MARSHALL, SUPERINTENDENT, SOUTHERN OHIO CORRECTIONAL FACILITY v. LONBERGER
No. 81-420.
Argued October 5, 1982
Decided February 22, 1983
Rehnquist, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and White, Powell, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. Brennan, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Marshall, J., joined, post, p. 439. Blackmun, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 447. Stevens, J.,’filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., joined, post, p. 447.
Richard David Drake, Assistant Attorney General of Ohio, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were William J. Brown, Attorney General, and Simon B. Karas, Dain N. De Veny, and Dennis L. Sipe, Assistant Attorneys General.
John Czamecki, by appointment of the Court, 455 U. S. 917, argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.
Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue here is whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the vacation of respondent’s Ohio murder conviction. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which granted respondent’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Lonberger v. Jago, 635 F. 2d 1189 (1980), and Lonberger v. Jago, 651 F. 2d 447 (1981), held that it did. The Court of Appeals held that respondent’s plea of guilty to a previous Illinois felony charge, offered and admitted into evidence at his Ohio murder trial, was invalid under Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238 (1969). It went on to hold that the admission into evidence of the Illinois conviction at the Ohio trial rendered respondent’s ensuing conviction in that proceeding unconstitutional under this Court’s decision in Burgett v. Texas, 389 U. S. 109 (1967). The State claims that the Court of Appeals exceeded its authority, under our holding in Sumner v. Mata, 449 U. S. 539 (1981), in concluding that the prior Illinois conviction was invalid. It also contends that even if the Court of Appeals were warranted in so concluding, the admission of that conviction at the Ohio murder trial did not render the Ohio conviction constitutionally infirm. We granted certiorari to consider, inter alia, the interrelationship between Boykin v. Alabama, supra, and Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U. S. 637 (1976).
I
There is apparently no dispute with respect to the operative facts which led to respondent’s indictment and conviction for the murder of Charita Lanier in Toledo, Ohio, on the evening of January 29, 1975. Lanier was brutally murdered in the living room of her home during that evening; blood stains led from the living room to the kitchen, where the victim’s partially clothed body was found in a freezer. An autopsy revealed that the victim bled to death after her throat had been slashed, and a bent, blood-stained knife found near the scene of the crime was identified as the murder weapon. The victim’s clothing was torn and sperm was detected in her vaginal canal.
The morning after the murder, the victim’s children told police that respondent, Robert Lonberger, had been at their home the previous evening. After the children had been sent to their upstairs bedroom, they heard their mother scream. When there was no response to his questions, the older child left his bedroom and went downstairs. The lights were out and when the child attempted to turn them on respondent grabbed his hand; he ordered the child back to bed. A pack of cigarettes of respondent’s brand was found in the house and blood-stained articles of clothing were discovered in his possession.
Respondent was indicted by a state grand jury on two counts of “aggravated murder.” The first count charged that respondent had murdered Lanier with “prior calculation and design,” in violation of Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2903.01(A) (1975). The second count charged respondent with murder while committing rape, in violation of Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2903.01(B) (1975). Both counts of aggravated murder included a “specification,” described below, in which the prosecution alleged that respondent previously had been convicted of an “offense of which the gist was the purposeful killing of or attempt to kill another.” Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2929.04(A)(5) (1975).
Respondent pleaded not guilty to the charges, and the State sought at trial to prove the specification of prior conviction for attempt to kill by introducing the record of a conviction of respondent in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Ill. It is the introduction of this conviction into evidence in the Ohio murder trial which has been the focus of constitutional objection on the part of respondent since that time, and upon which the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit based its conclusion that respondent's conviction was constitutionally infirm. Because of its central role in this litigation, we find it desirable to describe in some detail the evidence before the Ohio court relating to this prior conviction.
