opinion: PETERS, District Judge.
  Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for Puerto Rico adjudging the defendant guilty of violations of the Federal Firearms Act, 52 Stat. 1250, 15 U.S.C.A. § 902(e). The indictment contains two counts, one for transporting a firearm within the Territory of Puerto Rico, the defendant having been previously convicted of a crime of violence, i.e., aggravated assault and battery; and the other for transporting ammunition for firearms within the territory, after the same conviction.
  The defendant finds fault with the indictment on the ground that it does not charge him with an offense; claiming that transportation in interstate commerce is not charged by an allegation of transportation “in and within the territory of Puerto Rico”; and that in any event the Act should not be held to apply to transportation wholly within the territory, since Congress did not so intend, having established a Puerto Rican Legislature to legislate in such local matters.
  That the Act in question, like the White Slave Traffic Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 397 et seq., applies to transportation wholly within Puerto Rico, we have no doubt. See Crespo v. United States, 1 Cir., 1945, 151 F.2d 44.
  That the indictment sufficiently describes in each of the two counts an offense prohibited by the statute, is equally certain. The Act makes it “unlawful for any person * * * who has been convicted of a crime of violence * * * to * * * transport * * * in interstate * * * commerce any firearm or ammunition.” By § 1 of the Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 901 interstate commerce includes commerce “within any Territory or possession.”
  It is urged in behalf of the defendant that he could not be properly convicted of more than one offense because the ammunition he was charged with transporting was carried in the pistol which he was separately charged with transporting, and used with it when he shot a man named Marcano with three or four shots.
  This contention cannot be sustained. It is based on much the same reasoning as was advanced by the defendant in the Crespo case above mentioned, where several prostitutes were transported together. As we said in that case: “As to whether there is a plurality of offenses, ‘the test is whether, if what is set out in the second indictment had been proved under the first, there could have been a conviction; when there could, the second cannot be maintained; when there could not, it can be.’ ”
  The second count here is equivalent to a second indictment. It is clear that proof of transporting ammunition would not sustain a charge of transporting firearms, and vice versa.
  It is contended that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain a conviction. That contention is based partly on the fact that there was no evidence that either the pistol or the ammunition was brought into Puerto Rico in interstate commerce after the Act became effective. That was not important. It was not the introduction, covered by § 2(f) of the Act, that was involved, but the transportation solely. As to the transportation, the evidence is ample that the defendant, having the loaded revolver, traveled to the place where it was used arid proceeded to another place, having the revolver and a part of the ammunition — all in Puerto Rico.
  The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.
instruction: What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
  Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
  In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
  To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
  United States of America,
  Plaintiff, Appellant
  v
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendant, Appellee.
  International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
  Defendants, Cross-appellants
  v
  United States of America.
  Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
  of the Board
  Plaintiff, Appellants,
  v
  United States of America,
  Defendant, Appellee.
  This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
  Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
  If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
  Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.