Mr. Justice Douglas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Alaska, while a Territory, enacted a law which levied a tax at the rate of 1 percent on all real and personal property. L. 1949, c. 10, § 3. The tax was challenged in litigation without success. Some paid the tax voluntarily; others became delinquent. In 1953 the tax statute was repealed. L. 1953, c. 22. Thereafter petitioner instituted the present suits to collect taxes owing for the years 1949 to 1952, inclusive. The District Court granted a motion to dismiss, holding that no liability for these taxes had survived the repeal. 137 F. Supp. 181. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 246 F. 2d 493. The case is here by a petition for writ of certiorari which was granted in view of the fiscal importance of the question to Alaska. 356 U. S. 926.
Alaska has a general law, saving rights accrued under a statute that is repealed. The lower courts, however, held that this case was governed not by that provision but by § 2 (a) of the repealing Act which reads as follows:
“Section 1 of this Act shall not be applicable to:
“(a) any taxes which have been levied and assessed by any municipality, school or public utility district under the provisions of Chapter 10, Session Laws of Alaska 1949, as amended, or which are levied and assessed during the current fiscal year of such municipality, school or public utility district.”
It was held that this specific enactment qualifies the general repeal law and that the purpose of the 1953 Act was to wipe out any and all liabilities to pay taxes under the repealed law that had accrued prior to the date of repeal. Support for that conclusion was found in the title of the 1953 Act which includes the words “excepting from repeal certain taxes,” no qualifications whatsoever being indicated.
We take a different view. Section 2 (a) of the 1953 Act, as we read it, has nothing to do with any taxes other than those payable to a municipality, a school or public utility district, none of which is here involved. If it had done no more than save all accrued taxes in those categories, the case would be in quite a different posture. Section 2 (a), however, does not do that. It was protective of municipal, school, or public utility taxes in a much broader way. It saved first, those taxes that had been “levied and assessed” and second, those to be “levied and assessed during the current fiscal year.” This was to make sure, as the dissent below said, that municipalities and school and public utility districts (though not the Territory itself) would have the right to levy and collect the old taxes for the current year 1953, whether before or after the repealing Act had taken effect. So construed, § 2 (a) carves no exception from the general saving statute and does not interfere with the collection of unpaid taxes which accrued prior to repeal.
We are reinforced in this conclusion by the legislative history of the bill that became the repealing Act, a history of which we take judicial notice. See United States v. American Trucking Assns., 310 U. S. 534, 547. And see Wigmore on Evidence (3d ed. 1940) § 2577. The bill as introduced “cancelled, repealed and abrogated, and declared null and void” “all accrued and unpaid taxes” under the 1949 Act. That provision was deleted, however, by a House Committee, and it never became part of the law. The bill passed the House without it. The present § 2 (a) was added in the Senate; and the House agreed. If we adopted the construction taken below, we would be reading into the Act by implication what the Legislature seemingly rejected.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and, as there are other questions which were raised by the appeal (246 F. 2d 493, 495) but not reached by that court, the cause is remanded to it for proceedings in conformity with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice Harlan took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
See Mullaney v. Hess, 189 F. 2d 417; Hess v. Mullaney, 213 F. 2d 635.
Alaska Comp. L. Ann., 1949, § 19-1-1, reads as follows:
“The repeal or amendment of any statute shall not affect any offense committed or any act done or right accruing or accrued or any action or proceeding had or commenced prior to such repeal or amendment; nor shall any penalty, forfeiture or liability incurred under such statute be released or extinguished, but the same may be enforced, continued, sustained, prosecuted and punished under the repealing or amendatory statute save as limited by the ex post facto and other provisions of the Constitution, in which event the same may be enforced, continued, sustained, prosecuted and punished under the former law as if such repeal or amendment had not been made.”
Section 1 of the 1953 Act provides:
“That Chapter 10, Session Laws of Alaska, 1949, as amended by Chapter 88, Session Laws of Alaska, 1949, be and it is hereby repealed.”
We refer to the Alaska House and Senate Journals and to the original bill as introduced in the House which is on file with the Secretary of Alaska, a copy being certified by him.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.