opinion: Per Curiam.
  Petitioner, a car repairman employed by respondent railroad, brought this suit under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 35 Stat. 65, as amended, 45 U. S. C. § 51 et seq., in the Supreme Court of the State of New York to recover damages for personal injuries sustained as a result of respondent’s alleged negligence. A jury verdict for petitioner was set aside by the trial judge on the ground that negligence was not established. The Appellate Division affirmed without opinion, one judge dissenting, 10 App. Div. 2d 948, 201 N. Y. S. 2d 362, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, also without opinion, 11 N. Y. 2d 991, 183 N. E. 2d 704. This Court granted certiorari, 371 U. S. 860, to consider the propriety of the trial judge’s action.
  At the time of the accident, petitioner was working on a hoist platform located in a work pit underneath a railroad car on which new wheels were being installed. He testified that as he was lifting a 100-pound wheel spring into position the platform moved, causing him to drop the spring on his left index finger which, as a consequence, was amputated. Petitioner’s version of the accident was confirmed by a co-worker who testified that he saw the platform move at the time of the injury. Petitioner offered additional evidence that prior complaints had been lodged with respondent about platform movements in similar and adjacent repair pits in which fellow employees were working and that safety equipment preventing platform movements had been installed in one of the adjacent pits but not in the pit where the accident occurred.
  Respondent introduced evidence that it was physically impossible for the accident to have happened in the manner claimed by petitioner, that the platform was virtually immovable, and that the equipment installed in the adjacent pit was put there to assure that the platform was in position when the men went to work and had nothing to do with the movement of the platform during the process of installing new wheels.
  The conflict in the testimony was resolved by the jury’s verdict in favor of the petitioner. Since there was an evidentiary basis for that verdict, it was error for the New York trial and appellate courts to reevaluate the conflicting evidence and mandate a result opposite from that reached by the jury.
  In Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U. S. 645, also an F. E. L. A. action, the employer argued, as does respondent here, that its evidence tended to show it was physically impossible for its equipment to have injured the employee. There, as in this case, the suing employee offered evidence that the injury was the result of equipment failure. In reversing a state court judgment setting aside a jury verdict for the employee, this Court said, in language fully apposite here: “Only when there is a complete absence of probative facts to support the conclusion reached [by the jury] does a reversible error appear. But where, as here, there is an evidentiary basis for the jury’s verdict, the jury is free to discard or disbelieve whatever facts are inconsistent with its conclusion. And the appellate court’s function is exhausted when that evidentiary basis becomes apparent, it being immaterial that the court might draw a contrary inference or feel that another conclusion is more reasonable.” 327 U. S., at 653.
  Since, in this case, petitioner’s evidence, though disputed, constituted probative facts sufficient to support the finding of negligence, the state courts improperly invaded the function and province of the jury in setting the verdict aside. Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 352 U. S. 500.
  The judgment of the New York Court of Appeals is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
  It is so ordered.
instruction: What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.