opinion: In re INTERNATIONAL MATCH CORPORATION.
  No. 431.
  Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
  Aug. 12, 1935.
  Peaslee & Brigham, of New York City (Martin A. Meyer, Jr., of New York City, on the brief; Ralph G. Albrecht, of New York City, of counsel), for the State of Delaware.
  Rosenberg, Goldmark & Colin, of New York City (George K. Hourwich, of New York City, of counsel), for appellee.
  Before MANTON, SWAN, and CHASE, Circuit Judges.
  Writ of certiorari denied State of Delaware v. Irving Trust Co., 56 S. Ct. 368, 80 L. Ed. —.
  CHASE, Circuit Judge.
  The bankrupt, a corporation organized under the laws of Delaware, was adjudicated a bankrupt in the District Court for the Southern District of New York on April 19, 1932. The appellee is its trustee. The appellant has filed its claim for franchise taxes for the year 1932, which were payable April 1, 1933, and for the year 1933, payable April 1, 1934. Although the claim was filed subsequent to the time limited in a bar order, the order was modified to permit filing and nothing now turns upon that. The claims were expunged upon the theory that they were not provable under section 64a of the Bankruptcy Act, as amended by Act May 27, 1926, 11 USCA § 104 (a).
  It is undisputed that these taxes are laid upon the privilege of existing as a corporation. See State v. Surety Corporation, 19 Del. Ch. 17, 162 A. 852, 853. Also that they are to be computed on the basis of a report of the corporation’s authorized capital, required to be filed, in accordance with section 66 of the Delaware Franchise Tax Law (Rev. Code Del. 1915, § 103, as amended by 37 Del. Laws, c. 7, § 1), on January 1, 1933, showing the 1932 capital structure, and on January 1, 1934, showing the 1933- capital structure. Under section 67 of the same law (Rev. Code Del. 1915, § 104, as amended by 37 Del. Laws, c. 7, § 2), the tax is to be prorated, if a corporation ceases to exist during a year, for the portion of the year during which it continued in existence and “In case a corporation shall have changed during the taxable year the amount of its authorized capital stock, the total annual franchise tax payable at the foregoing rates shall be arrived at by adding together the franchise taxes calculated as above set forth as prorated for the several periods of the year during which each distinct authorized amount of capital was in effect.”
  Considerable stress is placed by the appellant upon the words “changed during the taxable year,” which appear in section 67 of the Delaware statute above quoted in part. It is argued from this that the franchise tax payable April 1, 1933, is for the year 1932, a year which had already commenced to run when the corporation was adjudicated a bankrupt. With this conclusion we agree. It is obvious that changes in capital structure which can be given effect in computing the tax on April 1st in' any year are changes which are then known. Certainly no tax could be computed which was dependent in amount upon events which might subsequently take .place. As the changes which must necessarily be given effect in the computation are those which are knowable and are . “changes within the taxable year” as designated by the statute, it follows .inevitably that the tax computed on any April 1st is the tax for the previous calendar year or such part of it as the corporation was in existence.
  The questions presented are (1) whether the tax for 1932, payable April 1, 1933, was provable within the meaning of section 64a of the Bankrúptcy Act; and (2) whether the tax for 1933, payable April 1, 1934, was likewise provable. The strongest argument in behalf of the appellant can be made for the first of these taxes and that will be considered first.
  Section 64a of the Bankruptcy Act, as amended by Act May 27, 1926, 11 USCA § 104 (a), provides, in so far as now material, that “The court shall order the trustee to pay all taxes legally due and owing by the bankrupt to the United States, State, county, district, or municipality, in the order of priority as set forth in paragraph (b) hereof. * * * ” The time when such taxes must be due and owing to be so payable is not fixed by the section. As to property taxes, it is clearly established that those which accrue after petition filed and during administration are to be paid. Swarts v. Hammer, 194 U. S. 441, 24 S. Ct. 695, 48 L. Ed. 1060; Dayton v. Stanard, 241 U. S. 588, 36 S. Ct. 695, 60 L. Ed. 1190. In equity receiverships, franchise taxes upon the privilege of existing which accrue during the receivership are likewise to be paid by the receiver. Michigan v. Michigan Trust Co., 286 U. S. 334, 52 S. Ct. 512, 76 L. Ed. 1136; People v. Hopkins (C. C. A.) 18 F.(2d) 731. But in an equity receivership the title to the property remains in the corporation and is merely put into the custody of the receiver, who must of necessity use the owner’s franchise in administering it. In bankruptcy, however, the trustee acquires the title by operation of law, and continued existence of the bankrupt as a corporation is nonessential. In re Century Silk Mills, Inc. (D. C.) 12 F.(2d) 292. So the supposed analogy between the provability of a claim for franchise taxes in an equity receivership and in bankruptcy is not close.
