opinion: Justice Rehnquist
  delivered the opinion of the Court.
  In this case we address the facial constitutionality of a Puerto Rico statute and regulations restricting advertising of casino gambling aimed at the residents of Puerto Rico. Appellant Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates, doing business in Puerto Rico as Condado Holiday Inn Hotel and Sands Casino, filed suit against appellee Tourism Company of Puerto Rico in the Superior Court of Puerto Rico, San Juan Section. Appellant sought a declaratory judgment that the statute and regulations, both facially and as applied by the Tourism Company, impermissibly suppressed commercial speech in violation of the First Amendment and the equal protection and due process guarantees of the United States Constitution. The Superior Court held that the advertising restrictions had been unconstitutionally applied to appellant’s past conduct. But the court adopted a narrowing construction of the statute and regulations and held that, based on such a construction, both were facially constitutional. The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico dismissed an appeal on the ground that it “d[id] not present a substantial constitutional question.” We postponed consideration of the question of jurisdiction until the hearing on the merits. 474 U. S. 917 (1985). We now hold that we have jurisdiction to hear the appeal, and we affirm the decision of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico with respect to the facial constitutionality of the advertising restrictions.
  In 1948, the Puerto Rico Legislature legalized certain forms of casino gambling. The Games of Chance Act of 1948, Act No. 221 of May 15, 1948 (Act), authorized the playing of roulette, dice, and card games in licensed “gambling rooms.” §2, codified, as amended, at P. R. Laws Ann., Tit. 15, §71 (1972). Bingo and slot machines were later added to the list of authorized games of chance under the Act. See Act of June 7, 1948, No. 21, § 1 (bingo); Act of July 30, 1974, No. 2, pt. 2, §2 (slot machines). The legislature’s intent was set forth in the Act’s Statement of Motives:
  “The purpose of this Act is to contribute to the development of tourism by means of the authorization of certain games of chance which are customary in the recreation places of the great tourist centers of the world, and by the establishment of regulations for and the strict surveillance of said games by the government, in order to ensure for tourists the best possible safeguards, while at the same time opening for the Treasurer of Puerto Rico an additional source of income.” Games of Chance Act of 1948, Act No. 221 of May 15, 1948, § 1.
  The Act also provided that “[n]o gambling room shall be permitted to advertise or otherwise offer their facilities to the public of Puerto Rico.” §8, codified, as amended, at P. R. Laws Ann., Tit. 15, §77 (1972).
  The Act authorized the Economic Development Administration of Puerto Rico to issue and enforce regulations implementing the various provisions of the Act. See § 7(a), codified, as amended, at P. R. Laws Ann., Tit. 15, §76a (1972). Appellee Tourism Company of Puerto Rico, a public corporation, assumed the regulatory powers of the Economic Development Administration under the Act in 1970. See Act of June 18, J.970, No. 10, § 17, codified at P. R. Laws Ann., Tit. 23, §671p (Supp. 1983). The two regulations at issue in this case were originally issued in 1957 for the purpose of implementing the advertising restrictions contained in §8 of the Act. Regulation 76-218 basically reiterates the language of § 8. See 15 R. & R. P. R. § 76-218 (1972). Regulation 76a-l(7), as amended in 1971, provides in pertinent part:
  “No concessionaire, nor his agent or employee is authorized to advertise the gambling parlors to the public in Puerto Rico. The advertising of our games of chance is hereby authorized through newspapers, magazines, radio, television and other publicity media outside Puerto Rico subject to the prior editing and approval by the Tourism Development Company of the advertisement to be submitted in draft to the Company.” 15 R. & R. P. R. §76a-l(7) (1972).
  In 1975, appellant Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates, a partnership organized under the laws of Texas, obtained a franchise to operate a gambling casino and began doing business under the name Condado Holiday Inn Hotel and Sands Casino. In 1978, appellant was twice fined by the Tourism Company for violating the advertising restrictions in the Act and implementing regulations. Appellant protested the fines in a series of letters to the Tourism Company. On February 16, 1979, the Tourism Company issued to all casino franchise holders a memorandum setting forth the following interpretation of the advertising restrictions:
  “This prohibition includes the use of the word ‘casino’ in matchbooks, lighters, envelopes, inter-office and/or external correspondence, invoices, napkins, brochures, menus, elevators, glasses, plates, lobbies, banners, fly-ers, paper holders, pencils, telephone books, directories, bulletin boards or in any hotel dependency or object which may be accessible to the public in Puerto Rico.” App. 7a.
