ZURCHER, CHIEF OF POLICE OF PALO ALTO, et al. v. STANFORD DAILY et al.
No. 76-1484.
Argued January 17, 1978
Decided May 31, 1978
White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Powell, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 568. Stewart, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Marshall, J., joined, post, p. 570. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 577. Brennan, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases.
Robert K. Booth, Jr., argued the cause for petitioners in No. 76-1484. With him on the briefs were Marilyn Norek Taketa, Melville A. Toff, and Stephen L. Newton.
W. Eric Collins, Deputy Attorney General of California, argued the cause for petitioners in No. 76-1600. With him on the briefs were Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General, Jack R. Winkler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Edward P. O’Brien, Assistant Attorney General, Patrick G. Golden and Eugene W. Raster, Deputy Attorneys General, Selby Brown, Jr., and Richard K. Abdalah.
Jerome B. Falk, Jr., argued the cause for respondents in both cases. With him on the briefs was Anthony G. Amsterdam.
Together with No. 76-1600, Bergna, District Attorney of Santa Clara County, et al. v. Stanford Daily et al., also on certiorari to the same court.
A brief of amici curiae urging reversal was filed for their respective States by William J. Baxley, Attorney General of Alabama; Avrum M. Gross, Attorney General of Alaska; Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General of California, and W. Eric Collins and Dane R. Gillette, Deputy Attorneys General; Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General of Georgia; Wayne L. Kidwell, Attorney General of Idaho; William J. Scott, Attorney General of Illinois; Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General of Indiana; Francis B. Burch, Attorney General of Maryland; Francis X. Bellotti, Attorney General of Massachusetts; A. F. Summer, Attorney General of Mississippi; Paul L. Douglas, Attorney General of Nebraska; David H. Souter, Attorney General of New Hampshire; Toney Anaya, Attorney General of New Mexico; James A. Redden, Attorney General of Oregon; Robert P. Kane, Attorney General of Pennsylvania; Robert B. Hansen, Attorney General of Utah; and Anthony F. Troy, Attorney General of Virginia. A brief of amici curiae urging reversal was filed by Frank Carrington, Wayne W. Schmidt, Glen R. Murphy, James P. Costello, Robert Smith, and Richard F. Mayer for Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc., et al.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Dominic P. Gentile, John E. Ackerman, and Joseph Beeler for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Inc.; and by Lloyd N. Cutler, Dennis M. Flannery, William T. Lake, A. Stephen Hut, Jr., Arthur B. Hanson, James R. Cregan, Erwin G. Krasnow, Richard M. Schmidt, Jr., J. Laurent Scharff, Christopher B. Fager, David S. Barr, and Mortimer Becker for the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press et al.
Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Solicitor General McCree, Assistant Attorney General Civiletti, Deputy Solicitor General Frey, Harriet S. Shapiro, and Elliot Schulder for the United States; and by Edwin L. Miller, Jr., Richard D. Huffman, and Peter C. Lehman for the National District Attorneys Assn, et al.
Mr. Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The terms of the. Fourth Amendment, applicable to the States by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, are familiar:
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
As heretofore understood, the Amendment has not been a barrier to warrants to search property on which there is probable cause to believe that fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence of crime is located, whether or not the owner or possessor of the premises to be searched is himself reasonably suspected of complicity in the crime being investigated. We are now asked to reconstrue the Fourth Amendment and to hold for the first time that when the place to be searched is occupied by a person not then a suspect, a warrant to search for criminal objects and evidence reasonably believed to be located there should not issue except in the most unusual circumstances, and that except in such circumstances, a subpoena duces tecum must be relied upon to recover the objects or evidence sought.
I
Late in the day on Friday, April 9, 1971, officers of the Palo Alto Police Department and of the Santa Clara County Sheriff's Department responded to a call from the director of the Stanford University Hospital requesting the removal of a large group of demonstrators who had seized the hospital's administrative offices and occupied them since the previous afternoon. After several futile efforts to persuade the demonstrators to leave peacefully, more drastic measures were employed. The demonstrators had barricaded the doors at both ends of a hall adjacent to the administrative offices. The police chose to force their way in at the west end of the corridor. As they did so, a group of demonstrators emerged through the doors at the east end and, armed with sticks and clubs, attacked the group of nine police officers stationed there. One officer was knocked to the floor and struck repeatedly on the head; another suffered a broken shoulder. All nine were injured. There were no police photographers at the east doors, and most bystanders and reporters were on the west side. The officers themselves were able to identify only two of their assailants, but one of them did see at least one person photographing the assault at the east doors.
