PUERTO RICO AQUEDUCT AND SEWER AUTHORITY v. METCALF & EDDY, INC.
No. 91-1010.
Argued November 9, 1992
Decided January 12, 1993
White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Blackmun, O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Blackmun, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 147. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 148.
Richard Taranto argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Perry M. Rosen, Paige E. Reffe, and Michael T. Brady.
Peter W. Sipkins argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Michael J. Wahoske, Paul R. Dieseth, Carol A. Peterson, and Jay A. Garcia-Gregory
Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Ohio et al. by Lee Fisher, Attorney General of Ohio, and Patrick A Devine and Andrew I. Sutter, Assistant Attorneys General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: James H. Evans of Alabama, Grant Woods of Arizona, Winston Bryant of Arkansas, Daniel E. Lungren of California, Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut, Robert A Butterworth of Florida, Michael J. Bowers of Georgia, Elizabeth Barrett-Anderson of Guam, Warren Price III of Hawaii, Larry EchoHawk of Idaho, Roland W. Burris of Illinois, Linley E. Pearson of Indiana, Bonnie J. Campbell of Iowa, Robert I Stephan of Kansas, Chris Gorman of Kentucky, Michael E. Carpenter of Maine, Scott Harshbarger of Massachusetts, Frank J. Kelley of Michigan, Mike Moore of Mississippi, William L. Webster of Missouri, Marc Racicot of Montana, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Robert J. Del Tufo of New Jersey, Tom Udall of New Mexico, Robert Abrams of New York, Lacy H. Thornburg of North Carolina, Nicholas J. Spaeth of North Dakota, Robert C. Naraja of Northern Mariana Islands, Susan Loving of Oklahoma, Charles Crookham of Oregon, Ernest D. Preate, Jr., of Pennsylvania, Jorge E. Perez Diaz of Puerto Rico, James E. O’Neil of Rhode Island, T. Travis Medlock of South Carolina, Mark W. Barnett of South Dakota, Charles W. Burson of Tennessee, Dan Morales of Texas, Paul Van Dam of Utah, Jeffrey L. Amestoy of Vermont, Mary Sue Terry of Virginia, Kenneth Eikenberry of Washington, Mario J. Palumbo of West Virginia, James E. Doyle of Wisconsin, and Joseph B. Meyer of Wyoming; and for the Council of State Governments et al. by Richard Ruda, Michael G. Dzialo, and Clifton S. Elgarten.
Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question before the Court is whether a district court order denying a claim by a State or a state entity to Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court may be appealed under the collateral order doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541 (1949). We conclude that it may.
I
Petitioner, the Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority (PRASA), is “an autonomous government instrumentality” which functions to “provide to the inhabitants of Puerto Rico an adequate drinking water, sanitary sewage service and any other service or facility proper or incidental thereto.” P. R. Laws Ann., Tit. 22, §§ 142,144 (1987). In 1985, PRASA entered into a consent decree with the federal Environmental Protection Agency under which it agreed to upgrade many of its wastewater treatment plants to ensure compliance with the federal Clean Water Act. PRASA subsequently contracted with respondent, a private engineering firm incorporated in Delaware, to assist it with this task. In 1990, PRASA withheld payments on the contract in light of alleged overcharging by respondent. Respondent brought a diversity action in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, alleging breach of contract and damage to its business reputation.
PRASA moved to dismiss on the grounds that it was an “arm of the State,” and that the Eleventh Amendment therefore prohibited the suit. The District Court found that petitioner did not qualify for immunity “because of its ability to raise funds for payment of its contractual obligations which do not affect the Commonwealth’s funds” and denied the motion. App. to Pet. for Cert. A-9. PRASA filed a timely notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit and sought to stay proceedings while the appeal was pending. The court denied the stay and subsequently dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction, 945 F. 2d 10, 14 (1991), concluding that First Circuit precedent barred both States and their agencies from taking an immediate appeal on a claim of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id., at 12 (discussing Libby v. Marshall, 833 F. 2d 402 (CA1 1987)).
In light of the conflict between the decision below and those of the other Courts of Appeals that have considered the issue, we granted certiorari. 503 U. S. 918 (1992).
H — I
Title 28 U. S. C. § 1291 provides for appeal from “final decisions of the district courts.” Appeal is thereby precluded “from any decision which is tentative, informal or incomplete,” as well as from any “fully consummated decisions, where they are but steps towards final judgment in which they will merge.” Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S., at 546. Nevertheless, a judgment that is not the complete and final judgment in a case will be immediately appealable if it
“fall[s] in that small class which finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.” Ibid.
