opinion: Mr. Justice Douglas
  delivered the opinion of the Court.
  Petitioner was indicted for the unlawful acquisition of marihuana in violation of 26 U. S. C. § 2593 (a). The indictment, found in September 1953, was based on evidence obtained by a search warrant issued by a United States Commissioner, as authorized by Rule 41 (a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, in August 1953. Petitioner moved under Rule 41 (e) to suppress the evidence on the ground that the search warrant was improperly issued under Rule 41 (c) in that it was insufficient on its face, no probable cause existed, and the affidavit was based on unsworn statements. The District Court granted the motion to suppress and, on the Government’s later motion, dismissed the indictment. No motion for return of the evidence was made. The evidence seized was indeed contraband. Since the crime charged was a violation of a provision of the Internal Revenue Code, 28 U. S. C. § 2463 was applicable. That section provides against the return of the property in the following words:
  “All property taken or detained under any revenue law of the United States shall not be repleviable, but shall be deemed to be in the custody of the law and subject only to the orders and decrees of the courts of the United States having jurisdiction thereof.” And see 26 U. S. C. § 2598.
  After the District Court suppressed the evidence, a federal narcotics agent swore to a complaint before a New Mexico judge and caused a warrant for petitioner’s arrest to issue. -Petitioner has now been charged with being in possession of marihuana in violation of New Mexico law and awaits trial in the state court. The case against petitioner in the state court will be made by testimony of the federal agent based on the illegal search and on the evidence seized under the illegal federal warrant.
  That at least is the basis of the motion in the District Court to enjoin the federal narcotics agent from testifying in the state case with respect to the narcotics obtained in the illegal search and, if the evidence seized is out of the custody of the United States, to direct the agent to reacquire the evidence and destroy it or transfer it to other agents. The District Court denied the motion and the Court of Appeals affirmed. 218 F. 2d 237. The case is here on a petition for certiorari which we granted because of the importance in federal law enforcement of the question presented. 348 U. S. 958.
  The briefs and oral argument have been largely devoted to constitutional questions. It is said, for example, that while the Fourth Amendment, as judicially construed, would bar the use of this evidence in a federal prosecution (Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383), our decision in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, would permit New Mexico to use the evidence in its prosecution of petitioner. Moreover, it is said that to suppress the use of the evidence in the state criminal proceedings would run counter to our decision in Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U. S. 117.
  We put all the constitutional questions to one side. We have here no problem concerning the interplay of the Fourth and the Fourteenth Amendments nor the use which New Mexico might make of the evidence. The District Court is not asked to enjoin state officials nor in any way to interfere with state agencies in enforcement of state law. Cf. Boske v. Comingore, 177 U. S. 459. The only relief asked is against a federal agent, who obtained the property as a result of the abuse of process issued by a United States Commissioner. The property seized is contraband which Congress has made “subject only to the orders and decrees of the courts of the United States having jurisdiction thereof,” as provided in 28 U. S. C. § 2463, already quoted. In this posture we have then a case that raises not a constitutional question but one concerning our supervisory powers over federal law enforcement agencies. Cf. McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332.
  A federal agent has violated the federal Rules governing searches and seizures — Rules prescribed by this Court and made effective after submission to the Congress. See 327 U. S. 821 et seg. The power of the federal courts extends to policing those requirements and making certain that they are observed. As stated in Wise v. Henkel, 220 U. S. 556, 558, which involved an order directing the district attorney to return certain books and papers unlawfully seized:
  “. . . it was within the power of the court to take jurisdiction of the subject of the return and pass upon it as the result of its inherent authority to consider and decide questions arising before it concerning an alleged unreasonable exertion of authority in connection with the execution of the process of the court.”
  No injunction is sought against a state official. The only remedy asked is against a federal agent who, we are told, plans to use his illegal search and seizure as the basis of testimony in the state court. To enjoin the federal agent from testifying is merely to enforce the federal Rules against those owing obedience to them.
  The command of the federal Rules is in no way affected by anything that happens in a state court. They are designed as standards for federal agents. The fact that their violation may be condoned by state practice has no relevancy to our problem. Federal courts sit to enforce federal law; and federal law extends to the process issuing from those courts. The obligation of the federal agent is to obey the Rules. They are drawn for innocent and guilty alike. They prescribe standards for law enforcement. They are designed to protect the privacy of the citizen, unless the strict standards set for searches and seizures are satisfied. That policy is defeated if the federal agent can flout them and use the fruits of his unlawful act either in federal or state proceedings.
  Reversed.
  Rule 41 (c) provides in relevant part as follows:
  “A warrant shall issue only on affidavit sworn to before the judge or commissioner and establishing the grounds for issuing the warrant. If the judge or commissioner is satisfied that grounds for the application exist or that there is probable cause to believe that they exist, he shall issue a warrant identifying the property and naming or describing the person or place to be searched. The warrant shall be directed to a civil officer of the United States authorized to enforce or assist in enforcing any law thereof or to a person so authorized by the President of the United States. It shall state the grounds or probable cause for its issuance and the names of the persons whose affidavits have been taken in support thereof.”