opinion: Justice White
  announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion in which The Chief Justice, Justice O’Connor, and Justice Kennedy join.
  The issue presented by this case is whether § 106(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U. S. C. § 106(c), authorizes a bankruptcy court to issue a money judgment against a State that has not filed a proof of claim in the bankruptcy proceeding.
  Petitioner Martin W. Hoffman is the bankruptcy trustee for Willington Convalescent Home, Inc. (Willington), and Edward Zera in two unrelated Chapter 7 proceedings. On behalf of Willington, he filed an adversarial proceeding in United States Bankruptcy Court — a “turnover” proceeding under 11 U. S. C. § 542(b) — against respondent Connecticut Department of Income Maintenance. Petitioner sought to recover $64,010.24 in payments owed to Willington for services it had rendered during March 1983 under its Medicaid contract with Connecticut. Willington closed in April 1983. At that time, it owed respondent $121,408 for past Medicaid overpayments that Willington had received, but respondent filed no proof of claim in the Chapter 7 proceeding.
  Petitioner likewise filed an adversarial proceeding in United States Bankruptcy Court on behalf of Edward Zera against respondent Connecticut Department of Revenue Services. Zera owed the State of Connecticut unpaid taxes, penalties, and interest, and in the month prior to Zera’s filing for bankruptcy the Revenue Department had issued a tax warrant resulting in a payment of $2,100.62. Petitioner sought to avoid the payment as a preference and recover the amount paid. See 11 U. S. C. § 547(b).
  Respondents moved to dismiss both actions as barred by the Eleventh Amendment. In each case the Bankruptcy Court denied the motions to dismiss, reasoning that Congress in § 106(c) had abrogated the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity from actions under §§ 542(b) and 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code and that Congress had authority to do so under the Bankruptcy Clause of the United States Constitution, Art. I, § 8, cl. 4. Respondents appealed to the United States District Court, and the United States intervened because of the challenge to the constitutionality of § 106. The District Court reversed without reaching the issue of congressional authority. 72 B. R. 1002 (Conn. 1987). The court held that § 106(c), when read with the other provisions of § 106, did not unequivocally abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity.
  The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court. 850 F. 2d 50 (1988). The Court of Appeals concluded that the plain language of § 106(c) abrogates sovereign immunity “only to the extent necessary for the bankruptcy court to determine a state’s rights in the debtor’s estate.” Id., at 55. The section does not, according to the Court of Appeals, abrogate a State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity from recovery of an avoided preferential transfer of money or from a turnover proceeding. The Court of Appeals specifically rejected petitioner’s reliance on the legislative history of § 106(c) because that expression of congressional intent was not contained in the language of the statute as required by Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234, 242 (1985). Because the actions brought by petitioner were not within the scope of § 106(c), the court held that they were barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
  The Second Circuit’s decision conflicts with the decisions of the Third Circuit in Vazquez v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Public Welfare, 788 F. 2d 130, 133, cert. denied, 479 U. S. 936 (1986), and the Seventh Circuit in McVey Trucking, Inc. v. Secretary of State of Illinois, 812 F. 2d 311, 326-327, cert. denied, 484 U. S. 895 (1987). We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict, 488 U. S. 1003 (1989), and we now affirm.
  Section 106 provides as follows:
  “(a) A governmental unit is deemed to have waived sovereign immunity with respect to any claim against such governmental unit that is property of the estate and that arose out of the same transaction or occurrence out of which such governmental unit’s claim arose. -
  “(b) There shall be offset against an allowed claim or interest of a governmental unit any claim against such governmental unit that is property of the estate.
  “(c) Except as provided in subsections (a) and (b) of this section and notwithstanding any assertion of sovereign immunity—
  “(1) a provision of this title that contains ‘creditor,’ ‘entity,’ or ‘governmental unit’ applies to governmental units; and
  “(2) a determination by the court of an issue arising under such a provision binds governmental units.” 11 U. S. C. § 106.
  Neither § 106(a) nor § 106(b) provides a basis for petitioner’s actions here, since respondents did not file a claim in either Chapter 7 proceeding. Instead, petitioner relies on § 106(c), which he asserts subjects “governmental units,” which includes States, 11 U. S. C. § 101(26), to all provisions of the Bankruptcy Code containing any of the “trigger” words in § 106(c)(1). Both the turnover provision, § 542(b), and the preference provision, § 547(b), contain trigger words — “an entity” is required to pay to the trustee a debt that is the property of the estate, and a trustee can under appropriate circumstances avoid the transfer of property to “a creditor.” Therefore, petitioner reasons, those provisions apply to respondents “notwithstanding any assertion of sovereign immunity,” including Eleventh Amendment immunity.
  We disagree. As we have repeatedly stated, to abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court, which the parties do not dispute would otherwise bar these actions, Congress must make its intention “unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.” Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, supra, at 242; see also Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U. S. 223, 227-228 (1989); Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways and Public Transp., 483 U. S. 468, 474 (1987) (plurality opinion). In our view, § 106(c) does not satisfy this standard.
