opinion: ZERBST, Warden, v. McPIKE.
  No. 8634.
  Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
  June 16, 1938.
  Lawrence S. Camp, U. S. A tty., and Flarvey H. Tisinger, H. T. Nichols, and J. Ellis Mundy, Asst. U. S. Attys., all of Atlanta, Ga., for appellant.
  Before FOSTER, SIBLEY, and HUT-CHESON, Circuit Judges.
  SIBLEY, Circuit Judge.
  Will McPike by habeas corpus challenged the legality of his imprisonment in the federal penitentiary at Atlanta, on the ground that the sentence of three years imposed on him Nov. 7, 1933, in the District Court for the Western District of Louisiana had expired. He obtained a judgment of discharge and the warden of the penitentiary appeals.
  The undisputed evidence is that Mc-Pike was arrested by the State of Louisiana and was in the parish jail awaiting trial. On Nov. 6, 1933, he was 'indicted in the federal court for fraudulently impersonating a United States officer. On Nov. 7th the State officers brought McPike into the federal court and suffered him to be tried. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to serve in the penitentiary for three years, no time being fixed for the commencement of the sentence. He was then taken by the State officers back to jail. On Nov. 13th he was tried and convicted for a State offense and sentenced to the State penitentiary for three to five years. The commitment which the clerk of the federal court issued on Nov. 7th was not executed but was returned Nov. 24th with an entry that McPike was confined as a prisoner in the Louisiana penitentiary as a State prisoner. After serving the State sentence he was taken on an alias commitment to the federal penitentiary Aug. 2, 1936. The deputy marshal testifies that McPike was maintained in the jail as a State prisoner before and after his trial in federal court, and was never maintained there as a federal prisoner and the District Attorney who handled the case testifies that the State never yielded jurisdiction over him to the federal government, except to try him.
  Under the inviolable rules of comity, which are reciprocal, the State having first arrested and imprisoned McPike could not without its consent be deprived of his custody until through with him. Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506, 16 L.Ed. 169; Covell v. Heyman, 111 U.S. 176, 4 S.Ct. 355, 28 L.Ed. 390. But the State could “lend” the prisoner to the federal government in order to afford him a speedy trial and to convenience the witnesses who might be necessary to be assembled for or against him. 'This can be done without a complete surrender of the prior jurisdiction over him which the State had acquired. This we think is fairly decided in the case of Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254, 42 S.Ct. 309, 66 L.Ed. 607, 22 A.L.R. 879. There the prisoner was serving a federal sentence and was taken on habeas corpus to the State court to be tried for a State offense, the federal officer accompanying him and maintaining federal custody. Ponzi was evidently to be returned to his federal service after the trial. It was held that the procedure was lawful. The fact that Ponzi was originally in federal rather than State custody does not alter the principle, nor does the fact that he had been already convicted when “loaned” to the State distinguish that case from this. The prior right acquired by first arrest continues unchanged until the arresting government has completed the exercise of its powers, and a waiver extends no further than it is intended to extend. Without the consent of the State authorities the United States Marshal could not lawfully take the person of McPike from the State officers, although McPike had been brought into the federal court and tried; and he did not attempt to. When McPike was taken back to jail he entered it not to await transportation to the federal penitentiary but to await trial in the State court. The proviso of 18 U.S.C.A. § 709a therefore does not apply. His federal sentence could begin to run only from “the date on which [he] is received at the penitentiary, reformatory or jail for service of said sentence”, by the express provision of that law. It has not yet Been fully served. The judgment is reversed with direction to remand the prisoner to the custody of the warden.
  Judgment reversed.
instruction: What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
  Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
  In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
  To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
  United States of America,
  Plaintiff, Appellant
  v
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendant, Appellee.
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendants, Cross-appellants
  v
  United States of America.
  Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
  of the Board
  Plaintiff, Appellants,
  v
  United States of America,
  Defendant, Appellee.
  This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
  Your task is to identify the state of the first listed state or local government agency that is an appellant.
choices: not Alabama Alaska Arizona Arkansas California Colorado Connecticut Delaware Florida Georgia Hawaii Idaho Illinois Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Maine Maryland Massachussets Michigan Minnesota Mississippi Missouri Montana Nebraska Nevada New New New New North North Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode South South Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Wisconsin Wyoming Virgin Puerto District Guam not Panama