opinion: Louis COLANGELO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. UNITED STATES of America et al., Defendants-Appellants.
  No. 77-1400.
  United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
  Argued Nov. 10, 1977.
  Decided May 17, 1978.
  F. Arnold Heller, Atty., Tax Div., Dept, of Justice, Washington, D. C., with whom M. Carr Ferguson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Edward F. Harrington, U. S. Atty., Boston, Mass., Gilbert E. Andrews, and Richard Farber, Attys., Tax Div., Dept, of Justice, Washington, D. C., were on brief, for defendants-appellants.
  Avram G. Hammer, Boston, Mass., for plaintiff-appellee.
  Before COFFIN, Chief Judge, CAMPBELL, Circuit Judge, GORDON , District Judge.
  Of the Eastern District of Wisconsin, sitting by designation.
  MYRON L. GORDON, District Judge.
  The appellee Louis Colangelo filed this action, claiming that wagering excise tax jeopardy assessments of $61,797.63 and a federal tax lien in the same amount lodged against his property were based on information obtained from illegal wiretaps conducted by the FBI. A three-judge court stayed the Government’s sale of the appellee’s property pending a decision in United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 94 S.Ct. 1820, 40 L.Ed.2d 341 (1974). Quintina v. United States, 359 F.Supp. 769 (D.Mass. 1973).
  In Giordano, the Supreme Court held that wiretap applications which were not authorized by the attorney general or his special designate did not conform to the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1). Evidence derived from wiretaps which were in turn based on these nonconforming wiretap applications was ordered suppressed.
  In July, 1975, following the Giordano decision, the Government recomputed the appellee’s wagering excise tax liability based only on information secured independent of the illegal wiretaps. The appellee’s tax liability was assessed at $7,147.99, instead of $61,797.63, for the period July-November, 1971. On March 11, 1977, the district director of the Internal Revenue Service sent the appellee a letter setting forth the revised total tax due. However, the Internal' Revenue Service refused to modify the tax liens to reflect the appellee’s reassessed tax liability.
  Mr. Colangelo requested that the district court discharge the federal tax liens in the amount of $61,797.63 filed in the Suffolk County Register of Deeds on February 8, 1973, and April 20,1973. In an unpublished memorandum and order dated June 13, 1977, the district court directed the Internal Revenue Service to discharge the liens. The district court denied the Government’s motions to amend the judgment and for a stay pending trial. The Government applied to this court for a stay pending the instant appeal. In an order dated October 19, 1977, Chief Judge Coffin granted the Government’s motion for a stay.
  The Government contends that this suit is barred by 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a), which provides in part that “. . .no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person . . . .” We are obliged to give the statute “almost literal effect.” Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 737, 94 S.Ct. 2038, 40 L.Ed.2d 496 (1974). The prohibition against restraint on the assessment and collection of taxes “is applicable not only to the assessment or collection itself, but ... to activities which are intended to or may culminate in the assessment or collection of taxes.” United States v. Dema, 544 F.2d 1373, 1376 (7th Cir. 1976).
  The district judge considered it “clear” that this action was not barred by § 7421 because Mr. Colangelo sought “an order correcting the public record which now saddles his real estate with a recorded lien in an amount . . . grossly in excess of . his presently assessed tax liability.” We recognize that the liens as originally filed reflect a claim for taxes above the amount which the Government now concedes may properly be assessed against Mr. Colangelo. However, the prohibition of § 7421(a) is broad enough to proscribe judicial interference with federal tax liens absent exceptional circumstances. MBI Motor Co. v. Lotus/East Inc., 399 F.Supp. 774 (E.D.Tenn.1975).
  The district court’s order would result in a total discharge of the tax liens. That court declined to permit the amendment of the notices of liens to reflect the reduced amount of Mr. Colangelo’s tax liability. In its brief, the Government represents, and the appellee apparently agrees, that several security interests were filed subsequent to the filing of the Government’s liens against Mr. Colangelo’s property. Thus, it would appear that the order of the district court would cause the Government to relinquish its priority among the appellee’s secured creditors with respect to his reassessed tax liability of $7,147.99. Although a portion of the liens reflect sums no longer assessed or collectable, another portion, more than $7,000, is still currently assessed, and the Government is entitled to pursue collection of this amount. We believe that the total discharge of the liens, as ordered by the lower court, would impede and restrain the collection of taxes to the extent of over $7,000, contrary to § 7421(a).
  Arguably, there would be no restraint on the collection of taxes if the Government’s liens in the sum of $61,797.63 were ordered replaced, without any loss of priority, with other liens showing the appellee’s actual assessed tax liability. In the district court, Mr. Colangelo sought removal or reduction in the amount of the liens, but on appeal he urges only removal. The Government, however, requests in the alternative that it be permitted to file amended notices of liens which preserve its original priority. Neither party had advanced any authority from which we might conclude that a federal court can properly affect the priorities of state court liens on an individual’s property by ordering that liens in one amount be supplanted by new liens in a different amount. We thus decline to order the alternate relief proposed by the Government.
