opinion: MICHIGAN v. OHIO
  No. 30,
  Orig.
  Argued December 11, 1972
  Decided and Decree entered February 22, 1973
  Charles F. Keeley, Assistant Attorney General of Michigan, argued the cause for plaintiff on exceptions to the Report of the Special Master. With him on the brief were Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, and Jerome Maslowski, Assistant Attorney General.
  Charles S. Rawlings, Assistant Attorney General of Ohio, argued the cause for defendant in answer to exceptions to the Report of the Special Master. With him on the brief was William J. Brown, Attorney General.
  Per Curiam and Decree.
  Upon consideration of the Report filed Nov. 9, 1971, by Senior Judge Albert B. Maris, Special Master, exceptions filed thereto, and argument thereon, it is now ordered, adjudged, and decreed as follows:
  1. The exceptions filed by the State of Michigan to the report and recommendations of the Special Master are overruled.
  2. The boundary line between the States of Ohio and Michigan in Lake Erie follows a line drawn from the point in Maume.e Bay where the north cape of that bay was located in 1836 on a course having a bearing North 46° East measured from a true meridian, passing over the center of the existing circular concrete seawall on Turtle Island and continuing on the same course through the lake to the point where it intersects the boundary line between the United States and Canada.
  3. In 1836 the north cape of Maumee Bay was located at the point in that bay where a line drawn North 87° 49' 44" East from Post 71 on the land boundary line between the States of Ohio and Michigan intersects a line drawn South 45° West from the center of the existing circular concrete seawall on Turtle Island, both bearings being measured from a true meridian.
  4. The costs of this suit, including the expenses of the Special Master, shall be borne by the State of Michigan.
instruction: What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the bases on which the Supreme Court rested its decision with regard to the legal provision that the Court considered in the case. Consider "judicial review (national level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of the federal government, including an interstate compact. Consider "judicial review (state level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of a state or local government. Consider "statutory construction" for cases where the majority interpret a federal statute, treaty, or court rule; if the Court interprets a federal statute governing the powers or jurisdiction of a federal court; if the Court construes a state law as incompatible with a federal law; or if an administrative official interprets a federal statute. Do not consider "statutory construction" where an administrative agency or official acts "pursuant to" a statute, unless the Court interprets the statute to determine if administrative action is proper. Consider "interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order" if the majority treats federal administrative action in arriving at its decision.Consider "diversity jurisdiction" if the majority said in approximately so many words that under its diversity jurisdiction it is interpreting state law. Consider "federal common law" if the majority indicate that it used a judge-made "doctrine" or "rule; if the Court without more merely specifies the disposition the Court has made of the case and cites one or more of its own previously decided cases unless the citation is qualified by the word "see."; if the case concerns admiralty or maritime law, or some other aspect of the law of nations other than a treaty; if the case concerns the retroactive application of a constitutional provision or a previous decision of the Court; if the case concerns an exclusionary rule, the harmless error rule (though not the statute), the abstention doctrine, comity, res judicata, or collateral estoppel; or if the case concerns a "rule" or "doctrine" that is not specified as related to or connected with a constitutional or statutory provision. Consider "Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction" otherwise (i.e., the residual code); for issues pertaining to non-statutorily based Judicial Power topics; for cases arising under the Court's original jurisdiction; in cases in which the Court denied or dismissed the petition for review or where the decision of a lower court is affirmed by a tie vote; or in workers' compensation litigation involving statutory interpretation and, in addition, a discussion of jury determination and/or the sufficiency of the evidence.