Mr. Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether the testimony of a witness in respondent’s state court trial for rape must be excluded simply because police had learned the identity of the witness by questioning respondent at a time when he was in custody as a suspect, but had not been advised that counsel would be appointed for him if he was indigent. The questioning took place before this Court’s decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), but respondent’s trial, at which he was convicted, took place afterwards. Under the holding of Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U. S. 719 (1966), therefore, Miranda is applicable to this case. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan reviewed respondent’s claim on a petition for habeas corpus and held that the testimony must be excluded. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
I
On the morning of April 19, 1966, a 43-year-old woman in Pontiac, Michigan, was found in her home by a friend and coworker, Luther White, in serious condition. At the time she was found the woman was tied, gagged, and partially disrobed, and had been both raped and severely beaten. She was unable to tell White anything about her assault at that time and still remains unable to recollect what happened.
While White was attempting to get medical help for the victim and to call for the police, he observed a dog inside the house. This apparently attracted White’s attention for he knew that the woman did not own 'a dog herself. Later, when talking with police officers, White observed the dog a second time, and police followed the dog to respondent’s house. Neighbors further connected the dog with respondent.
The police then arrested respondent and brought him to the police station for questioning. Prior to the actual interrogation the police asked respondent whether he knew for what crime he had been arrested, whether he wanted an attorney, and whether he understood his constitutional rights. Respondent replied that he did understand the crime for which he was arrested, that he did not want an attorney, and that he understood his rights. The police further advised him that any statements he might make could be used against him at a later date in court. The police, however, did not advise respondent that he would be furnished counsel free of charge if he could not pay for such services himself.
The police then questioned respondent about his activities on the night of the rape and assault. Respondent replied that during the general time period at issue he had first been with one Robert Henderson and then later at home, alone, asleep. The police sought to confirm this story by contacting Henderson, but Henderson’s story served to discredit rather than to bolster respondent’s account. Henderson acknowledged that respondent had been with him on the night of the crime but said that he had left at a relatively early time. Furthermore, Henderson told police that he saw respondent the following day and asked him at that time about scratches on his face — “asked him if he got hold of a wild one or something.” Respondent answered: “[S]omething like that.” Then, Henderson said, he asked respondent “who it was,” and respondent said: “[S]ome woman lived the next block over,” adding: “She is a widow woman” or words to that effect.
These events all occurred prior to the date on which this Court handed down its decision in Miranda v. Arizona, supra, but respondent’s trial occurred after-wards. Prior to trial respondent’s appointed counsel made a motion to exclude Henderson’s expected testimony because respondent had revealed Henderson’s identity without having received full Miranda warnings. Although respondent’s own statements taken during interrogation were excluded, the trial judge denied the motion to exclude Henderson’s testimony. Henderson therefore testified at trial, and respondent was convicted of rape and sentenced to 20 to 40 years’ imprisonment. His conviction was affirmed by both the Michigan Court of Appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court.
Respondent then sought habeas corpus relief in Federal District Court. That court, noting that respondent had not received the full Miranda warnings and that the police had stipulated Henderson’s identity was learned only through respondent’s answers, “reluctantly” concluded that Henderson’s testimony could not be admitted. Application of such an exclusionary rule was necessary, the court reasoned, to protect respondent’s Fifth Amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination. The court therefore granted respondent’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus unless petitioner retried respondent within 90 days. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. We granted certiorari, 414 U. S. 1062 (1973), and now reverse.
II
Although respondent’s sole complaint is that the police failed to advise him that he would be given free counsel if unable to afford counsel himself, he did not, and does not now, base his arguments for relief on a right to counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Nor was the right to counsel, as such, considered to be persuasive by either federal court below. We do not have a situation such as that presented in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S. 478 (1964), where the policemen interrogating the suspect had refused his repeated requests to see his lawyer who was then present at the police station. As we have noted previously, Escobedo is not to be broadly extended beyond the facts of that particular case. See Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U. S., at 733-734; Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U. S. 682, 689 (1972); Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U. S. 731, 739 (1969). This case also falls outside the rationale of United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218, 224 (1967), where the Court held that counsel was needed at a post-indictment lineup in order to protect the “right to a fair trial at which the witnesses against [the defendant] might be meaningfully cross-examined.” Henderson was fully available for searching cross-examination at respondent’s trial.
