opinion: PAN-ATLANTIC STEAMSHIP CORP. v. ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD CO. et al.
  No. 408.
  Argued April 23, 1957.
  Decided June 3, 1957.
  David G. Macdonald argued the cause for appellant in No. 408. With him on the brief were Russell S. Bernhard and Warren Price, Jr.
  James A. Murray argued the cause for appellant in No. 424. With him on the brief was Robert W. Ginnane.
  Charles H. Weston argued the cause for the United States, appellee. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Rankin and Assistant Attorney General Hansen.
  William Q. Keenan argued the cause for the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. et al., appellees. With him on the brief were Anthony P. Donadío, Charles T. Abeles, James A. Bistline, Carl Helmetag, Jr. and Prime F. Osborn, III.
  Mr. Justice Douglas
  delivered the opinion of the Court.
  Section 311 (a) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U. S. C. § 911 (a), gives the Commission power to grant “temporary authority” to a common carrier by water or a contract carrier by water to institute service for which “there is an immediate and urgent need.” And the section provides that the temporary authority “shall be valid for such time as the Commission shall specify, but not for more than an aggregate of one hundred and eighty days.”
  Section 9 (b) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 1008 (b), provides that “In any case in which the licensee has, in accordance with agency rules, made timely and sufficient application for a renewal or a new license, no license with reference to any activity of a continuing nature shall expire until such application shall have been finally determined by the agency.”
  The question in the case is whether this provision of the Administrative Procedure Act authorizes the Commission to extend a temporary authority granted under §311 (a) of the Interstate Commerce Act for more than 180 days.
  On May 5, 1955, Pan-Atlantic filed with the Commission an application for a permanent certificate of public convenience and necessity as a common carrier by water. The Commission, upon finding an immediate and urgent need for the service, issued on May 18, 1955, to Pan-Atlantic temporary authority to operate as a common carrier by water between various ports of the United States for a period of 180 days. The Commission did not conclude the proceedings on the application before the expiration of the 180-day period. Accordingly, prior to the expiration of the 180-day period and on application by Pan-Atlantic, it authorized Pan-Atlantic to continue to perform the water carrier service authorized by the temporary authority until further order of the Commission, but not beyond the time the application for a permanent certificate had been finally determined. The appellees, who are seven railroads, opposed this extension before the Commission and then instituted this suit in the District Court to vacate the Commission’s order which authorized the continuance of the temporary authority beyond the 180-day period.
  The District Court held for the appellees, 144 F. Supp. 53, feeling bound by the prior decision of that court in Stone’s Express, Inc. v. United States, 122 F. Supp. 955, though two of the three judges indicated that were stare decisis not to control, they would sustain the Commission. 144 F. Supp., at 54. The case is here by appeal. 28 U. S. C. § 1253. We noted probable jurisdiction. 352 U. S. 914.
  We sustain the Commission in its assertion of authority to extend this temporary authority beyond 180 days.
  “License” as used in the Administrative Procedure Act includes “the whole or part of any agency permit, certificate, approval, registration, charter, membership, statutory exemption or other form of permission.” § 2 (e). A temporary authority granted under § 311 (a) of the Interstate Commerce Act would seem to be a “permit” or “certificate” under the Administrative Procedure Act. “Licensee,” as used in the sentence of § 9 (b) which we have quoted, would seem, therefore, to include one who holds a temporary permit under § 311 (a). It is argued that “license” in that section includes only those that are permanent. But we see no justification for that narrow reading. A permit for 180 days covers an “activity of a continuing nature.”
  Section 9 (b) of the Administrative Procedure Act is a direction to the various agencies. By its terms there must be a license outstanding; it must cover activities of a continuing nature; there must have been filed a timely and sufficient application to continue the existing operation ; and the application for the new or extended license must not have been finally determined.
  Each of these conditions is satisfied in the present case; and we see no reason why the provisions of this later Act may not be invoked to protect a person with a license from the damage he would suffer by being compelled to discontinue a business of a continuing nature, only to start it anew after the administrative hearing is concluded. That has been the Commission’s consistent construction of the law; and we think it is the correct one. Section 9 (b) of the Administrative Procedure Act contains a new rule that supplements the prior authority granted by § 311 (a) of the Interstate Commerce Act. Initially, the Commission can do no more than issue a temporary authority good for 180 days. But once the conditions of § 9 (b) are satisfied, an extension in the interests of economy and efficiency is authorized.
  The Commission advises us that the combined time required for the administrative proceedings on an application for a certificate and for judicial review almost inevitably exceeds 180 days. Courts have no authority to issue these permits. See United States v. Carolina Carriers Corp., 315 U. S. 475, 489-490. Unless the authority is vested in the Commission by §9 (b), the operation, no matter how essential or necessary, must be discontinued at the end of 180 days. We think such a reading of the law would mutilate the administrative system which Congress created by the two Acts. Where the remedy for an evil is clear, the remedial provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act should be given full effect. See Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U. S. 33, 41. We conclude that an harmonious reading of § 311 (a) and § 9 (b) requires the latter to be read as supplementing the former and to be construed as applying to temporary as well as to permanent licenses.
  Reversed.
  That case became moot after probable jurisdiction had been noted by this Court. See 350 U. S. 906.
  See 13 Fed. Reg. 4150 for the rules of the Commission governing these extensions.