PER CURIAM.
A death sentence imposed by a Kentucky trial court and affirmed by the Kentucky Supreme Court has been overturned, on habeas corpus review, by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. During the jury selection process, the state trial court excused a juror after concluding he could not give sufficient assurance of neutrality or impartiality in considering whether the death penalty should be imposed. The Court of Appeals, despite the substantial deference it must accord to state-court rulings in federal habeas proceedings, determined that excusing the juror in the circumstances of this case violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. That ruling contravenes controlling precedents from this Court, and it is now necessary to reverse the Court of Appeals by this summary disposition.
Warden Randy White is the petitioner here, and the convicted prisoner, Roger Wheeler, is the respondent.
In October 1997, police in Louisville, Kentucky, found the bodies of Nigel Malone and Nairobi Warfield in the apartment the couple shared. Malone had been stabbed nine times. Warfield had been strangled to death and a pair of scissors stuck out from her neck. She was pregnant. DNA taken from blood at the crime scene matched respondent's. Respondent was charged with the murders.
During voir dire, Juror 638 gave equivocal and inconsistent answers when questioned about whether he could consider voting to impose the death penalty. In response to the judge's questions about his personal beliefs on the death penalty, Juror 638 said, "I'm not sure that I have formed an opinion one way or the other. I believe there are arguments on both sides of the-of it." App. to Pet. for Cert. 126a. When asked by the prosecution about his ability to consider all available penalties, Juror 638 noted he had "never been confronted with that situation in a, in a real-life sense of having to make that kind of determination." Id., at 131a. "So it's difficult for me," he explained, "to judge how I would I guess act, uh." Ibid. The prosecution sought to clarify Juror 638's answer, asking if the juror meant he was "not absolutely certain whether [he] could realistically consider" the death penalty. Id., at 132a. Juror 638 replied, "I think that would be the most accurate way I could answer your question." Ibid. During defense counsel's examination, Juror 638 described himself as "a bit more contemplative on the issue of taking a life and, uh, whether or not we have the right to take that life." Id., at 133a. Later, however, he expressed his belief that he could consider all the penalty options. Id., at 134a.
The prosecution moved to strike Juror 638 for cause based on his inconsistent replies, as illustrated by his statement that he was not absolutely certain he could realistically consider the death penalty. The defense opposed the motion, arguing that Juror 638's answers indicated his ability to consider all the penalty options, despite having some reservations about the death penalty. The judge said that when she was done questioning Juror 638, she wrote in her notes that the juror " 'could consider [the] entire range' " of penalties. Id., at 138a. She further stated that she did not "see him as problematic" at the end of her examination. Ibid . But she also noted that she did not "hear him say that he couldn't realistically consider the death penalty," and reserved ruling on the motion until she could review Juror 638's testimony. Ibid. The next day, after reviewing the relevant testimony, the judge struck Juror 638 for cause. When she announced her decision to excuse the juror, the trial judge stated, "And when I went back and reviewed [the juror's] entire testimony, [the prosecution] concluded with saying, 'Would it be accurate to say that you couldn't, couldn't consider the entire range?' And his response is-I think was, 'I think that would be pretty accurate.' So, I'm going to sustain that one, too." Id., at 139a-140a.
The case proceeded to trial. Respondent was convicted of both murders and sentenced to death. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and the sentence. Wheeler v. Commonwealth, 121 S.W.3d 173, 189 (2003). In considering respondent's challenges to the trial court's excusal of certain jurors for cause, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that the trial judge "appropriately struck for cause those jurors that could not impose the death penalty.... There was no error and the rights of the defendant to a fair trial by a fair and impartial jury ... under both the federal and state constitutions were not violated." Id., at 179.
After exhausting available state postconviction procedures, respondent sought a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 from the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky. He asserted, inter alia, that the Kentucky trial court erred in striking Juror 638 during voir dire on the ground that the juror could not give assurances that he could consider the death penalty as a sentencing option. The District Court dismissed the petition; but a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, granting habeas relief as to respondent's sentence. Wheeler v. Simpson, 779 F.3d 366, 379 (2015). While acknowledging the deferential standard required on federal habeas review of a state conviction, the Court of Appeals held that allowing the exclusion of Juror 638 was an unreasonable application of Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968), Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985), and their progeny. 779 F.3d, at 372-374.
