opinion: In re VEACH.
  (Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
  January 29, 1925.)
  No. 269, Original.
  1. Courts <©=>343 — Intervener cannot attack jurisdiction of court in main suit.
  Under equity rule 37,' providing that an intervention “shall be in subordination to, and in recognition of, the propriety of the main proceeding,” an intervention for the purpose of attacking the jurisdiction of the court in the main suit is not permissible, and the clerk will not be compelled by a rule to accept and file such a petition of intervention, which it would be the. duty of the court to immediately dismiss.
  2. Street railroads <©=>58 — Trustee in street railway mortgage held not necessary party to bondholder’s suit for receiver.
  Where a company, which purchased the several- street railway lines in a city and united them in a single system, executed a second mortgage on all its property as security for bonds previously issued by one of the subsidiary companies, which it had guaranteed, 'a holder of such bonds, in bringing suit for a receiver for the company, to conserve its property, for the protection of the rights of himself and other bondholders under the guaranty-mortgage, is not proceeding under such mortgage, nor subject to its terms, and the trustee-therein is nqt a necessary or proper party.
  Petition for Rule to Show Cause in the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Missouri.
  Petition by William J. Veach for a rule on the Clerk of the District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri to show cause-why he should not file petitioner’s petition in intervention in the ease oí Adler v. United Railways Company and the St. Louis Transit Company, pending in that court.
  Rule denied, and petition dismissed.
  Ephrim Caplan, of St. Louis, Mo., for petitioner.
  Before SANBORN, and LEWIS, Circuit. Judges, and POLLOCK, District Judge.
  PER CURIAM.
  Veach alleges in his petition filed here that Adler instituted his suit-in said District Court in April, 1919; that a receiver was appointed in said cause of all the properties of the Railways Company, with power to take possession of and operate its street ear system in the city of St. Louis; that said receiver took possession and has continued in possession of said properties and has eontinuonsly operated them. Adler’s complaint, on whieh the receiver was appointed, and Veaeh’s petition in intervention, which he tendered to the clerk, and whieh the clerk refused to file, are attached as exhibits to the petition here, and it appears therefrom that the sole purpose of intervention in Adler’s suit is to attack the jurisdiction of said District Court, it being alleged in the petition in intervention tendered to the clerk that the court was without jurisdiction, and that the order appointing the receiver, and all other orders in said canse, are null and void. The United Railways Company is, and was at the time the receiver was appointed, the owner of all of the street railway system in St. Louis. That system was made up in part of street railway property that had belonged to other companies, which had been taken over byr' the United Railways Company. Twp of the subsidiary companies whose properties were taken into the system were the St. Louis Transit Company and the Union Depot Railroad Company, each of whieh had issued bonds secured by mortgages prior to the consolidation, and these bonds were outstanding when Adler brought his suit. He held 135 bonds issued "by the St. Louis Transit Company, and petitioner, Yeaeh, owns 3 bonds of the same issue. The United Railways Company executed a $45,000,000 mortgage on all of its properties, under which about $30,000,-000 in bonds issued were outstanding. When it took over the St. Louis Transit Company’s property it guaranteed the payment of the bonds of the transit company, and as security therefor it g’ave a second mortgage on •all of its properties. The guaranty mortgage named the Mercantile Trust Company, of St. Louis, trustee, and petitioner here claims, and so alleges in his petition in intervention tendered to the clerk, that the court was without jurisdiction in Adler’s suit, because the Mercantile Trust Compamy was not made a party thereto. In support of that claim two sections of article III of the guaranty mortgage are quoted in the petition tendered in intervention as the basis for the allegation and claim therein that the Mercantile Trust Company was a necessary and indispensable party to the jurisdiction of the court in the Adler suit. Those sections are these:
  “Seetion 4. In ease default shall have been made in the payment of any interest on any bonds at any time issued under.and secured by this indenture, and any such default shall continue for a period of six months, or in case default shall be made in the due observance or performance of any other covenant or condition herein required to be kept or performed by the Railways Company, which shall continue for a period of three months after written notice thereof to Railways Company from trustee, or from the holders of 5 per cent, in amount of the bonds hereby secured, or in ease default shall be made in the due and punctual payment of the principal of any bond" hereby secured, then, and in each casé of such default, trustee, with or without entry, personally or by attorney, in its discretion, may sell to the highest and best bidder all and singular the mortgaged property and premises, rights, franchises, interests; and appurtenances, and all the other real and personal property of every kind, and all right, title, interest, claim, and demand therein and the right of redemption thereof, in one lot and as an entirety, unless a sale in parcels shall be requested and required by the holders of 75 per cent, in amount of the bonds hereby secured and then outstanding, in whieh case such sale may be made in parcels.”
