opinion: Justice Powell
  delivered the opinion of the Court.
  This case involves a facial challenge to the constitutionality of the Texas residency requirement governing minors who wish to attend public free schools while living apart from their parents or guardians.
  I
  Roberto Morales was born in 1969 in McAllen, Texas, and is thus a United States citizen by birth. His parents are Mexican citizens who reside in Reynosa, Mexico. He left Reynosa in 1977 and returned to McAllen to live with his sister, petitioner Oralia Martinez, for the primary purpose of attending school in the McAllen Independent School District. Although Martinez is now his custodian, she is not — and does not desire to become — his guardian. As a result, Morales is not entitled to tuition-free admission to the McAllen schools. Sections 21.031(b) and (c) of the Texas Education Code would require the local school authorities to admit him if he or “his parent, guardian, or the person having lawful control of him” resided in the school district, Tex. Educ. Code Ann. §§ 21.031(b) and (c) (Supp. 1982), but § 21.031(d) denies tuition-free admission for a minor who lives apart from a “parent, guardian, or other person having lawful control of him under an order of a court” if his presence in the school district is “for the primary purpose of attending the public free schools.” Respondent McAllen Independent School District therefore denied Morales’ application for admission in the fall of 1977.
  In December 1977 Martinez, as next friend of Morales, and four other adult custodians of school-age children instituted the present action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas against the Texas Commissioner of Education, the Texas Education Agency, four local School Districts, and various local school officials in those Districts. Plaintiffs initially alleged that § 21.031(d), both on its face and as applied by defendants, violated certain provisions of the Constitution, including the Equal Protection Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Plaintiffs also sought preliminary and permanent injunctive relief.
  The District Court denied a preliminary injunction in August 1978. It found “that the school boards . . . have been more than liberal in finding that certain children are not living away from parents and residing in the school district for the sole purpose of attending school.” App. 20a. The evidence “conclusively” showed “that children living within the school districts with someone other than their parents or legal guardians will be admitted to school if any reason exists for such situation other than that of attending school only.” Ibid, (emphasis in original).
  Plaintiffs subsequently amended the complaint to narrow their claims. They now seek only “a declaration that . . . § 21.031(d) is unconstitutional on its face,” id., at 3a, an injunction prohibiting defendants from denying the children admission to school pursuant to § 21.031(d), restitution of certain tuition payments, costs, and attorney’s fees. App. 3a, 7a. After a hearing on the merits, the District Court granted judgment for the defendants. Arredondo v. Brockette, 482 F. Supp. 212 (1979). The court concluded that § 21.031(d) was justified by the State’s “legitimate interest in protecting and preserving the quality of its educational system and the right of its own bona fide residents to attend state schools on a preferred tuition basis.” 482 F. Supp., at 222. In an appeal by two plaintiffs, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 648 F. 2d 425 (1981). In view of the importance of the issue, we granted certiorari. 457 U. S. 1131 (1982). We now affirm.
  HH
  This Court frequently has considered constitutional challenges to residence requirements. On several occasions the Court has invalidated requirements that condition receipt of a benefit on a minimum period of residence within a jurisdiction, but it always has been careful to distinguish such dura-tional residence requirements from bona fide residence requirements. In Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969), for example, the Court invalidated one-year durational residence requirements that applicants for public assistance benefits were required to satisfy despite the fact that they otherwise had “met the test for residence in their jurisdictions,” id., at 627. Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, stressed that “[t]he residence requirement and the one-year waiting-period requirement are distinct and independent prerequisites for assistance,” id., at 636, and carefully “implied] no view of the validity of waiting-period or residence requirements determining eligibility to vote, eligibility for tuition-free education, to obtain a license to practice a profession, to hunt or fish, and so forth,” id., at 638, n. 21. In Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330 (1972), the Court similarly invalidated Tennessee laws requiring a prospective voter to have been a state resident for one year and a county resident for three months, but it explicitly distinguished these durational residence requirements from bona fide residence requirements, id., at 334, 337, n. 7, 338, 343, 350, n. 20, 351-352. This was not an empty distinction. Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, again emphasized that “States have the power to require that voters be bona fide residents of the relevant political subdivision.” Id., at 343. See also Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U. S. 250, 255, 267 (1974) (invalidating one-year durational residence requirement before an applicant became eligible for public medical assistance, but recognizing validity of appropriately defined and uniformly applied bona fide residence requirements).