Thus, in Cohen itself, the Court held that appeal could be taken from a district court order denying the defendant’s motion to compel the plaintiffs in a shareholder derivative suit to post a bond. The Court found the order appealable because it “did not make any step toward final disposition of the merits of the case and [would] not be merged in final judgment” and because, after final judgment, it would “be too late effectively to review the present order, and the rights conferred by the [bond] statute, if it is applicable, will have been lost.” Ibid.
The Court has held that orders denying individual officials’ claims of absolute and qualified immunity are among those that fall within the ambit of Cohen. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 731 (1982); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511 (1985). Mitchell bears particularly on the present case. There, the Attorney General of the United States appealed from a District Court order denying his motion to dismiss on grounds of qualified immunity. The Court of Appeals held that the order was not appealable and remanded the case for trial. We reversed, holding that the order denying qualified immunity was a collateral order immediately appealable under Cohen. We found that, absent immediate appeal, the central benefits of qualified immunity — avoiding the costs and general consequences of subjecting public officials to the risks of discovery and trial — would be forfeited, much as the benefit of the bond requirement would have been forfeited in Cohen. “The entitlement is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Mitchell, supra, at 526 (emphasis in original).
Petitioner maintains, and we agree, that the same rationale ought to apply to claims of Eleventh Amendment immunity made by States and state entities possessing a claim to share in that immunity. Under the terms of the Amendment, “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State . . . .” This withdrawal of jurisdiction effectively confers an immunity from suit. Thus, “this Court has consistently held that an unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of another State.” Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 662-663 (1974). Absent waiver, neither a State nor agencies acting under its control may “be subject to suit in federal court.” Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways and Public Transportation, 483 U. S. 468, 480 (1987) (plurality opinion); see also Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U. S. 58, 66 (1989); Cory v. White, 457 U. S. 85, 90-91 (1982); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781 (1978) (per curiam); Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 280 (1977).
Once it is established that a State and its “arms” are, in effect, immune from suit in federal court, it follows that the elements of the Cohen collateral order doctrine are satisfied. “To come within the ‘small class’ of . . . Cohen, the order must [1] conclusively determine the disputed question, [2] resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and [3] be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463, 468 (1978) (footnote omitted). Denials of States’ and state entities’ claims to Eleventh Amendment immunity purport to be conclusive determinations that they have no right not to be sued in federal court. Moreover, a motion by a State or its agents to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment grounds involves a claim to a fundamental constitutional protection, cf. Lauro Lines s.r.l. v. Chasser, 490 U. S. 495, 502-503 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring), whose resolution generally will have no bearing on the merits of the underlying action. Finally, the value to the States of their Eleventh Amendment immunity, like the benefit conferred by qualified immunity to individual officials, is for the most part lost as litigation proceeds past motion practice.
Respondent, following the rationale of the First Circuit in this case and in Libby v. Marshall, 833 F. 2d 402 (1987), maintains that the Eleventh Amendment does not confer immunity from suit, but merely a defense to liability. Were this true, petitioner arguably would not be entitled to avail itself of the collateral order doctrine. See, e. g., Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U. S. 517, 526-527 (1988). Support for this narrow view of the Eleventh Amendment is drawn mainly from Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), under which suits seeking prospective, but not compensatory or other retrospective relief, may be brought against state officials in federal court challenging the constitutionality of official conduct enforcing state law.
The doctrine of Ex parte Young, which ensures that state officials do not employ the Eleventh Amendment as a means of avoiding compliance with federal law, is regarded as carving out a necessary exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity. See, e. g., Green v. Mansour, 474 U. S. 64, 68 (1985). Moreover, the exception is narrow: It applies only to prospective relief, does not permit judgments against state officers declaring that they violated federal law in the past, id., at 73, and has no application in suits against the States and their agencies, which are barred regardless of the relief sought, Cory v. White, supra. Rather than defining the nature of Eleventh Amendment immunity, Young and its progeny render the Amendment wholly inapplicable to a certain class of suits. Such suits are deemed to be against officials and not the States or their agencies, which retain their immunity against all suits in federal court.
More generally, respondent’s claim that the Eleventh Amendment confers only protection from liability misunderstands the role of the Amendment in our system of federalism: “The very object and purpose of the 11th Amendment were to prevent the indignity of subjecting a State to the coercive process of judicial tribunals at the instance of private parties.” In re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443, 505 (1887). The Amendment is rooted in a recognition that the States, although a union, maintain certain attributes of sovereignty, including sovereign immunity. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1, 13 (1890). It thus accords the States the respect owed them as members of the federation. While application of the collateral order doctrine in this type of case is justified in part by a concern that States not be unduly burdened by litigation, its ultimate justification is the importance of ensuring that the States’ dignitary interests can be fully vindicated.
