opinion: PER CURIAM:
  Pursuant to § 10(e) of the National Labor Relations Act (Act), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1982), the National Labor Relations Board (Board), as petitioner, seeks enforcement of its order issued against respondent Accurate Web, Inc., (Employer), compelling recognition of intervenor, Local One, Amalgamated Lithographers of America, (Union). We grant enforcement.
  I
  In June 1982 a Board director certified the Union as the exclusive collective bargaining representative of the Employer’s production and maintenance employees. The Board denied the Employer’s request for review of the certification. In order to test the certification the Employer then refused to bargain with the Union. In response, the Union filed an unfair labor practices (ULP) charge with the Board alleging a § 8(a)(5) violation of the Act. In March 1983 the Board sustained the charge and, as a remedy, extended the one year certification period to begin on the date the Employer commenced to bargain in good faith. 266 NLRB 487.
  Between the commencement and conclusion of the above action, the Union filed other ULP charges against the Employer. A hearing on the complaint was adjourned to allow the parties time to negotiate a settlement. In May 1983 the parties entered into a non-Board settlement agreement in which the Union agreed to withdraw all ULP charges and to seek vacatur of the above NLRB decision. In return, the Employer agreed, inter alia, to bargain in good faith with the Union and not to appeal the NLRB’s decision. The Board agreed to the withdrawal and vacated its decision in July 1983.
  After the withdrawal and vacatur, the parties engaged in good faith negotiations for approximately nine and a half months. In June 1984 a majority of the employees filed a decertification petition with the Board and, as a result, the Employer withdrew its recognition of the Union. In July 1984 a Board director, without a hearing, dismissed as untimely the decertification petition. The director interpreted the settlement agreement as extending the certification period from August 1983 to August 1984 and hence concluded that the petition could not be brought before the certification period expired. In November 1984 the Board affirmed the director’s decision.
  In order to obtain review of the decertification dismissal, the Employer thereafter refused to bargain with the Union. In response, the Union filed another § 8(a)(5) action with the Board. In September 1985 an AD held that the decision in the decertification proceeding controlled the issue before it under the NLRB’s administrative res judicata doctrine. He also held in the alternative that the non-Board settlement agreement had extended the certification year. The Board adopted the AD’s opinion in April 1986 and ordered the Employer to bargain in good faith with the Union. When the Employer refused, the Board brought this enforcement action.
  II
  An employer cannot withdraw recognition from a certified union for a reasonable time — usually a one year period— even if the union no longer has majority employee support. Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 103-04, 75 S.Ct. 176, 181-82, 99 L.Ed. 125 (1954). If the employer withdraws recognition and refuses to bargain in good faith during the insulated certification year, the Board has the power to extend the certification period as a remedy for the § 8(a)(5) violation. NLRB v. All Brand Printing Corp., 594 F.2d 926, 929 (2d Cir.1979). The extended certification year remedy has also been applied to appropriate non-Board settlement agreements. See, e.g., id.
  Nothing in the settlement agreement here suggests that the parties intended bargaining for an extended certification year or for any particular time period. The settlement agreement states simply that the Employer will bargain with the Union upon demand. Nevertheless, we view a “silent” non-Board settlement agreement such as this one as extending the certification period for a reasonable time if (1) the agreement was surrounded by sufficient “formalities” or Board involvement or (2) the employer’s promise to bargain was a quid pro quo for the Union’s withdrawal of the § 8(a)(5) charge. Id. at 930-31. We examine each of these possibilities for extending the certification period.
