opinion: PETITE v. UNITED STATES.
  No. 45.
  Decided February 23, 1960.
  Edward Bennett Williams, Raymond W. Bergan and Agnes A. Neill for petitioner.
  Solicitor "General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Wilkey, Wayne. G. Barnett, Beatrice Rosenberg and .Jerome M. Feit for the United States.
  Per Curiam.
  Petitioner was indicted, with others, in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, for conspiring to make false statements to an' agency of the United States at hearings held in Philadelphia and Baltimore under proceedings for the deportation of an alien. Petitioner was also separately indicted for suborning perjury at the Philadelphia hearings. Petitioner’s co-defendants pleaded • guilty to the conspiracy charged. Petitioner went to trial on both indictments, but at the close of the Government’s case he changed his plea to nolo contendere to the conspiracy charge, and the Government dismissed the subornation indictment. He was fined $500 and sentenced to two months’ imprisonment, which he served. 'Petitioner was subsequently indicted in the District of Maryland for suborning' the perjury of two witnesses at the Baltimore hearings. Among the overt acts which, had been relied upon in the Pennsylvania conspiracy indictment was the testimony of these two witnesses. ' Because of this, petitioner .moved to dismiss the Maryland indictment on the ground of double jeopardy, but his motion was denied, 147 F. Supp. 791, and the conviction which resulted was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 262 F. 2d 788.
  Thereupon a petition- for a writ of certiorari was filed with the double jeopardy issue as the single question presented, and certiorari was granted. 360 U. S. 908. The Government-did-not oppose the granting of this petition, but informed the Court that the case was' under consideration by the Department of Justice to determine whether the second prosecution in the District of Maryland was consistent with the sound policy of the Department in discharging its .responsibility for the control of government litigation wholly apart from the question of the legal validity of the claim of double jeopardy.
  In due course the Government filed this motion for an order vacating the judgment below and remanding the case to the United States District Court for the District of Maryland with directions to dismiss the indictment. It did so on the ground that it is the general policy of the Federal Government “that several offenses arising out of a single transaction should be alleged and tried tqgether and should not be made the basis of multiple prosecutions, a policy dictated by considerations both of fairness to defendants and of efficient and orderly law enforcement.” The Solicitor General on behalf of the Government represents this policy as closely related to that against duplicating federal-state prosecutions, which was formally defined by the Attorney General of the United States in a memorandum to the United States Attorneys. (Department of Justice Press Release, Apr. 6,1959.) Counsel for petitioner “joins in and consents” to the Government’s motion.
  The ca'se is remanded to the Court of Appeals to vacate its judgment and to direct the District Court to vacate. its judgment and to dismiss the indictment. In the interest of justice, the Court is clearly empowered thus to dispose of the matter, 28 U. S. C. § 2106, and we do so with due regard for the settled rule that the Court will not “anticipate a question of constitutional law in ádvance of the necessity of deciding it.” Liverpool, New York & Philadelphia S. S. Co. v. Commissioners of Emigration, 113 U. S. 33, 39. By thus disposing of the matter, we are of course not to be understood as remotely intimating in any degree an opinion on the question of double jeopardy sought to be presented by the petition for certiorari.