opinion: WOOTTEN v. WOOTTEN et al. (two cases).
  Nos. 3120, 3121.
  Circuit Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
  Aug. 27, 1945.
  HUXMAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
  Harry Hammerly, of Chickasha, Okl. (Seth & Montgomery, of Santa Fe, N. M., on the brief), for appellants.
  H. A. Kiker, of Santa Fe, N. M., for appellees.
  Before PHILLIPS, HUXMAN, and MURRAH, Circuit Judges.
  PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge.
  These are actions to establish constructive trusts in certain shares of stock of the Red River Ranch, Inc. The court below held that the complaints failed to state claims upon which relief could be granted, and dismissed the actions.
  The facts alleged in the complaints are these:
  On or about July 30, 1936, R. K. Wootten was the owner of certain ranch properties located in Mora, Colfax, and Harding Counties, New Mexico, consisting of 10,000 acres of deeded land, 46,000 acres of leased land, 4,000 acres of land purchased under contract from the State of New Mexico, 1300 head of ranch cattle, and horses, milk cows, and ranch equipment. On that date, R. K. Wootten sold and conveyed to his brother, John B. Wootten, an undivided one-half interest in the real estate and other ranch properties, and thereafter, until the death of R. K. Wootten, he and John B. Wootten were partners in the ownership, management, and operation of the ranch.
  On July 30, 1936, R. K. Wootten and John B. Wootten entered into a contract with W. R. Ferguson for the management and operation of the ranch properties for a term of six years. The contract recited that the ranch properties, other than cattle, had a value of $88,000, and that the cattle had a value of $57,587.50. It provided that Ferguson would manage and superintend the ranch and its operations for a period of six years from January 1, 1936; that the Woottens would pay him a salary of $100 per month and provide funds for the economical operation of the ranch; that the net profits or losses sustained in the conduct and operation of the ranch, excluding increases in the value of the lands, should be determined annually; that, in the event the net operating profit for the full term of six years should equal 100 per cent of the total investment during such period, including the fixed value of the lands and leases, Ferguson should be entitled to an undivided one-third interest in the ranch lands, leases, livestock, and equipment, and that such interest, at the end of six years, would be transferred to Ferguson; and that, in the event the net operating profit should not equal 100 per cent, an interest in the ranch properties on the basis of the net profits earned would be transferred to Ferguson at the end of the six-year period.
  R. K. Wootten died testate, January 2, 1938. John B. Wootten was the executor named in the will and duly qualified as such and has continued to act as such executor. Under the will, one-tenth of the ranch properties were devised and bequeathed to Vendía E. Wootten, widow of R. K. Wootten, deceased, and one-tenth to each of the four children of R. K. Wootten, deceased. The will provided that each of the shares of the four children should vest in John B. Wootten, as trustee. The will gave the executor power and authority to manage, control, sell, transfer, and convey any and all property of the estate and to invest and reinvest any and all money coming into his possession in such securities and upon such terms and conditions as he might, in the exercise of his judgment and discretion, determine.
  During the continuance of the Ferguson contract, it became necessary, from time to time, to purchase supplies, make advancements, purchase additional deeded land, and finance the operation of the ranch properties. The funds therefor were contributed equally by R. K. Wootten during his lifetime, and thereafter by the executor of his estate, and by John B. Wootten.
  After the death of R. K. Wootten, John B. Wootten formulated a plan to create a corporation under the laws of New Mexico and to transfer all of the ranch properties to such corporation. In December, 1939, John B. Wootten, acting for himself individually and as executor of the estate of R. K. Wootten, deceased, and as trustee for the children, Vendía E. Wootten, and Ferguson entered into a contract whereby they agreed to create such corporation and to transfer the ranch properties to the corporation in exchange for 2500 shares of the corporate stock of the par value of $100 per share; to deliver two-thirds of such stock to John B. Wootten individually and as trustee for the children, and to Vendía E. Wootten, and to retain, as treasury stock for the protection of Ferguson,'under the contract, one-third of the authorized capital stock, and at the end of the six-year period, to issue to Ferguson, the one-third of the shares retained in the treasury or such portion thereof as he might be entitled to.