It is fair to say that from the time the State first offered the record of the Illinois conviction until the present time, the opposing parties have never agreed as to the historical facts surrounding the acceptance of respondent’s plea of guilty to an indictment returned by a grand jury in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Ill., some three years before he was tried on the Ohio murder charge. The State offered in evidence at the Ohio trial a copy of the grand jury indictment forming the basis for the Illinois charge, a certified copy of an Illinois record called a “conviction statement,” and the transcript of a hearing in the Circuit Court of Cook County occurring at the time respondent pleaded guilty.
These documents show that respondent was indicted by the Cook County grand jury in May 1971 on four counts: aggravated battery against Dorothy Maxwell, aggravated battery with a deadly weapon against Dorothy Maxwell, intentionally and knowingly attempting to kill Dorothy Maxwell by cutting her with a knife, and aggravated battery against Wendtian Maxwell with a deadly weapon. The “conviction statement,” prepared and authenticated by the Circuit Court of Cook County, recited in pertinent part that respondent was indicted for “AGGRAVATED BATTERY, ETC.,” that on March 10, 1972, respondent withdrew an earlier plea of not guilty and entered a plea of guilty, and that after the court “fully explained to the Defendant. . . before the entry of said PLEA OF GUILTY, the consequences of entering such PLEA OF GUILTY, the said Defendant still persisted in his PLEA OF GUILTY in manner and form as charged in the indictment in this cause.” App. 5. The third record offered in evidence in the Ohio proceedings is the transcript of the colloquy at the time of sentencing in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Ill., id., at 6-15. It contains the following relevant exchanges at a time when the sentencing judge, respondent, respondent’s attorney, and the prosecuting attorney were shown to be present in open court:
“THE COURT: In other words, you are pleading guilty, that you did on August 25, 1968, commit the offense of aggravated battery on one Dorothy Maxwell, and that you did on the same date attempt on Dorothy Maxwell, with a knife, is that correct?
“THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
“THE COURT: And you did on the same date commit the offense of aggravated battery on one Wendtian Maxwell, is that correct?
“That is what you are pleading to, sir?
“THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
“THE COURT: And understand by pleading guilty to this indictment you are waiving your right to a trial by this Court or trial by this Court and a jury?
“THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
“THE COURT: Understand by pleading guilty I could sentence you from one to ten on the aggravated battery, and attempt one to twenty. So, I could sentence you to the penitentiary for a maximum of from one to forty years.
“Understand that?
“THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
“THE COURT: What do you wish to tell me insofar as stipulation and as far as facts concerned?
“MR. RANDALL [prosecuting attorney]: Let it be stipulated by and between the parties, Indictment 71-1554, it is both sufficient in law and in fact to sustain the charges contained therein, to sustain a finding of guilty on the charges involving Robert Lonberger. . . .
“MR. XINOS [respondent’s attorney]: So stipulated.”
Before respondent’s trial on the aggravated murder charges, the Ohio trial court conducted a hearing in limine to determine whether respondent’s guilty plea to the Illinois attempted murder charge was voluntary. The Illinois records were offered, and respondent took the stand and submitted himself to direct and cross-examination primarily as to his recollection of the Illinois proceedings which had taken place three years earlier. At the conclusion of this hearing, the trial court made the following findings:
“The Court finds on the evidence presented that the defendant is an intelligent individual, well experienced in the criminal processes and well represented at all stages of the proceedings by competent and capable counsel in Illinois. On review of the certified copy of the Illinois proceedings and a transcript of the plea of guilty, the Court finds that every effort was taken to safeguard and to protect the constitutional rights of the defendant. Therefore, the Court finds that the defendant intelligently and voluntarily entered his plea of guilty in the Illinois court.” Id., at 99-100.
Evidence of respondent’s Illinois conviction was admitted at his Ohio trial, subject to an instruction that it be considered only in connection with the specification, and not as probative of guilt on the underlying murder count. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on the second count of aggravated murder, one including the specification of the prior charge of attempted murder; after a sentencing hearing in accordance with Ohio law, the trial court imposed a sentence of death.