Respondent’s argument, and the opinions of the District Court and Court of Appeals, instead rely upon the Fifth Amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination and the safeguards designed in Miranda to secure that right. In brief, the position urged upon this Court is that proper regard for the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination requires, with limited exceptions not applicable here, that all evidence derived solely from statements made without full Miranda warnings be excluded at a subsequent criminal trial. For purposes of analysis in this case we believe that the question thus presented is best examined in two separate parts. We will therefore first consider whether the police conduct complained of directly infringed upon respondent’s right against compulsory self-incrimination or whether it instead violated only the prophylactic rules developed to protect that right. We will then consider whether the evidence derived from this interrogation must be excluded.
Ill
The history of the Fifth Amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination, and the evils against which it was directed, have received considerable attention in the opinions of this Court. See, e. g., Kastigar v. United States, 406 U. S. 441 (1972); Miranda v. Arizona, supra; Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U. S. 52 (1964); Ullmann v. United States, 350 U. S. 422, 426 (1956); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547 (1892). At this point in our history virtually every schoolboy is familiar with the concept, if not the language, of the provision that reads: “No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . ...” This Court’s decisions have referred to the right as “the mainstay of our adversary system of criminal justice,” Johnson v. New Jersey, supra, at 729, and as “ ‘one of the great landmarks in man’s struggle to make himself civilized.’ ” Ullmann, supra, at 426. It is not surprising that the constitution of virtually every State has a comparable provision. 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2252 (McNaughton rev. 1961) (hereinafter Wigmore).
The importance of a right does not, by itself, determine its scope, and therefore we must continue to hark back to the historical origins of the privilege, particularly the evils at which it was to strike. The privilege against compulsory self-incrimination was developed by painful opposition to a course of ecclesiastical inquisitions and Star Chamber proceedings occurring several centuries ago. See L. Levy, Origins of the Fifth Amendment (1968); Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 Minn. L. Rev. 1 (1949); 8 Wigmore §2250. Certainly anyone who reads accounts of those investigations, which placed a premium on compelling subjects of the investigation to admit guilt from their own lips, cannot help but be sensitive to the Framers’ desire to protect citizens against such compulsion. As this Court has noted, the privilege against self-incrimination “was aimed at a . . . far-reaching evil — a recurrence of the Inquisition and the Star Chamber, even if not in their stark brutality.” Ullmann, supra, at 428.
Where there has been genuine compulsion of testimony, the right has been given broad scope. Although the constitutional language in which the privilege is cast might be construed to apply only to situations in which the prosecution seeks to call a defendant to testify against himself at his criminal trial, its application has not been so limited. The right has been held applicable to proceedings before a grand jury, Counselman v. Hitchcock, supra; to civil proceedings, McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U. S. 34 (1924); to congressional investigations, Watkins v. United States, 354 U. S. 178 (1957); to juvenile proceedings, In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1 (1967); and to other statutory inquiries, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1 (1964). The privilege has also been applied against the States by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. Ibid.
The natural concern which underlies many of these decisions is that an inability to protect the right at one stage of a proceeding may make its invocation useless at a later stage. For example, a defendant’s right not to be compelled to testify against himself at his own trial might be practically nullified if the prosecution could previously have required him to give evidence against himself before a grand jury. Testimony obtained in civil suits, or before administrative or legislative committees, could also prove so incriminating that a person compelled to give such testimony might readily be convicted on the basis of those disclosures in a subsequent criminal proceeding.
In more recent years this concern — that compelled disclosures might be used against a person at a later criminal trial — -has been extended to cases involving police interrogation. Before Miranda the principal issue in these cases was not whether a defendant had waived his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination but simply whether his statement was “voluntary.” In state cases the Court applied the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, examining the circumstances of interrogation to determine whether the processes were so unfair or unreasonable as to render a subsequent confession involuntary. See, e. g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 (1936); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227 (1940); White v. Texas, 310 U. S. 530 (1940); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U. S. 560 (1958); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U. S. 503 (1963). See also 3 J. Wigmore, Evidence §815 et seq. (Chadbourne rev. 1970). Where the State’s actions offended the standards of fundamental fairness under the Due Process Clause, the State was then deprived of the right to use the resulting confessions in court.
