opinion: Adeline KIRSCHENMANN, Appellant, v. Harry C. WESTOVER, United States Collector of Internal Revenue for the Sixth District of California, Appellee. Henry KIRSCHENMANN, Appellant, v. Harry C. WESTOVER, United States Collector of Internal Revenue for the Sixth District of California, Appellee.
  No. 13736.
  United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
  March 8, 1955.
  Rehearing Denied May 31, 1955.
  Certiorari Denied Oct. 10, 1955.
  See 76 S.Ct. 70.
  Rainey & Blum, Beverly Hills, Cal., for appellant.
  H. Brian Holland, Asst. Atty. Gen., Harry Marselli, Ellis N. Slack, Howard P. Locke, Sp. Assts. to Atty. Gen., Laugh-lin E. Waters, U. S. Atty., Edward R. McHale, Asst. U. S. Atty., Los Angeles, Cal., for appellee.
  Before STEPHENS and FEE, Circuit Judges, and LING, District Judge.
  LING, District Judge.
  Taxpayers are husband and wife. In 1944, the taxable year here in question, and prior thereto, the husband was engaged in farming operations in Kern County, California. Part of the land used in this operation was a quarter section leased from one Margaret P. Osborne, under lease dated September 19, 1940. The lease was for five years, commencing November 1, 1941, at a total rental of $4550. Of this amount $700 was payable each year for the first two years and $1050 each remaining year. During the life of the lease, on August 25, 1943, taxpayers agreed with the lessor-owner to purchase the property for a down payment, of $8000 and a like amount each year for three years thereafter.
  On January 9, 1944, without valuable consideration, taxpayers conveyed their interest in the property to their minor daughter. Prior to this transaction they had discussed with their attorney the incident tax consequences. On February 7, 1944, Edward Kirschenmann, a brother of taxpayer, Henry Kirschenmann, was legally appointed guardian of the daughter’s estate. Two weeks later the guardian leased the property back to taxpayers for a five year term, commencing July . 1944. The lease was a share-crop agreement, under the terms of which in the Fall of 1944 taxpayers paid the guardian $19,412.54 as rental for that year. This represented a substantial part of the amount realized from farming the land. The child took no part in the farming operation and her parents exercised the same control over the property as before; community assets, credit and effort being used in the farming operation. The balance of $24,000 due under the purchase agreement was paid by the guardian with funds from his ward’s estate.
  Parenthetically it may be added, that in December 1943, Edward Kirschen-mann conveyed a quarter section of land to his children and his brother Henry was appointed guardian of their estates. As here, a share-crop lease was given the parents. All parties to both transactions were represented by the same attorney.
  Taxpayers deducted from their 1944 gross community income the amount of $19,412.54 as rental paid. The question for determination is whether this amount was paid as a condition to the continued use of the property for the purposes of their business. The District Court held against taxpayers.
  It is contended that Skemp v. Commissioner, 7 Cir., 168 F.2d 598, and Brown v. Commissioner, 3 Cir., 180 F.2d 926, support taxpayers’ position. We cannot agree. In both of these cases it was held that the rent paid was not unreasonable. Here no like finding was made, nor could such conclusion find support on the record. Taxpayers by the terms of their lease with Mrs. Osborne were obligated to pay only $1050 for the year in question; instead, by their own contrivance, they elected to pay $19,412.54. To say in this situation that such disparity was not the result of a studied attempt to gain a tax advantage would indicate a blindness to reality. It is true, taxpayers divested themselves of title to the property, yet they farmed the land as before, and in effect it was their earning power which formed the basis for the entire transaction, including payment of the purchase price. Tax consequences are determined not from the formal aspect of a transaction, but from the actual substance of a piece of business. What is found here lacks business meaning for tax purposes. This court’s decision in Shaffer Terminals, Inc., v. Commissioner, 9 Cir., 194 F.2d 539, is controlling.
  The instant case involved another issue which was resolved against- taxpayers in the District Court. Originally, the Court’s ruling on this disputed point was challenged here. However, it now appears that, while this appeal was pending, the parties stipulated that the judgment of the District Court on the question was correct. We have not therefore considered the matter.
  Affirmed.
  . Following are excerpts from the testimony of Henry Kirschenmann:
  “Q. Then this lease which you made, which you entered into as lessee from your brother Edward in 1944, was the only lease you have entered into, or entered into in this period on a share-crop basis, is that correct? A. That is right. •h *!• ífc
  “The Court: Hid you have any other similar lease on property where you were raising potatoes—
  “The Witness: No.
  “Q. (By Mr. McHale): Have you ever had any since?
  “The Court: That is all the rest of them were cash leases?
  “The Witness: Yes, Sir.
  “The Court: Go ahead.
  “Q. (By Mr. McHale): Have you ever had any since similar to this? A. No.
  $ * $ * *
  “Q. Could you give us an estimate of the number of acres you were farming in and about that period, (1942-3 — 4), Mr. Kirschenmann? A. Oh, I was farming between 700 and a thousand acres of potatoes through the year.”
  . Sec. 23. Deductions From Gross Income.
  “In computing net income there shall be allowed as deductions:
  “(a) (as amended by Sec. 121(a) of the Revenue Act of 1942, e. 619, 56 Stat. 798) Expenses
  “(1) Trade or Business Expenses.
  “ (A) In General. All the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business, including * * * rentals or other payments required to be made as a condition to the continued use or possession, for purposes of the trade or business, of property to which the taxpayer has not taken or is not taking title or in which he has no equity. * * * " 26 U.S.O. 1946 ed„ § 23.
instruction: What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
  Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
  In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
  To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
  United States of America,
  Plaintiff, Appellant
  v
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendant, Appellee.
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendants, Cross-appellants
  v
  United States of America.
  Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
  of the Board
  Plaintiff, Appellants,
  v
  United States of America,
  Defendant, Appellee.
  This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
  Your task is to identify the state of the first listed state or local government agency that is an appellant.
choices: not Alabama Alaska Arizona Arkansas California Colorado Connecticut Delaware Florida Georgia Hawaii Idaho Illinois Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Maine Maryland Massachussets Michigan Minnesota Mississippi Missouri Montana Nebraska Nevada New New New New North North Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode South South Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Wisconsin Wyoming Virgin Puerto District Guam not Panama