  We specifically have approved bona fide residence requirements in the field of public education. The Connecticut statute before us in Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U. S. 441 (1973), for example, was unconstitutional because it created an irrebut-table presumption of nonresidency for state university students whose legal addresses were outside of the State before they applied for admission. The statute violated the Due Process Clause because it in effect classified some bona fide state residents as nonresidents for tuition purposes. But we “fully recognize[d] that a State has a legitimate interest in protecting and preserving . . . the right of its own bona fide residents to attend [its colleges and universities] on a preferential tuition basis.” Id., at 452-453. This “legitimate interest” permits a “State [to] establish such reasonable criteria for in-state status as to make virtually certain that students who are not, in fact, bona fide residents of the State, but who have come there solely for educational purposes, cannot take advantage of the in-state rates.” Id., at 453-454. Last Term, in Plyler v. Doe, 457 U. S. 202 (1982), we reviewed an aspect of Tex. Educ. Code Ann. §21.031 — the statute at issue in this case. Although we invalidated the portion of the statute that excluded undocumented alien children from the public free schools, we recognized the school districts’ right “to apply . . . established criteria for determining residence.” Id., at 229, n. 22. See id., at 240, n. 4 (Powell, J., concurring) (“Of course a school district may require that illegal alien children, like any other children, actually reside in the school district before admitting them to the schools. A requirement of de facto residency, uniformly applied, would not violate any principle of equal protection”).
  A bona fide residence requirement, appropriately defined and uniformly applied, furthers the substantial state interest in assuring that services provided for its residents are enjoyed only by residents. Such a requirement with respect to attendance in public free schools does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It does not burden or penalize the constitutional right of interstate travel, for any person is free to move to a State and to establish residence there. A bona fide residence requirement simply requires that the person does establish residence before demanding the services that are restricted to residents.
  There is a further, independent justification for local residence requirements in the public-school context. As we explained in Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U. S. 717 (1974):
  “No single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local control over the operation of schools; local autonomy has long been thought essential both to the maintenance of community concern and support for public schools and to quality of the educational process. . . . [L]ocal control over the educational process affords citizens an opportunity to participate in decision-making, permits the structuring of school programs to fit local needs, and encourages ‘experimentation, innovation, and a healthy competition for educational excellence.’” Id., at 741-742 (quoting San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 50 (1973)).
  The provision of primary and secondary education, of course, is one of the most important functions of local government. Absent residence requirements, there can be little doubt that the proper planning and operation of the schools would suffer significantly. The State thus has a substantial interest in imposing bona fide residence requirements to maintain the quality of local public schools.
  III
  The central question we must decide here is whether § 21.031(d) is a bona fide residence requirement. Although the meaning may vary according to context, “residence” generally requires both physical presence and an intention to remain. As the Supreme Court of Maine explained over a century ago:
  “When... a person voluntarily takes up his abode in a given place, with intention to remain permanently, or for an indefinite period of time; or, to speak more accurately, when a person takes up his abode in a given place, without any present intention to remove therefrom, such place of abode becomes his residence. . . .” Inhabitants of Warren v. Inhabitants of Thomaston, 43 Me. 406, 418 (1857).
  This classic two-part definition of residence has been recognized as a minimum standard in a wide range of contexts time and time again.
  In Vlandis v. Kline, we approved a more rigorous domicile test as a “reasonable standard for determining the residential status of a student.” 412 U. S., at 454. That standard was described as follows: “ ‘In reviewing a claim of in-state status, the issue becomes essentially one of domicile. In general, the domicile of an individual is his true, fixed and permanent home and place of habitation. It is the place to which, whenever he is absent, he has the intention of returning.’” Ibid. (quoting Opinion of the Attorney General of the State of Connecticut Regarding Non-Resident Tuition, Sept. 6, 1972); cf. n. 6, supra. This standard could not be applied to school-age children in the same way that it was applied to college students. But at the very least, a school district generally would be justified in requiring school-age children or their parents to satisfy the traditional, basic residence criteria— i. e., to live in the district with a bona fide intention of remaining there — before it treated them as residents.
