opinion: UNITED STATES v. HENRY
  No. 79-121.
  Argued January 16, 1980
  Decided June 16, 1980
  Burger, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BreNNAN, Stewart, Marshall, Powell, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Powell, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 275. Blackmun, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which White, J., joined, post, p. 277. RehNquist, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 289.
  Deputy Solicitor General Frey argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General McCree, Assistant Attorney General Heymann, and Edwin S. Kneedler.
  Michael E. Geltner argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Larry J. Ritchie and William W. Greenhalgh.
  Me. Chief Justice Burgee
  delivered the opinion of the Court.
  We granted certiorari to consider whether respondent’s Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel was violated by the admission at trial of incriminating statements made by respondent to his cellmate, an undisclosed Government informant, after indictment and while in custody. 444 U. S. 824 (1979).
  I
  The Janaf Branch of the United Virginia Bank/Seaboard National in Norfolk, Va., was robbed in August 1972. Witnesses saw two men wearing masks and carrying guns enter the bank while a third man waited in the car. No witnesses were able to identify respondent Henry as one of the participants. About an hour after the robbery, the getaway car was discovered. Inside was found a rent receipt signed by one “Allen It. Norris” and a lease, also sighed by Norris, for a house in Norfolk. Two men, who were subsequently convicted of participating in the robbery, were arrested at the rented house. Discovered with them were the proceeds of the robbery and the guns and masks used by the gunmen.
  Government agents traced the rent receipt to Henry; on the basis of this information, Henry was arrested in Atlanta, Ga., in November 1972. Two weeks later he was indicted for armed robbery under 18 U. S. C. §§2113 (a) and (d). He was held pending trial in the Norfolk city jail. Counsel was appointed on November 27.
  On November 21, 1972, shortly after Henry was incarcerated, Government agents working on the Janaf robbery contacted one Nichols, an inmate at the Norfolk city jail, who for some time prior to this meeting had been engaged to provide confidential information to the Federal Bureau of Investigation as a paid informant. Nichols was then serving a sentence on local forgery charges. The record does not disclose whether the agent contacted Nichols specifically to acquire information about Henry or the Janaf robbery.
  Nichols informed the agent that he was housed in the same cellbloclc with several federal prisoners awaiting trial, including Henry. The agent told him to be alert to any statements made by the federal prisoners, but not to initiate any conversation with or question Henry regarding the bank robbery. In early December, after Nichols had been released from jail, the agent again contacted Nichols, who reported that he and Henry had engaged in conversation and that Henry had told him about the robbery of the Janaf bank. Nichols was paid for furnishing the information.
  When Henry was tried in March 1973, an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation testified concerning the events surrounding the discovery of the rental slip and the evidence uncovered at the rented house. Other witnesses also connected Henry to the rented house, including the rental agent who positively identified Henry as the “Allen R. Norris” who had rented the house and had taken the rental receipt described earlier. A neighbor testified that prior to the robbery she saw Henry at the rented house with John Luck, one of the two men who had by the time of Henry’s trial been convicted for the robbery. In addition, palm prints found on the lease agreement matched those of Henry.
  Nichols testified at trial that he had “an opportunity to have some conversations with Mr. Henry while he was in the jail,” and that Henry told him that on several occasions he had gone to the Janaf Branch to see which employees opened the vault. Nichols also testified that Henry described to him the details of the robbery and stated that the only evidence connecting him to the robbery was the rental receipt. The jury was not informed that Nichols was a paid Government informant.
  On the basis of this testimony, Henry was convicted of bank robbery and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 25 years. On appeal, he raised no Sixth Amendment claims. His conviction was affirmed, judgt. order reported at 483 F. 2d 1401 (CA4 1973), and his petition to this Court for a writ of cer-tiorari was denied. 421 U. S. 915 (1975).
  On August 28, 1975, Henry moved to vacate his sentence pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2255 At this stage, he stated that he had just learned that Nichols was a paid Government informant and alleged that he had been intentionally placed in the same cell with Nichols so that Nichols could secure information about the robbery. Thus, Henry contended that the introduction of Nichols’ testimony violated his Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel. The District Court denied the motion without a hearing. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed and remanded for an evidentiary inquiry into “whether the witness [Nichols] was acting as a government agent during his interviews with Henry.”
