opinion: COMPLETE AUTO TRANSIT, INC., et al. v. REIS et al.
  No. 79-1777.
  Argued February 24, 1981
  Decided May 4, 1981
  Brennan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stewart, White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Powell, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 417. Burger, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquist, J., joined, post, p. 424.
  R. Ian Hunter argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was C. John Holmguist, Jr.
  Hiram S. Grossman argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents.
  J. Albert Woll, Laurence Gold, and George Kaufmann filed a brief for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations as amicus curiae urging affirmance.
  Justice Brennan
  delivered the opinion of the Court.
  In Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U. S. 238 (1962), the Court held that § 301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 156, 29 U. S. C. § 185 (a), does not authorize a damages action against individual union officers and members when their union is liable for violating a no-strike clause in a collective-bargaining agreement. We expressly reserved the question whether an employer might maintain a suit for damages against “individual defendants acting not in behalf of the union but in their personal and nonunion capacity” where their “unauthorized, individual action” violated the no-strike provision of the collective-bargaining agreement. 370 U. S., at 249, n. 7. We granted cer-tiorari to decide this important question of federal labor law. 449 ü. S. 898 (1980).
  I
  Petitioners are three companies engaged in the transportation by truck of motor vehicles. All three are parties to a collective-bargaining agreement with the Teamsters Union that covers operations at their respective facilities in Flint, Mich. Respondents are employees of petitioners and members of Teamsters Local Union No. 332. The collective-bargaining agreement contains a no-strike clause and subjects all disputes to a binding grievance and arbitration procedure.
  On June 8, 1976, respondents commenced a wildcat strike, because they believed that “the union was not properly representing them in . . . negotiations for amendments to the collective bargaining agreement.” 614 F. 2d 1110, 1111 (CA6 1980). Soon thereafter, petitioners brought this § 301 (a) action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, seeking injunctive relief and “damages against the [employees], in their individual capacity, for all losses arising out of the unlawful work stoppage and for attorneys fees.” App. 21. Petitioners alleged that the strike was neither authorized nor approved by the union and, therefore, sought no damages from the union. See 614 F. 2d, at 1115; App. 18, 20-21. After a hearing, the District Court found that “the issue which had caused the work stoppage was not arbitrable” because, .it' was “an internal dispute between factions in the Local,” App. to Pet. for Cert. 15a-16a, and accordingly denied preliminary injunctive relief, citing Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, 398 U. S. 235 (1970). Following additional hearings and settlement of the “internal dispute,” the District Court concluded that “the work stoppage continued only because of a dispute between the Local and [petitioners] over amnesty for the strikers [and that] this issue was arbitrable.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 16a. The court, therefore, issued a preliminary injunction, enjoining continuation of the strike. Respondents obeyed the order and returned to work on June 21, 1976.
  Nine months later, respondents moved to dissolve the preliminary injunction and to dismiss the complaint for damages. Relying on this Court’s intervening decision in Buffalo Forge Co. v. Steelworkers, 428 U. S. 397 (1976), the District Court dissolved the injunction on the ground that the work stoppage was not precipitated by an arbitrable issue. App. to Pet. for Cert. 18a. The court also dismissed petitioners’ claim for damages, holding that, “an employer may not sue his employees for monetary relief for breach of the collective bargaining agreement . . . whether or not the union may also be liable.” Id., at 16a.
  The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the District Court’s dissolution of the injunction, holding that an injunction may be granted even where the issue which precipitated the strike was nonarbitrable provided an arbitrable issue, other than the simple legality of the strike itself, caused the continuation of the strike with the purpose of “compel [ling] the employer to concede on the arbitrable issue.” 614 F. 2d, at 1114. Petitioners do not seek review of this part of the Court of Appeals’ ruling.
  The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of petitioners’ claim for damages from the individual union members. Relying principally on the legislative history of § 301, the Court of Appeals concluded that Congress had not intended through § 301 to “create a cause of action for damages against individual union members for breach of a no-strike agreement.” 614 F. 2d, at 1116. We agree.
