opinion: Lloyd McCOMY, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
  No. 74-1946.
  United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
  Submitted March 12, 1975.
  Decided April 7, 1975.
  Jack J. Cavanaugh, St. Louis, Mo., for appellant.
  Richard Coughlin, Asst. U. S. Atty., St. Louis, Mo., for appellee.
  Before GIBSQN, Chief Judge, CLARK, Associate Justice, Retired, and LAY, Circuit Judge.
  Associate Justice Tom C. Clark, United States Supreme Court, Retired, sitting by designation.
  PER CURIAM.
  The defendant Lloyd McComy entered a guilty plea to three counts of a twenty-three count indictment charging him with fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1348. He was sentenced to a total prison term of seven years to be followed by a five-year probation term and a fine of $3,000.00. He filed a § 2255 motion contending that his plea of guilty was not voluntary. The district court denied relief and he has appealed. We affirm.
  The thrust of petitioner’s argument, as we understand it and we are not sure we do, is that his plea is not voluntary since the bargain (i. e., the dismissal of the other twenty counts along with the promise of the three-year sentence) was not fully spread upon the record with the trial judge. The argument couched in these terms was not raised in the district court since the only alleged misrepresentation before the trial judge was as to the length of the sentence.
  The government contends that Rule 11, Fed.R.Crim.P., was fully complied with by the district court. The record shows the district court (a) questioned the defendant concerning his understanding of his rights, (b) advised him of the consequences of his plea, (c) asked if the defendant had been induced to enter his plea by any threats or promises, and (d) established a factual basis for the plea. The defendant urges, however, that in addition to soliciting the above information, the court must also ascertain whether a plea bargain has been made, and if so, its terms.
  We find no deficiency in the record in this regard. The record shows the district court was fully aware that the government intended to ask leave to dismiss twenty counts of the indictment at the time of the defendant’s sentence. In addition, the trial judge asked what was to be done with two co-defendants and the United States Attorney replied that the government intended to dismiss the charges against them.
  The court specifically asked the appellant whether any other promises or inducements, particularly with regard to sentencing, had been made to him and he responded with equally concise and specific negative answers. At the evi-dentiary hearing on this motion, the court listened to the testimony of the defendant, the defendant’s wife, his attorney at the time the plea was entered and his attorney’s associate.. On the basis of their testimony, the court concluded that no promise as to the length of sentence was ever made. We are bound by this finding unless we can say that it was clearly erroneous and the record does not support this. Therefore, we find to the extent that any “plea bargain” had been made, its terms including the dismissal of the remaining twenty counts of the indictment and the dismissal of charges against the two co-defendants, were fully disclosed in open court.
  Judgment affirmed.
  . In United States v. Gallington, 488 F.2d 637 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 907, 94 S.Ct. 1613, 40 L.Ed.2d 112 (1974), this court observed:
  Plea bargaining is susceptible to abuse. Its proper use, however, has been tacitly approved by the Supreme Court, this Court and many study commissions that have reviewed the problem. While a recent report has recommended that plea bargaining be abolished by 1978, we are not prepared to adopt that recommendation.
  We caution, however, that if plea bargaining is to be practiced, the requirements of Rule 11, as explicated by the Supreme Court in McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969), must be followed. Furthermore, the following safeguards must also be implemented:
  * * * * * *
  (2) Judges are to require the agreement to be disclosed in open court at the time the plea is offered and require that the reasons for reaching the agreement be set forth in detail. 488 F.2d at 640 (footnotes omitted).
  . Whenever the United States “bargains” to dismiss other counts of the indictment in exchange for a plea of guilty to one or more counts, this of course should be spread on the record at the time of the guilty plea. When this appears, it is essential that the trial judge determine that the guilty plea independently rests on a factual basis and is not simply induced by the government’s promise to dismiss other counts.
  . The following colloquy took place between the court and the defendant:
  THE COURT: And you understand, do you, the charges to which you have pleaded “Guilty” and which I have gone over in detail here?
  MR. McCOMY: Yes, sir.
  THE COURT: The range of penalties for these offenses could be a fine of $1,000.00 or five years’ imprisonment on Count I; a fine of $1,000.00 and imprisonment of five years on Count II; a fine of $1,000.00 and imprisonment for five years on Count III; or a total of $3,000.00 and fifteen years, or some combination of it. That’s the maximum. Do you understand that?
  MR. McCOMY: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: Have any threats or promises been made to induce you to plead “Guilty”?
  MR. McCOMY: No, sir.
  THE COURT: You understand, do you, that I have the sole responsibility for imposing sentence in the event a sentence is imposed, and I have not promised Mr. Daly or Mr. Adelman or anybody else, and particularly you, anything in regard to this case?
  MR. McCOMY: I understand, Your Honor. THE COURT: I do not know what sentence you will receive until such time as a pre-sentence report is given to me.
  Do you think there is any understanding, or have any predictions been made to you concerning — -either by Mr. Daly or by anybody else either representing themselves to be from the Government or being from the Government, as to the sentence you will receive?
  MR. McCOMY: No, sir.
instruction: What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
  Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
  In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
  To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
  United States of America,
  Plaintiff, Appellant
  v
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendant, Appellee.
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendants, Cross-appellants
  v
  United States of America.
  Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
  of the Board
  Plaintiff, Appellants,
  v
  United States of America,
  Defendant, Appellee.
  This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
  Your task is to identify the state of the first listed state or local government agency that is an appellant.
choices: not Alabama Alaska Arizona Arkansas California Colorado Connecticut Delaware Florida Georgia Hawaii Idaho Illinois Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Maine Maryland Massachussets Michigan Minnesota Mississippi Missouri Montana Nebraska Nevada New New New New North North Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode South South Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Wisconsin Wyoming Virgin Puerto District Guam not Panama