  Pursuant to this administrative interpretation, the Tourism Company assessed additional fines against appellant. The Tourism Company ordered appellant to pay the outstanding total of $1,500 in fines by March 18, 1979, or its gambling franchise would not be renewed. Appellant continued to protest the fines, but ultimately paid them without seeking judicial review of the decision of the Tourism Company. In July 1981, appellant was again fined for violating the advertising restrictions. Faced with another threatened non-renewal of its gambling franchise, appellant paid the $500 fine under protest.
  Appellant then filed a declaratory judgment action against the Tourism Company in the Superior Court of Puerto Rico, San Juan Section, seeking a declaration that the Act and implementing regulations, both facially and as applied by the Tourism Company, violated appellant’s commercial speech rights under the United States Constitution. The Puerto Rico Secretary of Justice appeared for the purpose of defending the constitutionality of the statute and regulations. After a trial, the Superior Court held that “[t]he administrative interpretation and application has [sic] been capricious., arbitrary, erroneous and unreasonable, and has [sic] produced absurd results which are contrary to law.” App. to Juris. Statement 29b. The court therefore determined that it must “override the regulatory deficiency to save the constitutionality of the statute.” The court reviewed the history of casino gambling in Puerto Rico and concluded:
  “. . .We assume that the legislator was worried about the participation of the residents of Puerto Rico on what on that date constituted an experiment.... Therefore, he prohibited the gaming rooms from announcing themselves or offering themselves to the public — which we reasonably infer are the bona fide residents of Puerto Rico. . . . [WJhat the legislator foresaw and prohibited was the invitation to play at the casinos through publicity campaigns or advertising in Puerto Rico addressed to the resident of Puerto Rico. He wanted to protect him.” Id., at 32b.
  Based on this view of the legislature’s intent, the court issued a narrowing construction of the statute, declaring that “the only advertisement prohibited by the law originally is that which is contracted with an advertising agency, for consideration, to attract the resident to bet at the dice, card, roulette and bingo tables.” Id., at 33b-34b. The court also issued the following narrowing construction of Regulation 76a-l(7):
  “. . . Advertisements of the casinos in Puerto Rico are prohibited in the local publicity media addressed to inviting the residents of Puerto Rico to visit the casinos.
  “We hereby allow, within the jurisdiction of Puerto Rico, advertising by the casinos addressed to tourists, provided they do not invite the residents of Puerto Rico to visit the casino, even though said announcements may incidentally reach the hands of a resident. Within the ads of casinos allowed by this regulation figure, for illustrative purposes only, advertising distributed or placed in landed airplanes or cruise ships in jurisdictional waters and in restricted areas to travelers only in the international airport and the docks where tourist cruise ships arrive since the principal objective of said announcements is to make the tourist in transit through Puerto Rico aware of the availability of the games of chance as a tourist amenity; the ads of casinos in magazines for distribution primarily in Puerto Rico to the tourist, including the official guide of the Tourism Company ‘Que Pasa in Puerto Rico’ and any other tourist facility guide in Puerto Rico, even though said magazines may be available to the residents and in movies, television, radio, newspapers and trade magazines which may be published, taped, or filmed in the exterior for tourism promotion in the exterior even though they may be exposed or incidentally circulated in Puerto Rico. For example: an advertisement in the New York Times, an advertisement in CBS which reaches us through Cable TV, whose main objective is to reach the potential tourist.
