opinion: SCHERK v. ALBERTO-CULVER CO.
  No. 73-781.
  Argued April 29, 1974
  Decided June 17, 1974
  Stewart, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and BlacicmuN, Powell, and RehNQuist, JJ., joined. Douglas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BrenNAN, White, and Marshall, JJ., joined, post, p. 521.
  Robert F. Hanley argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Lynne E. McNown.
  Francis J. Higgins argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was A. Charles Lawrence.
  Gerald Aksen argued the cause for the American Arbitration Assn, as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Whitney North Seymour, Sol Neil Cor-bin, Rita E. Hauser, Howard M. Holtzmann, Andreas F. Lowenfeld, John R. Stevenson, and Rosemary S. Page.
  Mr. Justice Stewart
  delivered the opinion of the Court.
  Alberto-Culver Co., the respondent, is an American company incorporated in Delaware with its principal office in Illinois. It manufactures and distributes toiletries and hair products in this country and abroad. During the 1960’s Alberto-Culver decided to expand its overseas operations, and as part of this program it approached the petitioner Fritz Scherk, a German citizen residing at the time of trial in Switzerland. Scherk was the owner of three interrelated business entities, organized under the laws of Germany and Liechtenstein, that were engaged in the manufacture of toiletries and the licensing of trademarks for such toiletries. An initial contact with Scherk was made by a representative of Alberto-Culver in Germany in June 1967, and negotiations followed at further meetings in both Europe and the United States during 1967 and 1968. In February 1969 a contract was signed in Vienna, Austria, which provided for the transfer of the ownership of Scherk’s enterprises to Alberto-Culver, along with all rights held by these enterprises to trademarks in cosmetic goods. The contract contained a number of express warranties whereby Scherk guaranteed the sole and unencumbered ownership of these trademarks. In addition, the contract contained an arbitration clause providing that “any controversy or claim [that] shall arise out of this agreement or the breach thereof” would be referred to arbitration before the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris, France, and that “[t]he laws of the State of Illinois, U. S. A. shall apply to and govern this agreement, its interpretation and performance.”
  The closing of the transaction took place in Geneva, Switzerland, in June 1969. Nearly one year later Alberto-Culver allegedly discovered that the trademark rights purchased under the contract were subject to substantial encumbrances that threatened to give others superior rights to the trademarks and to restrict or preclude Alberto-Culver’s use of them. Alberto-Culver thereupon tendered back to Scherk the property that had been transferred to it and offered to rescind the contract. Upon Scherk’s refusal, Alberto-Culver commenced this action for damages and other relief in a Federal District Court in Illinois, contending that Scherk’s fraudulent representations concerning the status of the trademark rights constituted violations of § 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 891, 15 U. S. C. § 78j (b), and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, 17 CFR § 240.-10b-5.
  In response, Scherk filed a motion to dismiss the action for want of personal and subject-matter jurisdiction as well as on the basis of jorum non conveniens, or, alternatively, to stay the action pending arbitration in Paris pursuant to the agreement of the parties. Alberto-Culver, in turn, opposed this motion and sought a preliminary injunction restraining the prosecution of arbitration proceedings. On December 2, 1971, the District Court denied Scherk’s motion to dismiss, and, on January 14, 1972, it granted a preliminary order enjoining Scherk from proceeding with arbitration. In taking these actions the court relied entirely on this Court’s decision in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U. S. 427, which held that an agreement to arbitrate could not preclude a buyer of a security from seeking a judicial remedy under the Securities Act of 1933, in view of the language of § 14 of that Act, barring “[a]ny condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision of this subchap-ter _” 48 Stat. 84, 15 U. S. C. § 77n. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, with one judge dissenting, affirmed, upon what it considered the controlling authority of the Wilko decision. 484 F. 2d 611. Because of the importance of the question presented we granted Scherk’s petition for a writ of certiorari. 414 U. S. 1156.
  I
  The United States Arbitration Act, now 9 U. S. C. § 1 et seq., reversing centuries of judicial hostility to arbitration agreements, was designed to allow parties to avoid “the costliness and delays of litigation,” and to place arbitration agreements “upon the same footing as other contracts . . . H. R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1, 2 (1924); see also S. Rep. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924). Accordingly, the Act provides that an arbitration agreement such as is here involved “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U. S. C. § 2. The Act also provides in § 3 for a stay of proceedings in a case where a court is satisfied that the issue before it is arbitrable under the agreement, and § 4 of the Act directs a federal court to order parties to proceed to arbitration if there has been a “failure, neglect, or refusal” of any party to honor an agreement to arbitrate.