  (1) Formalities
  If the settlement agreement is surrounded by “formalities” or Board involvement, courts consider the parties more likely to have intended the scope of the bargaining duty contained in their settlement agreement to satisfy the Board standard of a remedial time extension. See, e.g., NLRB v. Vantran Electric Corp., 580 F.2d 921, 924 (7th Cir.1978). Here the Board maintains that the parties’ settlement agreement was surrounded by formalities and Board involvement because it permitted the withdrawal of the charges and the vacatur of its prior decision. We cannot agree. Such a view essentially would convert every non-Board settlement agreement into an agreement “surrounded by formalities” whenever the agreement required the dismissal of § 8(a)(5) charges. That is to say, a union could never withdraw § 8(a)(5) charges pursuant to a non-Board agreement without converting that private settlement into a “Board-approved” settlement because every dismissal requires Board consent.
  This result runs counter to Congress’ aim of promoting stable work relations and prompt dispute resolution. Further, in past cases, the level of Board involvement we found to satisfy the formalities test was much higher than that which is presented here. For example in both All Brand, 594 F.2d at 930 and Straus Communications, Inc. v. NLRB, 625 F.2d 458, 463 (2d Cir.1980), the AD was informed of the terms of the settlement and conducted an on the record inquiry into the propriety of the settlement before accepting it. In contrast, the subject agreement was not seen by the AD before approving the dismissal of the charges.
  In addition, as the Board argues in its brief,
  “[i]f [it] perceived the need to intervene to protect the public interest, the appropriate time for such intervention was when the union requested it to withdraw charges and dismiss the complaint against the Employer. At that time the Board could have refused to dismiss the complaint unless the settlement agreement was amended to include a bargaining obligation for an extended certification year.”
  Vantran, 580 F.2d at 925; see also Straus, 625 F.2d at 464, n. 5. The Board’s decision to forego intervention therefore precludes a finding of Board involvement and leaves the interpretation of the settlement agreement primarily to the language and intent of the parties. As a consequence, the parties’ settlement agreement is not “surrounded by formalities.”
  (2) Quid Pro Quo
  When an employer’s agreement to bargain is the primary reason for a union’s withdrawal of its § 8(a)(5) charge, the exchange includes a duty to bargain for an extended certification year. See, e.g., Vantran, 580 F.2d at 924-25. When it is not, the intent of the parties is less clear and the burden is on the Board seeking enforcement to show that the scope of the bargaining obligation was broader than the literal language of the parties’ agreement. Id. at 925.
  Relying on Vantran the Employer argues that its agreement not to appeal the representation decision was the quid pro quo for the Union’s withdrawal of charges. In Vantran, the court held that the employer’s agreement not to prosecute a state court damage action against the Union was the controlling quid pro quo and, therefore, found that the parties did not contemplate an extended certification year. 580 F.2d at 925. Under this analysis, the Employer argues that its agreement not to appeal the Board’s earlier decision should be considered its primary concession and that accordingly the Union is not entitled to a time extension.
  While facially appealing, the Employer’s argument is inconsistent with our approach in Straus. In Straus we affirmed the Board’s finding that even though the employer did not explicitly agree to bargain in the settlement agreement, the nature of the concessions made by the employer indicated that the union would not have agreed to withdraw its pending charges without such a commitment. Id. at 464. The Board found that a duty to bargain was the implicit quid pro quo for the withdrawal of charges and that therefore the settlement agreement extended the certification year.
  Applying that view to the instant case, the Board found that the Employer’s agreement to bargain was the primary concession triggering a time extension because it concluded from the totality of concessions made by the Employer that the Union would not have withdrawn its charges without such a commitment by the Employer. There is no reason to disturb this factual finding of the Board. Of course, since the Employer has already bargained in good faith for nine and one-half months, the time extension triggered here obligates it to bargain, in good faith, only for the balance of two and one-half months.
  Ill
  Enforcement of the Board’s order is granted.
instruction: What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
  Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
  In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
  To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
  United States of America,
  Plaintiff, Appellant
  v
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendant, Appellee.
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendants, Cross-appellants
  v
  United States of America.
  Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
  of the Board
  Plaintiff, Appellants,
  v
  United States of America,
  Defendant, Appellee.
  This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
  Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
  If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
  Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.