opinion: PER CURIAM.
  In this antitrust action for an injunction and treble damages, forty-one long distance trucking companies and their trade association, Pennsylvania Motor 'Truck Association, sued twenty-four major eastern railroads, Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference and Carl Byoir Associates, Inc. a New York corporation, the public relations agency for the Conference.
  Plaintiffs charged in their complaint (filed April 30, 1953) inter alia, that in or about May, 1949, the defendant Railroads embarked upon an illegal conspiracy, in violation of the civil and criminal provisions of the antitrust laws of the United States, aimed at destroying the plaintiffs and those similarly situated as competitors in the field of the hauling of freight, and at carving out exclusive, monopolistic spheres of operation in the freight transportation business of the United States, so that the railroads would have a monopoly on freight hauling in interstate commerce; that the defendant Railroads worked for those ends through the defendant Conference; that the latter retained defendant Byoir as publicity agent to carry said conspiracy into effect; that thereafter the Conference, its committees, members thereof, the defendant Railroads, their presidents and trustees and other individual defendants and Byoir, with divers other persons unknown to plaintiffs, have acted in combination and concert to obtain the objectives of the conspiracy. The means used are detailed in the complaint; a continuing conspiracy to the date of the complaint is alleged; damage to each of the plaintiffs is asserted, irreparable, continuing injury stated and an injunction asked. Defendants denied the charges of the complaint. In 1956, after the case had been assigned a trial date, October 1, 1956, and while discovery procedures were pending, some of the Railroads and the Conference sought permission to and were allowed to file a counterclaim against the plaintiffs. This claimed that plaintiffs were engaged in an illegal conspiracy to obtain a monopoly of the long haul freight industry in the same part of the United States as set out in the complaint and to force the Railroads out of that part of the transportation business in that area.
  The case went to trial before Judge Clary on October 1, 1956 and lasted almost four months. There were many witnesses and 968 exhibits. On October 10, 1957, the court in an exhaustive opinion (it covers 73 pages in 155 F.Supp. 768-841) found in favor of the plaintiffs against all the defendants on plaintiffs’ cause of action and against the defendant counterclaimants and in favor of the plaintiffs on the counterclaim.
  Soundly based on substantial evidence, the trial court found that the Railroads and Byoir, as contended, had conspired in unreasonable restraint of trade to injure the truckers in their competitive position in the long haul freight industry in the northeastern part of the United States; that their immediate purpose was to create public resentment to the truckers, not only in the minds of the general public but in the minds of those who utilized the services of the trucks and in such a manner as to interfere with business relations between shippers and truckers; that instead of meeting the truckers competition in the long haul freight field, the Railroads and Byoir combined to injure and/or destroy the truckers and thereby force the shippers to their detriment to continue to use the Railroads; that they adopted and carried out a full program to obtain that objective; that serious private injury to the truckers was accomplished, definitely a loss of good will to the trucking industry and in some instances that loss of good will being extreme; that their actions destroyed to a large extent the public confidence which the truckers had fairly earned and which might have been increased in the light of the innumerable beneficial accomplishments of the truckers in long haul transportation.
  The court found on overwhelming evidence that it was no series of individual conspiracies in the various states involved but one large ever-growing conspiracy as charged having as its goal to injure and/or destroy the long haul trucking industry and that the main means used to attain such end was primarily a campaign designed to destroy the good will of the truckers and to instigate and foster government restrictions by creating public hostility to the truckers, bringing this to the attention of the various legislatures, then proposing legislation crippling to the trucking industry and favored by the Railroads, all under the guise of public spirited organizations and with the defendants’ interest concealed.
  The record shows the defendants’ antitrust conspiracy completely established against all the defendants named in the decree. It shows both legal and illegal methods to obtain the illegal objective of injuring and/or destroying the long haul trucking industry. It shows injury to the plaintiffs and to the public. It justifies the injunctive relief against continuing illegal activities of the defendants. It justifies the compensatory damages (trebled by statute) allowed plaintiff Pennsylvania Motor Truck Association, together with costs and counsel fees. It justifies the holding of the district court that the other plaintiffs, by reason of the stipulation which is very clear and is part of the record, are only entitled to nominal damages. It justifies the dismissal of the counterclaim, which action is not disputed by the Railroads except in line with their argument that the counterclaim is similar in content to the plaintiffs’ claim.
