opinion: CONTRACTORS ASSOCIATION OF EASTERN PENNSYLVANIA, INC., General Building Contractors Association, Inc., Associated Master Painters & Decorators of Philadelphia, Inc., Employing Brick Layers Association of Delaware Valley, Inc., Interior Finish Contractors Association, Inc., Mechanical Contractors Association of Eastern Pennsylvania, Inc., Roofing and Sheet Metal Contractors Association, Inc., Sub-Contractors Association of Delaware Valley, Inc., National Electrical Contractors Association, Inc. v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, Elizabeth Reveal, as Director of Finance for the City of Philadelphia, Curtis Jones, Jr., as Director of the Minority Business Enterprise Council, United Minority Enterprise Associates, Inc., Intervening Defendant, The City of Philadelphia, Appellant at No. 90-1295, United Minority Enterprise Associates, Inc., Appellant at No. 90-1296.
  Nos. 90-1295, 90-1296.
  United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
  Argued Nov. 16, 1990.
  Decided Sept. 30, 1991.
  Charles W. Bowser (argued), James P. Cousounis, Bowser, Weaver & Cousounis, P.C., and Charisse Lillie, City Sol., Philadelphia, Pa., for City of Philadelphia.
  Robert T. Vance, Jr. (argued), Brown, Vance, Jackson & Smith, Philadelphia, Pa., for United Minority Enterprise Associates, Inc.
  John J. McAleese, Jr. (argued), Thomas J. McGoldrick, John H. Widman, McAleese, McGoldrick & Susanin, P.C., King of Prussia, Pa., for appellees.
  Before GREENBERG, HUTCHINSON and HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judges.
  At the time of argument, Judge Higginbotham was Chief Judge but has since assumed Senior status.
  OPINION OF THE COURT
  HUTCHINSON, Circuit Judge.
  The City of Philadelphia (City) and United Minority Enterprise Associates, Incorporated (Minority Associates) appeal an order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granting appellee Contractors Association of Eastern Pennsylvania, Incorporated, and other trade associations with members that do business in the construction industry in the Philadelphia metropolitan region (collectively “Contractors”), summary judgment on Contractors’ claim that Chapter 17-500 of the Philadelphia Code (Ordinance), Philadelphia’s public contract set-aside law, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Contractors Ass’n of E. Pa., Inc. v. City of Phila., 735 F.Supp. 1274 (E.D.Pa.1990). Among other contentions, Minority Associates argues that the district court erred by granting the Contractors’ motion without giving Minority Associates a chance to pursue additional discovery on the existence of discrimination in the Philadelphia construction market that could justify the various set-asides in the Ordinance. Minority Associates’ opposition to Contractors’ motion for summary judgment was accompanied by a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) affidavit. The affidavit stated that Minority Associates needed time to undertake further discovery. We think Minority Associates should have been given a reasonable opportunity for further discovery and will therefore vacate the district court’s order granting Contractors’ summary judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
  I.
  This appeal concerns claims Contractors made in an amended complaint dated May 19, 1989 that was filed in the district court in their suit to strike down Chapter 17-500 of the Philadelphia City Code and the regulations promulgated under that Ordinance as contrary to the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions and federal and state statutes guaranteeing them, inter alia, equal protection of the laws. The City filed an answer as did Minority Associates, an intervening defendant. On October 11, 1989, the City moved for judgment on the pleadings or, alternately, summary judgment on the grounds that Contractors lacked standing to sue and did not state a cause of action under the Equal Protection Clause, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 1981) and 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 (West 1981). The City also moved for judgment on the pleadings on the state law claims alleging that if the federal claims were dismissed the court would lack pendent jurisdiction. The Contractors replied and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on its Equal Protection Clause and section 1983 claims.
  The City opposed Contractors’ cross-motion for summary judgment arguing mainly that genuine issues of fact remained to be resolved. Minority Associates joined the City’s opposition and asked for a continuance so that discovery could be completed before the Contractors’ motion was ruled on.