  Initially, the narrow scope of the waivers of sovereign immunity in §§ 106(a) and (b) makes it unlikely that Congress adopted in § 106(c) the broad abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity for which petitioner argues. The language of § 106(a) carefully limits the waiver of sovereign immunity under that provision, requiring that the claim against the governmental unit arise out of the same transaction or occurrence as the governmental unit’s claim. Subsection (b) likewise provides for a narrow waiver of sovereign immunity, with the amount of the offset limited to the value of the governmental unit’s allowed claim. Under petitioner’s interpretation of § 106(c), however, the only limit is the number of provisions of the Bankruptcy Code containing one of the trigger words. With this “limit,” § 106(c) would apply in a scattershot fashion to over 100 Code provisions.
  We believe that § 106(c)(2) operates as a further limitation on the applicability of § 106(c), narrowing the type of relief to which the section applies. Section 106(c)(2) is joined with subsection (c)(1) by the conjunction “and.” It provides that a “determination” by the bankruptcy court of an “issue” “binds governmental units.” This language differs significantly from the wording of §§ 106(a) and (b), both of which use the word “claim,” defined in the Bankruptcy Code as including a “right to payment.” See 11 U. S. C. §101(4)(A). Nothing in § 106(c) provides a similar express authorization for monetary recovery from the States.
  The language of § 106(c)(2) is more indicative of declaratory and injunctive relief than of monetary recovery. The clause echoes the wording of sections of the Code such as §505, which provides that “the court may determine the amount or legality of any tax,” 11 U. S. C. § 505(a)(1), a determination of an issue that obviously should bind the governmental unit but that does not require a monetary recovery from a State. We therefore construe § 106(c) as not authorizing monetary recovery from the States. Under this construction of § 106 (c), a State that files no proof of claim would be bound, like other creditors, by discharge of debts in bankruptcy, including unpaid taxes, see Neavear v. Schweiker, 674 F. 2d 1201, 1204 (CA7 1982); cf. Gwilliam v. United States, 519 F. 2d 407, 410 (CA9 1975), but would not be subjected to monetary recovery.
  We are not persuaded by the. suggestion of petitioner’s amicus that the use of the word “determine” in the jurisdictional provision of the Code, 28 U. S. C. § 157(b)(1) (1982 ed., Supp. V), is to the contrary. Brief for INSLAW, Inc., as Amicus Curiae 10-11. That provision authorizes bankruptcy judges to determine “cases” and “proceedings,” not issues, and provides that the judge may “enter appropriate orders and judgments,” not merely bind the governmental unit by its determinations. Moreover, the construction we give to § 106(c) does not render irrelevant the language of the section that it applies “notwithstanding any assertion of sovereign immunity.” The section applies to the Federal Government as well, see 11 U. S. C. § 101(26) (defining “governmental unit” as including the “United States”), and the language in § 106(c) waives the sovereign immunity of the Federal Government so that the Federal Government is bound by determinations of issues by the bankruptcy courts even when it did not appear and subject itself to the jurisdiction of such courts. See, e. g., Neavear, supra, at 1204.
  Petitioner contends that the language of the sections containing the trigger words supplies the necessary authorization for monetary recovery from the States. This interpretation, however, ignores entirely the limiting language of § 106(c)(2). Indeed, § 106(c), as interpreted by petitioner, would have exactly the same effect if subsection (c)(2) had been totally omitted. “It is our duty ‘to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute,’” United States v. Menasche, 348 U. S. 528, 538-539 (1955) (quoting Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U. S. 147, 152 (1883)), and neither petitioner nor his amicus suggests any effect that their interpretation gives to subsection (c)(2).
  Finally, petitioner’s reliance on the legislative history of § 106(c) is.also misplaced. He points in particular to floor statements to the effect that “section 106(c) permits a trustee or debtor in possession to assert avoiding powers under title 11 against a governmental unit.” See 124 Cong. Rec. 32394 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards); id., at 33993 (statement of Sen. DeConcini). The Government suggests that these statements should be construed as referring only to cases in which the debtor retains a possessory or ownership interest in the property that the trustee seeks to recover, Brief for United States 20, and cites as an example this Court’s decision in United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U. S. 198 (1983) (holding that the Internal Revenue Service could be required to turn over to bankrupt estate tangible property to which debtor retained ownership).
  The weakness in petitioner’s argument is more fundamental, however, as the Second Circuit properly recognized. As we observed in Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U. S., at 230, “[legislative history generally will be irrelevant to a judicial inquiry into whether Congress intended to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment.” If congressional intent is unmistakably clear in the language of the statute, reliance on committee reports and floor statements will be unnecessary, and if it is not, Atascadero will not be satisfied. 491 U. S., at 228-229. Similarly, the attempts of petitioner and his amicus to construe § 106(c) in light of the policies underlying the Bankruptcy Code are unavailing. These arguments are not based in the text of the statute and so, too, are not helpful in determining whether the command of Atascadero is satisfied. See 491 U. S., at 230.
  We hold that in enacting § 106(c) Congress did not abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the States. Therefore, petitioner’s actions in United States Bankruptcy Court under §§ 542(b) and 547(b) of the Code are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Since we hold that Congress did not abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity by enacting § 106 (c), we need not address whether it had the authority to do so under its bankruptcy power. Cf. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U. S. 1 (1989). The judgment of the Second Circuit is affirmed.
  It is so ordered.
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