  Though we think it plain from what we have said, it might be well to expressly note that the suggestion that the Railroads’ entire activity, spearheaded by Byoir, was merely a perfectly legitimate public relations campaign for legislation is fanciful in view of the impressive documentation in the record of the finding of the trial court “ * * * that the entire campaign and its objectives did not constitute a mere appeal to the legislature; nor was it a large scale lobbying campaign. True, one phase of the activities was of a legislative nature — but a rather new approach to legislation, to say the least. The other phase, and the more important one of the campaign, was one of vilification designed to destroy the good will of the long-haul trucking industry. Hence, the Court has rejected the contention of the defendants that their combination was entirely legislative. 1 have further determined that the ro.ilroads were not acting as the guardian of the public welfare, as they have so earnestly asserted.” (Emphasis supplied.)
  Judge Clary’s opinion is soundly predicated on the facts and law of this litigation. We are in accord with it. The decree and orders of the district court of July 22, 1958 and July 31, 1958 will be affirmed.
  . Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq.; Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 15.
  . The third party apparatus employed by the defendants, while concealing their own adroit manipulation thereof, in seeking to procure legislative and executive action is contrary to public policy and illegal. Marshall v. Baltimore & O. Railroad Co., 1853, 16 How. 314, 335, 14 L. Ed. 953; Angle v. Chicago, St. Paul, M. & O. R. Co., 1893, 151 U.S. 1, 14 S.Ct. 240, 38 L.Ed. 55; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Textile Mills Securities Corp., 3 Cir., 1940, 117 F.2d 62, affirmed 1941, 314 U.S. 326, 62 S.Ct. 272, 86 L.Ed. 249. Cf. United States v. Silliman, 3 Cir., 1948, 167 F.2d 607, certiorari denied 1948, 335 U.S. 825, 69 S.Ct. 48, 93 L.Ed. 379.
  . The attempt to influence legislation and executive action while rightly held by the trial court to be less important than the direct vilification of the long haul trucking industry was nevertheless properly found to be a vital element of the defendants’ conspiracy to injure and/or destroy that group. Even assuming the brazen interference with legislation and executive action in this instance was lawful, its entire motivation was shown to emanate from the conspiracy charged. It was part of defendants’ scheme to wreck their competitor, to monopolize that branch of commerce for themselves. As such it violated the Sherman Act. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 1949, 336 U.S. 490, 497-502, 69 S.Ct. 684, 93 L.Ed. 834; United States v. Krasnov, D.C. E.D.Pa.1956, 143 F.Supp. 184, affirmed 1957, 355 U.S. 5, 78 S.Ct. 34, 2 L.Ed. 2d 21; Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Aircoach Transport As-soeiation, 102 U.S.App.D.C. 355, 253 F. 2d 877, 887.
  American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 1909, 213 U.S. 347, 29 S.Ct. 511, 53 L.Ed. 826, urged below and here by the Railroads, has no real application to the facts before us. The later decisions of the Supreme Court in United States v. Sisal Sales Corporation, 1927, 274 U.S. 268, 47 S.Ct. 592, 71 L.Ed. 1042, and Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 1952, 344 U.S. 280, 73 S.Ct. 252, 97 L.Ed. 252 clearly indicate that the Banana Company opinion is limited to the proposition that the Sherman Act cannot be invoked against persuading a foreign sovereign to act. Okefenokee Rural Electric Membership Corp. v. Florida Power & Light Co., 5 Cir., 1954, 214 F.2d 413, is the other decision stressed by the Railroads in the district court and on appeal. That too is hardly an authority for anything pertinent under the instant unescapable facts. There the complaint made no allegation that the conspiracy was directed to ruining a competitor in his business. The later case of Crummer Co. v. Du Pont, 5 Cir., 1955, 223 F.2d 238 and 5 Cir., 1958, 255 F.2d 425, certiorari denied 1958, 358 U.S. 884, 79 S.Ct. 119, 3 L. Ed.2d 113, leaves no doubt but that as of now in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, a conspiracy to drive a competitor out of business is a violation of the Sherman Act even though, as in Crum-mer, its most important element was the obtainment of its objective by secretly moving under the guise and protection of the public interest and through the public authorities.