  “Section 13. No holder of any bond or coupon hereby secured shall have any right to institute any suit, action or proceeding in equity or at law for the foreclosure of this indenture, or for the execution of any trust thereof, or for the appointment of a receiver, or for any other remedy hereunder, unless such holder previously shall have given to trustee written notice of such default and of the continuance thereof, as hereinbefore provided; nor unless, also, the holders of 25 per cent, in amount of the bonds hereby-secured, then outstanding shall have made written request upon trustee and shall have afforded to it a reasonable opportunity either to proceed to exercise the powers hereinbefore granted or to institute such action, suit,- or proceeding in its own name; nor unless, also, they shall have offered to trustee adequate security and indemnity against the costs, expenses, and liabilities to be incurred therein or thereby; and such notification, request, and offer of indemnity are hereby declared, in every such ease, at the option of trustee,- to he conditions precedent to the execution of the powers and trusts of this indenture, and to any action or cause of action for foreclosure, or for the appointment of a receiver, or for any other remedy hereunder; it being understood and intended that no one or more holders of bonds and cou; pons shall have any right • in any matter ^whatever to-affeet, disturb, or prejudice the lien of, this indenture by his or their action, or to 'enforce aim right hereunder, except in .the manner • herein provided, and that all proceedings at law or in equity shall be instituted, had, .and maintained in the manner .herein provided and for the equal benefit of all holders of. such, outstanding bonds and .coupons.” .. •-
  It is made clear that the-would-be intervener has no other purpose than that of attacking the jurisdiction of .the district .court in the .Adler suit, and thus accomplishing, if. he can, a, dismissal of that suit and the vacation of all orders made therein, as having been -made by the court without right or .power-to -do so2 and for that reason null and void. .
  11 It is our opinion that Veaeh cannot be permitted to evade the explicit command of equity rule 37. He can be admitted as an intervener in’ the Adler suit only in recognition of apd subject to the requirements of that. rule. It says that any one who is permitted tq intervene in a suit shall do so in subqrdinaijon. to and in recognition of the .propriety of the main .proceeding. Counsel frankly admits here tiiat. his only purpose is to lajinch.ai^at;tack, against the propriety of all,of the proceedings in the. Adler suit, and the petition, which he tendered to the clerk shows.upon-its-face that that was his sole purpose. ...If the clerk had .accepted and filed his petition in, intervention, it would have been the duty of the- District Court to immediately dismiss him out 'of-that ease, and It wopld.be an idle proceeding and a vain order .to require the clerk to accept and file-it. Mueller v. Adler (C. C. A.) 292 F. 138; Jennings v. Smith (D. C.) 242 F. 56; 64; King v. Barr (C. C. A.) 262 F. 56; Adler v. Segman (C. C. A.) 266 F. 828; Seaboard Air Line v. Trust Co., 125 Ga. 463, 465, 54 S. E. 138; Charleston By. Co. v. Pope, 122 Ga. 77, 50 S. E. 374.