  The corporation was duly created under the name of Red River Ranch, Inc. Six hundred and ten shares of the capital stock were issued to John B. Wootten individually, 122 shares to Vendía E. Wootten, and 488 shares to John B. Wootten, as trustee for the children. The remaining one-third of the stock, except one share issued to Ferguson, was held in the treasury. At the expiration of the six-year period, a controversy arose between John B. Wootten and Ferguson as to the interest in the ranch properties that Ferguson was entitled to receive under the contract. Ferguson brought an action in the District Court of the Eighth Judicial District of New Mexico against the Red River Ranch, Inc., and others. On December 4, 1942, a decree was entered in that case. It adjudged that Vendía E. Wootten was entitled to 126 shares of the corporate stock; that John B. Wootten, as trustee for the four children, was entitled to 504 shares of such stock; that John B. Wootten individually was entitled to 630 shares of such stock; and that Ferguson was entitled to 570 shares of such stock.
  Following the entry of such decree, John B. Wootten discontinued the services and employment of Ferguson and took over the sole and exclusive operation and management of the corporation and its ranch properties.
  In January, 1944, John B. Wootten began negotiations with Ferguson to purchase all of the latter’s corporate stock. Ferguson had disposed of 34 shares of the stock issued to him. John B. Wootten consummated the purchase of the remaining 536 shares of stock held by Ferguson for $87.50 per share. At the time of such purchase, such stock had an actual value of $175 per share. John B. Wootten, as trustee of the trust estates, had sufficient funds in his hands to purchase two-fifths of such stock for the benefit of the children.
  Carl Eklund Wootten, one of the children, brought an action in which he alleged the foregoing facts and sought a decree adjudging that John B. Wootten held 53.6 shares of the 536 shares purchased from Ferguson, as trustee for Carl Eklund Wootten. Each of the other children brought a like action.
  Vendía E. Wootten brought an action against John B. Wootten in which she alleged the foregoing facts and further alleged that John B. Wootten, as executor of the estate of R. K. Wootten, deceased, and as president and sole manager, and in full control of the ranch properties, was acting in a fiduciary capacity with respect to Vendía E. Wootten when he purchased the Ferguson stock, and sought a decree adjudging that John B. Wootten held 53.6 shares of such stock as trustee for Vendía E. Wootten.
  No. 3120 is an appeal from the judgment entered in the action brought by Carl Eklund Wootten. No. 3121 is an appeal from the judgment entered in the action brought by Vendía E. Wootten.
  In this drama of real life, John B. Wootten was the principal actor. At its inception, he owned individually one-half of the ranch properties; the widow and children of his deceased brother owned the beneficial interest in the remaining one-half thereof; and Ferguson, under his contract, had a contingent interest which might ripen into an ownership of one-third of such properties. John B. Wootten, as executor under the will, occupied a fiduciary relationship to Vendía E. Wootten, and, as trustee under such will, a fiduciary relationship to the children. Ferguson was the active manager of the ranch properties. John B. Wootten, as an individual, had a voice equal to, but not greater than, that of the other parties to the joint adventure. John B. Wootten first brought about the formation of the corporation, the transfer of the ranch properties to it, and the issuance of two-thirds of the shares of stock in the corporation to himself individually and as trustee, and to Vendía E. Wootten, in proportion to their respective interests in the ranch properties. At that stage the stock held by John B. Wootten individually did not give him control of the corporation. He could only dominate the corporation by joining the voting power of his individual stock and the stock held by him as trustee. By acquiring the Ferguson stock, he passed from a position where his individual interest was equal to the interests of the widow and children to the dominating position of a majority stockholder. The plan under which he organized the corporation, conveyed the ranch properties to it, and ultimately acquired a controlling interest in the corporation was all carried out during the time when he occupied such fiduciary relationships.
  Many forms of conduct regarded as permissible for those acting at arm’s length are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. The standards of conduct for a trustee rise far above the ordinary morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but a punctilio of honor the most sensitive is the standard of behavior required of a trustee. He must completely efface self-interest. His loyalty and devotion to his trust must be unstinted. Its well-being must always be his first consideration. These principles are inveterate and unbending.