  Having concluded that this is an action to restrain the assessment or collection of taxes, we still must decide whether it falls within the narrow exception to the bar of § 7421. An injunctive suit is not proscribed by § 7421 if it is shown that (1) the appellee will suffer irreparable injury absent an injunction, and (2) “under no circumstances [can] the Government ultimately prevail
  . Enochs v. Williams Packing Co., 370 U.S. 1, 7, 82 S.Ct. 1125, 1129, 8 L.Ed.2d 292 (1962); Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, supra, 416 U.S. at 737, 94 S.Ct. 2038.
  Addressing the second requirement first, Mr. Colangelo has the burden of showing that, based on information available to the Government at the time of the suit, liberally construed in its favor, the Government could not prevail. Commissioner of Int’l Revenue v. Shapiro, 424 U.S. 614, 628 n.10, 96 S.Ct. 1062, 47 L.Ed.2d 278 (1976); Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, supra; Enochs v. Williams Packing Co., supra. In this regard, the appellee contends that “[b]ecause the $61,797.63 assessment was concededly based on illegal wiretaps, it and the lien securing its payment were unlawful.” Chief Judge Coffin, in dissent, takes a similar position by stating that once the Supreme Court decided United States v. Giordano, supra, “there was no legal basis to the lien, and the IRS should have withdrawn it.” We do not agree. The $61,-797.63 liens were valid when filed in 1973, prior to the Giordano decision. Subsequently, there was only a partial abatement of the assessment on which the liens were based. Only that portion of the original assessment which stemmed from the illegal wiretap evidence was eliminated. Contrary to the dissent, we do not believe that the liens were invalid in their entirety, either when filed or after the ruling in Giordano.
  The Government, conversely, raises relevant considerations which preclude a positive declaration that it will not ultimately prevail. Although it refers to no statute either permitting or prohibiting the total discharge order by the district court, the Government does point out that under 26 U.S.C. § 6325(a)(1) the Commissioner may issue a certificate of release of lien only after finding that the assessed liability “has been fully satisfied or become legally unenforceable . . . .” Here part, but not all, of the originally assessed tax liability has become unenforceable. Moreover, a mortgagee is not required to modify a mortgage to reflect reductions in a mortgagor’s current outstanding liability on the underlying debt.
  A secondary consideration is the administrative burden that would be placed on the Government if it were obligated to modify all existing tax liens. We have already noted that a total discharge of the liens might damage the Government’s priority as to the assertedly valid portions thereof. Although in the instant case the present assessment is but a small fraction of the original one, it would seem particularly inequitable to require a total discharge of a lien where the original assessment was only slightly diminished. For these reasons, we are unable to conclude that the Government would clearly be unable to prevail.
  The other prerequisite to invoking the exception to § 7421 has not been satisfied here. Mr. Colangelo claims that the liens have interfered with the “use and enjoyment” of his property, thereby causing him irreparable damage. He asserts a “right to have his property available” for satisfaction of the interests of junior lien-holders. Even assuming that such a right exists, we doubt that it has been infringed by the presence of the Government’s liens. As already noted, the Government does not intend to attempt an assessment or collection of those past liabilities based on illegal wiretap evidence. The appellee’s property is available, beyond the extent of the Government’s present assessment, for his remaining creditors or for other purposes. The Government has provided Mr. Colangelo a letter reflecting his updated tax liability. Although that letter apparently may not be filed along with the liens, the appellee can show it to anyone he chooses. Moreover, the Government suggests that pursuant to treasury regulations it will provide certain persons directly with the information set forth in the letter. Significantly, Mr. Colangelo does not contend that he has been denied credit or suffered similar concrete adverse consequences by reasons of these tax liens.
  Because we conclude that this suit is barred by § 7421 and is not encompassed in the narrow exception to that statute, it follows that the district court erred in ordering the liens discharged. The order of the district court will therefore be reversed.
  REVERSED.
instruction: What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. You will be asked a question pertaining to issues that may appear in civil law issues involving government actors. The issue is: "Did the court rule for the government in an issue related to agency acquisition of information (e.g. physical inspections, searches, subpoenas, records, etc)? Answer the question based on the directionality of the appeals court decision. If the court discussed the issue in its opinion and answered the related question in the affirmative, answer "Yes". If the issue was discussed and the opinion answered the question negatively, answer "No". If the opinion considered the question but gave a mixed answer, supporting the respondent in part and supporting the appellant in part, answer "Mixed answer". If the opinion does not discuss the issue, or notes that a particular issue was raised by one of the litigants but the court dismissed the issue as frivolous or trivial or not worthy of discussion for some other reason, answer "Issue not discussed". If the opinion considered the question but gave a "mixed" answer, supporting the respondent in part and supporting the appellant in part (or if two issues treated separately by the court both fell within the area covered by one question and the court answered one question affirmatively and one negatively), answer "Mixed answer". If the opinion either did not consider or discuss the issue at all or if the opinion indicates that this issue was not worthy of consideration by the court of appeals even though it was discussed by the lower court or was raised in one of the briefs, answer "Issue not discussed".