Respondent argues in the alternative that a distinction should be drawn between cases in which the determination of a State or state agency’s claim to Eleventh Amendment immunity is bound up with factual complexities whose resolution requires trial and cases in which it is not. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 30-32; cf. Dube v. State University of New York, 900 F. 2d 587, 594 (CA2 1990) (immediate appeal will lie where immunity can be found as a matter of law), cert. denied, 501 U. S. 1211 (1991). On this view, for example, an order denying a motion to dismiss a suit against a named State would be immediately appealable, whereas the same order, when issued in a suit which presents difficult factual questions as to whether an agency is an “arm of the State,” would not. We see little basis for drawing such a line. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S., at 527-529, and n. 10. In any event, it does not appear to us that the determination of PRASA’s status under the Eleventh Amendment implicates any extraordinary factual difficulty and the issue of its entitlement to immunity can be fully explored in the Court of Appeals on remand.
m
We hold that States and state entities that claim to be “arms of the State” may take advantage of the collateral order doctrine to appeal a district court order denying a claim of Eleventh Amendment immunity. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
As the case comes to us, the law of the First Circuit — that the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is treated as a State for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment, see Ramirez v. Puerto Rico Fire Serv., 715 F. 2d 694, 697 (1983)-is not challenged here, and we express no view on this matter. Because the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal on jurisdictional grounds, it did “not consider the merits of PRASA's Eleventh Amendment defense and [took] no view as to whether PRASA is actually entitled to the claimed immunity.” 945 F. 2d 10, 14, n. 6 (CA1 1991). We likewise express no view on the merits of the immunity claim.
See Dube v. State University of New York, 900 F. 2d 587, 594 (CA2 1990), cert. denied, 501 U. S. 1211 (1991); Coakley v. Welch, 877 F 2d 304, 306 (CA4), cert. denied, 493 U. S. 976 (1989); Chrissy F. v. Mississippi Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 925 F 2d 844, 848-849 (CA5 1991); Kroll v. Board of Trustees of University of Illinois, 934 F. 2d 904, 906 (CA7), cert. denied, 502 U. S. 941 (1991); Barnes v. Missouri, 960 F. 2d 63, 64 (CA8 1992) (per curiam); Durning v. Citibank, N. A., 950 F. 2d 1419, 1422 (CA9 1991); Schopler v. Bliss, 903 F 2d 1373, 1377 (CA11 1990) (per curiam).
The District Court also denied absolute immunity. This order was held appealable by the Court of Appeals and was affirmed, as it was by us. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S., at 520.
The result reached today was largely anticipated by Ex parte New York, 256 U. S. 490 (1921). There, private citizens brought an in rem libel action in Federal District Court against ships chartered and operated by New York State. New York moved to dismiss on the ground that the action was in the nature of an in personam proceeding and was thus barred by the Eleventh Amendment. When the District Court denied the motion, the State applied to the Court for a writ of prohibition. Although noting that the State’s interest could be pressed on appeal, id., at 497, the Court issued the extraordinary writ in order to vindicate fully the "fundamental” constitutional rule that a State may not be sued in federal court without its consent, id., at 497, 503.
For this reason, the First Circuit’s attempt to distinguish Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511 (1985), on the grounds that the States, as compared to individual officials, are better able to bear the burden of litigation, fails. See Libby v. Marshall, 833 F. 2d 402, 406 (1987). The Eleventh Amendment is concerned not only with the States’ ability to withstand suit, but with their privilege not to be sued.
