ILLINOIS v. PERKINS
No. 88-1972.
Argued February 20, 1990
Decided June 4, 1990
Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and White, Blackmun, Stevens, O’Connor, and Scalia, JJ., joined. Brennan, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 300. Marshall, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 303.
Marcia L. Friedl, Assistant Attorney General of Illinois, argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the briefs were Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, Robert J. Ruiz, Solicitor General, and Terence M. Madsen and Jack Donatelli, Assistant Attorneys General.
Paul J. Larkin, Jr., argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Starr, Assistant Attorney General Dennis, and Deputy Solicitor General Bryson.
Dan W. Evers, by appointment of the Court, 493 U. S. 930, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Daniel M. Kirwan.
Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc., et al. by Gregory U. Evans, Daniel B. Hales, George D. Webster, Jack E. Yelverton, Fred E. Inbau, Wayne W. Schmidt, Bernard J. Farber, and James P. Manak; and for the Lincoln Legal Foundation et al. by Joseph A. Morris, Donald D. Bemardi, Fred L. Foreman, Daniel M. Harrod, and Jack E. Yelverton.
John A. Powell, William B. Rubenstein, and Harvey Grossman filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance.
Justice Kennedy
delivered the opinion of the Court.
An undercover government agent was placed in the cell of respondent Perkins, who was incarcerated on charges unrelated to the subject of the agent’s investigation. Respondent made statements that implicated him in the crime that the agent sought to solve. Respondent claims that the statements should be inadmissible because he had not been given Miranda warnings by the agent. We hold that the statements are admissible. Miranda warnings are not required when the suspect is unaware that he is speaking to a law enforcement officer and gives a voluntary statement.
I
In November 1984, Richard Stephenson was murdered in a suburb of East St. Louis, Illinois. The murder remained unsolved until March 1986, when one Donald Charlton told police that he had learned about a homicide from a fellow inmate at the Graham Correctional Facility, where Charlton had been serving a sentence for burglary. The fellow inmate was Lloyd Perkins, who is the respondent here. Charlton told police that, while at Graham, he had befriended respondent, who told him in detail about a murder that respondent had committed in East St. Louis. On hearing Charlton’s account, the police recognized details of the Stephenson murder that were not well known, and so they treated Charlton’s story as a credible one.
By the time the police heard Charlton’s account, respondent had been released from Graham, but police traced him to a jail in Montgomery County, Illinois, where he was being held pending trial on a charge of aggravated battery, unrelated to the Stephenson murder. The police wanted to investigate further respondent’s connection to the Stephenson murder, but feared that the use of an eavesdropping device would prove impracticable and unsafe. They decided instead to place an undercover agent in the cellblock with respondent and Charlton. The plan was for Charlton and undercover agent John Parisi to pose as escapees from a work release program who had been arrested in the course of a burglary. Parisi and Charlton were instructed to engage respondent in casual conversation and report anything he said about the Stephenson murder.
Parisi, using the alias “Vito Bianco,” and Charlton, both clothed in jail garb, were placed in the cellblock with respondent at the Montgomery County jail. The cellblock consisted of 12 separate cells that opened onto a common room. Respondent greeted Charlton who, after a brief conversation with respondent, introduced Parisi by his alias. Parisi told respondent that he “wasn’t going to do any more time” and suggested that the three of them escape. Respondent replied that the Montgomery County jail was “rinky-dink” and that they could “break out.” The trio met in respondent’s cell later that evening, after the other inmates were asleep, to refine their plan. Respondent said that his girlfriend could smuggle in a pistol. Charlton said: “Hey, Pm not a murderer, Pm a burglar. That’s your guys’ profession.” After telling Charlton that he would be responsible for any murder that occurred, Parisi asked respondent if he had ever “done” anybody. Respondent said that he had and proceeded to describe at length the events of the Stephenson murder. Parisi and respondent then engaged in some casual conversation before respondent went to sleep. Parisi did not give respondent Miranda warnings before the conversations.
Respondent was charged with the Stephenson murder. Before trial, he moved to suppress the statements made to Parisi in the jail. The trial court granted the motion to suppress, and the State appealed. The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed, 176 Ill. App. 3d 443, 531 N. E. 2d 141 (1988), holding that Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), prohibits all undercover contacts with incarcerated suspects that are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.
We granted certiorari, 493 U. S. 808 (1989), to decide whether an undercover law enforcement officer must give Miranda warnings to an incarcerated suspect before asking him questions that may elicit an incriminating response. We now reverse.
II
In Miranda v. Arizona, supra, the Court held that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination prohibits admitting statements given by a suspect during “custodial interrogation” without a prior warning. Custodial interrogation means “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody . . . .” Id., at 444. The warning mandated by Miranda was meant to preserve the privilege during “incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere.” Id., at 445. That atmosphere is said to generate “inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.” Id., at 467. “Fidelity to the doctrine announced in Miranda requires that it be enforced strictly, but only in those types of situations in which the concerns that powered the decision are implicated.” Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S. 420, 437 (1984).
Conversations between suspects and undercover agents do not implicate the concerns underlying Miranda. The essential ingredients of a “police-dominated atmosphere” and compulsion are not present when an incarcerated person speaks freely to someone whom he believes to be a fellow inmate. Coercion is determined from the perspective of the suspect. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U. S. 291, 301 (1980); Berkemer v. McCarty, supra, at 442. When a suspect considers himself in the company of cellmates and not officers, the coercive atmosphere is lacking. Miranda, 384 U. S., at 449 (“[T]he ‘principal psychological factor contributing to a successful interrogation is privacy—being alone with the person under interrogation’”); id., at 445. There is no empirical basis for the assumption that a suspect speaking to those whom he assumes are not officers will feel compelled to speak by the fear of reprisal for remaining silent or in the hope of more lenient treatment should he confess.
