opinion: SHERRER v. SHERRER.
  No. 36.
  Argued October 13-14, 1947.
  Decided June 7, 1948.
  Frederick M. Myers argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Francis J. Quirico.
  Lincoln S. Cain and Robert T. Capeless argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was James M. Carroll.
  Mr. Chief Justice Vinson
  delivered the opinion of the Court.
  We granted certiorari in this case and in Coe v. Coe, post, p. 378, to consider the contention of petitioners that Massachusetts has failed to accord full faith and credit to decrees of divorce rendered by courts of sister States.
  Petitioner Margaret E. Shérrer and the respondent, Edward C. Sherrer, were married in New Jersey in 1930, and from 1932 until April 3, 1944, lived together in Monterey, Massachusetts. Following a long period of marital discord, petitioner, accompanied by the two children of the marriage, left Massachusetts on the latter date, ostensibly for the purpose of spending a vacation in the State of Florida. Shortly after her arrival in Florida, however, petitioner informed her husband that she did not intend to return to him. Petitioner obtained housing accommodations in Florida, placed her older child in school, and secured employment for herself.
  On July 6,1944, a bill of complaint for divorce was filed at petitioner’s direction in the Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit of the State of Florida. The bill alleged extreme cruelty as grounds for divorce and also alleged that petitioner was a “bona fide legal resident of the State of Florida.” The respondent received notice by mail of the pendency of the divorce proceedings. He retained Florida counsel who entered a general appearance and filed an answer denying the allegations of petitioner’s corn-plaint, including the allegation as to petitioner’s Florida residence.
  On November 14, 1944, hearings were held in the divorce proceedings. Respondent appeared personally to testify with respect to a stipulation entered into by the parties relating to the custody of the children. Throughout the entire proceedings respondent was represented by counsel. Petitioner introduced evidence to establish her Florida residence and testified generally to the allegations of her complaint. Counsel for respondent failed to cross-examine or to introduce evidence in rebuttal.
  The Florida court on November 29, 1944, entered a decree of divorce after specifically finding that petitioner “is a bona fide resident of the State of Florida, and that this court has jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter in said cause; . . .” Respondent failed to challenge the decree by appeal to the Florida Supreme Court.
  On December 1,1944, petitioner was married in Florida to one Henry A. Phelps, whom petitioner had known while both were residing in Massachusetts and who had come to Florida shortly after petitioner’s arrival in that State. Phelps and petitioner lived together as husband and wife in Florida, where they were both employed, until February 5, 1945, when they returned to Massachusetts.
  In June, 1945, respondent instituted an action in the Probate Court of Berkshire County, Massachusetts, which has given rise to the issues of this case. Respondent alleged that he is the lawful husband of petitioner, that the Florida decree of divorce is invalid, and that petitioner’s subsequent marriage is void. Respondent prayed that he might be permitted to convey his real estate as if he were sole and that the court declare that he was living apart from his wife for justifiable cause. Petitioner joined issue on respondent’s allegations.
  In the proceedings which followed, petitioner gave testimony in defense of the validity of the Florida diyorce decree. The Probate Court, however, resolved the issues of fact adversely to petitioner’s contentions, found that she was never domiciled in Florida, and granted respondent the relief he had requested. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed the decree on the grounds that it was supported by the evidence and that the requirements of full faith and credit did not preclude the Massachusetts courts from reexamining the finding of domicile made by the Florida court.
  "'"It the outset, it should be observed that the proceedings in the Florida court prior to the entry of the decree of divorce were in no way inconsistent with the requirements of procedural due process. We do not understand respondent to urge the contrary. The respondent personally appeared in the Florida proceedings. Through his attorney he filed pleadings denying the substantial allegations of petitioner’s complaint. It is not suggested that his rights to introduce evidence and otherwise to conduct his defense were in any degree impaired; nor is it suggested that there was not available to him the right to seek review of the decree by appeal to the Florida Supreme Court. It is clear that respondent was afforded his day in court with respect to every issue involved in the litigation, including the jurisdictional issue of petitioner’s domicile. Under such circumstances, there is nothing in the concept of due process which demands that a defendant be afforded a second opportunity to litigate the existence of jurisdictional facts. Chicago Life Insurance Co. v. Cherry, 244 U. S. 25 (1917); Baldwin v. Iowa Traveling Men’s Assn., 283 U. S. 522 (1931).