Respondent’s appeal to the Ohio Court of Appeals was partially successful; that court found as a matter of state law that the jury’s finding that respondent had not only murdered Charita Lanier, but raped her as well, did not satisfy the Ohio rule relating to proof of crime by circumstantial evidence. App. to Pet. for Cert. A-38. It did uphold the jury finding that respondent was guilty of the murder of Lanier, and that the specification based on the prior Illinois conviction was adequately proved. It reversed the judgment imposing a death penalty, and directed imposition of a sentence based solely on the conviction of murder. With respect to the admissibility and evidence of the prior Illinois conviction, the Ohio Court of Appeals said:
“The transcript from the Cook County Circuit Court proceedings at which appellant changed his plea to guilty indicated that he was represented by competent counsel. When questioned by the court, appellant answered affirmatively that he was pleading guilty to ‘the offense of aggravated battery on one Dorothy Maxwell, ... attempt on Dorothy Maxwell, with a knife . . . [and] the offense of aggravated battery on Wendtian Maxwell. . . .’ Appellant further affirmed that he understood that he was waiving his right to trial and to confront witnesses, that he understood the penalties that could be imposed, that he was motivated to plead guilty by an offer of a reduced sentence, and that he had not otherwise been threatened or promised anything. Through his counsel, appellant stipulated that there were sufficient facts to sustain the charges contained in the indictment. We find from the record of this proceeding and from the record of the pre-trial hearing in the instant case, that the trial court did not err in ruling that appellant’s guilty plea was voluntarily and knowingly made and that the evidence of the prior conviction should be submitted to the jury.” Id., at A-42.
I — I t-H
It was the record of these proceedings in the Ohio state courts that formed the basis of respondent’s application for federal habeas in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. The District Court denied relief, finding that “from a review of the record, this Court is satisfied that an ordinary person would have understood the nature of the charges to which petitioner was pleading guilty.” Id., at A-31. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the judgment of the District Court, and ordered that a writ of habeas corpus issue. Lonberger v. Jago, 635 F. 2d 1189 (1980). We granted certiorari, vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and remanded for reconsideration in the light of Sumner v. Mata, 449 U. S. 539 (1981). Marshall v. Lonberger, 451 U. S. 902 (1981). On remand the Court of Appeals adhered to its previous decision. Lonberger v. Jago, 651F. 2d 447 (1981). We again granted certiorari, 454 U. S. 1141 (1982), and we now reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals, referring to its earlier opinion, stated:
“The basis for our judgment was that Lonberger’s 1972 guilty plea to attempted murder was not demonstrably an intelligent one, and was therefore invalid under federal constitutional standards. This conclusion is directly contrary to the conclusions of both of the Ohio courts that considered the question of the validity of Lonberger’s 1972 plea. We now expressly hold that these factual determinations by the Ohio courts are not fairly supported by the records that were before them. This we are empowered to do by 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(8). Sumner v. Mata, supra, requires that federal courts state their rationales for exercise of this power.
“The basis for our disagreement with the factual determinations of the state courts can be briefly stated. The question of an effective waiver of a federal constitutional right is governed by federal standards. Boykin v. Alabama, supra, 395 U. S. at 243 .... A guilty plea, which works as a waiver of numerous constitutional rights, cannot be truly voluntary if the defendant ‘has such an incomplete understanding of the charge that his plea cannot stand as an intelligent admission of guilt.’ Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U. S. 637, 645 n. 13 . . . (1976). Accord, Smith v. O’Grady, 312 U. S. 329, 334 . ... (1941).
“The transcript of Lonberger’s 1972 plea is inadequate to show that Lonberger was aware that he was pleading guilty to a charge of attempted murder.” 651 F. 2d, at 449 (footnote omitted).