  On remand, the District Court requested affidavits from the Government agents. An affidavit was submitted describing the agent’s relationship with Nichols and relating the following conversation:
  “I recall telling Nichols at this time to be alert to any statements made by these individuals [the federal prisoners] regarding the charges against them. I specifically recall telling Nichols that he was not to question Henry or these individuals about the charges against them, however, if they engaged him in conversation or talked in front of him, he was requested to pay attention to their statements. I recall telling Nichols not to initiate any conversations with Henry regarding the bank robbery charges against Henry, but that if Henry initiated the conversations with Nichols, I requested Nichols to pay attention to the information furnished by Henry.”
  The agent’s affidavit also stated that he never requested anyone affiliated with the Norfolk city jail to place Nichols in the same cell with Henry.
  The District Court again denied Henry’s § 2255 motion, concluding that Nichols’ testimony at trial did not violate Henry’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the actions of the Government impaired the Sixth Amendment rights of the defendant under Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201 (1964). The court noted that Nichols had engaged in conversation with Henry and concluded that if by association, by general conversation, or both, Nichols had developed a relationship of trust and confidence with Henry such that Henry revealed incriminating information, this constituted interference with the right to the assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. 590 F. 2d 544 (1978).
  II
  This Court has scrutinized postindictment confrontations between Government agents and the accused to determine whether they are “critical stages” of the prosecution at which the Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel attaches. See, e. g., United States v. Ash, 413 U. S. 300 (1973); United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218 (1967). The present case involves incriminating statements made by the accused to an undisclosed and undercover Government informant while in custody and after indictment. The Government characterizes Henry’s incriminating statements as voluntary and not the result of any affirmative conduct on the part of Government agents to elicit evidence. From this, the Government argues that Henry’s rights were not violated, even assuming the Sixth Amendment applies to such surreptitious confrontations; in short, it is contended that the Government has not interfered with Henry’s right to counsel.
  This Court first applied the Sixth Amendment to postindictment communications between the accused and agents of the Government in Massiah v. United States, supra. There, after the accused had been charged, he made incriminating statements to his codefendant, who was acting as an agent of the Government. In reversing the conviction, the Court held that the accused was denied “the basic protections of [the Sixth Amendment] when there was used against him at his trial evidence of his own incriminating words, which federal agents had deliberately elicted from him.” Id., at 206. The Massiah holding rests squarely on interference with his right to counsel.
  The question here is whether under the facts of this case a Government agent “deliberately elicited” incriminating statements from Henry within the meaning of Massiah. Three factors are important. First, Nichols was acting under instructions as a paid informant for the Government; second, Nichols was ostensibly no more than a fellow inmate of Henry; and third, Henry was in custody and under indictment at the time he was engaged in conversation by Nichols.
  The Court of Appeals viewed the record as showing that Nichols deliberately used his position to secure incriminating information from Henry when counsel was not present and held that conduct attributable to the Government. Nichols had been a paid Government informant for more than a year; moreover, the FBI agent was aware that Nichols had access to Henry and would be able to engage him in conversations without arousing Henry’s suspicion. The arrangement between Nichols and the agent was on a contingent-fee basis; Nichols was to be paid only if he produced useful information. This combination of circumstances is sufficient to support the Court of Appeals’ determination. Even if the agent’s statement that he did not intend that Nichols would take affirmative steps to secure incriminating information is accepted, he must have known that such propinquity likely would lead' to that result.
  The Government argues that the federal agents instructed Nichols not to question Henry about the robbery. Yet according to his own testimony, Nichols was not a passive listener; rather, he had “some conversations with Mr. Henry” while he was in jail and Henry’s incriminatory statements were “the product of this conversation.” While affirmative interrogation, absent waiver, would certainly satisfy Massiah, we are not persuaded, as the Government contends, that Brewer v. Williams, 430 U. S. 387 (1977), modified Massiah’s “deliberately elicited” test., See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U. S. 291, 300, n. 4 (1980). In Massiah, no inquiry was made as to whether Massiah or his codefendant first raised the subject of the crime under investigation.
  It is quite a different matter when the Government uses undercover agents to obtain incriminating statements from persons not in custody but suspected of criminal activity prior to the time charges are filed. In Hoffa v. United States, 385 U. S. 293, 302 (1966), for example, this Court held that “no interest legitimately protected by the Fourth Amendment is involved” because “the Fourth Amendment [does not protect] a wrongdoer’s misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it.” See also United States v. White, 401 U. S. 745 (1971). Similarly, the Fifth Amendment has been held not to be implicated by the use of undercover Government agents before charges are filed because of the absence of the potential for compulsion. See Hoffa v. United States, swpra, at 303-304. But the Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims made in those cases are not relevant to the inquiry under the Sixth Amendment here — whether the Government has interfered with the right to counsel of the accused by “deliberately eliciting” incriminating statements. Our holding today does not modify White or Hoffa.