  In Wilko v. Swan, supra, this Court acknowledged that the Act reflects a legislative recognition of the “desirability of arbitration as an alternative to the complications of litigation,” 346 U. S., at 431, but nonetheless declined to apply the Act’s provisions. That case involved an agreement between Anthony Wilko and Hayden, Stone & Co., a large brokerage firm, under which Wilko agreed to purchase on margin a number of shares of a corporation’s common stock. Wilko alleged that his purchase of the stock was induced by false representations on the part of the defendant concerning the value of the shares, and he brought suit for damages under § 12 (2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C. § 771. The defendant responded that Wilko had agreed to submit all controversies arising out of the purchase to arbitration, and that this agreement, contained in a written margin contract between the parties, should be given full effect under the Arbitration Act.
  The Court found that “[t] wo policies, not easily reconcilable, are involved in this case.” 346 U. S., at 438. On the one hand, the Arbitration Act stressed “the need for avoiding the delay and expense of litigation,” id., at 431, and directed that such agreements be “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable” in federal courts. On the other hand, the Securities Act of 1933 was “[d]esigned to protect investors” and to require “issuers, underwriters, and dealers to make full and fair disclosure of the character of securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce and to prevent fraud in their sale,” by creating “a special right to recover for misrepresentation . . . .” 346 U. S., at 431 (footnote omitted). In particular, the Court noted that § 14 of the Securities Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77n, provides:
  “Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision of this subchapter or of the rules and regulations of the Commission shall be void.”
  The Court ruled that an agreement to arbitrate “is a ‘stipulation/ and [that] the right to select the judicial forum is the kind of ‘provision’ that cannot be waived under § 14 of the Securities Act.” 346 U. S., at 434-435. Thus, Wilko’s advance agreement to arbitrate any disputes subsequently arising out of his contract to purchase the securities was unenforceable under the terms of § 14 of the Securities Act of 1933.
  Alberto-Culver, relying on this precedent, contends that the District Court and Court of Appeals were correct in holding that its agreement to arbitrate disputes arising under the contract with Scherk is similarly unenforceable in view of its contentions that Scherk’s conduct constituted violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and rules promulgated thereunder. For the reasons that follow, we reject this contention and hold that the provisions of the Arbitration Act cannot be ignored in this case.
  At the outset, a colorable argument could be made that even the semantic reasoning of the Wilko opinion does not control the case before us. Wilko concerned a suit brought under § 12 (2) of the Securities Act of 1933, which provides a defrauded purchaser with the “special right” of a private remedy for civil liability, 346 U. S., at 431. There is no statutory counterpart of § 12 (2) in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and neither § 10 (b) of that Act nor Rule 10b-5 speaks of a private remedy to redress violations of the kind alleged here. While federal case law has established that § 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5 create an implied private cause of action, see 6 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 3869-3873 (1969) and cases cited therein; cf. J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U. S. 426, the Act itself does not establish the “special right” that the Court in Wilko found significant. Furthermore, while both the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 contain sections barring waiver of compliance with any “provision” of the respective Acts, certain of the “provisions” of the 1933 Act that the Court held could not be waived by Wilko’s agreement to arbitrate find no counterpart in the 1934 Act. In particular, the Court in Wilko noted that the jurisdictional provision of the 1933 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77v, allowed a plaintiff to bring suit “in any court of competent jurisdiction — federal or state — and removal from a state court is prohibited.” 346 U. S., at 431. The analogous provision of the 1934 Act, by contrast, provides for suit only in the federal district courts that have “exclusive jurisdiction,” 15 U. S. C. § 78aa, thus significantly restricting the plaintiff’s choice of forum.