It is the premise of Miranda that the danger of coercion results from the interaction of custody and official interrogation. We reject the argument that Miranda warnings are required whenever a suspect is in custody in a technical sense and converses with someone who happens to be a government agent. Questioning by captors, who appear to control the suspect’s fate, may create mutually reinforcing pressures that the Court has assumed will weaken the suspect’s will, but where a suspect does not know that he is conversing with a government agent, these pressures do not exist. The state court here mistakenly assumed that because the suspect was in custody, no undercover questioning could take place. When the suspect has no reason to think that the listeners have official power over him, it should not be assumed that his words are motivated by the reaction he expects from his listeners. “[W]hen the agent carries neither badge nor gun and wears not ‘police blue,’ but the same prison gray” as the suspect, there is no “interplay between police interrogation and police custody.” Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah and Miranda: What is “Interrogation”? When Does it Matter?, 67 Geo. L. J. 1, 67, 63 (1978).
Miranda forbids coercion, not mere strategic deception by taking advantage of a suspect’s misplaced trust in one he supposes to be a fellow prisoner. As we recognized in Miranda: “Confessions remain a proper element in law enforcement. Any statement given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences is, of course, admissible in evidence.” 384 U. S., at 478. Ploys to mislead a suspect or lull him into a false sense of security that do not rise to the level of compulsion or coercion to speak are not within Miranda’s concerns. Cf. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U. S. 492, 495-496 (1977) (per curiam); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U. S. 412 (1986) (where police fail to inform suspect of attorney’s efforts to reach him, neither Miranda nor the Fifth Amendment requires suppression of prearraignment confession after voluntary waiver).
Miranda was not meant to protect suspects from boasting about their criminal activities in front of persons whom they believe to be their cellmates. This case is illustrative. Respondent had no reason to feel that undercover agent Parisi had any legal authority to force him to answer questions or that Parisi could affect respondent’s future treatment. Respondent viewed the cellmate-agent as an equal and showed no hint of being intimidated by the atmosphere of the jail. In recounting the details of the Stephenson murder, respondent was motivated solely by the desire to impress his fellow inmates. He spoke at his own peril.
The tactic employed here to elicit a voluntary confession from a suspect does not violate the Self-Incrimination Clause. We held in Hoffa v. United States, 385 U. S. 293 (1966), that placing an undercover agent near a suspect in order to gather incriminating information was permissible under the Fifth Amendment. In Hoffa, while petitioner Hoffa was on trial, he met often with one Partin, who, unbeknownst to Hoffa, was cooperating with law enforcement officials. Partin reported to officials that Hoffa had divulged his attempts to bribe jury members. We approved using Hoffa’s statements at his subsequent trial for jury tampering, on the rationale that “no claim ha[d] been or could [have been] made that [Hoffa’s] incriminating statements were the product of any sort of coercion, legal or factual.” Id., at 304. In addition, we found that the fact that Partin had fooled Hoffa into thinking that Partin was a sympathetic colleague did not affect the volun-tariness of the statements. Ibid. Cf. Oregon v. Mathiason, supra, at 495-496 (officer’s falsely telling suspect that suspect’s fingerprints had been found at crime scene did not render interview “custodial” under Miranda); Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U. S. 731, 739 (1969); Procunier v. Atchley, 400 U. S. 446, 453-454 (1971). The only difference between this case and Hoffa is that the suspect here was incarcerated, but detention, whether or not for the crime in question, does not warrant a presumption that the use of an undercover agent to speak with an incarcerated suspect makes any confession thus obtained involuntary.
Our decision in Mathis v. United States, 391 U. S. 1 (1968), is distinguishable. In Mathis, an inmate in a state prison was interviewed by an Internal Revenue Service agent about possible tax violations. No Miranda warning was given before questioning. The Court held that the suspect’s incriminating statements were not admissible at his subsequent trial on tax fraud charges. The suspect in Mathis was aware that the agent was a Government official, investigating the possibility of noncompliance with the tax laws. The case before us now is different. Where the suspect does not know that he is speaking to a government agent there is no reason to assume the possibility that the suspect might feel coerced. (The bare fact of custody may not in every instance require a warning even when the suspect is aware that he is speaking to an official, but we do not have occasion to explore that issue here.)
This Court’s Sixth Amendment decisions in Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201 (1964), United States v. Henry, 447 U. S. 264 (1980), and Maine v. Moulton, 474 U. S. 159 (1985), also do not avail respondent. We held in those cases that the government may not use an undercover agent to circumvent the Sixth Amendment right to counsel once a suspect has been charged with the crime. After charges have been filed, the Sixth Amendment prevents the government from interfering with the accused’s right to counsel. Moulton, supra, at 176. In the instant case no charges had been filed on the subject of the interrogation, and our Sixth Amendment precedents are not applicable.
Respondent can seek no help from his argument that a bright-line rule for the application of Miranda is desirable. Law enforcement officers will have little difficulty putting into practice our holding that undercover agents need not
give Miranda warnings to incarcerated suspects. The use of undercover agents is a recognized law enforcement technique, often employed in the prison context to detect violence against correctional officials or inmates, as well as for the purposes served here. The interests protected by Miranda are not implicated in these cases, and the warnings are not required to safeguard the constitutional rights of inmates who make voluntary statements to undercover agents.
We hold that an undercover law enforcement officer posing as a fellow inmate need not give Miranda warnings to an incarcerated suspect before asking questions that may elicit an incriminating response. The statements at issue in this case were voluntary, and there is no federal obstacle to their admissibility at trial. We now reverse and remand for proceedings not inconsistent with our opinion.
It is so ordered.
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