opinion: UNITED STATES v. CAMPOS-SERRANO
  No. 70-46.
  Argued October 14, 1971
  Decided December 20, 1971
  William Bradford Reynolds argued the cause for the United States pro hac vice. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Wilson, Beatrice Rosenberg, and Roger A. Pauley.
  John J. Cleary, by appointment of the Court, 401 U. S. 990, argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.
  William J. Scott, Attorney General, Joel M. Flaum, First Assistant Attorney General, and James B. Zagel and Jayne A. Carr, Assistant Attorneys General, filed a brief for the State of Illinois as amicus curiae urging reversal.
  Mr. Justice Stewart
  delivered the opinion of the Court.
  The respondent was convicted in a federal district court of possession of a counterfeit alien registration receipt card in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1546, and sentenced to a three-year prison term. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, 430 F. 2d 173, holding that because of the circumstances under which Government agents had acquired the card from the respondent, it had been unconstitutionally admitted against him at the trial under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436. We granted certiorari. 401 U. S. 936. We do not reach the constitutional issue, however, for we have concluded that the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be affirmed upon a discrete statutory ground. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 347 (Brandéis, J., concurring). We hold that possession of a counterfeit alien registration receipt card is not an act punishable under 18 U. S. C. § 1546.
  The statutory provision in question prohibits, inter alia, the counterfeiting or alteration of, or the possession, use, or receipt of an already counterfeited or altered “immigrant or nonimmigrant visa, permit, or other document required for entry into the United States.” This offense originated in Section 22 (a) of the Immigration Act of 1924, which covered only an “immigration visa or permit.” The words “other document required for entry into the United States,” were added in 1952 as part of the Immigration and Nationality Act. §402 (a), 66 Stat. 275. The legislative history of the 1952 Act, however, does not make clear which “other” entry documents the Congress had in mind.
  Alien registration receipt cards were first issued in 1941. They are small, simple cards containing the alien’s picture and basic identification information. They have no function whatsoever in facilitating the initial entry into the United States. Rather, they are issued after an alien has entered the country and taken up residence. Their essential purpose is to effectuate the registration requirement fór all resident aliens established in the Alien Registration Act of 1940.
  Until 1952, alien registration receipt cards could not even be used to facilitate re-entry into the United States by a resident alien who had left temporarily. Such an alien was required to obtain special documents authorizing his re-entry into the country, such as a visa or a re-entry permit. However, in 1952 — less than a month before final enactment of the Immigration and Nationality Act — the Immigration and Naturalization Service promulgated a regulation that allowed resident aliens to use their registration receipt cards for re-entry purposes as a permissible substitute for the specialized documents. The apparent reason for this regulation was to minimize paper work and streamline administrative procedures by giving resident aliens the option of using for re-entry a document already issued and serving other purposes. Thus, the registration receipt cards may now be used in lieu of a visa or a re-entry permit on condition that the holder is returning to the United States after a temporary absence of not more than one year.
  The Court of Appeals held that the limited, merely permissible, re-entry function of the alien registration receipt card is sufficient to make it a “document required for entry into the United States” under § 1546. 430 F. 2d, at 175. We cannot agree. It has long been settled that “penal statutes are to be construed strictly,” Federal Communications Comm’n v. American Broadcasting Co,, 347 U. S. 284, 296, and that one “is not to be subjected to a penalty unless the words of the statute plainly impose it,” Keppel v. Tiffin Savings Bank, 197 U. S. 356, 362. “[W]hen choice has to be made between two readings of what conduct Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate, before we choose the harsher alternative, to require that Congress should have spoken in language that is clear and definite.” United States v. Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp., 344 U. S. 218, 221-222. In § 1546, Congress did speak in “clear and definite” language. But, taken literally and given its plain and ordinary meaning, that language does not impose a criminal penalty for possession of a counterfeited alien registration receipt card. Alien registration receipt cards may be used for re-entry by certain persons into the United States. They are not required for entry.
  The canon of strict construction of criminal statutes, of course, “does not mean that every criminal statute must be given the narrowest possible meaning in complete disregard of the purpose of the legislature.” United States v. Bramblett, 348 U. S. 503, 510. If an absolutely literal reading of a statutory provision is irreconcilably at war with the clear congressional purpose, a less literal construction must be considered. In this spirit, we read § 1546 in conjunction with 8 U. S. C. §1101 (a) (13) — another part of the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act — which provides that, under most circumstances, an “entry” into the United States is defined to include a “re-entry.” We have held in the past that Congress did not intend these terms to be taken entirely synonymously. Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U. S. 449. But Congress clearly did intend a significant overlap, and we cannot say that a document usable for “entry” into the United States under § 1546 does not include some documents usable for “re-entry.” Nor do we hold that § 1546 applies only to those documents absolutely “required” in order to enter or re-enter the country. To do so would undermine the congressional purpose behind § 1546, since the Immigration and Naturalization Service has not required that presentation of any one particular document be the exclusive condition of crossing our borders.