  It should also be observed that there has been no suggestion that under the law of Florida, the decree of divorce in question is in any respect invalid or could successfully be subjected to the type of attack permitted by the Massachusetts court. The implicit assumption underlying the position taken by respondent and the Massachusetts court is that this case involves a decree of divorce valid and final in the State which rendered it; and we so assume.
  That the jurisdiction of the Florida court to enter a valid decree of divorce was dependent upon petitioner’s domicile in that State is not disputed. This requirement was recognized by the Florida court which rendered the divorce decree, and the principle has been given frequent application in decisions of the State Supreme Court. But whether or not petitioner was domiciled in Florida at the time the divorce was granted was a matter to be resolved by judicial determination. Here, unlike the situation presented in Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226 (1945), the finding of the requisite jurisdictional facts was made in proceedings in which the defendant appeared and participated. The question with which we are confronted, therefore, is whether such a finding made under the circumstances presented by this case may, consistent with the requirements of full faith and credit, be subjected to collateral attack in the courts of a sister State in a suit brought by the defendant in the original proceedings.
  The question of what effect is to be given to an adjudication by a court that it possesses requisite jurisdiction in a case, where the judgment of that court is subsequently subjected to collateral attack on jurisdictional grounds, has been given frequent consideration by this Court over a period of many years. Insofar as cases originating in the federal courts are concerned, the rule has evolved that the doctrine of res judicata applies to adjudications relating either to jurisdiction of the person or of the subject matter where such adjudications have been made in proceedings in which those questions were in issue and in which the parties were given full opportunity to litigate. The reasons for this doctrine have frequently been stated. Thus in Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U. S. 165, 172 (1938), it was said: “Courts to determine the rights of parties are an integral part of our system of government. It is just as important that there should be a place to end as that there should be a place to begin litigation. After a party has his day in court, with opportunity to present his evidence and his view of the law, a collateral attack upon the decision as to jurisdiction there rendered merely retries the issue previously determined. There is no reason to expect that the second decision will be more satisfactory than the first.”
  This Court has also held that the doctrine of res judi-cata must be applied to questions of jurisdiction in cases arising in state courts involving the application of the full faith and credit clause where, under the law of the state in which the original judgment was rendered, such adjudications are not susceptible to collateral attack.
  In Davis v. Davis, 305 U. S. 32 (1938), the courts of the District of Columbia had refused to give effect to a decree of absolute divorce rendered in Virginia, on the ground that the Virginia court had lacked jurisdiction despite the fact that the defendant had appeared in the Virginia proceedings and had fully litigated the issue of the plaintiff’s domicile. This Court held that in failing to give recognition to the Virginia decree, the courts of the District had failed to accord the full faith and credit required by the Constitution. During the course of the opinion, this Court stated: “As to petitioner’s domicil for divorce and his standing to invoke jurisdiction of the Virginia court, its finding that he was a bona fide resident of that State for the required time is binding upon respondent in the courts of the District. She may not say that he was not entitled to sue for divorce in the state court, for she appeared there and by plea put in issue his allegation as to domicil, introduced evidence to show it false, took exceptions to the commissioner’s report, and sought to have the court sustain them and uphold her plea. Plainly, the determination of the decree upon that point is effective for all purposes in this litigation.”
  We believe that the decision of this Court in the Davis case and those in related situations are clearly indicative of the result to be reached here. Those cases stand for the proposition that the requirements of full faith and credit bar a defendant from collaterally attacking a divorce decree on jurisdictional grounds in the courts of a sister State where there has been participation by the defendant in the divorce proceedings, where the defendant has been accorded full opportunity to contest the jurisdictional issues, and where the decree is not susceptible to such collateral attack in the courts of the State which rendered the decree.
