opinion: Julie DOMMER, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Jack F. CRAWFORD, Prosecuting Attorney for the 31st Judicial Circuit for the State of Indiana, Defendant-Appellant.
  No. 80-1364.
  United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
  Argued Sept. 26, 1980.
  Decided July 7, 1981.
  Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied July 9, 1981.
  Before PELL, Circuit Judge, SKELTON, Senior Judge, and WOOD, Circuit Judge.
  The Honorable Byron G. Skelton, Senior Judge of the United States Court of Claims, sitting by designation.
  PER CURIAM.
  Plaintiffs filed this class action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief for the unlawful practice of the Gary, Indiana police in arresting and holding individuals in excess of twenty-four hours without felony charges or producing them before a magistrate for a determination of probable cause to hold the individuals, contrary to Indiana law, I.C. 18-1-11-8. The class was certified to be those persons without counsel who were arrested and incarcerated for an unreasonable time without compliance with the applicable Indiana statute.
  The defendants were various officials of the City of Gary and Lake County, Indiana, including appellant Jack H. Crawford, prosecuting attorney for the 31st Judicial Circuit for the State of Indiana. The district court granted the relief sought in the form of a declaratory judgment and mandatory injunction. Only the prosecuting attorney has appealed.
  Count C of the complaint is the only Count before us on appeal, and only insofar as it pertains to defendant Crawford. The prosecuting attorney was not originally named as a defendant. Upon motion of certain other defendants, Crawford’s predecessors in office were named as parties, with Crawford substituted for his predecessors less than a week prior to the entry of judgment.
  Prior to amendment, Count C contained allegations only of improper police delay. When the prosecuting attorney was named as a defendant, the following paragraph was added to section III of Count C, no other changes being made in the complaint:
  la. After the arrest of one suspected of committing a crime, the police officers are responsible for preparing the case for presentation to the Lake County Prosecuting Attorney who makes the final decision on whether or not to file a charge in a court in Lake County with criminal jurisdiction. Thus there are two possible delays in bringing an accused into court: a) a delay caused by the police in processing the case for presentation to the prosecuting attorney, and b) a delay caused by the prosecuting attorney in the preparation, service and filing of the charge in court. Defendant city officials contend they cannot remedy the delay caused by the defendant prosecuting attorney and his staff.
  A state officer named in a suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must be in some manner responsible for the alleged deprivation of rights. See Duncan v. Duckworth, 644 F.2d 653 at 655 (7th Cir. 1981) (hospital administrator is appropriate party where prison hospital conditions are subject of suit). In this case, the amended portion of Count C informs us about “two possible delays,” one being caused by the prosecuting attorney in filing a charge. But since Crawford in his capacity as a prosecutor has no authority under Indiana law to order city police to detain arrestees past the statutory time limits, the complaint fails to state a cause of action against him. Unlike the hospital administrator in Duncan, Crawford has no responsibilities that make him a suitable defendant in this case.
  It is the city police force and not the prosecutor’s office that has the responsibility under Indiana law to bring before a magistrate those they arrest. Thus, as regards the city police, “[w]henever any arrest has been made by any member of the police force, the officer making the arrest shall bring the person before the court having jurisdiction of the offense, to be dealt with according to law .... But no person may be detained longer than twenty-four [24] hours, except where Sunday intervenes, in which case no person may be detained longer than forty-eight [48] hours.” I.C. 18-1-11-8 (emphasis added; brackets in original).
  Custody, then, is vested solely in the city police, not the prosecutor. It is the city police who are by law charged with the duty to honor the statutory time limits or else release the arrestees. Because the prosecutor’s responsibility to conduct criminal cases does not encompass the initial appearance procedure as applied to individuals arrested by city police, the complaint fails to state a cause of action against Crawford.