On Sunday, April 11, a special edition of the Stanford Daily (Daily), a student newspaper published at Stanford University, carried articles and photographs devoted to the hospital protest and the violent clash between demonstrators and police. The photographs carried the byline of a Daily staff member and indicated that he had been at the east end of the hospital hallway where he could have photographed the assault on the nine officers. The next day, the Santa Clara County District Attorney’s Office secured a warrant from the Municipal Court for an immediate search of the Daily’s offices for negatives, film, and pictures showing the events and occurrences at the hospital on the evening of April 9. The warrant issued on a finding of “just, probable and reasonable cause for believing that: Negatives and photographs and films, evidence material and relevant to the identity of the perpetrators of felonies, to wit, Battery on a Peace Officer, and Assault with Deadly Weapon, will be located [on the premises of the Daily].” App. 31-32. The warrant affidavit contained no allegation or indication that members of the Daily staff were in any way involved in unlawful acts at the hospital.
The search pursuant to the warrant was conducted later that day by four police officers and took place in the presence of some members of the Daily staff. The Daily’s photographic laboratories, filing cabinets, desks, and wastepaper baskets were searched. Locked drawers and rooms were not opened. The officers apparently had opportunity to read notes and correspondence during the search; but, contrary to claims of the staff, the officers denied that they had exceeded the limits of the warrant. They had not been advised by the staff that the areas they were searching contained confidential materials. The search revealed only the photographs that had already been published on April 11, and no materials were removed from the Daily’s office.
A month later the Daily and various members of its staff, respondents here, brought a civil action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 against the police officers who conducted the search, the chief of police, the district attorney and one of his deputies, and the judge who had issued the warrant. The complaint alleged that the search of the Daily’s office had deprived respondents under color of state law of rights secured to them by the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.
The District Court denied the request for an injunction but, on respondents’ motion for summary judgment, granted declaratory relief. 353 F. Supp. 124 (1972). The court did not question the existence of probable cause to believe that a crime had been committed and to believe that relevant evidence would be found on the Daily’s premises. It held, however, that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments forbade the issuance of a warrant to search for materials in possession of one not suspected of crime unless there is probable cause to believe, based on facts presented in a sworn affidavit, that a subpoena duces tecum would be impracticable. Moreover, the failure to honor a subpoena would not alone justify a warrant; it must also appear that the possessor of the objects sought would disregard a court order not to remove or destroy them. The District Court further held that where the innocent object of the search is a newspaper, First Amendment interests are also involved and that such a search is constitutionally permissible “only in the rare circumstance where there is a clear showing that (1) important materials will be destroyed or removed from the jurisdiction; and (2) a restraining order would be futile.” Id., at 135. Since these preconditions to a valid warrant had not been satisfied here, the search of the Daily’s offices was declared to have been illegal. The Court of Appeals affirmed per curiam, adopting the opinion of the District Court. 550 F. 2d 464 (CA9 1977). We issued the writs of certiorari requested by petitioners. 434 TI. S. 816 (1977). We reverse.
V-H HH
The issue here is how the Fourth Amendment is to be construed and applied to the “third party” search, the recurring situation where state authorities have probable cause to believe that fruits, instrumentalities, or other evidence of crime is located on identified property but do not then have probable cause to believe that the owner or possessor of the property is himself implicated in the crime that has occurred or is occurring. Because under the District Court’s rule impracticability can be shown only by furnishing facts demonstrating that the third party will not only disobey the subpoena but also ignore a restraining order not to move or destroy the property, it is apparent that only in unusual situations could the State satisfy such a severe burden and that for all practical purposes the effect of the rule is that fruits, instrumentalities, and evidence of crime may be recovered from third parties only by subpoena, not by search warrant. At least, we assume that the District Court did not intend its rule to be toothless and anticipated that only subpoenas would be available in many cases where without the rule a search warrant would issue.