Although federal cases concerning voluntary confessions often contained references to the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, references which were strongly criticized by some commentators, see 8 Wig-more § 2266, it was not until this Court’s decision in Miranda that the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination was seen as the principal protection for a person facing police interrogation. This privilege had been made applicable to the States in Malloy v. Hogan, supra, and was thought to offer a more comprehensive and less subjective protection than the doctrine of previous cases. In Miranda the Court examined the facts of four separate- cases and stated:
“In these cases, we might not find the defendants’ statements to have been involuntary in traditional terms. Our concern for adequate safeguards to protect precious Fifth Amendment rights is, of course, not lessened in the slightest. ... To be sure, the records do not evince overt physical coercion or patent psychological ploys. The fact remains that in none of these cases did the officers undertake to afford appropriate safeguards at the outset of the interrogation to insure that the statements were truly the product of free choice.” 384 U. S., at 457.
Thus the Court in Miranda, for the first time, expressly declared that the Self-Incrimination Clause was applicable to state interrogations at a police station, and that a defendant’s statements might be excluded at trial despite their voluntary character under traditional principles.
To supplement this new doctrine, and to help police officers conduct interrogations without facing a continued risk that valuable evidence would be lost, the Court in Miranda established a set of specific protective guidelines, now commonly known as the Miranda rules. The Court declared that “the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.” Id., at 444. A series of recommended “procedural safeguards” then followed. The Court in particular stated:
“Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.” Ibid.
The Court said that the defendant, of course, could waive these rights, but that any waiver must have been made “voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.” Ibid.
The Court recognized that these procedural safeguards were not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but were instead measures to insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination was protected. As the Court remarked:
“[W]e cannot say that the Constitution necessarily requires adherence to any particular solution for the inherent compulsions of the interrogation process as it is presently conducted.” Id., at 467.
The suggested safeguards were not intended to “create a constitutional straitjacket,” ibid., but rather to provide practical reinforcement for the right against compulsory self-incrimination.
A comparison of the facts in this case with the historical circumstances underlying the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination strongly indicates that the police conduct here did not deprive respondent of his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination as such, but rather failed to make available to him the full measure of procedural safeguards associated with that right since Miranda. Certainly no one could contend that the interrogation faced by respondent bore any resemblance to the historical practices at which the right against compulsory self-incrimination was aimed. The District Court in this case noted that the police had “warned [respondent] that he had the right to remain silent,” 352 F. Supp. 266, 267 (1972), and the record in this case clearly shows that respondent was informed that any evidence taken could be used against him. The record is also clear that respondent was asked whether he wanted an attorney and that he replied that he did not. Thus, his statements could hardly be termed involuntary as that term has been defined in the decisions of this Court. Additionally, there were no legal sanctions, such as the threat of contempt, which could have been applied to respondent had he chosen to remain silent. He was simply not exposed to “the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt.” Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U. S., at 55.
Our determination that the interrogation in this case involved no compulsion sufficient to breach the right against compulsory self-incrimination does not mean there was not a disregard, albeit an inadvertent disregard, of the procedural rules later established in Miranda. The question for decision is how sweeping the judicially imposed consequences of this disregard shall be. This Court said in Miranda that statements taken in violation of the Miranda principles must not be used to prove the prosecution’s case at trial. That requirement was fully complied with by the state court here: respondent’s statements, claiming that he was with Henderson and then asleep during the time period of the crime were not admitted against him at trial. This Court has also said, in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471 (1963), that the “fruits” of police conduct which actually infringed a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights must be suppressed. But we have already concluded that the police conduct at issue here did not abridge respondent’s constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, but departed only from the prophylactic standards later laid down by this Court in Miranda to safeguard that privilege. Thus, in deciding whether Henderson’s testimony must be excluded, there is no controlling precedent of this Court to guide us. We must therefore examine the matter as a question of principle.
