opinion: COMSTOCK v. GROUP OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS et al.
  NO. 451.
  Argued March 9-10, 1948.
  Decided June 21, 1948.
  Maxwell Brandwen argued the cause, and William H. Biggs filed a brief, for petitioners.
  Charles W. McConaughy argued the cause for the Group of Institutional Investors et al.; and Leonard P. Moore argued the cause for the Manufacturers Trust Co., respondents. With them on the brief were Clair B. Hughes and Sanford H. E. Freund.
  Harry Kirshbaum argued the cause and filed a brief for the Convertible Bondholders Group, respondents.
  Mr. Justice Jackson
  delivered the opinion of the Court.
  Since 1933 the Missouri Pacific, the New Orleans, Texas and Mexico Railway Co. and a number of affiliated railroad corporations have been in reorganization under the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U. S. C. § 205. A second plan of reorganization, approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission, was before the District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. Comstock then, in 1944, made objection to allowance of a claim of approximately 10 million dollars by the Missouri Pacific, one debtor corporation, against another, the New Orleans, which, during the 10 years of proceedings, had been unchallenged. The issues raised by his objection were severed from other problems of reorganization which do not concern us here. After full hearing the District Court made findings and wrote an opinion, In re Missouri Pacific R. Co., 64 F. Supp. 64, overruling his objections. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. Comstock v. Group of Institutional Investors, 163 F. 2d 350.
  The issues of fact, contested in a long hearing, are not before us for review. Petitioner assured us, in support of the petition for certiorari here, that “there is no factual controversy before this Court” and “we assume the findings of the District Court. Our challenge is directed only to the legal import of these unchallenged facts.”
  Much of petitioner’s argument seems to depart from these assumptions and to invite us to reach conclusions from the voluminous record in the case, contrary to those reached by the two courts below. This we cannot do. A seasoned and wise rule of this Court makes concurrent findings of two courts below final here in the absence of very exceptional showing of error. Stuart v. Hayden, 169 U. S. 1; Brainard v. Buck, 184 U. S. 99; First National Bank v. Littlefield, 226 U. S. 110; Baker v. Schofield, 243 U. S. 114; Second Russian Insurance Co. v. Miller, 268 U. S. 552; Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Clerks, 281 U. S. 548; Page v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 286 U. S. 269; Pick Mfg. Co. v. General Motors Corp., 299 U. S. 3; Virginian R. Co. v. System Federation, 300 U. S. 515; United States v. O’Donnell, 303 U. S. 501; Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U. S. 349; Allen v. Trust Co., 326 U. S. 630; United States v. Dickinson, 331 U. S. 745. No such error is claimed by petitioner.
  Since we are concluded by such concurrent findings, we can do no better than to adopt the statement of facts made in the opinion of the Court of Appeals, on the basis of which petitioner’s propositions of law are predicated and must be decided. The essential facts so recited are:
  “It appears that the Missouri Pacific acquired the controlling interest in the capital stock of the New Orleans at the end of 1924 and at times relevant here owned from 58 to 93 percent of the total $15,000,000 par value of such stock, and from January 1925, until simultaneous commencement of reorganization proceedings in bankruptcy of both corporations in 1933, it managed the affairs of the New Orleans through Missouri Pacific officers who were given corresponding positions in the New Orleans corporation. An expansion program for both companies was carried on and throughout the course of operations the Missouri Pacific made advancements for improvements and betterments to the New Orleans. Some were repaid, but in February 1933, the New Orleans filed its application with the Interstate Commerce Commission under Section 20a of the Transportation Act (49 U.S.C.A. Sec. 20a (2)), showing that it was indebted to the Missouri Pacific for an accumulation of such advances over a period of years remaining unpaid in the sum of $10,355,226.78, and that it had been requested by the Missouri Pacific to issue demand notes therefor in the amount of $9,955,226.78 to the Missouri Pacific. It had partially complied by issuing one such note for $400,000.00, and one for $2,498,500, and after hearing the Commission made its finding as required by the statute, 49 U.S.C.A. Sec. 20a (2), and authorized New Orleans to issue to the Missouri Pacific a note for the remaining $7,456,726.78. So that at the time of the bankruptcy of the New Orleans on t|ie same date as that of the Missouri Pacific the notes of the New Orleans to the Missouri Pacific in the sum of $10,355,226.78 were outstanding and unpaid. Under authorization of the Interstate Commerce Commission, granted after hearing, the Missouri Pacific had pledged two of the notes aggregating $9,955,226.78 as security for loans made to it by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. An additional pledge was made to Railroad Finance Corporation.
