opinion: COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS et al. v. UNITED STATES; UNITED STATES v. COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS et al.
  Nos. 4193, 4209.
  Circuit Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
  April 2, 1947.
  Alfred E. LoPresti, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Clarence A. Barnes, Atty. Gen., and John A. Brennan, Chief Counsel, Division of Employment Security, of Boston, Mass., on the brief), for Commonwealth of Mass., intervenor, and Carlton W. Spencer, defendant.
  Norman S. Altman, Sp. Asst. to the Atty. Gen. (Sewall Key, Acting Asst. Atty. Gen., and Helen R. Carloss, Sp. Asst. to the Atty. Gen., and George F. Garrity, U. S. Atty., and Thomas P. O’Connor, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of Boston, Mass., on the brief), for the United States.
  Before DOBIE (by special assignment) MAHONEY and WOODBURY, Circuit Judges.
  MAHONEY, Circuit Judge.
  . This case is here on cross appeals from the judgment of the district court. The question involves the application of Revised Statutes, § 3466 (1898), 31 U.S.C.A. § 191, to payment of competing claims of the United States and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts against an insolvent taxpayer for unemployment compensation taxes under Title IX of the Social Security Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 620, 639, 26 U.S.C.A. Int. Rev.Code, § 1600 et seq., and the Massachusetts Unemployment Act. There is no dispute as to the facts which are briefly as follows: The Somerville Sales & Service, Inc., being insolvent in 1939 made a common law assignment for the benefit of creditors. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue filed with the assignee a claim against the assignor for 1938 federal unemployment compensation taxes under Title IX of the Social Security Act in the sum of $963.08, for 1938 and 1939 federal insurance contributions taxes under Title VIII of said Act, 26 U.S.C.A. Int.Rev.Code, § 1400 et seq., in the sum of $690.05, and for 1939 capital stock tax in the sum of $21. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts filed with the assignee its claim for state unemployment taxes under Massachusetts Unemployment Compensation Act in the sum of $803.72, representing contributions for 1938 and 1939. On October 6, 1939 the assignee paid out of the sum of $1,135.11 which he had realized from the sale of the assets of the assignor $803.72 in full payment of the claim of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the remainder of $331.39 he paid to the Collector of Internal Revenue. This latter sum was credited to Title VIII taxes due for 1938 and there remained unpaid the sum of $1,342.74 with interest. Massachusetts has agreed to pay over the above mentioned $803.72 to the United States if the payment to it was in disregard of the priority of the United States under Rev.Stat. § 3466, and the United States has agreed that if it prevails the judgment shall be limited to $803.72.
  The lower court held that the United States had priority as to its capital stock taxes, its Title VIII taxes, and 10 per cent of its Title IX taxes, but that it could not recover 90 per cent of its Title IX taxes, stating that the taxpayer or his assignee had the alternative right to pay the 90 per cent of his obligation under Title IX to an approved state unemployment fund. It cited Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. United States, 1946, 328 U.S. 8, 66 S.Ct. 841, in support of its decision as to capital stock taxes and Title VIII taxes but said that the Supreme Court had no occasion in that case to consider the problem whether as to the 90 per cent of the amount due for Title IX taxes the statute had not given the taxpayer the option of making payment to a state instead of to the United States.