  While the apparent congressional purpose underlying § 1546 would thus seem to bar an uncompromisingly literal construction, the precise language of the provision must not be deprived of all force. The principle of strict construction of criminal statutes demands that some determinate limits be established based upon the actual words of the statute. Accordingly, a “document required for entry into the United States” cannot be construed to include any document whatsoever that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, from time to time, decides may be presented for re-entry at the border. The language of § 1546 denotes a very special class of “entry” documents — documents whose primary raison d’etre is the facilitation of entry into the country. The phrase, “required for entry into the United States,” is descriptive of the nature of the documents; it is not simply an open-ended reference to future administrative regulations.
  If, for example, the Immigration and Naturalization Service were to allow the presentation of identification such as a driver’s license at the border, the nature of such a license would not suddenly change so that it would fall into the category of a “document required for entry into the United States” under § 1546. To be sure, if a counterfeit driver’s license were presented to secure entry or re-entry into the country, the bearer could be prosecuted under 8 U. S. C. § 1325, which provides for the punishment of “[a]ny alien who . . . obtains entry to the United States by a willfully false or misleading representation . . . .” But mere possession of a counterfeit driver’s license, far from the border, could not be prosecuted under § 1546. The reason is that a driver’s license is not essentially an “entry” document. Rather, its primary purpose is to allow its bearer lawfully to drive a car, and the bearer’s possession of a counterfeit license, far from the border, could not be assumed to be related to the policies underlying the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act.
  The same analysis applies to the alien registration receipt card. Its essential purpose is not to secure entry into the United States, but to identify the bearer as a lawfully registered alien residing in the United States. It is issued to an alien after he has taken up residence in this country. It is intended to govern his activities and presence within this country. The card has been given a convenient, additional function as a permissible substitute for a visa or re-entry permit in facilitating re-entry into the United States by a resident alien. But, unlike a visa or a re-entry permit, an alien registration receipt card serves this function in only a secondary way. Unlike a visa or a re-entry permit, it is not, by its nature, a “document required for entry into the United States” under § 1546.
  This construction of the language of § 1546 is conclusively supported by that section’s statutory context. In the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act, Congress clearly regarded alien registration receipt cards as serving policies separate and distinct from those served by pure “entry” documents. Although, in 1952, those cards could be used as substitutes for visas or re-entry permits, the Congress chose to deal with them separately. In 8 U. S. C. § 1306 (c) and § 1306 (d), it specifically provided for the punishment of one “who procures or attempts to procure registration of himself or another person through fraud” and of one who counterfeits an alien registration receipt card. The fact that the Congress did not rely on § 1546 to ensure the integrity of alien registration receipt cards indicates that it did not believe that they were covered by that section. Moreover, there is a very specific overlap between § 1546 and § 1306. Both sections explicitly prohibit counterfeiting, and both explicitly prohibit fraud in the acquisition of documents. Unless we assume that § 1306 is mere sur-plusage, we must conclude that § 1546 covers only specialized “entry” documents, and not alien registration receipt cards specifically covered in § 1306.
  For these reasons the judgment is
  Affirmed.
  The applicable portion of § 1546 reads as follows:
  “Whoever . . . knowingly forges, counterfeits, alters, or falsely makes any immigrant or nonimmigrant visa, permit, or other document required for entry into the United States, or utters, uses, attempts to use, possesses, obtains, accepts, or receives any such visa, permit, or document, knowing it to be forged, counterfeited, altered, or falsely made, or to have been procured by means of any false claim or statement, or to have been otherwise procured by fraud or unlawfully obtained ....
  “Shall be fined not more than $2,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.”
  The sentence was suspended, and the respondent was placed on probation for three years “on condition that he return to Mexico and not return to the United States illegally.” Pursuant to this sentence, he was remanded to the custody of the Immigration and Naturalization Service for deportation under a previous order. It appears that he is now in Mexico. Clearly, the fact that the respondent is now out of the country does not render this case moot. He is still under the sentence of the District Court and on probation subject to conditions imposed by the District Court. Should he violate those conditions, he will be subject to imprisonment under his continuing criminal sentence.