  ’’“""Applying these principles to this case, we hold that the Massachusetts courts erred in permitting the Florida divorce decree to be subjected to attack on the ground that petitioner was not domiciled in Florida at the time the decree was entered. Respondent participated in the Florida proceedings by entering a general appearance, filing pleadings placing in issue the very matters he sought subsequently to contest in the Massachusetts courts, personally appearing before the Florida court and giving testimony in the case, and by retaining attorneys who represented him throughout the entire proceedings. It has not been contended that respondent was given less than a full opportunity to contest the issue of petitioner’s domicile or any other issue relevant to the litigation. There is nothing to indicate that the Florida court would not have evaluated fairly and in good faith all relevant evidence submitted to it. Respondent does not even contend that on the basis of the evidence introduced in the Florida proceedings, that court reached an erroneous result on the issue of petitioner’s domicile. If respondent failed to take advantage of the opportunities afforded him, the responsibility is his own. We do not believe that the dereliction of a defendant under such circumstances should be permitted to provide a basis for subsequent attack in the courts of a sister State on a decree valid in the State in which it was rendered.
  It is suggested, however, that Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U. S. 14 (1903), militates against the result we have reached. In that case a husband, who had been domiciled in Massachusetts, instituted divorce proceedings in a South Dakota court after having satisfied the residence requirements of that State. The wife appeared by counsel and filed pleadings challenging the husband’s South Dakota domicile. Before the decree of divorce was granted, however, the wife, pursuant to a consent agreement between the parties, withdrew her appearance from the proceedings. Following the entry of the decree, the husband returned to Massachusetts and subsequently remarried. After his death a contest developed between his first and second wives as to the administration of the husband’s estate. The Massachusetts court concluded that the South Dakota decree of divorce was void on the ground that the husband had not been domiciled in that State and that, under the applicable statutes of Massachusetts, the Massachusetts courts were not required to give recognition to such a decree. This Court affirmed on writ of error by a divided vote.
  On its facts, the Andrews case presents variations from the present situation. But insofar as the rule of that case may be said to be inconsistent with the judgment herein announced, it must be regarded as having been superseded by subsequent decisions of this Court. The Andrews case was decided prior to the considerable modern development of the law with respect to finality of jurisdictional findings. One of the decisions upon which the majority of the Court in that case placed primary reliance, Wisconsin v. Pelican Insurance Co., 127 U. S. 265 (1888), was, insofar as pertinent, overruled in Milwaukee County v. White Co., 296 U. S. 268 (1935). The Andrews case, therefore, may not be regarded as determinative of the issues before us.
  It is urged further, however, that because we are dealing with litigation involving the dissolution of the marital relation, a different result is demanded from that which might properly be reached if this case were concerned with other types of litigation. It is pointed out that under the Constitution the regulation and control of marital and family relationships are reserved to the States. It is urged, and properly so, that the regulation of the incidents of the marital relation involves the exercise by the States of powers of the most vital importance. Finally, it is contended that a recognition of the importance to the States of such powers demands that the requirements of full faith and credit be viewed in such a light as to permit an attack upon a divorce decree granted by a court of a sister State under the circumstances of this case even where the attack is initiated in a suit brought by the defendant in the original proceedings.