It is an understatement to say that there is no direct authority in this or any other federal court for the District Court’s sweeping revision of the Fourth Amendment. Under existing law, valid warrants may be issued to search any property, whether or not occupied by a third party, at which there is probable cause to believe that fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence of a crime will be found. Nothing on the face of the Amendment suggests that a third-party search warrant should not normally issue. The Warrant Clause speaks of search warrants issued on “probable cause” and “particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” In situations where the State does not seek to seize “persons” but only those “things” which there is probable cause to believe are located on the place to be searched, there is no apparent basis in the language of the Amendment for also imposing the requirements for a valid arrest — probable cause to believe that the third party is implicated in the crime.
As the Fourth Amendment has been construed and applied by this Court, “when the State’s reason to believe incriminating evidence will be found becomes sufficiently great, the invasion of privacy becomes justified and a warrant to search and seize will issue.” Fisher v. United States, 425 U. S. 391, 400 (1976). In Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 534-535 (1967), we indicated that in applying the “probable cause” standard “by which a particular decision to search is tested against the constitutional mandate of reasonableness,” it is necessary “to focus upon the governmental interest which allegedly justifies official intrusion” and that in criminal investigations a warrant to search for recoverable items is reasonable “only when there is 'probable cause’ to believe that they will be uncovered in a particular dwelling.” Search warrants are not directed at persons; they authorize the search of “place [s]” and the seizure of “things,” and as a constitutional matter they need not even name the person from whom the things will be seized. United States v. Kahn, 415 U. S. 143, 155 n. 15 (1974).
Because the State’s interest in enforcing the criminal law and recovering evidence is the same whether the third party is culpable or not, the premise of the District Court’s holding appears to be that state entitlement to a search warrant depends on the culpability of the owner or possessor of the place to be searched and on the State’s right to arrest him. The cases are to the contrary. Prior to Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, and See v. Seattle, 387 U. S. 541 (1967), the central purpose of the Fourth Amendment was seen to be the protection of the individual against official searches for evidence to convict him of a crime. Entries upon property for civil purposes, where the occupant was suspected of no criminal conduct whatsoever, involved a more peripheral concern and the less intense “right to be secure from intrusion into personal privacy.” Frank v. Maryland, 359 U. S. 360, 365 (1959); Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, at 530. Such searches could proceed without warrant, as long as the State’s interest was sufficiently substantial. Under this view, the Fourth Amendment was more protective where the place to be searched was occupied by one suspected of crime and the search was for evidence to use against him. Camara and See, disagreeing with Frank to this extent, held that a warrant is required where entry is sought for civil purposes, as well as when criminal law enforcement is involved. Neither case, however, suggested that to secure a search warrant the owner or occupant of the place to be inspected or searched must be suspected of criminal involvement. Indeed, both cases held that a less stringent standard of probable cause is acceptable where the entry is not to secure evidence of crime against the possessor.
We have suggested nothing to the contrary since Camara and See. Indeed, Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U. S. 72 (1970), and United States v. Biswell, 406 U. S. 311 (1972), dispensed with the warrant requirement in cases involving limited types of inspections and searches.
The critical element in a reasonable search is not that the owner of the property is suspected of crime but that there is reasonable cause to believe that the specific “things” to be searched for and seized are located on the property to which entry is sought. In Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132 (1925), it was claimed that the seizure of liquor was unconstitutional because the occupant of a car stopped with probable cause to believe that it was carrying illegal liquor was not subject to arrest. The Court, however, said:
“If their theory were sound, their conclusion would be. The validity of the seizure then would turn wholly on the validity of the arrest without a seizure. But the theory is unsound. The right to search and the validity of the seizure are not dependent on the right to arrest. They are dependent on the reasonable cause the seizing officer has for belief that the contents of the automobile offend against the law.” Id., at 158-159.
