opinion: Bennie WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. David M. HERITAGE, Warden, U. S. Penitentiary, Atlanta, Georgia, Appellee.
  No. 20328.
  United States Court oí Appeals Fifth Circuit.
  Oct. 18, 1963.
  Allen L. Chancey, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., Atlanta, Ga., Charles L. Goodson, U. S. Atty., Robert D. Feagin, III, Asst. U. S. Atty., for appellee.
  Before CAMERON and WISDOM, Circuit Judges, and DeVANE, District Judge.
  CAMERON, Circuit Judge.
  This is an appeal from a dismissal of a petition for habeas corpus. The court below denied relief upon its finding of lack of jurisdiction to inquire into the conviction and sentencing of appellant by a General Court-Martial, and that appellant had failed to exhaust remedies available under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
  Appellant was convicted on October 18, 1960 by a General Court-Martial of the crime of murder and was sentenced to be dishonorably discharged from the service, to forfeit all pay and allowances, and to be confined to hard labor for life. Uniform Code of Military Justice, Art. 118, 10 U.S.C.A. § 918. The conviction was affirmed by the Board of Review, U.C.M.J. Art. 66, 10 U.S.C.A. § 866, but so much of the sentence that exceeded dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of pay and allowances, and confinement at hard labor for thirty years was remitted.
  In November, 1962, appellant petitioned the District Court below, claiming that he was being held illegally because he had been incompetent to stand trial for the offense charged. He alleged that each of the three Army psychiatrists who examined him reached the conclusion that he was not competent, but that the court-martial “overrode" their findings and thus exceeded its “jurisdiction.”
  The government does not deny that the three doctors advanced the opinion that appellant was incompetent, but argues that the question was one for the court-martial and that the civil courts have no power to review its findings and verdict. It is urged also, as found by the court below, that appellant has not exhausted military remedies available under Articles 67 and 78 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
  We do not dispose of this appeal upon the claimed failure to exhaust military remedies. The relief available under Article 67 must be sought within "30 days from the time * * * of the decision of a board of review,” and that available under Article 73 “within one year after approval by the convening authority of a court-martial sentence * * *.” Inasmuch as these remedies are no longer available to appellant, it appears that the recently decided case of Fay v. Noia, 1963, 372 U.S. 391, 434-435, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837, governs in principle and that prior failure to seek military review is no longer necessarily a bar to habeas corpus relief otherwise available.
  With respect to the District Court’s dismissal for lack of power to inquire into the military proceedings, the latest word from the Supreme Court sustains the decision of the trial court, and even the prior short-lived more liberal view would not allow a contrary result.
  In Fowler, the court re-emphasized the principle that civil courts have very limited jurisdiction with respect to inquiries into the results of military justice:
  “As long ago as 1902 this Court recognized that it was a ‘salutary rule that the sentences of courts martial, when affirmed by the military tribunal of last resort, cannot be revised by the civil courts save only when void because of an absolute want of power, and not merely voidable because of the defective exercise of power possessed.’ Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U.S. 365, 401, [22 S.Ct. 181, 46 L.Ed. 236].”
  The only inquiry which a civil-court may make in a habeas corpus proceeding is whether the court-martial had jurisdiction over the person and over the subject matter of the offense. It is obvious that such jurisdiction was present in this case. The now restricted Burns intimation that the civilian courts have the power to test whether the military court “dealt fully and fairly with an allegation raised * * Burns, supra, at page 142 of 346 U.S., at page 1049 of 73 S.Ct., 97 L.Ed. 1508, would give no comfort here, for there is no showing or allegation whatever that the court-martial did not do so. Appellant claims only that the court-martial is bound by the opinions of the psychiatrists. That, we hold, is not the law. Failure to follow the advice of the experts is neither per se a denial of constitutional rights nor even error which may be corrected upon direct review, in either a military or civil case.
  It must be remembered that “in military habeas corpus the inquiry, the scope of matters open for review, has always been more narrow than in civil cases.” Burns, supra, at 139 of 346 U.S., at 1047 of 73 S.Ct., 97 L.Ed. 1508. We cannot broaden it here. We are bound by what the Supreme Court has decided, not on what we may think is the trend of its decisions away from what it has actually decided.
  Affirmed.
  WISDOM, Circuit Judge.
  I concur in the result.
  . 10 U.S.C.A. § 867, Art. 67, Review by The Court of Military Appeals; 10 U.S. C.A. § 873, Art. 73, Petition for a new trial.
  . Fowler v. Wilkinson, 1957, 353 U.S. 583, 77 S.Ct. 1035, 1 L.Ed.2d 1054. Cf. Jackson v. Taylor, Acting Warden, 1957, 353 U.S. 569, 77 S.Ct. 1027, 1 L.Ed.2d 1045.
  . Burns v. Wilson, 1953, 346 U.S. 137, 73 S.Ct. 1045, 97 L.Ed. 1508. But see, In re Yamashita, 1946, 327 U.S. 1, 66 S.Ct. 340, 90 L.Ed. 499, and Hiatt v. Brown, 1950, 339 U.S. 103, 70 S.Ct. 495, 94 L.Ed. 691.
instruction: What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
  Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
  In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
  To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
  United States of America,
  Plaintiff, Appellant
  v
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendant, Appellee.
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendants, Cross-appellants
  v
  United States of America.
  Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
  of the Board
  Plaintiff, Appellants,
  v
  United States of America,
  Defendant, Appellee.
  This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
  Your task is to identify the state of the first listed state or local government agency that is an appellant.
choices: not Alabama Alaska Arizona Arkansas California Colorado Connecticut Delaware Florida Georgia Hawaii Idaho Illinois Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Maine Maryland Massachussets Michigan Minnesota Mississippi Missouri Montana Nebraska Nevada New New New New North North Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode South South Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Wisconsin Wyoming Virgin Puerto District Guam not Panama