We entirely agree with the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit that the governing standard as to whether a plea of guilty is voluntary for purposes of the Federal Constitution is a question of federal law, Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U. S. 637 (1976); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238 (1969), and not a question of fact subject to the requirements of 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d). But the questions of historical fact which have dogged this case from its inception — what the Illinois records show with respect to respondent’s 1972 guilty plea, what other inferences regarding those historical facts the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit could properly draw, and related questions — are obviously questions of “fact” governed by the provisions of § 2254(d).
Section 2254(d) establishes a presumption of correctness for “a determination after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue, made by a State court of competent jurisdiction in a proceeding to which the applicant for the writ and the State or an officer or agent thereof were parties, evidenced by a written finding, written opinion, or other reliable and adequate written indicia. ...” One of the eight exceptions to this presumption of correctness, and the one relied upon by the Court of Appeals in this case, is where the federal habeas court, reviewing the state-court record offered to support the factual finding, “on a consideration of such part of the record as a whole concludes that such factual determination is not fairly supported by the record.” 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(8).
In its treatment of the state courts’ factual findings, the Court of Appeals failed in at least one major respect to accord those determinations the “high measure of deference,” Sumner v. Mata, supra, to which they are entitled. This deference requires that a federal habeas court more than simply disagree with the state court before rejecting its factual determinations. Instead, it must conclude that the state court’s findings lacked even “fair support” in the record. The Court of Appeals’ treatment of the issue of respondent’s credibility failed to satisfy this standard. Following a recital of the findings of the Ohio trial court, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit states that “[n]o explicit findings were made concerning Lonberger’s credibility as a witness.” 651 F. 2d, at 448. Likewise, the Court of Appeals wrote:
“At the pretrial hearing, Lonberger testified that he ‘copped out to aggravated battery’ in 1972, but had no knowledge of other charges. The Ohio prosecutors attempted to discredit this testimony by introducing copies of the 1972 indictment charging Lonberger with ‘the offense of attempt.’ Lonberger denied that he had ever seen or read this indictment. The prosecutors sought to imply by their questioning of Lonberger that he must have heard of the ‘attempt’ charge either at his arraignment or in conversation with his attorneys. Lonberger testified that he had not, and the state produced no contrary evidence.” Id., at 449-450 (footnote omitted).
Finally, the Court of Appeals explicitly credited Lonberger’s testimony in a footnote rejecting the State’s reliance on Henderson v. Morgan, supra. 651 F. 2d, at 450, n. 3.
We are unsure whether the Court of Appeals’ reassessment of the effect of respondent’s testimony at the Ohio state trial court hearing was undertaken because of the failure of the trial court to make express findings as to respondent’s credibility, or whether the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit felt that it should assess for itself the weight that such evidence should have been accorded by the state trial court. In either event, we hold that it erroneously applied the “fairly supported by the record” standard enunciated in 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d).
In LaVallee v. Delle Rose, 410 U. S. 690 (1973), we dealt with a state-court hearing in which the trial judge likewise failed to make express findings as to the defendant’s credibility. We held that because it was clear under the applicable federal law that the trial court would have granted the relief sought by the defendant had it believed the defendant’s testimony, its failure to grant relief was tantamount to an express finding against the credibility of the defendant. We think the same is true in the present case. The assumption referred to in Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293, 314-315 (1963), quoted in LaVallee v. Delle Rose, supra, at 694, “that the state trier of fact applied correct standards of federal law to the facts ...” leads inevitably to a similar conclusion here. Had the Ohio trial court credited respondent’s insistence that he had only been advised of or been aware of the battery charge at the time he pleaded guilty in Illinois, the Ohio trial court would have surely refused to allow the record of the Illinois conviction in evidence to prove the specification of attempted murder. The trial court’s ruling allowing the record of conviction to be admitted in evidence in support of the specification is tantamount to a refusal to believe the testimony of respondent.