  But the recognition of the importance of a State’s power to determine the incidents of basic social relationships into which its domiciliaries enter does not resolve the issues of this case. This is not a situation in which a State has merely sought to exert such power over a domiciliary. This is, rather, a case involving inconsistent assertions of power by courts of two States of the Federal Union and thus presents considerations which go beyond the interests of local policy, however vital. In resolving the issues here presented, we do not conceive it to be a part of our function to weigh the relative merits of the policies of Florida and Massachusetts with respect to divorce and related matters. Nor do we understand the decisions of this Court to support the proposition that the obligation imposed by Article IV, § 1 of the Constitution and the Act of Congress passed thereunder amounts to something less than the duty to accord full faith and credit to decrees of divorce entered by courts of sister States. The full faith and credit clause is one of the provisions incorporated into the Constitution by its framers for the purpose of transforming an aggregation of independent, sovereign States into a nation. If in its application local policy must at times be required to give way, such “is part of the price of our federal system.” Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287, 302 (1942). _
  This is not to say that in no case may an area be recog- "] nized in which reasonable accommodations of interest | may properly be made. But as this Court has heretofore { made clear, that area is of limited extent. We believe that in permitting an attack on the Florida divorce decree which again put in issue petitioner’s Florida domicile and in refusing to recognize the validity of that decree, the Massachusetts courts have asserted a power which cannot be reconciled with the requirements of due faith and credit. We believe that assurances that such a power will , be exercised sparingly and wisely render it no less repug- i nant to the constitutional commands. _j
  It is one thing to recognize as permissible the judicial reexamination of findings of jurisdictional fact where such findings have been made by a court of a sister State which has entered a divorce decree in ex parte proceedings. It is quite another thing to hold that the vital rights and interests involved in divorce litigation may be held in suspense pending the scrutiny by courts of sister States of findings of jurisdictional fact made by a competent court in proceedings conducted in a manner consistent with the highest requirements of due process and in which the defendant has participated. We do not conceive it to be in accord with the purposes of the full faith and credit requirement to hold that a judgment rendered under the circumstances of this case may be required to run the gantlet of such collateral attack in the courts of sister States before its validity outside of the State which rendered it is established or rejected. That vital interests are involved in divorce litigation indicates to us that it is a matter of greater rather than lesser importance that there should be a place to end such litigation. And where a decree of divorce is rendered by a competent court under the circumstances of this case, the obligation of full faith and credit requires that such litigation should end in the courts of the State in which the judgment was rendered.
  Reversed.
  U. S. Const. Art. IV, § 1, provides: “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.”
  The Act of May 26, 1790, 1 Stat. 122, as amended, R. S. § 905, 28 U. S. C. § 687, provides in part: “. . . And the said records and judicial proceedings . . . shall have such faith and credit given to them in every court within the United States as they have by law or usage in the courts of the State from which they are taken.”
  By statute, the Circuit Courts, as courts of equity, have jurisdiction of divorce causes. Florida Stat. Ann. § 65.01. Meloche v. Meloche, 101 Fla. 659, 662, 133 So. 339, 340 (1931).
  Section 65.02 of Florida Stat. Ann. provides: “In order to obtain a divorce the complainant must have resided ninety days in the State of Florida before the filing of the bill of complaint.” The Florida courts have construed the statutory requirement of residence to be that of domicile. Respondent does not contend nor do we find any evidence that the requirements of “domicile” as defined by the Florida cases are other than those generally applied or differ from the tests employed by the Massachusetts courts. Wade v. Wade, 93 Fla. 1004, 113 So. 374 (1927); Evans v. Evans, 141 Fla. 860, 194 So. 215 (1940); Fowler v. Fowler, 156 Fla. 316, 22 So. 2d 817 (1945).
  The first allegation of respondent’s answer stated: “That the Plaintiff is not a bona-fide legal resident of the State of Florida and has not been such continuously for more than the ninety days immediately preceding the filing of the bill of complaint. That on or about April 3, 1944, while the parties were living together as residents of Monterey, Massachusetts, the Plaintiff came to Florida with the children of the parties for a visit and without any expressed intention of establishing a separate residence from the Defendant and has remained in Florida ever since, but without any intention of becoming a bona-fide resident of Florida.”
  The agreement provided that respondent should have custody of the children during the school term of each year and that petitioner should be given custody throughout the rest of the year, subject to the right of both parents to visit at reasonable times. Before the final decree of divorce was entered, respondent returned to Massachusetts accompanied by the two children.
  It is said that throughout most of the proceedings respondent did not appear in the courtroom but remained “in a side room.”