  “We hereby authorize advertising in the mass communication media of the country, where the trade name of the hotel is used even though it may contain a reference to the casino provided that the word casino is never used alone nor specified. Among the announcements allowed, by way of illustration, are the use of the trade name with which the hotel is identified for the promotion of special vacation packages and activities at the hotel, in invitations, ‘billboards/ bulletins and programs or activities sponsored by the hotel. The use of the trade name, including the reference to the casino is also allowed in the hotel’s facade, provided the word ‘casino’ does not exceed in proportion the size of the rest of the name, and the utilization of lights and colors will be allowed if the rest of the laws regarding this application are complied with; and in the menus, napkins, glasses, tableware, glassware and other items used within the hotel, as well as in calling cards, envelopes and letterheads of the hotel and any other use which constitutes a means of identification.
  “The direct promotion of the casinos within the premises of the hotels is allowed. In-house guests and clients may receive any type of information and promotion regarding the location of the casino, its schedule and the procedure of the games as well as magazines, souvenirs, stirrers, matchboxes, cards, dice, chips, T-shirts, hats, photographs, postcards and similar items used by the tourism centers of the world.
  “Since a clausus enumeration of this regulation is unforeseeable, any other situation or incident relating to the legal restriction must be measured in light of the public policy of promoting tourism. If the object of the advertisement is the tourist, it passes legal scrutiny.” Id., at 38b-40b.
  The court entered judgment declaring that appellant’s constitutional rights had been violated by the Tourism Company’s past application of the advertising restrictions, but that the restrictions were not facially unconstitutional and could be sustained, as “modified by the guidelines issued by this Court on this date.” Id., at 42b.
  The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico dismissed appellant’s appeal of the Superior Court’s decision on the ground that it “d[id] not present a substantial constitutional question.” Id., at la. See P. R. Laws Ann., Tit. 4, §37(a) (1978). Treating appellant’s submission as a petition for a writ of review, see §§ 37(b), (g), the Supreme Court denied the petition. One judge dissented.
  We hold that we have jurisdiction to review the decision of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico. A federal statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1258(2), specifically authorizes an appeal to this Court from a decision of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico “where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, and the decision is in favor of its validity.” A careful review of the record in this case reveals that appellant’s federal constitutional claims were adequately raised at every stage of the proceedings below. In a letter to the Tourism Company on February 24, 1982, prior to filing suit, appellant warned that, absent a reinterpretation of the advertising restrictions by the Tourism Company, “we have no choice but to challenge in Court the constitutionality and or validity of the advertising prohibition of the Act and Regulations.” App. to Juris. Statement 6h. In its complaint, appellant claimed that the advertising restrictions “violat[ed] the constitutional rights of petitioner protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States ...[,] the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws protected by the Constitution of the United States . . . [and] the constitutional guarantee of due process of law . . . Id., at 4i. And in the bill of appeal to the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, appellant claimed that the advertising restrictions violated “the First Amendment of the United States Constitution,” id., at 5c, along with “due process of law guaranteed by the Constitution” and “the equal protection of the laws,” id., at 6c.
  Under Puerto Rico law, appellant had the right to appeal the Superior Court’s decision to the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico on the ground that that case “involv[ed] or decid[ed] a substantial constitutional question under the Constitution of the United States.” P. R. Laws Ann., Tit. 4, §37(a) (1978). The Supreme Court’s dismissal of appellant’s appeal for want of “a substantial constitutional question” therefore constituted a decision on the merits in favor of the validity of the challenged statute and regulations. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510, 515 (1927). In such a situation, we have jurisdiction to review the decision of the Supreme Court pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1258(2).
  The Tourism Company argues, however, that appellant’s notice of appeal was not timely filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, in violation of Rule 53.1 of the Puerto Rico Rules of Civil Procedure. According to the Tourism Company, this flaw is fatal to appellant’s right to seek review in this Court. We do not agree. The requirement under Rule 53.1 that a notice of appeal be timely filed with the clerk of the reviewing court has been held by the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico to be nonjurisdictional. See Morales v. Mendez Mas, 109 P. R. R. 1136 (1980). In this case, the Supreme Court did not dismiss appellant’s appeal on timeliness grounds, so we can only assume that the court waived the timeliness requirement, as it had the power to do. Appellant’s late filing of the notice of appeal does not affect our jurisdiction.
