opinion: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Parthenya WHITNEY, Defendant-Appellant.
  No. 80-7254
  Summary Calendar.
  United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
  Unit B
  Dec. 12, 1980.
  Jay L. Strongwater, Asst. Federal Public Defender, Atlanta, Ga., for defendant-appellant.
  Andrew J. Ekonomou, Asst. U. S. Atty., Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiff-appellee.
  Before GODBOLD, KRAVITCH and HATCHETT, Circuit Judges.
  PER CURIAM:
  This appeal presents the question whether the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment bars the district court from relying on specific acts of misconduct in revoking a defendant’s probation where those acts formed the basis of a previous parole revocation. Because we find that the double jeopardy clause is not applicable to parole or probation revocation proceedings, we hold that the double jeopardy clause does not bar consideration of certain acts in probation revocation proceedings where those acts formed the basis of a previous parole revocation. We therefore affirm.
  In May, 1975, Parthenya Whitney was convicted of three counts of interstate transportation of stolen property and conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314. The trial judge imposed a sentence of five years imprisonment on count one and a like term on count two, the sentences to run concurrently. Regarding count three, the trial judge placed appellant on probation for a period of five years, to commence upon her release from confinement in counts one and two. In October, 1976, appellant was released on parole. In November, 1979, the United States Parole Commission filed a petition to revoke appellant’s parole. The petition alleged that appellant violated the conditions of her parole in that she (1) failed to submit supervision reports, (2) passed bad checks, and (3) failed to report an arrest. After a hearing, the parole commission revoked appellant’s parole. Finding, however, that appellant’s parole term had expired, the parole commission released appellant from custody.
  On the day of her release, the United States’ probation office served appellant with an order to show cause why her probation should not be revoked. The revocation petition alleged violations identical to counts two and three of the parole revocation petition. At the probation revocation hearing, appellant made an oral motion to strike these grounds because they were barred by the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment. The trial judge denied appellant’s motion after which appellant’s probation was revoked.
  In her appeal, appellant assigns error to the trial judge’s denial of her motion. She argues that the “double-jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment prohibits the government from re-alleging specific acts of misconduct in a probation revocation hearing when there has already been a parole revocation relying on those same specific allegations.” The government argues that the trial judge properly denied appellant’s motion because the double-jeopardy clause is not applicable to probation or parole revocation hearings. The threshold issue in this case is whether the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment applies to parole or probation revocation proceedings.
  The purpose of the double jeopardy clause is to ensure that a person is subject to a criminal prosecution only once for the same offense. See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 44 L.Ed.2d 346 (1975). “Probation revocation, like parole revocation is not a stage of a criminal prosecution, [even though both may] result in a loss of liberty.” Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 1759, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973). It follows, therefore, that because parole and probation revocation proceedings do not constitute a stage of a criminal prosecution, they do not fall within the protection of the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment. This was the holding of the Ninth Circuit in Dunn v. California Department of Corrections, 401 F.2d 340 (9th Cir. 1968). Appellant seeks to avert this result by arguing that a finding that a proceeding is or is not a criminal prosecution should not determine whether due process protections are applicable. She avers that in In Re Gault, 397 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967), the Supreme Court held that the double jeopardy clause applies to juvenile proceedings notwithstanding its label as a civil proceeding. Appellant further asserts that probation and parole revocation proceedings warrant the same due process protections applicable to juvenile proceedings because they all involve a loss of liberty. While we agree that labels should not be the sole determinant of due process protections, we cannot agree that the double jeopardy clause applies to probation and parole revocation proceedings. As stated by the Supreme Court in Scarpelli, “a juvenile charged with violation of a generally applicable statute is differently situated from an already convicted probationer or parolee, and is entitled to a higher degree of protection.” 411 U.S. at 789 n. 12, 93 S.Ct. at 1763. Appellant is not a juvenile.
  We find that the double jeopardy clause is not applicable to parole or probation revocation proceedings. In the circumstances, we hold that the trial judge did not err in denying appellant’s motion to strike the first two grounds of the probation revocation petition. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the lower court.
  AFFIRMED.
instruction: What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
  Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
  In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
  To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
  United States of America,
  Plaintiff, Appellant
  v
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendant, Appellee.
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendants, Cross-appellants
  v
  United States of America.
  Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
  of the Board
  Plaintiff, Appellants,
  v
  United States of America,
  Defendant, Appellee.
  This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
  Your task is to identify the state of the first listed state or local government agency that is an appellant.
choices: not Alabama Alaska Arizona Arkansas California Colorado Connecticut Delaware Florida Georgia Hawaii Idaho Illinois Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Maine Maryland Massachussets Michigan Minnesota Mississippi Missouri Montana Nebraska Nevada New New New New North North Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode South South Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Wisconsin Wyoming Virgin Puerto District Guam not Panama