  It is undisputed that Henry was unaware of Nichols’ role as a Government informant. The Government argues that this Court should apply a less rigorous standard under the Sixth Amendment where the accused is prompted by an undisclosed undercover informant than where the accused is speaking in the hearing of persons he knows to be Government officers. That line of argument, however, seeks to infuse Fifth Amendment concerns against compelled self-incrimination into the Sixth Amendment protection of the right to the assistance of counsel. An accused speaking to a known Government agent is typically aware that his statements may be used against him. The adversary positions at that stage are well established; the parties are then “arm’s-length” adversaries.
  When the accused is in the company of a fellow inmate who is acting by prearrangement as a Government agent, the same cannot be said. Conversation stimulated in such circumstances may elicit information that an accused would not intentionally reveal to persons known to be Government agents. Indeed, the Massiah, Court noted that if the Sixth Amendment “is to have any efficacy it must apply to indirect and surreptitious interrogations as well as those conducted in the jailhouse.” The Court pointedly observed that Massiah was more seriously imposed upon because he did not know that his codefendant was a Government agent. 377 U. S., at 206.
  Moreover, the concept of a knowing and voluntary waiver of Sixth Amendment rights does not apply in the context of communications with an undisclosed undercover informant acting for the Government. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 (1938). In that setting, Henry, being unaware that Nichols was a Government agent expressly commissioned to secure evidence, cannot be held to have waived his right to. the assistance of counsel.
  Finally, Henry’s incarceration at the time he was engaged in conversation by Nichols is also a relevant factor. As a ground for imposing the prophylactic requirements in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 467 (1966), this Court noted the powerful psychological inducements to reach for aid when a person is in confinement. See also id., at 448-454. While the concern in Miranda was limited to custodial police interrogation, the mere fact of custody imposes pressures on the accused; confinement may bring into play subtle influences that will make him particularly susceptible to the ploys of undercover Government agents. The Court of Appeals determined that on this record the incriminating conversations between Henry and Nichols were facilitated by Nichols’ conduct and apparent status as a person sharing a common plight. That Nichols had managed to gain the confidence of Henry, as the Court of Appeals determined, is confirmed by Henry’s request that Nichols assist him in his escape plans when Nichols was released from confinement.
  Under the strictures of the Court’s holdings on the exclusion of evidence, we conclude that the Court of Appeals did not err in holding that Henry’s statements to Nichols should not have been admitted at trial. By intentionally creating a situation likely to induce Henry to make incriminating statements without the assistance of counsel, the Government violated Henry’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel. This is not a case where, in Justice Cardozo’s words, “the constable . . . blundered,” People v. DeFore, 242 N. Y. 13, 21, 150 N. E. 585, 587 (1926); rather, it is one where the “constable” planned an impermissible interference with the right to the assistance of counsel.
  The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is
  Affirmed.
  The record does disclose that on November 21, 1972, the same day the agent contacted Nichols, the agent’s supervisor interrogated Henry at the jail. After denying participation in the robbery, Henry exercised his right to terminate the interview.
  Henry also asked Nichols if he would help him once Nichols was released. Henry requested Nichols to go to Virginia Beach and contact a woman there. He prepared instructions on how to find the woman and wanted Nichols to tell her to visit Henry in the Norfolk jail. He explained that he wanted to ask the woman to carry a message to his partner, who was incarcerated in the Portsmouth city jail. Henry also gave Nichols a telephone number and asked him to contact an individual named “Junior” or “Nail.” In addition Henry asked Nichols to provide him with a floor plan of the United States Marshals’ office and a handcuff key because Henry intended to attempt an escape.
  Joseph Sadler, another of Henry’s cellmates, also testified at trial. He stated that Henry had told him that Henry had robbed a bank with a man named “Lucky” or “Luck.” Sadler testified that on advice of counsel he informed Government agents of the conversation with Henry. Sadler was not a paid informant and had no arrangement to monitor or report on conversations with Henry.
