Mr. Justice Black
delivered the opinion of the Court.
18 U. S. C. § 401 (2) empowers a court of the United States to punish as contempt “Misbehavior of any of its officers in their official transactions . ...” Petitioner, a lawyer, sent a questionnaire to a District of Columbia grand jury. For this, the District Court found petitioner guilty of contempt and fined him $100. 122 F. Supp. 388. In so doing the court held that within the meaning of the statute petitioner was one “of its officers” and that sending the questionnaire was “misbehavior” in an “official transaction.” The Court of Appeals affirmed, Circuit Judge Fahy dissenting. 96 U. S. App. D. C. 30, 223 F. 2d 322. The construction of the statute raised such important questions that we granted certiorari. 350 U. S. 817. A rather detailed statement of the facts, which are not in dispute, will point up the broad scope given the statute in sustaining this conviction.
A District of Columbia grand jury returned an indictment against Ben Gold, charging him with having filed a false non-Communist affidavit in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1001. Petitioner promptly appeared as his attorney. Shortly thereafter the same grand jury summoned two of Mr. Gold’s associates, commanding them to appear and produce documents. Petitioner appeared for them and moved to quash and vacate the subpoenas. On the same day or the next, petitioner mailed from New York identical letters and questionnaires to all members of the grand jury who were employees of the Federal Government. In the letters petitioner told the grand jurors that as Mr. Gold’s attorney he was trying to learn the effect of the Government’s loyalty program on federal employee jurors. Explaining that he wanted no information concerning proceedings or deliberations of the grand jury, he asked the jurors to answer his questions on the ground that it was their duty as citizens “to help enlighten the court on an issue which affects the liberty of a citizen on trial in a criminal case.” All of the questions were directed toward learning whether the government employee jurors might be influenced by bias or fear to indict persons charged with having had some association with the Com- . munist Party. On the basis of these facts, the District Court ordered petitioner to appear and show cause why he should not be adjudged guilty of contempt under 18 U. S. C. §401 (2).
Petitioner appeared and answered the charges. He admitted the facts just stated but denied that his conduct constituted contempt within the meaning of the statute. His answer set out the following additional facts which are not disputed:
Prior to the return of the indictment against Mr. Gold in the District of Columbia, two federal grand juries in New York had investigated this same alleged offense but returned no indictment. Immediately after Mr. Gold was arraigned in the District of Columbia Court, petitioner learned from a roster of the grand jury obtained from the clerk that 13 members of the grand jury — a majority — were government employees. Petitioner decided to make a motion challenging the legal qualifications of the government employee jurors. He concluded that this could be done under Rule 6 (b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, relying in part on this Court’s statement in Dennis v. United States, 339 U. S. 162, 171-172, that “Preservation of the opportunity to prove actual bias is a guarantee of a defendant’s right to an impartial jury.”
Petitioner was also led to believe that it would be necessary to obtain statements from the grand jurors because of the Government’s brief and the court’s holding in Emspak v. United States, 91 U. S. App. D. C. 378, 203 F. 2d 54. There the Government successfully contested Emspak’s efforts to show that federal employee grand jurors were biased and should not have served by arguing that “there is not the slightest indication in the long motion and offer of proof that an attempt has been made to interview a single one of the persons.” The Government also argued there that it was the defendant’s duty to make his own investigation of bias instead of calling on the court to make it for him. The petitioner was also influenced by what had taken place in connection with an investigation of bias of government employees in another case in the District of Columbia. There a district judge had held that the defendant Weinberg was not entitled to a hearing as to bias of government employees as grand jurors unless the defendant had himself first undertaken to contact the jurors to ascertain from them the existence of bias. The district judge had stated that there was “nothing to prevent counsel, if he sees fit, contacting those 15 members [of the grand jury] and inquiring only of one subject, whether or not they had any personal bias toward” the defendant. After this statement counsel for Weinberg had sent a letter and questionnaire to all the government employee members of the grand jury. Petitioner consulted with Weinberg’s lawyers who told him they had sent the letters and questionnaires without the prior knowledge or authority of the district judge, that their action was later made known to him, and that no suggestion of criticism was made either by the judge or by the Government. Petitioner then mailed substantially the same letter and questionnaire sent by Weinberg’s counsel to the government employees on the grand jury that had indicted his client, Gold.
On the basis of the foregoing undisputed facts the district judge found petitioner guilty of contempt. He concluded that petitioner’s act in sending the questionnaires was an impropriety but went on to say: “There seems to be reason to believe respondent may have misconceived the proprieties. What he did was open. There was no opprobrious personal approach to jurors. There is indication respondent may have believed he had a right to propound the questions at the time he did, notwithstanding this Court is of opinion he had not.” 122 F. Supp., at 389.
