opinion: EVANS v. UNITED STATES.
  No. 5695.
  Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
  May 2, 1936.
  George W. Dowell, of DuQuoin, 111., and Frank C. Smith, of East St. Louis, 111., for appellant.
  Arthur Roe, U. S. Atty., of Vandalia, 111., Joseph A. Troy, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., of East St. Louis, 111., Will G. Beardslee, Director, Bureau of War Risk Litigation, ■of Washington, D. C., Wilbur C. Pickett and Fendall Marbury, Sp. Assts. to the Atty. Gen., and J. Gregory Bruce, of Washington, D. C.
  Before EVANS and SPARKS, Circuit Judges, and BRIGGLE, District Judge.
  BRIGGLE, District Judge.
  Appellant, a soldier of the World War, sues to enforce the terms of a contract of insurance with his government. He enlisted April 27, 1918, and-was discharged February 15, 1919, and it is conceded that in order to recover he must establish that he became totally and permanently disabled, within the meaning of the contract, prior to its lapse on March 31, 1919. Pursuant to the terms of the War Risk Insurance Act and the regulations of the Treasury Department, appellant must show an impairment of mind or body which renders it impossible for him to follow continuously any substantially gainful occupation, and such disability must be founded upon conditions which render it reasonably certain that it will continue throughout the life of the insured.
  The legal principles governing the enforcement of war risk insurance contracts have been often stated and are too well known to require repetition. Each case must rest on its own facts, and the decision of one cannot be an unfaltering guide in the consideration of another.
  At the close of all the evidence, the trial court directed a verdict for defendant, which raises the somewhat narrow question of whether there was any substantial evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to appellant, that should have been submitted to the jury.
  It would be of little value to enter upon a' detailed discussion of the evidence in the record, yet the impaired physical condition of the soldier, which it is fairly disclosed was brought about by being “gassed” in the closing days of the war and while he lay asleep in obedience to orders that he be prepared to “go over the top” at 1 o’clock the following morning, invites our tenderest consideration of his contentions as disclosed by the record. This we have meticulously done, and the undisputed facts disclose a work record in the mines between the years 1919 and 1924 not ordinarily surpassed by the average miner. Appellant earned during that period morfe than $3,500, and the years following became a part owner of a dairy and aided in the operation of the same. We think it fair to assume that he worked not less than one-third of that time, and this was frankly conceded by counsel on the oral argument. It is probably true that such work at times was performed with discomfort due to his ailing condition, and he is deserving of commendation in his effort to earn an honest livelihood for himself and family; yet no court, charged with the duty of finding the facts, would in the face of this evidence be justified in finding total disability. It should not be lost sight of that the court can only be concerned with the enforcement of a contract, and cannot be led afield by any asserted duty that the government may owe its disabled veterans and which it has undertaken to meet through other legislation.
  A careful inspection of the record convinces us that there was no substantial evidence of total disability, and the action of the District Court in directing a verdict for defendant was fully justified.
  Counsel for appellant was apprehensive lest the court attach too great importance to the failure of the soldier to fully advise the doctors of his physical condition at the time of his discharge. It is fair to say that in reaching our conclusion we have given no consideration to this failure on the part of the soldier. While not approving any misrepresentation of fact, the provocation confronting the soldier on that occasion was great.
  The judgment is affirmed.
instruction: What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
  Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
  In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
  To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
  United States of America,
  Plaintiff, Appellant
  v
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendant, Appellee.
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendants, Cross-appellants
  v
  United States of America.
  Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
  of the Board
  Plaintiff, Appellants,
  v
  United States of America,
  Defendant, Appellee.
  This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
  Your task is to identify the state of the first listed state or local government agency that is an appellant.
choices: not Alabama Alaska Arizona Arkansas California Colorado Connecticut Delaware Florida Georgia Hawaii Idaho Illinois Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Maine Maryland Massachussets Michigan Minnesota Mississippi Missouri Montana Nebraska Nevada New New New New North North Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode South South Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Wisconsin Wyoming Virgin Puerto District Guam not Panama