opinion: PRAIRIE FARMER PUB. CO. et al. v. INDIANA FARMER’S GUIDE PUB. CO.
  No. 5646.
  Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
  March 27, 1936.
  Maxwell V. Beghtol, of Lincoln, Neb., Burke G. Slaymaker, of Indianapolis, Ind., Thomas E. Murphy, of Chicago, Ill., and J. L. Parrish, of Des Moines, Iowa, for appellants.
  U. S. Lesh and James E. Lesh, both of Indianapolis, Ind., Eben Lesh and Joseph H. Lesh, both of Huntington, Ind., and Samuel T. Lesh, of Indianapolis’, Ind., for appellee.
  Before EVANS, and SPARICS, Circuit Judges, and LINDLEY, District Judge.
  This action was brought under and pursuant to section 7 of the Sherman AntiTrust Act (15 U.S.C.A. § 15 note) to recover treble damages due to appellants’ alleged unlawful conspiracy to injure the plaintiff (appellee) and in violation of sectious 1 and 2 of said Act (15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1, 2). Appellee won a verdict of $10,000, upon which a judgment of $37,000 was entered. Included in the judgment was $7,-000 allowed as attorneys’ fees, as authorized by said statute.
  Appellants seek a reversal chiefly because their motion for a directed verdict was denied.
  EVANS, Circuit Judge.
  Brevity may be promoted by reference to two decisions, one by this court, 70 F.(2d) 3, and one by the Supreme Court, 293 U.S. 268, 55 S.Ct. 182, 79 L.Ed. 356. Both deal with this same case on a former appeal. The evidence on the former trial differed little in essential respects from that found in the record before us.
  On the former appeal we sustained the District Court’s dismissal of the action on the ground that the evidence failed to establish a violation of the sections relied upon. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment, and a new trial followed. On retrial, the duty of the District Court to follow the instructions of the Supreme Court was, of course, clear. It attempted so to do and submitted the case to the jury with the results above stated.
  The parties disagree as to the construction of the Supreme Court decision. Both agree that it controls this appeal.
  Appellants earnestly contend that the evidence in the case fails to show either a conspiracy to restrain interstate commerce or the adoption of unfair or unlawful trade practices by the appellants. This court adopted this view on the previous trial, and the Supreme Court differed with us and reversed the judgment. Appellants also argue that the evidence in this case fails to show any recoverable damages suffered by appellee.
  We deem it unnecessary to elaborate the questions so fully discussed in the previous opinions. As we view the question before us it is merely a matter of applying the Supreme Court’s decision.
  We accept appellee’s version which is that the complaint stated a good cause of action, and, if the facts which the evidence on the trial tended to establish be accepted by the jury as true, then it was justified in finding for appellee. In other words, the arguments which appellants advance do not establish a bar to recovery, but merely challenge the facts and the inferences which support appellee’s fact contentions. The result is that a jury question on the issue of damages, restraint of trade, and unfair methods, existed, and the jury settled the fact issues by its verdict. As we construe the decision of the Supreme Court, this conclusion is unavoidable.
  It follows, therefore, that the judgment should be and is hereby affirmed,
instruction: What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
  Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
  When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 
  
  Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "private business (including criminal enterprises)", specifically "other". Your task is to determine what subcategory of business best describes this litigant.
choices: medical clinics, health organizations, nursing homes, medical doctors, medical labs, or other private health care facilities private attorney or law firm media - including magazines, newspapers, radio & TV stations and networks, cable TV, news organizations school - for profit private educational enterprise (including business and trade schools) housing, car, or durable goods rental or lease entertainment: amusement parks, race tracks, for profit camps, record companies, movie theaters and producers, ski resorts, hotels, restaurants, etc. information processing consulting security and/or maintenance service other service (including accounting) other (including a business pension fund) unclear