opinion: MONKS v. NEW JERSEY
  No. 127.
  Argued February 26, 1970
  Decided May 25, 1970
  Anthony G. Amsterdam, by appointment of the Court, 395 U. S. 942, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Michael Meltsner.
  Archibald Kreiger argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was John G. Thevos.
  Per Curiam.
  Having scrutinized the record and considered the briefs and oral arguments submitted on both sides, we are satisfied that petitioner’s claim of coercion respecting his confession, given by him over 12 years ago upon his apprehension as an alleged juvenile delinquent, does not merit the plenary review that we thought it might deserve at the time petitioner’s pro se petition for cer-tiorari was granted. 395 U. S. 903. The other claims tendered in such petition fare no better.
  The further claim advanced by petitioner’s appointed counsel in this Court respecting the alleged unconstitutional application of N. J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:4-37 (b) has been raised for the first time upon this writ and the state courts have had no opportunity to pass upon it.
  Accordingly we conclude that the writ of certiorari should be dismissed as improvidently granted, without prejudice to any further appropriate proceedings below.
  It is so ordered.
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