opinion: NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Petitioner, v. DIAMOND STANDARD FUEL CORP., Respondent.
  No. 7702.
  United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
  Jan. 29, 1971.
  Warren M. Davison, Deputy Asst. Gen. Counsel, with whom Arnold Ord-man, Gen. Counsel, Dominick L. Manoli, Associate Gen. Counsel, Marcel Mallet-Prevost, Asst. Gen. Counsel, and Arthur L. Fox II, Atty., Washingon, D. C., were on brief, for petitioner.
  Julius Kirie, Boston, Mass., for respondent.
  Before ALDRICH, Chief Judge, Mc-ENTEE and COFFIN, Circuit Judges.
  PER CURIAM.
  This is the usual petition for enforcement of a Labor Board order. The Board found that the respondent, a New Hampshire trucking concern, violated § 8(a) (1) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1), by coercively interrogating and threatening its employees with regard to their union activities; § 8(a) (3) and (1) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) and (1), by laying off eight employees because they had joined the union; and § 8(a) (5) and (1) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) and (1), by refusing to recognize the union.
  Early in September 1968 the Teamsters’ Union obtained signatures from eleven of respondent’s seventeen truck drivers authorizing it to represent them for the purpose of collective bargaining. On the basis of this action, the union contacted the company on September 13 requesting recognition, which was refused. On September 19 eight of the drivers, known by the company to be union adherents, were laid off, assertedly for lack of available work. Respondent contends that the Board erred in discrediting its witnesses and in believing employee testimony regarding the alleged coercive interrogations and the discriminatory motivation behind its layoff policy. That “questions of credibility are for the Board” is too well established to require further discussion here. N. L. R. B. v. Universal Packaging Corporation, 361 F.2d 384, 388 (1st Cir. 1966).
  Respondent counters Board charges that it was obligated to recognize the union by asserting that (1) the Board’s determination that respondent’s truck drivers constitute an appropriate bargaining unit was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion and (2) the authorization cards were invalid designations of the union. With regard to the bargaining unit, we cannot say that the Board’s omission of respondent’s five garage employees was lacking in rationality or an abuse of its broad discretion to determine appropriate units. S. D. Warren Co. v. N. L. R. B., 353 F.2d 494 (1st Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 958, 86 S.Ct. 1222, 16 L.Ed.2d 300 (1966). As to the cards, they “unambiguously authorized the Union to represent the signing employee for collective bargaining purposes * * * [and made] no reference to elections.” N. L. R. B. v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 583 n. 4, 89 S.Ct. 1918, 1925, 23 L.Ed.2d 547 (1969). There was ample evidence for the hearing examiner’s finding that there had been no discussion about using the cards to obtain an election until after they were signed. There was also ample support for the Board’s decision to certify the union without holding an election on the grounds that the company’s unfair labor practices were so “outrageous” and “pervasive” that “the invocation of traditional remedies affords no guarantee that an election will provide a more accurate index of employee sentiment than the cards.” See N. L. R. B. v. Gissel Packing Co., supra at 613-615, 89 S.Ct. 1918.
  Finally, respondent argues that the trial examiner’s refusal to permit pre-hearing discovery was erroneous in view of N. L. R. B. v. Schill Steel Products, Inc., 408 F.2d 803 (5th Cir. 1969). But that case dealt with the scope of discovery in contempt hearings before the court of appeals and was not intended to apply to proceedings before the Board.
  The order of the Board will be enforced.
instruction: What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. You will be asked a question pertaining to issues that may appear in civil law issues involving government actors. The issue is: "Did the court conclude that it should defer to agency discretion? For example, if the action was committed to agency discretion. Answer the question based on the directionality of the appeals court decision. If the court discussed the issue in its opinion and answered the related question in the affirmative, answer "Yes". If the issue was discussed and the opinion answered the question negatively, answer "No". If the opinion considered the question but gave a mixed answer, supporting the respondent in part and supporting the appellant in part, answer "Mixed answer". If the opinion does not discuss the issue, or notes that a particular issue was raised by one of the litigants but the court dismissed the issue as frivolous or trivial or not worthy of discussion for some other reason, answer "Issue not discussed". If the opinion considered the question but gave a "mixed" answer, supporting the respondent in part and supporting the appellant in part (or if two issues treated separately by the court both fell within the area covered by one question and the court answered one question affirmatively and one negatively), answer "Mixed answer". If the opinion either did not consider or discuss the issue at all or if the opinion indicates that this issue was not worthy of consideration by the court of appeals even though it was discussed by the lower court or was raised in one of the briefs, answer "Issue not discussed".