  Before turning to the merits of appellant’s First Amendment claim, we must address an additional preliminary matter. Although we have not heretofore squarely addressed the issue in the context of a case originating in Puerto Rico, we think it obvious that, in reviewing the facial constitutionality of the challenged statute and regulations, we must abide by the narrowing constructions announced by the Superior Court and approved sub silentio by the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico. This would certainly be the rule in a case originating in one of the 50 States. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U. S. 747, 769, n. 24 (1982); Kingsley International Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U. S. 684, 688 (1959). And we believe that Puerto Rico’s status as a Commonwealth dictates application of the same rule. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U. S. 663, 672-673 (1974) (noting with approval decisions of lower federal courts holding that Puerto Rico is to be deemed “sovereign over matters not ruled by the Constitution”); Wackenhut Corp. v. Aponte, 266 F. Supp. 401, 405 (PR 1966) (Puerto Rico “should have the primary opportunity through its courts to determine the intended scope of its own legislation”), aff’d, 386 U. S. 268 (1967).
  Because this case involves the restriction of pure commercial speech which does “no more than propose a commercial transaction,” Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U. S. 748, 762 (1976), our First Amendment analysis is guided by the general principles identified in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n of New York, 447 U. S. 557 (1980). See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U. S. 626, 637-638 (1985). Under Central Hudson, commercial speech receives a limited form of First Amendment protection so long as it concerns a lawful activity and is not misleading or fraudulent. Once it is determined that the First Amendment applies to the particular kind of commercial speech at issue, then the speech may be restricted only if the government’s interest in doing so is substantial, the restrictions directly advance the government’s asserted interest, and the restrictions are no more extensive than necessary to serve that interest. 447 U. S., at 566.
  The particular kind of commercial speech at issue here, namely, advertising of casino gambling aimed at the residents of Puerto Rico, concerns a lawful activity and is not misleading or fraudulent, at least in the abstract. We must therefore proceed to the three remaining steps of the Central Hudson analysis in order to determine whether Puerto Rico’s advertising restrictions run afoul of the First Amendment. The first of these three steps involves an assessment of the strength of the government’s interest in restricting the speech. The interest at stake in this case, as determined by the Superior Court, is the reduction of demand for casino gambling by the residents of Puerto Rico. Appellant acknowledged the existence of this interest in its February 24, 1982, letter to the Tourism Company. See App. to Juris. Statement 2h (“The legislators wanted the tourists to flock to the casinos to gamble, but not our own people”). The Tourism Company’s brief before this Court explains the legislature’s belief that “[e]xcessive casino gambling among local residents . . . would produce serious harmful effects on the health, safety and welfare of the Puerto Rican citizens, such as the disruption of moral and cultural patterns, the increase in local crime, the fostering of prostitution, the development of corruption, and the infiltration of organized crime.” Brief for Appellees 37. These are some of the very same concerns, of course, that have motivated the vast majority of the 50 States to prohibit casino gambling. We have no difficulty in concluding that the Puerto Rico Legislature’s interest in the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens constitutes a “substantial” governmental interest. Cf. Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U. S. 41, 54 (1986) (city has substantial interest in “preserving the quality of life in the community at large”).
  The last two steps of the Central Hudson analysis basically involve a consideration of the- “fit” between the legislature’s ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends. Step three asks the question whether the challenged restrictions on commercial speech “directly advance” the government’s asserted interest. In the instant case, the answer to this question is clearly “yes.” The Puerto Rico Legislature obviously believed, when it enacted the advertising restrictions at issue here, that advertising of casino gambling aimed at the residents of Puerto Rico would serve to increase the demand for the product advertised. We think the legislature’s belief is a reasonable one, and the fact that appellant has chosen to litigate this case all the way to this Court indicates that appellant shares the legislature’s view. See Central Hudson, supra, at 569 (“There is an immediate connection between advertising and demand for electricity. Central Hudson would not contest the advertising ban unless it believed that promotion would increase its sales”); cf. Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U. S. 490, 509 (1981) (plurality opinion of White, J.) (finding third prong of Central Hudson test satisfied where legislative judgment “not manifestly unreasonable”).