  A trustee must not compete with his beneficiary in the acquisition of property. The principle is not limited to cases where the fiduciary acquires property entrusted to him, nor to cases where the fiduciary competes with the beneficiary in the purchase of property which the trustee has undertaken to purchase for the beneficiary. Even though the interest purchased by the fiduciary for himself is not property of the beneficiary entrusted to the fiduciary, nor property which the fiduciary has undertaken to purchase for the beneficiary, the principle applies if the property purchased by the fiduciary for himself is so connected with the trust property or the scope of his duties as fiduciary, that it is improper for him to purchase it for himself.
  It was to the advantage of John B. Wootten to secure a majority interest in the stock of the corporation, which gave him control. It was also to the disadvantage of the widow and children because it placed them in the position of minority stockholders. Because as an individual and fiduciary John B. Wootten was in control of the corporation and its management, he was able to purchase the Ferguson stock at a very advantageous price. Knowledge that came to him in his capacity as fiduciary was used to his individual advantage. It is true that he might have had that knowledge had he not been trustee and executor, but had he not been trustee and executor, a disinterested person would have been serving in those capacities, who would have had the knowledge from which John B. Wootten profited and who could have protected the interests of the widow and children.
  The motions to dismiss admitted all the facts well pleaded and all facts that can be reasonably inferred from the facts alleged.
  It is our opinion that under the facts well pleaded and the facts reasonably to be inferred therefrom, John B. Wootten, in acquiring all of the 536 shares of the Ferguson stock solely for himself individually, failed to measure up to those high standards of conduct which courts of equity have laid down as a measure of behavior required of a fiduciary and that the motions to dismiss should have been overruled.
  It may be on a hearing, John B. Wootten can satisfy the chancellor that, in failing to purchase half of such stock for the estate and for the trusts, he acted in good faith and in the exercise of a wise discretion. That issue, however, we think should be resolved after a full and searching inquiry into the facts.
  The judgments are reversed and the causes remanded with instructions to overrule the motions to dismiss.
  Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545, 546, 62 A.L.R. 1; Johnston v. Loose, 201 Mich. 259, 167 N.W. 1021, 1023; Ball v. Hopkins, 268 Mass. 260, 167 N.E. 33S, 341.
  Scott oh Trusts, Vol. 3, p. 2424, § 504; Id., Vol. 3, p. 2413, § 499; Johnston v. Loose, 201 Mich. 259, 167 N.W. 1021, 1022-1024; In re Robbins’ Estate, 94 Minn. 433, 103 N.W. 217, 110 Am.St.Rep. 375; Pine v. White, 175 Mass. 585, 56 N. E. 967.
  Gannaway v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co. of Detroit, 10 Cir., 85 F.2d 144, 145; Riskel v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. of California, 10 Cir., 78 F.2d 881, 886, 131 A.L.R. 414; Blanchar v. City of Casper, 10 Cir., 81 F.2d 452, 453.
  Hammond v. Mason and Hamlin Organ Co., 92 U.S. 724, 726, 23 L.Ed. 767; Weeks v. Denver Tramway Corporation, 10 Cir., 108 F.2d 509, 510.
  Cf. Pine v. White, 175 Mass. 585, 56 N.E. 967, 968.
instruction: What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
  Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
  In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
  To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
  United States of America,
  Plaintiff, Appellant
  v
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendant, Appellee.
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendants, Cross-appellants
  v
  United States of America.
  Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
  of the Board
  Plaintiff, Appellants,
  v
  United States of America,
  Defendant, Appellee.
  This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
  Your task is to identify the state of the first listed state or local government agency that is an appellant.
choices: not Alabama Alaska Arizona Arkansas California Colorado Connecticut Delaware Florida Georgia Hawaii Idaho Illinois Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Maine Maryland Massachussets Michigan Minnesota Mississippi Missouri Montana Nebraska Nevada New New New New North North Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode South South Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Wisconsin Wyoming Virgin Puerto District Guam not Panama