The Court’s ultimate conclusion was that “the officers here had justification for the search and seizure,” that is, a reasonable “belief that intoxicating liquor was being transported in the automobile which they stopped and searched.” Id., at 162. See also Husty v. United States, 282 U. S. 694, 700-701 (1931).
Federal Rule Crim. Proc. 41, which reflects “[t]he Fourth Amendment’s policy against unreasonable searches and seizures,” United States v. Ventresca, 380 U. S. 102, 105 n. 1 (1965), authorizes warrants to search for contraband, fruits or instrumentalities of crime, or “any . . . property that constitutes evidence of the commission of a criminal offense . . . Upon proper showing, the warrant is to issue “identifying the property and naming or describing the person or place to be searched.” Probable cause for the warrant must be presented, but there is nothing in the Rule indicating that the officers must be entitled to arrest the owner of the “place” to be searched before a search warrant may issue and the “property” may be searched for and seized. The Rule deals with warrants to search, and is unrelated to arrests. Nor is there anything in the Fourth Amendment indicating that absent probable cause to arrest a third party, resort must be had to a subpoena.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit expressed the correct view of Rule 41 and of the Fourth Amendment when, contrary to the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the District Court in the present litigation, it ruled that “[o]nce it is established that probable cause exists to believe a federal crime has been committed a warrant may issue for the search of any property which the magistrate has probable cause to believe may be the place of concealment of evidence of the crime.” United States v. Manufacturers Nat. Bank of Detroit, 536 F. 2d 699, 703 (1976), cert. denied sub nom. Wingate v. United States, 429 U. S. 1039 (1977). Accord, State v. Tunnel Citgo Services, 149 N. J. Super. 427, 433, 374 A. 2d 32, 35 (1977).
The net of the matter is that “[s]earches and seizures, in a technical sense, are independent of, rather than ancillary to, arrest and arraignment.” ALI, A Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure, Commentary 491 (Proposed Off. Draft 1975). The Model Code provides that the warrant application "shall describe with particularity the individuals or places to be searched and the individuals or things to be seized, and shall be supported by one or more affidavits particularly setting forth the facts and circumstances tending to show that such individuals or things are or will be in the places, or the things are or will be in possession of the individuals, to be searched.” § SB 220.1 (3). There is no suggestion that the occupant of the place to be searched must himself be implicated in misconduct.
Against this background, it is untenable to conclude that property may not be searched unless its occupant is reasonably suspected of crime and is subject to arrest. And if those considered free of criminal involvement may nevertheless be searched or inspected under civil statutes, it is difficult to understand why the Fourth Amendment would prevent entry onto their property to recover evidence of a crime not committed by them but by others. As we understand the structure and language of the Fourth Amendment and our cases expounding it, valid warrants to search property may be issued when it is satisfactorily demonstrated to the magistrate that fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence of crime is located on the premises. The Fourth Amendment has itself struck the balance between privacy and public need, and there is no occasion or justification for a court to revise the Amendment and strike a new balance by denying the search warrant in the circumstances present here and by insisting that the investigation proceed by subpoena duces tecum, whether on the theory that the latter is a less intrusive alternative or otherwise.
This is not to question that “reasonableness” is the overriding test of compliance with the Fourth Amendment or to assert that searches, however or whenever executed, may never be unreasonable if supported by a warrant issued on probable cause and properly identifying the place to be searched and the property to be seized. We do hold, however, that the courts may not, in the name of Fourth Amendment reasonableness, prohibit the States from issuing warrants to search for evidence simply because the owner or possessor of the place to be searched is not then reasonably suspected of criminal involvement.
Ill
In any event, the reasons presented by the District Court and adopted by the Court of Appeals for arriving at its remarkable conclusion do not withstand analysis. First, as we have said, it is apparent that whether the third-party occupant is suspect' or not, the State’s interest in enforcing the criminal law and recovering the evidence remains the same; and it is the seeming innocence of the property owner that the District Court relied on to foreclose the warrant to search. But, as respondents themselves now concede, if the third party knows that contraband or other illegal materials are on his property, he is sufficiently culpable to justify the issuance of a search warrant. Similarly, if his ethical stance is the determining factor, it seems to us that whether or not he knows that the sought-after articles are secreted on his property and whether or not he knows that the articles are in fact the fruits, instrumen-talities, or evidence of crime, he will be so informed when the search warrant is served, and it is doubtful that he should then be permitted to object to the search, to withhold, if it is there, the evidence of crime reasonably believed to be possessed by him or secreted on his property, and to forbid the search and insist that the officers serve him with a subpoena duces tecum.