  Accepting the premise, however, that the operative portions of the language of the 1933 Act relied upon in Wilko are contained in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the respondent’s reliance on Wilko in this case ignores the significant and, we find, crucial differences between the agreement involved in Wilko and the one signed by the parties here. Alberto-Culver’s contract to purchase the business entities belonging to Scherk was a truly international agreement. Alberto-Culver is an American corporation with its principal place of business and the vast bulk of its activity in this, country, while Scherk is a citizen of Germany whose companies were organized under the laws of Germany and Liechtenstein. The negotiations leading to the signing of the contract in Austria and to the closing in Switzerland took place in the United States, England, and Germany, and involved consultations with legal and trademark experts from each of those countries and from Liechtenstein. Finally, and most significantly, the subject matter of the contract concerned the sale of business enterprises organized under the laws of and primarily situated in European countries, whose activities were largely, if not entirely, directed to European markets.
  Such a contract involves considerations and policies significantly different from those found controlling in Wilko. In Wilko, quite apart from the arbitration provision, there was no question but that the laws of the United States generally, and the federal securities- laws in particular, would govern disputes arising out of the stock-purchase agreement. The parties, the negotiations, and the subject matter of the contract were all situated in this country, and no credible claim could have been entertained that any international conflict-of-laws problems would arise. In this case, by contrast, in the absence of the arbitration provision considerable uncertainty existed at the time of the agreement, and still exists, concerning the law applicable to the resolution of disputes arising out of the contract.
  Such uncertainty will almost inevitably exist with respect to any contract touching two or more countries, each with its own substantive laws and conflict-of-laws rules. A contractual provision specifying in advance the forum in which disputes shall be litigated and the law to be applied is, therefore, an almost indispensable precondition to achievement of the orderliness and predictability essential to any international business transaction. Furthermore, such a provision obviates the danger that a dispute under the agreement might be submitted to a forum hostile to the interests of. one of the parties or unfamiliar with the problem area involved.
  A parochial refusal by the courts of one country to enforce an international arbitration agreement would not only frustrate these purposes, but would invite unseemly and mutually destructive jockeying by the parties to secure tactical litigation advantages. In the present case, for example, it is not inconceivable that if Scherk had anticipated that Alberto-Culver would be able in this country to enjoin resort to arbitration he might have sought an order in France or some other country enjoining Alberto-Culver from proceeding with its litigation in the United States. Whatever recognition the courts of this country might ultimately have granted to the order of the foreign court, the dicey atmosphere of such a legal no-man’s-land would surely- damage the fabric of international commerce and trade, and imperil the willingness and ability of businessmen to enter into international commercial agreements.
  The exception to the clear provisions of the Arbitration Act carved out by Wilko is simply inapposite to a case such as the one before us. In Wilko the Court reasoned that “[w]hen the security buyer, prior to any violation of the Securities Act, waives his right to sue in courts, he gives up more than would a participant in other business transactions. The security buyer has a wider choice of courts and venue. He thus surrenders one of the advantages the Act gives him . . . .” 346 U. S., at 435. In the context of an international contract, however, these advantages become chimerical since, as indicated above, an opposing party may by speedy resort to a foreign court block or hinder access to the American court of the purchaser’s choice.
  Two Terms ago in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U. S. 1, we rejected the doctrine that a forum-selection clause of a contract, although voluntarily adopted by the parties, will not be respected in a suit brought in the United States “ 'unless the selected state would provide a more convenient forum than the state in which suit is brought.’ ” Id., at 7. Rather, we concluded that a “forum clause should control absent a strong showing that it should be set aside.” Id., at 15. We noted that “much uncertainty and possibly great inconvenience to both parties could arise if a suit could be maintained in any jurisdiction in which an accident might occur or if jurisdiction were left to any place [where personal or in rem jurisdiction might be established]. The elimination of all such uncertainties by agreeing in advance on a forum acceptable to both parties is an indispensable element in international trade, commerce, and contracting.” Id., at 13-14.
  An agreement to arbitrate before a specified tribunal is, in effect, a specialized kind of forum-selection clause that posits not only the situs of suit but also the procedure to be used in resolving the dispute. The invalidation of such an agreement in the case before us would not only allow the respondent to repudiate its solemn promise but would, as well, reflect a “parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved under our laws and in our courts. . . . We cannot have trade and commerce in world markets and international waters exclusively on our terms, governed by our laws, and resolved in our courts.” Id., at 9.