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), habeas relief is authorized if the state court's decision "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). This Court, time and again, has instructed that AEDPA, by setting forth necessary predicates before state-court judgments may be set aside, "erects a formidable barrier to federal habeas relief for prisoners whose claims have been adjudicated in state court." Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. ----, ----, 134 S.Ct. 10, 16, 187 L.Ed.2d 348 (2013). Under § 2254(d)(1), " 'a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.' " White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. ----, ----, 134 S.Ct. 1697, 1702, 188 L.Ed.2d 698 (2014) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103, 131 S.Ct. 770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011) ).
The Court of Appeals was required to apply this deferential standard to the state court's analysis of respondent's juror exclusion claim. In Witherspoon, this Court set forth the rule for juror disqualification in capital cases. Witherspoon recognized that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of an impartial jury confers on capital defendants the right to a jury not "uncommonly willing to condemn a man to die." 391 U.S., at 521, 88 S.Ct. 1770. But the Court with equal clarity has acknowledged the State's "strong interest in having jurors who are able to apply capital punishment within the framework state law prescribes." Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1, 9, 127 S.Ct. 2218, 167 L.Ed.2d 1014 (2007). To ensure the proper balance between these two interests, only "a juror who is substantially impaired in his or her ability to impose the death penalty under the state-law framework can be excused for cause." Ibid. As the Court explained in Witt, a juror may be excused for cause "where the trial judge is left with the definite impression that a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law." 469 U.S., at 425-426, 105 S.Ct. 844.
Reviewing courts owe deference to a trial court's ruling on whether to strike a particular juror "regardless of whether the trial court engages in explicit analysis regarding substantial impairment; even the granting of a motion to excuse for cause constitutes an implicit finding of bias." Uttecht, 551 U.S., at 7, 127 S.Ct. 2218. A trial court's "finding may be upheld even in the absence of clear statements from the juror that he or she is impaired...." Ibid. And where, as here, the federal courts review a state-court ruling under the constraints imposed by AEDPA, the federal court must accord an additional and "independent, high standard" of deference. Id., at 10, 127 S.Ct. 2218. As a result, federal habeas review of a Witherspoon -Witt claim-much like federal habeas review of an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim-must be " ' "doubly deferential." ' " Burt, supra, at ----, 134 S.Ct., at 13 (quoting Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 190, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 179 L.Ed.2d 557 (2011) ).
The Court of Appeals held that the Kentucky Supreme Court unreasonably applied Witherspoon, Witt, and their progeny when it determined that removing Juror 638 for cause was constitutional. 779 F.3d, at 372-374. The Court of Appeals determined Juror 638 "understood the decisions he would face and engaged with them in a thoughtful, honest, and conscientious manner." Id., at 373. In the Court of Appeals' estimation, the trial judge concluded the juror was not qualified only by "misapprehending a single question and answer exchange" between Juror 638 and the prosecution, id., at 374 -the exchange in which Juror 638 stated he was not absolutely certain he could realistically consider the death penalty, id., at 372. According to the Court of Appeals, Juror 638 "agreed he did not know to an absolute certainty whether he could realistically consider the death penalty, but the court proceeded as if he knew he could not ." Ibid . The Court of Appeals further determined that if the trial judge, when reviewing Juror 638's examination, had "properly processed that exchange" between Juror 638 and the prosecution, Juror 638 would not have been excused. Id., at 374.
Both the analysis and the conclusion in the decision under review were incorrect. While the Court of Appeals acknowledged that deference was required under AEDPA, it failed to ask the critical question: Was the Kentucky Supreme Court's decision to affirm the excusal of Juror 638 for cause " 'so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement' "? Woodall, supra, at ----, 134 S.Ct., at 1702 (quoting Harrington, supra, at 103, 131 S.Ct. 770 ).
The Court of Appeals did not properly apply the deference it was required to accord the state-court ruling. A fairminded jurist could readily conclude that the trial judge's exchange with Juror 638 reflected a "diligent and thoughtful voir dire "; that she considered with care the juror's testimony; and that she was fair in the exercise of her "broad discretion" in determining whether the juror was qualified to serve in this capital case. Uttecht, 551 U.S., at 20, 127 S.Ct. 2218. Juror 638's answers during voir dire were at least ambiguous as to whether he would be able to give appropriate consideration to imposing the death penalty. And as this Court made clear in Uttecht, "when there is ambiguity in the prospective juror's statements," the trial court is " 'entitled to resolve it in favor of the State.' " Id., at 7, 127 S.Ct. 2218 (quoting Witt, supra, at 434, 105 S.Ct. 844 ).