  Section 21.031 is far more generous than this traditional standard. It compels a school district to permit a child such as Morales to attend school without paying tuition if he has a bona fide intention to remain in the school district indefinitely, for he then would have a reason for being there other than his desire to attend school: his intention to make his home in the district. Thus §21.031 grants the benefits of residency to all who satisfy the traditional requirements. The statute goes further and extends these benefits to many children even if they (or their families) do not intend to remain in the district indefinitely. As long as the child is not living in the district for the sole purpose of attending school, he satisfies the statutory test. For example, if a person comes to Texas to work for a year, his children will be eligible for tuition-free admission to the public schools. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 37. Or if a child comes to Texas for six months for health reasons, he would qualify for tuition-free education. See id., at 31. In short, §21.031 grants the benefits of residency to everyone who satisfies the traditional residence definition and to some who legitimately could be classified as nonresidents. Since there is no indication that this extension of the traditional definition has any impermissible basis, we certainly cannot say that § 21.031(d) violates the Constitution.
  IV
  The Constitution permits a State to restrict eligibility for tuition-free education to its bona fide residents. We hold that §21.031 is a bona fide residence requirement that satisfies constitutional standards. The judgment of the Court of Appeals accordingly is
  Affirmed.
  Section 51.02(4) of the Texas Family Code defines “custodian” as “the adult with whom the child resides.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §51.02(4) (1975). “Guardian” is defined as “the person who, under court order, is the guardian of the person of the child or the public or private agency with whom the child has been placed by a court.” § 51.02(3).
  Section 21.031 provides, in relevant part:
  “(b) Every child in this state . . . who is over the age of five years and not over the age of 21 years on the first day of September of the year in which admission is sought shall be permitted to attend the public free schools of the district in which he resides or in which his parent, guardian, or the person having lawful control of him resides at the time he applies for admission.
  “(c) The board of trustees of any public free school district of this state shall admit into the public free schools of the district free of tuition all persons . . . who are over five and not over 21 years of age at the beginning of the scholastic year if such person or his parent, guardian or person having lawful control resides within the school district.
  “(d) In order for a person under the age of 18 years to establish a residence for the purpose of attending the public free schools separate and apart from his parent, guardian, or other person having lawful control of him under an order of a court, it must be established that his presence in the school district is not for the primary purpose of attending the public free schools. The board of trustees shall be responsible for determining whether an applicant for admission is a resident of the school district for purposes of attending the public schools.”
  Although the “special purpose” test was not codified in § 21.031(d) until 1977, it had been a feature of Texas common law since at least 1905. See, e. g., De Leon v. Harlingen Consolidated Independent School District, 552 S. W. 2d 922, 924-925 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977); Tex. Atty. Gen. Op. No. H-63, pp. 2-3 (July 12,1973); Tex. Atty. Gen. Op. No. 0-586, pp. 3-4 (May 25, 1939); 1906-1908 Tex. Atty. Gen. Op. 245, 248 (1905). Before 1905, courts in several States had ruled that a child could not acquire residence for school purposes if his presence in the school district was for the sole purpose of attending school. See, e. g., Yale v. West Middle School District, 59 Conn. 489, 491, 22 A. 295, 296 (1890); State ex rel. School District Board v. Thayer, 74 Wis. 48, 58-59, 41 N. W. 1014, 1017 (1889); Wheeler v. Burrow, 18 Ind. 14, 17 (1862); School District No. 1 v. Bragdon, 23 N. H. 507, 510, 516 (1851).
  Morales attended school in the McAllen School District during the fall, 1978 semester when Texas Rural Legal Aid, Inc., paid his tuition. Bond has been posted to cover subsequent tuition payments.
  The vast majority of the States have some residence requirements governing entitlement to tuition-free public schooling. Many States have statutes substantially similar to § 21.031(d). See, e. g., Ind. Code § 20-8.1-6.1-1 (c) (1982); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 20, § 859(3)(B)(2) (Supp. 1982); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 76, § 6 (West 1982); Mich. Comp. Laws § 380.1148 (Supp. 1981); Ore. Rev. Stat. §332.595(5) (1981).