The contempt section here relied on derives from the Contempt Act of March 2, 1831. 4 Stat. 487. In Nye v. United States, 313 U. S. 33, we reviewed the history of the 1831 Act and found that its purpose was greatly to limit the contempt power of federal courts. For this reason we gave the provision of the Contempt Act then under consideration a narrow construction. Even though we recognized that Nye was guilty of “highly reprehensible” conduct, we held that he could not be punished summarily for contempt but must be “afforded the normal safeguards surrounding criminal prosecutions.” Id., at 52, 53. Some time after the Nye case we considered In re Michael, 326 U. S. 224. There a trustee in bankruptcy had been adjudged guilty of contempt. The Gov-eminent argued that he was guilty of misbehavior as an officer of the court in an official transaction under the same section involved here. Again we pointed out that the 1831 Act “represented a deliberate Congressional purpose drastically to curtail the range of conduct which courts could punish as contempt.” We there construed the Act as embodying a congressional plan to limit the contempt power to “the least possible power adequate to the end proposed.” See Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 231. We added, “The exercise by federal courts of any broader contempt power than this would permit too great inroads on the procedural safeguards of the Bill of Rights, since contempts are summary in their nature, and leave determination of guilt to a judge rather than a jury. It is in this Constitutional setting that we must resolve the issues here raised.” 326 U. S., at 227. We consider the judicial power here in that same setting. Cf. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U. S. 11, 15-16.
Petitioner contends that his conduct was not “misbehavior” within the meaning of the Act, but was a good faith attempt to discharge his duties as counsel for a defendant in a criminal case. We find it unnecessary to decide this but it is not out of place to say that no statute or rule of court specifically prohibits conduct such as petitioner’s. Petitioner also contends that sending the questionnaire was not an “official transaction” within the meaning of the Act. However, if we assumed that a lawyer in ordinary practice is an “official” or “officer” of the court it would be hard to draw any line between “official” and “unofficial” transactions. Indeed there is plausibility in the implication of the Court of Appeals that if lawyers are covered by this section of the Act they are engaged in official transactions whenever engaged in the “practice of the profession.” But we find it unnecessary to decide when a lawyer is engaged in an “official transaction” for we hold that a lawyer is not a court “officer” within the meaning of § 401 (2).
It has been stated many times that lawyers are “officers of the court.” One of the most frequently repeated statements to this effect appears in Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 378. The Court pointed out there, however, that an attorney was not an “officer” within the ordinary meaning of that term. Certainly nothing that was said in Ex parte Garland or in any other case decided by this Court places attorneys in the same category as marshals, bailiffs, court clerks or judges. Unlike these officials a lawyer is engaged in a private profession, important though it be to our system of justice. In general he makes his own decisions, follows his own best judgment, collects his own fees and runs his own business. The word “officer” as it has always been applied to lawyers conveys quite a different meaning from the word “officer” as applied to people serving as officers within the conventional meaning of that term. Cf. Labor Board v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 350 U. S. 264. We see no reason why the category of “officers” subject to summary jurisdiction of a court under § 401 (2) should be expanded beyond the group of persons who serve as conventional court officers and are regularly treated as such in the laws. See 28 U. S. C. §§ 601-963.
There are strong reasons why attorneys should not be considered “officers” under § 401 (2). As we pointed out in the Nye case, the 1831 Act was promptly passed by the Congress after the impeachment proceedings against Judge Peck failed by a senatorial vote of 22 to 21. Judge Peck had sent a lawyer to jail and had taken away his right to practice as punishment for an alleged contempt. The contempt consisted of published criticism of Judge Peck’s opinion in a case in which the convicted lawyer had appeared as counsel; he was also counsel in other pending cases involving similar issues. Those directing the impeachment proceedings, who later brought about the passage of the 1831 Act, expressed deep concern lest lawyers continue to be subjected to summary trials by judges without the safeguards of juries and regular court procedure. Congressman James Buchanan who made the last argument against Judge Peck stated:
“But what is the process in the case of contempts? Without either an information or an indictment, but merely on a simple rule to show cause, drawn up in any form the judge may think proper, a man is put upon his trial for an infamous offence, involving in its punishment the loss both of liberty and property. He is deprived both of petit jury and grand jury, and is tried by an angry adversary prepared to sacrifice him and his rights on the altar of his own vengeance.
“I may be wrong, but I hold it to be the imperative duty of an attorney to protect the interests of his client out of court as well as in court.”