  In his § 2255 petition, Henry also alleged that Sadler’s testimony was perjurious; that the Government failed to disclose Brady material, see Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (1963); that the United. States Attorney’s argument to the jury was impermissibly prejudicial; and that his trial counsel was incompetent. The District Court rejected each of these grounds, and none of these issues is before this Court.
  The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the testimony of Sadler, another cellmate of Henry, supported the conviction but was not willing to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Nichols’ testimony did not influence the jury. Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18, 24 (1967).
  Although both the Government, and Mr. Justice Rehnquist in dissent, question the continuing vitality of the Massiah branch of the Sixth Amendment, we reject their invitation to reconsider it.
  The affidavit of the agent discloses that “Nichols had been paid by the FBI for expenses and services in connection with information he had provided” as an informant for at least a year. The only reasonable inference from this statement is that Nichols was paid when he produced information, not that Nichols was continuously on the payroll of the FBI. Here, the service requested of Nichols was that he obtain incriminating information from Henry; there is no indication that Nichols would have been paid if he had not performed the requested service.
  Two aspects of the agent’s affidavit are particularly significant. First, it is clear that the agent in his discussions with Nichols singled out Henry as the inmate in whom the agent had a special interest. Thus, the affidavit relates that “I specifically recall telling Nichols that he was not to question Henry or these individuals” and “I recall telling Nichols not to initiate any conversations with Henry regarding the bank robbery charges,” but to “pay attention to the information furnished by Henry.” (Emphasis added.) Second, the agent only instructed Nichols not to question Henry or to initiate conversations regarding the bank robbery charges. Under these instructions, Nichols remained free to discharge his task of eliciting the statements in myriad less direct ways.
  The situation where the “listening post” is an inanimate electronic device differs; such a device has no capability of leading the conversation into any particular subject or prompting any particular replies. See, e. g., United States v. Hearst, 563 F. 2d 1331, 1347-1348 (CA9 1977), cert. denied, 435 U. S. 1000 (1978). However, that situation is not presented in this case, and there is no occasion to treat it; nor are we called upon to pass on the situation where an informant is placed in close proximity but makes no effort to stimulate conversations about the crime charged.
  No doubt the role of the agent at the time of the conversations between Massiah and his codefendant was more active than that of the federal agents here. Yet the additional fact in Massiah that the agent was monitoring the conversations is hardly determinative. In both Massiah and this case, the informant was charged with the task of obtaining information from an accused. Whether Massiah's codefendant questioned Massiah about the crime or merely engaged in general conversation about it was a matter of no concern to the Massiah Court. Moreover, we deem it irrelevant that in Massiah the agent had to arrange the meeting between Massiah and his codefendant while here the agents were fortunate enough to have an undercover informant already in close proximity to the accused.
  This is not to read a “custody” requirement, which is a prerequisite to the attachment of Miranda rights, into this branch of the Sixth Amendment. Massiah was in no sense in custody at the time of his conversation with his eodefendant. Rather, we believe the fact of custody bears on whether the Government “deliberately elicited” the incriminating statements from Henry.
  This is admittedly not a case such as Massiah where the informant and the accused had a prior longstanding relationship. Nevertheless, there is ample evidence in the record which discloses that Nichols had managed to become more than a casual jailhouse acquaintance. That Henry could be induced to discuss his past crime is hardly surprising in view of the fact that Nichols had so ingratiated himself that Henry actively solicited his aid in executing his next crime — his planned attempt to escape from the jail.
  The holding of the Court of Appeals that this was not harmless error is on less firm grounds in view of the strong evidence against Henry, in-eluding the testimony of a neutral fellow inmate, Henry's rental of the hideaway house, and his presence there with the other participants in the robbery before the crime. The Government, however, has not argued that the error was harmless, and on balance, we are not inclined to disturb the determination of the Court of Appeals.
  Although it does not bear on the constitutional question in this case, we note that Disciplinary Rule 7-104 (A) (1) of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
  “ (A) During the course of his representation of a client a lawyer shall not:
  “(1) Communicate or cause another to communicate on the subject of the representation with a party he knows to be represented by a lawyer in that matter unless he has the prior consent of the lawyer representing such other party or is authorized by law to do so.”
  See also Ethical Consideration 7-18.
choices: stay, petition, or motion granted affirmed reversed reversed and remanded vacated and remanded affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded vacated petition denied or appeal dismissed modify remand unusual disposition