  In McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Service Comm’n, 424 U. S. 645 (1976) (per curiam), the Court upheld a bona fide continuing-residence requirement. Again, we carefully distinguished this from a durational residence requirement. Id., at 646-647.
  Two years before Vlandis, the Court upheld a domicile requirement for resident tuition rates at the University of Minnesota. Starns v. Malkerson, 401 U. S. 985 (1971), summarily aff’g 326 F. Supp. 234 (Minn. 1970) (three-judge court). The governing regulations declared: “No student is eligible for resident classification in the University . . . unless he has been a bona fide domiciliary of the state for at least a year immediately prior thereto. . . . For University purposes, a student does not acquire a domicile in Minnesota until he has been here for at least a year primarily as a permanent resident and not merely as a student; this involves the probability of his remaining in Minnesota beyond his completion of school.” 326 F. Supp., at 235-236.
  Shortly after Vlandis, we upheld a domicile requirement for resident tuition rates at the University of Washington. Sturgis v. Washington, 414 U. S. 1057, summarily aff’g 368 F. Supp. 38 (WD Wash. 1973) (three-judge court). The relevant statute declared: “The term ‘resident student’ shall mean a student who has had a domicile in the state of Washington for . . . one year . . . and has in fact established a bona fide domicile in this state for other than educational purposes. . . .” 368 F. Supp., at 39, n. 1. “Domicile” was defined as “a person’s true, fixed and permanent home and place of habitation. It is the place where he intends to remain, and to which he expects to return when he leaves without intending to establish a new domicile elsewhere.” Ibid.
  In Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U. S. 250 (1974), we recognized that a one-year residence requirement was consistent with Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969), and Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330 (1972), in the context of higher education — despite its durational aspect. 415 U. S., at 259-260, and nn. 12 and 15.
  A bona fide residence requirement implicates no “suspect” classification, and therefore is not subject to strict scrutiny. Indeed, there is nothing invidiously discriminatory about a bona fide residence requirement if it is uniformly applied. Thus the question is simply whether there is a rational basis for it.
  This view assumes, of course, that the “service” that the State would deny to nonresidents is not a fundamental right protected by the Constitution. A State, for example, may not refuse to provide counsel to an indigent nonresident defendant at a criminal trial where a deprivation of liberty occurs. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25 (1972). As we previously have recognized, however, “[p]ublic education is not a ‘right’ granted to individuals by the Constitution.” Plyler v. Doe, 457 U. S. 202, 221 (1982) (citing San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 35 (1973)).
  The courts below construed § 21.031(d) to apply to children entering a Texas school district not only from other States or countries, but also from other school districts within Texas. 648 F. 2d, at 428; 482 F. Supp., at 222. Thus there are applications of the statute that do not even involve interstate travel, let alone burden or penalize it.
  The Court of Appeals accepted the District Court’s findings on the adverse impact that invalidating § 21.031(d) would have on the quality of education in Texas. 648 F. 2d, at 428-429. The District Court explicitly found:
  “28. Declaring the statute unconstitutional would cause substantial numbers of int[er]-district transfers, which would . . . cause school populations to fluctuate. . . .
  “29. Fluctuating school populations would make it impossible to predict enrollment figures — even on a semester-by-semester basis, causing over- or-under-estimates on teachers, supplies, materials, etc.
  “30. The increased enrollment of students would cause overcrowded classrooms and related facilities; over-large teacher-pupil ratios; expansion of bilingual programs; the purchase of books, equipment, supplies and other customary items of support; all of which would require a substantial increase in the budget of the school districts.” 482 F. Supp., at 215.
  We do not suggest that findings of this degree of specificity are necessary in every case. But they do illustrate the problems that prompt States to adopt regulations such as §21.031.
  We need not decide whether § 21.031(d) is unconstitutional as applied, for plaintiffs limited their complaint to a facial challenge of this statute. See supra, at 325.
  We reject the argument that § 21.031(d) violates the Due Process Clause because it creates an irrebuttable presumption of nonresidence. Brief for Petitioner 46-49; see Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U. S. 441, 446 (1973). Morales easily could rebut any “presumption” of nonresidence if he were, in fact, a resident. See infra, at 332, and n. 15; App. 20a.
