opinion: LASCARIS, COMMISSIONER, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES OF ONONDAGA COUNTY v. SHIRLEY et al.
  No. 73-1016.
  Argued December 18, 1974
  Decided March 19, 1975
  Alan W. Rubenstein argued the cause for appellants in both cases. With him on the briefs for appellant in No. 73-1095 were Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General of New York, and Ruth Kessler Toch, Solicitor General. Philip C. Pinsky and John B. LaParo filed a brief for appellant in No. 73-1016.
  Douglas A. Eldridge argued the cause pro hac vice for appellees in both cases. With him on the brief for appellee Stuck was Isadore Greenberg.
  Together with No. 73-1095, Lavine, Commissioner, Department of Social Services of New York v. Shirley et al., also on appeal to the same court.
  Ronald A. Zumbrun filed a brief for the Pacific Legal Foundation as amicus curiae urging reversal in both cases. Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General, Elizabeth Palmer, Assistant Attorney General, and John J. Klee, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, filed a brief for the State of California as amicus curiae urging reversal in No. 73-1095.
  Per Curiam.
  After our previous remand, 409 U. S. 1052 (1972), the three-judge District Court held that amended New York Social Services Law § 101-a “engraft[ed] ... a condition on to the Congressionally prescribed initial AFDC eligibility requirements or on to the grounds for discontinuance of benefits.” 365 P. Supp. 818, 821 (1973). That condition, the court held, rendered the amended section invalid because in conflict with the Social Security Act, § 402 (a), 42 U. S. C. § 602 (a), insofar as it required recipient cooperation in a paternity or support action against an absent parent as a condition of eligibility for benefits under the program for Aid to Families with Dependent Children. On June 17, 1974, we noted probable jurisdiction of the appeals of the State and County Commissioners of Social Service, 417 U. S. 943. Since that time, however, on January 4, 1975, Pub. L. 93-647, 88 Stat. 2359, amended § 402 (a) of the Social Security Act expressly to resolve the conflict as to eligibility found by the three-judge District Court to exist between the federal and state laws. Amended §402 (a), like New York’s amended § 101-a, requires the recipient to cooperate to compel the absent parent to contribute to the support of the child.
  Section 402 (a), as amended, in pertinent part provides:
  “A State plan for aid and services to needy families with children must
  “(26) provide that, as a condition of eligibility for aid, each applicant or recipient will be required—
  “(B) to cooperate with the State (i) in establishing the paternity of a child born out of wedlock with respect to whom aid is claimed, and (ii) in obtaining support payments for such applicant and for a child with respect to whom such aid is claimed, or in obtaining any other payments or property due such applicant or such child and that, if the relative with whom a child is living is found to be ineligible because of failure to comply with the requirements of subparagraphs (A) and (B) of this paragraph, any aid for which such child is eligible will be provided in the form of protective payments as described in section 406 (b) (2) (without regard to subpara-graphs (A) through (E) of such section) . . .
  We affirm the judgment of the three-judge court. Townsend v. Swank, 404 U. S. 282 (1971); Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U. S. 598 (1972). In light of the resolution of the conflict by Pub. L. 93-647, we have no occasion to prepare an extended opinion.
  Affirmed.
  The Chief Justice, Me. Justice Powell, and Me. Justice Rehnquist dissent.
  Pub. L. 93-647 provides that § 402 (a), as amended, shall become effective on July 1, 1975. However, President Ford announced when he signed the law that he would propose changes to several sections, including the child-support provisions, during the early months of the 94th Congress, stating:
  “The second element of this bill involves the collection of child support payments from absent parents. I strongly agree with the objectives of this legislation.
  “In pursuit of this objective, however, certain provisions of this legislation go too far by injecting the Federal Government into domestic relations. Specifically, provisions for use of the Federal courts, the tax collection procedures of the Internal Revenue Service, and excessive audit requirements are an undesirable and unnecessary intrusion of the Federal Government into domestic relations. They are also an undesirable addition to the worldoad of the Federal courts, the IRS and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare Audit Agency. Further, the establishment of a parent locator service in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare with access to all Federal records raises serious privacy and administrative issues. I believe that these defects should be corrected in the next Congress, and I will propose legislation to do so.” 11 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, No. 2, Jan. 13, 1975, p. 20.
instruction: What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the bases on which the Supreme Court rested its decision with regard to the legal provision that the Court considered in the case. Consider "judicial review (national level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of the federal government, including an interstate compact. Consider "judicial review (state level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of a state or local government. Consider "statutory construction" for cases where the majority interpret a federal statute, treaty, or court rule; if the Court interprets a federal statute governing the powers or jurisdiction of a federal court; if the Court construes a state law as incompatible with a federal law; or if an administrative official interprets a federal statute. Do not consider "statutory construction" where an administrative agency or official acts "pursuant to" a statute, unless the Court interprets the statute to determine if administrative action is proper. Consider "interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order" if the majority treats federal administrative action in arriving at its decision.Consider "diversity jurisdiction" if the majority said in approximately so many words that under its diversity jurisdiction it is interpreting state law. Consider "federal common law" if the majority indicate that it used a judge-made "doctrine" or "rule; if the Court without more merely specifies the disposition the Court has made of the case and cites one or more of its own previously decided cases unless the citation is qualified by the word "see."; if the case concerns admiralty or maritime law, or some other aspect of the law of nations other than a treaty; if the case concerns the retroactive application of a constitutional provision or a previous decision of the Court; if the case concerns an exclusionary rule, the harmless error rule (though not the statute), the abstention doctrine, comity, res judicata, or collateral estoppel; or if the case concerns a "rule" or "doctrine" that is not specified as related to or connected with a constitutional or statutory provision. Consider "Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction" otherwise (i.e., the residual code); for issues pertaining to non-statutorily based Judicial Power topics; for cases arising under the Court's original jurisdiction; in cases in which the Court denied or dismissed the petition for review or where the decision of a lower court is affirmed by a tie vote; or in workers' compensation litigation involving statutory interpretation and, in addition, a discussion of jury determination and/or the sufficiency of the evidence.