  Eisler v. United States, 338 U. S. 189, is irrelevant to this case. There, the -petitioner fled voluntarily from the United States and successfully resisted extradition. We, therefore, declined to consider the merits of his case, just as we have declined over the years to consider the merits of criminal cases in which the party seeking review has escaped “from the restraints placed upon him pursuant to the conviction.” Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U. S. 365, 366; Bonahan v. Nebraska, 125 U. S. 692; Smith v. United States, 94 U. S. 97. “While such an escape does not strip the case of its character as an adjudicable case or controversy, we believe it disentitles [the party] to call upon the resources of the Court for determination of his claims.” Molinaro v. New Jersey, supra, at 366. In the present case, by contrast, the respondent has not fled from the restraints imposed by the District Court pursuant to this conviction. Rather, he is living under those restraints today.
  “The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.”
  Accord, United States v. Fernandez-Gonzalez (64 CR 101, ND Ill.) (unpublished opinion). Contrary to the suggestion in the dissenting opinion, our decision on this issue of statutory construction will hardly come as a “surprise” to the parties. The issue was presented to and decided by the Court of Appeals. It was argued and fully briefed before this Court by both parties.
  43 Stat. 165.
  See H. R. Rep. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess.; S. Rep. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess.; H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 2096, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. The only one of these reports to make any mention whatsoever of the changes in § 1546 was H. R. Rep. No. 1365. It simply stated that “necessary amendments [are made] to other laws .... Most of those amendments are in the nature of conforming changes.” Id., at 88. It seems most likely that the purpose of the new language in § 1546 was to reach the specialized border-crossing identification cards, authorized as a substitute for a visa or a permit in the Alien Registration Act of 1940. See n. 9 and n. 12, infra. At the time H. R. Rep. No. 1365 was published, the alien registration receipt card had no “entry” or “re-entry” function.
  The Appendix filed by the Government in this case contains a reproduction of an alien registration receipt card, Form 1-151 of the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
  See 54 Stat. 673. The statutory provisions for the registration of aliens are now contained in 8 U. S. C. §§ 1301-1306.
  Provision for the use of re-entry permits was made in the Immigration Act of 1924, § 10, 43 Stat. 158. The Alien Registration Act of 1940 required that an alien present one of three special documents — a visa, a re-entry permit, or a border-crossing identification card — in order to come into the United States. 54 Stat. 673.
  The 1952 INS regulation provided that the alien registration receipt card could be used as a permissible substitute for a visa or a re-entry permit in effecting a re-entry into this country from a contiguous country. 17 Fed. Reg. 4921. In 1957, this permissible use of the alien registration receipt card was expanded to include re-entry from noncontiguous nations. 22 Fed. Reg. 6377. The present INS regulation appeals in 8 CFR §211.1 (b).
  8 CFR §211.1 (b).
  Visas and re-entry permits are the specialized “entry” documents for which the alien registration receipt card is a permissible substitute under present INS regulations. See n. 10, supra.
  Border-crossing identification cards are like visas and re-entry permits, and unlike alien registration receipt cards, in that they are specialized documents whose sole purpose and function is to regulate the crossing of our national borders. Hence; the likelihood that Congress in 1952 wished to expand the coverage of § 1546 to reach border-crossing identification cards, see n. 6, supra, supports our holding. The expansion mandated by Congress was simply within the class of specialized “entry” documents.
  The prohibition of counterfeiting in § 1546 is contained in the first paragraph of that section. See n. 1, supra. The prohibition of fraud in the acquisition of documents is contained in the third paragraph of § 1546, which reads as follows:
  “Whoever, when applying for an immigrant or nonimmigrant visa, permit, or other document required for entry into the United States, or for admission to the United States personates another, or falsely appears in the name of a deceased individual, or evades or attempts to evade the immigration laws by appearing under an assumed or fictitious name without disclosing his true identity ....
  “Shall be fined not more than $2,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.”
  “ `[A] statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.’ ” Market Co. v. Hoffman, 101 U. S. 112, 115-116. See Jarecki v. G. D. Searle & Co., 367 U. S. 303, 307-308. To be sure, the overlap between § 1546 and § 1306 is only partial, since § 1546 goes farther than § 1306—prohibiting the possession of counterfeit documents as well as the counterfeiting of documents. But the Congress would hardly have thought it necessary to create any overlap at all, if it had believed alien registration receipt cards were covered by § 1546.
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