opinion: KELLEY, COMMISSIONER, SUFFOLK COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT v. JOHNSON
  No. 74-1269.
  Argued December 8, 1975
  Decided April 5, 1976
  Rehnquist, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Stewart, White, Blacicmun, and Powell, JJ., joined. Powell, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 249. Marshall, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan, J., joined, post, p. 249. Stevens, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
  Patrick A. Sweeney argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Hoivard E. Packman.
  Leonard D. Wexler argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Richard T. Haefeli.
  James vanR. Springer filed a brief for the International Brotherhood of Police Officers as amicus curiae urging affirmance.
  Me. Justice Rehnquist
  delivered the opinion of the Court.
  The District Court for the Eastern District of New York originally dismissed respondent’s complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against a regulation promulgated by petitioner limiting the length of a policeman’s hair. On respondent’s appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, that judgment was reversed, and on remand the District Court took testimony and thereafter granted the relief sought by respondent. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and we granted certiorari, 421 U. S. 987 (1975), to consider the constitutional doctrine embodied in the rulings of the Court of Appeals. We reverse.
  I
  In 1971 respondent’s predecessor, individually and as president of the Suffolk County Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association, brought this action under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, against petitioner’s predecessor, the Commissioner of the Suffolk County Police Department. The Commissioner had promulgated Order No. 71-1, which established hair-grooming standards applicable to male members of the police force. The regulation was directed at the style and length of hair, sideburns, and mustaches; beards and goatees were prohibited, except for medical reasons; and wigs conforming to the regulation could be worn for cosmetic reasons. The regulation was attacked as violative of respondent patrolman's right of free expression under the First Amendment and his guarantees of due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, in that it was “not based upon the generally_accepted standard of grooming in the community” and. .placed “an undue restriction” upon his activities therein. '
  The Court of Appeals held that cases characterizing the uniformed civilian services as “para-military,” and sustaining hair regulations on that basis, were not soundly grounded historically. It said that the fact that a police force is organized “with a centralized administration and a disciplined rank and file for efficient conduct of its affairs" did not foreclose respondent’s claim, but instead bore only upon “the existence of a legitimate state interest to be reasonably advanced by the regulation.” Dwen v. Barry, 483 F. 2d 1126, 1128-1129 (1973). The Court of Appeals went on to decide that “choice of personal appearance is an ingredient of an individual’s personal liberty” and is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. It further held that the police department had “failed to make the slightest showing of the relationship between its regulation and the legitimate interest it sought to promote.” Id., at 1130-1131. On the basis of this reasoning it concluded that neither dismissal nor summary judgment in the District Court was appropriate, since the department “has the burden of establishing a genuine public need for the regulation.” Id., at 1131.
  Thereafter the District Court, under the compulsion of the remand from the Court of Appeals, took testimony on the question of whether or not there was a “genuine public need.” The sole witness was the Deputy Commissioner of the Suffolk County Police Department, petitioner’s subordinate, who testified as to the police department’s concern for the safety of the patrolmen, and the need for some standards of uniformity in appearance. The District Court held that “[n]o proof” was offered to support any claim of the need for the protection of the police officer, and that while “proper grooming” is an ingredient of a good police department’s esprit de corps, petitioner's standards did not establish a public need because they ultimately reduced to “[ujniformity for uniformity’s sake.” The District Court granted the relief prayed for by respondent, and on petitioner's appeal that judgment was affirmed without opinion by the Court of Appeals. 508 F. 2d 836.
  I h-I
  Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part:
  “No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”
  This section affords not only a procedural guarantee against the deprivation of “liberty,” but likewise protects substantive aspects of liberty against unconstitutional restrictions by the State. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 572 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 502 (1965) (White, J., concurring).
  The “liberty” interest claimed by respondent here, of course, is distinguishable from the interests protected by the Court in Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, supra; and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923). Each of those cases involved a substantial claim of infringement on the individual's freedom of choice with respect to certain basic matters of procreation, marriage, and family life. But whether the citizenry at large has some sort of “liberty” interest within the Fourteenth Amendment in matters of personal appearance is a question on which this Court's cases offer little, if any, guidance. We can, nevertheless, assume an affirmative answer for purposes of deciding this case, because we find that assumption insufficient to carry the day for respondent's claim.