  For all these reasons we hold that the agreement of the parties in this case to arbitrate any dispute arising out of their international commercial transaction is to be respected and enforced by the federal courts in accord with the explicit provisions of the Arbitration Act. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded to that court with directions to remand to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
  It is so ordered.
  The arbitration clause relating to the transfer of one of Scherk’s business entities,, similar to the clauses covering the other two, reads in. its entirety as follows:
  “The parties agree that if any controversy or claim shall arise out of this agreement or the breach thereof and either party shall request that the matter shall be settled by arbitration, the matter shall be settled exclusively by arbitration in accordance with the rules then obtaining of the International Chamber of Commerce, Paris, France, by a single arbitrator, if the parties shall agree upon one, or by one arbitrator appointed by each party and a third arbitrator appointed by the other arbitrators. In case of any failure of a party to make an appointment referred to above within four weeks after notice of the controversy, such appointment shall be made by said Chamber. All arbitration proceedings shall be held in Paris, France, and each party agrees to comply in all respects with any award made in any such proceeding and to the entry of a judgment in any jurisdiction upon any award rendered in such proceeding. The laws of the State of Illinois, U. S. A. shall apply to and govern this agreement, its interpretation and performance.”
  Scherk had taken steps to initiate arbitration in Paris in early 1971. He did not, however, file a formal request for arbitration with the International Chamber of Commerce until November 9, 1971, almost five months after the filing of Alberto-Culver’s complaint in the Illinois federal court.
  The memorandum opinion of the District Court is unreported.
  English courts traditionally considered irrevocable arbitration agreements as “ousting” the courts of jurisdiction, and refused to enforce such agreements for this reason. This view was adopted by American courts as part of the common law up to the time of the adoption of the Arbitration Act. See H. R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., lst Sess., 1, 2 (1924); Sturges & Murphy, Some Confusing Matters Relating to Arbitration under the United States Arbitration Act, 17 Law & Contemp. Prob. 580.
  Section 2 of the Arbitration Act renders “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable” written arbitration provisions “in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce . . .,” as those terms are defined in § 1. In Bernhardt v. Poly-graphic Co., 350 U. S. 198, this Court held that the stay provisions of § 3 apply only to the two kinds of contracts specified in §§ 1 and 2. Since the transaction in this case constituted “commerce . . . with foreign nations,” 9 U. S. C. § 1, the Act clearly covers this agreement.
  The arbitration agreement involved in Wilko was contained in a standard form margin contract. But see the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 346 U. S. 427, 439, 440, concluding that the record did not show that “the plaintiff [Wilko] in opening an account had no choice but to accept the arbitration stipulation . . . .” The petitioner here would limit the decision in Wilko to situations where the parties exhibit a disparity of bargaining power, and contends that, since the negotiations leading to the present contract took place over a number of years and involved the participation on. both sides of knowledgeable and sophisticated business and legal experts, the Wilko decision should not apply. See also the dissenting opinion of Judge Stevens of the Court of Appeals in this case, 484 F. 2d 611, 615. Because of our disposition of this case on other grounds, we need not consider this contention.
  Section 14 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C. § 77n, provides as follows:
  "Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision of this subchapter or of the rules and regulations of the Commission shall be void.”
  Section 29 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. § 78cc (a), provides:
  “Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive compliance with any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder, or of any rule of an exchange required thereby shall be void.”
  While the two sections are not identical, the variations in their wording seem irrelevant to the issue presented in this case.
  We do not reach, or imply any opinion as to, the question whether the acquisition of Scherk’s businesses was a security transaction within the meaning of § 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5. Although this important question was considered by the District Court and the Court of Appeals, and although the dissenting opinion, post, p. 521, seems to consider it controlling, the petitioner did not assign the adverse ruling on the question as error and it was not briefed or argued in this Court.
  Together with his motion for a stay pending arbitration, Scherk moved that the complaint be dismissed because the federal securities laws do not apply to this international transaction, cf. Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F. 2d 1326 (CA2 1972). Since only the order granting the injunction was appealed, this contention was not considered by the Court of Appeals and is not before this Court.
  See Quigley, Accession by the United States to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 Yale L. J. 1049,' 1051 (1961). For example, while the arbitration agreement involved here provided that the controversies arising out of the agreement be resolved under “[t]he laws of the State of Illinois,” supra, n. 1, a determination of the existence and extent of fraud concerning the trademarks would necessarily involve an understanding of foreign law on that subject.
