PER CURIAM.
When a taxpayer overpays his taxes, he is generally entitled to interest from the Government for the period between the payment and the ultimate refund. See 26 U.S.C. § 6611(a). That interest begins to run "from the date of overpayment." §§ 6611(b)(1), (b)(2). But the Code does not define "the date of overpayment."
In this case, after the Internal Revenue Service advised Ford Motor Company that it had underpaid its taxes from 1983 until 1989, Ford remitted a series of deposits to the IRS totaling $875 million. Those deposits stopped the accrual of interest that Ford would otherwise owe once the audits were completed and the amount of its underpayment was finally determined. See § 6601, Rev. Proc. 84-58, 1984-2 Cum. Bull. 501. Later, Ford requested that the IRS treat the deposits as advance payments of the additional tax that Ford owed. Eventually the parties determined that Ford had overpaid its taxes in the relevant years, thereby entitling Ford to a return of the overpayment as well as interest. But the parties disagreed about when the interest began to run under 26 U.S.C. § 6611(b)(1). Ford argued that "the date of overpayment" was the date that it first remitted the deposits to the IRS. Ibid. The Government countered that the date of overpayment was the date that Ford requested that the IRS treat the remittances as payments of tax. The difference between the parties' competing interpretations of § 6611(b) is worth some $445 million.
Ford sued the Government in Federal District Court, asserting jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1). The Government did not contest the court's jurisdiction. See Brief in Opposition 3, n. 3. The District Court accepted the Government's construction of § 6611(b) and granted its motion for judgment on the pleadings. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, concluding that § 6611 is a waiver of sovereign immunity that must be construed strictly in favor of the Government. 508 Fed.Appx. 506 (2012).
Ford sought certiorari, arguing that the Sixth Circuit was wrong to give § 6611 a strict construction. In Ford's view, it is 28 U.S.C. § 1346-not § 6611-that waives the Government's immunity from this suit, and § 6611(b) is a substantive provision that should not be construed strictly. SeeGómez-Pérez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 491, 128 S.Ct. 1931, 170 L.Ed.2d 887 (2008); United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 472-473, 123 S.Ct. 1126, 155 L.Ed.2d 40 (2003). In its response to Ford's petition for certiorari, however, the Government contended for the first time that § 1346(a)(1) does not apply at all to this suit; it argues that the only basis for jurisdiction, and "the only general waiver of sovereign immunity that encompasses [Ford's] claim," is the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a). Brief in Opposition 3, n. 3. Although the Government acquiesced in jurisdiction in the lower courts, if the Government is now correct that the Tucker Act applies to this suit, jurisdiction over this case was proper only in the United States Court of Federal Claims. See § 1491(a).
This Court "is one of final review, 'not of first view.' " FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 529, 129 S.Ct. 1800, 173 L.Ed.2d 738 (2009) (quoting Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 718, n. 7, 125 S.Ct. 2113, 161 L.Ed.2d 1020 (2005)). The Sixth Circuit should have the first opportunity to consider the Government's new contention with respect to jurisdiction in this case. Depending on that court's answer, it may also consider what impact, if any, the jurisdictional determination has on the merits issues, especially whether or not § 6611 is a waiver of sovereign immunity that should be construed strictly.
The petition for certiorari is granted, the judgment of the Sixth Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.
It is so ordered.
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.