  “After appointment of the trustees for the railroads and on August 29, 1938, an officer of the Missouri Pacific filed claim for that company against the New Orleans for the amount of the notes, plus an item of advancement of $210,000.00, aggregating the amount of $10,565,226.78, describing the consideration as 'cash advances for operation, interest payments, etc., at various times from March 1929 to February 1933, both inclusive/ The items which made up the total $10,565,226.78 were clearly specified and evidence of the validity of the debt as consideration for the notes was adduced before the Commission at an early stage of these Section 77 proceedings, and the obligation was deemed to be valid and ahead of New Orleans’ stockholder interest in all of the account-ings, computations and adjustments resulting in the plan of reorganization determined by the Commission and approved by the court in 1940. It has also been so considered by the Commission in the plan of reorganization before the court at the time of the hearing and order now appealed from.
  “It appears that in 1926 the Missouri Pacific issued and caused to be sold to the public its 5%% Secured Serial Bonds in the amount of $13,156,000, secured by the pledge of $1000.00 par value of New Orleans capital stock for each $1000.00 principal amount of outstanding bonds, so that the officers who were put in charge of the affairs of both corporations came under fiduciary obligation to the creditors and the stockholders of each company to handle honestly the affairs of each.
  “Comstock owns some of said 5%% Secured Serial Bonds so secured by the pledge of the New Orleans capital stock, and by virtue of his ownership of said bonds he has an interest as a creditor of the Missouri Pacific in the payment of his bonds and the interest thereon, and also an interest in the capital stock of the New Orleans pledged to secure the bonds. On November 22, 1944, he filed his objections to the plan of reorganization and plea for equitable treatment on the basis of those interests. Certain of his objections contained charges of mismanagement of the Missouri Pacific to his detriment as a bondholding creditor of that corporation, but the separately numbered objections here involved relate to wrongs which he alleges were done by the Missouri Pacific to the New Orleans to the detriment of his interest in the pledged stock of that company.
  “By his objections 'Numbered 19 and related objections,’ Comstock charged that during the period when the affairs of the New Orleans were controlled by its majority stockholder the Missouri Pacific, between the end of 1924 and the bankruptcy in 1933, the Missouri Pacific management caused the New Orleans to pay dividends illegally out of capital and to improvidently declare and pay dividends unjustified by the business and condition of the New Orleans; improperly loaned money to it for the purpose of enabling it to pay dividends; involved it (the New Orleans) in expansion and improperly made advancements to it and caused it to assume indebtedness growing out of expansion; caused it to be operated with unfair advantage to the Missouri Pacific and loss to itself, and generally mismanaged it and committed spoliation and waste of its property and interests to the financial detriment of the New Orleans and for the benefit of the Missouri Pacific. There is also a charge that the trustee for the New Orleans, who is also trustee for the Missouri Pacific, failed to perform his duties as trustee for the New Orleans, to the detriment of New Orleans stock interest. Although an Exhibit ‘A! attached to the objections assumed to set forth details, the charges remained sweeping and general in form with few exceptions.
  “The objector prayed that the Missouri Pacific claim for $10,565,227 and interest against the New Orleans be disallowed; that it be determined that the New Orleans was not indebted to the Missouri Pacific, and in the alternative, that all claims of the Missouri Pacific against the New Orleans be subordinated in the reorganization to the New Orleans capital stock interest.
