Per Curiam.
The question presented by this case is whether a federal district judge in an action brought under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act is divested of all discretion to deny a § 1404 (a) transfer motion, when a suit upon the same cause of action, earlier brought in a state court in the same city, was dismissed by the state court on the ground of forum non conveniens.
Jack Filbrun commenced a Federal Employers’ Liability Act suit for personal injuries against the respondent railroad in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois. On the respondent’s motion the state court dismissed the action on the ground of jorum non conveniens. Filbrun did not appeal. Instead, he filed a complaint grounded on the same cause of action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, sitting in Chicago. The respondent filed a motion pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1404 (a), requesting that the case be transferred to the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, sitting in Grand Rapids. The district judge denied the motion, and the respondent sought mandamus from the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit to compel the judge to order the transfer. On rehearing, the Court of Appeals, one judge dissenting, vacated a previous judgment refusing mandamus, and issued a writ directing the transfer. 307 F. 2d 924. We granted certiorari, 371 U. S. 946, to review the action of the Court of Appeals. We reverse the judgment for the reasons stated below.
Under Illinois law a state court’s determination to dismiss a case on the ground of jorum non conveniens requires consideration of similar factors — convenience of the parties and of witnesses and the interests of justice— to those to be considered by a federal court in applying § 1404 (a). The Court of Appeals accordingly reasoned that every point necessary to be passed upon by the federal district judge on respondent’s § 1404 (a) transfer motion had already been adjudicated adversely to the plaintiff in the state court, and concluded that “the district court had no discretion but to recognize the authoritative value of the state court’s ruling, made in a case commenced there by plaintiff.” 307 F. 2d, at 926.
The discretionary determinations of both the state and federal courts in this case required, to be sure, evaluations of similar, but by no means identical, objective criteria. However, since the material facts underlying the application of these criteria in each forum were different in several respects, principles of res judicata are not applicable to the situation here presented.
Thus, for example, in determining that Cook County was an inconvenient forum, the state court in this case could appropriately consider the availability of a state forum at Ludington, Michigan, where Filbrun’s alleged injury had occurred. But since there is no federal court in Ludington, the federal district judge in making his determination was limited to consideration of the alternative of a trial in the federal court in Grand Rapids, a city some 60 miles from Ludington. Obviously, the question whether the convenience of the parties and of the witnesses would be better served by a trial in a state court in Ludington is not the same question as whether those interests would be better served by a trial in a federal court in Grand Rapids. Similarly, a trial judge weighing the interests of justice could legitimately consider the condition of his court’s docket an important factor. While docket congestion is a problem facing all trial courts in large metropolitan areas, there is nothing to show that the problem in the federal court in Chicago is identical in either nature or quantity to the problem in the Cook County court system.
These considerations no more than illustrate the many variables which might affect the exercise of discretion by a state court, as contrasted to a federal court, in any given case. Since different factual considerations may be involved in each court’s determination, we hold that a prior state court dismissal on the ground of jorum non con- veniens can never serve to divest a federal district judge of the discretionary power vested in him by Congress to rule upon a motion to transfer under § 1404 (a).
In its original opinion in this case, the Court of Appeals found that there had been no abuse of discretion by the district judge in denying the motion for transfer. We do not read the opinion on rehearing as having disturbed that finding, but only as having determined that the district judge had been divested of power to exercise his discretion at all — a determination we have now found to be erroneous. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings.
It is so ordered.
28 U. S. C. § 1404 (a) provides: “For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought.”
In addition, the state court was required to determine whether plaintiff's selection of that court was dictated by a desire to vex and harass the defendant. Cotton v. L. & N. R. Co., 14 Ill. 2d 144, 174, 152 N. E. 2d 385, 400.
The Supreme Court of Illinois has observed that a serious court congestion problem exists in the Cook County courts. 14 Ill. 2d, at 171, 152 N. E. 2d, at 398.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.