  Respondent has sought the protectiqn.:Jíf-_the- Fourteenth Amendment, not as a member of the citizenry at large, but on the contrary as an employee of the police department of Suffolk County, a subdivision o'f the State of New York. While the Court of Appeals made passing reference to this distinction, it was thereafter apparently ignored. We think, however, it is highly significant. In Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U. S. 563, 568 (1968), after noting that state employment may not be conditioned on the relinquishment of First Amendment rights, the Court stated that “[a]t the same time it cannot be gainsaid that the State has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general.” More recently, we have sustained comprehensive and substantial restrictions upon activities of both federal and state employees lying at the core of the First Amendment. CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U. S. 548 (1973); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601 (1973). If such state regulations may survive challenges based on the explicit language of the First Amendment, there is surely even more room fór restrictive regulations of state employees where the claim implicates only the more general contours of the substantive liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
  The hair-length regulation here touches respondent as ax) employee of the county and, more particularly, as a policeman. Respondent's employer has, in accordance wijth its well-established duty to keep the peace, placed myriad demands upon the members of the police force, duties which have no counterpart with respect to the public at large. Respondent must wear a standard uniform, specific in each detail. When in uniform he must salute the flag. He may not take an active role in local political affairs by way of being a party delegate or contributing or soliciting political contributions. He may not smoke in public. All of these and other regulations of the Suffolk County Police Department infringe on respondent's freedom of choice in personal matters, and it was apparently the view of the Court of Appeals that the burden is on the State to prove a “genuine public need” for each and every one of these regulations.
  This view was based upon the Court of Appeals’ reasoning that the “unique judicial deference” accorded by the judiciary to regulation of members of the military was inapplicable because there was no historical or functional justification for the characterization of the police as “para-military.” But the conclusion that such cases are inapposite, however correct, in no way detracts from the deference due Suffolk County’s choice of an organizational structure for its police force. Here the county has chosen a mode of organization which it undoubtedly deems the most efficient in enabling its police to carry out the duties assigned to them under state and local law. Such a choice necessarily gives weight to the overall need for discipline, esprit de corps, and uniformity.
  The county’s choice of an organizational structure, therefore, does not depend for its constitutional validity on any doctrine of historical prescription. Nor, indeed, has respondent made any such claim. His argument does not challenge the constitutionality of the organizational structure, but merely asserts that the present hair-length regulation infringes his asserted liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment. We believe, however, that the hair-length regulation cannot be viewed in isolation, but must be rather considered in the context of the county’s chosen mode of organization for its police force.
  The promotion of safety of persons and property is unquestionably at the core of the State’s police power, and virtually all state and local governments employ a uniformed police force to aid in the accomplishment of that purpose. Choice of organization, dress, and equipment for law enforcement personnel is a decision entitled to the same sort of presumption of legislative validity as are state choices designed to promote other aims within the cognizance of the State’s police power. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U. S. 421, 423 (1952); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 168-170 (1944); Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U. S. 236, 246-247 (1941). Having recognized in other contexts the wide latitude accorded the government in the “dispatch of its own internal affairs,” Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 896 (1961), we think Suffolk County’s police regulations involved here are entitled to similar weight. Thus the question is not, as the Court of Appeals conceived it to be, whether the State can “establish” a “genuine public need” for the specific regulation. It is whether respondent can demonstrate that there is no rational connection between the regulation, based as it is on the county’s method of organizing its police force, and the promotion of safety of persons and property. United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75, 100-101 (1947); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11, 30-31, 35-37 (1905).
