opinion: TAGLIANETTI v. UNITED STATES.
  No. 446.
  Decided March 24, 1969.
  Raymond LaFazia for petitioner.
  Solicitor General Griswold and Assistant Attorney General Rogovin for the United States.
  Per Curiam.
  The petition for certiorari is granted and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. Following a jury trial in the District Court, petitioner was convicted on three counts of wilfully attempting to evade his income tax for the years 1956, 1957, and 1958. Following a remand to the District Court, the Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions. In the District Court on remand, the Government purported to turn over to petitioner all of his own conversations which had been overheard by means of unlawful electronic surveillance. Petitioner argues that he was entitled to examine additional surveillance records because neither the Government nor the District Court was able to determine with certainty which conversations petitioner had been a party to. In fact, the District Court examined all the records in camera to ascertain if the Government had correctly identified petitioner’s voice and had turned over to petitioner each conversation in which he had participated.
  Nothing in Alderman v. United States, Ivanov v. United States, or Butenko v. United States, ante, p. 165, requires an adversary proceeding and full disclosure for resolution of every issue raised by an electronic surveillance. On the contrary, an adversary proceeding and disclosure were required in those eases, not for lack of confidence in the integrity of government counsel or the trial judge, but only because the in camera procedures at issue there would have been an inadequate means to safeguard a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. Here the defendant was entitled to see a transcript of his own conversations and nothing else. He had no right to rummage in government files. The trial court was asked to identify only those instances of surveillance which petitioner had standing to challenge under the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule and to double-check the accuracy of the Government’s voice identifications. Under the circumstances presented here, we cannot hold that “the task is too complex, and the margin for error too great, to rely wholly on the in camera judgment of the trial court.” Alderman v. United States, supra, at 182.
  MR. Justice Black concurs in the result.
  Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or disposition of this case.
  Although this petition for certiorari was not filed within the 30 days allowed by the Court’s Rule 22 (2), the time limitation is not jurisdictional, Heflin v. United States, 358 U. S. 415, 418, n. 7 (1959), and does not bar our exercise of discretion to consider this case.
  Petitioner sought disclosure only of his own conversations and apparently lacks standing as to any others. “We do not understand appellant to argue that he has a right to inspect logs or memos of conversations in which he was not a participant. Indeed, that point he wisely conceded before the district court.” 398 F. 2d 568, 571.
instruction: What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the bases on which the Supreme Court rested its decision with regard to the legal provision that the Court considered in the case. Consider "judicial review (national level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of the federal government, including an interstate compact. Consider "judicial review (state level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of a state or local government. Consider "statutory construction" for cases where the majority interpret a federal statute, treaty, or court rule; if the Court interprets a federal statute governing the powers or jurisdiction of a federal court; if the Court construes a state law as incompatible with a federal law; or if an administrative official interprets a federal statute. Do not consider "statutory construction" where an administrative agency or official acts "pursuant to" a statute, unless the Court interprets the statute to determine if administrative action is proper. Consider "interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order" if the majority treats federal administrative action in arriving at its decision.Consider "diversity jurisdiction" if the majority said in approximately so many words that under its diversity jurisdiction it is interpreting state law. Consider "federal common law" if the majority indicate that it used a judge-made "doctrine" or "rule; if the Court without more merely specifies the disposition the Court has made of the case and cites one or more of its own previously decided cases unless the citation is qualified by the word "see."; if the case concerns admiralty or maritime law, or some other aspect of the law of nations other than a treaty; if the case concerns the retroactive application of a constitutional provision or a previous decision of the Court; if the case concerns an exclusionary rule, the harmless error rule (though not the statute), the abstention doctrine, comity, res judicata, or collateral estoppel; or if the case concerns a "rule" or "doctrine" that is not specified as related to or connected with a constitutional or statutory provision. Consider "Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction" otherwise (i.e., the residual code); for issues pertaining to non-statutorily based Judicial Power topics; for cases arising under the Court's original jurisdiction; in cases in which the Court denied or dismissed the petition for review or where the decision of a lower court is affirmed by a tie vote; or in workers' compensation litigation involving statutory interpretation and, in addition, a discussion of jury determination and/or the sufficiency of the evidence.