opinion: Barbara E. KIMMEL, Administratrix of the Estate of Frank C. Kimmel, Deceased, v. YANKEE LINES, a Corporation, Appellant.
  No. 11511.
  United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit.
  Argued March 10, 1955.
  Decided July 15, 1955.
  Hastie, Circuit Judge, dissented.
  Robert E. Kline, William C. Walker, Pittsburgh, Pa. (Dickie, McCamey, Chil-cote, Reif- & Robinson, Pittsburgh, Pa., on the brief), for appellant.
  A. H. Rosenberg, Pittsburgh, Pa. (Rosenberg & Rosenberg, Pittsburgh, Pa., on the brief), for appellee.
  Before McLAUGHLIN, STALEY and HASTIE, Circuit Judges.
  McLAUGHLIN, Circuit Judge.
  Plaintiff’s decedent was killed as a result of a collision in Pennsylvania between the automobile he was operating and a tractor trailer owned by and operated for appellant: Nine months after this action' had been commenced' suits were filed in the' state court on behalf of the passengers in the Kimmel car against plaintiff as administratrix of her deceased husband’s estate and Yankee Lines. Those cases' were consolidated and tried. The jury found negligence on the part of both Kimmel and Yankee Lines and awarded verdicts against both defendants. The state trial judge on motion entered judgment n. o. v. in favor of Yankee Lines and allowed the verdicts against Kimmel to stand. This suit was tried thereafter in due course and resulted in a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.
  On motions for a new trial and for judgment n. o. v. appellant urged that the verdict in the federal court was against the weight of the evidence and that the state court judgment had resolved the issue of negligence making it res ad judicata.
  The first point need not concern us long. There was evidence from which the jury could have concluded as it did that the Yankee Lines driver caused the accident by his negligence and that Kimmel was not contributorily at fault. Those were matters for the jury.
  Since this is a diversity case we look to Pennsylvania law for the answer to the second question, whether recovery here is barred by the state court judgments. There is no appellate opinion directly in point but a common pleas decision of that state which is quite close to the situation before us squarely holds that a verdict against two joint defendants in an action such as the state court suit above mentioned does not foreclose the negligence issue as to the defendants in a later suit between them. Chenger v. Peccan, 1953, 88 Pa.Dist. & Co. 186. That opinion, while not controlling, is entitled to some weight. National Foam System v. Urquhart, 3 Cir., 1953, 202 F.2d 659.
  The common pleas decision relied on Section 82 of the Restatement of Judgments, which says:
  “The rendition of a judgment in an action does not conclude parties to the action who are not adversaries under the pleadings, as to their rights inter se upon matters which they did not litigate, or have an opportunity to litigate, between themselves.” (Emphasis supplied.)
  An illustration given under Comment b to this section is particularly apropos to our case:
  “1. A and B are driving automobiles, which collide. C, a passenger in B’s car, sues A and B. Whether the judgment is in favor of or against C as to either or both A and B, the issues as to negligence or other element of the cause of action are not res judicata in a subsequent action by A against B for damage to his car.”
  Appellant leans heavily on Simodejka v. Williams, 1948, 360 Pa. 332, 62 A.2d 17. In that case, however, the former suit arose under Pennsylvania’s third-party practice rule. Thus instead of the parties being co-defendants in the first suit they were adversaries, i. e. third-party plaintiff and third-party defendant. On this basis the Pennsylvania Supreme Court properly distinguished the Restatement’s nonadversary rule as well as an earlier Pennsylvania case, Jordan v. Chambers, 1910, 226 Pa. 573, 75 A. 956, which had refused to apply the doctrine of res adjudicata in a subsequent suit between two co-defendants who had been successful in an ejectment action brought against them.