  On April 5, 1990, the district court granted Contractors’ cross-motion, denied the City’s motion, declared the minority-, female- and handicapped-owned business enterprise set-aside programs set forth in the Ordinance and the implementing regulations unconstitutional and permanently enjoined the City from enforcing or implementing the Ordinance or the regulations. The City filed its notice of appeal on April 10, 1990, and Minority Associates filed its notice of appeal on April 12, 1990.
  II.
  The district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the section 1983 claim that the Ordinance violated Contractors’ right to equal protection under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (West Supp.1991) and 28 U.S.C.A. § 1343(a)(3) & (4) (West Supp.1991). We have appellate jurisdiction over the City’s and Minority Associates’ appeals from the district court’s final order under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291 (West Supp.1991).
  Our review of the district court’s order denying the City’s motion for summary judgment on standing and its order granting Contractors’ motion for summary judgment on the merits is plenary. See Country Floors, Inc. v. A Partnership Composed of Gepner & Ford, 930 F.2d 1056, 1060 (3d Cir.1991). We review the district court’s refusal to postpone action on the Contractors’ motion pending further discovery by Minority Associates for abuse of discretion. See Lunderstadt v. Colafella, 885 F.2d 66, 71-72 (3d Cir.1989). If information concerning the facts to be discovered is solely in the possession of the movant, however, “a motion for continuance of a motion for summary judgment for purposes of discovery should [then] ordinarily be granted almost as a matter of course.” Ward v. United States, 471 F.2d 667, 670 (3d Cir.1973) (citations omitted). The Ward rationale would not seem to apply, however, when the party seeking discovery has the information it seeks in its own possession or can get it from a source other than the movant.
  III.
  The Ordinance in question is entitled “Goals For The Participation Of Minority, Female And Handicapped Owned Businesses In City Contracts.” II Appendix (App.) at 310. Through various means, the Ordinance seeks to increase the number of “Disadvantaged Business Enterprises” owned by minorities, women or handicapped persons who are awarded city contracts. A Disadvantaged Business Enterprise is any small business “which is at least 51 percent (51%) owned by one or more socially and economically disadvantaged individuals.” Id. at 311. The Ordinance creates an agency called the Minority Business Enterprise Council (the agency). The agency is charged with the administration of the Ordinance, which authorizes the agency to presume that all minorities, women and handicapped persons are socially and economically disadvantaged persons. Once a Disadvantaged Business Enterprise receives contract work of more than $5,000,000.00 from the City under the Ordinance, that business is rebuttably presumed not to be disadvantaged. The Ordinance sets “goals” of fifteen-percent participation in city contracts for minority-owned businesses, ten percent for female-owned businesses and two percent for handicapped-owned businesses. Finally, the Ordinance contains provisions that allow the agency to waive its set-aside requirements in certain situations.
  A.
  We first address the City’s standing claim because it goes to the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court. See Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2298, 2306 & n. 13, 115 L.Ed.2d 236 (1991) (Court first addressed standing and ripeness claims that could impair the Court’s power to hear the case). The City contends that the Contractors lack standing for two reasons. First, the City says the Contractors did not establish that they suffered an injury-in-fact. Second, the City maintains that the Contractors cannot claim organizational standing because of conflicts of interest among the members of the organizations. We reject both challenges.
  The Supreme Court of the United States has stated:
  The Art. Ill judicial power exists only to redress or otherwise to protect against injury to the complaining party.... A federal court’s jurisdiction therefore can be invoked only when the plaintiff himself has suffered “some threatened or actual injury resulting from the putatively illegal action....”
  Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2205, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975) (citations omitted) (quoting Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617, 93 S.Ct. 1146, 1148, 35 L.Ed.2d 536 (1973)). An association can have standing on the basis of direct injury against itself as an association. See Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 1925, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976). Under certain circumstances, an association can also have standing on the basis of injury to its members.
  [A]n association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.
  Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 2441, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977). The district court determined that Contractors met Hunt’s requirements. Contractors Ass’n, 735 F.Supp. at 1281-87. We agree with its analysis.
  The City’s second argument on standing merits more discussion. Because an association represents many individuals, the potential for conflict of interest exists among its members. The City notes that some of the Contractors’ members qualify as disadvantaged businesses and actually oppose the litigation, and thus a conflict of interest exists that denies Contractors standing.