  “The allegations of breaches of obligations on the part of the Missouri Pacific were traversed in pleadings of other parties in interest. The main burden of producing witnesses and evidence to justify the handling of the affairs of the New Orleans by the Missouri Pacific during the period of Missouri Pacific management and to prove the $10,565,226.78 indebtedness of the New Orleans to the Missouri Pacific was carried at the trial by the Group of Institutional Investors Holding First and Refunding Mortgage Bonds of Missouri Pacific Railroad Company and The Protective Committee for the holders of General Mortgage Bonds of Missouri Pacific Railroad Company. They recognized fully the fiduciary nature of the obligation which law and equity attributed to the Missouri Pacific by reason of its pledge of the capital stock of the New Orleans to secure the 5%% Serial Bonds while the New Orleans was under its management as majority stockholder, and that by the terms of the pledge the Missouri Pacific was entitled to receive itself only the dividends (lawfully and properly declared) of the New Orleans stock and was required as to the corpus of said stock to honestly manage the corporate affairs and to exercise honest judgment and good faith to preserve the stock interest inviolate.
  “Comstock did not question or deny that the New Orleans had executed its negotiable promissory notes to the Missouri Pacific which were outstanding at the time of the trial drawing interest, and conceded that the Reconstruction Finance Corporation as an innocent holder thereof in pledge could hold the New Orleans for their face amount and interest, but his contention was that by reason of its wrong-doings the Missouri Pacific either had no valid claim or that such claim as it had should be subordinated to the capital stock interest. He did not assert or tender evidence to show that any specified individuals working for the New Orleans or the Missouri Pacific, or both companies, had misappropriated or wrongfully diverted to their own use any of the assets or business of the New Orleans to the detriment of stockholders. He tendered no evidence to show that the plan of Missouri Pacific system expansion, including expansion and improvement of the New Orleans, and for the financing thereof, adopted and carried through by the Missouri Pacific, was in itself fraudulent or reckless and improvident. As to the New Orleans, the plan contemplated that the Missouri Pacific would advance money to the New Orleans for betterments and additions on short time loans, and that at intervals when the indebtedness became of sufficient size bond issues would be sold to refund it. The worst of the depression came coincidentally with the time when such refunding was expected to be made and made the refunding impossible.
  “From testimony frankly given by himself, and on the face of the record, it clearly appears as to the case Comstock presented to the court on the objections herein involved that after the report of the Senate subcommittee which criticized the Missouri Pacific management of the New Orleans, and in 1940, Comstock bought a few of the Serial bonds at about 10 cents on the dollar and then employed an accountant to make studies of the accounts, records and reports of Missouri Pacific management of the New Orleans and based his charges on the accountant’s studies. He tendered no extraneous or newly discovered evidence. As the period of Missouri Pacific alleged mismanagement of the New Orleans (1925 to 1933) had expired many years before Com-stock acquired his interest in New Orleans stock, a court would not ordinarily have felt obliged at his instance to try the merits of charges of mismanagement committed in long past years and claimed to be provable by contemporaneous records which were at all times accessible. It would not sanction such buying into a lawsuit.
  “But here the plan for Missouri Pacific reorganization was before the court to be approved or disapproved, according to whether it was or was not fair and equitable. The proposed plan included as one of its essential postulates that the New Orleans was indebted to the Missouri Pacific in a sum which with accumulated interest amounted to around eighteen million dollars. No judicial determination upon the validity of the debt had ever been made in any adversary proceedings throughout the thirteen year course of the Section 77 proceedings and bonds like Comstock’s are outstanding in many hands aggregating some $13,500,000. Although the court was of opinion that not only Comstock but all other owners of the Missouri Pacific 5%% Serial Bonds secured by New Orleans stock who had at all times trustee representation and in great part representation by counsel, had been guilty of laches in failing for so many years to assert and present proof and try out before the Commission and the court the alleged invalidity of the debt almost entirely evidenced by the notes, it concluded that judicial adjudication should be made as to the debt and that the court should, and therefore it did, hear the evidence covering the whole period of management of the New Orleans by the Missouri Pacific, and it tried out the whole case and all the charges presented by Comstock on the merits.