  Appellant argues, however, that the challenged advertising restrictions are underinclusive because other kinds of gambling such as horse racing, cockfighting, and the lottery may be advertised to the residents of Puerto Rico. Appellant’s argument is misplaced for two reasons. First, whether other kinds of gambling are advertised in Puerto Rico or not, the restrictions on advertising of casino gambling “directly advance” the legislature’s interest in reducing demand for games of chance. See id., at 511 (plurality opinion of White, J.) (“[WJhether onsite advertising is permitted or not, the prohibition of offsite advertising is directly related to the stated objectives of traffic safety and esthetics. This is not altered by the fact that the ordinance is underinclusive because it permits onsite advertising”). Second, the legislature’s interest, as previously identified, is not necessarily to reduce demand for. all games of chance, but to reduce demand for casino gambling. According to the Superior Court, horse racing, cockfighting, “picas,” or small games of chance at fiestas, and the lottery “have been traditionally part of the Puerto Rican’s roots,” so that “the legislator could have been more flexible than in authorizing more sophisticated games which are not so widely sponsored by the people.” App. to Juris. Statement 35b. In other words, the legislature felt that for Puerto Ricans the risks associated with casino gambling were significantly greater than those associated with the more traditional kinds of gambling in Puerto Rico. In our view, the legislature’s separate classification of casino gambling, for purposes of the advertising ban, satisfies the third step of the Central Hudson analysis.
  We also think it clear beyond peradventure that the challenged statute and regulations satisfy the fourth and last step of the Central Hudson analysis, namely, whether the restrictions on commercial speech are no more extensive than necessary to serve the government’s interest. The narrowing constructions of the advertising restrictions announced by the Superior Court ensure that the restrictions will not affect advertising of casino gambling aimed at tourists, but will apply only to such advertising when aimed at the residents of Puerto Rico. See also n. 7, infra; cf. Oklahoma Telecasters Assn. v. Crisp, 699 F. 2d 490, 501 (CA10 1983), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U. S. 691 (1984). Appellant contends, however, that the First Amendment requires the Puerto Rico Legislature to reduce demand for casino gambling among the residents of Puerto Rico not by suppressing commercial speech that might encourage such gambling, but by promulgating additional speech designed to discourage it. We reject this contention. We think it is up to the legislature to decide whether or not such a “counterspeech” policy would be as effective in reducing the demand for casino gambling as a restriction on advertising. The legislature could conclude, as it apparently did here, that residents of Puerto Rico are already aware of the risks of casino gambling, yet would nevertheless be induced by widespread advertising to engage in such potentially harmful conduct. Cf. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, 585 (DC 1971) (three-judge court) (“Congress had convincing evidence that the Labeling Act of 1965 had not materially reduced the incidence of smoking”), summarily aff’d sub nom. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Acting Attorney General, 405 U. S. 1000 (1972); Dunagin v. City of Oxford, Miss., 718 F. 2d 738, 751 (CA5 1983) (en banc) (“We do not believe that a less restrictive time, place and manner restriction, such as a disclaimer warning of the dangers of alcohol, would be effective. The state’s concern is not that the public is unaware of the dangers of alcohol. . . . The concern instead is that advertising will unduly promote alcohol consumption despite known dangers”), cert. denied, 467 U. S. 1259 (1984).
  In short, we conclude that the statute and regulations at issue in this case, as construed by the Superior Court, pass muster under each prong of the Central Hudson test. We therefore hold that the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico properly rejected appellant’s First Amendment claim.
  Appellant argues, however, that the challenged advertising restrictions are constitutionally defective under our decisions in Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U. S. 678 (1977), and Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U. S. 809 (1975). In Carey, this Court struck down a ban on any “advertisement or display” of contraceptives, 431 U. S., at 700-702, and in Bigelow, we reversed a criminal conviction based on the advertisement of an abortion clinic. We think appellant’s argument ignores a crucial distinction between the Carey and Bigelow decisions and the instant case. In Carey and Bigelow, the underlying conduct that was the subject of the advertising restrictions was constitutionally protected and could not have been prohibited by the State. Here, on the other hand, the Puerto Rico Legislature surely could have prohibited casino gambling by the residents of Puerto Rico altogether. In our view, the greater power to completely ban casino gambling necessarily includes the lesser power to ban advertising of casino gambling, and Carey and Bigelow are hence inapposite.