  We think the answer here is so clear that the District Court was quite right in the first instance to have dismissed respondent’s complaint. Neither this Court, the Court of Appeals, nor the District Court is in a position to weigh the policy arguments in favor of and against a rule regulating hairstyles as a part of regulations governing a uniformed civilian service. The constitutional issue to be decided by these courts is whether petitioner’s determination that such regulations should be enacted is so irrational that it may be branded “arbitrary,” and therefore a deprivation of respondent’s “liberty” interest in freedom to choose his own hairstyle. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483, 487-488 (1955). The overwhelming majority of state and local police of the present day are uniformed. This fact itself testifies to the recognition by those who direct those operations, and by the people of the States and localities who directly or indirectly choose such persons, that similarity in appearance of police officers is desirable. This choice may be based on a desire to make police officers readily recognizable to the members of the public, or a desire for the esprit de corps which such similarity is felt to inculcate within the police force itself. Either one is a sufficiently rational justification for regulations so as to defeat respondent’s claim based on the liberty guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment.
  The Court of Appeals relied on Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U. S. 493 (1967), and amicus in its brief in support of respondent elaborates an argument based on the language in Garrity that “policemen, like teachers and lawyers, are not relegated to a watered-down version of constitutional rights.” Id., at 500. Garrity, of course, involved the protections afforded by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution as made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1 (1964). Certainly its language cannot be taken to suggest that the claim of a member of a uniformed civilian service based on the “liberty” interest protected by the Fourteenth-Amaiidment must necessarily be treated for constitutional purposes the same as a similar claim by a member of the general public.
  The regulation challenged_here — did- not violate any right guaranteed respondent by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and the Court of Appeals was therefore wrong in reversing the District Court’s original judgment dismissing the action. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
  Reversed.
  Mr. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
  Order No. 71-1 (1971), amending Chapter 2 of the Rules and Procedures, Police Department, County of Suffolk, N. Y., provided:
  “2/75.0 Members of the Force and Department shall be neat and clean at all times while on duty. Male personnel shall comply with the following grooming standards unless excluded by the Police Commissioner due to special assignment:
  “2/75.1 HAIR: Hair shall be neat, clean, trimmed, and present a groomed appearance. Hair will not touch the ears or the collar except the closely cut hair on the back of the neck. Hair in front will be groomed so that it does not fall below the band of properly worn headgear. In no case will the bulk or length of the hair interfere with the proper wear of any authorized headgear. The acceptability of a member’s hair style will be based upon the criteria in this paragraph and not upon the style in which he chooses to wear his hair.
  “2/75.2 SIDEBURNS: If an individual chooses to wear sideburns, they will be neatly trimmed and tapered in the same manner as his haircut. Sideburns will not extend below the lowest part of the exterior ear opening, will be of even width (not flared), and will end with a clean-shaven horizontal line.
  "2/75.3 MUSTACHES: A short and neatly trimmed mustache may be worn, but shall not extend over the top of the upper lip or beyond the corners of the mouth.
  “2/75.4 BEARDS & GOATEES: The face will be clean-shaven other than the wearing of the acceptable mustache or sideburns. Beards and goatees are prohibited, except that a Police Surgeon may grant a waiver for the wearing of a beard for medical reasons with the approval of the Police Commissioner. When a Surgeon prescribes that a member not shave, the beard will be kept trimmed symmetrically and all beard hairs will be kept trimmed so that they do not protrude more than one-half inch from the skin surface of the face.
  “2/75.5 WIGS: Wigs or hair pieces will not be worn on duty in uniform except for cosmetic reasons to cover natural baldness or physical disfiguration. If under these conditions, a wig or hair piece is worn, it will conform to department standards.” App. 57-58.
  E. g., Stradley v. Andersen, 478 F. 2d 188 (CA8 1973); Greenwald v. Frank, 40 App. Div. 2d 717, 337 N. Y. S. 2d 225 (1972), aff’d without opinion, 32 N. Y. 2d 862, 299 N. E. 2d 895 (1973). The District Court’s dismissal was based on cases upholding the discretionary power of the military and National Guard to regulate a soldier’s hair length. See Gianatasio v. Whyte, 426 F. 2d 908 (CA2), cert. denied, 400 U. S. 941 (1970); Raderman v. Kaine, 411 F. 2d 1102 (CA2), cert. dismissed, 396 U. S. 976 (1969).
