opinion: UNITED STATES v. FORTIER et al.
  No. 14.
  Argued October 10, 1951.
  Decided December 11, 1951.
  Oscar H. Davis argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Assistant Attorney General Baldridge and Samuel D. Slade.
  Stanley M. Brown argued the cause for respondents and filed a brief for Fortier, respondent. With Mr. Brown on the brief was Meyer Green for Marino et al., respondents.
  Briefs of amici curiae supporting respondents were filed by Alvan J. Goodbar for Doernhoefer; and by John G. Simms.
  Per Curiam.
  The United States brought this action under the Veterans’ Emergency Housing Act of 1946 to compel restitution of allegedly excessive prices charged by respondents in the sale of two houses. The District Court entered judgment for respondents, 89 F. Supp.708, and the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed, 185 F. 2d 608. We granted certiorari, 341 U. S. 925.
  Maximum sales prices for the two houses had been stipulated by respondents in securing the permission to build required under Priorities Regulation 33. Statutory authority for that regulation had been repealed before the sale of respondents’ houses, except for a proviso continuing in full force and effect priorities for building materials issued under the Veterans’ Emergency Housing’ Act of 1946. The Government views the maximum prices stipulated by respondents as a condition of construction authorization and priorities assistance that survived repeal under the proviso. We reject this view.
  The 1946 Act contained detailed authorization for price restrictions on houses and for priorities on building materials. When that Act was repealed in 1947, Congress provided for veterans’ preferences in the sale and rental of housing and for rent ceilings on certain accommodations constructed with the assistance of priorities secured under the 1946 Act. Congress addressed itself to the problem of veterans’ housing, but refrained from imposing any price restrictions on the sale of houses. Congress having indicated a contrary purpose, we will not impose such restrictions by implication.
  Affirmed.
  Mr. Justice Minton took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
  50 U. S. C. App. § 1821 et seq.
  10 Fed. Reg. 15301, as amended, 11 Fed. Reg. 6598. Respondents ' were required to comply with this regulation by Veterans’ Housing Program Order No. 1, 11 Fed. Reg. 3190.
  50 U. S. C. App. (Supp. IV) § 1881 (a), in repealing the 1946 Act, provided:
  “That any allocations made or committed, or priorities granted for the delivery, of any housing materials or facilities under any regulation or order issued under the authority contained in said Act, and before the date of enactment of this Act [June 30, 1947], with respect to veterans of World War II, their immediate families, and others, shall remain in full force and effect.”
  Respondents’ houses were not sold until November and December, 1947, months after repeal of the 1946 Act. As a result, no “penalty, forfeiture, or liability” had been incurred under the 1946 Act which would survive repeal under the general saving clause, 1 U. S. C. (Supp. IV) § 109. Compare United States v. Carter, 171 F. 2d 530 (C. A. 5th Cir. 1948).
  50 U. S. C. App. (Supp. IV) § 1884 (a); id., § 1892 (c) (1) (B) (3) (A).
instruction: What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the bases on which the Supreme Court rested its decision with regard to the legal provision that the Court considered in the case. Consider "judicial review (national level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of the federal government, including an interstate compact. Consider "judicial review (state level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of a state or local government. Consider "statutory construction" for cases where the majority interpret a federal statute, treaty, or court rule; if the Court interprets a federal statute governing the powers or jurisdiction of a federal court; if the Court construes a state law as incompatible with a federal law; or if an administrative official interprets a federal statute. Do not consider "statutory construction" where an administrative agency or official acts "pursuant to" a statute, unless the Court interprets the statute to determine if administrative action is proper. Consider "interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order" if the majority treats federal administrative action in arriving at its decision.Consider "diversity jurisdiction" if the majority said in approximately so many words that under its diversity jurisdiction it is interpreting state law. Consider "federal common law" if the majority indicate that it used a judge-made "doctrine" or "rule; if the Court without more merely specifies the disposition the Court has made of the case and cites one or more of its own previously decided cases unless the citation is qualified by the word "see."; if the case concerns admiralty or maritime law, or some other aspect of the law of nations other than a treaty; if the case concerns the retroactive application of a constitutional provision or a previous decision of the Court; if the case concerns an exclusionary rule, the harmless error rule (though not the statute), the abstention doctrine, comity, res judicata, or collateral estoppel; or if the case concerns a "rule" or "doctrine" that is not specified as related to or connected with a constitutional or statutory provision. Consider "Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction" otherwise (i.e., the residual code); for issues pertaining to non-statutorily based Judicial Power topics; for cases arising under the Court's original jurisdiction; in cases in which the Court denied or dismissed the petition for review or where the decision of a lower court is affirmed by a tie vote; or in workers' compensation litigation involving statutory interpretation and, in addition, a discussion of jury determination and/or the sufficiency of the evidence.