  Appellant also makes the related argument that, having chosen to legalize casino gambling for residents of Puerto Rico, the legislature is prohibited by the First Amendment from using restrictions on advertising to accomplish its goal of reducing demand for such gambling. We disagree. In our view, appellant has the argument backwards. As we noted in the preceding paragraph, it is precisely because the government could have enacted a wholesale prohibition of the underlying conduct that it is permissible for the government to take the less intrusive step of allowing the conduct, but reducing the demand through restrictions on advertising. It would surely be a Pyrrhic victory for casino owners such as appellant to gain recognition of a First Amendment right to advertise their casinos to the residents of Puerto Rico, only to thereby force the legislature into banning casino gambling by residents altogether. It would just as surely be a strange constitutional doctrine which would concede to the legislature the authority to totally ban a product or activity, but deny to the legislature the authority to forbid the stimulation of demand for the product or activity through advertising on behalf of those who would profit from such increased demand. Legislative regulation of products or activities deemed harmful, such as cigarettes, alcoholic beverages, and prostitution, has varied from outright prohibition on the one hand, see, e. g., Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 647(b) (West Supp. 1986) (prohibiting soliciting or engaging in act of prostitution), to legalization of the product or activity with restrictions on stimulation of its demand on the other hand, see, e. g., Nev. Rev. Stat. §§244.345(1), (8) (1986) (authorizing licensing of houses of prostitution except in counties with more than 250,000 population), §§201.430, 201.440 (prohibiting advertising of houses of prostitution “[i]n any public theater, on the public streets of any city or town, or on any public highway,” or “in [a] place of business”). To rule out the latter, intermediate kind of response would require more than we find in the First Amendment.
  Appellant’s final argument in opposition to the advertising restrictions is that they are unconstitutionally vague. In particular, appellant argues that the statutory language, “to advertise or otherwise offer their facilities,” and “the public of Puerto Rico,” are not sufficiently defined to satisfy the requirements of due process. Appellant also claims that the term “anunciarse,” which appears in the controlling Spanish version of the statute, is actually broader than the English term “to advertise,” and could be construed to mean simply “to make known.” Even assuming that appellant’s argument has merit with respect to the bare statutory language, however, we have already noted that we are bound by the Superior Court’s narrowing construction of the statute. Viewed in light of that construction, and particularly with the interpretive assistance of the implementing regulations as modified by the Superior Court, we do not find the statute unconstitutionally vague.
  For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico that, as construed by the Superior Court, § 8 of the Games of Chance Act of 1948 and the implementing regulations do not facially violate the First Amendment or the due process or equal protection guarantees of the Constitution, is affirmed.
  It is so ordered.
  We have held that Puerto Rico is subject to the First Amendment Speech Clause, Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U. S. 298, 314 (1922), the Due Process Clause of either the Fifth or the Fourteenth Amendment, Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U. S. 663, 668-669, n. 5 (1974), and the equal protection guarantee of either the Fifth or the Fourteenth Amendment, Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U. S. 572, 599-601 (1976). See generally Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U. S. 465, 468-471 (1979).
  The hotel was purchased in 1983 by Williams Electronics Corporation, is now organized as a public corporation under Delaware law as Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates, Inc., and does business in Puerto Rico as Condado Plaza Hotel and Casino.
  News of the Tourism Company’s decision to levy the fine against appellant reached the New Jersey Gaming Commission, and caused the Commission to consider denying a petition filed by appellant’s parent company for a franchise to operate a casino in that State.
  In addition to its decision concerning the advertising restrictions, the Superior Court declared unconstitutional a regulation, 15 R. & R. P. R. § 76a-4(e) (1972), that required male casino patrons to wear dinner jackets while in the casino. The court described the dinner jacket requirement as “basically a condition of sex” and found that the legislature “has no reasonable interest which would warrant a dissimilar classification” based on sex. See App. to Juris. Statement 35b-36b.