Again Mr. Buchanan said:
“I believe that I have as good a right to the exercise of my profession, as the mechanic has to follow his trade, or the merchant to engage in the pursuits of commerce. . . . The public have almost as deep an interest in the independence of the bar as of the bench.”
Such statements by the same man who reported the 1831 Act to the House of Representatives almost immediately after Judge Peck’s acquittal are completely inconsistent with a purpose to treat lawyers as “officers of the court” subject to summary punishment. We cannot hold that lawyers are subject to the precise kind of summary contempt power that the Act was designedly drawn to bar judges from exercising. Section 2 of that Act made ample provision for punishing corrupt efforts to influence, intimidate or impede juries. And Congress expressly provided that prosecution therefor be by indictment. Substantially the same provision has been a part of our law-ever since. 18 U. S. C. § 1503. See also Fed. Rules Crim. Proc. 7 (a). Of course it does not cover this case because there is no charge that petitioner attempted improperly to influence the jury or violate § 1503 in any other way. Had there been such a charge petitioner would have been entitled to a trial by jury after indictment by grand jury. We hold that a lawyer is not the kind of “officer” who can be summarily tried for contempt under 18 TJ. S. C. § 401 (2). The judgment of the Court of Appeals must therefore be reversed.
Reversed.
Section 401 in its entirety provides:
“A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or imprisonment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none other, as—
“(1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice;
“(2) Misbehavior of any of its officers in their official transactions;
"(3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command.”
For a discussion of the 1831 Act and the narrow limits of the contempt power in general, see Frankfurter and Landis, Power of Congress over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in “Inferior” Federal Courts — A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 1010; Nelles and King, Contempt by Publication in the United States, 28 Col. L. Rev. 401, 525. See also Stansbury, Report of the Trial of James H. Peck (1833).
Illustrations of the confusion and difficulty of courts in explaining what is meant when a lawyer is called an officer of the court may be found in the following cases: Langen v. Borkowski, 188 Wis. 277, 301, 206 N. W. 181, 190; In re Galusha, 184 Cal. 697, 698, 195 P. 406; Sowers v. Wells, 150 Kan. 630, 635, 95 P. 2d 281, 284-285; Bergeron, Petitioner, 220 Mass. 472, 476, 107 N. E. 1007, 1008.
Stansbury, Report of the Trial of James H. Peck (1833), 445, 455.
Id., at 450.
“And be it jurther enacted, That if any person or persons shall, corruptly, or by threats or force, endeavour to influence, intimidate, or impede any juror, witness, or officer, in any court of the United States, in the discharge of his duty, or shall, corruptly, or by threats or force, obstruct, or impede, or endeavour to obstruct or impede, the due administration of justice therein, every person or persons, so offending, shall be liable to prosecution therefor, by indictment, and shall, on conviction thereof, be punished, by fine not exceeding five hundred dollars, or by imprisonment, not exceeding three months, or both, according to the nature and aggravation of the offence.” 4 Stat. 488.
Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wall. 364, requires no different result. The Court there held that an attorney could not be disbarred solely on a showing of a contempt committed before another court. The Court did use broad language there as to the power of courts to punish attorneys as officers of courts for misbehavior in the practice of the profession. The statements in Ex parte Bradley went so far as to say that lawyers became subject to the summary jurisdiction of courts “for the commission of any other act of official or personal dishonesty and oppression.” Id., at 374. However questionable those statements may be, they were not made, as the Court pointed out, with respect to a court’s power to punish contempts. The Court was referring to the generally exercised powers of courts in that day to discipline attorneys. As said by the Court later in Ex parte Robinson, 19 Wall. 505, 512, “The power to disbar an attorney proceeds upon very different grounds” from those which support a court’s power to punish for contempt.