  When this bankrupt was adjudicated, ’it had been in existence as a corporation under its Delaware franchise during 1932 up to April 19th. From this it is argued that the 1932 tax was due and owing within the meaning of section 64a and so provable in accordance with the principles underlying the decisions in New Jersey v. Anderson, 203 U. S. 483, 27 S. Ct. 137, 51 L. Ed. 284, and New York v. Jersawit, 263 U. S. 493, 44 S. Ct. 167, 68 L. Ed; 405. In the second of these two cases, however, the tax held provable was a franchise tax to be paid annually by the corporation in advance on November 1st of each year to be computed “upon the basis of its entire net income for its fiscal or the calendar year next preceding.” The petition was filed on December 22d following the date when the tax was payable in advance. All the facts necessary to be known in order to compute the tax were knowable when the petition was filed. In the Anderson Case the tax for 1903 was based upon the amount of capital stock issued and outstanding on the 1st of January preceding the making of a return the corporation was required to make on or before May 1st. The adjudication was on April 23d. The return was not filed until May 2d, and the tax was not assessed until July 1st. The tax was held legally due and owing although not collectible until after adjudication. But before adjudication all the factors entering into the computation of the tax were knowable. Nothing remained to be done but the filing of a return and the assessment.
  In the instant case the situation is different in a vital respect. The amount of the 1932 tax could not "possibly be determined by any one until January 1, 1933. Not until then could possible changes in the capital structure affecting the amount of the tax be known. The distinction is between the accrual of a liability before petition filed though that liability has not yet ripened into an obligation to pay and the present situation where there was no liability whatever for the taxes on April 19, 1932. The time of the accrual of the obligation to pay rather than the time when the obligation is to be discharged by payment is the controlling feature. New Jersey v. Anderson, supra. See, also, Manhattan Properties, Inc., v. Irving Trust Co., 291 U. S. 320, 54 S. Ct. 385, 78 L. Ed. 824. This corporation continued to exist throughout the' whole taxable year. The tax for that period was entire. New York v. Jersawit, supra. It could not and cannot be computed as of the date of the petition in bankruptcy. When it did become due and owing from the corporation, the title to the property the appellant now seeks to subject to its payment had long since ceased to be in the corporation, but was in the trustee in bankruptcy who had nothing to do with the corporate franchise. It was not an obligation of the bankrupt when the trustee took title to the property, nor did it later become an obligation incurred by the trustee. In re Centfiry Silk Mills, Inc., supra. We therefore conclude that the claim for the 1932 tax was properly expunged because not provable. A fortiori, the claim for the 1933 tax must be treated the same way, for no part of that taxable period had run before the petition in bankruptcy was filed and in othér respects it stands the same.
  Orders affirmed.
instruction: What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
  Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
  In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
  To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
  United States of America,
  Plaintiff, Appellant
  v
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendant, Appellee.
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendants, Cross-appellants
  v
  United States of America.
  Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
  of the Board
  Plaintiff, Appellants,
  v
  United States of America,
  Defendant, Appellee.
  This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
  Your task is to identify the state of the first listed state or local government agency that is an appellant.
choices: not Alabama Alaska Arizona Arkansas California Colorado Connecticut Delaware Florida Georgia Hawaii Idaho Illinois Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Maine Maryland Massachussets Michigan Minnesota Mississippi Missouri Montana Nebraska Nevada New New New New North North Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode South South Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Wisconsin Wyoming Virgin Puerto District Guam not Panama