indicated on two previous occasions in the prior trial that just completed on Monday of this week, that I felt as though my effectiveness in representing Mr. Rascoe stood the good prospect of being diminished because of fear of a contempt citation in the course of my conduct in the course of this trial.
  Your Honor indicated yesterday morning, after a question, that if — I don’t recall Your Honor’s exact words — if I asked another question that I think you had sustained objection to that you would hold me in contempt. It was my belief at the time that I had asked a different question, that I had not asked the question that Your Honor had sustained objection to, and I believe that I had a good faith basis for asking the question and that it was incumbent upon me to try to get a response to a question that I had both a good faith basis to ask and a well-founded view of its relevance. Your Honor once again indicated the possibility of contempt. And [Tr. 9/25, p. 34] after that I really began to really search my own soul, if you will, as to my effectiveness, in that I do have and will have constantly in the back of my mind the prospect that Your Honor may see fit to cite me for contempt for some activity in the course of the trial and because of, as I said, on two previous occasions, your Hon- or had so indicated.
  [Tr. 9/25, p. 35] I would like to say to the court that I do not intentionally violate any court orders, any of the orders of the court, that if Your Honor has indicated in the past[ ] that I have asked questions [ ] that I have asked questions more than once, I would just say to the court that I— it is often times hard for me to personally keep as good track as to where I am in my notes as I would want to, and I would also tell Your Honor that I’m a human being.
  The Court: Mr. Holloway, there is nothing unusual about that and, God knows being a human being myself, you can rest assured. I know the frailties of humanity. So, you don’t have to waste time on that.
  [Tr. 9/25, p. 36] The Court: Thank you very much sir. [ ] Very well. Mr. Ras-coe, you have heard this motion that has been filed by your attorney, and I have given him an opportunity to expound on what he had written, and I want you to know that you have no reason to fear that your attorney can represent you effectively. He represented very effectively the client in the previous case that he refers to. He is an attorney with eleven and a half years of experience. He is not a neophyte. He will be able to represent you as zealously as he can represent anyone else. He will only be found in contempt of court if his conduct is contemptuous. All of us can be contemptuous from time to [Tr. 9/25, p. 37] time, and that is the only way that he or any other lawyer in this city will ever be found in contempt of court by me is if they are contemptuous. As long as Mr. Holloway is not contemptuous, he has not one thing to worry about, and he knows that. He knows what the law is with respect to contempt, and he knows that unless he behaves contemptuously, there is no possible way for him to be held in contempt of court.
  I am sure that I have not held an attorney in contempt of court in over 18 years, because most lawyers, like Mr. Holloway, know how to conduct themselves. If Mr. Holloway did not know how to conduct himself, I’m sure he would not be an Assistant Federal Public Defender. I’m sure he would not even be in his position if he did not know how to conduct himself.
  But, Mr. Holloway did, unfortunately, forget himself one day last week. After asking him five times to be seated and his refusal to move, I had to do something. I could not proceed. I couldn’t bring my jury into the court room because he refused to move. So, if he were to do that in here today during your case and I asked him to please be seated, I’ve got to move on, and he refuses a direct order and certainly not one that said stand on your head, Mr. Holloway, for ten minutes, simply would you please take your seat so that I can bring the jury in, then, yes, that is what is known as contempt of court. That is known as contemptuous conduct.
  [Tr. 9/25, p. 38] I have every reason to believe that since Mr. Holloway engaged in that contemptuous conduct that day and I chose not to hold him in contempt of court, because I know how it hurts an attorney if he is held in contempt of court, that is no reason for him to fear being held in contempt of court. All he has to do is not engage in contemptuous conduct, because, you see, Mr. Holloway, I could have held you in summary contempt right then and I could have locked you up right then. But I said to myself, there is something wrong here. Let me give him a little extra time to recognize the error of his ways. Here a judge is asking him to be seated so that she can proceed with the trial and he refuses to. Let me give him a little time to think. And I had my clerk come back from the door where she was poised to open the door to let the jury in whenever I was able to bring the jury in and to call to ask that not the marshall who was sitting in my courtroom but another marshall come up. And I told you very distinctly, I said, “Now, Mr. Holloway, if you are still standing here when that marshall comes upstairs, I shall have to hold you in summary contempt of the court.” You found a way to sit down.
  So, it is not I, Mr. Holloway. I have no problems with you or anyone else, zealously representing the interests of your client, but I do have a responsibility myself to the effective administration of justice. It is not a matter of just the lawyer or just the prosecutor or the prosecutor and [Tr. 9/25, p. 39] the defense bar. All three of us must work together. You have certain responsibilities. I have the responsibility to rule on certain issues, and when I rule on those issues, I expect all officers of the court, be they male, female, young or old, to comply with the rulings of the court.