attorney general of the United States, or his office specified state board or department of education city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit state commission, board, committee, or authority county government or county governmental unit, except school district court or judicial district state department or agency governmental employee or job applicant female governmental employee or job applicant minority governmental employee or job applicant minority female governmental employee or job applicant not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable retired or former governmental employee U.S. House of Representatives interstate compact judge state legislature, house, or committee local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact state or U.S. supreme court local school district or board of education U.S. Senate U.S. senator foreign nation or instrumentality state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of state college or university United States State person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime advertising business or agency agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes airline distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked American Medical Association National Railroad Passenger Corp. amusement establishment, or recreational facility arrested person, or pretrial detainee attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association author, copyright holder bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store water transportation, stevedore bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines brewery, distillery broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm construction industry bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle business, corporation buyer, purchaser cable TV car dealer person convicted of crime tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband chemical company child, children, including adopted or illegitimate religious organization, institution, or person private club or facility coal company or coal mine operator computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software consumer, consumer organization creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial defendant debtor real estate developer disabled person or disability benefit claimant distributor person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector drug manufacturer druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan electric equipment manufacturer electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company eleemosynary institution or person environmental organization employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer. farmer, farm worker, or farm organization father female employee or job applicant female movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of fisherman or fishing company food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity franchiser franchisee lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization person who guarantees another's obligations handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be hospital, medical center husband, or ex-husband involuntarily committed mental patient Indian, including Indian tribe or nation insurance company, or surety inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder investor injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related juvenile government contractor holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor magazine male medical or Medicaid claimant medical supply or manufacturing co. racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant minority female employee or job applicant manufacturer management, executive officer, or director, of business entity military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company mother auto manufacturer newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service radio and television network, except cable tv nonprofit organization or business nonresident nuclear power plant or facility owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels shareholders to whom a tender offer is made tender offer oil company, or natural gas producer elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly out of state noncriminal defendant political action committee parent or parents parking lot or service patient of a health professional telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society public interest organization physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee pipe line company package, luggage, container political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official indigent, needy, welfare recipient indigent defendant private person prisoner, inmate of penal institution professional organization, business, or person probationer, or parolee protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer public utility publisher, publishing company radio station racial or ethnic minority person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution realtor journalist, columnist, member of the news media resident restaurant, food vendor retarded person, or mental incompetent retired or former employee railroad private school, college, or university seller or vendor shipper, including importer and exporter shopping center, mall spouse, or former spouse stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder retail business or outlet student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only tenant or lessee theater, studio forest products, lumber, or logging company person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent trucking company, or motor carrier television station union member unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant union, labor organization, or official of veteran voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL) wholesale trade wife, or ex-wife witness, or person under subpoena network slave slave-owner bank of the united states timber company u.s. job applicants or employees Army and Air Force Exchange Service Atomic Energy Commission Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force Department or Secretary of Agriculture Alien Property Custodian Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army Board of Immigration Appeals Bureau of Indian Affairs Bonneville Power Administration Benefits Review Board Civil Aeronautics Board Bureau of the Census Central Intelligence Agency Commodity Futures Trading Commission Department or Secretary of Commerce Comptroller of Currency Consumer Product Safety Commission Civil Rights Commission Civil Service Commission, U.S. Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission Drug Enforcement Agency Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War) Department or Secretary of Energy Department or Secretary of the Interior Department of Justice or Attorney General Department or Secretary of State Department or Secretary of Transportation Department or Secretary of Education U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator Federal Aviation Agency or Administration Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director Federal Bureau of Prisons Farm Credit Administration Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission) Federal Credit Union Administration Food and Drug Administration Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Federal Energy Administration Federal Election Commission Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Federal Housing Administration Federal Home Loan Bank Board Federal Labor Relations Authority Federal Maritime Board Federal Maritime Commission Farmers Home Administration Federal Parole Board Federal Power Commission Federal Railroad Administration Federal Reserve Board of Governors Federal Reserve System Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation Federal Trade Commission Federal Works Administration, or Administrator General Accounting Office Comptroller General General Services Administration Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Interstate Commerce Commission Indian Claims Commission Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of Information Security Oversight Office Department or Secretary of Labor Loyalty Review Board Legal Services Corporation Merit Systems Protection Board Multistate Tax Commission National Aeronautics and Space Administration Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy National Credit Union Administration National Endowment for the Arts National Enforcement Commission National Highway Traffic Safety Administration National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer National Mediation Board National Railroad Adjustment Board Nuclear Regulatory Commission National Security Agency Office of Economic Opportunity Office of Management and Budget Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator Office of Personnel Management Occupational Safety and Health Administration Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission Office of Workers' Compensation Programs Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970) Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation U.S. Public Health Service Postal Rate Commission Provider Reimbursement Review Board Renegotiation Board Railroad Adjustment Board Railroad Retirement Board Subversive Activities Control Board Small Business Administration Securities and Exchange Commission Social Security Administration or Commissioner Selective Service System Department or Secretary of the Treasury Tennessee Valley Authority United States Forest Service United States Parole Commission Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster United States Sentencing Commission Veterans' Administration War Production Board Wage Stabilization Board General Land Office of Commissioners Transportation Security Administration Surface Transportation Board U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp. Reconstruction Finance Corp. Department or Secretary of Homeland Security Unidentifiable International Entity