  483 F. 2d, at 1130. While it recognized the distinction between citizens and uniformed employees of police and fire departments, the Court of Appeals stated that the individual’s status did not bear on the existence of his right but on whether the right was outweighed by a legitimate state interest. Id., at 1130 n. 9.
  On remand, the complaint was appropriately amended to reflect the interim renumbering and modification of the hair-grooming regulation. The former sections 2/75.0-2/75.3, see n. 1, supra, were modified to provide as follows:
  “Members of the Force will be neat and clean at all times while on duty. Male personnel will comply with the following grooming standards unless excluded by the Police Commissioner due to special assignments:
  “A. Hair will be neat, clean, trimmed and present a groomed appearance. Hair will not go below the ears or the collar except the closely cut hair on the back of the neck. Pony tails are prohibited. In no case will the bulk or length of the hair interfere with the proper wear of any authorized headgear.
  “B. If a member chooses to wear sideburns, they will be neatly trimmed. Sideburns will not extend below the lowest part of the ear. Sideburns shall not be flared beyond 2" in width and will end with a clean-shaven horizontal line. Sideburns shall not connect with the mustache.
  “C. A neatly trimmed mustache may be worn.” Rules and Procedures, Police Department, County of Suffolk, N. Y., 2/2.16 (hereinafter Rules and Procedures).
  Sections 2/75.4-2/75.5, see n. 1, supra, were simply renumbered as 2/2.16, subdivisions D and E, respectively. Deputy Commissioner Rapp’s testimony on remand was directed to the regulation as modified. For present purposes, the differences are immaterial.
  Illustrating one safety problem, Rapp showed that an assailant could throw an officer off balance by grabbing his hair from the rear and levering against the patrolman’s back. After noting that the prohibition against “ponytails” was thus a proper one, the District Court stated:
  “The remainder of 2/2.16A, however, bears no relationship to safety but rather related to hair styling. The potential danger in hairdress is the ability of the offender to grip the hair and hold the fate of the police officer in his hand. Bulk and length of the hair is not regulated except as it interferes with ‘the proper wear of any authorized headgear.’ Thus the regulation would permit bulky and lengthy hair on the top of the head, thereby presenting the very problem that was demonstrated. In the remaining subdivisions, sideburns, mustaches and wigs are regulated and beards are barred. No proof was offered to support any claim of the need for the protection of the police officer in the pertinent regulations.” Pet. for Cert. 7a.
  The District Court’s findings with respect to the relationship between morale and grooming standards are as follows:
  “The high morale of police personnel is a matter of grave concern to the department. Proper grooming is an ingredient of the esprit de corps of a good law enforcement organization. The self-esteem generated in the individual and the respect commanded from the public it serves promotes [sic] the efficiency of the organization’s work. However, with the exception of the general requirement that hair, sideburns and mustaches be neatly trimmed, the regulations do not provide standards for proper grooming. Rather, the standards do nothing more than demand uniformity. Uniformity for uniformity’s sake does not establish a public need. Defendant offered no proof that beards, goatees, hair styles that extend below the ears or collar, or sideburns that extend below the lowest part of the ear or beyond 2" in width and do not end with a cleanshaven horizontal line affect the morale of the members of the police department or earn the disrespect of the public.” Id., at 7a-8a.
  While noting Rapp’s testimony that uniformity was required for identification, the District Court stated: “It would appear, however, that the uniform (issued by the department) supplies the necessary identification for police work.”
  Rules and Procedures 4/1.0-4/1.3.
  Id., 6/2.2.
  Id., 2/2.5.
  Id., 2/5.1.
  See, e. g., id., 2/14.0 et seq. (Code of Ethics).
  The Court of Appeals itself found that while there was no desire on the part of local governments like Suffolk County to create a “military force,” “[t]he use of such organization evolved as a 'practical administrative solution . . . 483 F. 2d, at 1128-1129 (emphasis added).
choices: case did not arise on cert or cert not granted federal court conflict federal court conflict and to resolve important or significant question putative conflict conflict between federal court and state court state court conflict federal court confusion or uncertainty state court confusion or uncertainty federal court and state court confusion or uncertainty to resolve important or significant question to resolve question presented no reason given other reason