  II
  Since Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U. S. 448 (1957), it has been settled that § 301(a) does more than confer jurisdiction on federal courts to decide lawsuits alleging violations of collective-bargaining agreements. Section 301 (a) also “authorizes federal courts to fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of these collective bargaining agreements.” Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U. S., at 451. Lincoln Mills defined the mode of analysis- for fashioning this body of federal law as follows:
  “The Labor Management Relations Act expressly furnishes some substantive law. It points out what the parties may or may not do in certain situations. Other problems will lie in the penumbra of express statutory mandates. Some will lack express statutory sanction but will be solved by looking at the policy of the legislation and fashioning a remedy that will effectuate that policy. The range of judicial inventiveness will be determined by the nature of the problem.” Id., at 457.
  Of course, “Lincoln Mills did not envision any freewheeling inquiry into what the federal courts might find to be the most desirable rule, irrespective of congressional pronouncements.” Howard Johnson Co. v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees, 417 U. S. 249, 255 (1974). Rather, it is clear that in fashioning federal law under § 301 (a) substantial deference should be paid to revealed congressional intention. See Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U. S., at 248-249.
  In Atkinson, the Court relied on the intent of Congress in passing § 301 (b) to hold that individual union members may not be sued for damages where the union has breached the no-strike provision of its collective-bargaining agreement. Section 301 (b) states in pertinent part that “[a]ny money judgment against a labor organization . . . shall be enforceable only against the organization as an entity and against its assets, and shall not be enforceable against any individual member or his assets.” Thus, in Atkinson, we noted that “in discharging the duty Congress imposed on us to formulate the federal law to govern § 301 (a) suits, we are strongly guided by and do not give a niggardly reading to § 301 (b).” Ibid. Accordingly, we consulted and relied on the legislative history of § 301 (b) which made it “clear that th[e] third clause [of §301 (b) ] was a deeply felt congressional reaction against the Danbury Hatters case . . . and an expression of legislative determination that the aftermath ... of that decision was not to be permitted to recur.” Id., at 248. Similarly, in deciding the question presented in this case, we “discharg [e] the duty Congress imposed on us to formulate the federal law to govern § 301 (a) suits,” id., at 248-249, by looking to the “penumbra” of § 301 (b), 353 U. S., at 457, as informed by its legislative history. See Howard Johnson Co. v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees, supra, at 255.
  Section 301 (b) by its terms prohibits a money judgment entered against a union from being enforced against individual union members. See Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., supra. It is a mistake to suppose that Congress thereby suggested by negative implication that employees should be held liable where their union is not liable for the strike. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers, 452 F. 2d 49, 52 (CA7 1971). Although lengthy and complex, the legislative history of § 301 clearly reveals Congress’ intent to shield individual employees from liability for damages arising from their breach of the no-strike clause of a collective-bargaining agreement, whether or not the union participated in or authorized the illegality. Indeed, Congress intended this result even though it might leave the employer unable to recover for his losses. See Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., supra, at 248.
  The legislative history of § 301 begins with a review of congressional efforts in the year prior to adoption of the Labor Management Relations Act. Section 10 of the Case bill, H. R. 4908, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946), passed by both Houses of Congress, but vetoed by the President in 1946, was “the direct antecedent of § 301.” Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U. S. 502, 509 (1962). Since § 10 “contained provisions substantially the same ... as the provisions of § 301,” ibid., its legislative history is highly relevant in ascertaining congressional intent with respect to § 301, see id., at 511-512.
  The purpose of § 10 was “to establish a mutual responsibility when the collective-bargaining process has resulted in a contract.” 92 Cong. Rec. 838 (1946) (remarks of Rep. Case). As introduced in the House, § 10 provided for collective-bargaining agreements to be enforceable “against each of the parties thereto.” The Senate adopted a bill which encompassed the purposes of § 10 of the House version and which, in addition, explicitly permitted an employer to discharge an employee who participated in a strike which was not authorized by the union. Senator Taft, principal proponent of the provision, explained:
  “If the union violates its collective bargaining-agreement, it is responsible, but no individual member is responsible, and he can in no way be deprived of his rights. But if the union tries to keep its contract and, in violation of its undertaking, some of its members proceed to strike, then the employer may fire those members and they do not have the protection of the Wagner Act.” 92 Cong. Rec. 5705-5706 (1946).
  Thus the Senator stopped short of proposing that individual employees be held liable in damages for engaging in unauthorized strikes.
