opinion: Mr. Justice Douglas
  delivered the opinion of the Court.
  Petitioner instituted this suit in the District Court in 1954 to recover the proceeds of a National Service Life Insurance policy. Petitioner’s son, the insured, has been missing since disappearing from his army unit in 1943. The complaint alleges that, prior to the insured’s disappearance, his condition was one of “general debility and weakness and despondency,” and that he had become totally and permanently disabled as a result of certain “diseases, ailments and injuries.” The complaint further avers that the insured had died in 1943, and that his total and permanent disability during the time the policy was in force entitled him to waiver of premiums on the policy.
  The District Court dismissed the complaint, holding that the insured would, under the allegations of the complaint, be presumed to be dead as of 1950, and that the policy had lapsed in the interim. 138 F. Supp. 810. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 229 F. 2d 503. It held that the complaint contained no allegations which would entitle the trier of fact to conclude that the insured had died at a time when the policy continued in force. Id,., at 504. We granted certiorari. 352 U. S. 822.
  Respondent urges that the insured’s death must be presumed to have occurred in 1950, at the end of seven years’ unexplained absence, when this policy had long lapsed for failure to pay premiums. In the alternative, it is argued that, if the petitioner’s claim is founded on the insured’s death in 1943, it is barred by the six-year statute of limitations, 38 U. S. C. § 445. We hold that, under the allegations in this complaint, petitioner is entitled to take her case to a jury.
  Congress has provided in 38 U. S. C. § 810 that a presumption of death shall arise upon the continued and unexplained absence of the insured for a period of seven years. Where proof of the insured’s death must rest primarily upon his unexplained absence, suit may not be maintained, as a practical matter, prior to the expiration of the statutory seven-year period. Petitioner’s cause of action, therefore, “accrued” at the time when, under § 810, .she might have successfully maintained her suit, and that is the date from which the six-year statute of limitations should be computed.
  Moreover, nothing in the provision of § 810 that the death of the insured “as of the date of the expiration of such period . . . may ... be considered as sufficiently proved” precludes the beneficiary from introducing- further evidence from which the jury might conclude that the insured’s presumed death occurred at an earlier date when the policy was still in force. United States v. Willkite, 219 F. 2d 343. The jury might so conclude here, if petitioner can prove the allegations of the complaint concerning the insured’s frail health and disability or other relevant facts. The presumption leaves it open to prove the precise time of the death, as the statute does not purport to create a conclusive presumption that the insured died at the end of the seven-year period. To compute the six-year limitation period from the date which the trier of fact establishes as the date of death would be to say that the beneficiary’s right to recover had expired before she could have successfully prosecuted a lawsuit to enforce that right. It is only where the beneficiary proves merely the fact of the insured’s seven years’ unexplained absence that the statute establishes the presumption of death as of the end of that period. The “contingency on which the claim is founded,” as used in 38 U. S. C. § 445, must, therefore, mean the end of the seven-year period when the presumption of death arose.
  That seems to us to be the common sense of the matter; and common sense often makes good law.
  Furthermore the allegations of permanent and total disability at the time of disappearance of the insured, if proved, would bring the petitioner within the premium waiver provisions of 38 U. S. C. §802 (n). Since the claim was filed by petitioner within one year subsequent to the presumed date of death, it should be considered as including the lesser claim of premium waiver. Hence, even though the jury found the actual date of death to be later than 1943, the coverage of the policy might continue. As we read the complaint, this alternative cause of action would also not have accrued until 1950; and the six-year statute of limitations had not run when this suit was brought.
  The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded to the District Court for trial.
  Reversed.
  Mr. Justice Whittaker took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
  That was the view even before the presumption of death at the end of seven years’ absence was codified. In Davie v. Briggs, 97 U. S. 628, 634, the Court said, “If it appears in evidence that the absent person, within the seven years, encountered some specific peril, or within that period came within the range of some impending or immediate danger, which might reasonably be expected to destroy life, the court or jury may infer that life ceased before the expiration of the seven years.”
instruction: What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.