  2. The facts on- which petitioner bases his claim that, the Mercantile Trust Company was a necessary and indispensable party in the Adler suit do not .support that claim. It is insisted -.by petitioner that, because Adler, brought his'suit as owner of 135 bonds secured by the guaranty mortgage, he was bound by the requirements of sections 4 and 13 of, article IH qf that mortgage, above quoted, and that under the restrictions of those sections the. Mercantile Trust Company was an indispensable party to his suit. But the right which Adler asserted and sought to protect in his suit was not conferred on the trustee in .the guaranty mortgage, and did not fall within its restrictions. He did not seek in that suit an enforcement of any ¡of the provisions of that mortgage; he did .-not allege a breach of condition of that mortgage, nor that the property covered by it be applied to the satisfaction of the obligation of his guarantor. The gravamen of Adler’s complaint was this: As holder of the St. Louis Transit Company bonds secured by the guaranty mortgage he was interested in having the property of his guarantor conserved and not sacrificed, for his guarantor, United Bailways Company, as he alleged, was then insolvent, having many creditors, both, secured and unsecured, among them holders of about $30,000,000 in bonds outstanding under the $45,000,000 mortgage, which was pri- or in lien to the guaranty mortgage. His guarantor owned the entire street railway .system in St. Louis. The lines of the Union Depot Bailroad Company, worth about $8,-000,000, had been taken over and were a part of that system. The depot company had mortgaged its properties,.prior in date to the guaranty mortgage of the Bailways Company which secured .Adler. The $45,'000,000 mortgage contained a covenant that the Bail-.ways .Company would either pay off or secure an extension .of the bonds issued by the Union Depot Company, when they came due, and it had-failed to do so. It had pledged with the War Finance Corporation $3,487,-000, face value, of the Union Depot Company bonds to secure a. large indebtedness which it owed to the War Finance Corporation, and when Adler, sued it was proposing to redeem that pledge.by substituting with the pledgee a like amount of bonds then .unissued under the $45,000,00.0 mortgage.
  Adler alleged in his complaint -that the financial condition of the United Bailways Company was such that it was unabl.e to pay its indebtedness to the War Finance Corporation, that there was danger of forer closure of the mortgage of the Union Depot Company, causing a sacrifice of the property covered by that mortgage, which had a value of about $8,000,000, and also causing a dismemberment of the street railway system; that if the United Bailways Company succeeded in preventing a foreclosure of : the' Union Depot Company mortgage by substituting $3,487,000 of unissued bonds of the $45,000,000 mortgage, in lieu of the Union Depot Company bonds, the issuance of' those additional bonds under the $45,000,000 mortgage would likely bring about a forep .closure of the latter mortgage. It was this threatened dismemberment of the system,, on the one hand, and the loss to Adler, on the other hand, of all security, that gave him a right to invoke the aid of the court in preserving the property for the benefit of all creditors, so as to prevent its sacrifice, and the assertion of this right was not given to the Mercantile Trust Company, as trustee, nor was Adler in any wise restricted by sections 4 and 13 of article III of the g-uaranty mortgage in asserting such a right on his own motion. Those sections found in the guaranty mortgage relate to procedure to he taken under it on breach of its conditions. Adler sought to preserve the property for the benefit of the holders of bonds under the guaranty mortgage, as well as other creditors. He was not attempting to enforce payment of the indebtedness to him and the other holders of bonds under that mortgage by proceeding under its terms for that purpose, and the right which he asserted was not a right given to the Mercantile Trust Company, as trustee, nor a right in which Adler was restricted in assertion on his own motion; and so we think that the Mercantile Trust Company would have been an improper party.in the Adler suit.
  Issuance of the rule prayed for is denied, and the petition dismissed.
instruction: What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
  Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
  When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 
  
  Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "private business (including criminal enterprises)", specifically "unclear". Your task is to determine what subcategory of business best describes this litigant.
choices: auto industry chemical industry drug industry food industry oil & gas industry clothing & textile industry electronic industry alcohol and tobacco industry other unclear