  The House’s subsequent consideration of the Senate’s version reflected its clear understanding of the Senate’s limitation on employers’ remedies. Representative Case explained the Senate amendment on the floor of the House:
  “Individual members of a union are not made liable for any money judgment, I might point out, but only the union as an entity. If employees strike in violation of their agreement, the only individual penalty that can be employed is the forfeiture of their right to employment under that contract which is cured when the employer reemploys them.” Id., at 5930-5931 (emphasis added).
  The House then passed the Senate version. In doing so, the House, like the Senate, clearly intended to protect employees from the sanction of a suit for damages for a strike in breach of the collective-bargaining agreement, whether or not the union participated in or authorized the strike. It is true that the President vetoed this bill and that his veto was sustained. Nevertheless, the substantial similarity between the pertinent language of the Case bill as passed by Congress and of § 301 as it reads today makes the legislative history of the Case bill vitally significant to a full understanding of the policy behind § 301 (b).
  Six months after the veto, Congress began work on the legislation which became § 301. The bill ultimately passed by the House created a federal cause of action for breach of a collective-bargaining agreement. The Committee Report explained that “actions and proceedings involving violations of contracts between employers and labor organizations may be brought by either party.” H. R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 45-46 (1947). Section 302 (b) also contained express language precluding enforcement against individuals of judgments entered against unions. In addition, the bill included an amendment to § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act providing that “violations of collective bargaining-agreements” would not be protected under the Act, H. R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), § 7 (a), thereby allowing employers to discharge wildcat strikers. The House bill also included a provision, however, which allowed an employer to recover damages from individual employees. Section 12 created a damages action against any person engaging in an unlawful concerted activity. The bill defined “unlawful concerted activities” to include, inter alia, jurisdictional strikes, sympathy strikes, and certain picketing activities.
  Significantly, however, the Senate rejected the House’s imposition in § 12 of damages liability against individuals for unlawful concerted activity, and a Conference Committee adopted the Senate version. The Senate counterpart to § 12 of the House bill was § 303. Senator Taft offered a floor amendment to § 303 which would have established a damages action against individuals who engage in certain types of unlawful concerted activity such as secondary boycotts and jurisdictional strikes. 93 Cong. Rec. 4900 (1947). In a critical exchange during the debate on the proposed amendment, Senator Taft altered the language to limit damages actions to claims against unions, in order to conform with § 301 (b) and bar imposition of individual damages liability against employees:
  “Mr. MORSE: [T]he proposal of the Senator from Ohio would open wide the doors of the Federal courts to damage suits against any person who engaged in a strike or attempted to persuade other employees to engage in a strike for one of the prohibited objectives.
  “The proposal would very definitely take us back at least 40 years and we would again have the spectacle of mass suits against employees, similar to the infamous Danbury Hatters case. Senators will recall that in that case some 150 members of the union were sued by their employer and the Supreme Court of the United States sustained a judgment against them in the neighborhood of a quarter million dollars. . . .
  “It also should be pointed out that the substitute proposal is inconsistent with the present provision in the bill allowing a union to be sued for breach of contract. Section 301 of the bill permits suits against labor organizations only, whereas the substitute proposal allows damage suits against ‘any person.’ Also, section 301 limits recovery to the assets of the union. The substitute allows the attachment of employees’ bank accounts and all their property..
  “Mr. TAFT: On request by . . . Senator [Ives] from New York and others who raised the point, I am amending the proposal, by striking out the word ‘person,’ in the second line, and inserting in lieu thereof ‘labor organization,’ so the action will be open only against labor organizations promoting this type of strike.” Id., at 4839-4841.
  The Senate passed this version of the bill, foreclosing individual damages liability in both § 301 and § 303 lawsuits.
  At conference, the Conference Committee squarely rejected § 12 of the House bill in favor of § 303 of the Senate bill, thereby refusing to create a damages action against individual employees for the conduct prohibited in that section. In addition, the Committee deleted the provision in the House bill which had removed protection under § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act for concerted activity in breach of a collective-bargaining agreement for the stated reason that the provision was unnecessary in light of recent decisions of the National Labor Relations Board. Those provisions had held that “strikes in violation of collective bargaining contracts were not concerted activities protected by the act and [the NLRB had] refused to reinstate employees discharged for engaging in such activities.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 39 (1947). The Committee, therefore, opted for a discharge remedy for violations of § 303 by individuals, rather than for the damages remedy that had been proposed by the House. At the same time, it preferred discharge as the employer’s remedy under § 301 where employees violate the no-strike provision of their collective-bargaining agreement.