  “The expert accountant called by Comstock produced a large number of exhibits which he had prepared from the books, records and reports of the individual companies and explained in connection with them the inferences he had drawn from his studies and expressed his opinions tending to support the Comstock charges. He centered his attack largely on that part of the accounting system of the railroads through which the New Orleans and its fourteen subsidiary railroads had been treated as a unit for financing purposes and the financial condition indicated by consolidated balance sheets. By disregarding the system character of all the Gulf Coast Lines held under New Orleans ownership he inferred a much less favorable financial position for the New Orleans than was shown by its consolidated balance sheets. He had no personal knowledge of the railroad operations or transactions covered by his testimony.
  “The Group of Institutional Investors Holding First and Refunding Mortgage Bonds of Missouri Pacific and The Protective Committee for the holders of General Mortgage bonds of Missouri Pacific to sustain the burden of Missouri Pacific defense called as their witnesses on the trial the railroad men who had engaged, each in his own department, in all of the transactions and railroad operations and the records made thereof throughout the period involved, and they, testified of and concerning matters with which they were intimately familiar. Also Mr. William Wyer, who after his graduation from Yale and Massachusetts Institute of Technology served in railroad construction and operation for the government during World War I, and in U. S. Railroad Administration during Federal Control, and afterwards in various positions in the Division of Operations, Division of Accounts and Assistant to the Comptroller. From 1920 to 1927 he occupied important positions with the Southern Railroad Company and the Denver Rio Grande and Western, the latter being 'fifty percent, owned by the Missouri Pacific so it was considered a part of the Missouri Pacific System.’ In February, 1929, he became Assistant to the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Missouri Pacific who was also Chairman of the Board of the New Orleans, and later in the year he became Secretary and Treasurer of the Missouri Pacific and an officer on all the subsidiaries, except as to the Texas and Pacific he was such officers for only six years. He handled a great many of the financial matters involving the Missouri Pacific and the New Orleans under the supervision of the Chairman of the Board of the Missouri Pacific. In 1933 he started studies which have provided substantially all of the studies upon which the various plans of reorganization have been based. He was at the time of testifying the chief executive officer of the Central Railroad of New Jersey. He was thoroughly informed and conversant with the Missouri Pacific policies of system operation and of expanding and financing, and with the railroad operations and the financial transactions upon which the validity or invalidity of the debt in controversy depend, as well as the accounting and reporting system maintained for disclosing and reporting them. He had an important part in what was done, was in touch with substantially the whole course of the management of the New Orleans under attack and he gave his extensive testimony upon direct and cross examination with obvious understanding of its relevancy and importance. His testimony, supported by many accounting and summarizing exhibits, was to the effect that Missouri Pacific management of New Orleans was honest and was beneficial to New Orleans.