Second, we are unpersuaded that the District Court’s new rule denying search warrants against third parties and insisting on subpoenas would substantially further privacy interests without seriously undermining law enforcement efforts. Because of the fundamental public interest in implementing the criminal law, the search warrant, a heretofore effective and constitutionally acceptable enforcement tool, should not be suppressed on the basis of surmise and without solid evidence supporting the change. As the District Court understands it, denying third-party search warrants would not have substantial adverse effects on criminal investigations because the nonsuspect third party, once served with a subpoena, will preserve the evidence and ultimately lawfully respond. The difficulty with this assumption is that search warrants are often employed early in an investigation, perhaps before the identity of any likely criminal and certainly before all the perpetrators are or could be known. The seemingly blameless third party in possession of the fruits or evidence may not be innocent at all; and if he is, he may nevertheless be so related to or so sympathetic with the culpable that he cannot be relied upon to retain and preserve the articles that may implicate his friends, or at least not to notify those who would be damaged by the evidence that the authorities are aware of its location. In any event, it is likely that the real culprits will have access to the property, and the delay involved in employing the subpoena duces tecum, offering as it does the opportunity to litigate its validity, could easily result in the disappearance of the evidence, whatever the good faith of the third party.
Forbidding the warrant and insisting on the subpoena instead when the custodian of the object of the search is not then suspected of crime, involves hazards to criminal investigation much more serious than the District Court believed; and the record is barren of anything but the District Court’s assumptions to support its conclusions. At the very least, the burden of justifying a major revision of the Fourth Amendment has not been carried.
We are also not convinced that the net gain to privacy interests by the District Court’s new rule would be worth the candle. In the normal course of events, search warrants are more difficult to obtain than subpoenas, since the latter do not involve the judiciary and do not require proof of probable cause. Where, in the real world, subpoenas would suffice, it can be expected that they will be employed by the rational prosecutor. On the other hand, when choice is available under local law and the prosecutor chooses to use the search warrant, it is unlikely that he has needlessly selected the more difficult course. His choice is more likely to be based on the solid belief, arrived at through experience but difficult, if not impossible, to sustain in a specific case, that the warranted search is necessary to secure and to avoid the destruction of evidence.
IV
The District Court held, and respondents assert here, that whatever may be true of third-party searches generally, where the third party is a newspaper, there are additional factors derived from the First Amendment that justify a nearly per se rule forbidding the search warrant and permitting only the subpoena duces tecum. The general submission is that searches of newspaper offices for evidence of crime reasonably believed to be on the premises will seriously threaten the ability of the press to gather, analyze, and disseminate news. This is said to be true for several reasons: First, searches will be physically disruptive to such an extent that timely publication will be impeded. Second, confidential sources of information will dry up, and the press will also lose opportunities to cover various events because of fears of the participants that press files will be readily available to- the authorities. Third, reporters will be deterred from recording and preserving their recollections for future use if such information is subject to seizure. Fourth, the processing of news and its dissemination will be chilled by the prospects that searches will disclose internal editorial deliberations. Fifth, the press will resort to self-censorship to conceal its possession of information of potential interest to the police.
