opinion: HOPFMANN et al. v. CONNOLLY et al.
  No. 84-1440.
  Decided May 13, 1985
  Per Curiam.
  Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, the petition is granted.
  Hopfmann filed this action in the Federal District Court for the District of Massachusetts challenging a provision in the Charter of the Massachusetts Democratic Party. Among the theories he advanced was a claim that the provision, as enforced by Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 53, §§1-121 (West 1975 and Supp. 1985), violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Relying on Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U. S. 332, 344 (1975), the Court of Appeals held that the claim was foreclosed by this Court’s summary disposition of two appeals from the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Langone v. Connolly, 460 U. S. 1057 (1983). See 746 F. 2d 97, 100-101 (1984).
  In Hicks, the Court explained the precedential effect of the dismissal “for want of [a] substantial federal question” in Miller v. California, 418 U. S. 915 (1974):
  “[Miller] was an appeal from a decision by a state court upholding a state statute against federal constitutional attack. A federal constitutional issue was properly presented, it was within our appellate jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1257(2), and we had no discretion to refuse adjudication of the case on its merits as would have been true had the case been brought here under our certiorari jurisdiction. We were not obligated to grant the case plenary consideration, and we did not; but we were required to deal with its merits. We did so by concluding that the appeal should be dismissed because the constitutional challenge to the California statute was not a substantial one.” 422 U. S., at 343-344.
  Because the Court had jurisdiction over the appeal in Miller, the dismissal involved a rejection of “the specific challenges presented in the statement of jurisdiction.” Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U. S. 173, 176 (1977) (per curiam).
  On the other hand, the order disposing of the appeals in Langone read:
  “Appeals from Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass, dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeals were taken as petitions for writs of certiorari, certiorari denied. Reported below: 388 Mass. 185, 446 N. E. 2d 43 [1983].” 460 U. S., at 1057 (emphasis added).
  Because the Court dismissed the appeals for lack of appellate jurisdiction, we had no occasion to adjudicate the merits of the constitutional questions presented in the jurisdictional statements. Nor did the denial of certiorari have any prec-edential effect. See Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U. S. 912, 919 (1950) (opinion of Frankfurter, J., respecting denial of the petition for certiorari).
  The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated to the extent it relied on the dismissal of the appeals in Langone, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.
  It is so ordered.
instruction: What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the bases on which the Supreme Court rested its decision with regard to the legal provision that the Court considered in the case. Consider "judicial review (national level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of the federal government, including an interstate compact. Consider "judicial review (state level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of a state or local government. Consider "statutory construction" for cases where the majority interpret a federal statute, treaty, or court rule; if the Court interprets a federal statute governing the powers or jurisdiction of a federal court; if the Court construes a state law as incompatible with a federal law; or if an administrative official interprets a federal statute. Do not consider "statutory construction" where an administrative agency or official acts "pursuant to" a statute, unless the Court interprets the statute to determine if administrative action is proper. Consider "interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order" if the majority treats federal administrative action in arriving at its decision.Consider "diversity jurisdiction" if the majority said in approximately so many words that under its diversity jurisdiction it is interpreting state law. Consider "federal common law" if the majority indicate that it used a judge-made "doctrine" or "rule; if the Court without more merely specifies the disposition the Court has made of the case and cites one or more of its own previously decided cases unless the citation is qualified by the word "see."; if the case concerns admiralty or maritime law, or some other aspect of the law of nations other than a treaty; if the case concerns the retroactive application of a constitutional provision or a previous decision of the Court; if the case concerns an exclusionary rule, the harmless error rule (though not the statute), the abstention doctrine, comity, res judicata, or collateral estoppel; or if the case concerns a "rule" or "doctrine" that is not specified as related to or connected with a constitutional or statutory provision. Consider "Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction" otherwise (i.e., the residual code); for issues pertaining to non-statutorily based Judicial Power topics; for cases arising under the Court's original jurisdiction; in cases in which the Court denied or dismissed the petition for review or where the decision of a lower court is affirmed by a tie vote; or in workers' compensation litigation involving statutory interpretation and, in addition, a discussion of jury determination and/or the sufficiency of the evidence.