opinion: Mr. Justice Douglas
  delivered the opinion of the Court.
  Missouri has a statute, Mo. Rev. Stat., 1949, § 129.060, first enacted in 1897, which was designed to end the coercion of employees by employers in the exercise of the franchise. It provides that an employee may absent himself from his employment for four hours between the opening and closing of the polls without penalty, and that any employer who among other things deducts wages for that absence is guilty of a misdemeanor.
  Appellant is a Missouri corporation doing business in St. Louis. November 5, 1946, was a day for general elections in Missouri, the polls being open from 6 A. M. to 7 P. M. One Grotemeyer, an employee of appellant, was on a shift that worked from 8 A. M. to 4:30 P. M. each day, with thirty minutes for lunch. His rate of pay was $1.60 an hour. He requested four hours from the scheduled work day to vote on November 5, 1946. That request was refused; but Grotemeyer and all other employees on his shift were allowed to leave at 3 P. M. that day, which gave them four consecutive hours to vote before the polls closed.
  Grotemeyer left his work at 3 P. M. in order to vote and did not return to work that day. He was not paid for the hour and a half between 3 P. M. and 4:30 P. M. Appellant was found guilty and fined for penalizing Grotemeyer in violation of the statute. The judgment was affirmed by the Missouri Supreme Court, 362 Mo. 299, 240 S. W. 2d 886, over the objection that the statute violated the Due Process and the Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Contract Clause of Art. I, § 10.
  The liberty of contract argument pressed on us is reminiscent of the philosophy of Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, which invalidated a New York law prescribing maximum hours for work in bakeries; Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1, which struck down a Kansas statute outlawing “yellow dog” contracts; Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, which held unconstitutional a federal statuté fixing minimum wage standards for women in the District of Columbia, and others of that vintage. Our recent decisions make plain that we do not sit as a super-legislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation nor to decide whether the policy which it expresses offends the public welfare. The legislative power has limits, as Tot v. United States, 319 U. S. 463, holds. But the state legislatures have constitutional authority to experiment with new techniques; they are entitled to their own standard of the public welfare; they may within extremely broad limits control practices in the business-labor field, so long as specific constitutional prohibitions are not violated and so long as conflicts with valid and controlling federal laws are avoided. That is the essence of West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379; Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502; Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U. S. 236; Lincoln Union v. Northwestern Co., 335 U. S. 525; and California Auto. Assn. v. Maloney, 341 U. S. 105.
  West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, supra, overruling Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, supra, held constitutional a state law fixing minimum wages for women. The present statute contains in form a minimum wage requirement. There is a difference in the purpose of the legislation.. Here it is not the protection of the health and morals of the citizen. Missouri by this legislation has sought to safeguard the right of suffrage by taking from employers the incentive and power to use their leverage over employees to influence the vote. But the police power is not confined to a narrow category; it extends, as stated in Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, 111, to all the great public needs. The protection of the right of suffrage under our scheme of things is basic and fundamental.
  The only semblance of substance in the constitutional objection to Missouri’s law is that the employer must pay wages for a period in which the employee performs no services. Of course many forms of regulation reduce the net return of the enterprise; yet that gives rise to no constitutional infirmity. See Queenside Hills Co. v. Saxl, 328 U. S. 80; California Auto. Assn. v. Maloney, supra. Most regulations of business necessarily impose financial burdens on the enterprise for which no compensation is paid. Those are part of the costs of our civilization. Extreme cases are conjured up where an employer is required to pay wages for a period that has no relation to the legitimate end. Those cases can await decision as and when they arise. The present law has no such infirmity. Jt is designed to eliminate any penalty for exercising the right of suffrage and to remove a practical obstacle to getting out the vote. The public welfare is a broad and inclusive concept. The moral, social, economic, and physical well-being of the community is one part of it; the political well-being, - another. The police power which is adequate to fix the financial burden for one is adequate for the other. The judgment of the legislature that time out for voting should cost the employee nothing may be a debatable one. It is indeed conceded by the opposition to be such. But if our recent cases mean anything, they leave debatable issues as respects business, economic, and social affairs to legislative decision. We could strike down this law only if we returned to the philosophy of the Lochner, Coppage, and Adkins cases.
  The classification of voters so as to free employees from the domination of employers is an attempt to deal with an evil to which the one group has been exposed. The need for that classification is a matter for legislative judgment (American Federation of Labor v. American Sash Co., 335 U. S. 538), and does not amount to a denial of equal protection under the laws.
  Affirmed.
  Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurs in the result.
  “Any person entitled to vote at any election in this state shall, on the day of such election, be entitled to absent himself from any services or employment in which he is then engaged or employed, for a period of four hours between the times of opening and closing the polls; and such voter shall not, because of so absenting himself, be liable to any penalty; provided, however, that his employer may specify the hours during which such employee may absent himself as aforesaid. Any person or corporation who shall refuse to any employee the privilege hereby conferred, or shall discharge or threaten to discharge any employee for absenting himself from his work for the purpose of said election, or shall cause any employee to suffer any penalty or deduction of wages because of the exercise of such privilege, or who shall, directly or indirectly, violate the provisions of this section, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof be fined in any sum not exceeding five hundred dollars.”
  Decisions contrary to that of the Missouri Supreme Court in this case have been rendered by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky in Illinois Central R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 305 Ky. 632, 204 S. W. 2d 973, and by the Supreme Court of Illinois in People v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 306 Ill. 486, 138 N. E. 155. But cf. Zelney v. Murphy, 387 Ill. 492, 56 N. E. 2d 754. The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York in People v. Ford Motor Co., 271 App. Div. 141, 63 N. Y. S. 2d 697, and the Appellate Department of the Superior Court of California in Ballarini v. Schlage Lock Co., 100 Cal. App. 2d 859, 226 P. 2d 771, held in accord with Missouri. For a review of legislation in this field, see 47 Col. L. Rev. 135.