  That is so regardless of the plaintiffs’ assertions in their briefs that the prosecutor is involved at the initial appearance stage because as a matter of practice the prosecutor’s office represents the state’s interests during that proceeding. The plaintiffs’ point is irrelevant, since it is not questioned on appeal that the relief sought in the complaint is directed to the persons having custody of the class members, not to the conduct of the hearing.
  The complaint vaguely alleges that there are “two possible delays,” only one of which is attributable to the prosecuting attorney as he is the one who prepares, serves and files a charge in court. It is not alleged that the prosecutor is actually responsible for prolonged detention. Nor is it alleged that the prosecuting attorney has some statutory control over detention which he is ignoring. It cannot be said that under Indiana law a prosecutor who may be merely dilatory in fulfilling the responsibilities of his own office thereby provides local police officials with a waiver of their statutory duties placing a limit on detention. The plaintiffs conclude the only paragraph of their complaint relating in part to the prosecutor by alleging that the other defendants, the city officials, claim they cannot remedy any possible delay caused by the prosecutor. In effect the plaintiffs allege that the defendant city officials claim to have some excuse for their actions in an attempt to shift part of the blame to the codefendant prosecutor. However, not even the codefendants, according to the plaintiffs’ complaint, claim that the prosecuting attorney, somehow by orders or otherwise, causes them to violate the Indiana statute which places the detention restrictions squarely on them, not the prosecutor. The issue is solely detention and neither the complaint nor Indiana law puts responsibility for detention on the prosecutor.
  The relief accorded must be directed to those who impinge plaintiffs’ liberty by detabling arrestees for too long a period: i. e., the Gary City police. Complete relief was accorded the class when the district court entered its injunction requiring the city police to promptly bring class members before a court for an initial appearance or else release them from custody. If the prosecutor now wishes to have anything to do with the initial appearances of arrestees, he will have to conform his timetable of participation to that established by statute for the city police, and enforceable under the district court’s order.
  Insofar as it relates to the actions of defendant Crawford, the district court’s order is reversed. The rest of the order, directed to the Gary police, remains undisturbed by this decision.
  . A prior opinion was issued in this case and is reported at 7 Cir., 638 F.2d 1031. A timely Petition for Rehearing with Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc was filed. That Petition is denied. The original opinion is withdrawn and superceded by this opinion.
  . The injunction required the defendants as a group to bring arrestees for an initial appearance before a magistrate within twenty-four hours of arrest, except in certain circumstances. The terms of the injunction did not delineate any action to be taken specifically by the prosecutor. The injunction required the defendants to file with the district court a monthly report that detailed their compliance with the injunction’s terms. Eleven months after entry of the injunction, the district court lifted the defendants’ obligation to make any further reports.
  . Counts A and B alleged a variety of conditions at the Gary City Jail that were deleterious to the health of the class members. Those Counts were the subject of a declaratory judgment stipulated to by the parties and approved and entered by the district court. They are not involved in this appeal.
  . Cf. Grooms v. Férvida, Ind.App., 396 N.E.2d 405, 411 (1979), where the court notes that the strict time limits contained in I.C. 18-1-11-8 apply solely to city police, and not to the state or county police when they act in concert with the prosecuting attorney. See I.C. 17-3-14-5, defining the powers and duties of the county police. The county and state police forces were not parties to this case.
instruction: What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
  Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
  In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
  To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
  United States of America,
  Plaintiff, Appellant
  v
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendant, Appellee.
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendants, Cross-appellants
  v
  United States of America.
  Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
  of the Board
  Plaintiff, Appellants,
  v
  United States of America,
  Defendant, Appellee.
  This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
  Your task is to identify the state of the first listed state or local government agency that is an appellant.
choices: not Alabama Alaska Arizona Arkansas California Colorado Connecticut Delaware Florida Georgia Hawaii Idaho Illinois Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Maine Maryland Massachussets Michigan Minnesota Mississippi Missouri Montana Nebraska Nevada New New New New North North Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode South South Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Wisconsin Wyoming Virgin Puerto District Guam not Panama