The Court of Appeals’ reliance on respondent’s testimony, discussed above, and the fact that “the state produced no contrary evidence,” are quite wide of the mark for purposes of deciding whether factual findings are fairly supported by the record. Title 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d) gives federal habeas courts no license to redetermine credibility of witnesses whose demeanor has been observed by the state trial court, but not by them. In United States v. Oregon Medical Society, 343 U. S. 326 (1952), commenting on the deference which this Court gave to the findings of a District Court on direct appeal from a judgment in a bench trial, we stated:
“As was aptly stated by the New York Court of Appeals, although in a case of a rather different substantive nature: ‘Face to face with living witnesses the original trier of the facts holds a position of advantage from which appellate judges are excluded. In doubtful cases the exercise of his power of observation often proves the most accurate method of ascertaining the truth. . . . How can we say the judge is wrong? We never saw the witnesses. ... To the sophistication and sagacity of the trial judge the law confides the duty of appraisal. ’ Boyd v. Boyd, 252 N. Y. 422, 429, 169 N. E. 632, 634.” Id., at 339.
We greatly doubt that Congress, when it used the language “fairly supported by the record” considered “as a whole” intended to authorize broader federal review of state-court credibility determinations than are authorized in appeals within the federal system itself. While disbelief of respondent’s testimony may not form the basis for any affirmative findings by the state trial court on issues with respect to which the State bore the burden of proof, it certainly negates any inferences favorable to respondent such as those drawn by the Court of Appeals, based on his testimony before the Ohio trial court.
Thus, the factual conclusions which the federal habeas courts were bound to respect in assessing respondent’s constitutional claims were the contents of the Illinois court records, the finding of the Ohio trial court that respondent was “an intelligent individual, well experienced in the criminal processes and well represented at all stages of the proceedings by competent and capable counsel in Illinois,” supra, at 428, and the similar conclusion of the Ohio Court of Appeals, and the inferences fairly deducible from these facts. These records and findings show, with respect to the attempted murder charge, that it was one of the four counts contained in the Cook County indictment returned against respondent. The “conviction certificate” recites that at the time respondent pleaded guilty, he was duly advised by the court of the consequences of pleading guilty, and nonetheless adhered to his plea. The transcript, as appears from its face and as found by the Ohio Court of Appeals, shows that respondent answered affirmatively that he was pleading guilty, inter alia, to the offense of “attempt on Dorothy Maxwell, with a knife . . . .” Respondent’s attorney, in his presence, stipulated that the indictment was “both sufficient in law and in fact to sustain the charges contained therein, to sustain a finding of guilty on the charges involving [respondent].” Ibid. There is perhaps an arguable conflict between the recitation of the “conviction certificate” and the transcript by reason of the latter’s omission of the word “murder” after the word “attempt” in the colloquy between respondent and the court. For our purposes we assume that the transcript version, which is more favorable to respondent, was accurate.
It is well established that a plea of guilty cannot be voluntary in the sense that it constitutes an intelligent admission that the accused committed the offense unless the accused has received “real notice of the true nature of the charge against him, the first and most universally recognized requirement of due process.” Smith v. O’Grady, 312 U. S. 329, 334 (1941), quoted in Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U. S., at 645. In Henderson v. Morgan, we went on to make the following observations:
“Normally the record contains either an explanation of the charge by the trial judge, or at least a representation by defense counsel that the nature of the offense has been explained to the accused. Moreover, even without such an express representation, it may be appropriate to presume that in most cases defense counsel routinely explain the nature of the offense in sufficient detail to give the accused notice of what he is being asked to admit.” Id., at 647.