  The dissenting opinion argues that our conclusion that Wilko is inapplicable to the situation presented in this case will vitiate the force of that decision because parties to transactions with many-more direct contacts with this country than in the present case will nonetheless be able to invoke the “talisman” of having an “international contract.” Post, at 529. Coneededly, situations may arise where the contacts with foreign countries are so insignificant or attenuated that the holding in Wilko would meaningfully apply. Judicial response to such situations can and should await future litigation in concrete cases. This case, however, provides no basis for a judgment that only United States laws and United States courts should determine this controversy in the face of a solemn agreement between the parties that such controversies be resolved elsewhere. The only contact between the United States and the transaction involved here is the fact that Alberto-Culver is an American corporation and the occurrence of some — but by no means the greater part — of the pre-contract negotiations in this country. To determine that “American standards of fairness,” post, at 528, must nonetheless govern the controversy demeans the standards of justice elsewhere in the world, and unnecessarily exalts the primacy of United States law over the laws of other countries.
  The dissenting opinion raises the specter that our holding today will leave American investors at the mercy of multinational corporations with .“vast operations around the world . . . .” Post, at 533. Our decision, of course, has no bearing on the scope of the substantive provisions of the federal securities laws for the simple reason that the question is not presented in this case. See n. 8, supra.
  Under some circumstances, the designation of arbitration in a certain place might also be viewed as implicitly selecting the law of that place to apply to that transaction. In this case, however, “[t]he laws of the State of Illinois” were explicitly made applicable by the ' arbitration agreement. See n. 1, supra.
  In The Bremen we noted that forum-selection clauses “should be given full effect” when “a freely negotiated private international agreement [is] unaffected by fraud . . . .” 407 U. S., at 13, 12. This qualification does not mean that any time a dispute arising out of a transaction is based upon an allegation, of fraud, as in this case, the clause is unenforceable. Rather, it means that an arbitration or forum-selection clause in a contract is not enforceable if the inclusion of that clause in the contract was the product of fraud or coercion. Cf. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U. S. 395.
  Although we do not decide the question, presumably the type of fraud alleged here could be raised, under Art. V of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, see n. 15, infra, in challenging the enforcement of whatever arbitral award is produced through arbitration. Article V (2) (b) of the Convention provides that a country may refuse recognition and enforcement of an award if “recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that country.”
  Our conclusion today is confirmed by international developments and domestic legislation in the area of commercial arbitration subsequent to the Wilko decision. On June 10, 1958, a special conference of the United Nations Economic and Social Council adopted the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. In 1970 the United States acceded to the treaty, [1970] 3 U. S. T. 2517, T. I. A. S. No. 6997, and Congress passed Chapter 2 of the United States Arbitration Act, 9 U. S. C. § 201 et seq., in order to implement the Convention. Section 1 of the new chapter, 9 U. S. C. § 201, provides unequivocally that the Convention “shall be enforced in United States courts in accordance with this chapter,”
  The goal of the Convention, and the principal purpose underlying American adoption and implementation of it, was to encourage the recognition and enforcement of commercial arbitration agreements in international contracts and to unify the standards by which agreements to arbitrate are observed and arbitral awards are enforced in the signatory countries. See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, S. Exec. Doc. E, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); Quigley, Accession by the United States to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 Yale L. J. 1049 (1961). Article II (1) of the Convention provides:
  “Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing under which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration.”
  In their discussion of this Article, the delegates to the Convention voiced frequent concern that courts of signatory countries in which an agreement to arbitrate is sought to be enforced should not be permitted to decline enforcement of such agreements on the basis of parochial views of their desirability or in a manner that would diminish the mutually binding nature of the agreements. See Q. Haight; Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards: Summary Analysis of Record of United Nations Conference, May/June 1958, pp. 2A-28 (1958).
  Without reaching the issue of whether the Convention, apart from the considerations expressed in this opinion, would require of its own force that the agreement to arbitrate be enforced in the present case, we think that this country’s adoption and ratification of the Convention and the passage of Chapter 2 of the United States Arbitration Act provide strongly persuasive evidence of congressional policy consistent with the decision we reach today.