opinion: OPINION
  Before CHOY and GOODWIN, Circuit Judges, and BURNS, District Judge.
  PER CURIAM:
  Matson Terminals appeals a judgment of liability under an indemnity contract with the United States, owner of a vessel on which a longshoreman was injured. We affirm.
  Gerald Griffin, a longshoreman employed by Matson, was loading lumber aboard the USNS “Lt. Robert Craig” on February 19, 1969. While climbing up a ladder from a ship hold, he sustained an eye injury when struck by an unidentified falling object. Griffin’s action' against the United States for unseaworthiness was dismissed by the district court. This court reversed, determined that the ship was unseaworthy, and remanded for computation of damages and resolution of the indemnity claim. Griffin v. United States, 469 F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1972).
  The indemnity contract sets two conditions to Matson’s liability. First, a Matson employee must have been negligent. Second, unseaworthiness of the ship must have been discoverable, or the injury otherwise avoidable, through the exercise of due diligence by Matson.
  Taking no new testimony, relying instead on the trial transcript, the district court on remand held Matson liable under the indemnity agreement. The court concluded that one of Griffin’s fellow workers, Reihing, had negligently caused the object to fall, but made no formal finding of fact to this effect. No formal or informal finding on due diligence was made.
  Any error in the trial court’s failure to make a designated Rule 52 (F.R. Civ.P.) finding of fact that Reihing was negligent was harmless. Boutte v. M/V Malay Maru, 370 F.2d 906, 907 (5th Cir. 1967). The record discloses that critical determination in the judge’s explicit statement during the trial. See generally, Dann v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 288 F.2d 201, 205-206 (6th Cir. 1961); Graham v. United States, 243 F.2d 919, 923 (9th Cir. 1957).
  Applying the clearly erroneous standard, we affirm the trial court’s informal finding of negligence. Reihing had a duty to exercise reasonable care for the safety of his fellow employees. See, Arista Cia. DeVapores, S.A. v. Howard Terminal, 372 F.2d 152, 154 (9th Cir. 1967). Reihing did not look beneath his feet while climbing up the ladder, a failure that the trial court could plausibly conclude was a breach of his duty.
  Matson’s liability to the United States depends also on its failure to exercise due diligence. Although the trial court made no finding on this point, in an opinion or elsewhere in the record, reversal is not required. Since Reihing’s negligence sent the unidentified object falling and caused the injury, the accident would not have occurred if Matson, acting through its agent Reihing, had observed a proper standard of care. Conversely, Matson, again through its agent Reihing, could have prevented the accident by the exercise of due diligence, assuming that the agent’s and Matson’s standards of care are congruent.
  In Arista Cia., supra, this court held, in effect, that a longshoreman’s duty of care was equivalent to his employer stevedore’s implied warranty of workmanlike service. That equivalence is particularly appropriate here, where the longshoreman’s negligence was in failing to watch out for debris on the ladder, precisely the condition of unseaworthiness Matson should have discovered. In these circumstances, the trial court’s failure to make findings as to Matson’s due diligence is therefore harmless error.
  Affirmed.
  Honorable James M. Burns, United States District Court for the District of Oregon, sitting by designation.
  . Matson’s negligence and the ship’s unseaworthiness are not mutually exclusive.
  “An unseaworthy condition that causes no damage until brought into play by the negligence of a longshoreman employed by the stevedore is nonetheless an unseaworthy condition in the workman’s action against the shipowner. E. g., Alaska Steamship Co. v. Garcia, 378 F.2d 153 (9th Cir. 1967).” Griffin v. United States, 469 F.2d 671, 672 (9th Cir. 1972). On the previous appeal, this court held that the ship was unseaworthy because dangerous debris had accumulated in a place from which it could fall and injure someone.
  . The court made a determination of the amount of plaintiff’s damages as required by the remand.
  . “Also, I find that there was negligence on the part of the fellow employees [sic], who obviously stepped and kicked something down, —that is what he said he did, anyhow, stepped on something and caused it to fall down the escape hatch shaft, and struck Mr. Griffin in the eye.” R.T. 168-169. “Well, I conclude that there was something that fell, and that Reihing caused it to fall, I have already told you that, and that it was his fault that it fell. I have already made up my mind on that.” R.T. 209.
instruction: What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
  Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
  When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 
  
  Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "private business (including criminal enterprises)", specifically "other". Your task is to determine what subcategory of business best describes this litigant.
choices: medical clinics, health organizations, nursing homes, medical doctors, medical labs, or other private health care facilities private attorney or law firm media - including magazines, newspapers, radio & TV stations and networks, cable TV, news organizations school - for profit private educational enterprise (including business and trade schools) housing, car, or durable goods rental or lease entertainment: amusement parks, race tracks, for profit camps, record companies, movie theaters and producers, ski resorts, hotels, restaurants, etc. information processing consulting security and/or maintenance service other service (including accounting) other (including a business pension fund) unclear