Applying this standard to the factual determinations arising from the state-court proceedings which were “fairly supported by the record” within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d), we disagree with the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in its conclusion that respondent’s plea to the Illinois charge was not “voluntary” in the constitutional meaning of that term. We think that the application of the principles enunciated in Henderson v. Morgan, supra, lead inexorably to the conclusion that the plea was voluntary. We think a person of respondent’s intelligence and experience in the criminal justice system would have understood, from the statements made at the sentencing hearing recorded in the transcript before us, that the presiding judge was inquiring whether the defendant pleaded guilty to offenses charged in the indictment against him. This is evident from the references in the proceeding by the judge to the fact the respondent was “pleading guilty to this indictment” and by respondent’s counsel’s stipulation that the indictment sustained the plea of guilty. Supra, at 427-428. Under Henderson, respondent must be presumed to have been informed, either by his lawyers or at one of the presentencing proceedings, of the charges on which he was indicted. Given this knowledge of the indictment and the fact that the indictment contained no other attempt charges, respondent could only have understood the judge’s reference to “attempt on Dorothy Maxwell, with a knife” as a reference to the indictment’s charge of attempt to kill. It follows, therefore, both that respondent’s argument that his plea of guilty was not made knowingly must fail, and that the admission in the Ohio murder trial of the conviction based on that plea deprived respondent of no federal right. Spencer v. Texas, 385 U. S. 554 (1967). The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly
Reversed.
Both the first and the second counts of aggravated murder, and the accompanying specifications, were submitted to the jury. No verdict was returned as to the first count or the specification accompanying that charge, and neither is relevant to our decision.
Under the Ohio statute, the death sentence could be imposed only for the crime of aggravated murder, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2929.03 (1975). Even as to aggravated murder, the prosecution was required separately to allege a specification and prove beyond a reasonable doubt the aggravating circumstance contained in the specification, §2929.03(C). If the jury found the defendant guilty of both aggravated murder and the specification, then the trial judge was required to hold a sentencing hearing where the defendant could show mitigating circumstances, §§2929.03(D) and 2929.04. If no mitigating circumstances were found, the judge was required to impose the death sentence; a mandatory life sentence applied if mitigating circumstances were shown.
The likelihood that the state trial court would have reached such a conclusion is not diminished by the facts before us. The state courts found that respondent was represented by two lawyers who were competent and capable, and the record suggests that one of the two was a nationally respected public defender; either of them might well have informed respondent of the charges contained in the indictment against him. Moreover, respondent appeared in several court proceedings in connection with his attack on Dorothy Maxwell, at any one of which the indictment could have been read to him.
The method by which court records from one State are to be authenticated and proved in the courts of a second State, the weight to be given those records, and the extent to which they may be impeached by later oral testimony, are all matters generally left to the laws of the States. A State “is free to regulate the procedure of its courts in accordance with its own conception of policy and fairness unless in so doing it offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 105 (1934).
The Sixth Circuit sought to distinguish Henderson on several grounds, none of which withstands analysis. First, it relied on “Lonberger’s testimony that his lawyers did not discuss the charge of ‘attempt’ with him.” This, however, requires rejection of the state courts’ necessary conclusions as to Lonberger’s testimony, which the federal habeas court was unjustified in doing. Supra, at 433-434. In addition, the Court of Appeals thought that the fact that respondent had changed lawyers following the return of the grand jury indictment somehow made it less likely that the presumption would operate. The mere fact of a change in representation, if it has any probative value, would suggest to us that it was even more likely than usual that one of the two lawyers informed respondent of the contents of the indictment. The Court of Appeals also relied on what it thought was a vague description of the attempt-to-kill offense in the indictment and the sentencing proceedings. We cannot agree with the Court of Appeals’ apparent implication that the indictment failed to provide respondent’s counsel with sufficient information to enable them to describe to him the charges he faced: indeed, counsel stipulated that the indictment was “sufficient in law and fact” to sustain the charges against respondent. Finally, the Court of Appeals thought it “questionable whether [the Henderson presumption] is proper in a case ... in which a prior conviction forms an essential element of a later crime.” Whatever may be the case otherwise, there is surely no obstacle to use of the presumption in a case such as this, when the defendant is challenging a conviction which does not have a prior conviction as an element.