  In considering whether a target corporation had standing to assert the interests of its shareholders in the case of a hostile takeover, we stated that “associational standing has never been granted in the presence of serious conflicts of interest either among the members of an association or between an association and its members.” Polaroid Corp. v. Disney,-862 F.2d 987, 999 (3d Cir.1988). We explained the rationale for denying standing to the corporation in that case as follows:
  [A] potential conflict [exists] between those shareholders who view litigation to enjoin a tender offer as adversely affecting their opportunity to collect on the tender offer premium and those shareholders who are cut out of the tender offer and thus may want to see it defeated. Even though some shareholders are disadvantaged by their exclusion from the tender offer, a great majority of shareholders will often benefit from the offer. A corporation is thus an uncertain representative for the interests of the disadvantaged shareholders, as it may have an eye to protecting the interests of the majority. This undermines the basis for jus tertii standing — that the jus ter-tii advocate will vigorously assert the interests of the right-holder. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 194, 97 S.Ct. 451, 455, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976); Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 114, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 2874, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976) (plurality opinion). Indeed, one basis for the constitutional requirement that a litigant have a personal stake in a litigation is “to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult ... questions.” Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Right [sic] Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 38 n. 16, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 1924 n. 16, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962)).
  Id. (emphasis in original).
  In Polaroid, we noted two possible conflicts that could prevent a target corporation from seeking standing on behalf of its shareholders. The first is between management, who would seek to defeat the takeover to remain in control, and the shareholders, who could profit from the tender offer. The second conflict is between the shareholders who will profit from the tender offer, normally the majority of shareholders, and the target corporation when the target corporation sides with the shareholders who will not profit from the tender offer, normally the minority of shareholders. The conflict in our case is of the second type. In the matter at hand, however, the City and Minority Associates do not argue that Contractors are not representing the interests of a majority of their membership. Only twenty-nine of Contractors’ 535 members are registered Minority, Female or Handicapped Business Enterprises. Contractors Ass’n, 735 F.Supp. at 1286. There is little chance that the conflict between the majority and minority of the Contractors’ members will affect the adequacy of representation or present a likelihood of a collusive suit that would deprive the court of vigorous advocacy on all sides of this dispute. When an association has not violated its members’ rights by ignoring the association’s by-laws before bringing an action on a matter of concern to the membership, it is primarily concern over the absence of strong advocacy on both sides of a controversy that has motivated courts to hold that a conflict of interest among its members deprives an association of associational standing. See National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Califano, 622 F.2d 1382, 1391-92 (10th Cir.1980) (an association cannot have associational standing if more members oppose the association’s position than support it); Associated Gen. Contractors of Conn., Inc. v. City of New Haven, 130 F.R.D. 4,10 (D.Conn.1990) (“[a]s long as the [law] suit is not in contravention of [the association’s] purposes nor its by-laws ... it has [associational] standing”); Mountain States Legal Found, v. Dole, 655 F.Supp. 1424, 1426 (D.Utah 1987) (“Because associations typically consist of many members with potentially conflicting interests and views on any particular dispute, a danger exists that certain members of the association will be sympathetic to the adverse party. In such a case, there could be no legitimate controversy.”). The Contractors’ position in this litigation is not contrary to the interests of a majority of their members, and there is nothing on this record indicating that they failed to follow their own internal rules before joining this litigation. Therefore, the City’s argument fails, and we hold that Contractors have associational standing to maintain the present action.
  B.
  On the merits, Minority Associates contends that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the Contractors since Minority Associates did not have enough time to discover evidence it believed was in the possession of the Contractors which would show the existence of past and present discrimination by Contractors against entities that would qualify as Disadvantaged Business Enterprises and so preclude the entry of summary judgment for Contractors under the teaching of City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 109 S.Ct. 706, 102 L.Ed.2d 854 (1989). Accordingly, it argues that the district court should have delayed ruling on the Contractors’ motion for summary judgment until it and the City completed discovery. Minority Associates formally advised the district court of its need for further discovery in accord with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f). Rule 56(f) states:
  Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party’s opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just.
  Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(f). Whether such a motion should be granted depends, in part, on “what particular information is sought; how, if uncovered, it would preclude summary judgment; and why it has not previously been obtained.” Lunderstadt, 885 F.2d at 71 (quoting Dowling v. City of Phila., 855 F.2d 136, 140 (3d Cir.1988)).
  In order to examine the first consideration specified in Lunderstadt, what information is sought, we must look to the affidavit filed with the Rule 56(f) motion. It seeks information from Contractors concerning “past and current practices and/or instances of discrimination by plaintiffs and their members in both the public and private construction industries.” II App. at 305. The affidavit also states that Minority Associates plans to seek this information from Contractors through testimony on depositions, interrogatories, and requests for production of documents served on Contractors.
  Knowing what information Minority Associates seeks, we turn to the next part of Lunderstadt’s inquiry — whether the information sought, if uncovered, could preclude summary judgment. See Lunderstadt, 885 F.2d at 71. This inquiry into the substantive law on the constitutionality of minority set-asides is controlled by the Supreme Court’s decision in Croson. From the opinions in that case, we must determine whether the information Minority Associates seeks could create a genuine dispute of material fact and so defeat Contractors’ motion for summary judgment.
  In Croson, a majority of the Supreme Court held that the City of Richmond had not demonstrated a compelling governmental interest that would justify its racially-based set-aside ordinance. Croson, 109 S.Ct. at 723-28. A plurality of the Court also held that the set-aside program violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the City of Richmond had not demonstrated that the ordinance was necessary to remedy past discrimination. Id. at 730 (plurality opinion). The lack of record evidence concerning past “discrimination in the local construction industry” was fatal to the ordinance. Id. at 726; see id. at 723 & 727. The plurality says that this evidence is necessary to the constitutionality of a minority set-aside ordinance. See id. at 729-30 (plurality opinion). We conclude that the evidence of past discrimination Minority Associates seeks could preclude summary judgment if the City Council’s purpose in creating the various set-asides was to remedy such discrimination.
  Application of the last Lunderstadt factor requires an inquiry into why the party seeking more time has not previously obtained the information. In its Rule 56(f) affidavit, Minority Associates stated that Contractors had not yet answered many of the City’s interrogatories seeking information Minority Associates needs to formulate its own interrogatories and depositions. Minority Associates also noted that the City’s depositions of some of Contractors’ members, in which Minority Associates would participate, had been noticed but not taken when the district court granted Contractors’ motion for summary judgment. Minority Associates attributes this delay to the Contractors’ desire for a protective order and its intent to move for such an order. These reasons are sufficient to explain why the information has not been previously obtained.
  Since Minority Associates’ request for more time to engage in discovery was for the purpose of seeking information that could defeat a summary judgment motion, which it could not have previously obtained, under Lunderstadt, its Rule 56(f) affidavit authorized the district court to delay action on the Contractors’ motion for a reasonable time.
  This conclusion does not, however, end our inquiry. A district court has discretion in acting on Rule 56(f) motions. See Koplove v. Ford Motor Co., 795 F.2d 15, 18 (3d Cir.1986). The Lunderstadt factors simply offer a guide for a district court to follow in exercising its discretion under Rule 56(f).
  In this case, however, the breadth of the district court’s discretion is affected by Contractors’ possession of records that contain the information Minority Associates seeks. As we said earlier, this limits the district court’s discretion to deny a request for delay when a proper Rule 56(f) affidavit is filed. In such a case, a district court should grant a Rule 56(f) motion almost as a matter of course unless the information is otherwise available to the non-movant. See Ward, 471 F.2d at 670. Here, Minority Associates’ Rule 56(f) affidavit avers the information it seeks from Contractors is not otherwise available. Thus, the record before us shows the Lunderstadt factors are present. See Lunderstadt, 885 F.2d at 71. It also demonstrates no undue delay. Cf. id.