  We also find no merit to the argument that § 21.031(d) constitutes an impermissible burden on children who choose to adopt a nontraditional family-living arrangement. Brief for Petitioner 23-24; see Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 506 (1977) (plurality opinion). Unlike the housing ordinance we invalidated in Moore v. East Cleveland, the statute before us imposes residence requirements that are justified by substantial state interests on children who live apart from their parents, § 21.031(d), and on children who live with their parents, §§ 21.031(b) and (c); see Mills v. Bartlett, 377 S. W. 2d 636, 637 (Tex. 1964); Snyder v. Pitts, 150 Tex. 407,412-417, 241 S. W. 2d 136, 139-141 (1951); Whitney v. State, 472 S. W. 2d 524, 525-526 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971); Harrison v. Chesshir, 316 S. W. 2d 909, 915 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958), rev’d on other grounds, 159 Tex. 359, 320 S. W. 2d 814 (1959) (per curiam); Prince v. Inman, 280 S. W. 2d 779, 782 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
  Contrary to the suggestion in the dissent, post, at 337-341, we have said nothing about domicile. The Texas statute, like many similar ones, speaks only in terms of residence. We hold simply that a State may impose bona fide residence requirements for tuition-free admission to its public schools. Our conclusion is supported by the fact that several States have recognized the “intention to remain” requirement in this context. See, e. g., Conn. Gen. Stat. § 10-253(d) (Supp. 1981); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 22-1-102(2)(g) (1973); Op. No. 76-94,1975-1976 Biennial Report of the Atty. Gen. of S. D. 660, 662 (1976); Op. No. 2825,1969-1970 Annual Report & Official Opinions of the Atty. Gen. of S. C. 39, 40 (1970); Op. No. 59-146, 1915-1971 Ariz. Atty. Gen. Reports & Opinions 218, 220 (1959); In re VanCurran, 18 Ed. Dept. Rep. 523, 524 (N. Y. Comm’r Educ. 1979). Cf. n. 13, infra.
  See, e. g., Kiehne v. Atwood, 93 N. M. 657, 662, 604 P. 2d 123, 128 (1979); Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 28 Utah 2d 261, 269-270, 501 P. 2d 266, 272 (1972); Estate of Schoof v. Schoof, 193 Kan. 611, 614, 396 P. 2d 329, 331-332 (1964); Hughes v. Illinois Public Aid Comm’n, 2 Ill. 2d 374, 380,118 N. E. 2d 14,17 (1954); Spratt v. Spratt, 210 La. 370, 371, 27 So. 2d 154,154 (1946); Appeal of Lawrence County in re Forman, 71 S. D. 49, 51, 21 N. W. 2d 57, 58 (1945); Jenkins v. North Shore Dye House, Inc., 277 Mass. 440, 444, 178 N. E. 644, 646 (1931); Thomas v. Warner, 83 Md. 14, 20, 34 A. 830, 831 (1896); Pfoutz v. Comford, 36 Pa. 420, 422 (1860).
  Of course, the “intention to remain” component of the traditional residency standard does not imply an intention never to leave. Given the mobility of people and families in this country, changing a place of residence is commonplace. The standard accommodates that possibility as long as there is a bona fide present intention to remain. See n. 11, supra.
  In most cases, of course, it is the intention of the parent or guardian on behalf of the child that is relevant. See Deterly v. Wells, 53 S. W. 2d 847, 848 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) (minor presumed to lack capacity to form requisite intention necessary to establish separate domicile). But for convenience we speak of the child’s intention.
  Respondents have conceded that “the statute permits any child to attend school in a district in which he is present for the purpose of ‘establishing a home.’” Brief for Respondents 25. But even if §21.031(d) could be read to exclude a child who moves to a school district with the intent of making his home there when the desire to make the new home is motivated solely by the desire to attend school, Martinez does not have standing to raise such a claim. The record shows that Morales does not intend to make his home in McAllen: the District Court found as a fact that “Morales only intends to reside in the McAllen Independent School District until he completes his education.” 482 F. Supp., at 214. He thus fails to satisfy even this most basic criterion of residence.
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