  Thus, while § 301 (b) explicitly addresses only union-authorized violations of a collective-bargaining agreement, the “penumbra” of § 301 (b), Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U. S., at 457, as informed by its legislative history, establishes that Congress meant to exclude individual strikers from damages liability, whether or not they were authorized by their union to strike. The legislative debates and the process of legislative amendment demonstrate that Congress deliberately chose to allow a damages remedy for breach of the no-strike provision of a collective-bargaining agreement only against unions, not individuals, and, as to unions, only when they participated in or authorized the strike. See Carbon Fuel Co. v. Mine Workers, 444 U. S. 212, 216 (1979). Congress itself balanced the competing advantages and disadvantages inherent in the possible remedies to combat wildcat strikes, and “we are strongly guided by” its choice. Atkin son v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U. S., at 249. See Howard Johnson Co. v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees, 417 U. S., at 255. Accordingly, we hold that § 301 (a) does not sanction damages actions against individual employees for violating the no-strike provision of the collective-bargaining agreement, whether or not their union participated in or authorized the strike.
  Affirmed.
  The no-strike clause provides that “[t]he Unions and the Employers agree that there shall be no strike, tie-up of equipment, slowdowns or walkouts on the part of the employees, nor shall the Employer use any method of lockout or legal proceeding without first using all possible means of a settlement, as provided for in this Agreement, of any controversy which might arise.” See Exhibit A to Complaint of Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 24r-25.
  In Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, 398 U. S., at 253-254, this Court held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act’s prohibition against enjoining strikes does not apply where the “collective-bargaining contract contains a mandatory grievance adjustment or arbitration procedure,” where the grievance is subject to arbitration, and where the usual requirements for obtaining equitable relief have been satisfied.
  In Buffalo Forge Co. v. Steelworkers, 428 U. S., at 407 (emphasis in original), this Court held that the Federal District Court properly refused to enjoin a sympathy strike because “the strike was not over any dispute between the Union and the employer that was even remotely subject to the arbitration provisions of the contract.” The Court further held that, even though the “dispute whether the sympathy strike violated the Union’s no-strike undertaking . . . was arbitrable,” injunctive relief was not warranted, since to hold otherwise “would cut deeply into the policy of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and make the courts potential participants in a wide range of arbitrable disputes.” Id., at 410.
  We express no view on whether the Court of Appeals’ ruling was correct.
  Section 301, as set forth in 29 U. S. C. § 185, states in pertinent part:
  “(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
  “(b) Any labor organization which represents employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter and any employer whose activities affect commerce as defined in this chapter shall be bound by the acts of its agents. Any such labor organization may sue or be sued as an entity and in behalf of the employees whom it represents in the courts of the United States. Any money judgment against a labor organization in a district court of the United States shall be enforceable only against the organization as an entity and against its assets, and shall not be enforceable against any individual member or his assets.”
  In the Danbury Hatters ease, “an antitrust treble damage action was brought against a large number of union members, including union officers and agents, to recover from them the employer’s losses in a nationwide, union-directed boycott of his hats. The union was not named as a party, nor was judgment entered against it. A large money judgment was entered, instead, against the individual defendants for participating in the plan 'emanating from headquarters’ ... , by knowingly authorizing and delegating authority to the union officers to- do the acts involved. In the debates, Senator Ball, one of the Act’s sponsors, declared that § 301, ‘by providing that the union may sue and be sued as a legal entity, for a violation of contract, and the liability for damages will lie against union assets only, will prevent a repetition of the Danbury Hatters case, in which many members lost their homes.’ ” Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U. S., at 248. See Savings Bank of Danbury v. Loewe, 242 U. S. 357 (1917); Lawlor v. Loewe, 235 U. S. 522 (1915); Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274 (1908).
  Section 10 of the Case bill provided:
  “All collective-bargaining contracts shall be mutually and equally binding and enforceable either at law or in equity against each of the parties thereto, any other law to the contrary notwithstanding. In the event of a breach of any such contract or of any agreement contained in such contract by either party thereto, then, in addition to any other remedy or remedies existing either in law or equity, a suit for damages for such breach or for injunctive relief in equity may be maintained by the other party or parties in any United States district court having jurisdiction of the parties. If the defendant against whom action is sought to be commenced and maintained is a labor organization, such action may be filed in the United States district court of any district wherein any officer of such labor organization resides or may be found.” H. R. 5262, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946).