The Court of Appeals erred in its assessment of the trial judge's reformulation of an important part of Juror 638's questioning. 779 F.3d, at 372. When excusing the juror the day after the voir dire, the trial judge said that the prosecution had asked whether the juror "couldn't consider the entire range" of penalties. App. to Pet. for Cert. 139a. The prosecution in fact asked if the juror was "not absolutely certain whether [he] could realistically consider" the entire range of penalties. Id., at 132a. The juror's confirmation that he was "not absolutely certain whether [he] could realistically consider" the death penalty, ibid ., was a reasonable basis for the trial judge to conclude that the juror was unable to give that penalty fair consideration. The trial judge's decision to excuse Juror 638 did not violate clearly established federal law by concluding that Juror 638 was not qualified to serve as a member of this capital jury. See Witt, supra, at 424-426, 105 S.Ct. 844. And similarly, the Kentucky Supreme Court's ruling that there was no error is not beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.
The Court of Appeals noted that the deference toward trial courts recognized in Uttecht "was largely premised on the trial judge's ability to 'observe the demeanor of' " the juror. 779 F.3d, at 373 (quoting 551 U.S., at 17, 127 S.Ct. 2218 ). It concluded that deference to the trial court here supported habeas relief, because the trial judge's "initial assessment of [the juror's] answers and demeanor" did not lead her to immediately strike Juror 638 for cause. 779 F.3d, at 373-374.
The Court of Appeals' conclusion conflicts with the meaning and holding of Uttecht and with a common-sense understanding of the jury selection process. Nothing in Uttecht limits the trial court to evaluating demeanor alone and not the substance of a juror's response. And the implicit suggestion that a trial judge is entitled to less deference for having deliberated after her initial ruling is wrong. In the ordinary case the conclusion should be quite the opposite. It is true that a trial court's contemporaneous assessment of a juror's demeanor, and its bearing on how to interpret or understand the juror's responses, are entitled to substantial deference; but a trial court ruling is likewise entitled to deference when made after a careful review of a formal transcript or recording. If the trial judge chooses to reflect and deliberate further, as this trial judge did after the proceedings recessed for the day, that is not to be faulted; it is to be commended.
This is not a case where "the record discloses no basis for a finding of substantial impairment." Uttecht, supra, at 20, 127 S.Ct. 2218. The two federal judges in the majority below might have reached a different conclusion had they been presiding over this voir dire . But simple disagreement does not overcome the two layers of deference owed by a federal habeas court in this context.
* * *
The Kentucky Supreme Court was not unreasonable in its application of clearly established federal law when it concluded that the exclusion of Juror 638 did not violate the Sixth Amendment. Given this conclusion, there is no need to consider petitioner's further contention that, if there were an error by the trial court in excluding the juror, it should be subject to harmless-error analysis. And this Court does not review the other rulings of the Court of Appeals that are not addressed in this opinion.
As a final matter, this Court again advises the Court of Appeals that the provisions of AEDPA apply with full force even when reviewing a conviction and sentence imposing the death penalty. See, e.g., Parker v. Matthews, 567 U.S. ----, 132 S.Ct. 2148, 183 L.Ed.2d 32 (2012) (per curiam ); Bobby v. Dixon, 565 U.S. ----, 132 S.Ct. 26, 181 L.Ed.2d 328 (2011) (per curiam ); Bobby v. Mitts, 563 U.S. 395, 131 S.Ct. 1762, 179 L.Ed.2d 819 (2011) (per curiam ); Bobby v. Van Hook, 558 U.S. 4, 130 S.Ct. 13, 175 L.Ed.2d 255 (2009) (per curiam ).
The petition for certiorari and respondent's motion to proceed in forma pauperis are granted. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered .
attorney general of the United States, or his office specified state board or department of education city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit state commission, board, committee, or authority county government or county governmental unit, except school district court or judicial district state department or agency governmental employee or job applicant female governmental employee or job applicant minority governmental employee or job applicant minority female governmental employee or job applicant not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable retired or former governmental employee U.S. House of Representatives interstate compact judge state legislature, house, or committee local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact state or U.S. supreme court local school district or board of education U.S. Senate U.S. senator foreign nation or instrumentality state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of state college or university United States State person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime advertising business or agency agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes airline distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked American Medical Association National Railroad Passenger Corp. amusement establishment, or recreational facility arrested person, or pretrial detainee attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association author, copyright holder bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store water transportation, stevedore bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines brewery, distillery broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm construction industry bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle business, corporation buyer, purchaser cable TV car dealer person convicted of crime tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband chemical company child, children, including adopted or illegitimate religious organization, institution, or person private club or facility coal company or coal mine operator computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software consumer, consumer organization creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial defendant debtor real estate developer disabled person or disability benefit claimant distributor person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector drug manufacturer druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan electric equipment manufacturer electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company eleemosynary institution or person environmental organization employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer. farmer, farm worker, or farm organization father female employee or job applicant female movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of fisherman or fishing company food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity franchiser franchisee lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization person who guarantees another's obligations handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be hospital, medical center husband, or ex-husband involuntarily committed mental patient Indian, including Indian tribe or nation insurance company, or surety inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder investor injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related juvenile government contractor holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor magazine male medical or Medicaid claimant medical supply or manufacturing co. racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant minority female employee or job applicant manufacturer management, executive officer, or director, of business entity military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company mother auto manufacturer newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service radio and television network, except cable tv nonprofit organization or business nonresident nuclear power plant or facility owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels shareholders to whom a tender offer is made tender offer oil company, or natural gas producer elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly out of state noncriminal defendant political action committee parent or parents parking lot or service patient of a health professional telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society public interest organization physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee pipe line company package, luggage, container political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official indigent, needy, welfare recipient indigent defendant private person prisoner, inmate of penal institution professional organization, business, or person probationer, or parolee protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer public utility publisher, publishing company radio station racial or ethnic minority person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution realtor journalist, columnist, member of the news media resident restaurant, food vendor retarded person, or mental incompetent retired or former employee railroad private school, college, or university seller or vendor shipper, including importer and exporter shopping center, mall spouse, or former spouse stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder retail business or outlet student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only tenant or lessee theater, studio forest products, lumber, or logging company person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent trucking company, or motor carrier television station union member unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant union, labor organization, or official of veteran voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL) wholesale trade wife, or ex-wife witness, or person under subpoena network slave slave-owner bank of the united states timber company u.s. job applicants or employees Army and Air Force Exchange Service Atomic Energy Commission Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force Department or Secretary of Agriculture Alien Property Custodian Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army Board of Immigration Appeals Bureau of Indian Affairs Bonneville Power Administration Benefits Review Board Civil Aeronautics Board Bureau of the Census Central Intelligence Agency Commodity Futures Trading Commission Department or Secretary of Commerce Comptroller of Currency Consumer Product Safety Commission Civil Rights Commission Civil Service Commission, U.S. Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission Drug Enforcement Agency Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War) Department or Secretary of Energy Department or Secretary of the Interior Department of Justice or Attorney General Department or Secretary of State Department or Secretary of Transportation Department or Secretary of Education U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator Federal Aviation Agency or Administration Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director Federal Bureau of Prisons Farm Credit Administration Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission) Federal Credit Union Administration Food and Drug Administration Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Federal Energy Administration Federal Election Commission Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Federal Housing Administration Federal Home Loan Bank Board Federal Labor Relations Authority Federal Maritime Board Federal Maritime Commission Farmers Home Administration Federal Parole Board Federal Power Commission Federal Railroad Administration Federal Reserve Board of Governors Federal Reserve System Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation Federal Trade Commission Federal Works Administration, or Administrator General Accounting Office Comptroller General General Services Administration Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Interstate Commerce Commission Indian Claims Commission Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of Information Security Oversight Office Department or Secretary of Labor Loyalty Review Board Legal Services Corporation Merit Systems Protection Board Multistate Tax Commission National Aeronautics and Space Administration Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy National Credit Union Administration National Endowment for the Arts National Enforcement Commission National Highway Traffic Safety Administration National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer National Mediation Board National Railroad Adjustment Board Nuclear Regulatory Commission National Security Agency Office of Economic Opportunity Office of Management and Budget Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator Office of Personnel Management Occupational Safety and Health Administration Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission Office of Workers' Compensation Programs Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970) Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation U.S. Public Health Service Postal Rate Commission Provider Reimbursement Review Board Renegotiation Board Railroad Adjustment Board Railroad Retirement Board Subversive Activities Control Board Small Business Administration Securities and Exchange Commission Social Security Administration or Commissioner Selective Service System Department or Secretary of the Treasury Tennessee Valley Authority United States Forest Service United States Parole Commission Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster United States Sentencing Commission Veterans' Administration War Production Board Wage Stabilization Board General Land Office of Commissioners Transportation Security Administration Surface Transportation Board U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp. Reconstruction Finance Corp. Department or Secretary of Homeland Security Unidentifiable International Entity