  Your motion is denied. There is absolutely nothing inconsistent with your being able to represent Mr. Raseoe and your professional interest. There’s no reason for you to fear being held in contempt of court, because you will certainly be given full notice of it. I can’t promise that I will give you as much notice as I gave you the day you refused to take your seat when I told you to be seated. I can’t promise you I mil give you that much notice again by calling downstairs and giving you time to think while the marshall came upstairs. I can’t promise you I will do that again, but I can promise you that I have not held a lawyer in contempt in over 18 years, hope that I don’t ever have to hold another lawyer in contempt, but I must perform my function as well. If you will remember your function and remember the court’s function, there will be no problems. And it is so ordered.
  . Accordingly, cases such as In re McConnell, 370 U.S. 230, 82 S.Ct. 1288, 8 L.Ed.2d 434 (1962); In re Brown, 454 F.2d 999 (D.C.Cir. 1971); United States ex rel. Robson v. Oliver, 470 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Sopher, 347 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1965); United States v. Meyer, 346 F.Supp. 973 (D.D.C.1972), discussed in the Dissent at 1098-99, are, insofar as they clarify the meaning of the obstruction of justice element of § 401(1), not pertinent to this opinion. See In re Brown, 454 F.2d 999, 1003-04 (discussing § 401(1)), 1005-09 (discussing § 401(3)).
  . The dissent speculates that Holloway embarked on this inquiry with the "hope[] that the jury would afford less credence to" the Gerstein affidavit for Rascoe if it were shown to be hearsay. See Dissent at 1095. If Holloway indulged any such hope, he never revealed it — not in his dialogues with the court during the trial, not in his pre-sentencing hearing, and not in his briefs to this court. It would seem an odd mission, as no one had offered the Gerstein statement, so its "credence” was presumably zero. The closest Holloway could be said to suggesting such a purpose — and it is not very close at all — is a footnote in his Reply Brief at 15 n. 5, where he alleges that the D.C. police often use hearsay statements in Gerstein affidavits to insulate arresting officers from cross examination. The procedure could not have had that effect here, as Truesdale prepared at least one PD 163 and Holloway used it in his cross-examination of Truesdale.
  . The dissent states that the judge was unclear because she told Holloway he could “proceed” with his questioning of Young after Young stated that he had never seen the document before and because Holloway "made clear to the judge that his primary reason for calling Officer Young ... was to ask him about the preparation of the PD-163 and the Gerstein affidavit.” Dissent at 1100. There are two problems with the dissent's theory. First, assuming arguendo that Holloway had indicated that his primary reason for calling Young was to inquire about the preparation of the documents, there was absolutely no reason for the judge to think Holloway might not wish to pursue other lines of inquiry. Holloway had already, for example, questioned Young for four pages of transcript on his role in the search. See Tr. 10/8 at 65-69. In any event, Judge Johnson’s instruction to proceed is a rote direction used every day by both trial and appellate judges. Any litigant familiar with trial or appellate practice would understand that the judge was instructing Holloway either to go on to another line of questioning or, if he had no other line of questioning, to cease and allow the government to examine Officer Young on cross. There is no basis at all for assigning the phrase the dissent's proposed meaning — i.e., that Holloway could proceed with his questioning about the document — as the judge had barred that in the immediately preceding colloquy.
  . The quoted passage also alludes to allegedly contemptuous conduct of Holloway from a different trial that also took place before Judge Johnson and that immediately preceded the Rascoe trial. See United States v. Farrell, Crim. No. 90-0524 (D.D.C. tried September 17-23, 1991). We do not need to address the question whether a reviewing court may look at incidents from other trials to evaluate the contemnor's intent, as the incidents from the Rascoe trial dictate affir-mance. We consider the quoted passage because it shows that appellant had been warned, not because it describes other incidents not in the record before us.
  . Fed.R.Crim.P. 42 provides:
  (a) Summary Disposition. A criminal contempt may be punished summarily if the judge certifies that the judge saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt and that it was committed in the actual presence of the court.
  (b) Disposition Upon Notice and Hearing. A criminal contempt except as provided in subdivision (a) of this rule shall be prosecuted on notice. The notice shall state the time and place of hearing, allowing a reasonable time for the preparation of the defense, and shall state the essential facts constituting the criminal contempt charged and describe it as such. The notice shall be given orally by the judge in open court in the presence of the defendant or, on application of the United States attorney or of an attorney appointed by the court for that purpose, by an order to show cause or an order of arrest. The defendant is entitled to a trial by jury in any case in which an act of Congress so provides. The defendant is entitled to admission to bail as provided in these rules. If the contempt charged involves disrespect to or criticism of a judge, that judge is disqualified from presiding at the trial or hearing except with the defendant’s consent. Upon a verdict or finding of guilt the court shall enter an order fixing the punishment.
  Appellant does not dispute that Judge Johnson "saw or heard the conduct constituting the [cited] contempt” and that the conduct was committed in the "actual presence of the court” as required by Rule 42(a).
  . Appellant does not challenge the propriety of the district judge's order barring him from appearing in her courtroom. Compare Dissent at 1102 (discussing propriety of the bar). See 'Appellant’s Brief at 2 (presenting statement of issues), 46-47 (discussing the order solely when arguing that appellant should have been tried by another judge under Fed.R.Crim.P. 42(b)); Reply Brief at 17 (same).