  Since the lower court handed down its decision in the instant case, the Supreme Court in People of State of Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 67 S.Ct. 340, restated its position as follows: “Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. United States, 328 U.S. 8, 66 S.Ct. 841, held that in circumstances which called into application Rev.Stat. § 3466, 31 U.S.C. § 191, 31 U.S.C.A. § 191, the claims of the United States for federal insurance contributions taxes under Title 8 of the Social Security Act, 49 Stat. 620, 636, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1001 et seq., and for federal unemployment compensation taxes under Title 9 of the Social Security Act, 49 Stat., at page 639, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1101 et seq., had priority over claims of Illinois for taxes under its Unemployment Compensation Act. That decision is controlling, of course, upon the same feature of this case iff
  Under said § 3466 it is stated that where a debtor is insolvent the debts due the United States must be paid first. There is no question but what these are debts due the United States. “The words of Section 3466 are broad and sweeping and, on their face, admit of no exception to the priority of claims of the United States.” United States v. Waddill, Holland & Flinn, Inc., 1945, 323 U.S. 353, 355, 65 S.Ct. 304, 306, 89 L.Ed. 294. It has not been decided that taxes under Title IX of the Social Security Act are an exception which can be read into this statute and we do not think that they are. Nor do we think that § 902 amended by implication said § 3466. Recently the Supreme Court in United States Department of Agriculture v. Remund, 67 S.Ct. 891, 894, has said: “We reiterate what was said in United States v. Emory, 314 U.S. 423, 433, 62 S.Ct. 317, 322, 86 L.Ed. 315, ‘Only the plainest inconsistency would warrant our finding an implied exception to the operation of so clear a command as that of § 3466/ ”
  “We agree that the social security legislation provides a method for accomplishing state and federal unemployment relief systems, integrated in plan, function, and purpose, and that sound state systems are essential to complete success of the Congressional plan. But we cannot agree that Congress thereby intended in effect to amend Section 3466, by making its priority provisions inapplicable to state unemployment tax claims.” Illinois ex rel. vior-don v. United States, supra, 328 U.S. at page 11, 66 S.Ct. at page 843. There is nothing here to show any intention on the part of Congress that only 10 per cent of the taxes under Title IX of the Social Security Act should be collected by the United States from insolvents. The words of the Act do not show such intention and the court has no power to apply what it may deem equitable principles in the distribution of an estate when Congress has formulated the rule that must be applied. In re White Plains Oil Corp., 1941, 287 N.Y. 141, 38 N.E.2d 472.
  The taxpayer was clearly insolvent at the time it made the assignment for the benefit of creditors. The total amount of its assets was $1,135.11 and apart from all other claims filed with the assignee the claim of the United States alone amounted to $1,674.13. The claim for taxes under Title IX was $963.08. The payment of Title VIII taxes and capital stock taxes would leave a balance in the hands of the as-signee of only $424.06. This was clearly insufficient to pay Title IX taxes and the full amount of those taxes had to be paid before any payment could be made to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Under § 902 of the Act the only way in which a taxpayer may obtain a credit against Title IX taxes would be to make actual payment to a state. In this case such a payment could not be made until the United States claim was paid. By paying the United States as required under § 3466 there would be nothing left with which to pay Massachusetts. Hence there is no way by which a credit against Title IX taxes could be obtained.
  The determination by the district court that the question was one of meeting alternative obligations was error. There was no such alternative obligation here. Section 3466 commanded the payment to the United States of debts due it and therefore there was no balance left to meet any state payment with which to obtain such credit.
  The judgment of the District Court -is affirmed as to Title VIII taxes and capital stock taxes and is reversed as to Title IX taxes, and the case is remanded to the District Court .for judgment in conformity with this opinion.
  “Sec. 3466. Whenever any person indebted to the United States is insolvent, or whenever the estate of any deceased debtor, in the hands of the executors or administrators, is insufficient to pay all the debts due from the deceased, the debts due to the United States shall be first satisfied; and the priority established shall extend as well to cases in which, a debtor, not having sufficient property to pay all his debts, makes a voluntary assignment thereof, or in which the estate and effects of an absconding, concealed, or absent debtor are attached by process of law, as to cases in which an act of bankruptcy is committed.”
instruction: What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
  Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
  In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
  To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
  United States of America,
  Plaintiff, Appellant
  v
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendant, Appellee.
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendants, Cross-appellants
  v
  United States of America.
  Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
  of the Board
  Plaintiff, Appellants,
  v
  United States of America,
  Defendant, Appellee.
  This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
  Your task is to identify the state of the first listed state or local government agency that is an appellant.
choices: not Alabama Alaska Arizona Arkansas California Colorado Connecticut Delaware Florida Georgia Hawaii Idaho Illinois Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Maine Maryland Massachussets Michigan Minnesota Mississippi Missouri Montana Nebraska Nevada New New New New North North Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode South South Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Wisconsin Wyoming Virgin Puerto District Guam not Panama