It is true that the struggle from “'which the Fourth Amendment emerged “is largely a history of conflict between the Crown and the press,” Stanford v. Texas, 379 U. S. 476, 482 (1965), and that in issuing warrants and determining the reasonableness of a search, state and federal magistrates should be aware that “unrestricted power of search and seizure could also be an instrument for stifling liberty of expression.” Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U. S. 717, 729 (1961). Where the materials sought to be seized may be protected by the First Amendment, the requirements of the Fourth Amendment must be applied with “scrupulous exactitude.” Stanford v. Texas, supra, at 485. “A seizure reasonable as to one type of material in one setting may be unreasonable in a different setting or with respect to another kind of material.” Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U. S. 496, 501 (1973). Hence, in Stanford v. Texas, the Court invalidated a warrant authorizing the search of a private home for all books, records, and other materials relating to the Communist Party, on the ground that whether or not the warrant would have been sufficient in other contexts, it authorized the searchers to rummage among and make judgments about books and papers and was the functional equivalent of a general warrant, one of the principal targets of the Fourth Amendment. Where presumptively protected materials are sought to be seized, the warrant requirement should be administered to leave as little as possible to the discretion or whim of the officer in the field.
Similarly, where seizure is sought of allegedly obscene materials, the judgment of the arresting officer alone is insufficient to justify issuance of a search warrant or a seizure without a warrant incident to arrest. The procedure for determining probable cause must afford an opportunity for the judicial officer to “focus searchingly on the question of obscenity.” Marcus v. Search Warrant, supra, at 732; A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U. S. 205, 210 (1964); Lee Art Theatre, Inc. v. Virginia, 392 U. S. 636, 637 (1968); Roaden v. Kentucky, supra, at 502; Heller v. New York, 413 U. S. 483, 489 (1973).
Neither the Fourth Amendment nor the cases requiring consideration of First Amendment values in issuing search warrants, however, call for imposing the regime ordered by the District Court. Aware of the long struggle between Crown and press and desiring to curb unjustified official intrusions, the Framers took the enormously important step of subjecting searches to the test of reasonableness and to the general rule requiring search warrants issued by neutral magistrates. They nevertheless did not forbid warrants where the press was involved, did not require special showings that subpoenas would be impractical, and did not insist that the owner of the place to be searched, if connected with the press, must be shown to be implicated in the offense being investigated. Further, the prior cases do no more than insist that the courts apply the warrant requirements with particular exactitude when First Amendment interests would be endangered by the search. As we see it, no more than this is required where the warrant requested is for the seizure of criminal evidence reasonably believed to be on the premises occupied by a newspaper. Properly administered, the preconditions for a warrant — probable cause, specificity with respect to the place to be searched and the things to be seized, and overall reasonableness — should afford sufficient protection against the harms that are assertedly threatened by warrants for searching newspaper offices.
There is no reason to believe, for example, that magistrates cannot guard against searches of the type, scope, and intrusiveness that would actually interfere with the timely publication of a newspaper. Nor, if the requirements of specificity and reasonableness are properly applied, policed, and observed, will there be any occasion or opportunity for officers to rummage at large in newspaper files or to intrude into or to deter normal editorial and publication decisions. The warrant issued in this case authorized nothing of this sort. Nor are we convinced, any more than we were in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665 (1972), that confidential sources will disappear and that the press will suppress news because of fears of warranted searches. Whatever incremental effect there may be in this regard if search warrants, as well as subpoenas, are permissible in proper circumstances, it does not make a constitutional difference in our judgment.
The fact is that respondents and amici have pointed to only a very few instances in the entire United States since 1971 involving the issuance of warrants for searching newspaper premises. This reality hardly suggests abuse; and if abuse occurs, there will be time enough to deal with it. Furthermore, the press is not only an important, critical, and valuable asset to society, but it is not easily intimidated — nor should it be.
Respondents also insist that the press should be afforded opportunity to litigate the State's entitlement to the material it seeks before it is turned over or seized and that whereas the search warrant procedure is defective in this respect, resort to the subpoena would solve the problem. The Court has held that a restraining order imposing a prior restraint upon free expression is invalid for want of notice and opportunity for a hearing, Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U. S. 175 (1968), and that seizures not merely for use as evidence but entirely removing arguably protected materials from circulation may be effected only after an adversary hearing and a judicial finding of obscenity. A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, supra. But presumptively protected materials are not necessarily immune from seizure under warrant for use at a criminal trial. Not every such seizure, and not even most, will impose a prior restraint. Heller v. New York, supra. And surely a warrant to search newspaper premises for criminal evidence such as the one issued here for news photographs taken in a public place carries no realistic threat of prior restraint or of any direct restraint whatsoever on the publication of the Daily or on its communication of ideas. The hazards of such warrants can be avoided by a neutral magistrate carrying out his responsibilities under the Fourth Amendment, for he has ample tools at his disposal to confine warrants to search within reasonable limits.