  This is not the first time the federal courts have applied Pennsylvania law to this particular problem. In Hassenplug v. Victor Lynn Lines, 3 Cir., 1947, 163 F.2d 828, affirming, D.C.E.D.Pa.1947, 71 F.Supp. 70, the representatives of a deceased automobile passenger had recovered a judgment against decedent’s driver and the owner of a truck, the latter being the second vehicle involved in the fatal collision. This court, in a per curiam affirmance, refused to apply the doctrine of res adjudicata in the subsequent suit brought by decedent’s driver against the truck owner. In Greer v. Stanislau, D.C.E.D.Pa.1953, 118 F.Supp. 494, two automobiles collided on the streets of Philadelphia. A land owner brought suit for damages in the Municipal Court of Philadelphia County against the two drivers as joint tortfeasors. Greer did not contest the action and the jury returned a verdict against Greer but exonerated Stanislau. Greer then sued Stanislau in the federal district court. The latter’s motion to dismiss, on the res ad-judicata ground was denied. In his opinion Judge Ganey cited the Simodejka case, quoted Section 82 of the Restatement of Judgments and concluded: “We think the Pennsylvania Courts would follow this section of the Restatement.” The Greer case was not appealed. See also Hornstein v. Kramer Bros. Freight Lines, 3 Cir., 1943, 133 F.2d 143.
  Exactly the same problem was before the Minnesota Supreme Court in Bunge v. Yager, 1952, 236 Minn. 245, 52 N.W. 2d 446, 451. What that court said about its contribution and cross-claim procedure could also be said by us about the law of Pennsylvania:
  “Our statutes, as well as our new rules, simply provide a method whereby the right's and liabilities of co-parties mazy be litigated in an action in which they are aligned on the same side of the litigation, thereby preventing a multiplicity of suits. But where action is not taken to bring co-parties into an adversary relationship, their rights and liabilities as against each other are not ■ determined, nor is the determination of their liability to a third party a bar to a subsequent action by one of the codefendants against the other to recover damages which he may have suffered as a result of the same tort.” (Emphasis supplied.)
  For cases in other jurisdictions to the same effect, see 152 A.L.R. 1066-1072 (1944); 9 Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law-and Practice, Section 5835 (1955).
  There is more than technicality behind the Restatement illustration. The state court suits were brought to obtain compensation for injuries suffered by the passengers in the present plaintiff’s car. The right of contribution which either defendant there might have been able to assert against the other is entirely collateral to the subject matter of the present cause of action based upon the personal injuries and wrongful death suffered by plaintiff’s decedent. The fact is that no such contribution right was asserted under the pleadings. Nor did plaintiff assert in the prior suit a separate cross-claim against her co-defendant for the injuries and death suffered by her decedent. Plaintiff, acting within Her rights, chose to remain in a non-adversary position with her co-defendant in the first suit. To preclude her now from litigating her cause of action would in effect superimpose a mandatory cross-claim rule on Pennsylvania practice.
  We think the Restatement rule is sound and that the Pennsylvania courts would follow it. The judgment below will be affirmed.
  . “When Williams, in answering George’s [the plaintiff in the first suit] complaint, also brought in Michael as additional defendant, he, Williams, pursuant to Rule 2255 [of the Pennsylvania rules] [12 P.S. Appendix], became a plaintiff as against Michael and Michael became a defendant opposed to Williams; * * * in other words, as the rule provided, they became adverse parties as to each other * Simodejka v. Williams, supra, 360 Pa. at page 335, 62 A.2d at page 18.
  . Appellant also urges upon us Section 68 of the Restatement of Judgments which pertains to the doctrine known as “collateral estoppel”. That contention was also made before the Minnesota Supreme Court. As there indicated, Section 68 must be read in conjunction with Section 82. When that is done it is clear that the collateral estoppel doctrine is likewise limited to subsequent suits between adverse parties in the prior suit or their privies. Any exception to this principle such as where a person has accepted the benefits of a prior judgment bears no relevancy to the instant situation. Cf. Livesay Industries v. Livesay Window Co., 5 Cir., 1953, 202 F.2d 378, certiorari denied 346 U.S. 855, 74 S.Ct. 70, 98 L.Ed. 369. National Bondholders Corp. v. Seaboard Citizens Nat. Bank, 4 Cir., 1940, 110 F.2d 138, while containing broader language, is factually sui generis.
  . Mere assertions in separate answers that the other defendant is the one at fault does not make the defendants adversaries. Pearlman v. Truppo, 1932, 10 N.J.Misc. 477, 159 A. 623; see also Cooke v. Kilgore Mfg. Co., D.C.N.D.Ohio, 1954, 15 F.R.D. 465.
instruction: What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
  Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
  When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 
  
  Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "private business (including criminal enterprises)", specifically "unclear". Your task is to determine what subcategory of business best describes this litigant.
choices: auto industry chemical industry drug industry food industry oil & gas industry clothing & textile industry electronic industry alcohol and tobacco industry other unclear