IV
Just as the law does not require that a defendant receive a perfect trial, only a fair one, it cannot realistically require that policemen investigating serious crimes make no errors whatsoever. The pressures of law enforcement and the vagaries of human nature would make such an expectation unrealistic. Before we penalize police error, therefore, we must consider whether the sanction serves a valid and useful purpose.
We have recently said, in a search-and-seizure context, that the exclusionary rule’s “prime purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures.” United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 347 (1974). We then continued:
“ 'The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter — to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way — by removing the incentive to disregard it.’ Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, 217 (1960).” Ibid.
In a proper case this rationale would seem applicable to the Fifth Amendment context as well.
The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct which has deprived the defendant of some right. By refusing to admit evidence gained as a result of such conduct, the courts hope to instill in those particular investigating officers, or in their future counterparts, a greater degree of care toward the rights of an accused. Where the official action was pursued in complete good faith, however, the deterrence rationale loses much of its force.
We consider it significant to our decision in this case that the officers’ failure to advise respondent of his right to appointed counsel occurred prior to the decision in Miranda. Although we have been urged to resolve the broad question of whether evidence derived from statements taken in violation of the Miranda rules must be excluded regardless of when the interrogation took place/ we instead place our holding on a narrower ground. For at the time respondent was questioned these police officers were guided, quite rightly, by the principles established in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S. 478 (1964), particularly focusing on the suspect’s opportunity to have retained counsel with him during the interrogation if he chose to do so. Thus, the police asked respondent if he wanted counsel, and he answered that he did not. The statements actually made by respondent to the police, as we have observed, were excluded at trial in accordance with Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U. S. 719 (1966). Whatever deterrent effect on future police conduct the exclusion of those statements may have had, we do not believe it would be significantly augmented by excluding the testimony of the witness Henderson as well.
When involuntary statements or the right against compulsory self-incrimination are involved, a second justification for the exclusionary rule also has been asserted: protection of the courts from reliance on untrustworthy evidence. Cases which involve the Self-Incrimination Clause must, by definition, involve an element of coercion, since the Clause provides only that a person shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself. And cases involving statements often depict severe pressures which may override a particular suspect's insistence on innocence. Fact situations ranging from classical third-degree torture, Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 (1936), to prolonged isolation from family or friends in a hostile setting, Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U. S. 49 (1962), or to a simple desire on the part of a physically or mentally exhausted suspect to have a seemingly endless interrogation end, Watts v. Indiana, 338 U. S. 49 (1949), all might be sufficient to cause a defendant to accuse himself falsely.
But those situations are a far cry from that presented here. The pressures on respondent to accuse himself were hardly comparable even with the least prejudicial of those pressures which have been dealt with in our cases. More important, the respondent did not accuse himself. The evidence which the prosecution successfully sought to introduce was not a confession of guilt by respondent, or indeed even an exculpatory statement by respondent, but rather the testimony of a third party who was subjected to no custodial pressures. There is plainly no reason to believe that Henderson’s testimony is untrustworthy simply because respondent was not advised of his right to appointed counsel. Henderson was both available at trial and subject to cross-examination by respondent’s counsel, and counsel fully used this opportunity, suggesting in the course of his cross-examination that Henderson’s character was less than exemplary and that he had been offered incentives by the police to testify against respondent. Thus the reliability of his testimony was subject to the normal testing process of an adversary trial.