We note finally that if the evidence sought by warrant is sufficiently connected with the crime to satisfy the probable-cause requirement, it will very likely be sufficiently relevant to justify a subpoena and to withstand a motion to quash. Further, Fifth Amendment and state shield-law objections that might be asserted in opposition to compliance with a subpoena are largely irrelevant to determining the legality of a search warrant under the Fourth Amendment. Of course, the Fourth Amendment does not prevent or advise against legislative or executive efforts to establish nonconstitutional protections against possible abuses of the search warrant procedure, but we decline to reinterpret the Amendment to impose a general constitutional barrier against warrants to search newspaper premises, to require resort to subpoenas as a general rule, or to demand prior notice and hearing in connection with the issuance of search warrants.
V
We accordingly reject the reasons given by the District Court and adopted by the Court of Appeals for holding the search for photographs at the Stanford Daily to have been unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and in violation of the First Amendment. Nor has anything else presented here persuaded us that the Amendments forbade this search. It follows that the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
So ordered.
Mr. Justice Brennan took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.
There was extensive damage to the administrative offices resulting from the occupation and the removal of the demonstrators.
The District Court did not find it necessary to resolve this dispute.
The Court of Appeals also approved the award of attorney’s fees to respondents pursuant to the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U. S. C. § 1988 (1976 ed.). We do not consider the propriety of this award in light of our disposition on the merits reversing the judgment upon which the award was predicated.
Petitioners in No. 76-1484 are the chief of police and the officers under his command who conducted the search. Petitioners in No. 76-1600 are the district attorney and a deputy district attorney who participated in the obtaining of the search warrant. The action against the judge who issued the warrant was subsequently dismissed upon the motion of respondents.
Respondents rely on four state cases to support the holding that a warrant may not issue unless it is shown that a subpoena is impracticable: Owens v. Way, 141 Ga. 796, 82 S. E. 132 (1914); Newberry v. Carpenter, 107 Mich. 567, 65 N. W. 530 (1895); People v. Carver, 172 Misc. 820, 16 N. Y. S. 2d 268 (County Ct. 1939); and Commodity Mfg. Co. v. Moore, 198 N. Y. S. 45 (Sup. Ct. 1923). None of these cases, however, stands for the proposition arrived at by the District Court and urged by respondents. The District Court also drew upon Bacon v. United States, 449 F. 2d 933 (CA9 1971), but that case dealt with arrest of a material witness and is unpersuasive with respect to the search for criminal evidence.
The same view has been expressed by those who have given close attention to the Fourth Amendment. “It does not follow, however, that probable cause for arrest would justify the issuance of a search warrant, or, on the other hand, that probable cause for a search warrant would necessarily justify an arrest. Each requires probabilities as to somewhat different facts and circumstances — a point which is seldom made explicit in the appellate cases. . . .
“This means, for one thing, that while probable cause for arrest requires information justifying a reasonable belief that a crime has been committed and that a particular person committed it, a search warrant may be issued on a complaint which does not identify any particular person as the likely offender. Because the complaint for a search warrant is not ‘filed as the basis of a criminal prosecution,’ it need not identify the person in charge of the premises or name the person in possession or any other person as the offender.” LaFave,'Search and Seizure: “The Course of True Law . . . Has Not . . . Run Smooth,” U. Ill. Law Forum 255, 260-261 (1966) (footnotes omitted).
“Furthermore, a warrant may issue to search the premises of anyone, without any showing that the occupant is guilty of any offense whatever.” T. Taylor, Two Studies in Constitutional Interpretation 48-49 (1969). “Search warrants may be issued only by a neutral and detached judicial officer, upon a showing of probable cause — that is, reasonable grounds to believe — that criminally related objects are in the place which the warrant authorizes to be searched, at the time when the search is authorized to be conducted.” Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev. 349, 358 (1974) (footnotes omitted).