  Under Puerto Rico law, the notice of appeal apparently was due in the Clerk’s Office by 5 p.m. on the 30th day following the docketing of the Superior Court’s judgment. Supreme Court of Puerto Rico Rule 48(a). The certificate of the Acting Chief Clerk of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico indicates that appellant’s notice of appeal was filed at 5:06 p.m. on the 30th day.
  A rigid rule of deference to interpretations of Puerto Rico law by Puerto Rico courts is particularly appropriate given the unique cultural and legal history of Puerto Rico. See Diaz v. Gonzalez, 261 U. S. 102, 105-106 (1923) (Holmes, J.) (“This Court has stated many times the deference due to the understanding of the local courts upon matters of purely local concern. . . . This is especially true in dealing with the decisions of a Court inheriting and brought up in a different system from that which prevails here”).
  The narrowing construction of the statute and regulations announced by the Superior Court effectively ensures that the advertising restrictions cannot be used to inhibit either the freedom of the press in Puerto Rico to report on any aspect of casino gambling, or the freedom of anyone, including casino owners, to comment publicly on such matters as legislation relating to casino gambling. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U. S. 626, 637-638, n. 7 (1985) (noting that Ohio’s ban on advertising of legal services in Daikon Shield cases “has placed no general restrictions on appellant’s right to publish facts or express opinions regarding Daikon Shield litigation”); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U. S. 376, 391 (1973) (emphasizing that “nothing in our holding allows government at any level to forbid Pittsburgh Press to publish and distribute advertisements commenting on the Ordinance, the enforcement practices of the Commission, or the propriety of sex preferences in employment”); Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 Va. L. Rev. 1, 35, n. 125 (1979) (such “ ‘political’ dialogue is at the core of. . . the first amendment”).
  The history of legalized gambling in Puerto Rico supports the Superior Court’s view of the legislature’s intent. Casino gambling was prohibited in Puerto Rico for most of the first half of this century. See Puerto Rico Penal Code, §299, Rev. Stats, and Codes of Porto Rico (1902). The Puerto Rico Penal Code of 1937 made it a misdemeanor to deal, play, carry on, open, or conduct “any game of faro, monte, roulette, fantan, poker, seven and a half, twenty one, hoky-poky, or any game of chance played with cards, dice or any device for money, checks, credit, or other representative of value.” See P. R. Laws Ann., Tit. 33, §1241 (1983). This longstanding prohibition of casino gambling stood in stark contrast to the Puerto Rico Legislature’s early legalization of horse racing, see Act of Mar. 10, 1910, No. 23, repealed, Act of Apr. 13, 1916, No. 28, see P. R. Laws Ann., Tit. 15, §§ 181-197 (1972 and Supp. 1985); “picas,” see Act of Apr. 23, 1927, No. 25, § 1, codified, as amended, at P. R. Laws Ann., Tit. 15, § 80 (1972); dog racing, see Act of Apr. 20, 1936, No. 35, repealed, Act of June 4, 1957, No. 10, §1, see P. R. Laws Ann., Tit. 15, §231 (1972) (prohibiting dog racing); cockfighting, see Act of Aug. 12, 1933, No. 1, repealed, Act of May 12, 1942, No. 236, see P. R. Laws Ann., Tit. 15, §§ 292-299 (1972); and the Puerto Rico lottery, see J. R. No. 37, May 14, 1934, repealed, Act of May 15, 1938, No. 212, see P. R. Laws Ann., Tit. 15, §§ 111-128 (1972 and Supp. 1985).
  It should be apparent from our discussion of the First Amendment issue, and particularly the third and fourth prongs of the Central Hudson test, that appellant can fare no better under the equal protection guarantee of the Constitution. Cf. Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U. S. 41, 55, n. 4 (1986). If there is a sufficient “fit” between the legislature’s means and ends to satisfy the concerns of the First Amendment, the same “fit” is surely adequate under the applicable “rational basis” equal protection analysis. See Dunagin v. City of Oxford, Miss., 718 F. 2d 738, 752-753 (CA5 1983) (en banc), cert. denied, 467 U. S. 1259 (1984).