  Representative Case explained that the “parties” against whom a “suit for damages” would lie were limited to the employer and to “the recognized bargaining agent rather than an individual.” 92 Cong. Rec. 765 (1946).
  Senate Amendment No. 3 to H. R. 4908, passed by the Senate, stated in pertinent part:
  “(a) Suits for violation of a contract concluded as the result of collective bargaining between an employer and a labor organization if such contract affects commerce as defined in this act may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties.
  “(b) Any labor organization whose activities affect commerce as defined in this act shall be bound by the acts of its duly authorized agents acting within the scope of their authority from the said labor organization and may sue or be sued as an entity and in behalf of the employees whom it represents in the courts of the United States: Provided, That any money judgment against such labor organization shall be enforceable only against the organization as an entity and against its assets, and shall not be enforceable against any individual member or his assets.
  “(d) Any employee who participates in a strike or other stoppage of work in violation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement, if such strike or stoppage is not ratified or approved by the labor organization party to such agreement and having exclusive bargaining rights for such employee, shall lose his status as an employee of the employer party to such agreement for the purposes of sections 8, 9, and 10 of the National Labor Relations Act: Provided, That such loss of status for such employee shall cease if and when he is reemployed by such employer.” 92 Cong. Rec. 5705 (1946). .
  Representative Halleck echoed Representative Case:
  “Mr. Speaker, there is substituted for that [the provision] which has to do with the responsibility of the individual who goes out on a wildcat strike in violation of a contract and in violation of the wishes of his organization. All we say is that if he breaches his contract as an individual in that manner, his employer does not have to take him back unless he wants to. What is the matter with that[?]” Id., at 5932.
  In the House, Representative Case introduced a bill containing a provision establishing federal-court jurisdiction over actions for breaches of collective-bargaining agreements. Subsections (a) and (b) were virtually identical to their counterparts in the bill passed in the previous session of Congress. As Representative Case explained the bill before the House Committee on Education and Labor, “there is no provision for suing individual workers, as such, or rendering any judgment against them.” Hearings before the House Committee on Education and Labor on Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 (1947). Instead, wildcat strikers would be subject to discharge. Ibid.
  Representative Case’s testimony before the House Committee is also instructive:
  “Mr. Landis. I agree that you can deny the members the rights of the Wagner Act, but say there is one coal mine — we had an instance in Indiana where one coal mine went out on a wildcat strike, and the United Mineworkers organization did not like it, and they tried to get the men to go back to work, and they would not go back to work, and still refused to go back to work for several days.
  “Who would you sue in that case?
  “Mr. Case. Of course, I would think the United Mine Workers, as an organization, would have a pretty good defense to any suit for damages against them, if they ordered the men back to work.
  “It would seem to me, if you had a local that went out on strike, and they were parties to a contract, the local would be liable for damages.” Id., at 126.
  Section 302 (a) stated:
  “(a) Any action for or proceeding involving a violation of an agreement between an employer and a labor organization or other representative of employees may be brought by either party in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without regard to the amount in controversy, if such agreement affects commerce, or the court otherwise has jurisdiction of the cause.” H. R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (as passed by the House) (1947).
  Section 302 (b) stated:
  “(b) Any labor organization whose activities affect commerce shall be bound by the acts of its agents, and may sue or be sued as an entity and in behalf of the employees whom it represents in the courts of the United States. Any money judgment against a labor organization' in a district court of the United States shall be enforceable only against the organization as an entity and against its assets, and shall not be enforceable against any individual member or his assets.” H. R. 3020, supra.
  The Committee Report stated that “[t]he committee has revised this section by writing into it in express terms that employees who strike or engage in similar activities in violation of collective-bargaining agreements . . . forfeit the protection of the Labor Act.” H. R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 27 (1947).
