opinion: KOLDEN v. SELECTIVE SERVICE LOCAL BOARD NO. 4
  No. 70.
  Decided February 24, 1970
  Melvin L. Wulf, Chester Bruvold, and Lynn Costner for petitioner in No. 70. John J. Abt for petitioner in No. 73. Stanley Faulkner for petitioner in No. 164. Mr. Wulf for petitioner in No. 183. Robert Eugene Smith for petitioner in No. 331. Sheldon M. Meizlish for petitioners in No. 449.
  Solicitor General Grisioold, Assistant Attorney General Ruckelshaus, Morton Hollander, and Ralph A. Fine for respondents in Nos. 70, 164, and 183. Solicitor General Grisioold, Assistant Attorney General Ruckelshaus, and Mr. Hollander for respondents in No. 73. Solicitor General Griswold for respondents in Nos. 331 and 449.
  Together with No. 73, Chaikin v. Selective Service Local Board 66 et al.; No. 164, Faulkner v. Laird, Secretary of Defense, et al.; No. 183, Osher v. Selective Service Local Board No. 6 et al., petitions for writs of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; No. 331, Kraus v. Selective Service Local 25 et al., on petition for writ of certiorari to the States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit; and No. 449, Anderson et al. v. Hershey, National Director, Selective Service et al., on petition for writ of certiorari to the United States of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
  Per Curiam
  The petitions for writs of certiorari are granted, judgments are vacated and the cases are remanded to the respective United States Courts of Appeals for further consideration in light of Breen v. Selective Service Board, 396 U. S. 460.
  Mr. JüíStice Harlan reverse these cases and remand them on the basis of his concurring opinion in Breen v. Selective Service Board, 396 U. S., at 468, and the Court’s opinion in Gutknecht v. United States, 396 U. S. 295.
instruction: What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether administrative action occurred in the context of the case prior to the onset of litigation. The activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. To determine whether administration action occurred in the context of the case, consider the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.