opinion: UNITED STATES of America and Albert J. Valentas, Internal Revenue Agent, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. HUMBLE OIL & REFINING COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.
  No. 72-3029.
  United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
  Sept. 8, 1975.
  Anthony J. P. Farris, U. S. Atty., James R. Gough, Asst. U. S. Atty., Houston, Tex., Scott P. Crampton, Asst. Atty. Gen., Meyer Rothwacks, Mary J. McGinn, Charles E. Anderson, Gilbert E. Andrews, Crombie J. D. Garrett, Robert E. Lindsay, Attys., Tax Div., Dept, of Justice, Washington, D. C., for plaintiffs-appellants.
  Walter B. Morgan, Robert G. Standlee, Houston, Tex., for defendant-appellee.
  Before GEWIN and MORGAN, Circuit Judges, and GORDON, District Judge.
  PER CURIAM:
  The Supreme Court of the United States on April 28, 1975 vacated the judgment of this court in the case of United States v. Humble Oil and Refining Company, 488 F.2d 953 (5th Cir. 1974) and remanded the case'for further consideration in light of United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 95 S.Ct. 915, 43 L.Ed.2d 88 (1975).
  We have carefully considered Bisceglia and have concluded that it does not require a reversal of our decision in this case. Both cases involve the enforceability of a “John Doe” summons issued by the Internal Revenue Service. While the Bisceglia Court held the “John Doe” summons before it to be enforceable, we decline to construe that holding as a blanket endorsement of the use of “John Doe” summonses in every situation without reference either to the purpose of the summons or to the factual circumstances which underlie its issuance.
  At issue in Bisceglia was the enforceability of a “John Doe” summons issued by the IRS to a bank. The impetus behind the issuance of the summons was the deposit with the bank of some 400 badly deteriorated one hundred dollar bills by an unknown bank customer. This extraordinary transaction gave rise to a strong suspicion of unpaid taxes. An agent was assigned to investigate, and the issuance of the summons constituted the first step in the investigative process.
  In the case now before us the IRS issued a “John Doe” summons in order to discover the identities of all lessors of mineral leases surrendered by Humble Oil in the calendar year 1970. The information sought did not relate to a specific, extraordinary transaction as in Bisceglia. Nor were there any factu- . ally demonstrable grounds to suggest the likelihood of unpaid taxes. The summons was not issued to facilitate any ongoing investigation. Rather, the information was sought from Humble to expedite research on an IRS project concerning compliance with the lease restoration requirements of the Internal Revenue Code. An adjustment of tax liabilities may have incidentally resulted from the project, but the primary purpose of the project was research. We do not believe that the provisions of 26 U.S.C. §§ 7601 and 7602 authorize the IRS to force private citizens to do its research. Nor do we believe that Bisceglia sanctions this use of the summons power. The judgment is therefore affirmed.
instruction: What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
  Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
  In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
  To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
  United States of America,
  Plaintiff, Appellant
  v
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendant, Appellee.
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendants, Cross-appellants
  v
  United States of America.
  Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
  of the Board
  Plaintiff, Appellants,
  v
  United States of America,
  Defendant, Appellee.
  This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
  Your task is to identify the state of the first listed state or local government agency that is an appellant.
choices: not Alabama Alaska Arizona Arkansas California Colorado Connecticut Delaware Florida Georgia Hawaii Idaho Illinois Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Maine Maryland Massachussets Michigan Minnesota Mississippi Missouri Montana Nebraska Nevada New New New New North North Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode South South Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Wisconsin Wyoming Virgin Puerto District Guam not Panama