opinion: COMMONWEALTH of PUERTO RICO, Petitioner, v. FEDERAL MARITIME BOARD and United States of America, Respondents, United States Atlantic & Gulf-Puerto Rico Conference, et al., Waterman Steamship Corporation and Waterman Steamship Corporation of Puerto Rico, Intervenors. UNITED STATES ATLANTIC & GULF-PUERTO RICO CONFERENCE, et al., Petitioners, v. FEDERAL MARITIME BOARD and United States of America, Respondents, The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Intervenor.
  Nos. 15846, 15847.
  United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.
  Argued Dee. 6, 1960.
  Decided Feb. 23, 1961.
  Mr. William D. Rogers, Washington, D. C., for petitioner in No. 15846. Mr. George Bunn, Washington, D. C., also entered an appearance for petitioner in No. 15846.
  Mr. Mark P. Schlefer, Washington, D. C., with whom Mr. T. S. L. Perlman, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for petitioner in No. 15847.
  Mr. Edward Aptaker, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Federal Maritime Bd., with whom Messrs. James L. Pimper, Gen. Counsel, and Robert E. Mitchell, Asst. Gen. Counsel, were on the brief, for respondent Federal Maritime Bd.
  Mr. Henry Geller, Atty., Dept, of Justice, with whom Mr. Richard A. Solomon, Atty., Dept, of Justice, was on a statement filed in behalf of respondent United States of America.
  Messrs. Warren Price, Jr., Washington, D. C., and Sterling F. Stoudenmire, Jr., Mobile, Ala., were on the brief for intervenors Waterman Steamship Corp. and Waterman Steamship Corp. of Puerto Rico in No. 15846.
  Before Edgerton, Prettyman and Bastían, Circuit Judges.
  PER CURIAM.
  We are asked to review a Federal Maritime Board ruling of April 28, 1960, that certain large rate increases for carriage of cargo between Puerto Rico and ports on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts of the United States are just and reasonable.
  In a report which accompanied its order the Board said: “We find that value of the vessels on the domestic market at or about the time the rate increase is requested with adjustments to eliminate short term peaks in vessel values, is the proper method for determining the reasonable value of the property being used for the public.” The Board did not say why it adopted market value as a rate base or why it rejected Puerto Rico’s contention that this base is grossly excessive and rates should be based on prudent investment less depreciation.
  The Department of Justice urges on behalf of the United States that the rate base question cannot be resolved on the present record. We agree. The Administrative Procedure Act requires all decisions to state not only findings and conclusions but also “the reasons or basis therefor, upon all the material issues of fact, law or discretion presented on the record * * § 8(b), 5 U.S.C. A. § 1007(b). The Board “should make the basis of its action reasonably clear. We cannot find that it did so here.” Radio Station KFH Co. v. Federal Communications Commission, 101 U.S.App.D. C. 164, 166, 247 F.2d 570, 572; Pacific Far East Line, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Board, 107 U.S.App.D.C. 155, 275 F.2d 184. Cf. Secretary of Agriculture v. United States, 347 U.S. 645, 654, 74 S. Ct. 826, 98 L.Ed. 1015.
  The Board’s order is therefore vacated and the case remanded for the Board to reconsider and clarify the rate base question. The Board should also pass upon the Commonwealth’s argument that it is not fair to rate payers to let an accumulated depreciation reserve be depleted and depreciation charges thereby increased.
  The motion to dismiss Puerto Rico’s petition for review in No. 15846 is denied. Puerto Rico’s motion to dismiss the petition for review in No. 15847 is granted.
  Vacated and remanded.
  . The Board acted under § 18 of the Shipping Act, 1916, c. 451, 39 Stat. 735, as amended, 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 801, 817, and § 3 of the Intercoastal Shipping Act, 1933, c. 199, 47 Stat. 1426, as amended, 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 843, 845. This proceeding for review is brought under the Judicial Review Act of 1950, c. 1189, 64 Stat. 1129, as amended, 5 U.S.C.A. § 1031 et seq.
instruction: What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
  Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
  In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
  To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
  United States of America,
  Plaintiff, Appellant
  v
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendant, Appellee.
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendants, Cross-appellants
  v
  United States of America.
  Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
  of the Board
  Plaintiff, Appellants,
  v
  United States of America,
  Defendant, Appellee.
  This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
  Your task is to identify the state of the first listed state or local government agency that is an appellant.
choices: not Alabama Alaska Arizona Arkansas California Colorado Connecticut Delaware Florida Georgia Hawaii Idaho Illinois Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Maine Maryland Massachussets Michigan Minnesota Mississippi Missouri Montana Nebraska Nevada New New New New North North Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode South South Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Wisconsin Wyoming Virgin Puerto District Guam not Panama