opinion: John E. HAYCRAFT et al., Plaintiff s-Appellees, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF JEFFERSON COUNTY, KENTUCKY, et al., Defendants-Appellants.
  No. 76-2301.
  United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
  Argued June 8, 1977.
  Decided Aug. 23, 1977.
  John A. Fulton, Will H. Fulton, Woodward, Hobson & Fulton, E. Preston Young, Louisville, Ky, for defendants-appellants.
  Thomas L. Hogan, Galen Martin, Darrel T. Owens, John G. O’Mara, Louisville, Ky, for plaintiffs-appellees.
  Before PHILLIPS, Chief Judge, and PECK and ENGEL, Circuit Judges.
  JOHN W. PECK, Circuit Judge.
  This latest aspect of the Louisville school desegregation case commenced in May of 1976, when District Judge Gordon conducted hearings concerning implementation of the July 30, 1975, desegregation plan and order approved by this Court in Cunningham v. Grayson, 541 F.2d 538 (6th Cir. 1976).
  As a result of the May 1976 evidentiary hearings, Judge Gordon determined that the pupil population ratio in at least 28 elementary schools did not satisfactorily reflect the racial guidelines set forth in the July 30, 1975, desegregation order. Appellants do not dispute this finding on appeal. Having found that “the elementary school system in Jefferson County has never been in compliance with this Court’s desegregation decision,” and that this failure of compliance rendered the case outside the scope of Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 96 S.Ct. 2697, 49 L.Ed.2d 599 (1976), the district court on August 2, 1976, entered an amended order, which inter alia, altered the pupil assignment methodology of the July 30, 1975 desegregation order by requiring the busing of an additional 900 black pupils. The Board of Education of Jefferson County appeals from this August 2, 1976, amended desegregation order.
  On appeal the Board of Education maintains that the district court exceeded its remedial powers in amending the plan without making any determination that the racial imbalance in these 28 elementary schools resulted from any additional segre-gative action on the part of the Board. This is, appellants argue, the precise issue resolved by Pasadena. We do not agree.
  In the Pasadena case, the district court entered a desegregation order on January 23, 1970, requiring assignment of students in such a manner that no school within the district would have a majority of minority students (the “no majority” requirement). Only during the 1970-71 school year was the “no majority” requirement met. Thereafter, in 1974, the Board of Education sought to be relieved of the “no majority” requirement and the district court denied its motion. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court, quoting Swann v. Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 31-32, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 28 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971):
  “Neither school authorities nor district courts are constitutionally required to make year-by-year adjustments of the racial composition of student bodies once the affirmative duty to desegregate has been accomplished and racial discrimination through official action is eliminated from the system.” Pasadena, supra, 427 U.S. at 436, 96 S.Ct. at 2708. (emphasis added).
  We conclude that the district court correctly determined that Pasadena is distinguishable from the instant case. This case is in the pre-compiiance rather than the post-compliance stage of implementation of Pasadena. As the Supreme Court has held “[o]nce a right and a violation have been shown, the scope of a district court’s equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies.” Swann v. Board of Education, supra, 402 U.S. at 15, 91 S.Ct. at 1276. We agree with the district court’s conclusion that nothing in Pasadena restricts its remedial powers so as to preclude modification of the student assignment portion of a desegregation plan, which had not, as of the time the modifications were ordered brought about the desegregation of the school system. See United States v. Seminole County School District, 553 F.2d 992 (5th Cir. 1977).
  The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
  . In this amended order, the district court also approved the report of a Special Committee, appointed May 6, 1976, and in conformity therewith, ordered implementation of procedures for hardship transfers and ordered the school board to keep open five elementary schools scheduled to be closed; and adopted the Board’s recommended voluntary transfer plan.
instruction: What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
  Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
  In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
  To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
  United States of America,
  Plaintiff, Appellant
  v
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendant, Appellee.
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendants, Cross-appellants
  v
  United States of America.
  Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
  of the Board
  Plaintiff, Appellants,
  v
  United States of America,
  Defendant, Appellee.
  This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
  Your task is to identify the state of the first listed state or local government agency that is an appellant.
choices: not Alabama Alaska Arizona Arkansas California Colorado Connecticut Delaware Florida Georgia Hawaii Idaho Illinois Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Maine Maryland Massachussets Michigan Minnesota Mississippi Missouri Montana Nebraska Nevada New New New New North North Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode South South Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Wisconsin Wyoming Virgin Puerto District Guam not Panama