  “Judge Moore, presiding at the trial, has exercised the jurisdiction in these Section 77 proceedings through most of their course, and his questions, comments and directions reflect his close attention to and understanding of the testimony and its application through the trial. His written opinion is reported 64 F. Supp. 64. His findings of facts and conclusions of law were drawn with care and thoroughness, and appear to us to be responsive to all the issues presented by the objections here involved and the evidence that was adduced, and the appellant has not called our attention to any refusal on the part of the court to make findings in respect to any other issues claimed to have been presented. The vast extent of the railroad business carried on by the Missouri Pacific and the New Orleans during the long past period of alleged mismanagement and the intricate corporate structures of the railroads, inevitably presented most serious problems in the attempts of accountants to picture what their course of operations and financial transactions had been. The New Orleans had in some respects the character of a holding company in that it operated itself only a small fraction (around 11%) of the railroad mileage of its railroad system but owned the stocks and securities of some fourteen other railroad companies and was the only one of the group of railroads comprising its railroad system which had any relatively substantial amount of securities outstanding in the hands of the public. For financing purposes the individual roads in the group were dependent upon the New Orleans which, acting for the group in respect to financing, presented the necessary unitary functioning principal. There was fundamental controversy as to what inferences should be drawn from the available accounts to establish the true financial condition of the New Orleans at different times within the period and to establish and present the financial results of the railroad operations that were carried on. Mr. Wyer testified that the identified consolidated balance sheets compiled under direction of the Missouri Pacific and New Orleans officers were the summarizing records which were submitted to the Board of Directors to keep its members informed in the discharge of their duties. It was through the use of the consolidated balance sheets that the New Orleans and its affiliated railroads were treated as a unit in the financing of the companies throughout Missouri Pacific management. Though he could not say what went on in the minds of others, his testimony leaves no room to doubt that the Board members well understood how the computations were arrived at and that the members relied on them in the usual course of the financing of the business. He was intimately familiar with all phases of the accounting in which they culminate, and although he admitted that perfection was never attained, his testimony together with that of the railroad officers and employees who did the work, fully justified the trial court’s reliance upon the consolidated balance sheets in his findings and conclusions. But the disputes and conflicts of testimony in respect to the accounts and the inferences to be drawn were all issues of fact. The court recognized fully all the burden of obligation imposed by law upon the Missouri Pacific in respect to its management of the New Orleans and that if the Comstock charges could be proved and the indebtedness in issue was invalid or ought not in equity to be enforced against New Orleans stockholders, the then pending plan of reorganization could not stand.
  “Comstock’s contention that the court erroneously put the burden of proving his charges on him rather than requiring the Missouri Pacific to proceed first to disprove them, is without merit. As the execution of the promissory notes was admitted and at least formal proof of all of the items of advancements making up the debt had been in the record of the Section 77 proceedings for many years before the hearing, the court required only that all the records of the transactions that were questioned be made available for the hearing so that there was the equivalent of a full disclosure by the Missouri Pacific before Comstock was required to proceed with his proof of the charges. In its findings the court stated the facts as it found them to be proven by the whole evidence. It found in detail and in effect that the Missouri Pacific had administered the affairs of the New Orleans in good faith to the advantage of that company; had made the advancements to it for proper purposes; had not caused dividends to be paid out of capital or improvidently in bad faith, and that the asserted indebtedness arose from advancement made by Missouri Pacific to New Orleans for betterments and additions and was valid and should be allowed in items specified, and that the plan of reorganization based as it was in part on recognition of the existence of the debt in question, was fair and equitable and conformable to the requirements of law regarding the participation of the various classes of creditors and stockholders.”
  We are confronted at the outset with petitioner’s delay and conduct and its effect on the duty of this Court and that below to pass on the merits of his objections. Corn-stock, apparently with general knowledge of the conduct he alleges to be a wrong toward the securities which he now holds, bought them at about 10 cents on the dollar nearly seven years after the alleged misconduct had ended. Thus, it was not Comstock who was a victim of any wrongdoing but those in whose hands the securities depreciated to the low point at which Comstock bought. It is apparent that Comstock bought a grievance to exploit and to reap the advantage of its rectification. Those who realized the loss through sales to Comstock could, in no event, be indemnified in this proceeding. From every viewpoint, the delay in asserting these claims is unusual. The District Court found it also prejudicial due to the death of six named witnesses and participants, among others, whose testimony would be important. While it considered the objections barred by laches, it nonetheless adjudged their merits.
  We think that, in the reorganization proceeding, the courts may entertain on their merits objections to a plan even if made by one who might be barred from asserting a cause of action in his own behalf, if the subject-matter of the objections is such that it goes beyond the objector’s individual interests and affects the fairness and equity of the plan. In view of the amount and position of the claim involved, we do not disagree with the Court of Appeals that such was the case here.