  The Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare had earlier reported a bill creating a federal cause of action for breach of a collective-bargaining agreement. It stated in pertinent part:
  “Sec. 301 (a) Suits for violation of contracts concluded as the result of collective bargaining between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
  “(b) Any labor organization which represents employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act may sue or be sued in its common name in the courts of the United States: Provided, That any money judgment against such labor organization shall be enforceable only against the organization as an entity and against its assets, and shall not be enforceable against any individual member or his assets.” H. R. 3020, supra.
  During the floor debate, proponents of the Committee bill emphasized the limited nature of the damages remedy in the proposed legislation. For example, Senator Ball stated: “[W]e give to employers the right to- sue a union in interstate commerce, in a Federal court, for violation of contract. It does not go beyond that.” 93 Cong. Rec. 5014 (1947) (emphasis added).
  “Many of the matters covered in section 12 of the House bill are also covered in the conference agreement in different form, as has been pointed out above in the discussion of section 7 and section 8 (b) (1) of the conference agreement. Under existing principles of law developed by the courts and recently applied by the Board, employees who engage in violence, mass picketing, unfair labor practices, contract violations, or other improper conduct, or who force the employer to violate the law, do not have any immunity under the act and are subject to discharge without right of reinstatement. The right of the employer to discharge an employee for any such reason is protected in specific terms in section 10 (c). Furthermore, under section 10 (k) of the conference agreement, the Board is given authority to apply to the district courts for temporary injunctions restraining alleged unfair labor practices temporarily pending the decision of the Board on the merits.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 59 (1947).
  Petitioners’ reliance on the statement in Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U. S. 554, 562 (1976) (emphasis added), that “Section 301 contemplates suits by and against individual employees” is misplaced. We decide a much narrower question not before the Court in Hines: that § 301 does not contemplate recovery of damages from individual employees as a result of a breach of the no-strike provision of a collective-bargaining agreement. Whether Hines contemplated injunc-tive suits against individuals was not decided by the Court in Hines and we have no occasion to decide that issue now. See n. 18, infra.
  Petitioners argue that a damages remedy against individual employees is indispensable to preserve the integrity of the collective-bargaining agreement and thereby to further the national labor policy of promoting industrial peace. This proposition is questionable on its own terms, overlooks an array of potential remedies that are available to the employer apart from a damages remedy against individuals, and in any event was rejected by Congress.
  It is by no means certain that an individual damages remedy will meaningfully increase deterrence of wildcat strikes above that resulting from use of other available remedies. It is just as likely that damages actions against individuals would exacerbate industrial strife: “an action for damages prosecuted during or after a labor dispute would only tend to aggravate industrial strife and delay an early resolution of the difficulties between employer and union.” Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, 398 U. S., at 248 (footnote omitted); see Gateway Coal Co. v. Mine Workers, 414 U. S. 368, 381, n. 14 (1974).
  The significant array of other remedies available to employers to achieve adherence to collective-bargaining agreements casts further doubt on petitioners’ proposition. First, an employer may seek damages against the union where responsibility may be traced to the union for the contract breach. See 29 U. S. C. § 185 (b); Carbon Fuel Co. v. Mine Workers, 444 U. S. 212, 216-218 (1979); Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U. S., at 247-249. Second, an employer may discharge, or otherwise discipline, an employee who unlawfully walks off the job. See id., at 246; NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U. S. 71, 80 (1953); Lakeshore Motor Freight Co. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 483 F. Supp. 1150, 1154, n. 2 (WD Pa. 1980) (wildcat strikers discharged, and those allowed to return were rehired as new employees). Third, the union itself may discipline its members. See Carbon Fuel Co. v. Mine Workers, supra, at 220; Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers, 452 F. 2d 49, 54 (CA7 1971); see 92 Cong. Rec. 5706 (1946) (Sen. Capehart) (debate on Case bill). Finally, an employer may seek injunctive relief against unions for breach of a no-strike provision in a collective-bargaining agreement where the underlying dispute giving rise to the breach is subject to binding arbitration. See Buffalo Forge Co. v. Steelworkers, 428 U. S., at 407; Gateway Coal Co. v. Mine Workers, supra, at 380-387; Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, supra. Whether a Boys Markets-Buffalo Forge injunction could have issued against individual union members engaged in the wildcat strike at issue here is not before us. It may be that an injunction would not issue against a participating or authorizing union in circumstances otherwise the same: in the instant case the District Judge found that the strike commenced over a nonarbitrable labor dispute, and that ruling was not disturbed by the Court of Appeals.