“Two conclusions necessary to the issuance of the warrant must be supported by substantial evidence: that the items sought are in fact seizable by virtue of being connected with criminal activity, and that the items will be found in the place to be searched. By comparison, the right of arrest arises only when a crime is committed or attempted in the presence of the arresting officer or when the officer has ‘reasonable grounds to believe’ — sometimes stated ‘probable cause to believe’- — that a felony has been committed by the person to be arrested. Although it would appear that the conclusions which justify either arrest or the issuance of a search warrant must be supported by evidence of the same degree of probity, it is clear that the conclusions themselves are not identical.
“In the case of arrest, the conclusion concerns the guilt of the arrestee, whereas in the case of search warrants, the conclusions go to the connection of the items sought with crime and to their present location.” Comment, 28 U. Chi. L. Rev. 664, 687 (1961) (footnotes omitted).
Petitioners assert that third-party searches have long been authorized under Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 1524 (West 1970), which provides that fruits, instrumentalities, and evidence of crime “may be taken on the warrant from any place, or from any person in whose possession [they] may be.” The District Court did not advert to this provision.
It is also far from, clear, even apart from the dangers of destruction and removal, whether the use of the subpoena duces tecum under circumstances where there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that the materials sought constitute evidence of its commission will result in the production of evidence with sufficient regularity to satisfy the public interest in law enforcement. Unlike the individual whose privacy is invaded by a search, the recipient of a subpoena may assert the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in response to a summons to produce evidence or give testimony. See Maness v. Meyers, 419 U. S. 449 (1975). This privilege is not restricted to suspects. We have construed it broadly as covering any individual who might be incriminated by the evidence in connection with which the privilege is asserted. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U. S. 479 (1951). The burden of overcoming an assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege, even if prompted by a desire not to cooperate rather than any real fear of self-incrimination, is one which prosecutors would rarely be able to meet in the early stages of an investigation despite the fact they did not regard the witness as a suspect. Even time spent litigating such matters could seriously impede criminal investigations.
We reject totally the reasoning of the District Court that additional protections are required to assure that the Fourth Amendment rights of third parties are not violated because of the unavailability of the exclusionary rule as a deterrent to improper searches of premises in the control of nonsuspects. 353 F. Supp. 124, 131-132 (1972). In Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165 (1969), we expressly ruled that suppression of the fruits of a Fourth Amendment violation may be urged only by those whose rights were infringed by the search itself and not by those aggrieved solely by the introduction of incriminating evidence. The predicate for this holding was that the additional deterrent effect of permitting defendants whose Fourth Amendment rights had not been violated to challenge infringements of the privacy interests of others did not “justify further encroachment upon the public interest in prosecuting those accused of crime and having them acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evidence which exposes the truth.” Id., at 175. For similar reasons, we conclude that the interest in deterring illegal third-party searches does not justify a rule such as that adopted by the District Court. It is probably seldom that police during the investigatory stage when most searches occur will be so convinced that no potential defendant will have standing to exclude evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds that they will feel free to ignore constitutional restraints. In any event, it would be placing the cart before the horse to prohibit searches otherwise conforming to the Fourth Amendment because of a perception that the deterrence provided by the existing rules of standing is insufficient to discourage illegal searches. Cf. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294, 309 (1967). Finally, the District Court overlooked the fact that the California Supreme Court has ruled as a matter of state law that the legality of a search and seizure may be challenged by anyone against whom evidence thus obtained is used. Kaplan v. Superior Court, 6 Cal. 3d 150, 491 P. 2d 1 (1971).
Petitioners assert that the District Court ignored the realities of California law and practice that are said to preclude or make very difficult the use of subpoenas as investigatory techniques. If true, the choice of procedures may not always be open to the diligent prosecutor in the State of California.
case did not arise on cert or cert not granted federal court conflict federal court conflict and to resolve important or significant question putative conflict conflict between federal court and state court state court conflict federal court confusion or uncertainty state court confusion or uncertainty federal court and state court confusion or uncertainty to resolve important or significant question to resolve question presented no reason given other reason