  It also is true, as the court below indicates, that this objector made no effort to exhaust or to avail himself of administrative remedies in support of his objection. Neither the objection nor the evidentiary support for it were laid before the Interstate Commerce Commission in its hearings on successive plans of reorganization. The requirement that the Commission “hold public hearings, at which opportunity shall be given to any interested party to be heard, and following which the Commission shall render a report” to the court is not provided without a purpose and is not to be ignored by persons with claims or objections to be heard. This issue involved matters with which the Commission and its staff are especially qualified to deal. It has had no opportunity to express a view on this issue, which was allowed to go by default before it, and the courts do not have the benefit of the Commission’s informed judgment on the matter involved. To by-pass the Commission and make the court the original forum for such contentions is not to be encouraged.
  But the court did not refuse to hear the objections on their merits. In view of the functions cast upon the court in such cases, we cannot say that it may not, in its discretion, consider objections on their merits even though they have not been presented to the Commission. Some circumstances might be disclosed to indicate a remand for their consideration by the Commission. They might indicate that the courts would withhold approval, not out of deference to the objecting parties’ rights but because of the broad responsibility laid upon the court for the equity and fairness of the plan as a whole. The court will be diligent to protect itself and the public from approval of unfair plans, even by default, and may take for its own use evidence no party would have a right to force upon it. The court below evidently considered the circumstances of this case to warrant such inquiry into the merits, and we do not inquire whether the discretion was wisely exercised.
  The case on the merits presents, as to several different and complicated transactions, a single question of law. It is said that our decision in Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric Co., 306 U. S. 307, requires that the claim of Missouri Pacific against the New Orleans be disallowed and petitioner’s objections sustained. In that case this Court reformulated for application to reorganization cases a wholesome equity doctrine to the effect that a claim against a debtor subsidiary be disallowed or at least subordinated when the claimant corporation has wholly dominated and controlled the subsidiary and in the transactions creating the debt has breached its fiduciary duty and acted both to its own benefit and to the detriment of the debtor. As we later said of the decision, “This was based on the equities of the case — the history of spoliation, mismanagement, and faithless stewardship of the affairs of the subsidiary by Standard to the detriment of the public investors.” Pepper v. Litton, 308 U. S. 295, 308.
  Petitioner asks us to declare the same result in this case despite explicit and unchallenged findings that, in its dealings with New Orleans during the period involved, “the Missouri Pacific acted in good faith and with due regard to its obligations, legal and equitable, to the New Orleans and its security holders,” that the “effect of the control by the Missouri Pacific of the Gulf Coast Lines was beneficial and advantageous to the New Orleans and the holders and pledgees of its securities,” that all dividends in question “were paid either out of the earned surplus of the New Orleans available for dividends or out of the net income of the New Orleans after payment of all prior charges against income,” and that the subordination of the claim as asked “would unjustly enrich the holders of the Capital Stock of the New Orleans and the holders of the Secured Serial Bonds,” as well as other more detailed findings to the same effect.
  In the case before us there was domination of the subsidiary, a relationship between corporations which the law has not seen fit to proscribe. By the application of long-standing principles of equity this Court fashioned the rule in the Taylor case to prevent a fiduciary in such a position from enriching itself by breach of its trust. It is not mere existence of an opportunity to do wrong that brings the rule into play; it is the unconscionable use of the opportunity afforded by the domination to advantage itself at the injury of the subsidiary that deprives the wrongdoer of the fruits of his wrong. On the findings in this case, the claim of Missouri Pacific was the outgrowth of complicated but legitimate good faith business transactions, neither in design or effect producing injury to the petitioner or the interests for which he speaks.