Respondent contends that an additional reason for excluding Henderson’s testimony is the notion that the adversary system requires “the government in its contest with the individual to shoulder the entire load.” 8 Wig-more § 2251, p. 317; Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U. S., at 55; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S., at 460. To the extent that this suggested basis for the exclusionary rule in Fifth Amendment cases may exist independently of the deterrence and trustworthiness rationales, we think it of no avail to respondent here. Subject to applicable constitutional limitations, the Government is not forbidden all resort to the defendant to make out its case. It may require the defendant to give physical evidence against himself, see Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757 (1966); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U. S. 1 (1973), and it may use statements which are voluntarily given by the defendant after he receives full disclosure of the rights offered by Miranda. Here we deal, not with the offer of respondent’s own statements in evidence, but only with the testimony of a witness whom the police discovered as a result of respondent’s statements. This recourse to respondent’s voluntary statements does no violence to such elements of the adversary system as may be embodied in the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
In summary, we do not think that any single reason supporting exclusion of this witness’ testimony, or all of them together, are very persuasive. By contrast, we find the arguments in favor of admitting the testimony quite strong. For, when balancing the interests involved, we must weigh the strong interest under any system of justice of making available to the trier of fact all con-cededly relevant and trustworthy evidence which either party seeks to adduce. In this particular case we also “must consider society’s interest in the effective prosecution of criminals in light of the protection our pre-Miranda standards afford criminal defendants.” Jenkins v. Delaware, 395 U. S. 213, 221 (1969). These interests may be outweighed by the need to provide an effective sanction to a constitutional right, Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914), but they must in any event be valued. Here respondent’s own statement, which might have helped the prosecution show respondent’s guilty conscience at trial, had already been excised from the prosecution’s case pursuant to this Court’s Johnson decision. To extend the excision further under the circumstances of this case and exclude relevant testimony of a third-party witness would require far more persuasive arguments than those advanced by respondent.
This Court has already recognized that a failure to give interrogated suspects full Miranda warnings does not entitle the suspect to insist that statements made by him be excluded in every conceivable context. In Harris v. New York, 401 U. S. 222 (1971), the Court was faced with the question of whether the statements of the defendant himself, taken without informing him of his right of access to appointed counsel, could be used to impeach defendant’s direct testimony at trial. The Court concluded that they could, saying:
“Some comments in the Miranda opinion can indeed be read as indicating a bar to use of an uncounseled statement for any purpose, but discussion of that issue was not at all necessary to the Court’s holding and cannot be regarded as controlling. Miranda barred the prosecution from making its case with statements of an accused made while in custody prior to having or effectively waiving counsel. It does not follow from Miranda that evidence inadmissible against an accused in the prosecution’s case in chief is barred for all purposes, provided of course that the trustworthiness of the evidence satisfies legal standards.” Id., at 224.
We believe that this reasoning is equally applicable here. Although Johnson enabled respondent to block admission of his own statements, we do not believe that it requires the prosecution to refrain from all use of those statements, and we disagree with the courts below that Henderson’s testimony should have been excluded in this case.
Reversed.
352 F. Supp. 266 (1972).
480 F. 2d 927 (1973).
Tr. of Prelim. Hearing 99.
Ibid.
Id,., at 99-100.
Tr. of Trial 223.
Ibid.
Id., at 224.
Ibid.
Ibid.
19 Mich. App. 320, 172 N. W. 2d 712 (1969).
385 Mich. 594, 189 N. W. 2d 290 (1971).
352 F. Supp., at 268.
The Court has also held that comment on a defendant’s silence or refusal to take the witness stand may be an impermissible penalty on exercise of the privilege. See Griffin v. California, 380 U. S. 609 (1965).
For example in Bram v. United States, 168 U. S. 532, 542 (1897), the Court stated:
“In criminal trials, in the courts of the United States, wherever a question arises whether a confession is incompetent because not voluntary, the issue is controlled by that portion of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, commanding that no person ‘shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.’ ”
As noted in the text, the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination was not held applicable against the States until Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1 (1964).
Wigmore states his objection in the following terms:
“Today in the United States confessions, and probably even lesser self-incriminating admissions, are excluded despite their trustworthiness if coerced. The policies leading to this recent extension of the confession rule are quite similar to those underlying the privilege against self-incrimination. It is thus not surprising that the privilege, with its unclear boundaries and apparently unending capacity for transmogrification and assimilation, is now sometimes invoked to effect exclusion even though the disclosure was not compelled from a person under legal compulsion. Distortion of the privilege to cover such situations is not necessary. If trustworthy confessions are to be excluded because coerced, it should be done frankly as an exception to the principle . . . that the illegality of source of evidence is immaterial. It should be done, as it usually is, on the ground that the combination of coercion and use of the evidence in the particular case violates the relevant constitutional due process clause.” Id., at 402. (Citations omitted.)
