opinion: RUBEN v. WELCH, Superintendent, District of Columbia Reformatory.
  No. 5554.
  Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
  Jan. 30, 1947.
  Writ of Certiorari Denied April 28, 1947.
  See 67 S.Ct. 1199.
  Sam Ruben, pro se.
  George R. Humrickhouse, Asst. U. S. Atty., of Richmond, Va. (Harry H. Holt, Jr., U. S. Atty., of Hampton, Va., on the brief), for appellee.
  Before PARKER, SOPER, and DOBIE, Circuit Judges.
  PER CURIAM.
  This is an appeal from an order dismissing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus by appellant, who is confined in the District of Columbia Reformatory at Lorton, Virginia, under a judgment and sentence of the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia. Appellant was convicted of robbing the Washington Mechanics Savings Bank on June 10, 1932. He was tried in 1939 and upon conviction was given a prison term of not less than three nor more than fifteen years under the indeterminate sentence law of the District of Columbia. The judgment was affirmed on appeal in an exhaustive opinion, in which all questions raised on the trial were carefully reviewed. Neufield v. United States 73 App.D.C. 174, 118 F.2d 375.
  In the court below, appellant asked release from imprisonment on the grounds that he was denied the speedy trial guaranteed by the Constitution, Amend. 6, and that he was without counsel both in removal proceedings and upon arraignment in the trial court. These contentions are entirely without merit and were adequately answered in the memorandum opinion of the District Judge. It is nothing short of absurd to contend that a prisoner may be released on habeas corpus after conviction merely because his trial was improperly delayed. See Ex Parte Pickerill, D.C., 44 F.Supp. 741, There is no constitutional requirement that counsel be assigned in removal proceedings. Gilmore v. United States 10 Cir. 129 F.2d 199; Counselman v. Hitchcock 142 U.S. 547, 563, 12 S.Ct. 195, 35 L.Ed. 1110. And it makes no difference that a prisoner did not have counsel at the arraignment where it appears that he was adequately represented by counsel in subsequent proceedings. Canizio v. People of State of New York, 327 U.S. 82, 66 S.Ct. 452. Especially is this true where the prisoner entered a plea of not guilty on arraignment, which is all that a lawyer could have done for him.
  In this Court appellant raises the additional point that the sentence imposed upon him was void because not authorized by statute. The crime of which defendant was convicted was committed on June 10, 1932. The District of Columbia indeterminate sentence law, under which the appellant was given the sentence of not less than three nor more than fifteen years, was approved July 15, 1932, and provided: “That for any felony committed before this Act takes effect, the penalty, sentence, or forfeiture provided by law for such felony at the time such felony was committed shall remain in full force and • effect and shall be imposed, notwithstanding this Act.” § 7, 47 Sta-t. 696, 698. The law in effect at the time of the commission of the crime for which the appellant was sentenced provided for the imposition of a definite sentence. The sentence imposed is accordingly void; but this does not mean that appellant is entitled to be released on habeas corpus. He should be held and remanded to the custody of the United States Marshal for the District of Columbia to be returned to the court by which he was tried in order that proper sentence may be imposed upon him. De Benque v. United States, 66 App.D.C. 36, 85 F.2d 202, 106 A.L.R. 839.
  Appellant argues that he is entitled to be released from custody because he has served the minimum term prescribed by the sentence; but if the sentence is void, and it is only upon this ground that it is subject to attack in habeas corpus proceedings, it manifestly cannot protect appellant from further sentence any more than it can justify his imprisonment. When sentence is imposed, defendant will doubtless receive credit for the time that he has served on the void sentence. See 85 F.2d at page 207. A similar question was before this court in Mitchell v. Youell, 4 Cir., 130 F.2d 880, 882, in which we held a state trial to be void because of the denial of due process to the accused. We said:
  “The trial and sentence of the state court must accordingly be held for naught.’ Powell v. [State of] Alabama supra, [287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158, 84 A.L.R. 527]; Smith v. O’Grady, supra, [312 U.S. 329, 61 S.Ct. 572, 85 L.Ed. 859]; Boyd v. O’Grady, supra, [8 Cir., 121 F.2d 146]. This does not mean, however, that petitioner may escape further punishment under the bill of indictment returned against him. While the conviction and sentence under the bill must be held 'to be void and the prisoner released from further service of the sentence, he will be subject to arrest and trial under the indictment. The defense of prior jeopardy will not protect him, for in holding that the trial was a nullity, we hold that he has not been in jeopardy under the charge. It is settled that an accused is not put in jeopardy by a void judgment of conviction, and that upon his discharge thereunder he may be again arrested and prosecuted.”
  The order appealed from will accordingly be reversed and the case will be remanded to the District Judge with direction that an order be entered finding that the sentence under which the accused is imprisoned is void, but directing that he be held and remanded to the custody of the United States Marshal for the District of. Columbia to be returned to the court by which he wás tried in order that proper sentence may be imposed upon him.
  Reversed and remanded with directions.
instruction: What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
  Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
  In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
  To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
  United States of America,
  Plaintiff, Appellant
  v
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendant, Appellee.
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendants, Cross-appellants
  v
  United States of America.
  Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
  of the Board
  Plaintiff, Appellants,
  v
  United States of America,
  Defendant, Appellee.
  This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
  Your task is to identify the state of the first listed state or local government agency that is an appellant.
choices: not Alabama Alaska Arizona Arkansas California Colorado Connecticut Delaware Florida Georgia Hawaii Idaho Illinois Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Maine Maryland Massachussets Michigan Minnesota Mississippi Missouri Montana Nebraska Nevada New New New New North North Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode South South Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Wisconsin Wyoming Virgin Puerto District Guam not Panama