In Spencer, which we reaffirm, the Court upheld a conviction despite the introduction at the guilt-determination stage of trial of a defendant’s prior conviction for purposes of sentence enhancement. Central to our decision was the fact that the Due Process Clause does not permit the federal courts to engage in a finely tuned review of the wisdom of state evidentiary rules: “It has never been thought that [decisions under the Due Process Clause] establish this Court as a rule-making organ for the promulgation of state rules of criminal procedure.” 385 U. S., at 564. Applying these principles, we observed that the Texas procedural rules permitting introduction of the defendant’s prior conviction did not pose a sufficient danger of unfairness to the defendant to offend the Due Process Clause, in part because such evidence was accompanied by instructions limiting the jury’s use of the conviction to sentence enhancement. This analysis remains persuasive; as recognized in Parker v. Randolph, 442 U. S. 62, 73 (1979) (Rehnquist, j.), the “crucial assumption” underlying the system of trial by jury “is that juries will follow the instructions given them by the trial judge. Were this not so, it would be pointless for a trial court to instruct a jury, and even more pointless for an appellate court to reverse a criminal conviction because the jury was improperly instructed.” Cf. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U. S. 510 (1979). Spencer also observed that in cases where documentary evidence is used to prove the prior crime, the evidence seldom, if ever, will be so inflammatory or “devastating,” Parker v. Randolph, supra, at 74-75, that the jury will be unable to follow its instructions. See, e. g., Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123 (1968). And, of course, if the jury considers a defendant’s prior conviction only for purposes of sentence enhancement no questions of fairness arise.
Justice Stevens’ dissent appears to rest on a view that the common law regarded the admission of prior convictions as grossly unfair and subject to some sort of blanket prohibition. In fact, the common law was far more ambivalent. See, e. g., Stone, Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: America, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 988 (1938). Alongside the general principle that prior convictions are inadmissible, despite their relevance to guilt, 1 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 194 (3d ed. 1940), the common law developed broad, vaguely defined exceptions — such as proof of intent, identity, malice, motive, and plan — whose application is left largely to the discretion of the trial judge, see Spencer v. Texas, 385 U. S., at 560-561. In short, the common law, like our decision in Spencer, implicitly recognized that any unfairness resulting from admitting prior convictions was more often than not balanced by its probative value and permitted the prosecution to introduce such evidence without demanding any particularly strong justification.
Here, as in Spencer, the trial judge gave a careful and sound instruction requiring the jury to consider respondent’s prior conviction only for purposes of the specification. The extent to which the jury can and does consider limiting instructions, or for that matter any instructions, has been fully considered in cases such as Spencer, supra, Bruton, supra, Parker, supra, and Burgett v. Texas, 389 U. S. 109 (1967). The matter was put to rest for cases such as this by our decision in Spencer, supra, in which the Court quoted the remark of Justice Cardozo in Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S., at 105, that a state rule of law “does not run foul of the Fourteenth Amendment because another method may seem to our thinking to be fairer or wiser or to give a surer promise of protection to the prisoner at the bar.”
Remarking on the state of the law of evidence with respect to reputation in criminal cases, the Court in Michelson v. United States, 335 U. S. 469, 486 (1948), said:
“We concur in the general opinion of the courts, textwriters and the profession that much of this law is archaic, paradoxical and full of compromises and compensations by which an irrational advantage to one side is offset by a poorly reasoned counterprivilege to the other. But somehow it has proved a workable even if clumsy system when moderated by discretionary controls in the hands of a wise and strong trial court. To pull one misshapen stone out of the grotesque structure is more likely simply to upset its present balance between adverse interests than to establish a rational edifice.”
If this Court was thus willing to defer to “accumulated judicial experience” at the expense of “abstract logic,” id., at 487, in a case such as Michelson which arose in the federal court system, the Due Process Clause as construed in Spencer surely cannot require a State to do more.
case did not arise on cert or cert not granted federal court conflict federal court conflict and to resolve important or significant question putative conflict conflict between federal court and state court state court conflict federal court confusion or uncertainty state court confusion or uncertainty federal court and state court confusion or uncertainty to resolve important or significant question to resolve question presented no reason given other reason