See n. 5, supra.
See nn. 3 and 4, supra.
In Wong Sun the police discovered evidence through statements made by the accused after he had been placed under arrest. This Court, finding that the arrest had occurred without probable cause, held that the derivative evidence could not be introduced against the accused at trial. For the reasons stated in the text we do not believe that Wong Sun controls the case before us.
The opinion also relied upon Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 656 (1961); Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U. S. 406, 416 (1966); and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 29 (1968). See 414 U. S., at 348.
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 31 et seq.; Brief for Respondent 9 et seq.
As previously noted, the defendant in Escobedo had repeatedly asked to see his lawyer who was available at the police station. Those requests were denied, and the defendant ultimately confessed. Thus, in direct contrast to the situation here, the defendant in Escobedo was told he did not have a right to see his lawyer, although he had expressly stated his desire to do so.
The Court has made clear that the truth or falsity of a statement is not the determining factor in the decision whether or not to exclude it. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 (1964). Thus a State which has obtained a coerced or involuntary statement cannot argue for its admissibility on the ground that other evidence demonstrates its truthfulness. Ibid. But it also seems clear that coerced statements have been regarded with some mistrust. The Court in Escobedo, for example, stated that “a system of criminal law enforcement which comes to depend on the 'confession’ will, in the long run, be less reliable and more subject to abuses” than a system relying on independent investigation, 378 U. S., at 488-489. The Court then cited several authorities concerned with false confessions. Id., at 489 n. 11. Although completely voluntary confessions may, in many cases, advance the cause of justice and rehabilitation, coerced confessions, by their nature, cannot serve the same ends.
Tr. of Trial 226-234.
It has been suggested that courts should exclude evidence derived from “lawless invasions of the constitutional rights of citizens,” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S., at 13, in recognition of “the imperative of judicial integrity.” Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, 222 (1960). This rationale, however, is really an assimilation of the more specific rationales discussed in the text of this opinion, and does not in their absence provide an independent basis for excluding challenged evidence.
Our Brother BreNNAN in his opinion concurring in the judgment treats the principal question here simply as a lineal descendant of the one decided in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618 (1965), to be analyzed only in terms of the retroactivity framework established in that and subsequent decisions. While his approach has a beguiling simplicity, we believe it marks a significant and unsettling departure from the past practice of the Court in this area. Our retroactivity cases, from Linkletter v. Walker, supra, to Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U. S. 665 (1973), all have in common a particular factual predicate: a previous constitutional decision of this Court governs the facts of an earlier decided case unless the constitutional decision is not to have retroactive effect. The doctrine of retroactivity does not modify the substantive scope of the constitutional decision but rather determines the point in time when it is held to apply.
That common factual predicate is absent here. No defendant in Miranda sought to block evidence of the type challenged in this case, and the holding of Miranda, even if made fully retroactive, would not therefore resolve the question of whether Henderson’s testimony must also be excluded at trial. Contrary, therefore, to the suggestion in our Brother’s opinion that the question here is whether to “limit the effect of Johnson v. New Jersey,” post, at 454 n. 1, Johnson has never been thought controlling on the question of fruits, for the simple reason that the parent Miranda case did not reach that issue.
Our Brother BreNNAN’s method of disposition is to determine in the present case the retroactivity of a holding which the Court has yet to make. He would say, in effect, that if the Court should later determine that Miranda requires exclusion of fruits such as the testimony of Henderson, nonetheless that determination shall not be applied retroactively. But this approach wholly subverts the heretofore established relationship between the parent case and the subsidiary case determining whether or not to apply the parent case retroactively. Under the framework of the analysis established in Linklebter, supra, and in subsequent cases, it would seem indispensable to understand the basis for a constitutional holding of the Court in order to later determine whether that holding should be retroactive. Yet ex hypothesi our Brother has no such analysis available, since the case has yet to be decided. Cases which subsequently determine the retroactivity of a constitutional holding have given the Court enough occasion for concern without substantially increasing the difficulty of that type of decision by making it before, rather than after, the constitutional holding.