  Appeals lie to the Florida Supreme Court from final decrees of divorce. Fla. Const. Art. V, § 5. And see e. g., Homan v. Homan, 144 Fla. 371,198 So. 20 (1940).
  The action was brought pursuant to the provisions of Mass. Gen. Laws (Ter. Ed.) c. 209, § 36.
  Petitioner testified that for many years prior to her departure for Florida, respondent had made frequent allusions to the fact that petitioner’s mother had been committed to a mental institution and had suggested that petitioner was revealing the same traits of mental instability. Petitioner testified that as a result of these remarks and other acts of cruelty, her health had been undermined and that it had therefore become necessary for her to leave respondent. In order to insure her departure, she had represented that her stay in Florida was to be only temporary, but from the outset she had in fact intended not to return. Petitioner testified further that both before and after the Florida decree of divorce had been entered, she had intended to reside permanently in Florida and that she and Phelps had returned to Massachusetts only after receiving a letter stating that Phelps’ father was in poor health.
  320 Mass. 351,69 N. E. 2d 801 (1946).
  See Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226, 233-234 (1945); cf. Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U. S. 66, 78, note 26 (1939). No Florida case has been called to our attention involving a collateral attack on a divorce decree questioning the domicile of the parties, and hence the jurisdiction of the court which entered the decree, where both parties appeared in the divorce proceedings. See generally Everette v. Petteway, 131 Fla. 516, 528-529, 179 So. 666, 671-672 (1938); State ex rel. Goodrich Co. v. Trammell, 140 Fla. 500, 505, 192 So. 175, 177 (1939). But cf. Chisholm v. Chisholm, 98 Fla. 1196, 125 So. 694 (1929); Dye v. Dolbeck, 114 Fla. 866, 154 So. 847 (1934), involving attacks on jurisdictional findings made in ex parte divorce proceedings.
  Bell v. Bell, 181 U. S. 175 (1901).
  See note 3 supra.
  Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men’s Association, 283 U. S. 522 (1931); Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U. S. 165 (1938); Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U. S. 371 (1940); Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U. S. 381 (1940); Jackson v. Irving Trust Co., 311 U. S. 494 (1941). And see Forsyth v. Hammond, 166 U. S. 506 (1897); Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U. S. 726 (1946).
  American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U. S. 156 (1932); Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U. S. 66 (1939). And see Chicago Life Insurance Co. v. Cherry, 244 U. S. 25 (1917).
  Davis v. Davis, 305 U. S. 32, 40 (1938). And see Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U. S. 165, 172, note 13 (1938).
  See cases discussed supra.
  We, of course, intimate no opinion as to the scope of Congressional power to legislate under Article IV, § 1 of the Constitution. See note 1 supra.
  Justices Brewer, Shiras, and Peckham dissented. Mr. Justice Holmes took no part in the case.
  Thus, in the Andrews case, before the divorce decree was entered by the South Dakota court, the defendant withdrew her appearance in accordance with a consent agreement.
  See note 14 supra.
  But cf. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226, 230 (1945).
  Davis v. Davis, 305 U. S. 32, 40 (1938); Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287, 294 (1942).
  Milwaukee County v. White Co., 296 U. S. 268, 276-277 (1935); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U. S. 430, 439 (1943).
  But we may well doubt that the judgment which we herein announce will amount to substantial interference with state policy with respect to divorce. Many States which have had occasion to consider the matter have already recognized the impropriety of permitting a collateral attack on an out-of-state divorce decree where the defendant appeared and participated in the divorce proceedings. See, e. g., Norris v. Norris, 200 Minn. 246, 273 N. W. 708 (1937); Miller v. Miller, 65 N. Y. S. 2d 696 (1946), affirmed 271 App. Div. 974, 67 N. Y. S. 2d 379 (1947); Cole v. Cole, 96 N. J. Eq. 206, 124 A. 359 (1924).
  Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U. S. 629, 642 (1935); Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287, 294-295 (1942).
  Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226 (1945).
  Cf. Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U. S. 165, 172 (1938).
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