opinion: MAYFAIR EXTENSION, Inc., Appellant, v. Warren E. MAGEE, Appellee.
  No. 13319.
  United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.
  Argued Feb. 5, 1957.
  Decided Feb. 21, 1957.
  Mr. Robert H. McNeill, Washington, í). C., for appellant.
  Mr. William J. Hughes, Jr., Washington, D. C., for appellee.
  Before BAZELON, FAHY and BAS-TIAN, Circuit Judges.
  PER CURIAM.
  This appeal is from the District Court’s denial of appellant corporation’s motion, under Rules 55 and 60, Fed.R.Civ.P., 28 U.S.C. to vacate the default judgment entered in appellee’s suit on two promissory notes and for attorney’s fees.
  The suit was filed on March 30, 1954, when appellee was general counsel and secretary of appellant. Service was made the next day on appellant’s executive vice president, Cassell. According to affidavits in support of the motion to vacate, Cassell and appellee were denied re-election at a Board of Directors meeting on April 16, 1954, and they withdrew from the meeting without mentioning the suit and the service upon CasselL Appellee obtained judgment by default on April 26,1954.
  It appears from Cassell’s affidavit that one Walker, who was employed as a property manager by appellant corporation after April 16, 1954, knew of the suit and service of process before the entry of the default judgment. Walker’s affidavit, executed a week or so after Cas-sell’s was filed, is completely silent as to whether he had such knowledge or, if so, conveyed it to any officer or director. There is no dispute, however, that appellant was fully advised of the judgment no later than May 7, 1954. The motion to vacate was not filed until April 25, 1955 — almost a year later.
  Appellant says its motion is premised on a breach of trust by attorney against client and therefore falls within Rule 60(b) (3), Fed.R.Civ.P. Under this rule a default judgment may be set aside for “fraud * * *, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party.” Appellant argues that a motion to vacate for such reason may be brought any time within one year. But the rule requires that “The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and [when based upon Rule 60 (b^ than one year after the [default] judgment * * *.” Thus necessary that the motic in one year, but also within a reasonable time within the one-year period. Upon the record before us, the latter requirement The District Court was, therefore, correct in denying the motipn. (3)] not more it was not only on be filed with-that it be filed
  Affirmed.
instruction: What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
  Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
  When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 
  
  Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "private business (including criminal enterprises)", specifically "unclear". Your task is to determine what subcategory of business best describes this litigant.
choices: auto industry chemical industry drug industry food industry oil & gas industry clothing & textile industry electronic industry alcohol and tobacco industry other unclear