opinion: JONES v. STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TENNESSEE et al.
  No. 731.
  Argued January 19-20, 1970
  Decided February 24, 1970
  Beber F. Boult, Jr., argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Charles Morgan, Jr., Richard Bellman, Melvin L. Wulf, and Eleanor H. Norton.
  Robert H. Roberts, Assistant Attorney General of Tennessee, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were David M. Pack, Attorney General, and Thomas E. Fox, Deputy Attorney General.
  Per Curiam.
  Petitioner Jones was suspended indefinitely as a student at Tennessee A. & I. State University in the summer 1967. His indefinite suspension was confirmed after a hearing in September of that year, in which charges against him were specified, evidence taken, and findings made. He, along with two other suspended students, brought suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, seeking to set aside the suspension on First Amendment and due process grounds. After a hearing, the District Court granted judgment on merits to defendants with an opinion. 279 F. Supp. 190 (1968). On appeal the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 407 F. 2d 834 (1969). We granted certiorari, 396 U. S. 817 (1969), primarily to consider the issues raised by Jones’ claim that he had been separated from the university solely because of his distribution of leaflets urging a boycott of fall registration.
  After oral argument, and on closer review of the record, it emerges — as it did not from the certiorari papers or the opinions of the District Court and the Court of Appeals — that Jones’ indefinite suspension was based in part on a finding that he lied at the hearing on the charges against him. This fact sufficiently clouds the record to render the case an inappropriate vehicle for this Court’s first decision on the extent of First Amendment restrictions upon the power of state universities to expel or indefinitely suspend students for the expression of views alleged to be disruptive of the good order of the campus. Accordingly the writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted.
  It is so ordered.
  Mb. Justice Black, for reasons set out in the above opinion and others stated in his dissent in Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U. S. 503, 515-526, would affirm the judgment below.
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