  Justice Stevens, in dissent, asserts the additional equal protection claim, not raised by appellant either below or in this Court, that the Puerto Rico statute and regulations impermissibly discriminate between different kinds of publications. Post, at 359-360. Justice Stevens misunderstands the nature of the Superior Court’s limiting construction of the statute and regulations. According to the Superior Court, “[i]f the object of [an] advertisement is the tourist, it passes legal scrutiny.” See App. to Juris. Statement 40b. It is clear from the court’s opinion that this basic test applies regardless of whether the advertisement appears in a local or nonlocal publication. Of course, the likelihood that a casino advertisement appearing in the New York Times will be primarily addressed to tourists, and not Puerto Rico residents, is far greater than would be the ease for a similar advertisement appearing in the San Juan Star. But it is simply the demographics of the two newspapers’ readerships, and not any form of “discrimination” on the part of the Puerto Rico Legislature or the Superior Court, which produces this result.
  See also 15 U. S. C. § 1335 (prohibiting cigarette advertising “on any medium of electronic communication subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Communications Commission”), upheld in Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (DC 1971), summarily aff’d sub nom. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Acting Attorney General, 405 U. S. 1000 (1972); Fla. Stat. § 561.42(10)-(12) (1985) (prohibiting all signs except for one sign per product in liquor store windows); Mass. Gen. Laws § 138:24 (1974) (authorizing Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission to regulate liquor advertising); Miss. Code Ann. § 67-1-85 (Supp. 1985) (prohibiting most forms of liquor sign advertising), upheld in Dunagin v. City of Oxford, Miss., supra; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 4301.03(E), 4301.211 (1982) (authorizing Liquor Control Commission to regulate liquor advertising and prohibiting off-premises advertising of beer prices), upheld in Queensgate Investment Co. v. Liquor Control Comm’n, 69 Ohio St. 2d 361, 433 N. E. 2d 138, appeal dism’d for want of a substantial federal question, 459 U. S. 807 (1982); Okla. Const., Art. 27, § 5, and Okla. Stat., Tit. 37, § 516 (1981) (prohibiting all liquor advertising except for one storefront sign), upheld in Oklahoma Telecasters Assn. v. Crisp, 699 F. 2d 490 (CA10 1983), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U. S. 691 (1984); Utah Code Ann. §§ 32-7-26 to 32-7-28 (1974) (repealed 1985) (prohibiting all liquor advertising except for one storefront sign).
  Justice Stevens claims that the Superior Court’s narrowing construction creates an impermissible “prior restraint” on protected speech, because that court required the submission of certain casino advertising to appellee for its prior approval. See post, at 361. This argument was not raised by appellant either below or in this Court, and we therefore express no view on the constitutionality of the particular portion of the Superior Court’s narrowing construction cited by Justice Stevens.
choices: First Amendment, miscellaneous (cf. comity: First Amendment) commercial speech, excluding attorneys libel, defamation: defamation of public officials and public and private persons libel, privacy: true and false light invasions of privacy legislative investigations: concerning internal security only federal or state internal security legislation: Smith, Internal Security, and related federal statutes loyalty oath or non-Communist affidavit (other than bar applicants, government employees, political party, or teacher) loyalty oath: bar applicants (cf. admission to bar, state or federal or U.S. Supreme Court) loyalty oath: government employees loyalty oath: political party loyalty oath: teachers security risks: denial of benefits or dismissal of employees for reasons other than failure to meet loyalty oath requirements conscientious objectors (cf. military draftee or military active duty) to military service campaign spending (cf. governmental corruption): protest demonstrations (other than as pertains to sit-in demonstrations): demonstrations and other forms of protest based on First Amendment guarantees free exercise of religion establishment of religion (other than as pertains to parochiaid:) parochiaid: government aid to religious schools, or religious requirements in public schools obscenity, state (cf. comity: privacy): including the regulation of sexually explicit material under the 21st Amendment obscenity, federal