opinion: Harold Lamont OTEY, Appellee, v. Frank X. HOPKINS, Warden of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, Appellant.
  No. 92-2733.
  United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
  Submitted Aug. 4, 1992.
  Decided Aug. 4, 1992.
  James R. Mowbray and Dorothy A. Walker, Lincoln, Neb., argued, for appellant.
  J. Kirk Brown and Donald Andrew Kohtz, Lincoln, Neb., argued, for appellee.
  Before JOHN R. GIBSON, BOWMAN and MAGILL, Circuit Judges.
  JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge.
  Harold Otey is scheduled for execution August 6, 1992, and the district court has stayed execution to permit consideration of a petition for writ of habeas corpus raising new issues. Order of July 30, 1992. A motion to vacate the stay of execution is before us, and we deny the motion.
  Otey’s petition for writ of habeas corpus is directed to the commutation hearing before the Nebraska Board of Pardons conducted in June 1991. The Board of Pardons denied commutation by a vote of two to one. Otey attacked the commutation proceedings in state court. The Nebraska Supreme Court ruled against him in Otey v. State of Nebraska, 240 Neb. 813, 485 N.W.2d 153 (1992), which was filed on May 29, 1992. The Nebraska Supreme Court held that in Nebraska as a matter of law the judicial branch has no jurisdiction to review the granting or denial of clemency in a death sentence case by the Board of Pardons, 485 N.W.2d at 163, and further held that the clemency decision by the Nebraska Board of Pardons did not implicate any interest protected by the due process clause of the federal or state constitutions. Id. at 167.
  The petition claims constitutional violations in that the attorney general participated in conflicting capacities in the Board of Pardons proceedings, acting simultaneously as prosecutor and witness before that Board; sitting as a decisionmaker on the Board; and directing the Nebraska Board of Parole not to make a recommendation to the Nebraska Board of Pardons. The district court denied the state’s motion to dismiss on the ground that Otey’s claims are not properly the subject of a petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988). The court reasoned that a habeas petition may attack executive restraints on liberty, including a parole board’s decision and a decision of the executive branch of government with respect to insanity, citing Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 58, 88 S.Ct. 1549, 20 L.Ed.2d 426 (1968); Harris v. Nel son, 394 U.S. 286, 291, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 1086, 22 L.Ed.2d 281 (1969); Burnside v. White, 760 F.2d 217, 219 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1022, 106 S.Ct. 576, 88 L.Ed.2d 559 (1985); and Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410-12, 106 S.Ct. 2595, 2602-03, 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986). Order of July 30,1992, slip op. at 2-3.
  The district court, in considering the application for stay of execution, concluded that the unusual constitutional issues required more thorough examination than could be given before the scheduled execution date of August 6, not only because the legal issues are new, but because the record is not yet fully developed. Id. at 5-6. The district court stated that it was apparent that an evidentiary hearing may be necessary, that the claims are not frivolous, and under this court’s standard in Mercer v. Armontrout, 864 F.2d 1429, 1431-32 (8th Cir.1988), a stay was required in order to give the necessary careful study to the constitutional issues raised. Order of July 30, 1992, slip op. at 5-6.
  Hopkins’ reliance on Bundy v. Wainwright, 808 F.2d 1410 (11th Cir.1987), with its recitation of the four factors to be considered in granting a stay, 808 F.2d at 1421, is unavailing. The holding in Bundy is directly contrary to Hopkins’ position. Bundy demonstrates that nothing in Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 77 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1983), which deals primarily with stays in the courts of appeal, alters the pleading obligations for habeas cases set out in the rules governing section 2254 cases. 808 F.2d at 1421. Here, the district court has rejected summary dismissal as provided for in Rule 4 of the section 2254 rules, has found the claim is not frivolous, and has ordered the parties to brief the question of whether a hearing is necessary. Order of July 30, 1992, slip op. at 5-6.
  As the issues raised in this case arise from proceedings in June 1991, it is evident that the petition raises a claim that is neither successive (i.e., it has not been raised before), nor abusive (i.e., it does not raise grounds that were available but ignored in an earlier petition). Thus, the concerns expressed in Delo v. Stokes, 495 U.S. 320, 110 S.Ct. 1880, 109 L.Ed.2d 325 (1990), and the cause and prejudice analysis in McCleskey v. Zant, — U.S. -, ---, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 1470-75, 113 L.Ed.2d 517 (1991), are not applicable.
  Hopkins and the dissent argue that Otey’s claims are foreclosed by Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 101 S.Ct. 2460, 69 L.Ed.2d 158 (1981). It is first interesting to note that Hopkins filed no response in the district court within the time allotted by local rules or before the district court entered its order granting the stay now before us. Dumschat was raised only in the motion for reconsideration. Dumschat states that “[a] state-created right can, in some circumstances, beget yet other rights to procedures essential to the realization of the parent right.” 452 U.S. at 463, 101 S.Ct. at 2464. Dumschat dealt with a very limited argument that there was an expectation of actually receiving a commutation and the state had to explain its reasons for denying the commutation. Otey’s argument is far different as it is based on the expectation of receiving a meaningful commutation process, which he argues was denied him by the actions of the Attorney General. The district court order states only that this is a claim that is not frivolous and must be thoughtfully and fully considered. We reject the argument that Dumschat, with its differing facts, requires us to vacate the stay, enter a decision on the merits in favor of Hopkins, and permit execution of Otey.
  As the district court aptly stated, this case involves unusual constitutional issues requiring development of a factual record, and an evidentiary hearing may well be necessary. Order of July 30, 1992, slip op. at 5-6. Because we do not deal with a successive or abusive petition, and the district court has made a clear statement that the claims are not frivolous, a stay is required to fully and diligently consider the issues raised. Mercer, 864 F.2d at 1431-32. The district court set a schedule for the parties to file briefs on August 12 and 19, 1992, to be followed by an August 28, 1992, conference regarding issues and procedures. Slip op. at 6-7. It is evident that the court is giving this new petition expedited consideration. We can anticipate that the experienced district judge will issue a decision with due dispatch.
  To vacate the stay would require summary disposition of issues the district court has held to be not frivolous and to require development of a record. When human life is at stake, we would be derelict in our judicial duty to so rule. Mercer, 864 F.2d at 1431-32.
  The motion to vacate the stay is denied.
  . The Honorable Warren K. Urbom, Senior United States District Judge for the District of Nebraska.
  . Otey’s petition was filed June 16, 1992, and the district court issued its order July 30, 1992. The district court denied a motion for reconsideration on August 3, 1992.
instruction: What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
  Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
  In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
  To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
  United States of America,
  Plaintiff, Appellant
  v
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendant, Appellee.
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendants, Cross-appellants
  v
  United States of America.
  Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
  of the Board
  Plaintiff, Appellants,
  v
  United States of America,
  Defendant, Appellee.
  This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
  Your task is to identify the state of the first listed state or local government agency that is an appellant.
choices: not Alabama Alaska Arizona Arkansas California Colorado Connecticut Delaware Florida Georgia Hawaii Idaho Illinois Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Maine Maryland Massachussets Michigan Minnesota Mississippi Missouri Montana Nebraska Nevada New New New New North North Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode South South Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Wisconsin Wyoming Virgin Puerto District Guam not Panama