attorney general of the United States, or his office specified state board or department of education city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit state commission, board, committee, or authority county government or county governmental unit, except school district court or judicial district state department or agency governmental employee or job applicant female governmental employee or job applicant minority governmental employee or job applicant minority female governmental employee or job applicant not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable retired or former governmental employee U.S. House of Representatives interstate compact judge state legislature, house, or committee local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact state or U.S. supreme court local school district or board of education U.S. Senate U.S. senator foreign nation or instrumentality state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of state college or university United States State person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime advertising business or agency agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes airline distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked American Medical Association National Railroad Passenger Corp. amusement establishment, or recreational facility arrested person, or pretrial detainee attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association author, copyright holder bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store water transportation, stevedore bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines brewery, distillery broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm construction industry bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle business, corporation buyer, purchaser cable TV car dealer person convicted of crime tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband chemical company child, children, including adopted or illegitimate religious organization, institution, or person private club or facility coal company or coal mine operator computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software consumer, consumer organization creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial defendant debtor real estate developer disabled person or disability benefit claimant distributor person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector drug manufacturer druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan electric equipment manufacturer electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company eleemosynary institution or person environmental organization employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer. farmer, farm worker, or farm organization father female employee or job applicant female movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of fisherman or fishing company food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity franchiser franchisee lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization person who guarantees another's obligations handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be hospital, medical center husband, or ex-husband involuntarily committed mental patient Indian, including Indian tribe or nation insurance company, or surety inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder investor injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related juvenile government contractor holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor magazine male medical or Medicaid claimant medical supply or manufacturing co. racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant minority female employee or job applicant manufacturer management, executive officer, or director, of business entity military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company mother auto manufacturer newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service radio and television network, except cable tv nonprofit organization or business nonresident nuclear power plant or facility owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels shareholders to whom a tender offer is made tender offer oil company, or natural gas producer elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly out of state noncriminal defendant political action committee parent or parents parking lot or service patient of a health professional telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society public interest organization physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee pipe line company package, luggage, container political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official indigent, needy, welfare recipient indigent defendant private person prisoner, inmate of penal institution professional organization, business, or person probationer, or parolee protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer public utility publisher, publishing company radio station racial or ethnic minority person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution realtor journalist, columnist, member of the news media resident restaurant, food vendor retarded person, or mental incompetent retired or former employee railroad private school, college, or university seller or vendor shipper, including importer and exporter shopping center, mall spouse, or former spouse stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder retail business or outlet student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only tenant or lessee theater, studio forest products, lumber, or logging company person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent trucking company, or motor carrier television station union member unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant union, labor organization, or official of veteran voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL) wholesale trade wife, or ex-wife witness, or person under subpoena network slave slave-owner bank of the united states timber company u.s. job applicants or employees Army and Air Force Exchange Service Atomic Energy Commission Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force Department or Secretary of Agriculture Alien Property Custodian Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army Board of Immigration Appeals Bureau of Indian Affairs Bonneville Power Administration Benefits Review Board Civil Aeronautics Board Bureau of the Census Central Intelligence Agency Commodity Futures Trading Commission Department or Secretary of Commerce Comptroller of Currency Consumer Product Safety Commission Civil Rights Commission Civil Service Commission, U.S. Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission Drug Enforcement Agency Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War) Department or Secretary of Energy Department or Secretary of the Interior Department of Justice or Attorney General Department or Secretary of State Department or Secretary of Transportation Department or Secretary of Education U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator Federal Aviation Agency or Administration Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director Federal Bureau of Prisons Farm Credit Administration Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission) Federal Credit Union Administration Food and Drug Administration Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Federal Energy Administration Federal Election Commission Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Federal Housing Administration Federal Home Loan Bank Board Federal Labor Relations Authority Federal Maritime Board Federal Maritime Commission Farmers Home Administration Federal Parole Board Federal Power Commission Federal Railroad Administration Federal Reserve Board of Governors Federal Reserve System Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation Federal Trade Commission Federal Works Administration, or Administrator General Accounting Office Comptroller General General Services Administration Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Interstate Commerce Commission Indian Claims Commission Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of Information Security Oversight Office Department or Secretary of Labor Loyalty Review Board Legal Services Corporation Merit Systems Protection Board Multistate Tax Commission National Aeronautics and Space Administration Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy National Credit Union Administration National Endowment for the Arts National Enforcement Commission National Highway Traffic Safety Administration National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer National Mediation Board National Railroad Adjustment Board Nuclear Regulatory Commission National Security Agency Office of Economic Opportunity Office of Management and Budget Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator Office of Personnel Management Occupational Safety and Health Administration Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission Office of Workers' Compensation Programs Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970) Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation U.S. Public Health Service Postal Rate Commission Provider Reimbursement Review Board Renegotiation Board Railroad Adjustment Board Railroad Retirement Board Subversive Activities Control Board Small Business Administration Securities and Exchange Commission Social Security Administration or Commissioner Selective Service System Department or Secretary of the Treasury Tennessee Valley Authority United States Forest Service United States Parole Commission Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster United States Sentencing Commission Veterans' Administration War Production Board Wage Stabilization Board General Land Office of Commissioners Transportation Security Administration Surface Transportation Board U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp. Reconstruction Finance Corp. Department or Secretary of Homeland Security Unidentifiable International Entity