  Unanswered interrogatories and notices to take depositions directed to Contractors were outstanding when the district court ruled on Contractors’ motion for summary judgment, a practice this Court has disapproved. See Sames v. Gable, 732 F.2d 49, 51 (3d Cir.1984). Accordingly, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion when it refused Minority Associates the delay it sought pursuant to Rule 56(f). On remand, Minority Associates should be given a reasonable opportunity to discover evidence that relates to a pattern of discriminatory practices or instances of discrimination in the Philadelphia-area construction industry that occurred over time before passage of the Ordinance. We are confident that the district court will require the Contractors to move promptly for any protective orders they desire and thereafter impose reasonable limits on the scope and time for completion of the discovery Minority Associates seeks.
  IV.
  The district court abused its discretion in not allowing a continuance before ruling on the pending motions for summary judgment. Consequently, our opinion takes no view on any of the other issues presented in this appeal with the exception that we agree with the district court’s holding that the Contractors’ have standing. Beyond that, we will vacate the order of the district court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Each party to bear its own costs.
  . The collective term "Contractors” means Contractors Association of Eastern Pennsylvania, Incorporated; General Building Contractors Association, Incorporated; Employing Bricklayers Association of Delaware Valley, Incorporated; and Subcontractors Association of Delaware Valley, Incorporated. These four are those plaintiffs the district court held met the standing requirements of Article III of the United States Constitution. See Contractors Ass’n of E. Pa., Inc. v. City of Phila., 735 F.Supp. at 1283-84 & n. 3.
  . After oral argument, this Court received supplemental briefing from the parties in April and May of 1991.
  . The class of “socially and economically disadvantaged individuals” is defined as follows:
  (11) Socially and Economically Disadvantaged Individuals shall mean those individuals who have either been subjected to racial, sexual or ethnic prejudice because of their identity as a member of a group or differential treatment because of their handicap without regard to their individual qualities, and whose ability to compete in the free enterprise system has been impaired due to diminished capital and credit opportunities as compared to others in the same business area who are not socially disadvantaged.
  (a) In determining who are socially and economically disadvantaged individuals, the Minority Business Enterprise Council may make a reputable presumption that all minority persons, all women and all handicapped persons shall be so classified.
  (b) The Minority Business Enterprise Council, in making said determination, shall also consider, among other things the extent of the liquid assets and net worth of such socially disadvantaged individuals.
  Id.
  . In Rocks v. City of Philadelphia, 868 F.2d 644, 648 (3d Cir.1989), this Court held that municipal taxpayers did not have standing to challenge Chapter 17-500 absent a showing that they had "sustained a proximate, individual and addressable injury, based solely on their status as municipal residents and taxpayers,” but in dicta, stated that: "Contemplating the appellants’ allegation, we think that an article III injury to contractors and bidders at large has been made out.” This supports, but does not compel, our result.
  . The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has rejected the theory that an internal conflict of interest may deprive an organization of standing. See Humane Society of the United States v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 45, 59-60 n. 25 (D.C.Cir.1988); National Maritime Union v. Commander, Military Sealift Command, 824 F.2d 1228, 1234 (D.C.Cir.1987).
  . The reader is reminded that the term "Contractors" as used in this opinion encompasses all the trade associations that joined in bringing this action who were found to have met Article Ill’s requirements for standing by the district court. See supra note 1.
  . Though Minority Associates may also compile and submit evidence of instances of discrimination that pre-date the passage of the Ordinance, we note that the questions of whether evidence of past discrimination not known to City Council when it passed the Ordinance is proof material to the legislative purpose of correcting such discrimination that Croson requires, or whether anecdotal evidence of discrimination is suffi-dent to show the compelling interest Croson requires are not now before us.
instruction: What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
  Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
  In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
  To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
  United States of America,
  Plaintiff, Appellant
  v
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendant, Appellee.
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendants, Cross-appellants
  v
  United States of America.
  Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
  of the Board
  Plaintiff, Appellants,
  v
  United States of America,
  Defendant, Appellee.
  This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
  Your task is to identify the state of the first listed state or local government agency that is an appellant.
choices: not Alabama Alaska Arizona Arkansas California Colorado Connecticut Delaware Florida Georgia Hawaii Idaho Illinois Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Maine Maryland Massachussets Michigan Minnesota Mississippi Missouri Montana Nebraska Nevada New New New New North North Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode South South Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Wisconsin Wyoming Virgin Puerto District Guam not Panama