  Special emphasis has been placed on the fact that under control of the Missouri Pacific dividends were paid by the subsidiary at a time when it was borrowing money represented by this claim. It is clear from the findings that the dividends were paid out of current earnings or surplus, and not in violation of law or contract. Only in 1929 did New Orleans earn currently sufficient to pay its dividends. Nevertheless in all three years there was sufficient earned surplus legally to permit dividends. Heavy investments in improvements may require borrowings for dividends; but no law or public policy requires a corporation to finance capital additions out of earnings or to pass dividends because of low current earnings when past earnings are available for dividend purposes. These past earnings may be used to compensate the capital that produced them, and capital additions may be made from funds borrowed or raised by issues of capital securities, so long as the authorizations required in the case of railroads are obtained. No question is raised as to the authority to borrow.
  While the contemporaneous borrowing to pay for capital additions, and payment of dividends, is not in itself illegal, it would, of course, come under the ban of the Taylor decision if it were carried out in breach of good faith for the advantage of the holding company to the detriment of the subsidiary. But the findings of good faith, fair dealing and freedom from fraud or overreaching cover the dividend policy as well as other questioned transactions. Such being the facts, the allowance of the claim is not error of law.
  The findings here do not stop with holding that the questioned transactions were intended to and did benefit the system as a whole. An over-all benefit to the system might be attained at the injury of one of its units and the security holders of that unit. But here the finding of good faith and of benefit applies to the New Orleans and its security holders as well as to the system generally. The finding is unequivocal that the control of Missouri Pacific not only was “in good faith and with due regard to its obligations, legal and equitable, to the New Orleans and its security holders,” but also that its control of the Gulf Coast Lines “was beneficial and advantageous to the New Orleans and the holders and pledgees of its securities.” The criticised transactions are thus not only exonerated of evil or illegal intent but are also established as beneficial rather than injurious to the interests which now challenge them. The findings to that effect are entitled to special weight where, as here, they are based on the District Judge’s complete familiarity with the case. Reconstruction Finance Corporation v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R. Co., 328 U. S. 495, 533. Affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, they are, under the rule concerning concurrent findings, and on the basis of our grant of certiorari, conclusive in this Court.
  Disallowance of petitioner’s objections on such findings was not error of law. In this view of the case we need not consider questions tendered as to validity or effect of the issuance of notes or of their pledge.
  The judgment below in No. 451 is
  Affirmed.
  Petitions in Nos. 452, 453 and 454 were addressed to dismissals by the Court of Appeals from the same order as No. 451 but taken in different names. The petitions were filed as safeguards against procedural objections to review of the order. The writs in these cases are dismissed.
  “1 '* * * that the issue by the New Orleans, Texas & Mexico Railway Company of a note or notes in an aggregate amount not exceeding $7,456,726.78, as aforesaid, (2) is for a lawful object within its corporate purposes, and compatible with the public interest, which is necessary and appropriate for and consistent with the proper performance by it of service to the public as a common carrier, and which will not impair its ability to perform that service, and (b) is reasonably necessary and appropriate for such purpose.’ New Orleans, Texas & Mexico Railway Company Notes, Finance Docket No. 9817; 189 ICC 600, 601, (1933) (R. 20839-20840).”
  “2 The Exhibit ‘A’ also included excerpts from a report of a subcommittee of the United States Senate on the subject of Missouri Pacific System — Inter Company Dividends and Advances, published about July 29, 1940, which criticized Missouri Pacific management of the New Orleans.”
  “3 There was also at all times a substantial minority stockholding interest in the New Orleans with means to keep informed of the affairs of the regulated railroad corporation.”
  The leading party opposing Comstock on this appeal was the Group of Institutional Investors, holding first and refunding mortgage bonds of MOP. This group represented less than 10% of such bonds and admitted that it had “no financial interest in the controversy revolving about” the MOP claim, its only interest being to expedite a reorganization plan then under consideration. But this group offered the only evidence in the District Court in support of the MOP claim. Another party was the NOTM mortgage and income bondholders committee, which also admitted it had no direct interest in the MOP claim litigation. Other parties included MOP, the MOP common and preferred stockholders committees, the MOP trustee, Alleghany Corporation, and certain groups of creditors and indenture trustees. These parties are now respondents before us.